Managing Chinese Threat

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 26 Oct 2011 23:47

rajrang ji,

I've read 120,000-150,000 Tibetans in India. So yes, I am in fact speaking of recruiting all able-bodied Tibetans there are. There are a lot more Tibetans where those came from, namely Tibet itself.

Varoon Shekhar · Post by **Varoon Shekhar** » 27 Oct 2011 02:33

RajeshA or anyone, do you know what the peak number of Tibetans in India ever was? Many of them have migrated to the US, Canada and elsewhere. One distant relative of mine said it was 1 million in the aftermath of the Chinese invasion, but that number doesn't sound credible(?).

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 27 Oct 2011 17:41

X-Posting from "Iran News and Discussions" Thread

shyamd wrote:According to the report, Iran recently tested a neutron initiator, which is used to detonate a nuclear bomb, at the Fordo nuclear site.

The report also notes that North Korea recently sold Iran an MCNPX 2.6.0 computer program that simulates the neutron and photon flows in nuclear processes.A NoKo team of engineers were in Tehran to train def ministry officials on the program

Interesting how China has undermined American influence and power by proliferating to all. Through nuclear NoKo it has put Japan and South Korea in the dock, through nukes for Pakistan it has won Pakistan's gratitude and stolen West's rentboy from them. By using the NoKos, they have proliferated to Iran, and thus brought Iran closer to China. By using Pakistan, they have proliferated to Saudis and thus brought Saudis closer to China-Pakistan-Axis.

Chinese sell the biggest weapons in the world - nukes to everybody, so the Chinese get to have the most loyal friends in the world! Americans in their efforts to try to contain proliferation look like saboteurs in the national interests of all these countries. The Pakis think the Americans want to steal their nukes. The Saudis too would think, Americans don't want to allow Pakistanis to give the Sunni Saudis any nukes. Iran thinks America is out to get it, as the Iran nuclear file has been so prominent.

So the Chinese have neutralized the Western influence simply by busting Western system of proliferation without much cost to itself.

It is here that India should rethink our own policies regarding proliferation. India has to step up and transfer nuclear weapon know-how to Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan and further if needed to South Koreans and Japanese. We have to make the Chinese suffer some of the inherent risks of nuclear proliferation as well including containment through nukes.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 27 Oct 2011 18:22

Military supplies are the thin end of the wedge.India should transfer at "fiendship rates" a host of eqpt. to nations threatened by China.The wares which they would be most interested in are Prithvi and B'Mos missiles-the latter only with Russia's permission,ALHs,MBTs (Tank-X,an excellent export prospect if we build about 100 and gift large part of them to friendly states),MICVs,and other eqpt. like spares,etc. for legacy Russian eqpt. We should also assist Taiwan in itss own military build up especially in designing and building/helping build for it a new sub deisgn as no nation is willingg to assist Taiwan in this matter.Thus far,we have done precious little in this regard,and barring some paltry transfers to IOR island states,our performance has been pathetic when compared with the Sino-Pakis who have done far better.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 27 Oct 2011 20:18

^+1

I said so a couple of years ago. India should supply all Indigenous products to Indic-alliance nations on discount prices. This include, but not limited to -

* Arjun
* Pinaka
* Akash
* LCA
* LCH
* Nag
* Prahar
* Indra
* Brahmos (with Russian permission)

While providing nuke-umbrella from India core.

Nowadays India is offering $1B+ credit lines to most of these nations. Why not make some of it military credit?

Another idea is to develop additional (division strength) corps from these regions as part of IA.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 27 Oct 2011 20:22

All in good times folks. Some of what is listed above has been already gifted. Some are in pipeline. Lets secure our borders first and then we will focus more on our allies.

rajrang · Post by **rajrang** » 27 Oct 2011 21:32

Philip wrote:Military supplies are the thin end of the wedge.India should transfer at "fiendship rates" a host of eqpt. to nations threatened by China.The wares which they would be most interested in are Prithvi and B'Mos missiles-the latter only with Russia's permission,ALHs,MBTs (Tank-X,an excellent export prospect if we build about 100 and gift large part of them to friendly states),MICVs,and other eqpt. like spares,etc. for legacy Russian eqpt. We should also assist Taiwan in itss own military build up especially in designing and building/helping build for it a new sub deisgn as no nation is willingg to assist Taiwan in this matter.Thus far,we have done precious little in this regard,and barring some paltry transfers to IOR island states,our performance has been pathetic when compared with the Sino-Pakis who have done far better.

Yes, give a wide range of military supplies at "friendship rates", except for Agni missiles which should be given free of cost. This is "personal" for the amount of harm PRC has done to India.

member_20029 · Post by **member_20029** » 28 Oct 2011 02:22

RajeshA wrote: Tibetans should come from Tibet itself to get their training in the Indian Army. During the training, the needs of them and their families should be catered to.

while your sentiment is noble, for India to train and prepare foreign nationals for modern regional-scale war is tantamount to a declaration of war against China. However, I do agree that Tibet and India should strengthen their diplomatic and military ties.

Throughout the 20th and 21th century, the weapons of war have been the currency of diplomacy. During the Cold War, the Rus handed out MiGs and Sukhois and T-55s and AKs. Now, the Chin/Pak/NoKo hand out nukes while the US gives F-16s and the like to whoever wants them.
the problem is that (with the notable exception of the BrahMos), India has no developed, combat-ready indigenous weapons system (missiles excluded). India can't barter much of anything with it's allies. The technologies that India has/is developing are either top-secret due to classified specs (Kanchan composite armor, per se) or aren't being mass produced.

THUS, as of now, we don't really have much "currency" when it comes to buying alliances.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 28 Oct 2011 03:20

param.karandikar wrote:
RajeshA wrote: Tibetans should come from Tibet itself to get their training in the Indian Army. During the training, the needs of them and their families should be catered to.
while your sentiment is noble, for India to train and prepare foreign nationals for modern regional-scale war is tantamount to a declaration of war against China. However, I do agree that Tibet and India should strengthen their diplomatic and military ties.

param.karandikar ji,

In one previous thread titled "Should HH The Dalai Lama be elected India's next President?" many here explored the idea of a per forma merger of Tibet in India through an Instrument of Accession signed by the Tibetan Government in Exile, a referendum among the Tibetan diaspora, and sealed by making the Dalai Lama India's President. It involved accepting Tawang region as South Tibet as the Chinese claim, but making a claim that the whole Tibet belongs to India, even if China happens to be in its possession.

The point was to tell China that the Tibet question is not settled. If the Chinese are willing to de-facto occupy a necessary historical geographical buffer between India and China, then India too is willing to make de-jure claims on the territory.

India can say, that we are not interested in armed conflict with China and would continue to try to solve the issue amicably.

Such an arrangement however does give India all the necessary free space to integrate Tibetans into India whichever way we like, including by recruiting them into Indian Armed Forces, not just those Tibetans in India but also those who are still in Tibet.

It is a bold move, perhaps a move nobody in power in India today would be in favor of making, but the idea needs to still be out there.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 28 Oct 2011 11:54

Published on October 28, 2011
By Jarius Bondoc
Philippine-Vietnam amity upsets China: The Philippine Star

No doubt China watched keenly Vietnam president Truong Tan Sang’s state visit to the Philippines this week. The two states are China’s briskest trade buddies in Southeast Asia. They are also its shrillest rivals for oil-rich zones in the South China Sea. This was highlighted anew when the Philippine and Vietnamese navies forged Wednesday an info exchange, and their coast guards a communication hotline.

China-Vietnam bilateral commerce grew 43 percent in 2010. In a Beijing trip in September President Noynoy Aquino projected to double Manila’s two-way trade to $60 billion by term’s end in 2016. Economics elates China; territorial feuds agitate it. A dozen times since March it has harassed Vietnamese and Philippine patrol, research and fishing craft in the sea it claims to own solely. Hanoi and Manila countered by reiterating their respective terms for the waters, the East (Vietnam) Sea and the West Philippine Sea. They also linked arms with ASEAN allies, including counterclaimants Malaysia and Brunei, to denounce China’s stoking of tensions. China looked like a neighborhood bully. In contrast, the four ASEAN counterclaimants appeared reasonable in setting aside disputes for the sake of regional amity.

Sang and Aquino’s call for full implementation of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the disputed sea all the more puts China on the spot. China had signed the accord with ASEAN in 2002. In the face of China’s frequent rows with the Philippines and Vietnam, the 10 ASEAN states now want the Declaration enforced via a Code of Conduct. China’s smug response — that it would deal separately with each counterclaimant — reinforces the bully image.

Sang echoed Aquino’s “rules-based approach” in the region. This means adhering to international law, especially the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. China is a signatory to it, but can’t bring itself to abide by the provisions. Vietnam and Malaysia in 2008 jointly had filed under the UNCLOS the extents and overlaps of their 200-mile exclusive economic zones. The following year China unilaterally declared the entire South Sea as its territory, via a map that delineates boundaries by nine hazy dashes. Singapore, the smallest ASEAN member, howled that China’s claim has no historical root. Indonesia, the largest member and present ASEAN president, demanded China’s basis for the nine dashes. No answer. Vietnam went on exploring for oil in the Paracel Isles just off its coast, and the Philippines in Recto Bank off the Palawan province. Both avoided their claimed Spratly islets. Still Chinese warships fired at a Vietnamese scientific vessel in the Paracels, and nearly rammed a similar Philippine boat in Recto Bank. The Philippines filed a complaint with the UN, and an appeal for UN arbitration of the maritime tiff. The bully was exposed to the world.

Sang signed last month with India a “strategic partnership” jointly to explore the Paracels. It came a day after the China visit of Vietnam’s Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong. Instantly Beijing fumed that the pact “would push China to the limit.” Ignoring the term Indochina, it said India has no business helping Vietnam search for oil in the South Sea since the two have no historical ties. Shrieked the Global Times, “China may consider taking actions to show its stance, and prevent more reckless attempts in confronting China.” The English language foreign-policy tabloid of the Chinese Communist Party’s official organ, People’s Daily, panders largely to ultranationalists. China has growing trade — and military competition — with India, with which it has waged border wars. But even the usually staid China Energy News, also under the People’s Daily, bellowed: “[India’s] energy policy is slipping into an extremely dangerous whirlpool.”

With China’s escalation of conflict, Vietnam conducted last June live-fire naval exercises in the Paracels. The Philippines called up its Mutual Defense Treaty with America, to which the latter responded by expressing readiness to abide by it and warning China to cool down. Last week the Global Times again fired a broadside, apparently to pre-empt Sang’s visit to Manila. Warning of war, it roared: “If these countries don’t want to change their ways with China, they will need to mentally prepare for the sounds of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the seas to be resolved.” The editorial was “grossly irresponsible,” Philippine foreign secretary Albert del Rosario shook his head. And the big bully is beginning to sound like little boy blue tooting his own horn.

It is good that newspapers all over Southeast Asia are exposing China's bullying attitude to all their people and outside world.

If India can get her military-industrial complex working, India would win the game of alliances hands-down in Southeast Asia.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 28 Oct 2011 15:57

Published on Oct 28, 2011
By Ishaan Tharoor
China and India at War: Study Contemplates Conflict Between Asian Giants: Time

Not surprisingly, it's in this remote corner of the world that many suspect a war could kick off, particularly around the historic Tibetan monastery town of Tawang. India has reinforced its position in Arunachal with more boots on the ground, new missile defenses and some of the Indian air force's best strike craft, new Russian-made Su-30 fighters. After decades of focusing its army west against perennial threat Pakistan, India is tacitly realigning its military east to face the long-term challenge of China.

The report speculates that China could make a targeted territorial grab, "for example, a bid to take Tawang." Further west along the LAC, another flashpoint lies in Kashmir.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Oct 2011 20:29

Nonsense article.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 28 Oct 2011 20:36

THey are creating fake scenario and images about India and China

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 28 Oct 2011 22:18

http://blog.american.com/2011/10/does-c ... r-arsenal/
Does China have a secret nuclear arsenal?

The extent of the tunneling was also hard to square with the supposedly small size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which is commonly believed to be in the range of 240-400 warheads. “So they’ve built 10 miles of tunnel for every warhead?” Mr. Karber recalls asking himself. “That doesn’t make sense; it’s kind of overkill.”
That thought prompted Mr. Karber to take a closer look at Western estimates of China’s arsenal. In the late 1960s, the U.S. military projected that China would be able to field 435 warheads by 1973. A straight-line extrapolation based on that assumption would suggest that China would have somewhere in the order of 3,000 warheads today. In 1984 the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that China would have 818 warheads by 1994 and more than 1,000 today. More recent reports in the Chinese media put the figure somewhere between 2,350 and 3,500, with an average annual warhead production of 200 over the last decade. By contrast, estimates by the Natural Resources Defense Council suggest that China’s arsenal peaked by about 1980 and has been more-or-less flat ever since.

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 29 Oct 2011 21:16

Manoj Joshi, writing in Mail today, wrote a very thoughtful article titled LESSONS FROM HIS TERRIBLE BLUNDER. This article is mostly about the blunders that George Bush did. But it had nuggets as far as India was concerned

The army has to carry out a restructuring and see whether it needs to shift its emphasis in different directions. For example, does it need 5,000 tanks which can only be used on the Pakistan border since an armoured thrust of any consequence, could trigger a nuclear war? Are the Special Forces that India has built up, merely super- infantry, or should they be more deeply integrated with intelligence services for special operations? Should India move towards air- mobile divisions which can play a role across mountain regions as well?

I dearly hope that somebody in MoD/GoI/PMO is reading this article.

What we need is to do is increase the strength, in both manpower and firepower, of ITBP. Its strength has to increase to about 7.5 lakhs to 10 lakhs and it should be patterned on US Marines form. For example in case of IA there is infantry which does the fighting and there are troops which support the infantry, but do not take part in actual fighting. But in case of US Marines each and every soldier is a fighter and takes part in fighting. For example US Marines hold on to the belief that "Every Marine is a rifleman". So every Marine, regardless of his actual job profile, undergoes training as a infantry soldier. This is not the case of IA or generally other armies.
The Indian Army on the other hand should raise at-least 3/4 air-mobile corps. Converting existing corps to air-mobile capability, say the 15th, 3rd and 4th corps, can be considered. Also what is needed is augmenting IAF strength to 50 squadrons. This will ensure that we will be able to airlift these 3-4 air-mobile corps into Tibet and East Turkestan where they can carry out deep operations against PLA. While ITBP will remain restricted to McMohan Line, it would provide the ultimate strategic reserve in case IA faces some catastrophic losses over the Tibetan Plateau or in the deserts of East Turkestan. Off course IA divisions air lifted into Tibetan plateau can be used to crush PLA troops deployed on McMohan Line from their back and front in one gigantic pincer movement.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 29 Oct 2011 22:01

^^^Can you please elaborate what will you do with Air-Mobile Divisions/Corps in the Sino-India scenario? Can you do a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation regarding the number and type of lift a/c required for a single air-mobile division?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 29 Oct 2011 22:31

CS, IA also has the concept Every soldier is a rifleman. Even the cooks.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 29 Oct 2011 23:36

Its best to take any thing Joshi writes with salt. His is a curious mix of analysis going haywire thanks to ideology taking sway. Eg the reference to tanks being unecessary, refs to n-war etc. The services professionals in public authorship often openly rebut what this fellow claims and writes. Rest is jargon for the sake of jargon.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 29 Oct 2011 23:46

Karan, the problem with these analyst is that they write stuff without thinking through and taking the arguments to their logical conclusion. Couple of high-sounding stuff and jargons here and there and thats all...you have you indepth analysis and recco for dealing with complex situation like possibility of two-front war.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 29 Oct 2011 23:53

Exactly. Journalism in India esp. defence journalism is the pits. Some of these "well known" types just jargon drop and think everything is A-ok. Here IA is coming up with a strategy to give India options without crossing n-threshold and the expert wonders why we need 5000 tanks (not that we even have so many). Mind you, if there is a conflict, he will be first to point fingers at IA for being unprepared etc etc. We don't have enough transports, light equipment as it is for regular formations, and he wants to suggest air mobile corps. And how will lightly equipped air mobile "corps" (corps mind you, not brigades even) hold ground against heavier units? Never mind, jargon, jargon! Rest is obvious stuff - eg SF with intel etc which has been long debated or wanted etc.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 30 Oct 2011 00:03

^^^I have seen the argument(s) about number of tanks before. What people don't realize that we need the number of tanks we have and then some more. Those armored and mechanized formations are the Iron Fist which will keep pukes in the check. And if ever, GOI feels the need to implement CSD, this Iron Fist will be at the forefront of the assault. They are the surest and best way to enforce the decision we want - from capturing land to destruction of PA.

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 30 Oct 2011 00:09

Posting in full, Dragon's Familiar Dance - Brahma Chellaney for India Today

As the 50th anniversary of China’s invasion approaches, history is in danger of repeating itself, with Chinese military pressures and aggressive designs against India not only mirroring the pre-1962 war situation but also extending to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the oceans around India. China’s expanding axis of evil with Pakistan, including a new troop presence in PoK, heightens India’s vulnerability in Jammu and Kashmir, even as India has beefed up its defences in Arunachal Pradesh.

By muscling up to India, what is China seeking to achieve? The present situation, ominously, is no different in several key aspects from the one that prevailed in the run-up to the 1962 war.

● The aim of “Mao’s India war” in 1962, as Harvard scholar Roderick MacFarquhar has called it, was largely political: to cut India to size by demolishing what it represented—a democratic alternative to China’s autocracy. The swiftness and force with which Mao Zedong defeated India helped discredit the Indian model, boost China’s international image, and consolidate Mao’s internal power. The return of the China-India pairing decades later riles Beijing.

● Just as the Dalai Lama’s flight to India in 1959 set the stage for the Chinese military attack, the exiled Tibetan leader today has become a bigger challenge for China than ever. The continuing security clampdown across the Tibetan plateau since the March 2008 Tibetan uprising parallels the harsh Chinese crackdown in Tibet during 1959-62.

● The prevailing pattern of cross-frontier incursions and other border incidents is no different than the situation that led up to the 1962 war. Yet, India is repeating the same mistake by playing down the Chinese intrusions. Gratuitously stretching the truth, Indian officials say the incursions are the result of differing perceptions about the line of control. But which side has refused to define the line of control? It speaks for itself that China hasn’t offered this excuse. The fact is that Chinese forces are intruding even into Uttarakhand—the only sector where the line of control has been clarified by an exchange of maps—and into Sikkim, whose 206-km border with Tibet is recognised by Beijing.

● The 1962 war occurred against the backdrop of China instigating and arming insurgents in India’s northeast. Although such Chinese activities ceased after Mao’s death, China has come full circle today, with Chinese-made arms increasingly flowing into guerrilla ranks in northeast India via Burmese front organisations. In fact, Pakistan-based terrorists targeting India also rely on Chinese arms.

● China’s pre-1962 psychological war is returning. In recent years, Beijing has employed its state-run media and nationalistic websites to warn of another armed conflict. It is a throwback to the coarse rhetoric China had used in its build-up to the 1962 war. Its People’s Daily, for example, has warned India to weigh “the consequences of a potential confrontation with China.” China merrily builds strategic projects in an internationally disputed area like PoK but responds with crude threats when others explore just for oil in the South China Sea.

● Just as India in the early 1960s retreated to a defensive position in the border negotiations after having undermined its leverage through a formal acceptance of the “Tibet region of China,” the spotlight now is on China’s revived Tibet-linked claim to Arunachal rather than on the core issue, Tibet itself. India, with its focus on process than results, has remained locked in continuous border negotiations with China since 1981—the longest and the most-fruitless process between any two nations post-Second World War. This process has only aided China’s containment-with-engagement strategy.

● In the same way that India under Nehru unwittingly created the context to embolden Beijing to wage aggression, New Delhi is again staring at the consequences of a mismanagement of relations. The more China’s trade surplus with India has swelled—jumping from $2 billion in 2002 to more than $30 billion now—the greater has been its condescension toward India. To make matters worse, the insidious, V.K. Krishna Menon-style shadow has returned to haunt Indian defence management and policy. India has never had more clueless defence and foreign ministers or a weaker Prime Minister with a credibility problem than it does today.

In fact, as it aims to mould a Sino-centric Asia, China is hinting that its real geopolitical contest is more with India than with the distant United States. The countries around India have become battlegrounds for China’s moves to encircle India. From a military invasion in 1962 and a subsequent cartographic aggression, China is moving towards a hydrological aggression and a multipronged strategic squeeze of India. China’s damming of rivers flowing from Tibet to India are highlighting Indian vulnerability on the water front even before India has plugged its disadvantage on the nuclear front by building a credible but minimal deterrent.

Whether Beijing actually sets out to teach India “the final lesson” by launching a 1962-style attack will depend on several factors. They include India’s domestic political situation, its defence preparedness, and the availability for China of a propitious international timing of the type the Cuban missile crisis provided in 1962. If India does not want to be caught napping again, it has to come out of the present political paralysis and inject greater realism into its China policy, which today bears a close resemblance to a studied imitation of an ostrich burying its head in the sand.

(c) India Today, 2011.

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 30 Oct 2011 00:25

I have not disagreed on the utility of the tanks that IA has. I have not highlighted that fact.

I have highlighted the fact that IA and IAF lack the capability to launch an airborne assault over the Himalayas into Tibet. For this IAF will need to have complete air-dominance over Tibet and East Turkestan. Only when this dominance is assured will we be able to airlift our divisions over the Himalayas into Tibet.

And even if we disagree on whatever the author says about insurgency and other actions of George Bush we should not loose track of the relevant point over here.

pgbhat · Post by **pgbhat** » 31 Oct 2011 07:39

PDF link.
A Consideration of Sino-Indian Conflict ---- Ali Ahmed

There is considerable interest in a possible conflict with China. However, little discussion exists in the open domain on conflict possibilities. This Brief attempts to fill this gap by dilating upon conflict scenarios along the spectrum of conflict. It brings out the need for limitation to conflict and the necessity for a grand strategic approach towards China as against a military driven one.

Altair · Post by **Altair** » 31 Oct 2011 15:49

*** Excerpts from Sardar Patel’s Letter to Nehru on China dt. 07 Nov, 1950 ***

My Dear Jawaharlal,

Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the Cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically 15 minutes notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers,I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.

I have carefully gone through (all) the correspondence…but I regret to say that neither of them (our Ambassador and the Chinese government) comes out well as a result of this study…The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professins of peaceful intentions. My own feeling is that at a cruicial period they managed to instil into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means.

There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence,the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama.

Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf.

.

…During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have been practically alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into the UNO and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa…In spite of this,China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism,perhaps mixed with a little hostility.

I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already …Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences.It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

With this background, we have to consider what new situation we are now faced with as a result of the disappearance of Tibet…Throughout history, we have been seldom worried about our North-East frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impregnable barrier against any threat from the North.

…We can therefore, safely assume that very soon they (Chinese government) will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into in the past. That throws all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet, in accordance with which we had been functioning and acting during the last half a century, into the melting pot.

…Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also.

…While our Western and North-Western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the North and North-East.

Thus for the first time after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on calculations of superiority over Pakistan. We shall now have to reckon with communist China in the North and North-East, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not in any way seem friendly towards us.

Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our Northern or Northeastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and tribal areas in Assam. They are weak from the point of view of communications.Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is an almost unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. Our contact with these areas is by no means close and intimate.

…I am sure the Chinese…would not miss any oppurtunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly their ambition. In my judgement, therefore,the situation is one in which we cannot afford to be either complacent or vacillating. We must ahve a clear idea of what we wish to acheive and the methods by which we should acheive it. Any lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or pursuing our policy to attain them is bound to weaken us and increase the threats.

Along with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. Hitherto,the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature etc.from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers in the East or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparitively easy means of access to Chinese communists, and through them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier.

…It is, of course, impossible for me to exhaustively set out all the problems. I have, however, given below some of the problems which,in my opinion, require early solutions, around which we have to build our administrative or military policy measures.

A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India, both on the frontier and internal security.
An examination of our military position and such re-disposition of forces as might be necessary,particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of di(s)pute.
An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of these new threats.
A long term consideration of our defence needs.
…
The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our Northern and Northeastern frontiers.
Measures of internal security in the border areas,such as U.P, Bihar , Bengal and Assam .
Improvements of our communications,road,rail,air and wireless in these areas and with the frontier outposts.
Policing and intelligence of frontier outposts.
The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
The policy in regard to the McMohan Line.

*** End of Excerpts ***

* This letter of Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel is excerpted from the book:”Makers of India’s Foreign Policy : From Raja Rammohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha” – by J.N. Dixit, published by India Today.

aditya · Post by **aditya** » 31 Oct 2011 20:57

Indian Army not ready for War with China

The army functions on a communications system developed in the 1970s that has negligible data transmission. "We are fighting fourth-generation warfare (insurgencies), preparing for third-generation warfare (conventional conflicts) with a Second World War mindset," says a general. Only two major weapon systems have been acquired since the Kargil war: over 1,000 T-90 tanks and Smerch long-range rockets from Russia. Meanwhile, its infantrymen lack lightweight body armour and modern helmets. The army officially admits that close to 80 per cent of its 3,500 tanks are not equipped with night-vision devices and hence cannot fight at night. The new T-90 tanks in the strike formations are protected by 1960s vintage air defence missiles.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Nov 2011 06:40

Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service By Frederic Wakeman Jr.

Publisher: University of California Press 2003 | 672 Pages | ISBN: 0520234073 |

The most feared man in China, Dai Li, was chief of Chiang Kai-shek's secret service during World War II. This sweeping biography of "China's Himmler," based on recently opened intelligence archives, traces Dai's rise from obscurity as a rural hooligan and Green Gang blood-brother to commander of the paramilitary units of the Blue Shirts and of the dreaded Military Statistics Bureau: the world's largest spy and counterespionage organization of its time.
In addition to exposing the inner workings of the secret police, whose death squads, kidnappings, torture, and omnipresent surveillance terrorized critics of the Nationalist regime, Dai Li's personal story opens a unique window on the clandestine history of China's Republican period. This study uncovers the origins of the Cold War in the interactions of Chinese and American special services operatives who cooperated with Dai Li in the resistance to the Japanese invasion in the 1930s and who laid the groundwork for an ongoing alliance against the Communists during the revolution that followed in the 1940s. Frederic Wakeman Jr. illustrates how the anti-Communist activities Dai Li led altered the balance of power within the Chinese Communist Party, setting the stage for Mao Zedong's rise to supremacy. He reveals a complex and remarkable personality that masked a dark presence in modern China--one that still pervades the secret services on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Wakeman masterfully illuminates a previously little-understood world as he discloses the details of Chinese secret service trade-craft. Anyone interested in the development of modern espionage will be intrigued by Spymaster, which spells out in detail the ways in which the Chinese used their own traditional methods, in addition to adapting foreign ways, to create a modern intelligence service.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 01 Nov 2011 11:07

Published on Oct 28, 2011
By Harsh V. Pant
Wary of China, Its Southern Neighbors Court India: YaleGlobal

China is too big and too powerful to be ignored by states in the region. But the states in China’s vicinity are now seeking to expand their strategic space by reaching out to other regional and global powers. Smaller states in the region are now looking to India to act as a balancer in view of China’s growing influence and America’s anticipated retrenchment from the region in the near future, while larger states see India as an attractive engine for regional growth.

To live up to its full potential and meet the region’s expectations, India must do a more convincing job of emerging as a credible strategic partner of the region. Neither India nor the regional states in East Asia have incentive to define their relationship in opposition to China. But they are certainly interested in leveraging their ties with other states to gain benefits from China and bring a semblance of equality in their relationships. Great power politics in the region have only just begun.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 01 Nov 2011 20:58

Prepare long-term against China, exhorts N.V.Subramanian.

31 October 2011: It is never easy to grade the importance of political will versus military strength. But they are perhaps equally consequential. India's political will must match military strength if it is to continue to rise peacefully. This is most essential in its fraught engagements with China.

The fiftieth anniversary of the 1962 Chinese aggression against India has just passed. Despite an outward calm in Sino-Indian relations, strategists are warning of another Chinese aggression. The latest to say that is the government think-tank, the New Delhi-based IDSA.

What IDSA says is not new. That China will set out to "teach India a lesson" again has been argued before, including by this writer. That it will do so before India has entirely risen, and thereby psychologically scar it, as it happened in the post-1962 period, has been analyzed previously.

This writer took the analysis further in a piece called "China syndrome" (16 September 2011) where he argued for India to open a second front in case of a Chinese aggression. Since it entered the realm of military planning, the details were deliberately concealed.

But the broad idea was spelt out.

The only way to deter China is to have a credible non-nuclear strategic second-strike option (the nuclear plans could be pursued independently).

There is no running away from this.

It is here that political will plays up more importantly than military capacity, and perhaps the first drives the second. How it works is rather simple. First, there ought to be the political will to win against China should it first aggress. This is not only critical to the long-term peaceful rise of India, removing China as a threat. But it is important as well for exorcising the ghost of the 1962 defeat.
To talk of peace from a position of strength is not the same as a puny state preaching the merits of pacifism.

India's China problem is that China keeps India forever on tenterhooks, whether it is by adding to Pakistani military capacities in PoK and legitimizing its occupation of that territory; or damming the rivers that flow into India; or making military incursions into Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh to contest their Indianness; or preventing UN proscription of Pak terror entities attacking India. This is over and above its policy of encircling and containing India with a nuclearized Pakistan and an Indian Ocean string-of-pearls strategy.

What India needs more than ever is a bold strategic plan to break out of Chinese containment and counter China at the heart of its central power, prestige and glory, and not necessarily at the peripheries. The IDSA speaks of a Kargil-like war very likely on the Indo-Tibet land border. This writer believes innovative China will attempt a skirmish at another place, perhaps at sea, simply in order to do something different, and to achieve bigger strategic goals than in 1962.

Which is why this writer has argued earlier that the Chinese skirmish may come in the Indian Ocean, both to rebuff India's claims in the region, and to warn off India's friend if not ally, the declining United States. Equally, the attack may come in the South China Sea, riding on China's resentment of the Indo-Vietnamese joint oil-and-gas exploration venture.

The point is, while it is important to know where all China may seek to "punish" India (and not just confine to a Kargil-type attack), it is equally necessary to prepare a counter-strategy. You could be bogged down in the semantics of whether or not China will attack, with there being equally plausible reasons to argue in favour of or against a prospective Chinese aggression. The sane way is to prepare a counter-attack strategy anyhow, and to make a plan that will so grievously hurt China that it will baulk from even thinking about "teaching India a lesson".

A counter-attack strategy is important for another reason. While deterring China in the short-to-medium term (and even long-term, why not?), it will permit India in the interim to build military capacities to put down Chinese aggression anytime, anywhere, without necessarily resorting to a strategic counter-strike. That may be reserved for further conflict escalation.

All of this requires long-term military thinking and planning, which inter-services rivalries may not permit. But political will is the primary requirement. The political establishment (which means the ruling dispensation, the opposition, the bureaucracy, etc) must come to terms with the fact that the present piecemeal way of dealing with China is perilous.

China only understands the grammar of force. Once it knows India won't permit another 1962, and will give as good as it gets, it will back off. At the least, this is a ten-year project.

But do we have the necessary political will for it?

More than fifty years after the humiliation of 1962, the answer is no.

Jarita · Post by **Jarita** » 01 Nov 2011 21:00

RajeshA wrote:Published on Oct 28, 2011
By Harsh V. Pant
Wary of China, Its Southern Neighbors Court India: YaleGlobal
China is too big and too powerful to be ignored by states in the region. But the states in China’s vicinity are now seeking to expand their strategic space by reaching out to other regional and global powers. Smaller states in the region are now looking to India to act as a balancer in view of China’s growing influence and America’s anticipated retrenchment from the region in the near future, while larger states see India as an attractive engine for regional growth.

To live up to its full potential and meet the region’s expectations, India must do a more convincing job of emerging as a credible strategic partner of the region. Neither India nor the regional states in East Asia have incentive to define their relationship in opposition to China. But they are certainly interested in leveraging their ties with other states to gain benefits from China and bring a semblance of equality in their relationships. Great power politics in the region have only just begun.

Paper from YaleGlobal - Interesting because Yale University was closely involved with the cultural revolution and propping up both Mao and Chiang Kai Shek.

aditya · Post by **aditya** » 02 Nov 2011 14:32

Army to recruit one lakh soldiers for China border

The central government has cleared a massive modernisation plan to recruit 1 lakh soldiers. The soldiers would be deployed along the Indo-China border over the next five years.

The move comes after increasing presence of Chinese troops along the border and reports of frequent incursions.

Sources said the defence ministry has approved a Rs. 64,000 crore military modernisation plan.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 02 Nov 2011 18:56

A good read:
Competition deepens in the South China Sea

Vietnam and the Philippines, likely emboldened by strategic commitments from Japan and India, are saying in no uncertain terms that they will not yield to pressure from China over unresolved territorial issues in the South China Sea. While their stand promotes American and regional power involvement in the dispute, they will need to tread carefully since the tides are in Beijing's favor.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 03 Nov 2011 12:45

Published on Nov 03, 2011
US should conclude Free Trade Agreement with India soon: Senator Joe Lieberman: Economic Times

"India, for instance, is another Asian great power that has experienced spectacular economic growth over the past two decades and lies outside the US treaty system," he said.

"But while India is modernising its military, it has notably not chosen to invest in the kind of anti-access, area-denial capabilities that China has prioritised. That is perhaps one reason why India's rise has not provoked the sort of anxieties in the region that have become associated with China," Lieberman said in his remarks at The Heritage, a Washington-based think tank.

He said the US needs to redouble efforts to move towards a Free Trade Agreement with India, starting with a bilateral investment treaty.

"... we must redouble our efforts to conclude a Bilateral Investment Treaty with India, with the clearly stated goal of concluding a full FTA with New Delhi before the decade is out," the Senator said.

Lieberman, the chairman of the Senate Homeland and Governmental Affairs Committee, said China's "new assertiveness" has only exacerbated concerns over its build up in the region.

He noted that China has of late stepped out of Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy of 'keeping a low profile', and 'hiding one's capabilities', to display an aggressive approach.

It has been "employing heavy-handed tactics in territorial disputes with a broad swath of its neighbours -- from the South China Sea to Arunchal Pradesh".

He said these actions have raised worrying questions, not just in Asia, but around the world about how China will exercise its influence as it grows more powerful in the years ahead.

"It is especially striking that these tensions between China and its neighbours have ratcheted up at the same time that cross-strait relations with Taiwan have settled down.

"This strongly suggests that the argument, once quite popular in Washington, that China's rise will be free of turbulence unless there is a flare-up over Taiwan is far too simplistic," he said.

Lieberman said the Obama Administration has pledged to push forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, which would liberalise trade with eight Pacific Rim countries.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 03 Nov 2011 12:51

Published on Nov 2, 2011
By Rajeev Sharma
India-China Tranquility Fading?: The Diplomat Blogs

Yet tensions are simmering between both nations over troop deployments along the LAC, suggesting the so-called tranquility of their unrecognized international border is fading.

Chinese state-controlled media has reacted angrily to the Indian military build-up along the LAC and, for the first time, China’s Chengdu Military Region has organized an Army-Air Force drill using live ammunition in an area 4,500 meters above sea level.

A Chinese language blog reported on October 21, under the heading “PLA’s Powerful Exercise: Lightning Hit Back at India’s Border Provocation,” that live ammunition war games were held soon after the Indian Army-Air Force Exercise along Rajasthan border. As China specialist D.S. Rajan noted writing for the South Asia Analysis Group, the blog suggested that MI-17 helicopters, F-10 fighter aircraft, 122-mm howitzers, two car- mounted anti-aircraft artillery groups and a large number of infantry fighting vehicles.

Also on October 21, a Chinese website published an extended article titled “India’s Border Blitz, Not to be Routine, with No Prior Notice to Beijing,” giving details of the Indian deployment along the LAC that is supposed to have used China’s strengthening of its troop deployment in Tibet as a “pretext.” It says that India has so far deployed 240 to 300 fighter aircraft, five mountain infantry divisions and one mechanized division in the eastern sector, including Arunachal Pradesh.

As Rajan also noted, the piece took special note of reports in the Indian media of the Indian government supposedly sanctioning deployment of Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles in Arunachal Pradesh. It described the move as the first time India would be deploying offensive tactical missiles against China, thus signaling a marked shift in the Indian military strategy vis-à-vis China from “defensive” to “offensive.”

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 03 Nov 2011 13:03

While it is welcome development that the GOI has approved the recruitment of 100000 men for the eastern frontier. It also needs to think in terms of developing a neval capability to operate in the south china seas.

It must unleash the naval construction immediately with the intention of building 150 frigates destroyers and at least 50 submarines by 2030 with at least 10 fleet carriers.

The up side of this naval construction will be that it will generate at least 5 to 6 lakh jobs in the shipyards of the country.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 03 Nov 2011 18:02

Manoj Joshi has made a very interesting point about "air-mobile" divisions,etc. A wonderful thought and stroke of genius,reminiscient of that great commander and adventurer,Gen.Bandiccoot and his Kargil misadventure.A former army officer,veteran of the Himalays,once told told me about how he deftly persuaded his GOC not to carry out an adventurous "hare-brained" plan of action about to be launched during a time of crisis with one of our neighbours.He detailed to his GOC how it would end in defeat for the very reasons given below.Fortunately for us the GOC was an astute general and avoided a catastrophe.

However,one must remember that wars are won by serious logistic planning and the support of these mountian-hoppin' troops will be a very formidable task indeed,when the infrastructure on our side is pathetic.Just imagine the immense task of airlifting all the neccessary war material across the high Himalayas into Tibet for example,what it would take in terms of aircraft and helo transport assets,and how we would be able to sustain such an effort in along-drawn out conflict,especially when the PRC have such good road and rail links into Tibet.As for airlifting our troops into Central Asia,how are we going to supply them too? Through Pak where NATO suppliy and tanker convoys are daily targets? Iran,or even from Russia?! We are only planning to acquire 16 heavy-lift helos (MI-26s or Chinooks) in the future and would need several dozen to be able to susatin such a campaign,plus at least 100+ C-130s and other heavy-lift aircraft on supply runs reminiscient of the Berlin airlift!

However I do advocate the idea of raising a number of mountian strike forces that can play hell with the enemy's vital infrastructure,by destroying his road and rail inlks,carrying out attacks aganst his bases and key installations,etc.These special forces can simultaneously carry out a string of attacks all along the enemy's front,deceiving him as to our intentions and making him spread his forces thin in such inhospitable terrain.Once achieved,one could then make a determined thruist into enmy territory (Tibet) and be able to support the thrust and hold ground gained .The recovery of lost ground in Aksai China and along the McMahoin Line,or even POK should be our goal.The liberation of Tibet would require something stupendous.

What we have to design and create are the mountain forces' equivalent of the "Desert Fox's" rapid strike forces in N.Africa and the British "Long Range Patrols".This would require these forces to have very capable air-mobile assets that could deploy fast moving armoured vehicles,supported by helos.One must study Carter's failed Iranian rescue mission and the US's successful hit on Bin Laden.

For his (MJ's) serious study,I recommend another great visionary plan in WW2 by that great commander,"Monty","Operation Market-Garden",otherwise known to all by another phrase...."A bridge too far".

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Nov 2011 20:10

Distorted Map: Chinese Envoy tells Indian journalist to shut up

Distorted map: Chinese ambassador tells Indian journalist to shut up

Sameer Arshad, TNN | Nov 3, 2011, 06.40PM IST
Distorted map: Chinese envoy tells Indian journo to shut up

NEW DELHI: A distorted Indian map showing parts of India in China and Pakistan led to an argument between Chinese Ambassador to India Zhang Yan and a journalist on the sidelines of a business session with Xinjiang governor at a New Delhi hotel on Thursday.

Zhang asked the journalist to "shut up" as he repeatedly questioned him about the map on the cover of a Chinese firm's brochure that showed Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh as part of China and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) as that of Pakistan . The heavy equipment manufacturing firm signed a $ 400 million business deal with the Gujarat government earlier in the day.

"This is not China...it is India. We have full freedom here. How can you ask a journalist to shut up, if he is asking you something,'' the journalist told Zhang.

The ambassador said the journalist "pushed, pushed, pushed" and that he repeatedly told him that it was a technical issue that would be sorted out. "We will handle this. We are working for friendlier ties with India...this will not help,'' said Zhang. "...we are handling this in a friendly way." Zhang said he raised the issue with the company. "So what can I do for you?"

The journalist said he just asked the ambassador for his comments and that he had no business to be agitated. The two were later seen shaking hands, as Chinese officials tried damage control with one of them asking the journalist "to sort this out in a friendly way".

Ministry of external affairs joint secretary Gautam Bambawale, who was present at the meet, said he drew Zhang's attention towards the map and that he accepted that it was wrong. "It is a private sector company (that has goofed up) and not the Chinese government."

Officials down played the issue; saying even Indian companies have made similar mistakes in the past and that it did not reflect Beijing's official position.

China, India's largest trading partner, claims sovereignty over parts of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh and calls it southern Tibet. It refuses to recognize the "imperialist" 1913 Shimla Convention under which Tibet ceded Tawang to India and regards its border with India -- the McMahon line -- as disputed.

The two countries have sparred over high-profile visits to Arunachal Pradesh asserting India's sovereignty over the region while New Delhi recently expressed its displeasure over Beijing's infrastructural projects and overall presence in PoK. Beijing has been issuing stapled visas to Kashmiris as part of its refusal to accept India sovereignty over Jammu & Kashmir.

PRC is a thug society that got a nation state. It does not know how to deal with outsiders. To add to the mix MEA is a bunch of clerks who kowtow to thugs. The MEA official should have walked out. Especially its the 50th anniversary of the 1962 Chinese aggression.

I guess they need a spine transplant.

BTW surprising that TOIlet is publishing this report. Maybe its not all that bad. They go potty when its Aman ka tamasha.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 03 Nov 2011 20:19

Self Deleted

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 03 Nov 2011 20:22

^^^

For some reason the Indian media is very hawkish towards the PRC. It is just that they are serving the interests of some one else. Whenever, the Indian media attacks the PRC.

Ramana Ji, It is that bad. The media in India represents every one but India's interests.

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 05 Nov 2011 21:07

Philip wrote:Manoj
For his (MJ's) serious study,I recommend another great visionary plan in WW2 by that great commander,"Monty","Operation Market-Garden",otherwise known to all by another phrase...."A bridge too far".

The airborne divisions managed to most of their key objectives. It is just that they were unable to relieved by regular troops, i.e. the Garden component of the plan. In WWII the airborne divisions did not have that much or armour or heavy armaments that they could carry with them. This was due to the limited air-lift capacity that they had. Capacity not in numbers but in the load the a plane could carry and drop.

For a more closer analogy, consider the air lift across the Himalayas. According to wikipedia a total of 6.5 lakhs tons was transported over a period of 42 months. At their peak they were transporting approximately 34 thousand tons per month in 1944. There were some 700 aircraft and the approximately 80 thousand personnel taking part in the operation. (Source = http://www.usaaf.net/ww2/airlift/airliftpg7.htm). The airlift was gradually scaled back as progress was made in recapture of Burma and also in US Advance in the so called island-hopping strategy. This was in WWII.

Modern Transport planes have made progress. Maybe we might not be able to airlift significant numbers of Arjun MBT and T-90s into the Tibetan plateau. But we can transport other armoured vehicles other light tanks.