Bharat Rakshak

The Saudi Arabia you encounter today wants these fires to be put out as soon as possible. In the meantime, it acts as if they don’t exist. As news from Syria and Gaza dominated global headlines, the conversation here focused on other matters. An ultramodern driverless metro, the world’s longest subway system, opened last week. Jennifer Lopez, in a plunging sequined body suit, headlined a fashion show/concert “ode to the female figure” put on in Riyadh by the Lebanese designer Elie Saab. Later this week, Hollywood’s glitterati are coming in for the Red Sea Film Festival. On Wednesday, Saudi Arabia won the right to host the 2034 soccer World Cup.


This, in a couple of nutshells, is today’s Saudi Arabia, as transformed with a firm hand by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

“Like China on steroids,” one diplomat quips.

“There is this sense that they don’t want anything to screw up the good things that are happening in their own country,” adds another.

Riyadh is disorienting. The conversations you have, the public interactions, images that come at you are so … normal. As if you were in Singapore, Seoul or Stockholm. Until you remember where you are: a film festival in a place where a decade ago cinemas were closed and public executions on Riyadh’s “Chop Chop Square” passed for mass entertainment. Forget about J.Lo. Saudi women, fashionably dressed, hair covered, slightly exposed or freely flowing, greet you at a hotel reception desk or sit next to you at a coffee shop or drive — that wasn’t possible in the fundamentalist version of Saudi Arabia.

“It could be seen as a provocation,” says Elie Saab Jr., the designer’s son and CEO of the fashion company, referring to last month’s fashion show. “But Saudi Arabia is on a mission. They want to change, and we are happy to contribute to that vision.”

“What has changed in this country? Everything,” says Mohammed Alyahya, the U.S.-educated senior adviser to the Saudi foreign minister, echoing what every ambassador and businessperson I meet here tells me. “We all thought it might take two to three generations. It was sudden and it worked. We have a leader in this country who is drawing on the energy of the ‘youth bulge’ to remake it.”

There is no other game in town than Washington. China helped broker the Saudi normalization deal with Iran and is looking to expand its influence. But it can’t come close to the hard and soft power that the U.S. has in the Middle East.

The other Gulf countries are effectively well-run city states. Saudi Arabia carries real bulk — and faces real challenges. MBS has to navigate his family and tribal politics and worry about resistance to his modernization plans. Saudi demographics are an advantage and a danger. The oil riches, vulnerable to swinging prices — at the moment on the way down — have to provide all these young people opportunities. Geography matters, of course, too. Iran, Yemen and the Levant are all nearby. Egypt, which had a brief fling with freedom in 2011, is big, poor, repressed and ripe for another explosion.

ricky_v wrote: ↑14 Jan 2024 14:05 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans- ... ary-guards
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Tanaji wrote: ↑20 May 2025 22:17 Resurrecting this thread…

How is it that Qatar has such an out of proportion influence in geopolitics compared to its size? They have even managed to insert themselves as mediators in the Ukraine war…

It cant simply be money. SA has more money and yet it doesnt have the same level of influence. I am aware that the Qataris have spent lot of money on propping up Al Jazeera but that cant be the only reason.. what gives?

The relatively quiet East Mediterranean appears to be boiling again, following the signing of a new agreement by Turkey and Libya on the delineation of their maritime borders. Ankara is once again pushing East Mediterranean littoral states—Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt—toward confrontation by asserting longstanding claims over the Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ) of Athens, Nicosia, and Cairo. Ankara is now actively fueling the fire.

In June 2025, Turkey raised tensions by submitting a new maritime map to UNESCO, challenging Greek authority over territorial waters and airspace in the Aegean. Simultaneously, it reiterated its opposition to Greece’s internationally recognized 12-nautical-mile zone, insisting on only six nautical miles. Ankara considers the Greek stance a violation of its national rights and a potential casus belli.


he latest friction concerns Ankara’s hydrocarbon exploration in contested Turkish Cypriot waters. Some sources claim Turkey is preparing military maneuvers to challenge Greek claims in the Aegean and East Med. While Athens and Ankara have held diplomatic talks, progress has been limited. In May 2025, Greek PM Mitsotakis stated that Ankara must withdraw its 1995 casus belli to participate in new EU defense funding mechanisms.

Turkey has also deepened its offshore involvement in Libya, eyeing oil and gas operations in contested maritime zones under the 2019 Turkey-Libya memorandum. A new MoU signed in October 2022 between Ankara and Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) grants Turkey exploration rights in Libyan waters. Discussions with Libya’s eastern government, led by General Haftar, are ongoing, raising pressure across the region.

Ankara insists the 2019 MoU is legal and warns of diplomatic or military repercussions if Turkish East Med claims are challenged. Greece has declared the MoU invalid and is engaging Libya directly. Libya’s House of Representatives plans to vote on the agreement soon. Greek naval presence off Libya is being considered.

Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus support Greece’s position, fearing Turkey’s expanding influence. Cairo has called on Washington to pressure Haftar’s parliament to block the MoU. Concerns are mounting over potential impacts on offshore investments and security in Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, and Israel.

Meanwhile, reports have surfaced of secret Turkey-Syria talks to define new EEZ boundaries post-Assad. A leaked letter from Turkish FM Hakan Fidan confirms coordination is underway for a maritime agreement with Syria, further cementing Turkish claims tied to Northern Cyprus.

A Syrian-Turkish deal would harm the interests of Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, bolstering Turkey’s maximalist maritime ambitions. It may also jeopardize the East Med Gas Forum’s collaborative energy efforts, potentially shifting regional energy dynamics and increasing geopolitical risk. While open conflict is not desired, it can no longer be ruled out.

Baikul wrote: ↑24 Dec 2024 08:47 X posting from Iran thread

Time to update this map.

Syria- Iran influence is now almost gone , close to zero. They have been supplanted largely by the Turks. With other players such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Israel and U.S. in the mix.

Gaza Strip - with the loss of Syria, Iran ability to send weapons and materials) to Hamas via a land route is severely curtailed. At the same time Hamas itself may take years to recover, it at all

Lebanon - Hezbollah, same as Hamas. Although Shia Hezbollah may still find more resonance with Iran

Iraq: what stands out is this fellow Shia country’s reluctance to give unqualified backing to Iran’s Syrian adventure. Unlike the previous time, Iraq refused to send their forces to support Assad without specific guarantees. Iran’s influence in Iraq is clearly not that of a master or possibly even an elder brother, but slowly becoming more a relationship between independent, friendly, nations.

Yemen: only a part of Yemen, the areas dominated by the Houthis can be said to be firmly with Iran. But at next they’re an irritating (but unrelenting) pinprick, every now and then launching missions at Israel and/ or other nations ships. At the same time, one can’t say that they have yet received the full force of Israeli regards.

Bahrain: with a 40-45 percent Shia population (remaining mostly Sunni) ruled by a Sunni dynasty, Iran’s relationship has always been turbulent, its influence exercised ‘through the people’ and through its Al Ashraf proxy. A footnote in the larger scheme of things.

This those greens areas outside of Iran are either entirely gone, or an paler shade.

Tanaji wrote: ↑11 Aug 2025 18:35 Israel has deliberately taken out a known Al Jazeera reporter saying he was a Hamas supporter. They have obviously put Al Jazeera on notice… a message is being delivered.

Mukesh.Kumar wrote: ↑09 Sep 2025 19:34 Israel seems to have attacked Hamas leadership in Doha, If this is true, then it's going to set the cat among pigeons. Let's see if the Gulf monarchies bridge their divide to stand up to Israel, or, they play along.

Israel launches attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar, blasts heard in Doha

Lisa wrote: ↑09 Sep 2025 21:38

Mukesh.Kumar wrote: ↑09 Sep 2025 19:34 Israel seems to have attacked Hamas leadership in Doha, If this is true, then it's going to set the cat among pigeons. Let's see if the Gulf monarchies bridge their divide to stand up to Israel, or, they play along.

Israel launches attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar, blasts heard in Doha

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtlv_UN3zok

Saudi opinion of Qatar.

uddu wrote: ↑10 Sep 2025 16:00 https://x.com/DrEliDavid/status/1965413524320227574
@DrEliDavid
On October 7 H×mas leaders in Qatar celebrated the massacre of Jews

Every single one of them in this video is now dead.

Ambar wrote: ↑11 Sep 2025 04:30 ..
False! IDF has no positive identification nor confirmation that they killed any Hamas leaders in Doha. Hamas said one of its members is dead and two are injured. ...

The most transformative Middle East developments often arrive unheralded. The Cairo-Riyadh estrangement is one such shift. Whispers of a fundamental dispute have burst into public view, fracturing one of the Middle East and North Africa's most pivotal alliances. This rupture, rooted in a clash of governing philosophies, is accelerating regional fragmentation.

The core tension is a philosophical clash between leaders. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 champions economic diversification and meritocratic reform—a direct challenge to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's model of top-down authority and military-dominated economics.

This divergence crystallized in practical policy. Saudi Arabia grew frustrated with what it perceives as Egypt's exploitation of Gulf generosity without meaningful reform. Between 2013 and 2019, Riyadh provided Cairo with approximately $25 billion in financial aid—a lifeline President Sisi admitted saved Egypt from "drowning." By 2023, however, Riyadh had completely shifted to a Saudi Arabia First policy, demanding economic reforms for further support. The contrast is stark: Saudi pursues aggressive privatization while Egypt's military-dominated economy has accumulated a crippling $168 billion in debt.

The relationship has transformed into instrumental leverage. Saudi Arabia holds existential cards over Egypt's fragile economy. An estimated 2.3 million Egyptian expatriates in Saudi Arabia send home billions in annual remittances. Remittances account for an estimated 44–61 percent of Egypt's foreign exchange reserves, primarily fueled by its expatriate community in Saudi Arabia—the largest Egyptian diaspora abroad. The "Saudization" program threatens millions of these jobs, and massive reversible Saudi investments hang in the balance as a coercive tool.

Despite a projected GDP growth of 4.7 percent for 2026, Egypt's economy remains fundamentally vulnerable. This renders it susceptible to Riyadh's leverage, demonstrated by its readiness to divert investment to Syria's new President Ahmed al-Sharaa despite Cairo's protests.

The dispute has paralyzed multilateral Arab collaboration. Egypt, historically the Sudanese army's closest ally, reiterated the "importance of preserving Sudan's national institutions"—a position directly opposed to the United Arab Emirates' call for excluding what Emirati state-linked commentators argued is a "Muslim Brotherhood-led army."

Most importantly, the Egyptian-Saudi conflict escalated through state-linked media campaigns. Egyptian influencers linked to intelligence fronts launched vicious personal attacks, including ethnic slurs, against the Saudi royal family and graphic insults targeting the crown prince. Saudi journalists responded in kind, with one reportedly linked to the Saudi crown prince predicting the end of President Sisi's rule and potential imprisonment by 2026. This public vitriol signifies a point of no return.

Beneath the immediate conflict lies a deeper ideological schism. MBS' modernization vision challenges the Nasserist model that has dominated Egypt for decades. Across youth-led Arab societies, Riyadh's pragmatic blueprint is overshadowing Cairo's nationalist discourse and even reshaping notions of Arab identity, with Saudis increasingly contending that Egyptians are not Arab per se but North African Arabic-speakers and as such can't claim, or wish, to lead the Middle East.

This confrontation signals a fundamental realignment. The erosion of cooperation fragments collective Arab action on critical issues from Gaza to Nile water disputes, accelerating regional conflicts into competing spheres of influence.

Japan is finalizing plans not to recognize Palestine as a sovereign state for the time being, following the lead of the United States, a staunch ally of Israel, government sources said.

The move is believed to stem from concerns that such recognition could negatively affect the situation in the Middle East, as well as Japan’s relationship with the United States, the sources said.

On Sunday local time, Australia, Canada and the UK announced their recognition of Palestinian statehood. Reports show that France, Andorra, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Malta, and San Marino also plan to recognize the State of Palestine at a high-level conference of the UN General Assembly on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine and the implementation of the two-state solution on September 22 or the previous day. This will further expand the ranks of UN member states - already more than two-thirds - that recognize a Palestinian state. An overwhelming majority view within the international community has already taken shape.

This new "wave of recognition" comes precisely from the US' traditional allies who had consistently obstructed this process.
...

As a crucial third party in the Israel-Palestine issue, the actions of the US severely hinder the realization of international calls for justice and the prompt achievement of a ceasefire. The strong consensus reached by the international community fully reflects that the "two-state solution" is not an option but a necessity; it is not a future possibility but a present reality. Relevant countries should reevaluate its Middle East policy, fulfill its international responsibilities, and make the right decisions that are accountable to life and history.

Canada, UK, Australia Recognize Palestine Amid Israel-Hamas War
Last updated
19 minutes ago
On September 21, 2025, Prime Ministers Mark Carney of Canada, Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom, and Anthony Albanese of Australia announced formal recognition of the State of Palestine to support a two-state solution and address the Gaza humanitarian crisis, where over 41,000 Palestinians have died since October 2023. The leaders cited stalled peace efforts and the need for Palestinian self-determination based on 1967 borders, while conditioning the move on excluding Hamas from governance and advancing elections. Israel condemned the decisions as rewarding terrorism, and Palestinian officials welcomed them as historic progress toward ending the occupation.

P resident Prabowo Subianto on Tuesday offered to send at least 20,000 troops as peacekeepers to Gaza to safeguard any future peace deal. Addressing the UN General Assembly, Prabowo said that the world's most populous Muslim-majority country wanted a peace that shows that "might cannot make right." "We believe in the UN. We will continue to serve where peace needs guardians -- not with just words, but with boots on the ground," he said. "If and when the UN Security Council and this great Assembly decide, Indonesia is prepared to deploy 20,000 or even more of our sons and daughters to help secure peace in Gaza," he said.

New 21-point peace plan (September 2025)

At the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025, the Trump administration circulated a revised, 21-point plan for Gaza to several Arab and Muslim nations. This proposal, detailed by outlets like The Times of Israel and Al Arabiya, reverses some of the most controversial elements of his earlier idea. Key components include:

Permanent ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal: The plan calls for an immediate end to hostilities, followed by a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza.

Release of all hostages: It mandates the unconditional release of all remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas.

No Israeli annexation: The U.S. would guarantee that Israel would not annex the West Bank, a reassurance that reportedly helped secure talks with Arab nations.

Future governance: Gaza would be temporarily administered by an international and Arab security force. A Palestinian committee under the Palestinian Authority (PA) would oversee day-to-day governance, with the PA eventually assuming full control.

Reconstruction: An international and Arab consortium would manage the reconstruction of Gaza over a five-year period.

Disarmament of Hamas: The plan is contingent on Hamas agreeing to disarm and transfer its weapons. Members who comply would be granted amnesty, while those who wish to leave Gaza would be given safe passage.

Current status and reactions

While Trump told reporters he believes a deal is "very close," obstacles remain. The plan faces challenges, including:

Disagreement between parties: Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu has publicly dismissed the idea of a Palestinian state as "sheer madness," while Hamas officials remain frozen in negotiations.

Arab nations' role: The plan relies heavily on the cooperation and potential military involvement of Arab and Muslim countries to manage security and governance.

Uncertainty over implementation: Critics and analysts question the feasibility of executing the plan and whether all parties will fully comply.

Ambar wrote: ↑28 Sep 2025 05:36 What did we really achieve by walking out during Netanyahu’s UN speech?