Bharat Rakshak

The Saudi Arabia you encounter today wants these fires to be put out as soon as possible. In the meantime, it acts as if they don’t exist. As news from Syria and Gaza dominated global headlines, the conversation here focused on other matters. An ultramodern driverless metro, the world’s longest subway system, opened last week. Jennifer Lopez, in a plunging sequined body suit, headlined a fashion show/concert “ode to the female figure” put on in Riyadh by the Lebanese designer Elie Saab. Later this week, Hollywood’s glitterati are coming in for the Red Sea Film Festival. On Wednesday, Saudi Arabia won the right to host the 2034 soccer World Cup.


This, in a couple of nutshells, is today’s Saudi Arabia, as transformed with a firm hand by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

“Like China on steroids,” one diplomat quips.

“There is this sense that they don’t want anything to screw up the good things that are happening in their own country,” adds another.

Riyadh is disorienting. The conversations you have, the public interactions, images that come at you are so … normal. As if you were in Singapore, Seoul or Stockholm. Until you remember where you are: a film festival in a place where a decade ago cinemas were closed and public executions on Riyadh’s “Chop Chop Square” passed for mass entertainment. Forget about J.Lo. Saudi women, fashionably dressed, hair covered, slightly exposed or freely flowing, greet you at a hotel reception desk or sit next to you at a coffee shop or drive — that wasn’t possible in the fundamentalist version of Saudi Arabia.

“It could be seen as a provocation,” says Elie Saab Jr., the designer’s son and CEO of the fashion company, referring to last month’s fashion show. “But Saudi Arabia is on a mission. They want to change, and we are happy to contribute to that vision.”

“What has changed in this country? Everything,” says Mohammed Alyahya, the U.S.-educated senior adviser to the Saudi foreign minister, echoing what every ambassador and businessperson I meet here tells me. “We all thought it might take two to three generations. It was sudden and it worked. We have a leader in this country who is drawing on the energy of the ‘youth bulge’ to remake it.”

There is no other game in town than Washington. China helped broker the Saudi normalization deal with Iran and is looking to expand its influence. But it can’t come close to the hard and soft power that the U.S. has in the Middle East.

The other Gulf countries are effectively well-run city states. Saudi Arabia carries real bulk — and faces real challenges. MBS has to navigate his family and tribal politics and worry about resistance to his modernization plans. Saudi demographics are an advantage and a danger. The oil riches, vulnerable to swinging prices — at the moment on the way down — have to provide all these young people opportunities. Geography matters, of course, too. Iran, Yemen and the Levant are all nearby. Egypt, which had a brief fling with freedom in 2011, is big, poor, repressed and ripe for another explosion.

ricky_v wrote: ↑14 Jan 2024 14:05 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans- ... ary-guards
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Tanaji wrote: ↑20 May 2025 22:17 Resurrecting this thread…

How is it that Qatar has such an out of proportion influence in geopolitics compared to its size? They have even managed to insert themselves as mediators in the Ukraine war…

It cant simply be money. SA has more money and yet it doesnt have the same level of influence. I am aware that the Qataris have spent lot of money on propping up Al Jazeera but that cant be the only reason.. what gives?

The relatively quiet East Mediterranean appears to be boiling again, following the signing of a new agreement by Turkey and Libya on the delineation of their maritime borders. Ankara is once again pushing East Mediterranean littoral states—Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt—toward confrontation by asserting longstanding claims over the Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ) of Athens, Nicosia, and Cairo. Ankara is now actively fueling the fire.

In June 2025, Turkey raised tensions by submitting a new maritime map to UNESCO, challenging Greek authority over territorial waters and airspace in the Aegean. Simultaneously, it reiterated its opposition to Greece’s internationally recognized 12-nautical-mile zone, insisting on only six nautical miles. Ankara considers the Greek stance a violation of its national rights and a potential casus belli.


he latest friction concerns Ankara’s hydrocarbon exploration in contested Turkish Cypriot waters. Some sources claim Turkey is preparing military maneuvers to challenge Greek claims in the Aegean and East Med. While Athens and Ankara have held diplomatic talks, progress has been limited. In May 2025, Greek PM Mitsotakis stated that Ankara must withdraw its 1995 casus belli to participate in new EU defense funding mechanisms.

Turkey has also deepened its offshore involvement in Libya, eyeing oil and gas operations in contested maritime zones under the 2019 Turkey-Libya memorandum. A new MoU signed in October 2022 between Ankara and Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) grants Turkey exploration rights in Libyan waters. Discussions with Libya’s eastern government, led by General Haftar, are ongoing, raising pressure across the region.

Ankara insists the 2019 MoU is legal and warns of diplomatic or military repercussions if Turkish East Med claims are challenged. Greece has declared the MoU invalid and is engaging Libya directly. Libya’s House of Representatives plans to vote on the agreement soon. Greek naval presence off Libya is being considered.

Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus support Greece’s position, fearing Turkey’s expanding influence. Cairo has called on Washington to pressure Haftar’s parliament to block the MoU. Concerns are mounting over potential impacts on offshore investments and security in Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, and Israel.

Meanwhile, reports have surfaced of secret Turkey-Syria talks to define new EEZ boundaries post-Assad. A leaked letter from Turkish FM Hakan Fidan confirms coordination is underway for a maritime agreement with Syria, further cementing Turkish claims tied to Northern Cyprus.

A Syrian-Turkish deal would harm the interests of Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, bolstering Turkey’s maximalist maritime ambitions. It may also jeopardize the East Med Gas Forum’s collaborative energy efforts, potentially shifting regional energy dynamics and increasing geopolitical risk. While open conflict is not desired, it can no longer be ruled out.

Baikul wrote: ↑24 Dec 2024 08:47 X posting from Iran thread

Time to update this map.

Syria- Iran influence is now almost gone , close to zero. They have been supplanted largely by the Turks. With other players such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Israel and U.S. in the mix.

Gaza Strip - with the loss of Syria, Iran ability to send weapons and materials) to Hamas via a land route is severely curtailed. At the same time Hamas itself may take years to recover, it at all

Lebanon - Hezbollah, same as Hamas. Although Shia Hezbollah may still find more resonance with Iran

Iraq: what stands out is this fellow Shia country’s reluctance to give unqualified backing to Iran’s Syrian adventure. Unlike the previous time, Iraq refused to send their forces to support Assad without specific guarantees. Iran’s influence in Iraq is clearly not that of a master or possibly even an elder brother, but slowly becoming more a relationship between independent, friendly, nations.

Yemen: only a part of Yemen, the areas dominated by the Houthis can be said to be firmly with Iran. But at next they’re an irritating (but unrelenting) pinprick, every now and then launching missions at Israel and/ or other nations ships. At the same time, one can’t say that they have yet received the full force of Israeli regards.

Bahrain: with a 40-45 percent Shia population (remaining mostly Sunni) ruled by a Sunni dynasty, Iran’s relationship has always been turbulent, its influence exercised ‘through the people’ and through its Al Ashraf proxy. A footnote in the larger scheme of things.

This those greens areas outside of Iran are either entirely gone, or an paler shade.