Frederic wrote:panduranghari wrote:From political thread in GDF
The dollar has lost its intrinsic value anyway.
https://econographics.files.wordpress.c ... lar-vs.jpg
The only natural good left to recapitalise the global economy is gold. Gold is a Giffen Good- anything which people buy in more quantity when the price is rising.
Saar, how is the intrinsic value of dollah (or for that matter, any currency) calculated? Could you please explain this in layman's terms to an economy neophyte?
I can try. But I am not that knowledgeable about it. I will try to explain it as I understand it.
In the wake of WWI (1914-1918) there was an international movement in Europe to return to the stability of fixed exchange rates between national currencies. But all of them had been inflated so much during the war that reestablishing the peg to gold at the pre-war price would have implied an overvaluation of currencies that would have led inevitably to a run on all the gold in the banking system, monetary deflation and economic depression. At the same time, they feared that raising the gold price would raise questions about the credibility of the new post-war regime, and quite possibly cause a global scramble into gold.
This "problem" with gold was viewed at the time as a "shortage" of gold. And so one of the stated goals of the effort to solve this problem was "some means of economizing the use of gold by maintaining reserves in the form of foreign balances. So to "economize the use of gold" meant to limit or reduce the use of gold.
Meanwhile, the United States had emerged from the war as the major creditor to the world and the only post-war economy healthy enough to lend the financial assistance needed for rebuilding Europe. And so even though the U.S. wasn't directly involved in the European monetary negotiations that took place in Brussels in 1920 and Genoa in 1922, it was acknowledged that any new monetary order was likely to be a U.S. centered system.
The Genoa negotiations were led by the English including British Prime Minister Lloyd George and Bank of England Governor Montagu Norman who proposed a "two-tier" system especially designed to circumvent "the gold shortage". The British proposal described a group of "center countries" who would hold their reserves entirely in gold and a second tier group of (unnamed) countries who would hold reserves partly in gold and partly in short-term claims on the center countries.
The proposal was named the "gold-exchange standard" (not gold standard).
The gold-exchange standard that officially came into being around 1926 (and lasted only about six years in its planned form) worked like this: The U.S. dollar was backed by and redeemable in gold at any level, even down to small gold coins. The British pound was backed by gold and dollars and redeemable in both, but for gold, only in large, expensive bars (like A 400oz LBMA good delivery bar).
link Other European currencies were backed by and redeemable in British pound sterling, while both dollars and pounds served as official reserves equal to gold in the international banking system.
Since only the U.S. dollar was fully redeemable in gold, you might expect that gold would have immediately flowed out of the U.S. and into Europe. At the beginning of the gold-exchange standard in 1926 the U.S. held 6000 tonnes of gold and by the beginning of Breton woods conference of 1945 they held over 20000 tonnes.
When you go to the shop and buy goods, you pay currency using say- your credit card. At some stage you settle your debt with the credit card company. In essence the credit card company is owing money to the shop where you bought goods from. The company settles its debt with the shop. The point is the balances have to be settled. Mostly in the same currency.
But because different countries use different currencies, we need another level of imbalance clearing. And that international level is cleared with what we call reserves. So, in essence, we really do have two tiers in the way we use money. We have the domestic tier where everyone uses the same currency and clearing is handled at the commercial bank level with currency. And then we have the international tier where everyone doesn't use the same currency and so trade imbalances tend to aggregate and then clear with what we call "reserves" (aka international liquidity) at the national or Central Bank level.
What are reserves? What are assets? These words are present in every balance sheet. In your own family, you will have reserves and you will have assets.
RBI has 2 reserves like every other foreign central bank (cB): 1. gold reserves and 2. foreign currency reserves.
They also have assets. Assets are claims against residents of your currency zone denominated mostly in your own currency. Reserves are either gold or claims against non-residents denominated in a foreign currency.
Reserves are the fundamental basis on which the basic money supply of a bank is borne, while assets are the balance sheet representation of the bank's extension of credit. Changes in the ratio between reserves and assets exert opposing influences on the ability of the system to expand.
The reserves are the base on which all bank money expands. CB money rests on CB reserves and commercial bank money rests on commercial bank reserves which are, in fact, CB money which is resting on CB reserves. Commercial bank like SBI hold assets which are in effect liabilities for the CB. This is because, SBI knows holding any asset of RBI is worth it because RBI backstops the system. When our public sector banks became GOI undertakings, it effectively meant- they won't default. The money you keep in that bank will be accessible when you need it. They guarantee access to money, they do not guarantee the value of that money. So you can see that the entire money system is built up from the CB reserves.
From an international perspective, if trade between the two currency zones was perfectly equal at all times, there would be an equal amount of rupees wanting to buy dollars and vice versa. But we don't live in a perfect world, so there's always more of one or the other which is why the exchange rates float. If, instead, we had fixed exchange rates, the CBs would be involved in equalizing the number of rupees and dollars being exchanged, and then the CBs would settle up amongst themselves using their reserves, which was how it was before 1971.
But even today, with floating exchange rates, the CB's still do get involved in what we call the "dirty float" to manage the price of their currency on the international market. This is essentially the same process as during fixed exchange rates except that they don't maintain an exact peg, but instead they let it float within a range that they deem acceptable. And the way they do that is essentially the same way they did it back in the fixed exchange rate system of Bretton Woods and before. They buy up foreign currency from their commercial banks with newly printed cash.
Or, if there's a excess of their own currency in foreign lands trying to get home, then they have to buy back their own currency using up their CB reserves. Which brings us to the makeup of a CB's balance sheet, most pointedly its reserves. And the take-home point here is the difference between finite and infinite from a CB's perspective.
From the perspective of a CB, its own currency is infinite while its reserves are finite. So if there's a shortage of foreign currency in its zone, it has no problem buying up as much as it wants with printed cash. In fact, theoretically, a CB could buy up foreign currency that is accumulating in its zone until the cows come home. On the other hand, if there's a excess of its own currency abroad, its buy-back power is finite and limited to the amount of reserves it stockpiled earlier.
So why do it? Why does a CB spend its precious reserves buying its own currency back from foreign lands? What happens if it doesn't? Currency collapse is what happens. If there's a glut of your currency abroad and you don't buy it back, the market will take care of it for you by devaluing your currency until it becomes impossible for you to run a trade deficit. And this is a painful process when the marketplace handles it for you because it not only collapses your trade deficit to zero, it also tends to bring your domestic economy to a standstill at the same time, a double-whammy.
And this is how the monetary system above scales up to the international level. While the commercial bank reserves (Cash) are good for clearing, redemption and credit expansion within a currency zone, only the CB reserves work in a pinch on the international level. And if the CB runs out of reserves, the currency collapses due to market forces and, therefore, the commercial bank reserve (Cash) upon which commercial bank money is expanded devalues, and so bank money, too, devalues. It is all stacked upon the CB reserves from whence the first bank money was born.
And as you can see above, the natural makeup of a CB's reserves is gold. But that changed in 1922.
Now when a Central Bank's finite reserves are ultimately exhausted in the international defense of its currency, its local commercial bank's reserves (Cash) are naturally devalued by the international market. And with the commercial bank reserves being what commercial bank deposits are redeemable in, so too is local money devalued.
But in 1922 they "solved" this "problem" with the introduction of theoretically infinite reserves. Theoretically infinite reserves can equal to infinite base money.
Of course it doesn't take a genius to figure out that infinite money expansion does not automatically translate into infinite real economic growth. And so we need to look at who, in particular, was the prime beneficiary of these newly infinite reserves.
In 1922 the Governor of the Bank of England which had around 1,000 tonnes of gold at the time (less than the Bank of France which had about 1,200 tonnes) proposed economizing the use of gold by declaring British pound sterling and U.S. dollars to be official and recognized reserves anywhere in the world. The "logic" was that dollars and pounds would be as good as gold because they would be redeemable in gold on their home turf.
The U.S. has run a trade deficit every year since 1975. Since 1971, the U.S. government has run its national debt up from $400B to $15,500B, and that foreign Central Banks buying this debt have been the primary support for both the relatively stable value of the dollar and the perpetual nature of the U.S. trade deficit.
But it wasn't always this way. Before 1971 the U.S. was running a trade surplus and the national debt level was relatively steady during both the gold-exchange standard and the Bretton Woods era. During the gold-exchange standard the national debt ranged from about $16B up to $43B. It increased a lot during WWII to about $250B, but then it remained below its $400B ceiling until 1971.
Another big difference during this timeline is the flow of gold. The U.S. experienced an uncontrolled inflow of gold from the beginning of the gold-exchange standard until 1952, and then a stunted outflow ensued until it was stopped altogether in 1971.
The real problem was and is - the monetary privilege that comes from the rest of the world voluntarily using that which comes only from US printing press as its monetary reserves. It was and is, "the outcome of an unbelievable collective mistake which, when people become aware of it, will be viewed by history as an object of astonishment and scandal."
Another angle which was apparent from the very beginning—was that of international lending. It basically worked except that the net international (trade) payment was an international loan. Remember that the U.S. was the prime creditor to the world following both wars. This may partly explain the inflow of gold payments that brought the U.S. stockpile up from 3,679 tonnes in 1920 to 20,663 tonnes in 1952. A dollar loan was the same as a gold loan and was payable in dollars or gold. But lent dollars returned to NY like lent pounds returned to London.
This is an excerpt from FOFOA
--------
Hello Victor,
The point of JR's excerpts is that the real threat to the dollar lies in the physical plane (real price inflation) rather than the monetary plane (foreign exchange market). The source of the price inflation will be from abroad and it will be reflected in the exchange rate, but the price inflation, not the FX market, is the real threat.
Imagine a toy model where the entire United States (govt. + private sector) imports $100,000 worth of stuff during a period of time (T). T repeats perpetually and, just to keep it real, let's say that t = 1 second, which is pretty close to reality. So the US imports the real stuff and exports the paper dollars. But the US also exports $79,000 worth of real stuff each second. So 79,000 of those dollars come right back into the US economy in exchange for the US stuff exports.
Now, in our toy model, let's say that the US private sector is no longer expanding its aggregate level of debt. And so let's say, just for the sake of simplicity, that $79,000 worth of international trade over time period T represents the US private sector trading our stuff for their stuff. And let's say that the other $21,000 worth of imports each second is all going to the USG consumption monster.
So the USG is borrowing $21,000 **from some entity** each second and spending it on stuff from abroad. This doesn't cover the entire per-second appetite of the USG consumption monster, only the stuff from abroad. The USG also consumes another $114,000 in domestic production each second, which is all the domestic economy can handle right now without imploding, but we aren't concerned with that part yet.
Now, if the **from some entity** is our trading partner abroad, then there is no fear of real price inflation. The USG is essentially borrowing $21,000 this second -- that our trading partner received last second -- and the USG will spend it again on more foreign stuff a second from now and then borrow it again. See? No inflation! The same dollars circulate in perpetuity, the real stuff piles up in DC, and the USG debt piles up in Beijing.
But what if that **from some entity** is mostly the Fed, and has been for two years now (and they are calling it QE only to make it sound like its purpose is to assist the US private sector)? If that's the case, then the fear of real price inflation is now a clear and present danger to "national security" (aka the USG consumption monster). Not so much for the private sector which is now trading our stuff for their stuff, but mostly for the public sector which trades only $21,000 in paper nothings, per second, for their stuff.
Under this latter situation, you now have $21,000 per second piling up outside of US borders and it's not being lent back to either the USG or the US private sector (which has stopped expanding its debt). It's either going to bid for stuff outside or inside of US boundaries.
The USG budget approved by Congress does account for this $21,000 per second borrowing, but it also assumes reasonably stable prices. If the general price level starts to rise faster than Congress approves new budgets, this creates a problem for the USG. It's not as big of a problem for the US private sector, since we are trading mostly stuff for stuff. If the cost of a banana rises to $1T, it will still only cost half an apple. But if you're relying only on paper currency to pay for your monstrous needs, real price inflation is an imminent threat!
FX volatility has more to do with the changing preferences of the financial markets. It is a monetary plane phenomenon on most normal days. But it will also show up when the price of a banana starts to rise.
When the USG cuts a check, it is drafted on a Treasury account at the Fed. Sometimes those funds are all ready to go in the account. Sometimes they are pulled (momentarily) from a commercial bank into the Fed account for clearing purposes. And sometimes the Fed simply creates them, adding a Treasury IOU to its balance sheet.
This latest Executive Order paves the way for the Fed to start stacking not only Treasury IOUs, but also Commerce Dept. IOUs, Homeland Security IOUs, State Dept., Interior, Agriculture, Labor, Transportation, Energy, Housing and Urban Development, Health and Human Services, etc… IOUs. Whatever it takes to keep the real stuff flowing in! If you think the Fed's balance sheet looks like a gay rainbow now, just wait!
But from a financial perspective, if you are stuck in dollar assets when real price inflation takes hold, you are going to want out. And the quickest way out is through the currency itself. So we could see a spike (outside of the US) in the price of Realdollars even as the dollar is collapsing against the physical plane and the USG is printing like crazy to defend its own largess! How confusing will that be to all the hot "experts" on CNBC?
The financial markets can cause dramatic volatility in the FX market, and vice versa. But that's all monetary plane nonsense. A small change in the physical plane might not even register at first in the FX market, especially if a financial panic is overpowering it in the opposite direction. But even if the dollar doubles in financial product purchasing power terms (USDX to 150+), that's not going to lower the price of a banana in the physical plane while the USG is defending its consumption status quo with the printing press.
Sincerely,
FOFOA
-------
The U.S. is now the world's premier debtor while it was the world's creditor back in the 30s. But in both cases the dollar currency is being continuously recycled while notations recording its passage pile up as reserves on which foreign bank money is expanded while the U.S. counterpart of reserves and bank money is not reduced as a consequence of the transfer.
If you print the currency that the rest of the world uses as a reserve behind its currency, that alone enables you to run a trade deficit without ever reducing your ability to run a future trade deficit. Deficit without tears it was called. For the rest of the world, running a trade deficit has the finite limitation of the amount of reserves stored previously and/or the amount of international liquidity (reserves) your trading partner is willing to lend you.
Another thing that happens is that, as the printer of the reserve, the rest of the world actually requires you to run a balance of payments deficit or else its (the rest of the world's) reserves will have to shrink, and its currency, credit and economy consequently contract. So to avoid monetary and economic contraction, the world not only puts up with, but supports your deficit without tears.
I mentioned Triffins dilemma before. It basically means national currency acting like an international currency causes problems between national and international objectives leading to severe market turmoil.
From Wikipedia
"In 1960 Robert Triffin testified before the United States Congress warning of serious flaws in the Bretton Woods system. His theory was based on observing the dollar glut, or the accumulation of the United States dollar outside of the US. Under the Bretton Woods agreement the US had pledged to convert dollars into gold, but by the early 1960s the glut had caused more dollars to be available outside the US than gold was in its Treasury. As a result the US had to run deficits on the current account of the balance of payments to supply the world with dollar reserves that kept liquidity for their increased wealth. However, running the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments in the long term would erode confidence in the dollar. He predicted the result that the system would not maintain both liquidity and confidence, a theory later to be known as the Triffin dilemma. It was largely ignored until 1971, when his hypothesis became reality, forcing US President Richard Nixon to halt convertibility of the United States dollar into gold, an event with consequences known as the Nixon Shock. It effectively ended the Bretton Woods System."
Basically he was recommending creation of SDR.
The USG was now relying on treasury to create new units of currency and Fed was buying it. To enable doing this they raised the debt ceiling, many times.
Here is the easy explanation as why - THE DOLLAH HAS LOST ITS VALUE-
The U.S. privilege which began in Genoa in 1922, and was so complicated that only one in a million could even fathom it in 1931 and 1960, became as clear as day for anyone with eyes to see after 1971. And so, to see it in real (not nominal) terms, we can very simply look at the percentage of our imports that is not paid for with exports. So simple, which might be why the government doesn't publish that number and the media doesn't talk about it. All you have to do is compare the goods and services balance (which is a negative number or a deficit every year since 1975) with the total for all goods and service imports.
That's comparing apples with apples. For example, in 1971 total imports were $60,979,000,000 and total exports were $59,677,000,000 leaving us with a trade deficit of $1,302,000,000. It doesn't matter what the price of an apple was in 1971, because whatever it was, we still imported 2.14% more stuff than we exported. 1,302 ÷ 60,979 = 2.14%.
A trade discrepancy of 2.14% in any given year would be normal under normal circumstances. You'd expect to see it alternate back and forth from deficit to surplus and back again as it actually did from 1970 through 1976. But it becomes something else entirely when you go year after year (for 36 years straight) importing more than you export. And that's the visualization of the U.S. exorbitant privilege at 1971.
Points to remember:
1. The U.S. exorbitant privilege peaked in 2005 (before the financial crisis) and is now on the decline, meaning it is no longer supported abroad.
2. The U.S. government (with the obvious assistance of the Fed) is now in defensive mode, defending that inflow of free stuff with the printing press.
3. The U.S. federal government budget deficit (DC's "needs" minus its normal revenue) **eclipses** the trade deficit by more than a 2 to 1 margin.
So what could possibly go wrong? The recession has already contracted the U.S. economy, all except the part that resides in Washington, DC. And just to maintain its own status quo (!) USG federal government needs to insure its national business of exporting empty containers at its present level.
What could go wrong? Prices! If the price of an apple doubles, what do you think happens to the price of a full container? Those of you who think we are due for some more price deflation in the stuff that the USG needs to maintain its status quo should really have your heads examined. Even Obama is winding up to pitch the whole ball of twine at the problem. He just delegated his executive power to print until the cows come home to each of his department heads. Here is the Executive Order -- National Defense Resources Preparedness:
"To ensure the supply… from high cost sources… in light of a temporary increase in transportation cost… the head of each agency… is delegated the authority… to make subsidy payment.
I hope this answers your question.