Bharat Rakshak

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Afghan President Hamid Karzai has given NATO an ultimatum. Angered by civilian casualties, he has said that Afghans will start regarding Western soldiers as occupiers if they continue to conduct airstrikes on private homes. Are German soldiers still welcome in Afghanistan

Rangin Dadfar Spanta: This is his final word on this matter, and it should be taken seriously. We have the impression that people in Washington have understood it. If nothing changes, sentiments among the population will start turning against NATO.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: There have recently been three deadly attacks on German soldiers and on General Daud Daud, the police chief of northern Afghanistan. Why has the situation there gotten worse?

Spanta: A network of the Taliban, al-Qaida and their Pakistani supporters are behind this. They are pursuing a new tactic after having been forced to give up a number of areas last winter. They're trying to hit senior figures.



SPIEGEL ONLINE: American special forces have taken out a number of Taliban leaders in the north. Who are the new attackers?

Spanta: Even if European countries refuse to acknowledge it, the resistance is now being orchestrated by terrorist centers in Pakistan, the Quetta Shura (editor's note: the innermost circle of Taliban leaders), the Haqqani network, the group of (Gulbaddin) Hekmatyar and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2 in the al-Qaida leadership. There are 40,000 madrassas -- or religious schools -- in Pakistan, and even if only a small fraction of them support the terrorists, the stream of new fighters is almost endless. There will only be peace in this region when this source has been dried up.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Can negotiations with the Taliban solve the problem?

Spanta: They could be helpful if Pakistan were willing to support the peace process. But that's not the case. Pakistan has a different strategy: The West is obviously weary and will soon withdraw. Then, in one or two years, Pakistan can finally move into Afghanistan and use it as a strategic area. That's what this is all about.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Did Pakistani leaders know that Osama bin Laden was hiding out in Abbottabad?


Spanta: I am convinced that top-level officials had been informed. Without institutional, state support, Osama bin Laden wouldn't have been able to hide in Pakistan for so long. A few years back, our intelligence chief gave General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president at the time, exact coordinates on where Osama bin Laden was staying. But Musharraf only ridiculed him. But now it has emerged that the information was only a few miles off from the place where bin Laden was actually found.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Should the Bundeswehr, Germany's military, stay or go?

Spanta: It's understandable that the Germans are discussing whether they want to keep on investing their money and the lives of their soldiers in this conflict. We view it as a common cause; we have the same goal. Though even my name is on the terrorist hit lists, I will remain here and fight for peace here in my homeland -- even if the others pull out.

Alarm bells have begun to ring in New Delhi after the US and European countries recently moved a draft UN Security Council resolution to separate the Taliban from al-Qaeda in the UN sanctions regime, which could make it easier to “de-list” entities in future.
The consolidated sanctions list under UNSC Resolution 1267 on the ‘al-Qaeda and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities’ as of now also contains India-specific groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, its key individuals, and the Jaish-e-Mohammed. They have been put down as al-Qaeda affiliates.

The political objective behind the move, sources said, is to aid the reconciliation process with the Taliban in Afghanistan after communication channels were established with some Taliban leaders. But India is concerned that this change could dilute the well-established UN sanctions regime.

The concern stems from the fact that the proposal on the table has a sunset clause, which conditions continuation of the regime to periodic reviews. This could mean that India may have to continuously provide fresh information to keep someone like Lashkar founder Hafiz Mohammed Saeed on the list.

The proposal has sparked a heated debate within the sanctions committee, which is made up of all 15 members of the UN Security Council.

India is not worried so much about the larger objective as about the manner in which these changes might be executed. Sources explained that splitting up the list would not be easy, given that these entities overlap in many ways on the ground. Presumably, the de-listing process in the Taliban list could be made easier for political purposes, and might conceivably be misused.

India has had problems getting entities listed under the 1267 regime, with China still to lift its official hold on proscribing JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar and LeT members Azam Cheema and Abdul Rahman Makki. China had even put a hold on listing Hafiz Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, but had to withdraw after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. Any break-up or dilution of the regime could provide more avenues for either delaying or denying immediate action on an entity.

While these are still early days in the debate, it is learnt that India has already warned against diminishing the impact of the sanctions regime. Resolution 1267 guarantees the most comprehensive collective action against terror entities.

Once designated by this committee, all states are required to freeze the assets of the individual or entity concerned, prevent entry or transit through their territories and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms and military equipment to any of these entities.

“The primary responsibility for the implementation of the sanctions measures rests with member states and effective implementation is mandatory,” states the Resolution, which was came about in 1999 but was given more teeth through a series of resolutions after 9/11.

Over the years, cases have been filed in various human rights courts, particularly in the European Union, against aspects of the sanctions regime. Courts, sources said, have often taken a sympathetic view on persons who are old or dead but continue to be on the list. An office of the ombudsman has been created within the 1267 sanctions committee to remove such persons from the list.

But clearly, many European powers want further “safeguards”.

The U.S. is asking the United Nations Security Council to distinguish between Taliban and al- Qaeda followers in enforcing sanctions, a bid to encourage Taliban reconciliation with Afghanistan’s government.
The U.S. mission to the UN has circulated two draft resolutions to council members that would split what has been a combined list of Taliban and al-Qaeda adherents subject to the travel ban and asset freeze imposed in 1999, according to three diplomats who spoke on condition of not being identified because the texts haven’t been made public.
The goal of adopting the measures on June 17 would be to send a message to the Taliban that they may escape sanctions by entering into negotiations with the government in Kabul, the diplomats said. Legal and political considerations have complicated efforts to remove selected members of the Taliban from the list in recent years, discouraging reconciliation, they said.
The sanctions list includes 138 Taliban members and 350 al- Qaeda individuals and organizations. The Afghan government’s preconditions for peace talks with the Taliban include a pledge by the Taliban to sever all ties with al-Qaeda.
“We support this step,” Zahir Tanin, Afghanistan’s ambassador to the UN, said in an interview. “It will give us more flexibility for success of the process, making it easier to get delisted by treating the two groups separately.”
Support Reconciliation
U.S. diplomats, who wouldn’t speak publicly about the initiative, said they’re seeking to adapt the sanctions regime to demonstrate support for Afghan reconciliation efforts.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai was in Islamabad today seeking the help of Pakistan’s leaders in pursuing peace talks with the Taliban, which has bases on Pakistani territory.
The visit comes two months after the governments agreed to form a commission to support a peace process. Concern over the rising U.S. debt has led to growing calls in Congress for the Obama administration to withdraw a substantial number of U.S. troops from Afghanistan beginning next month.
A Karzai-appointed Afghan peace council, which includes former Taliban officials, says it has opened secret contacts with the guerrillas.
The U.S. has about 97,000 troops in Afghanistan fighting alongside almost 50,000 soldiers from 47 other nations in an effort to degrade the Taliban in its southern Afghanistan stronghold while building up the central government’s ability to secure the country.
The troops have been there since the U.S. toppled the Taliban regime because of its support for al-Qaeda terrorists who planned the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.
Adoption of the resolutions would establish separate committees of the Security Council to enforce the sanctions, while extending for 18 months the mandate of the UN offices that monitor the lists and deal with delisting requests.
To contact the reporter on this story: Bill Varner at the United Nations at [email protected]

By July 15, President Obama will unveil a plan to reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan by upward of 30,000, but to withdraw them slowly under military guidance over 12 to 18 months, according to administration officials.

In sum, the quick exiters get the big 30,000 or so number, and the die-harders get one last year-plus at near full strength to weaken the Taliban.

Of equal import, he’s got to lay out a diplomatic strategy of containing and deterring extremism in Afghanistan by partnering with India, China, Russia, Pakistan, and even Iran. These are all states that can partner around their shared fear of Taliban religious extremism and the drug trade.

The empty words of Karzai

We believe, there is a genuine concern in Pakistan over the massive Indian engagement and presence in Afghanistan which definitely has specific objectives. The Indians are spending $2b in the name of reconstruction in Afghanistan and have established Consulates in cities along Pakistan border including in Jalalabad and Kandahar. Through these Consulates, India is indulging in spying activities and promoting acts of terrorism in FATA and Balochistan. Some of the extremist elements are enjoying Kabul’s hospitality and they visited India to meet their families there. In addition India has established a huge network of spies in other cities under the pretext of reconstruction activities and for the security of the staff. There is no check on their movement and interaction with the Afghan nationals who are being hired, trained, financed and then sent to Pakistan for acts of terrorism. As for his assertions about cross border attacks in Upper Dir and Bajaur,

A defining characteristic of U.S. and Western foreign policy during the Cold War and its aftermath before 9/11 was its failure to integrate counter-terrorism into strategic perceptions, policies, and goals. Terrorism was hived into a compartment of its own where it was not seen as a necessary part of a nation’s grand strategy and was attacked with a half-hearted combination of law enforcement, war-like actions, and turning a blind eye. Some argue this has changed since the pre-9/11, Cold War era, but there is room for doubt. Good evidence that Western leaders and bureaucracies are still locked in this Cold War approach lies in Afghanistan, where the operating assumption of the United States and NATO seems to be that all countries share the same strategic interest in ensuring Afghanistan becomes a secular, democratic and pro-Western state. This assumption - based on the error that two nations can have identical interests - has led the West to allow any and all nations to play a role in Afghanistan of their own choosing, a policy that will ultimately help undo Western interests there. The best example of the destructiveness of the “we’re all in this together” policy is the role India is being allowed to play in Afghanistan; indeed, when Islamists again rule in Kabul, they should send New Delhi a hearty thank you note.



When a suicide car-bomb was detonated near India’s Kabul embassy on July 7 – killing four Indian officials and more than 40 other people – the world was aghast (CNN-IBN, July 20). International sentiment was horrified further when “U.S. intelligence sources” said that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) supported the attack (Times of India, August 4). This reaction was predictable, but the more reasonable reaction would have been to ask: “Why did such an attack take so long to happen?” To ask that question would have been to recognize that the United States and NATO have allowed their Kabul surrogate, President Hamid Karzai, and the Indian government to use the supposedly selfless project of Afghan reconstruction as a tool with which to destroy one of the historic tenets of Pakistan’s national security policy.



How so? Well, since it inception more than 60 years ago, Pakistan’s government and military have, with reason, regarded India as a moral threat to the country’s survival. India defeated Pakistan in several wars - seizing East Pakistan, today’s Bangladesh, in 1971 - and acquired nuclear weapons long before Pakistan. Islamabad’s national security strategy, therefore, has been and is India-centric. It focuses on three core requirements: 1) an ability to place most of its military on the Indo-Pakistani border; 2) the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent (accomplished in 1998); and 3) the maintenance of a quiet western border with Afghanistan to give Pakistan a kind of strategic depth so it would not face a two-front war. These requirements were met until September 11, 2001; the next day, only the nuclear deterrent remained.



Immediately after 9/11, President Musharraf allied Pakistan with the United States and helped it and NATO remove the Taliban regime from power, thereby wrecking one-third of Pakistan’s national security strategy by dethroning a pro-Pakistan, Islamist, and Pashtun-dominated Afghan government and unsettling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Musharraf then sent military forces into the country’s tribal regions, where they were defeated by the Taliban and Pakistani Pashtuns. Finally, the Pakistani military’s prolonged operations in the tribal regions have so angered the never very pro-Islamabad Pashtun tribes that warfare between them and the army continues, a situation that has given birth to a Pakistani Taliban. This unrest has revived the Pashtuns’ long-dormant interest in seceding from Pakistan and creating a nation – called Pashtunistan - comprised of tribal lands straddling the border. Such an event would leave Pakistan as a narrow strip of territory that could not be defended against India.



Needless to say, none of these developments pleased Musharraf’s fellow general officers, but at least there has been a payback for Pakistan - $10 billion dollars in U.S. aid and the chance for Islamabad to buy a new generation of F-16s. Until recently it seemed certain that the United States and NATO would not stay in Afghanistan forever and that Pakistan’s western border could be quieted after they left.



The Indian government, however, recognized a key strategic, anti-Pakistan opportunity when it saw one and is trying – with President Karzai eagerly assisting - to permanently deprive Pakistan of a quiet western border. Since the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, India has been in the forefront of the Afghan reconstruction effort. India has now pledged about $1.2 billion in aid and is the fifth biggest donor after the United States, the UK, Japan, and Germany (khabrein.info, August 3). New Delhi also has deployed between 3,000 and 4,000 Indian nationals to Afghanistan to assist in road-building and other infrastructure projects (Indian Express [Mumbai], July 29).



In addition, Kabul has given New Delhi permission to establish an historically unprecedented Indian diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, with an embassy in Kabul, and consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat (Power and Interest News, March 23, 2007). Finally, New Delhi has created programs to inculcate pro-Indian views among Afghans, such as the provision of full scholarships for Afghan bureaucrats to train in India’s technical institutions and for Afghan students to attend Indian universities (Times of India, August 4).



Indian leaders and Karzai – who was schooled in India – have taken the high road, using rhetoric about India’s “no-strings-attached” activities in Afghanistan, identifying them as efforts to “fight terrorism” and bring a “pluralistic and democratic society” to Afghanistan (Indian Express, August 5). Indian commentators, however, have felt no need to disguise India’s strategic gambit as altruistic. Most gloat over India’s Afghan successes and some argue that because Pakistan supports the Taliban and al-Qaeda, India must field a far greater military presence in Afghanistan:



"Several hundred miles from New Delhi and Islamabad, India-Pakistan hostility is spilling over into another country – Afghanistan. Here the two countries are engaged in an unacknowledged bid for supremacy [in] their bilateral relationship with Afghanistan. For the moment, India seems to be winning this new version of the great game effortlessly" (The Hindu, November 9, 2003).



"Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is a global curse. The massive and callous July 7 blast outside the Indian embassy in Kabul … has exposed Pakistan’s hollowness and duplicity for orchestrating the nefarious act. … The Government of India was well aware about ISI’s deceitful maneuverings some months ago. No less a person than Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai had cautioned India about what was going to befall and mar Indian interests in Afghanistan. His assessment has proved correct. Pakistan has exhibited its classic example of hate-India relationship with gusto, and this time in a foreign country" (Asian Tribune, July 26).



Given the word “paranoid” seems to have been created for how New Delhi and Islamabad perceive each other’s intentions, the response of President Musharraf and the Pakistan government toward India’s actions in Afghanistan is not surprising – they view them as a mortal threat to Pakistan’s national security. “India’s motivation in Afghanistan is very clear,” Musharraf has said, “[it is] nothing further than upsetting Pakistan. Why should they [India] have consulates in Jalalabad and Khandahar? What is their interest? There is no interest other than disturbing Pakistan, doing something about Pakistan” (Asian Tribune, July 26). Musharraf also has claimed that Islamabad is “1,000 percent certain” that India’s diplomatic posts in Afghanistan are really bases for Indian intelligence to collect data about Pakistan and to provide paramilitary support for dissidents in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province. He also has said that the United States, India, and Afghanistan are trying to weaken Pakistan and its armed forces by conspiring to destroy ISI (Daily Times [Lahore], August 5; The News, August 4).



Adding substance to the fears of Musharraf and Pakistan’s general officer corps is the reality of Washington’s growing military and nuclear cooperation with India and its support for New Delhi’s regional assertiveness. The U.S. government has urged India “to assume greater responsibility as [a] stakeholder in the international system, commensurate with its growing economic, military, and soft power” (Asia Times, August 9). India has built a military airbase at Ayni in northwestern Tajikistan, a site within striking distance of Pakistan (Asianews.it, September 13, 2006).



Much of Pakistan’s media has agreed with Musharraf – paranoia about India often unites Pakistan’s very politically partisan newspapers – describing a “trilateral consensus between Kabul, Delhi, and Washington on Islamabad alone being the primary and near-exclusive troublemaker in Afghanistan” (The News, August 6). The Indian presence in Afghanistan, according to the anti-Musharraf Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, has resulted in “[Kabul] replacing Kashmir as the main area of antagonism [and] as the main area of [Indo-Pak] antagonism” (Asia Times, August 9). At the same time, a stridently Islamist newspaper has railed against “India’s malicious intentions against Pakistan … [and] its efforts [that] aim to sabotage Pakistan-Afghanistan relations” (Ausaf [Islamabad], July 31).



If Pakistan’s ISI was involved in the 7 July bombing in Kabul, it probably will not be its last participation in anti-Indian attacks in Afghanistan. The West often forgets that intelligence services – without exception – are responsible only to their own governments and for protecting their country’s national interests. Clearly, Islamabad’s military and civilian leadership have decided that India’s expanding and U.S.-sanctioned presence in Afghanistan is a serious threat to Pakistan’s survival. “The Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies,” wrote a commentator summarizing the Pakistani view, “are engaged in undermining Pakistan’s security from two fronts. They are busy using the Baluch card and the [Pashtun] militant card,” both of which feed what is for Pakistan an intolerable secessionist fervor in the country’s western border provinces. That commentator also claimed – probably correctly -- that Pakistan now believes it has no choice but to “play as clean as the world around it” (The News, August 6).



India’s strengthening presence in Afghanistan puts the Pakistani government and military – at least in a de facto manner – on the same side as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Pakistan’s Islamist Pashtun organizations. The latter well remember India’s long history of supporting Soviet barbarism in Afghanistan; the Afghan communist regime of Muhammad Najibullah; and the Northern Alliance’s war with the Pashtun Taliban. In fact, the Pakistani Taliban already has said that “India is an eternal enemy of the Ummah [Islamic community] and would be confronted after defeating the allied forces stationed in Afghanistan” (The News, August 5). While a decision to increase aid to Arab and Pashtun mujahideen will anger Washington and NATO, Islamabad will do so because it believes a pro-Indian government in Kabul, and the likelihood it would permit a permanent Indian presence in Afghanistan, poses an existential threat to Pakistan’s survival. Thus, the West’s lingering Cold War confidence that all nations can have the same interests in promoting peace and prosperity has crumpled in Afghanistan. It has, moreover, created a new venue for a possible confrontation between South Asia’s two paranoid nuclear powers.

Pakistan: According to a report in The Express Tribune, the government plans to urge local tribal elders and tribesmen in North Waziristan to form lashkars (tribal militias) to target al Qaida militants as well as the Tajik, Uzbek and Chechen militants hiding in the tribal agency. An unnamed Pakistani military official said US CIA Director Panetta and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani discussed the idea of facilitating the formation of pro-government tribal laskhars.

The anti-US and anti-Afghanistan insurgent syndicate led by the Haqqanis, however, will not be targeted. Islamabad's priority is to remove anti-Pakistan government militants from the area first. Another source said once Pakistan enlists the aid of the tribes, it will be easier for the army to drive the militants out of North Waziristan.

Comment: There is less here than the report suggests. The constitutional provisions governing the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas, of which North Waziristan is one, restrict the Army from operating freely in the tribal agencies, except by invitation, in the event of an insurrection and to defend the national borders. The tribal leaders already have the authority, working through the federal government's political agents, to invite the Army to operate or to form tribal militias. The major drawbacks are concerns about local autonomy and lack of organization, financing, weapons and training.

Musharraf used lashkars to help suppress anti-Pakistan groups in the agencies, but they usually tipped off the targets of federal operations. They all live together in the neighborhood under Pashtun hospitality customs.

The announcement of the plan is mostly for public relations purposes, but the exemption of the Haqqanis as targets proves the point that Pakistan has no quarrel with anti-Afghanistan groups who operate from Pakistan but otherwise cause no trouble for Pakistan. These groups include Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Moreover, a crackdown on the large Afghan Pashtun population in Pakistan risks causing even more unmanageable internal instability.

The intense U.S. focus on the south has meant that there are about 38,500 troops in that region, compared with 31,000 in eastern Afghanistan. But those in the east have borne a disproportionately high share of casualties in recent months, and some territory held by the Afghan government has fallen back into Taliban hands after U.S. troops pulled out of their small outposts. By concentrating more on the east, U.S. military officials hope to confront the cross-border flow of Taliban and Haqqani network fighters who operate from Pakistan’s poorly governed tribal districts. The higher priority would mean more intelligence capabilities, such as surveillance drones, as well as more Afghan soldiers for the region.“It’s the last place we will be fighting,” a senior U.S. military official said, speaking on the condition that he not be identified by name. “And the Afghans will be fighting there in perpetuity. It’s a bad neighborhood.”
The problems in the east start with Pakistan, whose tribal border districts have long provided refuge for Afghan insurgents. Fighters for the Taliban, as well as al-Qaeda and the Pakistani group Lashkar-i-Taiba, can move from Pakistan into places such as Konar province, which has cultivated a toxic mix of fighters in remote mountain valleys. U.S. military commanders recognized last year that they were likely never going to have enough troops to pursue a strategy built around protecting the Afghan population.

The US has established contacts with Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar to negotiate an end to the conflict in Afghanistan, a media report said on Tuesday.
Abdul Haqiq, a former Afghan Taliban spokesman who used the alias Mohammad Hanif, played a key role in helping Washington reach out to Mullah Omar, The Express Tribune newspaper quoted a source as saying.

Several claims have been made so far by the US about negotiations with the Taliban but Islamabad and Kabul were never taken into confidence over the talks, the report said. The US reportedly offered the Taliban control over southern Afghanistan, leaving the north for other political forces under American influence.

However, this was rejected by the Taliban. "The acceptance of such a proposal could not be possible for the Taliban as it could lead to the disintegration of Afghanistan," said former Inter-Services Intelligence chief Hamid Gul.

The death of Ilyas Kashmiri continues to remain a mystery and as per agencies in India, he is still alive since there is no credible confirmation regarding his death. Two weeks back, news had broken out stating that Ilyas Kashmiri was killed in a drone attack. Barring the Harkat-ul-Jihadi, no other agency including the United States of America were able to confirm the news and it remains a status quo till date.
Indian agencies when contacted say that there are three aspects to the news relating to Ilyas Kashmiri. Following the David Headley revealations at the Chicago court, the heat was on Kashmiri. Moreover the United States of America too had made it clear that after the death of Osama Bin Laden, the man most wanted on their list was Kashmiri. The US had also gone to the extent of telling Pakistan to act against Kashmiri.
Once this directive was given to Pakistan, the ISI found itself in an extremely difficult situation since they could not afford the death of another high profile terrorist after Osama Bin Laden. Pakistan following the death of Laden has already been facing the heat from terrorist groups. The death of Kashmiri at the hands of US forces would have only meant that the retaliatory measures would have been terrible for Pakistan.
According to Indian agencies the death of Kashmiri appears to be a rumour either floated by the ISI or Kashmiri himself. Had the US drones killed Kashmiri, they would not have hesitated to declare it since it would have been another feather in their cap in their war on terror.
Both the ISI and Kashmiri were aware that the US were closing in on him. Hence the best way to have avoided any such onslaught was to float such a rumour regarding his death.
At first it was believed that the ISI may have killed him. This could have been easily true considering the fact that Kashmiri has been saying that the Al-Qaeda has managed to infiltrate into the Pakistan army which ultimately resulted in the success of the Mehran attack. However the intercepts now trickling in suggest that the plan to eliminate Kashmiri was called off and the ISI managed to force a truce with the man. Indian agencies feel that the truce between the two would have dealt with outflow of information and Kashmiri could have been told to remain silent. In addition to this, Kashmiri is still an important man for the ISI since he is the one who trains new cadres who can carry out precision attacks.
This prompted Kashmiri himself to float the rumour regarding himself stating that he was dead. Through his parent outfit HuJI, he attempted to confirm the news to the rest of the world. Although none were sure of this, the heat surely died down and resources were spent in confirming the news than tracking him down. This gave him ample time to change his hideout.
Indian agencies say that this is for the second time Kashmiri and the ISI managed to hood wink the world. Similar news regarding his death had emerged a couple of years back too. However at that time even the US forces made the mistake of confirming his death only to realise that he was alive and had very well managed to change his base.
According to the intelligence bureau, deaths of high profile terrorists at the hands of the establishment is nothing new. The ISI tends to eliminate persons who start generating heat which ultimately falls on Pakistan from the rest of the world. There are two more similar instances regarding the death of terrorists. Shahid Bilal of the Hyderabad twin blasts fame was eliminated by the ISI when it was realised that his hiding in Pakistan was doing no good for them. Although the father of Bilal confirmed his death after seeing photographs of Bilal on the internet, the case is not the same for Riyaz Bhatkal, the Indian Mujahideen big wig. There was a claim that he was killed by members of the Chota Rajan gang, but till date there is no confirmation either from our own agencies nor from Pakistan. Indian agencies say that these are the types of games that the ISI plays in a bid to reduce heat. It is extremely difficult to get such things confirmed since Pakistan has a lot at stake either to confirm or even deny the news.

However the intercepts now trickling in suggest that the plan to eliminate Kashmiri was called off and the ISI managed to force a truce with the man. Indian agencies feel that the truce between the two would have dealt with outflow of information and Kashmiri could have been told to remain silent.

ravi_ku wrote:Is there a Irani angle involved in this? Is the US thinking that Quetta Shura can used in Iran?

Rudradev wrote: You see, the main motivation of TTP in fighting the TSPA/ISI is that TSPA/ISI is supporting the US in Afghanistan. If US withdraws from Afghanistan after a negotiated settlement with Taliban, which gives Taliban control over part or all of Afghanistan... then TTP has no more reason to fight. They can join in the Taliban victory and share in the spoils.

ravi_ku wrote:

Rudradev wrote: You see, the main motivation of TTP in fighting the TSPA/ISI is that TSPA/ISI is supporting the US in Afghanistan. If US withdraws from Afghanistan after a negotiated settlement with Taliban, which gives Taliban control over part or all of Afghanistan... then TTP has no more reason to fight. They can join in the Taliban victory and share in the spoils.

I dont think this will happen. Would you(Pakjab) allow someone(Pakiban) a share in the spoils if they have actually worked against you?

Mahendra wrote:

ravi_ku wrote: I dont think this will happen. Would you(Pakjab) allow someone(Pakiban) a share in the spoils if they have actually worked against you?

It is in the green colour

If bangladeshis can cheer for PackeE-Colis barely a few decades after being raped and pillaged then in the greater interest of Khilafat anything is possible.

Frederic wrote:Rudradevji,

*How does the PNS Mehran attack tie into this Mullah Omar scenario? Even if we go by your earlier hypothesis that the burning of the Orions was just for show and effect, something did happen on that night?

Best Regards
Fred

ravi_ku wrote:

Rudradev wrote: You see, the main motivation of TTP in fighting the TSPA/ISI is that TSPA/ISI is supporting the US in Afghanistan. If US withdraws from Afghanistan after a negotiated settlement with Taliban, which gives Taliban control over part or all of Afghanistan... then TTP has no more reason to fight. They can join in the Taliban victory and share in the spoils.

I dont think this will happen. Would you(Pakjab) allow someone(Pakiban) a share in the spoils if they have actually worked against you?

In December 2009, President Obama sent an additional 30,000 troops to confront the growing violence in Afghanistan. Though the impact of the U.S. military and diplomatic surge continues to remain uncertain for the present, we can nevertheless conclude that 2010 had been by far the most violent year in the decade-old conflict.

The Taliban’s response, however, was a surge of its own, which it launched through bold attacks and targeted assassinations of senior Afghan government officials. Those efforts have clearly had an impact on the ground.

The last three decades in Afghan history are filled with violence. Indeed, Afghans are now tired of this violence and want to live in peace. They want to live in a country where their children can go to school and live a normal life.
The process of reconciliation has become an important demand of Afghans, and most are convinced that the only way to end this bloody conflict is through a political settlement with the Taliban.

Clearly, there are some who claim this bloodbath should continue till the defeat of the Taliban, but their arguments are divorced from the reality. There are also signs that the Taliban wishes to engage in dialogue.

The Afghan government has taken the initiative and created a 70-member High Peace Council. The HPC has become the body leading reintegration and reconciliation efforts, and its mandate is to reach out and engage with the Taliban.

Nonetheless, what is desperately needed is a home for the Taliban, from which to represent themselves and open channels for transparent face-to-face interaction.

From the outset, coordination of efforts by the international community has been a major challenge in Afghanistan. Governments and major international organizations have always acted on their own interests and policies rather than the demands of the Afghan people.

Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the International Security Assistance Force, described the posture of the international community vis-a-vis the political process as “reconciliation tourism.” This insinuates that most influential players on the ground are busy establishing contacts with the Taliban. As a result, there is much confusion about the process and its direction.

There are countries that see a political settlement in Afghanistan as an opportunity for an early exit. So, naturally, they have redirected their efforts. But the question they are not asking is: Shouldn’t Afghans be taking a leading role in any future settlement?

What makes matters worse is that many countries lack an understanding of the complex process and the players involved. Their actions are not well-thought-out. A case in point is the high-level meetings that were held in Kabul with a “shopkeeper.”

The most important advantage of establishing a home for the Taliban would be to combine the reconciliation efforts currently under way into one channel. There are currently several players wishing to play the role of a facilitator and uniting these efforts could contribute to a more successful process.

Second, many speculate about what kind of Afghanistan the Taliban aspire to live in. The Taliban’s clear concern has been against foreign forces. What about human rights, education and other important issues? It’s time to find out. This reconciliation process can help clarify that.

Third, different groups carry out various acts across Afghanistan, and at the end most of these acts are attributed to the Taliban. It must be noted that there are actors who take advantage of and misuse the identity of the Taliban. Representation of the Taliban can specifically put an end to this.

Fourth, it is estimated that around 35 percent of the schools in southern Afghanistan are closed. In addition, there are areas in Afghanistan where the implementation of a simple vaccine poses a grave danger for the beneficiary. A coordinated effort that reaches consensuses with the Taliban can tackle these issues, and humanitarian assistance can be delivered to the people who are in urgent need.

Lastly, if the Taliban is provided a home and treated in an acceptable manner, the Afghan government and the international community can hold it responsible for specific behaviors and demand an explanation for its actions.

2011 is a crucial year for Afghanistan. The international community can continue with more of the same, which will lead to further violence and loss of innocent lives, or embark on strategic thinking by supporting a home for the Taliban. Naturally, the choice is clear for the Afghans.

Zaeef was the former ambassador of the Taliban to Pakistan and author of My Life With the Taliban. Karzai is the director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) in Kabul. Both are active supporters of a peace process in Afghanistan.

ravi_ku wrote:I also have a doubt, the afghan leadership of taliban has been decimated. Only NWFP/ Pakistani leadership of taliban remains, i.e. the taliban from being a afghan protege of Pak became a Pak protege itself. What are its affects? Would the durranis/western afghans accept this leadership?

Posted on June 16, 2011 by Vicky Nanjappa

Photo caption: Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama Bin Laden. Photo courtesy: http://barcelonavsmachesterunited-road.blogspot.com/
Although it was a well known fact, the news has been made official today- Ayman al-Zawahiri has been chosen to lead the dreaded Al-Qaeda as per the posting on a jihadi website called Ansar al Islam.

The death of Osama Bin Laden had left a vaccum in the Al-Qaeda. Although they were very sound when it came to execution and operations, what they lacked was a idelogical figure to whom people could look up to. This gap will now be filled in by Zawahiri.

Zawahiri like Bin Laden will continue to focus his resources on the United States of America. However the lurking danger is that he would want to carry out something spectacular in a bid to announce his arrival.

Indian agencies point out that the Al-Qaeda has never been much of a worry for India since the ISI has always ensured that the likes of the Lashkar-e-Tayiba focus its resources on the Indian soil. However despite the Al-Qaeda not carrying out any attack on the Indian soil, the inspiration for the Indian jihadi has always been this outfit and never the Lashkar. During the recruitment process in India, videos of Al-Qaeda operations especially the 9/11 attack would be shown. During the interrogations conducted on several terrorists in India, the revealation has always been that Bin Laden is their biggest inspiration as they believe that he took on the mighty US single handedly.

Although Zawahiri has made it clear that jihad against the US would continue despite the death of Laden, Indian agencies suspect that he may try and play a role in Kashmir, the next biggest thing for jihadi factions after the US. Zawahiri may not try and stage a big attack against the US at the moment, since he is very high on their wanted list. Moreover the think tank within the Al-Qaeda would have advised him to go slow on the US at least for the time being.

Zawahiri is not new to the job and this take over cannot be considered as sudden. Although Laden was the face of the Al-Qaeda, he had taken a back seat for the past five years thanks to a falling out with Zawahiri. According to the Indian agencies, Zawahiri had side lined Laden as he felt that the latter did not have the resources to finance the group any longer. Although there was no major war of words between the two of them, Laden had been told by Zawahiri to lie low and not involve himself too much with the outfit. Laden’s health was failing and there was so much heat on him that it had become virtually impossible for him to move about. Hence it was a known fact that Zawahiri would be the next in line.

With this take over, the structure of the Al-Qaeda would appear a bit changed. Under the directions of Zawahiri, newer tie ups had been formed. The 313 brigade was given absolute control over the trainings wing of the Qaeda while the Haqqani Network was roped in for the job of operations.When one looks at these two wings, it is clear that both have a keen interest in Kashmir since their leaders started out their battle over there. This gives one the suspicion whether Zawahiri may also permit the Al-Qaeda to play a bigger part in Kashmir.

Moreover what has also been worrying the Indian agencies is that the recruitments for the Al-Qaeda have been taking place on a large scale from India and all this was with the blessings of the new leader.

The new leader although not as charismatic as Laden, does enjoy a lot of clout within the outfit. The very fact that he became their undisputed leader is a testimony for the same. However the worry for the Al-Qaeda would be whether he would be able to rope in the new faces into the outfit. He is a powerful speaker, but he will try and go the Laden way to ensure that he too is viewed as a hero like Laden was in the jihadi circles, Indian agencies also point out.

Praveen Swami

Al-Zawahiri under pressure to establish power over jihadists

PHOTO: AP

NEW HELMSMAN: Al-Qaeda, which has suffered a mortal blow in the death of Osama bin-Laden at the hands of the U.S. special forces, has selected its long-time No. 2, al-Zawahiri, to succeed him. In this file photo, al-Zawahiri (left) and Osama are seen at Khost in Afghanistan.

NEW DELHI: India could be one of several new theatres targeted by al-Qaeda's newly-appointed chief to establish his authority over the jihadist group and its allies, intelligence sources say.

The appointment of Osama bin-Laden's long-standing lieutenant to lead al-Qaeda was made public on Thursday, in a three-page online communiqué, which announced “the undertaking of responsibility of the amir [supreme leader] of the group by Sheikh Dr. Abu Muhammad Ayman al-Zawahiri.”

Perceived by many within the jihadist leadership as aloof, even arrogant, the 1959-born former Egyptian surgeon is under intense pressure to demonstrate that al-Qaeda has survived bin-Laden's killing by the United States special forces last month.

Long-standing problems between the Egyptian jihadist circles led by al-Zawahiri and their Yemeni and Saudi counterparts, though, mean he could turn to Pakistani jihadists to execute his plans. Fakir Muhammad, a top jihadist commander who has repulsed multiple military campaigns to retake his strongholds in northwest Pakistan's Bajaur agency, is among al-Zawahiri's closest allies.

Hatred against India runs deep amongst Pakistan's Islamists, and targeting it could prove a means for leaders like Fakir Muhammad to win domestic legitimacy, as well as draw cadre away from organisations that have been reined in by Pakistan since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, like the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Fears that al-Qaeda will choose India as a theatre to expand have been mounting since last summer, when al-Zawahiri's former deputy released an audiotape claiming responsibility for the 2009 bombing of a café in Pune.

“I bring you the good tidings,” al-Masri said in the audiotape, “that last February's India operation was against a Jewish locale in the west of the Indian capital [sic.].”

Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani jihadist, reported — but not proven —to have been killed in a drone strike earlier this year, was announced to have set up a special unit to stage the Pune bombing and future strikes.

Al-Zawahiri was among the first international jihadist leaders to mention India, writing in a manifesto published in 2001 that his cadre had “revived a religious duty of which the [Muslim] nation had long been deprived, by fighting in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya.”

The theme was taken up by bin Laden himself in 1996, when he issued a declaration condemning “massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Pattani, Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.”

Later, in September 2003, al-Zawahiri again invoked India to warn Pakistanis that their President, General Pervez Musharraf, was plotting to “hand you over to the Hindus and flee to enjoy his secret accounts.”

Thursday's communiqué is believed by experts to have followed a meeting of al-Qaeda's 10-member General Command, though it is unclear whether its scattered members communicated through couriers or cast their votes online.

The statement also called on “the Muslim people to rise and continue resistance, sacrifice and persistence [until] full and anticipated change comes, which will not be achieved except by the Islamic nation's return to the law of its Lord.”