What is it when it comes to former "CIA officers" and Pakistan? How come they always proffer opinion and solutions that are the exact opposite of what should be done (even from strictly an American interest point of view)?
Here is Bruce Riedel in today's LA Times. He is, of course, not just a "former and long time CIA officer" but also a supposed South Asia expert, and an "advisor to four presidents" and is also currently a senior fellow at Brookings.
Riedel asks these two fundamental questions:
Pakistan is playing a complex double game in Afghanistan. What is not clear from the (Wikileak) documents is why and how we came to this point.
and proceeds to give his answers, which are fabulously foolish:
1). "In poll after poll, Pakistanis say they do not believe America is a reliable ally. They are right." And this low opinion of America in the Paki mind is mainly because in the past the US supported dictators, instead of democracy, and because there were some moments of pause in an otherwise nonstop decades long giving of aid from the US taxpayers to Pakistan. That is it. Fix these two problems, and the Pakis will start loving America.
2). "...doubts persist in Pakistan that the United States is in for the long haul, and the doubts are strongest in the Pakistani army, which has little confidence in America." And why is the Paki army having such little confidence in USA?
Why, because "It repeatedly has relied on American arms to fight its wars, only to find the arms supply cut off
when it's most needed." So, lesson learnt, as per Riedel, is that stopping arms supply to the Pakis for starting the 1965 war was wrong, and that the Pakis, when they start a war, and thus when they need the arms supply the most, should not be let down anymore by the US.
3). So, to fix this:
"There are several things America can do now to help strengthen Pakistan's young democracy and wean it from playing both sides. The first is to follow through on our commitments. Pakistan desperately needs helicopters and other military equipment to fight the extremists within its borders, and we must help meet that need.
The U.S. should have no illusions about Pakistan; it is our most important ally in the war with Al Qaeda, but it is also our most difficult ally. We need to be open-eyed, but we also need to be consistent."
In all of this, what is noticeable is that (a) Riedel is totally nonjudgmental about the ill-motives or ill-actions of the Paki army. As far as he is concerned, all the blame lies with past US policies; and (b) since this is the case, then all the obligations on future course of action also lies with the US. The Pakis, and the Paki army needs to correct nothing.
If there is a reason why the US is losing in AfPak, and why that US Air Force base in Dover is unfortunately getting ever so busier, is because the US is acting on idiot advise and policy formulations such as this.
With Pakistan, being consistent is key