Bharat Rakshak

ramana wrote:After the Gauri missile failure one can expect the imminent Noko missile test to be postponed till failure analysis is conducted. On the other hand, maybe Pakis made so many changes to NoDong to get to Hatf-5 that its not relevant to the NoKos.

ArmenT wrote:

ramana wrote:After the Gauri missile failure one can expect the imminent Noko missile test to be postponed till failure analysis is conducted. On the other hand, maybe Pakis made so many changes to NoDong to get to Hatf-5 that its not relevant to the NoKos.

I presume you are referring to this test planned by the NoKos soon:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20636671

Anujan wrote: At the very top of the money and influence chain, borders dont exist for RAPEs.

Anujan wrote:No I am serious.

During the past decade, there have been notable shifts in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, away from minimum deterrence to second strike capability and towards expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal to include both strategic and tactical weapons. Islamabad has described these developments as “consolidating Pakistan’s deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum.” These shifts are apparent from the following developments:

(1) There is a deliberate shift from the earlier generation of enriched uranium nuclear weapons to a newer generation of plutonium weapons.

(2) This shift has enabled Pakistan to significantly increase the number of weapons, which now appears to have overtaken India’s nuclear weapon inventory and, in a decade, may well surpass those held by Britain and France.

(3) Progress has been made in the miniaturisation of weapons, enabling their use with cruise missiles, both air and surface-based (Ra’ad or Hatf VIII and Babur or Hatf-VII respectively) as also with a new generation of short range and tactical missiles (Abdali or Hatf II with a range of 180 km and Nasr or Hatf-IX with a range of 60 km).

(4) Pakistan has steadily improved the range and accuracy of its delivery vehicles{except Hatf-5 perhaps}, building upon the earlier Chinese models (the Hatf series) and the later North Korean models (the No-dong series). The newer missiles, including the Nasr, are solid-fuelled, which are quicker to launch than the older liquid-fuelled versions.

Not under safeguards

This rapid development of its nuclear weapon arsenal has been enabled by the setting up of two plutonium production reactors at Khusab with a third and fourth under construction. These have been built with Chinese assistance{It is my understanding that though the French did not supply a re-processing plant in the 70s, some significant ToT had already taken place before the contract was terminated} and are not under safeguards. The spent fuel from these reactors is reprocessed at the Rawalpindi New Labs facility, where there are reportedly two plants each with a capacity to reprocess 10 to 20 tonnes annually.

Olli Heinonen, a former Director of Safeguards at the IAEA has observed: “Commissioning of additional plutonium production reactors and further construction of reprocessing capabilities signify that Pakistan may even be developing second-strike capabilities”.

These developments are driven by a mix of old and new set of threat perceptions and, equally, political ambitions. The so-called existential threat from India continues to be cited as the main driver of Pakistan’s nuclear compulsions. The rapid increase in the number of weapons is justified by pointing to India having a larger stock of fissile material available for a much more numerous weapons inventory, thanks to the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear agreement. Tactical nuclear weapons are said to be a response to India’s so-called “Cold Start” doctrine or its suspected intention to launch quick response punitive thrusts across the border in case of another major cross-border terrorist strike.

Pakistan’s strategic objective has been expanded to the acquisition of a “full-spectrum capability” comprising a land, air and sea-based triad of nuclear forces, to put it on a par with India.

However, the focus on India has tended to obscure an important change in Pakistan’s threat perception which has significant implications. The Pakistani military and civilian elite is convinced that the United States has also become a dangerous adversary, which seeks to disable, disarm or take forcible possession of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

This threat perception may be traced to the aftermath of 9/11, when Pakistan, for the first time in its history, faced the real prospect of a military assault on its territory by U.S. forces and the loss of its strategic assets. In his address to the nation on September 15, 2001, President Pervez Musharraf justified his acquiescence to the U.S. ultimatum to abandon the Taliban and support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, on account of four over-riding and critical concerns — “our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets and fourth our Kashmir cause.” Pakistan once again became a “front-line state,” this time in the U.S. war on terrorism in Afghanistan in contrast to the U.S.-led war against the Soviet forces in that country in the 1980s. But this time round, Pakistan became an ally by compulsion rather than by choice.

While the immediate threat to its strategic assets passed, Pakistan’s suspicions of U.S. intentions in this regard did not diminish and have now risen to the level of paranoia. The American drone attacks against targets within Pakistani territory and, in particular, the brazenness with which the Abbotabad raid was carried out by U.S. Navy Seals in May 2011 to kill Osama bin Laden, have only heightened Pakistan’s concerns over U.S. intentions. These have overtaken fears of India, precisely because the U.S. has demonstrated both its capability and willingness to undertake such operations. India has not.

Recent shifts

Thus the recent shifts in Pakistan’s nuclear strategy cannot be ascribed solely to the traditional construct of India-Pakistan hostility. They appear driven mainly by the fear of U.S. assault on its strategic assets. The more numerous and compact the weapons, the wider their dispersal and the greater their sophistication, the more deterred the U.S. would be from undertaking any operations to disable them or to take them into its custody. The U.S. finds it as difficult to acknowledge this reality as it has, until recently, Pakistan’s complicity in terrorism directed against its forces in Afghanistan. This permits putting the onus on India to reassure Pakistan through concessions rather than admitting that the problem lies elsewhere. There is also a strong non-proliferation lobby in the U.S. which believes it could leverage the threat of an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange to reverse some of the concessions made to India in the civil nuclear deal. More recently, it is being argued that since the U.S. is finding it difficult to get its promised share of the civil nuclear business in India due to concerns over the country’s Nuclear Liability legislation, a major rationale behind the agreement no longer exists. And meanwhile, it is further claimed, the civil nuclear agreement has only heightened the danger of India-Pakistan nuclear war by feeding into Pakistani fears of India’s enhanced nuclear capabilities.

In this context, I wish to recall an exchange over dinner hosted by President George Bush for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in November 2008 in Washington. The then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked that after the “heavy lifting” the U.S. had done to get the nuclear deal through, she hoped India would ensure that U.S. companies got a share of the orders for new reactors. Before our Prime Minister could reply, Mr. Bush stated categorically that he was not bothered if India did not buy even a single reactor from the U.S., since he regarded the agreement as confirming India as a long-term strategic partner rather than a mere customer for U.S. reactors.

Pakistan encourages the arguments of the U.S. non-proliferation lobby since this keeps the pressure on India and enables the camouflage of Pakistan’s real motivations. It would not wish to project, as an adversary, a much more powerful U.S., and lose out on the economic and military support it receives, however transactional these deals may have become.

The implications

What are the implications of these recent developments?

One, it is not through “strategic restraint” or security assurances by India that Pakistan would be persuaded to change its behaviour and revise its strategy. India and Pakistan have some nuclear CBMs in place and India would be prepared to go further. The main levers for such persuasion lie in Washington and in Beijing, not in New Delhi.

Two, whatever sophistry Pakistan may indulge in to justify its augmented arsenal and threatened recourse to tactical nuclear weapons, for India, the label on the weapon, tactical or strategic, is irrelevant since the use of either would constitute a nuclear attack against India. In terms of India’s stated nuclear doctrine, this would invite a massive retaliatory strike. For Pakistan to think that a counter-force nuclear strike against military targets would enable it to escape a counter-value strike against its cities and population centres, is a dangerous illusion. The U.S. could acquaint Pakistan with NATO’s own Cold War experience when tactical nuclear weapons were abandoned once it was realised that use of such weapons in any conflict would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Instead of urging India to respond to Pakistani nuclear escalation through offering mutual restraint, the U.S. should convince Islamabad that a limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms and that it should abandon such reckless brinkmanship. The U.S. knows that India’s nuclear deterrence is not Pakistan-specific. Any misguided attempt to constrain Indian capabilities would undermine, for both, the value of Indo-U.S. strategic partnership in an increasingly uncertain and challenging regional and global security environment.

Three, Pakistan is no longer India’s problem. Its toxic mix of jihadi terrorism and nuclear brinkmanship poses a threat to the region and to the world. Even China, whose culpability in continuing to assist Pakistan in developing its nuclear and delivery capabilities is well documented, is not exempt. It needs to reassess its own policies. An apparently low-cost and proxy effort to contain India may well become China’s nightmare, too, in the days to come.

SSridhar wrote:Dealing with Pakistan's brinkmanship - Shyam Saran, The Hindu

The approval of the agreement is a success for Pakistan and a recognition of its non-proliferation commitments, it said, and added that a similar safeguards agreement was also in place for Chashma-1 in central Punjab province.

JE Menon wrote:>>I don't know if Shariah allows honeytrap activities in the service of Ummah.

Sure it does, a version of Taqiyyah called "Faqiyyah"...

JE Menon wrote:>>I don't know if Shariah allows honeytrap activities in the service of Ummah.

Sure it does, a version of Taqiyyah called "Faqiyyah"...

With more than a million new inhabitants pouring in each year, it's not surprising that the stretch marks are showing in one of the largest and most rapidly growing cities in this world!

Street crime in Karachi is about what you'd expect from a big city. Use common sense and avoid dangerous areas.

Wracked by endemic political violence and crime, Karachi is the world's most dangerous megacity.

"We are not worried about any security issues because we are certain that the Indian board and government will provide the best possible security for our players," Ashraf said.

"It is difficult to give a time-frame for international teams to return to Pakistan but I see a scenario now where every board is waiting to see which board first sends it team to Pakistan," he said.

JE Menon wrote:>>I don't know if Shariah allows honeytrap activities in the service of Ummah.

Sure it does, a version of Taqiyyah called "Faqiyyah"...

CRamS wrote:Johann,

Excellent post. I mean I would love to see the day when the Jihadi foot soldiers including LeT realize how they have been used as cannon fodder by the RAPE TSPA/ISI, and then turn on them with a vengeance.

That said, I wounder if you watched the interview with Karzai.

Pakistan-Afghanistan: Pakistani news services reported that a senior Pakistan Army official stationed in South Waziristan Agency said the Pakistan Taliban (Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan) is engaged in a leadership struggle. The current commander, Hakimullah Mehsud, reportedly has lost favor with the rank and file and is likely to be deposed by deputy leader, Wali-ur-Rehman.

The deputy is viewed as more moderate and pragmatic. He is expected to reach a truce with the Pakistani government and turn the Pakistani Taliban towards attacking American targets in Afghanistan.

The army official said, "Rehman is fast emerging as a consensus candidate officially to replace Hakimullah. Now we may see the brutal commander replaced by a more pragmatic one for whom reconciliation with the Pakistani government has become a priority.

Comment: Two years ago the al Qaida affiliated groups split over whether the main effort should be against the US in Afghanistan or against the pro-US government in Pakistan. The Afghanistan Taliban under Mullah Omar broke with al Qaida and remained dedicated to fight in Afghanistan, using Pakistan as the logistics base and safe haven. That has proven to be a winning strategy.

The Pakistani Taliban, encouraged by al Qaida's leader Zawahiri, fought against the government in Islamabad to no substantial, measurable effect. Instead, the Pakistani Taliban failed to expand beyond the tribal agencies and generated a backlash against their harsh, religiously justified atrocities, which bordered on mindless local punishments.

The nail in the coffin for the Pakistani Taliban Ultras, led by Hakimullah, apparently was the attempted murder of the 14-year old girl{Malala?} for attending school. The worldwide outrage over that attack appears to have split the Pashtun terrorists in the tribal agencies, resulting in the leadership struggle.

A shift in strategic emphasis towards Afghanistan is an enormous windfall for the government in Islamabad. If the shift occurs, the Pakistan Army can take a rest from campaigning in the tribal agencies in the northwest.

The news for Afghanistan and the residual Western combat forces there is not so good. The great rift in the Pashtun fighting groups will have been healed in favor of hastening the departure of Western forces from Afghanistan, just when they are most vulnerable.

ramana wrote:SS, baikul et al,

Nightwatch on the TTP leadership rumors
LINK

What if all this is psy-ops after all TSPA has learnt from the best?

RajeshA wrote:

JE Menon wrote:>>I don't know if Shariah allows honeytrap activities in the service of Ummah.

Sure it does, a version of Taqiyyah called "Faqiyyah"...

or "Takhiya"!

The relationship between Takhiya and Faqiyyah is the same as Pillow and Peyllo!

Pakistan's Supreme Court today dissolved an inquiry commission a day after it said that Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry's son had admitted that he made two foreign visits that were paid for by real estate tycoon Malik Riaz Hussain and his associates.

The court also ruled that there was no need for any further proceedings in the matter.

RajeshA wrote:

JE Menon wrote:>>I don't know if Shariah allows honeytrap activities in the service of Ummah.

Sure it does, a version of Taqiyyah called "Faqiyyah"... or "Takhiya"!
The relationship between Takhiya and Faqiyyah is the same as Pillow and Peyllo!

RajeshA wrote:Jhujar ji,

are you inferring that the response of Hindooos to all the Paki Taqiyya, Takhiya, Takya and Thak-gya should be Thokkiya, Thookya, Tokya and Takkaya?
If yes, then by taking this Theka, sab Theek-kiya!

Modi’s alleged complicity in the riots is bound to make the international community, particularly the Muslim countries, extremely apprehensive if the BJP were to anoint him as its prime ministerial candidate. For long, he conflated the Muslim with the terrorist, Islam with backwardness. In his quest to fan fear and anxiety, Modi recognised no limits, no niceties. He is among the few politicians in the world to have targeted the head of another country in his election campaigns, as he did in 2002 and 2007, spewing venom on then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and imploring the people of Gujarat to teach him a lesson by, believe it or not, voting Modi to power.

Should then the principal opposition party of India, which the BJP is, project him as the prospective prime minister? Ask this question of BJP leaders and they are likely to reprimand you for seeking the approval of Uncle Sam and India’s erstwhile colonial master, simultaneously pooh-poohing the clout the Muslim countries can wield. Yet these leaders were overjoyed at the decision of Time magazine to put him on its cover and went to town at the British government’s instruction to its High Commissioner in Delhi for renewing ties with Modi, whom they had boycotted after the 2002 riots. The British government cited “national interest” to justify its rethink on Modi, a point BJP supporters often harp upon to claim that as prime minister, he cannot remain a pariah to foreign countries, who would not wish to risk their commercial interests in India.It is this logic of self-interest that has bolstered the hope of the BJP that most of its existing or potential allies, despite their deep dislike for Modi, would veer to rallying behind him, as it is only he who has the mass appeal to wrest power from the Congress-led coalition in Delhi. Would they for the ideological reason of secularism sacrifice their chances of securing a share of power, ask the BJP leaders.Now imagine Modi as India’s prime minister and his need, inherent in democratic politics, to muster sufficient numbers to remain ensconced in power. From talking about the pride of Gujaratis, he will harp on the pride of Indians. His emotive style of politics will see him fan insecurities countrywide, demanding he create enemies capable of terrorising the entire nation. Such enemies will be so much simpler to find outside the country, in other nations, particularly those comprising South Asia. A trade dispute between India and another country could be blown out of proportion, a concession granted to another nation reversed suddenly, and a border skirmish portrayed as the prelude to an inevitable conflict. It has been Modi’s trait to feed on the weak to become strong personally. Ultimately, Mr Strong is Mr Bully.

partha wrote:https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?pid= ... 3805415202

Aman Ki Tamasha meet in Kanpur. Now the tamasha is not limited to just the Delhi Mumbai socialites. They are trying to get the second tier cities involved.

Minister for Information and Broadcasting Qamar Zaman Kaira on Friday said that the Transparency International (TI) report on corruption in Pakistan was fabricated, baseless and a pack of lies.

1. THE FACTS ARE FAULTY: he said that Pakistan’s 33rd ranking in comparison with being 42nd the previous year was illogical.

2. ITS NOT JUST US. ITS EVERYWHERE: more corruption in South Asian states was worrisome as Nepal stood at 139 in the list of most corrupt countries, but South Asian states of Bangladesh and Afghanistan followed it depicting that the whole region was crippled with corruption.

3. AND THE FINAL REFUGE OF A PAKI: Its islamophobia (or rather, look at the christian west: He observed that the world’s top 85 multinational companies do not show their tax invoices on their corporate website.

Now imagine Modi as India’s prime minister and his need, inherent in democratic politics, to muster sufficient numbers to remain ensconced in power. From talking about the pride of Gujaratis, he will harp on the pride of Indians. His emotive style of politics will see him fan insecurities countrywide, demanding he create enemies capable of terrorising the entire nation. Such enemies will be so much simpler to find outside the country, in other nations, particularly those comprising South Asia. A trade dispute between India and another country could be blown out of proportion, a concession granted to another nation reversed suddenly, and a border skirmish portrayed as the prelude to an inevitable conflict. It has been Modi’s trait to feed on the weak to become strong personally. Ultimately, Mr Strong is Mr Bully

Dealing with Pakistan’s brinkmanship

Shyam Saran

Islamabad’s expanding nuclear capability is no longer driven solely by its oft-cited fears of India but by the paranoia about U.S. attacks on its strategic assets

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/de ... epage=true