Bharat Rakshak

India ought not to be part of this circus. True, our politicians, like their ilk elsewhere, are fond of spouting high-sounding nonsense and striking poses in international forums. But while disarmament was useful as a morality stick to beat the great powers with in Jawaharlal Nehru’s time in the Fifties, in the second decade of the 21st century it is a shovel to dig our own grave.

Despite being victimised by it New Delhi has not caught on to the nuclear disarmament movement being yesterday’s preoccupation. At a time when the science of nuclear weapons is widely disseminated and the skills to engineer a bomb are within grasp of any country with even a small industrial base, national interest now requires India, rather than flogging the dead horse of nuclear weapons-free world, to spearhead a movement for a fair, more equitable, accord and system of nuclear management to replace the old order imposed by NPT.

Independent Strategic Nuclear Programme
BJP believes that the strategic gains acquired by India during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on the nuclear programme have been frittered away by the Congress. Our emphasis was, and remains on, beginning of a new thrust on framing policies that would serve India's national interest in the 21st century. We will follow a two-pronged independent nuclear programme, unencumbered by foreign pressure and influence, for civilian and military purposes, especially as nuclear power is a major contributor to India's energy sector.

BJP will:
Study in detail India's nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times.
Maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostatic realities.
Invest in India's indigenous Thorium Technology Programme

wig wrote:one, Jonathan Pollard, - shortly to be released from gaol is the former US intelligence agent who was convicted of spying for Israel by compromising Pakistan’s nuclear secrets. this implies that the US was complicit of Paki nuke capability and was actively assisting in masking it
Pollard, J was jailed in 1987 for spying for Israel, gave his spy handlers information on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, according to declassified documents. He is currently serving a life sentence for selling classified information to the Israeli government between 1985 and 1987. CIA assessment states that Pollard focused on “Arab and Pakistani nuclear intelligence” and gave his Israeli handlers information on a secret Pakistani ‘plutonium reprocessing facility near Islamabad’.
http://www.dawn.com/news/1097169/us-spy ... e-released
and
http://www.dawn.com/news/772350/how-isr ... tani-nukes

RKumar wrote:Do we get Shakti-II? Personally I hope, we skip it during first term of NaMo as there are too many others issues to address. On the other side, earlier the better

Independent Strategic Nuclear Programme
BJP believes that the strategic gains acquired by India during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on the nuclear programme have been frittered away by the Congress. Our emphasis was, and remains on, beginning of a new thrust on framing policies that would serve India's national interest in the 21st century. We will follow a two-pronged independent nuclear programme, unencumbered by foreign pressure and influence, for civilian and military purposes, especially as nuclear power is a major contributor to India's energy sector.

BJP will:
Study in detail India's nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times.Maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostatic realities.
Invest in India's indigenous Thorium Technology Programme

ramana wrote:What test/vest?

BJP will bring the policy in line with the US policy.

With India’s national elections in full swing, the campaign promises of the Bharatiya Janata Party, the presumed front-runner to lead the next government, are drawing more scrutiny. Among the more troubling proposals in the party’s election manifesto is one to “revise and update” the country’s nuclear doctrine.
Neither Narendra Modi, the party’s candidate for prime minister, nor any of his allies have fully explained what they have in mind. Some news reports suggest the B.J.P., the Hindu nationalist party, may not just reconsider but jettison India’s “no first use” policy that was adopted in 1999 when the party was previously in power. The policy committed the country to show restraint in not being the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.The lack of clarity about the party’s intentions on this issue introduces more uncertainty into an already unstable region. Should Mr. Modi scuttle the “no first use” policy if he wins, he would exacerbate tensions with China, which subscribes to the policy, and Pakistan, which does not.The unresolved conflict over Kashmir between India and Pakistan, which have fought three wars since 1947, and the existence of extremist groups in the Afghan-Pakistan border region make any shifts in nuclear policies particularly dangerous.India and Pakistan, each with about 100 nuclear weapons and building more, have little regular communication, which raises the potential for miscalculation. Pakistan, in fact, has the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and recently added short-range tactical nuclear weapons that experts say are more likely to be used in battle. That existing threat, however, is not a reason for India to abandon its “no first use” doctrine; its conventional arsenal is far superior to Pakistan’s and sufficient to respond to most threats.Although the B.J.P. initiated the “no first use” policy in India, a B.J.P.-led government also conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1998. In signaling its willingness to take a more provocative stance toward Pakistan and China, the party does not advance India’s interests.The current government led by the Congress party has focused somewhat more on developing the country’s civilian nuclear energy sector rather than on nuclear arms. In fact, last week, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh proposed a global framework to promote a “no first use” doctrine among nuclear weapons states, a laudable goal.Instead of abandoning the “no first use” doctrine, whoever wins the election would do better to commit himself to improving ties with Pakistan and starting an arms control initiative that could lead to a regional equilibrium on these dangerous weapons ( China Ko terra Baap Dekhega Kya)

Jhujar wrote:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/opini ... .html?_r=0
A Risk to India’s Nuclear DoctrineBy THE IDITORIAL BOARD

Should Mr. Modi scuttle the “no first use” policy if he wins, he would exacerbate tensions with China, which subscribes to the policy, and Pakistan, which does not.

panduranghari wrote:How likely are Pokhran III, Pokhran IV...?

Supratik wrote:We are unlikely to have an expansive testing schedule. It is going to be a small window. The politicians don't understand the concept of testing (including the Vajpayee admin). It is the job of the scientists to drill it into their heads. In 1998 either the politicians did not understand or the scientists were overconfident. Otherwise the result of 1 test vs 10 tests would have been the same i.e. sanctions.

ramana wrote:LakshO, India needs to do what India needs to do.
There are three types of nukes:fission, boosted fisson, special TN.

All three have fission as the beginning stage. India has shown mastery of this.No need for this.
The second type was also successfully shown. Again no need for this.
The third type had an underperformance for what ever reasons. However if it were not special, there is no doubt in any existing nuke power that it cannot be achieved.
So non special is not an issue.
Now there are political considerations at work.
There is no power in the world that can stop India from testing in Supreme National Interest. That clause is there even in CTBT.
Now its in the interests of P5 to ensure India is no forced to exercise that right.
The Modifesto pledge to reassess everything is a step in right direction for it brings back stability.

He saw the signs of the approaching doomsday all around him: in moral degradation, in casual sex, in the rise of western power, in space travel, in our high-tech age. God, wrote Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons guru Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood in Mechanics of the Doomsday..., had not privileged man to know when it would come, but “the promised Hour is not a far off event now.” It would come as a “great blast,” perhaps “initiated by some catastrophic man-made devices, such as sudden detonation of a large number of nuclear bombs.”

Long mocked by his colleagues for his crazed beliefs — the physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy records him as saying, “djinns, being fiery creatures, ought to be tapped as a free source of energy” — and condemned to obscurity after his arrest on charges of aiding the Taliban, Mr. Mahmood may yet be remembered as a prophet.

The doctrine debate

India’s next government will, without dispute, find itself dancing with the nuclear djinn Mr. Mahmood helped unleash. In its election manifesto, the Bharatiya Janata Party has promised to “study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it to make it relevant to [the] challenges of current times.” Mr. Seshadri Chari, a member of the group that formulated this section of the party’s manifesto said: “why should we tie our hands into accepting a global no-first-use policy, as has been proposed by the Prime Minister recently?”

The debate will come in dangerous times. Pakistan has been growing its arsenal low-yield plutonium nuclear weapons, also called tactical or theatre nuclear weapons. Estimates suggest some 10-12 new nuclear warheads are being added to the country’s 90-110 strong arsenal, and new reactors going critical at Khushab will likely boost that number even further. New Delhi must respond — but the seeds of a nuclear apocalypse could sprout if it gets that response wrong.

Mr. Chari’s grasp of fact doesn’t give much reason to hope for much else: India’s no-first-use commitment was made by a government his party led, not Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. In 1998, battling to contain the international fallout from the Pokhran II nuclear tests, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee promised Parliament that “India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.” Later, in August 1999, the National Security Advisory Board’s draft nuclear doctrine stated that India would only “retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces.”

The no-first-use posture, scholar Ashley Tellis has noted in his magisterial book, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, was founded on a pragmatic judgment of India’s strategic circumstances. Even if India needed to fight shallow cross-border wars, Dr. Tellis argued, its “nominal military superiority over Pakistan and its local military superiority, allow such operations to be conducted by conventional means alone.”

For more than a decade-and-a-half, the commitment has held, but there have been signs it is fraying at the edges. In 2003, India announced it reserved the right to deliver a nuclear-weapons response to a chemical or biological attack, a significant caveat to the no-first-use promise. Then, in a speech delivered at the National Defence College, National Security Adviser, Shivshankar Menon, appeared to add a caveat to India’s nuclear doctrine, saying in passing that it committed to “no first use against non-nuclear weapon states.” This was interpreted by some observers to mean India might consider first strikes against nuclear-weapons states.

Dr. Singh reiterated Mr. Vajpayee’s formulation early this month — but there is at least some reason to believe the caveats reflect ongoing debates at the highest levels of the strategic community.

From its genesis, questions have hung over India’s no-first-use commitment. How would India react to credible intelligence that an imminent Pakistani first-strike against its own nuclear arsenal, would degrade its ability to retaliate? How might India deal with an attack that came from an insurgent group operating from within Pakistani territory, which seized control of a nuclear weapon? In addition, as the scholar Vipin Narang has argued, India has not committed against using its superior air power against Pakistani missile launchers armed with nuclear warheads — confronting its western adversary in a “use-it-or-lose-it” dilemma.

Bharat Karnad, a strategic affairs commentator who will likely influence a future BJP-led government’s nuclear thinking, thus described no-first-use as something of a pious fiction: “one of those restrictions which countries are willing to abide by except in war.”

Dangerous future

This much, we do know: the next government, whoever forms it, will command a more lethal nuclear arsenal than ever before. Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris have noted that while India’s nuclear arsenal, at some 80-100 warheads, is smaller than that of Pakistan, it is set to expand. India is introducing new missiles and is inducting almost-impossible-to-target nuclear-powered submarines. The experts estimate that India already has a weapons-grade plutonium stockpile of 520 kilograms, enough for 100-130 warheads, but will need more from the prototype fast-breeder reactor at Kalpakkam to meet the needs of its growing arsenal.

India’s strategic establishment seems certain it needs these weapons — but remains less than clear on just how and under what circumstances they might be used.

The threat from the east is relatively predictable. For years now, India has periodically suffered from dragon-under-the-bed nightmares — the prospect that a more aggressively nationalist China, whose conventional forces are expanding and modernising dramatically, could initiate a war to settle the two countries’ unresolved conflicts. China is bound by a no-first-use pledge, but some experts fear India’s conventional forces might be overwhelmed. It is improbable, though, that these losses would pose an existential threat to India.

“Ironically,” Dr. Narang has written, “China doubts India’s no-first-use pledge for the same reasons the United States doubts China’s: that in a crisis, no rhetorical pledge physically prevents the state from using nuclear weapons first.” For India’s nuclear strategists, this is a good thing: China’s fears should deter it from a large-scale war.

The TNW challenge

From the east, though, the threat is more complex. In the wake of the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan crisis, the Indian Army began acquiring the resources to fight limited conflicts at short notice — in essence, wars of punishment for acts of terrorism. Pakistan responded by growing its Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) arsenal, for use against advancing Indian formations inside its own territory. Last year, eminent diplomat Shyam Saran lucidly explained the thinking. Pakistan hopes “to dissuade India from contemplating conventional punitive retaliation to sub-conventional but highly destructive and disruptive cross-border terrorist strikes.”

From Cold War experience, Pakistan likely knows its nuclear-weapons strategy makes no sense. In 1955, historian David Smith has recorded, a NATO exercise code-named Carte Blanche concluded that a war using TNWs would leave two million dead in the north German plains. Exercise Sagebrush later concluded that all participating military formations would also end up being annihilated. Exercise Oregon Trail, conducted from 1963-1965, showed that when forces concentrated to fight conventionally, they “offered lucrative nuclear targets” — but if they “dispersed to avoid nuclear strikes, the units could be defeated by conventional tactics.”

Pakistan’s generals know expert studies, like that of A.H. Nayyar and Zia Mian, demonstrate that TNWs would be near-useless in stopping an Indian armoured thrust into Pakistan. The generals know that TNWs have to be dispersed, vastly increasing the risks of miscalculation by local commanders, accidental use, or even theft. Ejaz Haider, a Pakistani strategic commentator, has bluntly stated that the confused state of the Pakistan’s TNW doctrine “essentially means we don’t know what the hell to do with them.”

India doesn’t either. Purely symbolic gestures like revoking the no-first-use policy will yield no dividends, though. If Pakistan is desperate enough to use TNWs, thus inviting an Indian second strike, it certainly won’t be deterred by a threat to unleash Armageddon first. Backing down on no-first-use will, moreover, deny India the fruits of being seen as a responsible nuclear-weapons state, one of the reasons Mr. Vajpayee made his call in the first place.

It isn’t clear, though, that reason will prevail: Mr. Mahmood, after all, isn’t the only crazed South Asian in shouting distance of a nuclear bomb. In 1999, as war raged in Kargil, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh journal organiser had these words for Mr. Vajpayee: “Arise, Atal Behari! Who knows if fate has destined you to be the author of the final chapter of this long story. For what have we manufactured bombs? For what have we exercised the nuclear option?”

It is critical that voices like these be nowhere near the ears of the leaders whose hands hover over our nuclear button.

pravula wrote:Noob query: What is special in "special TN"?

How are nuclear weapons for the newest missile systems from those that are gradually removed from service?

- Development of modern technologies in the field of construction materials, microelectronics, information creates the conditions to optimize the performance of existing nuclear weapons, and the newly created.

The ones that are removed from service, are able to perform combat tasks, but due to technical and physical aging are less effective than modern counterparts. They fall short in important characteristics, such as life and, just as importantly, the safety of operation.

New types of nuclear weapons (nuclear warheads) have smaller size and weight, high reliability. The use of the latest generation of microelectronic control systems greatly increased accuracy and, as a result, the effectiveness of the combat mission. Using sophisticated algorithms, the exchange of information ensures the safety of guarantees of protection from enemy electronic warfare.

To improve the safe operation of the modern nuclear weapons introduced devices and systems, excluding their involvement and unauthorized use, but ensure their full-time job for combat use.

Design of modern nuclear weapons provide protection against accidents of natural and man-made, while maintaining a safe condition after exposure to ammunition damaging factors such as fire, shock or drop. In the newly developed nuclear warheads based on innovative materials and technical solutions that can significantly reduce the time for their service and training for combat.

SSridhar wrote:Dancing with the nuclear djinn - Praveen Swami, The Hindu

Purely symbolic gestures like revoking the no-first-use policy will yield no dividends, though.

ramana wrote:Lilio, Its not helpful for India anymore. MMS and his ilk are still in Nehruvian Morass and propose irresponsible ideas like AAP.

Now that India is a nuclear power proposing silly stuff like global NFU makes as the first candidates to be volunteered for disarmament. He has no business talking about tall this after having done nothing in last ten years when he could do something.

Are we sure this is not MMS April Fools Day speech?

“The no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons was a well thought out stand of the NDA government led by Atal Behari Vajpayee. We don’t intend to reverse it,” BJP chief Rajnath Singh told HT.

For now, I am inclined to believe the "new form" of nuclear testing most likely means simultaneous tests, part of a program of more intense nuclear testing that we are likely to see over the next few years.

Nuclear doctrine must reflect ground reality
Wednesday, 16 April 2014 | Ashok K Mehta | in Edit
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The ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons is a policy that security experts are best equipped to address. Politicians will do well to consult them before making grand statements. Moreover, time has come to re-visit the NFU

By declaring that his party would leave unchanged, its ‘no first use policy, BJP president Rajnath Singh appears to have been hustled into not reversing it, preempting, as stated in the party’s manifesto, any ‘meaningful’ revision and update of nuclear doctrine to the make it relevant to the contemporary strategic environment. Admittedly, this premature response to the criticism levelled against a speculative change of policy first adopted by the NDA Government will only dilute the review process, which is an idea whose time has come.

National Security Advisory Board convenor Shyam Saran has been urging that the nuclear doctrine be made public, debated and revised in order to strengthen India’s credible minimum deterrent. In view of the geo-strategic changes, especially in relation to Pakistan’s growing nuclear capability and the increasing strategic gap between China and India, and more confounding, the security alliance between Pakistan and China, this exercise is necessary for deterrence stability and escalation control in the region. Ideally any review posture should be preceded by a Strategic Defence and Security Review, one that has never been done in the country. This will define the contours of the evolving geo-strategic environment.

The speculation about renunciation of the NFU has derived from statements attributed to National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon during a lecture at the National Defence College, though the articulation that the NFU applies to non-nuclear weapon states only has never been confirmed. Recent internal debate among BJP strategists has fuelled thoughts about abandoning the NFU. As late as last year, Mr Saran said India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if attacked with even a tactical nuclear weapon, the retaliation will be massive and designed to cause unacceptable damage. Different authorities have made differently worded policy statements which need to be brought at par, though many believe that the NFU is piously declaratory and can be rescinded in a crisis.

The unquestionable logic of First Use Nuclear, or FUN, goes back to the Cold War era when conventionally inferior Nato forces were required to deter the overwhelmingly conventionally superior Warsaw Pact armies from sweeping across central Europe. Nuclear deterrence worked to prevent both a conventional campaign and nuclear war-fighting with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This deterrence theory has worked between India and Pakistan, but with a caveat: While it has prevented a full-blown conventional war, it has not deterred a Kargil or a terrorist attack. Ironically, Pakistan has crafted space below the nuclear threshold to continue sponsoring terrorist attacks and similar misadventures. India has been unable to exploit this space with its superior conventional forces to deter sub-conventional terrorist assaults.

Bar the Kargil skirmish (1999), there has been no war after India inflicted a humiliating defeat to Pakistan in 1971, and that pain and New Delhi’s conventional superiority has deterred Pakistan from indulging in bravado till the tit-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998, when India, in a catch-22 situation, lost its conventional edge against Pakistan to win a strategic equaliser with China.

The biggest defect in the credible minimum deterrent is over its credibility — credibility of nuclear forces due to a variety of contestations between nuclear scientists about yield etc, which have not been set to rest; and credibility of political will, that “we will do what we say we will do”. In other words, credibility of a second strike after riding out the first. Our challenge is in dealing with Pakistan which holds India’s resolve to retaliate with a second strike at very low credibility. Given the empirical evidence of political dithering even after a terror strike, it does not believe the leadership has the political will to hit back with nuclear weapons.. What use is military or strategic capability if, in the eyes of the adversary, it is seen as unusable?

Looking back, it would seem we have erred on the side of caution or strategic restraint. In Kargil we preferred joining battle to evict intrusions by declaring the Line of Control will not be crossed and surrendering strategic options. The same restraint was demonstrated after the attack on Parliament, to be followed by zero military response after Mumbai.

Pakistan is the only Islamic country which has usable nuclear weapons that are India-centric, and both its nuclear arsenal and delivery capability are superior to India’s. By successful lowering of the nuclear threshold and rationally portraying its irrationality, Islamabad has reduced the space for politically significant conventional military operations. Dealing with this innovatively will likely enhance the credibility of political will for conventional and nuclear retaliation. Pakistan believes its FUN has deterred India’s response to a terrorist attack. Islamabad must be acquainted with risks attached to such misconceptions through resumed nuclear risk-reduction dialogue and appropriate deeds.

With China, India has plenty of catching up to do, both conventionally and strategically. Typically, Beijing neither recognises India as a nuclear weapons state nor will it engage it in a nuclear discourse in any strategic conversation. This impasse has to be broken. Re-visiting the nuclear doctrine is the opportunity to clear the cobwebs about the NFU. Of the nine nuclear weapon states, only two — India and China — espouse the NFU; the Chinese with the qualification that its nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapon states and on its soil. This relates to all its territorial claims. The review process should weigh political correctness and diplomatic niceties of the NFU against operational disadvantages. If India decides to drop the NFU eventually, it will join any Universal NFU Treaty. Other issues for review are: Do dirty bombs breach NFU; configuring credible minimum force, massive retaliation, unacceptable damage, survivability of forces and leadership and selective EMP hardening of nuclear assets.

The military must enjoy the strictest confidence in assured credibility of nuclear force, its capacity to deter and if deterrence fails, the resolve of the political leadership to retaliate. Strategic signalling must disabuse Pakistani thinking that India is self-deterred. After the strategic and doctrinal review, an all-party meeting should adopt the revised nuclear doctrine in Parliament. The NFU or the FUN must be accompanied with a strong message that any terrorist attack that can be sourced to the neighbourhood will attract severe military reprisals. The NSAB’s ongoing programmes of educating young MPs is a good start. Let us become serious about nuclear doctrine and national security. Let nuclear experts, not Mr Singh, decide India’s nuclear doctrine.

ramana wrote:Jhujar, Cant have it like that.
One recalibration is reciprocal NFU. i.e. Indian has NFU for states that have a NFU.

Yet India's nuclear doctrine badly needs a review. While the NFU pledge must quickly be scrapped, the ill-conceived commitment to "massive retaliation" is even more damaging to our nuclear credibility. Fifteen years ago, facing tight international sanctions, we needed a restrained doctrine. Today, with the security environment more challenging than ever, India's nuclear doctrine must complicate the calculus of opponents, not simplify it as the single-minded focus on massive retaliation does.

The existing nuclear doctrine - initially issued as a "draft nuclear doctrine" in August 1999, and solidified (in slightly changed form) through a gazette notification on January 4, 2003 - pledges that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with massive retaliation should deterrence fail. India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapons powers".

In simple terms, this means that India will wait to get nuked before it fires nukes. Once nuked - even by a small, tactical nuclear weapon fired by, say, Pakistan on its own soil against an Indian armoured offensive, that destroys one squadron of 14 tanks and kills 45 Indian soldiers - New Delhi's response will be automatic. India's massive retaliation will unleash most of its 80-100 nuclear weapons against Pakistani towns and cities - termed "counter-value targets".

Since Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is currently larger than India's, and is dispersed and sheltered across that country, New Delhi will be visited by retaliation from the smoking ruins of Pakistan. In what is termed a "second strike", that country's nuclear command authority, safe in underground command posts, will fire its surviving nukes - and there will be many - at New Delhi, Mumbai and other Indian cities within range of its Shaheen-II ballistic missiles. In this chain of events, most of Pakistan and large swathes of India will be transformed into radioactive wastelands and hundreds of millions of people killed. Remember, this level of destruction follows from a single tactical nuclear weapon, fired by Pakistan at its own territory. Most rational people would find this scenario incredible.

Indeed, New Delhi's massive retaliation strategy rests on the belief that Pakistani policymakers are rational actors, who will avoid this cataclysm. Yet even rational actors behave irrationally when under enormous stress, such as an existential threat to one's country. While New Delhi's nuclear theologians bet our lives on the rationality of Pakistani generals, is that generous assessment corroborated by Pakistan's heedless plunge into the abyss of radicalism and jihad?

Should India's leaders have no choice but "suicide or surrender"? Remember that New Delhi, under BJP rule in 1999 (Kargil) and 2001-02 (Parliament attack), and under Congress rule in 2008 (Mumbai attack), shrank from employing even conventional military force against Pakistan. Will New Delhi sanction massive nuclear retaliation that could lead to the aptly termed MAD - mutual assured destruction? Probably not, which is why the misconceived massive retaliation strategy must be revisited even before NFU.

ShauryaT wrote:Ajai Shukla: Come out of the nuclear closet

Remember that New Delhi, under BJP rule in 1999 (Kargil) and 2001-02 (Parliament attack), and under Congress rule in 2008 (Mumbai attack), shrank from employing even conventional military force against Pakistan. Will New Delhi sanction massive nuclear retaliation that could lead to the aptly termed MAD - mutual assured destruction? Probably not, which is why the misconceived massive retaliation strategy must be revisited even before NFU.