Modi's ANI interview, part 2
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bXK242AV ... Ge7IlOgCKe
No change in NFU, nuke disarmament policies
We want to be militarily strong for defensive purposes.
Will deal with US in Indian national interest, not based on what they did to modi.
Pakistan, China will be dealt with Indian interests in mind.
Article 370, status of PoK
Deterrence
Re: Deterrence
Nuclear Deterrence: The Wohlstetter-Blackett Debate Re-visited
ABSTRACT
The Cold War debate between Albert Wohlstetter and Patrick Blackett over the requirements of effective deterrence is of profound relevance half a century later. The two thinkers offered systematic arguments for their maximalist (Wohlstetter) and minimalist (Blackett) positions. How we conceive of these requirements shapes the kinds of nuclear weapons doctrines, forces and postures we adopt. Whereas the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate was based largely on deductive logic, the opposing arguments can today be assessed on the basis of evidence drawing from nearly seven decades of strategic behaviour between nuclear rivals. An analysis of major confrontations in five nuclear dyads – United States-Soviet Union, United States-China, Soviet Union-China, India-Pakistan, and United States-North Korea – clearly offers much stronger support for Blackett‟s minimalist case than for Wohlstetter‟s maximalist one. Effective deterrence does not require second-strike capability as defined by Wohlstetter and the nuclear balance has no effect on a state‟s capacity to deter. Consequently, the central tenets of orthodox nuclear deterrence theory and doctrine are shown to be without foundation. For policymakers, the optimal forces and postures required for effective deterrence are therefore less demanding and the hurdles in the path of arms control and at least partial disarmament less difficult to cross.
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Rajesh Basrur is Professor of International Relations and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Re: Deterrence
Massive Retaliation
BY KREPON
BY KREPON
Massive retaliation is a siren song that appeals to states that cannot afford a nuclear competition but can afford to let an adversary cross the nuclear threshold first. It’s a money-saver, and it sounds persuasive, until the threat of massive retaliation is actually tested — when a nation’s nuclear bluff is called. What national leader would actually respond to the use of a single nuclear weapon, or just a few, with massive retaliation?
India, perhaps more than any other state possessing nuclear weapons, might actually have its nuclear doctrine put to the test. One possibility is if, in a limited war, a weapon detonates when struck by conventional means because it lacks adequate safety mechanisms. Another is a breakdown of command and control in the fog of war. A third is if Pakistani military authorities use a detonation to demand stoppage of an Indian advance.
None of these scenarios might come to pass. Previous Indian governments have demonstrated great restraint after suffering attacks originating in Pakistan, preferring to go about the business of economic growth rather than to engage in retaliatory military strikes. The Indian Army’s “Cold Start”-like military plans have many weaknesses and might be left on the drawing boards. And Pakistani military and intelligence authorities might prove capable of preventing the usual suspects from carrying out new explosions on Indian soil during a very hawkish Indian government. These suppositions are conceivable. They are also about as reliable as declaratory nuclear doctrine.
The peculiarity here is that India, unlike the United States facing the Soviet Union, enjoys conventional military advantages over Pakistan – advantages that will grow over time. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine threatens first use because of India’s conventional edge. This is understandable. But why has New Delhi adopted a posture of massive retaliation? Is it to save money or sound tough, like the Eisenhower Administration? How credible is this posture, and will New Delhi revamp it? And if New Delhi does vocalize the possibility of limited nuclear options, will this be good or bad for deterrence stability and escalation control?
Re: Deterrence
Guys has really poor understanding of Indian sub-continents history and geopolitics.ShauryaT wrote:Massive Retaliation
BY KREPONBut why has New Delhi adopted a posture of massive retaliation? Is it to save money or sound tough, like the Eisenhower Administration? How credible is this posture, and will New Delhi revamp it?
Re: Deterrence
To some extent I find all talk about deterrence and nuclear war irrational. It is irrational to wage a war that massively damages enemy territory in a way that is unusable for you and for anyone else for ages to come. Nuclear war is irrational and from that follows the fact that nuclear weapons too are irrational.
Please allow me to use one of my more vulgar analogies. Discussions about rationality and irrationality in nuclear deterrence are like men in coats and ties with no pants or underwear with their organs peeping out. In this condition a group of people discuss whether they should wear socks and shoes that match or don't match. They are ignoring, with stiff upper lip, the fact that exposing their genitals removes all pretence of seriousness or rationality in their discussion.
Once you make nuclear weapons for use in war you have already crossed the bounds of rationality - you have already removed your pants and exposed your organ. After starting off with an irrational step, it is actually funny to see people discussing the nitty gritty of deterrence - MAD or minimalist, FU or NFU.
Since the first step, that of acquiring nuclear weapons is itself irrational any ways in which you intend to use them are also irrational. Every nuclear weapons state is already irrational. FU/NFU are all fluff. No one really knows why deterrence has worked. Everyone imagines that something or the other about his own arsenal or the other guy's arsenal is leading to deterrence. Or they imagine that deterrence is not enough and that the other party will simply laugh off destruction of a few cities unless you can destroy a few more cities.
If the other party is going to laugh off and ignore your threat of destroying say 2 cities - then he is already irrational. So if you think your adversary is not scared of having two cities destroyed by you - then you are already calling him irrational. If he is irrational, how many of his cities do you need to destroy before he is actually scared of you? The only logical rational answer to that is destruction of your enemy totally - that is destroy everything.
But if you develop enough nuclear weapons to totally destroy an enemy you are the one who is being irrational. So once again you see that whatever way you approach the nuclear war question everyone is irrational from the word go. If all states do not abjure nuclear weapons, they are all being irrational, so the only rational step is for a non nuclear state is to develop nuclear weapons and join the irrationality game.
Maybe deterrence holds because everyone understands that they are already irrational in possessing nukes. When one side has nukes and the other does not, it is rational for the non nuclear state to be afraid. But if the non nuclear state acquires nukes, you have two irrational players in a face off. Maybe the fear that the other guy may be as irrational as you are drives the need to avoid using nuclear weapons. That is rationality being imposed by mutual irrationality.
If deterrence is rationality maintained by two nuclear states who mutually recognize each others' irrationality, then what would constitute loss of rationality and increase the possibility of nuclear war? Loss of rationality could be a sudden loss of fear of the other guys nukes. Why would anyone suddenly stop fearing the other guy's nukes? The only reason would be if one side has nothing to lose or nothing more to lose. Therefore rationality demands that you do not push your adversary into a situation where all that is dear to him is gone. Leave him with some things so he has not lost everything.
This logic allows the setting up of red lines - where one party says that xyz is dear to him. That is a rational act. It is a warning that an opponent should not deprive him of xyz, or he will get nuked. That tells the opponent, "Xyz is dear to me. Leave me with xyz and I will not nuke you". This rational statement demands a rational response. First use and NFU belong to this category of "rational propositions" made to an opponent. Pakistan is vague about its nuclear red lines, but things seem to suggest that they will start with tactical nukes if India attacks. India has a counter proposition for Pakistan where India says "Our desire is not to be nuked. If you nuke us, we will have nothing left to lose, and we will nuke you"
In this situation, I think India holds two cards than can be played. One card is changing NFU to FU. But on thinking about it, India should reserve the changing of NFU to FU to a time when it sends a strong signal. It should come if Pakistan reverts to wanton targeting of India in terrorist attacks or economic or sectarian attacks.
But I do think one more change is required in India's nuclear doctrine. If Indi judges that Pakistani nukes have fallen into the hands of "non state actors" or if Pakistan starts claiming that "non state actors" have access to nukes, Pakistan should be nuked anyway. First use becomes mandatory if Pakistan pushes the irrationality-rationality game to a level where the army washes its hands off responsibility for its nukes.
Please allow me to use one of my more vulgar analogies. Discussions about rationality and irrationality in nuclear deterrence are like men in coats and ties with no pants or underwear with their organs peeping out. In this condition a group of people discuss whether they should wear socks and shoes that match or don't match. They are ignoring, with stiff upper lip, the fact that exposing their genitals removes all pretence of seriousness or rationality in their discussion.
Once you make nuclear weapons for use in war you have already crossed the bounds of rationality - you have already removed your pants and exposed your organ. After starting off with an irrational step, it is actually funny to see people discussing the nitty gritty of deterrence - MAD or minimalist, FU or NFU.
Since the first step, that of acquiring nuclear weapons is itself irrational any ways in which you intend to use them are also irrational. Every nuclear weapons state is already irrational. FU/NFU are all fluff. No one really knows why deterrence has worked. Everyone imagines that something or the other about his own arsenal or the other guy's arsenal is leading to deterrence. Or they imagine that deterrence is not enough and that the other party will simply laugh off destruction of a few cities unless you can destroy a few more cities.
If the other party is going to laugh off and ignore your threat of destroying say 2 cities - then he is already irrational. So if you think your adversary is not scared of having two cities destroyed by you - then you are already calling him irrational. If he is irrational, how many of his cities do you need to destroy before he is actually scared of you? The only logical rational answer to that is destruction of your enemy totally - that is destroy everything.
But if you develop enough nuclear weapons to totally destroy an enemy you are the one who is being irrational. So once again you see that whatever way you approach the nuclear war question everyone is irrational from the word go. If all states do not abjure nuclear weapons, they are all being irrational, so the only rational step is for a non nuclear state is to develop nuclear weapons and join the irrationality game.
Maybe deterrence holds because everyone understands that they are already irrational in possessing nukes. When one side has nukes and the other does not, it is rational for the non nuclear state to be afraid. But if the non nuclear state acquires nukes, you have two irrational players in a face off. Maybe the fear that the other guy may be as irrational as you are drives the need to avoid using nuclear weapons. That is rationality being imposed by mutual irrationality.
If deterrence is rationality maintained by two nuclear states who mutually recognize each others' irrationality, then what would constitute loss of rationality and increase the possibility of nuclear war? Loss of rationality could be a sudden loss of fear of the other guys nukes. Why would anyone suddenly stop fearing the other guy's nukes? The only reason would be if one side has nothing to lose or nothing more to lose. Therefore rationality demands that you do not push your adversary into a situation where all that is dear to him is gone. Leave him with some things so he has not lost everything.
This logic allows the setting up of red lines - where one party says that xyz is dear to him. That is a rational act. It is a warning that an opponent should not deprive him of xyz, or he will get nuked. That tells the opponent, "Xyz is dear to me. Leave me with xyz and I will not nuke you". This rational statement demands a rational response. First use and NFU belong to this category of "rational propositions" made to an opponent. Pakistan is vague about its nuclear red lines, but things seem to suggest that they will start with tactical nukes if India attacks. India has a counter proposition for Pakistan where India says "Our desire is not to be nuked. If you nuke us, we will have nothing left to lose, and we will nuke you"
In this situation, I think India holds two cards than can be played. One card is changing NFU to FU. But on thinking about it, India should reserve the changing of NFU to FU to a time when it sends a strong signal. It should come if Pakistan reverts to wanton targeting of India in terrorist attacks or economic or sectarian attacks.
But I do think one more change is required in India's nuclear doctrine. If Indi judges that Pakistani nukes have fallen into the hands of "non state actors" or if Pakistan starts claiming that "non state actors" have access to nukes, Pakistan should be nuked anyway. First use becomes mandatory if Pakistan pushes the irrationality-rationality game to a level where the army washes its hands off responsibility for its nukes.
Re: Deterrence
Guys has really poor understanding of Indian sub-continents history and geopolitics.[/quote]SRoy wrote:Massive Retaliation
BY KREPONBut why has New Delhi adopted a posture of massive retaliation? Is it to save money or sound tough, like the Eisenhower Administration? How credible is this posture, and will New Delhi revamp it?
Maybe Krepon is partly right and partly wrong. "Massive retaliation" for India is "as much as we can throw at them". It also puts no limit on how many weapons we will eventually hold.
Re: Deterrence
Krepon, appropriately called Crapon on BRF, generates a lot of mostly that. Crap.
His problem is that he does not have a clue of what India will or will not do, and he does not have adequate understanding of the country or what makes its people behave in the way they do, to make any specific analyses on India. He undoubtedly listens to some Indians, who tell him what they think he wants to hear... This is a problem it seems the US establishment as a whole shares, which is why they keep trying to figure out our "strategic intent", our "objectives", and so forth.
They don't believe us when we tell them that all we want is peace and harmony in the world, so we can all trade happily. They want to know what we'll do if there is no peace and harmony. I don't understand why they don't know it. Our actions of May 1998 should serve as a clear indicator of how we will behave. It's going to be a frenzied mad orgy of violence with no thought of consequences, just as the parallel opposite, i.e. what we demonstrate now, is a ridiculously extreme display of restraint when the situation appears manageable. We see confrontation as end-game. That is why we are so reluctant to get into it.
His problem is that he does not have a clue of what India will or will not do, and he does not have adequate understanding of the country or what makes its people behave in the way they do, to make any specific analyses on India. He undoubtedly listens to some Indians, who tell him what they think he wants to hear... This is a problem it seems the US establishment as a whole shares, which is why they keep trying to figure out our "strategic intent", our "objectives", and so forth.
They don't believe us when we tell them that all we want is peace and harmony in the world, so we can all trade happily. They want to know what we'll do if there is no peace and harmony. I don't understand why they don't know it. Our actions of May 1998 should serve as a clear indicator of how we will behave. It's going to be a frenzied mad orgy of violence with no thought of consequences, just as the parallel opposite, i.e. what we demonstrate now, is a ridiculously extreme display of restraint when the situation appears manageable. We see confrontation as end-game. That is why we are so reluctant to get into it.
Re: Deterrence
Ajai Shukla reaches the wrong conclusion.ShauryaT wrote:Ajai Shukla: Come out of the nuclear closetYet India's nuclear doctrine badly needs a review. While the NFU pledge must quickly be scrapped, the ill-conceived commitment to "massive retaliation" is even more damaging to our nuclear credibility. Fifteen years ago, facing tight international sanctions, we needed a restrained doctrine. Today, with the security environment more challenging than ever, India's nuclear doctrine must complicate the calculus of opponents, not simplify it as the single-minded focus on massive retaliation does.
The existing nuclear doctrine - initially issued as a "draft nuclear doctrine" in August 1999, and solidified (in slightly changed form) through a gazette notification on January 4, 2003 - pledges that India "will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with massive retaliation should deterrence fail. India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapons powers".
In simple terms, this means that India will wait to get nuked before it fires nukes. Once nuked - even by a small, tactical nuclear weapon fired by, say, Pakistan on its own soil against an Indian armoured offensive, that destroys one squadron of 14 tanks and kills 45 Indian soldiers - New Delhi's response will be automatic. India's massive retaliation will unleash most of its 80-100 nuclear weapons against Pakistani towns and cities - termed "counter-value targets".
Since Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is currently larger than India's, and is dispersed and sheltered across that country, New Delhi will be visited by retaliation from the smoking ruins of Pakistan. In what is termed a "second strike", that country's nuclear command authority, safe in underground command posts, will fire its surviving nukes - and there will be many - at New Delhi, Mumbai and other Indian cities within range of its Shaheen-II ballistic missiles. In this chain of events, most of Pakistan and large swathes of India will be transformed into radioactive wastelands and hundreds of millions of people killed. Remember, this level of destruction follows from a single tactical nuclear weapon, fired by Pakistan at its own territory. Most rational people would find this scenario incredible.
Indeed, New Delhi's massive retaliation strategy rests on the belief that Pakistani policymakers are rational actors, who will avoid this cataclysm. Yet even rational actors behave irrationally when under enormous stress, such as an existential threat to one's country. While New Delhi's nuclear theologians bet our lives on the rationality of Pakistani generals, is that generous assessment corroborated by Pakistan's heedless plunge into the abyss of radicalism and jihad?
Should India's leaders have no choice but "suicide or surrender"? Remember that New Delhi, under BJP rule in 1999 (Kargil) and 2001-02 (Parliament attack), and under Congress rule in 2008 (Mumbai attack), shrank from employing even conventional military force against Pakistan. Will New Delhi sanction massive nuclear retaliation that could lead to the aptly termed MAD - mutual assured destruction? Probably not, which is why the misconceived massive retaliation strategy must be revisited even before NFU.
The nuclear doctrine says "massive retaliation" and "unacceptable damage". Shukla assumes that India will use up all it has and invite a Pakistani second strike.
In fact - given smart leadership - a Pakistani nuclear strike on its own territory that takes out 14 tanks and kills 45 soldiers could invite a wide variety of responses, including leaving open the possibility of Indian nuclear strike without warning at any time or simply punitive conventional strikes to remove command and control and other options.
In fact a Pakistan strike that has such a small effect on Indian forces should not be met with immediate retaliation. Times needs to be given for the news to spread around the world that Pakistan is the first nation to start using nuclear weapons in war after 1945.
If Pakistan hits 14 tanks on day 1 of a war - India would be making a huge error in nuking 20 Paki cities on day 2. By day 3 all the news in the world would be about the Indian attack, not the original Pakistani provocation. Recall what happened first in Godhra. Show me any western news outlet that spoke of (at that time) or speaks of (now) the provocation. For that matter who remembers how the 1965 war started and how Pakistan started the war.
So a Pakistani nuclear attack of the sort Shukla envisages should not provoke an Indian retaliation until everyone knows and has seen visuals of area that was nuked.
After that it can be open season.
But Shukla is right in bringing that up. He helps bring the issue into the consciousness of more people via the lay media. As long as people can learn about Pakistan I am for it.
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RKumar
Re: Deterrence
Shiv your logic is flawed on two fronts
1. Paki nuke will be limited to 14 tank and 45 soldiers. When we push it will be across many important points in snap escalation without giving enough time to anyone respond to it.
2. That we should wait for couple of weeks after being nuked. As it noclear matter, whole world will be preaching us to restrain and will be black mailed with economic s(uck)anction .... so on and so on. Will give pure enough time to prepare for second/third lunch by moving the assets to purer land or china. So there will be assured response within few hours. (Will it be intense or not that is another topic)
1. Paki nuke will be limited to 14 tank and 45 soldiers. When we push it will be across many important points in snap escalation without giving enough time to anyone respond to it.
2. That we should wait for couple of weeks after being nuked. As it noclear matter, whole world will be preaching us to restrain and will be black mailed with economic s(uck)anction .... so on and so on. Will give pure enough time to prepare for second/third lunch by moving the assets to purer land or china. So there will be assured response within few hours. (Will it be intense or not that is another topic)
Re: Deterrence
For 14 tanks suicide bombers are enough, why waste nukes.
A retaliation has to be immediate, massive and maximum.
If not, it makes sense wait out, practice restrain and accept LoC pushed to Aravalis.
A retaliation has to be immediate, massive and maximum.
If not, it makes sense wait out, practice restrain and accept LoC pushed to Aravalis.
Re: Deterrence
Umm I did not say two weeks - that was your guesstimate. But I think 36 to 48 hours would probably be a wise choice.In fact I think it will take at least that long to ensure that what happened in the battle area within Pakistani territory was a nuclear attack, and in fact Pakistan may well announce that the Indians have exploded a nuke on "their own tanks inside Pakistani territory" to provoke nuclear war and ensured that their losses are relatively light. Pakistan would be stupid if they start moving or hiding their nukes after launching one. They will be well hidden but readied long before. The way I see it - when India retaliates - it should be a flurry of missiles and attacks - some conventional and some nuclear. The nuclear retaliation must not be predictable, but an initial pause would, in my view be useful. Of course Pakistan could launch everything it has in that time - but that is not what Ajai Shukla envisaged the the particular scenario he suggested.RKumar wrote:Shiv your logic is flawed on two fronts
1. Paki nuke will be limited to 14 tank and 45 soldiers. When we push it will be across many important points in snap escalation without giving enough time to anyone respond to it.
2. That we should wait for couple of weeks after being nuked. As it noclear matter, whole world will be preaching us to restrain and will be black mailed with economic s(uck)anction .... so on and so on. Will give pure enough time to prepare for second/third lunch by moving the assets to purer land or china. So there will be assured response within few hours. (Will it be intense or not that is another topic)
Did you read Ajai Shukla's scenario?
In case you didn't here is a summary.
He says:
1. Pakistan will first use a nuke on its own territory and knock out 14 tanks and 45 soldiers
2. India wiil then massively retaliate and expend all its nukes
3. Pakistan which has more nukes than India, all safely hidden away will then strike back and nuke India with all it has got
What do you say about this scenario?
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member_28352
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Re: Deterrence
Why is our massive retaliation doctrine predicated on counter value targets and not on counter force targets. I think the first thing that the Indian forces will do in any major clash with Bakistan will be to take out C3I assets, infrastructure assets. Hardened bunkers having nukes etc will also be part of this. This will happen even if Bakistan doesn't use nukes.
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member_20317
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Re: Deterrence
To throw some ghee into the fires 
.
The edge of the cliff scenario sounds like the Brahmastra episode in Mahabharat. No reason to believe rationality cannot be exercised in extreme duress. Nor any reason to believe 'Massive retaliation' is irrational.
Pakis taking out 14 tanks on their own soil is kind of like arguing for their rationality. Even if we ignore the yuck factor in this line of argument still we got to remember they want to be tactically brilliant and strategically stupid. Probably gives them a feel good factor - like they are some later day Salladin.
Anyhow for me the more pertinent point is why cannot 'Massive retaliation' be regarded as rational. What if the establishment decides to nuke the two ports a clutch of airbases and some other concentrations or Mangala dam, Pindi etc. That is a pretty Massive a retaliation, if you ask me.
.The edge of the cliff scenario sounds like the Brahmastra episode in Mahabharat. No reason to believe rationality cannot be exercised in extreme duress. Nor any reason to believe 'Massive retaliation' is irrational.
Pakis taking out 14 tanks on their own soil is kind of like arguing for their rationality. Even if we ignore the yuck factor in this line of argument still we got to remember they want to be tactically brilliant and strategically stupid. Probably gives them a feel good factor - like they are some later day Salladin.
Anyhow for me the more pertinent point is why cannot 'Massive retaliation' be regarded as rational. What if the establishment decides to nuke the two ports a clutch of airbases and some other concentrations or Mangala dam, Pindi etc. That is a pretty Massive a retaliation, if you ask me.
Re: Deterrence
That's why he is painting himself silly. Massive retaliation is not being expending the stock.shiv wrote: He says:
2. India wiil then massively retaliate and expend all its nukes
Just the enough numbers to turn all TSP industrial/military/transportation hubs into ashes. If he is saying that the current Indian armory is lower than this required number then the problem is that he is not showing his calculations.
Insufficient size of armory is a separate issue. Previous govt. that were proxy for TSP interests cannot be expected to address this.
Those advocating revisiting NFU and talking of massive retaliation must have thought of addressing the inventory size problem.
Re: Deterrence
IMO "Massive retaliation" is irrational in moral terms - as the possession of nuclear weapons itself is irrational on moral terms.ravi_g wrote:
The edge of the cliff scenario sounds like the Brahmastra episode in Mahabharat. No reason to believe rationality cannot be exercised in extreme duress. Nor any reason to believe 'Massive retaliation' is irrational.
Once you decide to possess a weapon that can kill hundreds of thousands of people and make an area unlivable for humans you are already on a course of irrationality because nothing can really justify mass mindless mass "dog in manger" style murder. But after you have gone past this first hurdle and pretend that the possible use of a weapon of mass destruction can somehow be rational, one has to go to extra lengths to show how and where rationality can be introduced into this. The US started this and all nuclear weapons states are following, making a pretence that some rational reason can be found for the use of WMD. India was a latecomer - but even India realized that this charade has to be played from within the nuclear club - non nuclear states cannot join this game of how to pretend that irrational is rational.
How to pretend that irrational is rational is as follows. He (my enemy) has nukes and is threatening me. A nuclear threat is irrational but there is nothing I can do unless I can scare him. So for me the ONLY choice is to scare him back with nukes of my own. So when my adversary already has nukes it is rational for me to posses them and threaten him with them. He is irrational and only equal and opposite irrationality on my part can possibly force him back on to the rational track of not using nuclear weapons. That is what is hoped for in deterrence.
Once deterrence fails and a nuclear attack occurs the attacker, no matter what his justification, has done an irrational act of mass destruction. More mass destruction in retaliation is not rational. It is only revenge and a sense of justice for the retaliator. Killing more people in exchange for people killed is irrational. Only in certain religious doctrines is an eye for an eye rational.
Anyhow - enough of this. Nuclear war cannot be discussed in terms of rationality and morality. It really should be discussed in terms of pain, terror and suffering that one is capable and willing to cause. Screw the rationality bit.
Re: Deterrence
Counter force can be done with conventional weapons. Real pain can be inflicted by killing millions of civilians. Why end up killing a few hundred when juicy cities are waiting to be covered in death?ShankarCag wrote:Why is our massive retaliation doctrine predicated on counter value targets and not on counter force targets. I think the first thing that the Indian forces will do in any major clash with Bakistan will be to take out C3I assets, infrastructure assets. Hardened bunkers having nukes etc will also be part of this. This will happen even if Bakistan doesn't use nukes.
I just wonder, if China were given a choice - which two cities would they gladly lose in nuclear war.
Re: Deterrence
Massive retaliation is the only thing that Pakis worry about. Their hope so far is westrn useful idiots like Crapon and White House will prevent Indian retaliation. Shyam Saran as the NSAB director disabused them of this hope and ever since there is cacophony of US experts advocating India should not use massive retaliation. Right after POKII tests a bevy of US experts ( 
) had proclaimed that India would not use nukes on TSP due to prevailing winds, proximity of TSP cities to Indian border regions, WWKitis of the Indian political elite, pappi-jhappi of the Indian Punjabi elite. All this emboldened TSP to launch Kargil and then J&K assy and Lok Sabha attacks.
So after SeS sellout SS (not SSM!) made his now famous speech and now wea re here.
) had proclaimed that India would not use nukes on TSP due to prevailing winds, proximity of TSP cities to Indian border regions, WWKitis of the Indian political elite, pappi-jhappi of the Indian Punjabi elite. All this emboldened TSP to launch Kargil and then J&K assy and Lok Sabha attacks.So after SeS sellout SS (not SSM!) made his now famous speech and now wea re here.
Re: Deterrence
Our deterrence policy with respect to Pakistan should be changed(with the attendant deterrent capability) and phrased as follows:
(1)Any use of, or credible information about the impending use of
(2)nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction
(3)at any scale
(4)on Indian civilian, military, economic assets within India or outside by
(5)Pakistan, Individuals/Organizations in or 'outside its control' using its weapons, people, infracture or geography
(6)will invite an Immediate nuclear response which will
(7)result in Total and Complete Annihilation of Pakistan's civilian, military and economic assets (within or outside Pakistan) specifically, (8)and Pakistan as a country in general,
(9)and also upon any country(or its Individuals/Organizations in or 'outside its control') which provides material help to Pakistan(or Individuals/Organizations in or 'outside its control' ),
(10)while maintaining a strong deterrence posture against any countries
(11)that attempt to coerce India into not carrying out or impede the said nuclear response
(12)or is a threat in any way to India after the event.
(1)Any use of, or credible information about the impending use of
(2)nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction
(3)at any scale
(4)on Indian civilian, military, economic assets within India or outside by
(5)Pakistan, Individuals/Organizations in or 'outside its control' using its weapons, people, infracture or geography
(6)will invite an Immediate nuclear response which will
(7)result in Total and Complete Annihilation of Pakistan's civilian, military and economic assets (within or outside Pakistan) specifically, (8)and Pakistan as a country in general,
(9)and also upon any country(or its Individuals/Organizations in or 'outside its control') which provides material help to Pakistan(or Individuals/Organizations in or 'outside its control' ),
(10)while maintaining a strong deterrence posture against any countries
(11)that attempt to coerce India into not carrying out or impede the said nuclear response
(12)or is a threat in any way to India after the event.
Re: Deterrence
Ajay Shuklaji writes
Lets take this one step at a time.
Step 1:
New Delhi's massive retaliation strategy rests on the belief that Pakistani policymakers are rational actors, who will avoid this cataclysm.
Any state that acquires nukes by any means is rational for it wants to ward of threats to its existence.
Step 2:
even rational actors behave irrationally when under enormous stress, such as an existential threat to one's country.
Contradiction for if they worry about the existential threat to theri country they are rational which demolished his own argument.
Step 3:
New Delhi's nuclear theologians bet our lives on the rationality of Pakistani generals, is that generous assessment corroborated by Pakistan's heedless plunge into the abyss of radicalism and jihad?
Pakistan is very rational in plunging into heedless radicalism and jihad for it has the nukes to prevent invasion by India in retaliation. By threatening massive retaliation India is forcing the majority of jihadis to be confined in TSP.
Indeed, New Delhi's massive retaliation strategy rests on the belief that Pakistani policymakers are rational actors, who will avoid this cataclysm. Yet even rational actors behave irrationally when under enormous stress, such as an existential threat to one's country. While New Delhi's nuclear theologians bet our lives on the rationality of Pakistani generals, is that generous assessment corroborated by Pakistan's heedless plunge into the abyss of radicalism and jihad?
Lets take this one step at a time.
Step 1:
New Delhi's massive retaliation strategy rests on the belief that Pakistani policymakers are rational actors, who will avoid this cataclysm.
Any state that acquires nukes by any means is rational for it wants to ward of threats to its existence.
Step 2:
even rational actors behave irrationally when under enormous stress, such as an existential threat to one's country.
Contradiction for if they worry about the existential threat to theri country they are rational which demolished his own argument.
Step 3:
New Delhi's nuclear theologians bet our lives on the rationality of Pakistani generals, is that generous assessment corroborated by Pakistan's heedless plunge into the abyss of radicalism and jihad?
Pakistan is very rational in plunging into heedless radicalism and jihad for it has the nukes to prevent invasion by India in retaliation. By threatening massive retaliation India is forcing the majority of jihadis to be confined in TSP.
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brihaspati
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Re: Deterrence
The best way would be to create so much fear of massive retaliation that either way Pakis lose.
(a) if they nuke in fear - they lose moral ground and any degree of even asymmetric retaliation by conventional means would no longer be protested by "humanitarians"
(b) if they dont nuke, you can still bring in massive damage through conventional means.
(a) if they nuke in fear - they lose moral ground and any degree of even asymmetric retaliation by conventional means would no longer be protested by "humanitarians"
(b) if they dont nuke, you can still bring in massive damage through conventional means.
Re: Deterrence
"Feedback" anyone? In case of extended nuclear exchange?
Setting aside the possibility that the NATO/Russia/China/Klaatu + GORT/etc will not bomb our nuke assets to stop our retaliation, what about feedback generated within the country on the "See what they did to our Armored Brigade deep in Pakistan yesterday! Shall we nuke Chaklala and Sargodha now.... and escalate if the Pakis don't listen?" thing? That is assuming the political opposition/opponents within the government/press/social media generate enough momentum in this regard. One can even assume unmanageable mass panic in Mumbai, Delhi, Jaipur, Lucknow, Chandigarh, Amritsar, Pune at least as even the Lotus Eaters in these cities will know their hometowns feature high-up the counter-value list (they will be well "educated" on this fact by various sources). Then there would be the IM/ISI strikes and riots. So there's this "feedback" to consider too.
Our NCA buried deep in the Aravallis or something will have to factor this element even if L&O has broken down across the country. Maybe as you stretch this out things will become even worse?
PS: Even in SS's old Deterrence & Equilibrium thread and previous pages of this thread I remember little discussion of Aam Admi "feedback", L&O and panic factor. IIRC.
PPS: A different topic - Pakis haven't nuclearized their green-paint HN-1/HN-2 yet - or maybe even the SRBM/MRBM. Too hair trigger and destabilizing apparently (remember those articles in the forum and BRM?). Now once they nuclearize at impending war, these highly mobile and dispersed elements, in deep ravines and caves a-la the Chinese, will be more Counter Force then some hardened base storing some last reserve nukes/F-16s no? And to get these areas you need nukes too. And to counter KS-1/KS-2 and other Air Defense.....
Setting aside the possibility that the NATO/Russia/China/Klaatu + GORT/etc will not bomb our nuke assets to stop our retaliation, what about feedback generated within the country on the "See what they did to our Armored Brigade deep in Pakistan yesterday! Shall we nuke Chaklala and Sargodha now.... and escalate if the Pakis don't listen?" thing? That is assuming the political opposition/opponents within the government/press/social media generate enough momentum in this regard. One can even assume unmanageable mass panic in Mumbai, Delhi, Jaipur, Lucknow, Chandigarh, Amritsar, Pune at least as even the Lotus Eaters in these cities will know their hometowns feature high-up the counter-value list (they will be well "educated" on this fact by various sources). Then there would be the IM/ISI strikes and riots. So there's this "feedback" to consider too.
Our NCA buried deep in the Aravallis or something will have to factor this element even if L&O has broken down across the country. Maybe as you stretch this out things will become even worse?
PS: Even in SS's old Deterrence & Equilibrium thread and previous pages of this thread I remember little discussion of Aam Admi "feedback", L&O and panic factor. IIRC.
PPS: A different topic - Pakis haven't nuclearized their green-paint HN-1/HN-2 yet - or maybe even the SRBM/MRBM. Too hair trigger and destabilizing apparently (remember those articles in the forum and BRM?). Now once they nuclearize at impending war, these highly mobile and dispersed elements, in deep ravines and caves a-la the Chinese, will be more Counter Force then some hardened base storing some last reserve nukes/F-16s no? And to get these areas you need nukes too. And to counter KS-1/KS-2 and other Air Defense.....
Last edited by Anand K on 22 Apr 2014 09:44, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Deterrence
Anand advice to Shukla applies to all.
Re: Deterrence
^^
Which one?
Which one?
Re: Deterrence
I just did some string searches in this dhaaga - "panic", "riots", "law+order", "breakdown" and saw that the scant times these appear it's in relation with the size of the bombs dropped. That is as a variable in the "length of the sword" issue. Not exactly on the law & order and governance issue. Not on the FEAR aspect. AFAIK.
I wonder, don't you need to see if your own people are deterred? I mean, the people, press, and the bottom rungs of the state if not the well informed higher-ups? Especially in the case of a stretched nuke exchange scenario as Shiv speaks about? Or is it not a factor at all and the priority is to ensure the leadership survives and sort up the mess later on? I mean, even in this extreme case (lose many cities and forces) the leadership knows they will have to be accountable to what's left of India right?
In the 2004/2005 SS thread I raised this point a senior member/admin told me let's not take the discussion that way. In another thread I asked about how in the case of extended nuke exchange (or even conventional war) the CRPF jawan from fear-struck Chandigarh is going to feel when he patrols riot hit Malappuram and things like that? No response.
Maybe the length of the sword and if the sword is forged correctly is not the only thing that matters? Fear is the key?
I have seen some articles on modeling public response in the US society in nuclear war scenario and I thought in case of India this will be 100x chaotic...... So why bother with factoring this huh? It's going to be a unmanageable toss-up anyway? 
I wonder, don't you need to see if your own people are deterred? I mean, the people, press, and the bottom rungs of the state if not the well informed higher-ups? Especially in the case of a stretched nuke exchange scenario as Shiv speaks about? Or is it not a factor at all and the priority is to ensure the leadership survives and sort up the mess later on? I mean, even in this extreme case (lose many cities and forces) the leadership knows they will have to be accountable to what's left of India right?
In the 2004/2005 SS thread I raised this point a senior member/admin told me let's not take the discussion that way. In another thread I asked about how in the case of extended nuke exchange (or even conventional war) the CRPF jawan from fear-struck Chandigarh is going to feel when he patrols riot hit Malappuram and things like that? No response.
Maybe the length of the sword and if the sword is forged correctly is not the only thing that matters? Fear is the key?
I have seen some articles on modeling public response in the US society in nuclear war scenario and I thought in case of India this will be 100x chaotic...... So why bother with factoring this huh? It's going to be a unmanageable toss-up anyway? Re: Deterrence
I have gradually begun to view the rationality-irrationality argument in deterrence as pointless without a clear definition of what any particular group/nation considers as rational. "Rationality" depends on perspective. Everything can be declared rational (or irrational) depending on how the argument is worded.
It is important, in my view, to define what we believe is rational behaviour and what we believe is irrational.
For example we could set the rational redline as "Not using nuclear weapons against us". Irrationality would be "using nukes against us". For this perspective, Pakistan is irrational for using nukes no matter what their excuse might be "oops, we fear destruction" or "Oh Oh non state actor stole the nuke"
We cannot have an "excuses/justifications based" system of judging someone else's rationality. Ideally, we must not test the other person's rationality for validity and then decide our response. But this trick depends on our definition of rationality. If we say "Pakistan's using nukes against us is not justified if it is unprovoked, but it is justified and rational if they use it while we attack them" - then what we are doing is telling ourselves that we must not attack Pakistan. Pakistan uses this trick on India. Pakistan defines rationality as "India not attacking Pakistan". "If India attacks Pakistan, it is being irrational and we will nuke India"
Do we then believe our own red line which is "Do not nuke us"?, or do we believe Pakistan's red line which is "Do not attack us at all"
If we believe Pakistan's red line it means our own red line is almost worthless.
It is important, in my view, to define what we believe is rational behaviour and what we believe is irrational.
For example we could set the rational redline as "Not using nuclear weapons against us". Irrationality would be "using nukes against us". For this perspective, Pakistan is irrational for using nukes no matter what their excuse might be "oops, we fear destruction" or "Oh Oh non state actor stole the nuke"
We cannot have an "excuses/justifications based" system of judging someone else's rationality. Ideally, we must not test the other person's rationality for validity and then decide our response. But this trick depends on our definition of rationality. If we say "Pakistan's using nukes against us is not justified if it is unprovoked, but it is justified and rational if they use it while we attack them" - then what we are doing is telling ourselves that we must not attack Pakistan. Pakistan uses this trick on India. Pakistan defines rationality as "India not attacking Pakistan". "If India attacks Pakistan, it is being irrational and we will nuke India"
Do we then believe our own red line which is "Do not nuke us"?, or do we believe Pakistan's red line which is "Do not attack us at all"
If we believe Pakistan's red line it means our own red line is almost worthless.
Re: Deterrence
Exhibit-A: Industry captains rushing to ABV to "stop the Parakram atikramam" instead of going all IG Farben or Siemens or Imperial Japan Elite.
Exhibit-B: Fearful, anguished screaming relatives picketing 7 RCR when the flight was hijacked. Instead of proclaiming them as martyrs for the country and faith and all that instead.
Exhibit-C: Intense Casteism and Regionalism in India
Exhibit-D: Indian elites closely tied (all aspects) to a dozen Indian metros
...
Exhibit-ZZZZ: Indian economy and people are getting along pretty well with an eye on worldly life and a future for the children. Unlike miserable Pakis where large sections (of state/non-state powers/people) are fatalistic or at least consequentialist-ic or even seek End of Times ("Objection: Unsubstantiated statement?" )
So, who will crumble faster? Who has.... more to lose? So what does this mean for Red Lines?
Exhibit-B: Fearful, anguished screaming relatives picketing 7 RCR when the flight was hijacked. Instead of proclaiming them as martyrs for the country and faith and all that instead.
Exhibit-C: Intense Casteism and Regionalism in India
Exhibit-D: Indian elites closely tied (all aspects) to a dozen Indian metros
...
Exhibit-ZZZZ: Indian economy and people are getting along pretty well with an eye on worldly life and a future for the children. Unlike miserable Pakis where large sections (of state/non-state powers/people) are fatalistic or at least consequentialist-ic or even seek End of Times ("Objection: Unsubstantiated statement?"
)So, who will crumble faster? Who has.... more to lose? So what does this mean for Red Lines?
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member_28352
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Re: Deterrence
IMHO Shukla does have a point. While his reasoning is asinine, that of India expending all its weapons in a massive retaliation, there is a hint of truth in the fact that the doctrine of NFU and massive retaliation needs to be revisited. I would go so far as to say that massive retaliation is an intellectual and strategic copout atleast from India's perspective as far as Pakistan is concerned.. I had talked about counter force targets in an earlier post. As Hakim sahab rightly points out counter force targets can be blasted using conventional weapons too. Also conventional weapons don't need a NFU doctrine for use. So in a future bi$$ing contest with the Al Bakis we should pre-emptively remove their C3I,infrastructure,hardened bunkers,missile silos and physics package storage dumps, atleast all of what we know exists. There is hardwork and expense that is needed to achieve this, i.e. superior intelligence, accurate weapons delivery platforms, such as Brahmos, Nirbhay and Air launched Brahmos and Prithvi,Prahaar,Pinaka missiles and rockets. Essentially wipe out the force multipliers and WMD stores of the Bakis in a pre-emptive conventional strike. If after this the Bakis still find a few crackers to explode then opt for massive retaliation, i.e. counter value targets. Ideally after this there should be no second strike capability available to the Bakis. If we do all of the above we should be able to deter the Bakis.
Last edited by member_28352 on 22 Apr 2014 09:38, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Deterrence
There isn't goanna be enough CRPF personal for what might come next.
Re: Deterrence
The Red Lines are lines in the sand in a desert with howling winds. They have no meaning, IMO, when it comes to the crunch. During peaceful times, these nuclear doctrines help to project a certain 'rationality' of an 'irrational' WMD. Like the Newtonian laws being not applicable when it comes to atomic and sub-atomic particles and their behaviour, these doctrines are worthless when detente-like situations disappear and real hostility develops. Until such time, these might be useful in projecting a false piety to the external world. No nation develops its real war fighting doctrine based on these patently false nuclear doctrines.
Re: Deterrence
Talk about not enough CRPF....
There's almost no apocalyptic fiction in India right? Even though we have cyclic mythos and a Shiva the Destroyer..... and also a large number of Muslims who have Armageddon fundae. Does that mean something?
There's almost no apocalyptic fiction in India right? Even though we have cyclic mythos and a Shiva the Destroyer..... and also a large number of Muslims who have Armageddon fundae. Does that mean something?
Re: Deterrence
Raeding the last page of this thread and the position espoused by the members regarding the merits of massive retaliation or the lack thereof. I was transferred to the movie apocalypse now, and the monologue by col krurtz.
About the value of judgement, how it defeats us.
Having said so. Once nukes have been used. Regardless of the scale, bu the enemy. Indian response must be free of any form of moral judgement. It must be absolute, it must be devastating. It must be unambiguous.
Else we will be subjecting our future generations to continous nuke black mail.
About the value of judgement, how it defeats us.
Having said so. Once nukes have been used. Regardless of the scale, bu the enemy. Indian response must be free of any form of moral judgement. It must be absolute, it must be devastating. It must be unambiguous.
Else we will be subjecting our future generations to continous nuke black mail.
Re: Deterrence
If I may go out on a limb, Pakis and ChiComs know that India fears nuking them not because India doesn't have the strength (or doubts it's strength) to nuke them enough [at least in a unacceptable loss terms anyway]. Indian leadership would be shit-scared about what to do with a heavily nuked India - because they fear whatever threads that holds India together as a state and Indian people accepting the state as a fact in everyday life will be torn as a result of nuclear war and riots and breakdown of L&O and all that. Perhaps for good.
Whatever be said, Indian leaderships/elites will not risk the absolute sundering of the state - they perceive there's no way they can bring back it to what it was. Heh, it is a miracle we got this far as a state in the first place IMHO! With large number of Indians losing faith in the Indian leadership and thus the Indian State itself, for causing such huge losses in life and property, picking up the pieces will be near impossible.
That is, unless dour and determined enough force recasts the broken pieces and recasts Indian society. Which again will be quite difficult. Heh, try telling the newly seceded Republic of Meghalaya to come back into the union after the dust has settled. They will say - "Bhy for, hain? To get our Shillong nuked by the Burmese next? The Chinese cruise missile strikes were bad enough, you Hindustani fu(kers! And we got the U.S. 101st Airborne to safeguard our sovereignty too HAHAHAHAHA!."
PS: If there's such a ruin you can be sure there will be NATO/UN troops here also to preserve heh... law and order.
JM2c
Whatever be said, Indian leaderships/elites will not risk the absolute sundering of the state - they perceive there's no way they can bring back it to what it was. Heh, it is a miracle we got this far as a state in the first place IMHO! With large number of Indians losing faith in the Indian leadership and thus the Indian State itself, for causing such huge losses in life and property, picking up the pieces will be near impossible.
That is, unless dour and determined enough force recasts the broken pieces and recasts Indian society. Which again will be quite difficult. Heh, try telling the newly seceded Republic of Meghalaya to come back into the union after the dust has settled. They will say - "Bhy for, hain? To get our Shillong nuked by the Burmese next? The Chinese cruise missile strikes were bad enough, you Hindustani fu(kers! And we got the U.S. 101st Airborne to safeguard our sovereignty too HAHAHAHAHA!."
PS: If there's such a ruin you can be sure there will be NATO/UN troops here also to preserve heh... law and order.
JM2c
Re: Deterrence
We need to understand, how the state has responded to natural disasters, in the recent past. If one looks at the kutch quake, one is reassured that the state can re assert it self and mobilise the necessary resources to help out in the event of a crisis. But if we are to look at the response of the uk floods of the last year. We see that the state was ill equipped to handle the event.
I guess it is a function of who is at the helm of affairs. If you have a capable leader the reminder of the administration will respond to the challenge and achieve the near impossible.
But it you have a leader who has no faith in the national ability to cope. We will go to pieces.
We must have leadership, that is sure of itself and the nation. In order to deal with the aftermath of any major disaster or a nuke attack on a population centre. If we are to sail through.
I guess it is a function of who is at the helm of affairs. If you have a capable leader the reminder of the administration will respond to the challenge and achieve the near impossible.
But it you have a leader who has no faith in the national ability to cope. We will go to pieces.
We must have leadership, that is sure of itself and the nation. In order to deal with the aftermath of any major disaster or a nuke attack on a population centre. If we are to sail through.
Re: Deterrence
IMO if a large section of our professional armies are destroyed in such a war and sections of executive/police/military leadership are killed it will be difficult to bring the rump in order. Even if you have a sliver of very capable leadership surviving. And PAC/SAP/CRPF type units don't have the discipline or training of the Army for this tough nation-building task - heck, we had a whole UP PAC battalion revolt in the 70s and the Army had to kill a hundred of them. Not to forget that Sikh Battalion in '84 and the multitude of other ugly events which call into question the integrity of the State structure.
Another factor - Indian leadership has only India. Even the ones with nest eggs in Swiss chateaus and even those with pocket boroughs and transferable vote-banks that know that a singular Indian State is their only and ultimate source of strength. It's not like the Paki elites who can find succor in KSA/Qatar/UK and one day return with the CENTCOM C-in-C, the Saud King, the Shawl of the Prophet and Caliph Umar's AK-47 or something for "ultimate authority". They are a rentier state anyway! The Chinese people OTOH are used to this kind of genocidal chaos and matsyanyaya anarchy anyway (throughout their history), and when the dust settles their quite homogeneous sheeple can be quite probably controlled with application of sufficient enough pressure. In time. Can the same be done in a no-more-unity-in-diversity-India?
IMO this kind of thinking could be a factor that stays our hand every time. "We got a lot more to lose" and all that...
Makes me wonder if we will retaliate to a battle-field strike or a deniable JDAM dirty bomb.
Another factor - Indian leadership has only India. Even the ones with nest eggs in Swiss chateaus and even those with pocket boroughs and transferable vote-banks that know that a singular Indian State is their only and ultimate source of strength. It's not like the Paki elites who can find succor in KSA/Qatar/UK and one day return with the CENTCOM C-in-C, the Saud King, the Shawl of the Prophet and Caliph Umar's AK-47 or something for "ultimate authority". They are a rentier state anyway! The Chinese people OTOH are used to this kind of genocidal chaos and matsyanyaya anarchy anyway (throughout their history), and when the dust settles their quite homogeneous sheeple can be quite probably controlled with application of sufficient enough pressure. In time. Can the same be done in a no-more-unity-in-diversity-India?
IMO this kind of thinking could be a factor that stays our hand every time. "We got a lot more to lose" and all that...
Makes me wonder if we will retaliate to a battle-field strike or a deniable JDAM dirty bomb.
Re: Deterrence
Anand K,
You mean unlike Indian leaders who are scared of what will happen in a nuclear devastated India, the Paks, Chinese, Americans, etc are not scared of what the situation will be in their own nuclear devastated countries?
Or are you suggesting that India won't do anything in the face of a concerted attack from the NATO, Russia, China & Pakistan. I mean, how else would they be able to co-ordinate for a peacekeeping force in post-attack India?
I'm not clear what you mean above...
You mean unlike Indian leaders who are scared of what will happen in a nuclear devastated India, the Paks, Chinese, Americans, etc are not scared of what the situation will be in their own nuclear devastated countries?
Or are you suggesting that India won't do anything in the face of a concerted attack from the NATO, Russia, China & Pakistan. I mean, how else would they be able to co-ordinate for a peacekeeping force in post-attack India?
I'm not clear what you mean above...
Re: Deterrence
In a nutshell, the Paki elites and their 3.5 can live with a rump Pakistan, it's people be damned. Hey, it's already something like that. They also have Islamic and Elite links to fall back upon. Chinese society, due to it's homogeneous nature and demographics and more importantly 70s years of Commie Iron Hand can be brought in order. At great cost and over some time, but that's nothing new in China. But OTOH, our leadership has a large stake in existence of the singular Indian state. Perhaps they feel that a post-nuke India can never ever be reforged and that is too big a milch cow to loose (if not for reasons of patriotism and continuity of the state for the heck of it). That also makes our threshold quite "relaxed". Consequently, an Indian FU against cities or galling counter-force targets seems quite unlikely IMO.JE Menon wrote:Anand K,
You mean unlike Indian leaders who are scared of what will happen in a nuclear devastated India, the Paks, Chinese, Americans, etc are not scared of what the situation will be in their own nuclear devastated countries?
Or are you suggesting that India won't do anything in the face of a concerted attack from the NATO, Russia, China & Pakistan. I mean, how else would they be able to co-ordinate for a peacekeeping force in post-attack India?
I'm not clear what you mean above...
Now in case we are pushed against a wall (as in a Global Alliance against India
) or a shooting war with Chi-Pak where they nuke a few cities of ours), it's a different matter and IMO we will have no choice but to respond. In THAT case it won't be anything like Prime Minister Dixit from that "Dragonfire" trash who "doesn't want to condemn millions of humans to death". Maybe we'll even do a Jauhar Option. JM2c
Last edited by Anand K on 22 Apr 2014 12:32, edited 1 time in total.
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member_20317
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Re: Deterrence
Bhailog,
Remember we all love democracy and the participative sense of control and power it hands out. So would we really want to bind ourself in fear while affording all the flexibility of doctrine writing, nuke manufacturing and consequent international gun slinging, think tanking, to our opponents. After all Nukes do play a part, have been used, have been lived through, have been made.
Beginning the argument from Fear is kind of like certifying that Deterrence would work in all situations because then everybody can be presumed to be fearful (unless the 1 Momin == 10 Yindu is accepted). But then if fear is so universal then why not just ban nukes and release each other from continual fear - would that be too MMS to the taste buds? (ok the later part was mischief, sorry about that)
Be that as it may, I say, 'Chance' is just as universal as 'Fear'. Chance as in chance maro. Jisko chance milta hai vo chance jaroor marta hai, bhai. See you can always balance the inequation caused by fear.
Some fears can be quite interesting though, to analyse that is. Like US will pre-empt the Indian massive counter strike. Yeh! these bums wasted 10 years of their life after losing 2 buildings, lets see what they do after they find two SDRE doing the unmentionable in the unmentionable. @Panduranghari ji, what would happen hain ji?
Fear of losing the near and dear is not something that has not happened before to Indians, at a mass scale. IC-814 passenger manifest cannot really be scale fitted to the nation at large. Chinese too have tasted mass deaths.
The only fear I see is the fear of finality itself. Not being able to reverse the results of the path taken. I guess not even the biggest hedge markets can ever make one feel safe in this regard. Safety is linked with skills not with a hedge call, such is life alas! Wish the warm cozy feeling of safety was available over the counter paid through a credit card.
..............
Can I have the freedom to reverse my stands as and when I feel like. We would call it enlightenment.
Remember we all love democracy and the participative sense of control and power it hands out. So would we really want to bind ourself in fear while affording all the flexibility of doctrine writing, nuke manufacturing and consequent international gun slinging, think tanking, to our opponents. After all Nukes do play a part, have been used, have been lived through, have been made.
Beginning the argument from Fear is kind of like certifying that Deterrence would work in all situations because then everybody can be presumed to be fearful (unless the 1 Momin == 10 Yindu is accepted). But then if fear is so universal then why not just ban nukes
and release each other from continual fear - would that be too MMS to the taste buds? (ok the later part was mischief, sorry about that)Be that as it may, I say, 'Chance' is just as universal as 'Fear'. Chance as in chance maro. Jisko chance milta hai vo chance jaroor marta hai, bhai. See you can always balance the inequation caused by fear.
Some fears can be quite interesting though, to analyse that is. Like US will pre-empt the Indian massive counter strike. Yeh! these bums wasted 10 years of their life after losing 2 buildings, lets see what they do after they find two SDRE doing the unmentionable in the unmentionable. @Panduranghari ji, what would happen hain ji?
Fear of losing the near and dear is not something that has not happened before to Indians, at a mass scale. IC-814 passenger manifest cannot really be scale fitted to the nation at large. Chinese too have tasted mass deaths.
The only fear I see is the fear of finality itself. Not being able to reverse the results of the path taken. I guess not even the biggest hedge markets can ever make one feel safe in this regard. Safety is linked with skills not with a hedge call, such is life alas! Wish the warm cozy feeling of safety was available over the counter paid through a credit card.
..............
Can I have the freedom to reverse my stands as and when I feel like. We would call it enlightenment.
Last edited by member_20317 on 22 Apr 2014 13:01, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Deterrence
Well, fear was the root cause of the original WMD question, no? Projected 200K U.S. fatalities in Op Coronet/Op Olympic alone? Kremlin's fear of budding Manhattan Project making America far too powerful leading to establishing their WMD program? SACEUR's fear of vast & dispersed Red Army Arty Divisions pounding down the U.S. forces from afar leading to the H-Bomb? And so on....But then if fear is so universal then why not just ban nukes
Now that the nukes are here to stay, your own fears and the fears of one's own people have to be factored heavily into the deterrence game. And they indeed are, when imagining where the Deterrence valley bottoms out..... after all, you should know what deters you in the first place before modelling your foes' fear. Isn't that the core of deterrence? That's also why USSR/US had MAD and Chinese had Armed Suasion with Minimal Nuke Force (for a long time) and India has/had a MCD.
Re: Deterrence
BTW, when was the last time mass death directly due to war happened in India? The terrible famine in '43 in Bengal took 4 million lives but it was not exactly the same right? Bombs, artillery duels, drafts, militias, blackouts, sirens, rations, own & invading armies, executions, rapes and all that? Or for that matter, mass deaths from a single bomb that leaves residues that can harm generations? The Japanese sure got changed - by the nukes and the firestorms from single raids. The Red Army "Sea of Fire" assaults and the firestorms also changed German society considerably. Indian society now ain't exactly the same as the indoctrinated and quite united '40s Germany or Japan society or Russia, eh? We Indians have not faced large scale collapse and flight of leadership and death due to war, on industrial scale, for a long time.... not since the Medieval Wars. Hope we never do again. Heck, we haven't faced even the Draft yet or a "long" war or a glorious Total War. But then the 1962 and '65 mobilizations and wars themselves hurt our economy so bad that it ultimately snowballed into a lost 25 years right?Fear of losing the near and dear is not something that has not happened before to Indians, at a mass scale. IC-814 passenger manifest cannot really be scale fitted to the nation at large. Chinese too have tasted mass deaths.
No offense but I think one shouldn't be so flippant about death and destruction due to war. The immediate and long term effects and the cognizance on WMDs (among general public) have to be factored in - significantly. And will that factor paralyze us enough not to retaliate against a JDAM dirty bomb/tactical strike or something like that? Well.... that's another issue. I for one think we would not escalate with nukes to that. But I could very well be wrong - Armchair General wonlee.
Jm2c.
Re: Deterrence
Anand K,
So if I understand correctly, your view is that India is not going to do an all-out FU. I thought in your initial post you meant India was scared of going all-out in any scenario.
I agree, India will not go all out FU. I don’t think it will go for FU even in the case of small tactical strike… the majority of public will not be able to process that kind of aggression and will not countenance it. Which is why, I believe, we are quite comfortable with a very circumscribed NFU policy.
But, as far as retaliation to a strike by one or more powers is concerned, I have little doubt that it would bring in end-game considerations on our part - “jauhar” as you put it – if the reading of the outcome is that it will be a disintegrated polity. It is entirely feasible that we will use all our resources in such a circumstance against everyone.
No one will be spared, even outside the 3.5. From a purely philosophical point of view, that will not be a hard sell to Indians – i.e. death with honour and inflicting maximum damage on the opponent – in the face of certain annihilation.
I suppose the “Jauhar Option” is as good a name as any.
So if I understand correctly, your view is that India is not going to do an all-out FU. I thought in your initial post you meant India was scared of going all-out in any scenario.
I agree, India will not go all out FU. I don’t think it will go for FU even in the case of small tactical strike… the majority of public will not be able to process that kind of aggression and will not countenance it. Which is why, I believe, we are quite comfortable with a very circumscribed NFU policy.
But, as far as retaliation to a strike by one or more powers is concerned, I have little doubt that it would bring in end-game considerations on our part - “jauhar” as you put it – if the reading of the outcome is that it will be a disintegrated polity. It is entirely feasible that we will use all our resources in such a circumstance against everyone.
No one will be spared, even outside the 3.5. From a purely philosophical point of view, that will not be a hard sell to Indians – i.e. death with honour and inflicting maximum damage on the opponent – in the face of certain annihilation.
I suppose the “Jauhar Option” is as good a name as any.