Bharat Rakshak

chetak wrote:{quote="Sudip"}
Musharraf advocates Pak-Israel ties
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pankajs wrote:I am thinking of it as a move by Mush to get the chair that dus-percenti may have to vacate.

Anujan wrote:Pakis are a lost cause. It doesn't matter what we do or say anymore. A bloodbath inside pakiland followed by the emergence of one power center which has consolidated its power is needed before India can influence Pakiland through carrot, stick, surrender, treachery or whatever. So everyone chill out.

At this stage, even if we are ready to surrender JK we don't know who to call in Pakiland to share the good news. 10%? Groper? (They are hanging to their chairs) Ashphuck? Pasha? (They are an inch from being qadrified by the TFTAs) Various Yahoos fleeing the predators? (They are freezing in the cold without gas and electricity). Who exactly would we call to surrender ?

Unkil and taller than deep sea friend also have this problem. So they are setting up a telephone number first.

SSridhar wrote:Now, even his party, APML, would be hard-pressed to defend his stance. Wait for a day or two for reaction from his party leaders in Pakistan.

The only way this friendship offer can be turned around in favour of Musharraf is if Israel demonstrates in a very large measure its generosity in terms of funds and weapons and its opposition to India simultaneously. Even then, it will be a matter of touch and go. This is not going to happen at all.

CRamS wrote:

And his speech that goes on to toe the GoI line is filled with digs at Pakistan.

Big deal. And TSP takes lotsa digs at India too in return. What is required is thappad, and many of them, on TSP's backside.

The civil-military imbalance in Islamabad is a key factor impeding India-Pakistan relations . . . The dominant role played by the security establishment in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy and the powerful military’s long-standing links with jihadi groups are issues that will have to be addressed to put the bilateral relationship on an even keel. . . elements in Pakistan had for long sponsored terrorists and jihadis as part of a policy meant to “bleed India” . . . The Pakistan Army was one of the most “lavishly funded” armies of the world and has a “stranglehold over policy” while no elected civilian government had ever completed its term . . . The Pakistan Army was one of the most “lavishly funded” armies of the world and has a “stranglehold over policy” while no elected civilian government had ever completed its term . . .The army lays down the red lines that political leaders dare not cross . . . a civilian administration in Pakistan that neither controls nor launches militants for terrorist attacks {the implication here is that it is the PA that launches the terrorists}. . . People in India also questioned whether the Pakistan Army would agree if a civilian dispensation decided that India is not a threat . . . peace overtures made by President Asif Ali Zardari shortly after he came to power and the army’s negative reaction to them showed that the President “went farther than the army was willing to allow him to”.

Short of catching hold of Lt. gen. Asad Durrani (who was sitting there) by his collar and slapping him, Tharoor has done everything else, IMHO only.

SSridhar wrote:From Tharoor's website, here are some statements he made at the Jinnah Institute which is the closest an Indian politician can get to PA.
I have not known of any politician or leader or General from any other country speak so damningly and so extensively on Pakistani soil about the PA, and that too at a PA-run think tank. Full marks to Shashi Tharoor here. Short of catching hold of Lt. gen. Asad Durrani (who was sitting there) by his collar and slapping him, Tharoor has done everything else, IMHO only.

In his first ever interview to an Israeli daily, Ha'aretz, Musharraf insisted on his innocence and said he was 100 per cent sure about himself that he did not know he (Osama bin Laden) was there.

"I say the question is, was there complicity or negligence? And I strongly believe it was negligence. Of course, that's not great either, it's terrible negligence and shameful. But, while both are bad - complicity would be worse," said the former president, who became a key ally of the West in the fight against terror post 9/11.

WASHINGTON – Afghan President Hamid Karzai has maintained that the United States is fighting war on terror ‘on wrong side of the border’.
In an interview with American newspaper The Daily Beast published on Saturday, Hamid Karzai said “They [the Americans] were not happy with the way I stood up for certain issues in Afghanistan such as [NATO-caused] civilian casualties, night raids, and relations with Pakistan.” On Pakistan, Karzai said he believes the Americans are fighting on the wrong side of the border. “The war on terror in my view [should not have been fought] in Afghanistan, in Afghan villages and homes,” he added. “But in the [Pakistani] sanctuaries, and the training, motivational and financial grounds that [the Taliban] have there. And the US did not go there for 10 years. We know where the troubles were coming from but they [the Americans] did nothing about it.”
He is also miffed that the US has been talking to the Taliban behind his back over the setting up of a Taliban representative office in the Gulf state of Qatar, even after Washington insists that the peace process must be Afghan led and Afghan owned. “[It’s] definitely not [Afghan led,”] he said.
“That’s the problem. We have told the Americans that.” Even so, he said he will support the Qatar option for talks. “We will go along with it for the return of peace to Afghanistan as soon as possible.”
He also said that he ‘welcomed’ the statement by US Vice President Joe Biden that the Taliban ‘are not the enemy per se’. “We hope that [statement] will end all the reasons and excuses for the causing of casualties and harm to the Afghan people.” Karzai said he and his government will maintain their own negotiating track with the Taliban. “We have contacts with our fellow countrymen, the Taliban,” he said. “It will continue.” He added that he believes that the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar is alive and is most probably living in Pakistan, though he admits he does not have any direct contact with Omar. “If I did [have contact] I’d call him right now and say: ‘Let’s talk, Afghan to Afghan’.” He also said he believed that most Taliban are interested in peace despite their propaganda statements insisting that no negotiations are possible until all foreign forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan.
“I think a great many of them are interested in peace,” he said. “At least those who are Afghans and have families in Afghanistan.” He added that there’s another category of insurgent “who is in the pay of this or that intelligence agency,” perhaps a reference to the Haqqani Network, which is close to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence.
“Of course, they do not want peace. But the majority [of the Taliban] do.”
He believes Pakistan could squeeze the Taliban into negotiating seriously if it wanted. “[Pakistan] can and should [squeeze the Taliban] including Mullah Omar,” he said. “Pakistan does have a major role to play with regard to those Taliban whom it accommodates in its own territory. The Pakistani connection to the Taliban is old and real. It is not a fantasy.”
Karzai believes that Pakistan unfortunately does not have what he calls “an independent policy toward Afghanistan.” “It’s as if Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan is driven by [the quality of its] relations, either good or bad, with India or the US,” he said. With Pakistan-US relations at an all-time nadir right now, Pakistan is not about to be helpful in the peace process, at least according to Karzai’s calculation.

“Musharraf will be travelling to Saudi soon in order to get support before he goes back to Pakistan,” said a Gulf-based Saudi source familiar with the matter. A Pakistani source confirmed that Musharraf, who is in Dubai, was to travel to Saudi Arabia soon.

The source declined to say what form of support the former president is seeking. But some reports have said that Musharraf, who faces possible arrest on charges that he had failed to provide adequate security to former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto before her assassination in 2007, will seek Saudi guarantees that he would not be detained.

Saudi Arabia, which has considerable influence in Pakistan because of its economic support, has expressed concern over the friction between the army and the government in recent months.

Dilbu wrote:Musharraf plans trip to Saudi Arabia to rally support: Sources

. . . will seek Saudi guarantees that he would not be detained.

After a thorough year-long re-evaluation of its “war concepts”, Pakistan is learnt to have adopted a revised doctrine that calls for immediate mobilisation of one-fourth of its battalion reserves to defensive positions along the Indian border in case there is a major terrorist attack in India.

Sources said this change was made after rehearsing new war-fighting concepts at various levels throughout 2009-10, announced as the “year of training” by Pakistan Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

The assessment in Islamabad was that post 26/11 attack, India would certainly carry out a military offensive in case another major terror attack were to happen on its territory.

Defensive positions were identified along the border which would have to be occupied immediately in case of a major terror attack in India.

Pakistan, sources said, still continues to assume that India has a cold start doctrine, which caters for rapid offensive strike into Pakistan territory which has been used as another justification to alter its military posture.

A photograph circulated by the Press Information Department across newsrooms recently had Yousaf Raza Gilani standing in the middle, chatting with General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and General Khalid Shameem Wynne, with his fingers stationed uncomfortably near his chest — a pose we normally won’t stand in. But then again he is the prime minister.

A sub-editor’s journalistic curiosity and an acute eye for detail led to a legitimate inquiry. Experts were called in. Professional advice was sought. No one could figure out this enigmatic conundrum: What happened to the prime minister’s fingers? “They are hiding something,” screamed one over-worked editor. “It is the memo, people,” hushed another pale-faced girl. “No! Gilani is showing Kayani the conversation between Husain Haqqani and Mansoor Ijaz on his BlackBerry,” came another sweeping declaration. But true hope often emerges from the unlikeliest of places. A ‘chai wala’ figured it all out. He closely inspected the image for a while. And then came the revelation: “They removed a teacup from his hand!”

Was the premier’s nonchalant demeanour in front of the army chief a plausible threat to the supremacy of the military? If anything, the original picture negated all notions of the apparent standoff between the military and the government. It seemed all had been forgotten over a cup of tea. But then the teacup vanished.

pankajs wrote:New Pak doctrine: Deploy at border if terror strike in India

pankajs wrote:Right saar. India would be forced to respond even if they did not originally intend to deploy.

The civil-military imbalance in Islamabad is a key factor impeding India-Pakistan relations despite a large constituency for peace in both countries, former Indian minister Shashi Tharoor said in Islamabad on Thursday. The dominant role played by the security establishment in shaping

Pakistan’s foreign policy and the powerful military's long-standing links with jihadi groups are issues that will have to be addressed to put the bilateral relationship on an even keel, Tharoor said.
Speaking on the theme, "India and Pakistan: Cooperation or conflict", at an event organised by the Jinnah Institute, a leading think tank, Tharoor noted that elements in Pakistan had for long sponsored terrorists and jihadis as part of a policy meant to "bleed India" while compensating for the asymmetry in conventional forces.

The Pakistan Army was one of the most "lavishly funded" armies of the world and has a "stranglehold over policy" while no elected civilian government had ever completed its term, he pointed out.

It was not in Pakistan's interests for the army to get a "grossly disproportionate share" of the GDP and the budget, said Tharoor, who arrived in Lahore on Tuesday on a four-day Pakistan visit.

"The army lays down the red lines that political leaders dare not cross," he said. The army also preserves the "myth of an Indian threat", the former minister of state for external affairs underlined.

This civil-military imbalance made people in India wonder whether the government was doing the right thing by holding talks with a civilian administration in Pakistan that neither controls nor launches militants for terrorist attacks, he said.

Each terror attack, he said, undermines the minority who believe peace is possible.

People in India also questioned whether the Pakistan Army would agree if a civilian dispensation decided that India is not a threat, Tharoor remarked.

In this regard, he said peace overtures made by President Asif Ali Zardari shortly after he came to power and the army's negative reaction to them showed that the President "went farther than the army was willing to allow him to".

Pakistan's policy of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and any efforts to wrest Kashmir from India too are not in Islamabad’s interests, he said.

At the same time, Pakistan was suffering due to its policy of financing and training jihadis for 20 years as the terrorists were now targeting military establishments like the army's General Headquarters and a naval airbase in Karachi, he said.

Addressing Pakistan’s concerns about India, Tharoor said the people of India were "totally reconciled to Pakistan's existence as an independent state" and no one believes that the events of 1971 – which led to the creation of Bangladesh – can be replicated.

He noted that the 1971 war was a "special case" precipitated by a Pakistani crackdown on the people of erstwhile East Pakistan.

Answering questions from the audience after his speech, Tharoor made it clear that India had neither the intention nor capability to foment unrest in Balochistan.

A strong and stable Pakistan was in India's interest, he said. India was essentially a "status quoist" country and there could be peace between the two sides if they agreed on "mutually acceptable parameters", Tharoor said.

While terrorist groups have a momentum of their own and cannot be turned off like a tap, Pakistan and India can focus on softer issues like a free trade pact and educational exchanges to improve relations, Tharoor noted.

He also called for greater interaction between India and Pakistan on Afghanistan, where an "unhealthy sense of competition" had developed. Though both countries were often on opposite sides, a stable, moderate and functional Afghanistan was in the interest of both sides, he said.

In response to a question on the failure by both sides to reach an agreement to end the military standoff on the Siachen glacier, Tharoor acknowledged that there had been a "hardening" of the Indian stance after Pakistan-backed infiltrators occupied strategic heights in Kargil in 1999.

There were fears that a unilateral withdrawal by Indian troops would be taken advantage of, he said.

Dipanker wrote:I am posting this PTI summary of Tharoor's speech in Hindustan Times for the benefit of those among us who are still not quite sure what he said or made an interpretation contrary to what he said.

This summary of speach should abundantly make it clear that he delivered them a whole series of slaps!

Notice that I have made the entire text bold as each and every paragraph is a slap to Pakis!
Gotta to say, this guy is good!

http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-new ... 91691.aspx

The joker in the pack remains the Pakistani Army. Until the military men are convinced that peace with India is in their self-interest, they will remain the biggest obstacles to it. One hope may lie in the extensive reach of the Pakistani military apparatus and its multiple business and commercial interests.

dada wrote:When someone walks up to you and asks you to stop believing in what you really believe in essentially asking you to lose your identity do you question your own beliefs or do you punch the other guy in the face?

Identity. Its what makes me me!

In this situation , what will pakjabis do ? most will punch the other guy in the face.
But the more important question is "How will we indians respond ?"

January 6, 2012: The Pakistani military is still feuding with NATO and its own government. This has been going on since the American raid into Pakistan last May, which killed Osama bin Laden. Both the U.S. and Pakistani politicians were appalled at the duplicity of the Pakistani military, which had always insisted it had no idea where bin Laden was. Pakistani politicians have always feared and despised their own military. During Pakistan's brief history (since 1947) the military has forcibly taken control of the government half the time. Usually, the reason given was massive corruption and incompetence in an elected government (accurate accusations). But this was often an excuse to settle a dispute between politicians and generals over who could steal what. The latest such incidence was in 1999, when the military increased their unauthorized (by the civilian government) attacks on Indian troops along the Kashmir border. This led to a brief war (which Pakistan, as usual, lost). In response, the elected government tried to remove the head of the military (Pervez Musharraf) from his job, but instead Musharraf took control of the government. But, as always happens, the military eventually becomes very unpopular, because they are no more effective at running the country than elected politicians. Musharraf and the military lost control of the government in 2008, and elected officials took over. The politicians then sought to curb the independence of the military. It was during this struggle (which involved a lot of posturing and threats by both sides), the bin Laden raid occurred. The generals saw this raid as a major defeat. Now the military was seen as liars and incompetent. The military had always presented themselves as the least corrupt and most efficient institution in Pakistan. The military had also convinced most Pakistanis that the many (most of them invented by the generals) threats to Pakistan could only be handled by the military. The chief threat was India, which the generals insisted was always just on the brink of invading. Only the Pakistani military prevented this.

The Pakistani generals had adopted Islamic radicalism in the 1970s, so the generals could claim to be guardians of Islam as well. Thus it came to be that the Pakistani military created the Taliban in the early 1990s, and used this force to suppress the messy civil war in Afghanistan. But the Taliban idea (tribal religious zealots taking over the government) got out of hand, and after September 11, 2001 there arose a Pakistani branch, which went to war with the Pakistani government. When ordered, by the newly elected 2008 government, to go after the Taliban, the military refused to finish the job, leaving the Taliban with safe havens in North Waziristan and Quetta. The generals still believed they could regain control of their terrorist creations. While many Pakistanis still believe in Islamic conservatism and the need to protect the country from external threats, it's increasingly common for Pakistanis to see their military leadership as a bunch of lying, self-serving warlords. The Pakistani military has never won a war, but they have grown rich.

After a November incident on the Afghan border (where American aircraft attacked Pakistani troops mistaken for those who had just fired on Afghan troops in Afghanistan), the Pakistani military declared this a deliberate American attack and sought to use this incident to get the Americans, and Pakistani politicians, to stop pressuring the Pakistani military to go after Islamic terrorists and halt support for groups like the Taliban. As a result, NATO supplies moved via Pakistan have been halted at the Afghan border. Some of the supplies have been seized by Pakistani troops, and NATO has ordered the 3,600 trucks stuck at the border for weeks to turn around and go back to the port of Karachi. NATO has been reducing the use of the Pakistani land route for years, because of the thefts and attacks, and now it looks like that shift will be completed sooner rather than later.

The Pakistani military also ordered most NATO military advisors and such out of Pakistan. NATO was still allowed to fly through Pakistani air space, the generals apparently concluding that trying to halt air traffic might get the Pakistani Air Force destroyed. The U.S. has halted over a billion dollars in military aid to Pakistan. Since the generals steal a lot of that, this confrontation is hitting the Pakistani generals in their foreign bank accounts.

Negotiations between the U.S. and the Pakistani military have been carried out quietly, and the U.S. will only say that these talks will be concluded successfully shortly. When these negotiations are over, there will be a winner, and a loser. The Pakistani government is also negotiating with its own military, publicly and secretly. Because these negotiations are partly public, and the military is increasingly being accused of killing and threatening journalists who do not toe the army line, one can surmise that the military is not doing well here either. There are more rumors of another military coup. The Pakistani generals appear cornered and out-of-control. What is to be done? The generals are using cash, economic clout and terror to prevent the elected government from removing senior commanders and replace them with more democracy minded officers. The military knows how to play this game and has allies among civilian leaders and judges. Most Pakistanis expect the military to survive this crisis.

Indian officials, trying to negotiate a peace deal with Pakistan, complained that interference from the Pakistani military prevented a peace deal from being agreed upon. The Indians believe the Pakistani Army is addicted to the large chunk of Pakistan's GDP they receive each year, and fear (correctly) the military budget would be cut if there were an official peace deal with India. Elected Pakistani officials openly admit that they cannot control their own military and that interference from their generals makes peace negotiations difficult. The generals have allies in the Islamic parties, which see India as an enemy of Islam and a permanent threat.

India is also upset about Pakistan's increasingly close relationships with China. Most of this has to do with Chinese economic investment in Pakistan. But even here, the Chinese insist on security and anti-corruption guarantees, which the Pakistanis are not able to provide for some projects (where the security is bad and corrupt officials too numerous). There are rumors that China is going to station troops in northern Pakistan, but Pakistan and China deny this.

January 4, 2012: Indian intelligence officials warn that Pakistan-based Islamic terror groups are training 21 women to carry out operations in Kashmir and the rest of India. Islamic terrorism in Kashmir have been declining for the past seven years and the terrorists are desperate to come up with some new tactic that will prevent them from being entirely wiped out there. The use of female operatives seems to be their latest gambit. While Islamic terrorists have frequently used women as suicide bombers, they have not trained a lot of women to be full time terrorists. But some women have taken over when sons, brothers or cousins, who were Islamic terrorists, were killed. This came about despite the fact Islamic radicals espouse a form of Islam that severely limits the activities of women outside the home.

Anujan wrote:At this stage, even if we are ready to surrender JK we don't know who to call in Pakiland to share the good news. 10%? Groper? (They are hanging to their chairs) Ashphuck? Pasha? (They are an inch from being qadrified by the TFTAs) Various Yahoos fleeing the predators? (They are freezing in the cold without gas and electricity). Who exactly would we call to surrender ?

Ashok Gottipati wrote:I have a line of thought please point out the flaws if wrong.From Tharoors speeches and other sources we do know that GoI is aware of Puke duplicity and Chicanery at the highest level.So what is compeling the GoI to take a tough line.My reasons

1)The AF-Pak war which prevents us from taking any action

2)I was thinking of Nukes as a deterrence but the more i look at it and the more I read about Nuclear detterence ,warfare and Stuart Slades works I feel that Pakistan Nukes are not much of a problem as their most effective delivery veichicles are only F-16's not ballistic missiles yet

3)I think the major impediment which prevents the GoI from taking action is the refugee problem .Hoordes of inhttp://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=6252&start=320bred idiots will once start streaming across the border bring pestilence and chaos with them.This is the biggest problem for GoI and the biggest detterrence the PA has against India

I think the best way to tame Pakistan is to wide the chasm btw the various based on any ideology which can enable mass culling in the likes of the Taipeng rebellion in China(it claimed nearly 50 million lifes)and in the mean time upgrade our infrastructure in the west wing to make it refugee proof is my idea .

Members please think of this

shiv wrote:

Ashok Gottipati wrote:I have a line of thought please point out the flaws if wrong.From Tharoors speeches and other sources we do know that GoI is aware of Puke duplicity and Chicanery at the highest level.So what is compeling the GoI to take a tough line.My reasons

1)The AF-Pak war which prevents us from taking any action

2)I was thinking of Nukes as a deterrence but the more i look at it and the more I read about Nuclear detterence ,warfare and Stuart Slades works I feel that Pakistan Nukes are not much of a problem as their most effective delivery veichicles are only F-16's not ballistic missiles yet

3)I think the major impediment which prevents the GoI from taking action is the refugee problem .Hoordes of inhttp://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=6252&start=320bred idiots will once start streaming across the border bring pestilence and chaos with them.This is the biggest problem for GoI and the biggest detterrence the PA has against India

I think the best way to tame Pakistan is to wide the chasm btw the various based on any ideology which can enable mass culling in the likes of the Taipeng rebellion in China(it claimed nearly 50 million lifes)and in the mean time upgrade our infrastructure in the west wing to make it refugee proof is my idea .

Members please think of this

Ashok good thinking. I have always felt that the real reason why a series of GoIs do not deal a permanent blow to Pakistan is that it is actually too costly for India. This statement of mine "too costly" will be hotly cntested and a lot of people WILL disagree, but I am convinced that the GoI is intent on addressing poverty, literacy etc (apart from some pocket lining )

India is not a weak nation, but neither is Pakistan. The cost of seeking a permanent solution by war is too much. Pakistan knows this and has exploited it to the hilt. We can hit Pakistan. We can damage Pakistan seriously, but I suspect that no one in the GoI or military can promise a permanent solution by war. Irritating. Frustrating but true.

This must not be construed as meaning that India cannot defend itself against Pakistan. Defence requires fewer resources than offence.

With all eyes focused on the consequences for the United States and NATO of the accidental air strikes, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, little attention has been paid to another big player who will be greatly impacted by Pakistan’s refusal to go after militants that are using the country as a refuge: China. Pakistan-based militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are increasingly a threat to China’s core interests: national stability and territorial integrity. In July, Turkestani Islamic Party (TIP) militants trained in FATA launched yet another attack against China with bomb explosions in Kashgar, Xinjiang, ahead of China’s launch of “China-Eurasia Expo” in Urumqi under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). TIP wants Xinjiang to be an independent Islamic state and the China-Eurasia Expo is a centerpiece of China’s Eurasia strategy of developing its western provinces and rebuilding the Silk Road of trade and commerce across the Eurasia heartland (Beijing Review, September 15, 2011; China Daily, September 6, 2011; Xinhua, September 1, 2011). Outraged at Pakistan’s inability to clean up its own backyard, Chinese Communist Party-controlled press was immediate and harsh in decrying this incident (China Daily, August 12, 2011; Xinhua, August 1, 2011). This quickly prompted a scurrying of Pakistani leaders—military intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar and President Asif Ali Zardari—to Beijing to mend relations with its patron (Dawn, August 25, 2011; New York Times, August 1, 2011).

In these meetings, China allegedly demanded to set up military bases in FATA or in the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) that borders Xinjiang province (Asia Times, October 26, August 10, 2011). After the bombing, the Chinese government reportedly deployed at least 200,000 security personnel to pursue Uyghur terrorists in the region, more than the 140,000 coalition troops currently in Afghanistan (Asia Times, August 31, 2011). China also is revising its anti-terror law to possibly allow military intervention abroad (Xinhua, October 27, October 24, 2011). One official commentary warned that “If the violent forces in Xinjiang gain ground, China may be forced to directly intervene militarily in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but this is clearly not the situation China would like to see” (Xinhua, September 27, 2011; “China and Pakistan: Evolving Focus on Stability within Continuity,” China Brief, November 30, 2011). While these reports may be speculative, taken together, they suggest Beijing’s concerns—especially with a less active U.S. presence in Pakistan—may be rethinking fundamental tenets of its security policy.

FATA-Based Militants’ Threat to China’s Core Interests

That Beijing might demand a military base in this hotbed would underscore its view on the gravity of the FATA threat against China’s core interests: realizing its western development strategy across Eurasia; continued economic growth for Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s legitimacy and survival; and sovereign control over Xinjiang to deter ”splittism” in other parts of the country, such as Tibet and Inner Mongolia as well as to preserve its claims on Taiwan. Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie spelled out China’s core interests at the IISS 10th Asia Security Summit last June:

“The core interests include anything related to sovereignty, stability and form of government. China is now pursuing socialism. If there is any attempt to reject this path, it will touch upon China’s core interests. Or, if there is any attempt to encourage any part of China to secede, that also touches upon China’s core interests related to our land, sea or air. Then, anything that is related to China’s national economic and social development also touches upon China core interests” (Straits Times, June 6, 2011).

China also fears TIP’s close ties with al-Qaeda in FATA and increasing Chinese “Turkistan-ization” of al Qaeda. Trained by al-Qaeda in FATA, TIP already has claimed a number of attacks in Xinjiang as well as against Chinese economic interests in Pakistan. The extent of TIP militants’ network of terrorist activities in Pakistan was revealed in 2009 when they threatened the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad through a letter to kidnap Chinese diplomats and consular officers. In a video on August 1, 2009, TIP leader Abdul Haq al Turkistani urged Muslims to attack Chinese interests to punish Beijing for what he described as massacres against Uyghur Muslims during their uprising in Xinjiang (Asia Times, August 10, 2011). Abdul Haq had been appointed a member of al-Qaeda’s majlis-e-shura or executive council in 2005, but was subsequently killed in a 2010 U.S. drone strike and succeeded by Abdul Shakoor Turkistani, a Chinese Uyghur well known for his friendly terms with major Taliban groups in Waziristan (Asia Times, October 26, 2011). A few weeks before the death of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda appointed him as new commander of its Pakistan forces and training camps (Times of India, May 11, 2011). Beijing thus has legitimate fears that Pakistan’s inability to crack down on TIP and al-Qaeda in FATA will undermine China’s hold over Xinjiang and sabotage China’s access to strategic minerals and markets across the Eurasian heartland.

Political Dimensions of the Threat

It was not surprising therefore when Beijing dispatched its elite commando forces, the Snow Leopard, near Pakistan’s borders in the aftermath of the Kashgar bombing and stepped up its “Strike Hard” campaign (China Daily, August 13, 2011). Xinjiang is a strategic region for China. Three times the size of France and one sixth of China’s land area, it share borders with eight countries: Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. It is rich in energy resources and a key transport corridor for China to access energy and strategic minerals from Central Asia, Caspian region and the Middle East [1].

Instability in Xinjiang is a threat to CCP credibility and legitimacy. Senior CCP officials seem to think that if the government is seen as weak and unable to control Xinjiang, this may encourage separatism in other regions, such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Taiwan and potentially elsewhere. Moreover, the CCP needs continued access to energy and strategic minerals in Central Asia to help feed its voracious economic growth. The SCO is China’s vehicle to project its influence across this pivot of the Eurasia heartland.

In 1996, then-President Jiang Zemin presided over a Politburo Standing Committee meeting that addressed Xinjiang’s stability. In a document called “Document #7,” CCP issued directives to resolve regional issues. Document #7 outlined three main security concerns: (1) outside influence in destabilizing Xinjiang; (2) erosion of state’s authority as religiously-motivated groups challenge authority at the local level; and (3) economic impoverishment in the region as a catalyst for discontent. CCP’s courses of action to address these issues are threefold: (1) resolve problems of foreign influence through multilateral diplomacy with Central Asian republics; (2) crack down on challenges to state authority; and (3) promote economic development to resolve impoverishment [2]. This Document #7 served as the blueprint for China’s ”Develop the West” Silk Road Strategy to stabilize Xinjiang and spur local economic growth.

Economic Dimensions of the Threat

Terrorist attacks from al-Qaeda-trained TIP potentially threaten a core tenet of China’s strategy of stabilizing Xinjiang—as an ‘inseparable part of China”, for resource extraction and as a springboard into Central Eurasia. More than 43 percent of investment allocated by the central government to expand domestic demand was used for projects in western regions (Xinhua, October 16, 2009). Xinjiang is also a vital section of the continental rail route, the Eurasia Land Bridge, which connects China with Europe (Beijing Review, August 11, 2011).

On April 23, 2010, in a meeting held by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, President Hu Jintao stated, “it is a major and urgent task of strategic significance for us to boost the economic and social development of Xinjiang to achieve lasting stability in the region.” According to Wang Ning, an economist with the Academy of Social Sciences in Xinjiang, the development of the region would speed up the political, economic and cultural exchanges between China and Central Asian states and contribute to regional prosperity and stability. To that end, China’s Civil Aviation Administration plans to have six new airports in the region by 2015, bringing the total number to 22. There are also plans for new flight routes to link Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi to Istanbul, Dubai, Samarkand in Uzbekistan, Yekaterinburg in Russia and Tbilisi in Georgia (Xinhua, July 2, 2010).

Kashgar, a key hub near China’s far western border, is emblematic of both Beijing’s outreach and vulnerability. Kashgar is being developed into a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and together with Pakistan’s northern provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan, this will form the central plank in the emerging architecture for new silk routes. There are ideas to establish a trans-border economic zone on both sides of Pakistan and China by establishing manufacturing hubs, trade houses and clearing houses as well as the use of yuan for cross-border trade settlement (Global Times, September 18, 2011). Since FATA borders Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan and the latest terrorist attack was in Kashgar, collectively the foundational stone of China’s Silk Road development strategy, China would not be able to launch this central plank if FATA militants became a more significant destabilizing force.

Military Dimensions of the Threat

One key aspect of Xinjiang that is sorely neglected in press coverage regarding terrorism is China’s nuclear arsenal. Xinjiang hosts China’s nuclear test site Lop Nur and elements of the Second Artillery Corps, China’s strategic missile force. Some of the Second Artillery’s vaunted tunnels—the so-called “Underground Great Wall” for hiding missiles and nuclear warheads—also surround Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang and site of the July 2009 riots that killed 200 people and injured almost 2,000 others. Persistent unrest on a national scale has left at least China’s Xinjiang-based nuclear warheads vulnerable, like during the Cultural Revolution (Washington Post, November 29, 2011; People’s Daily, July 6, 2009) [3]. Should such unrest occur again—probably on a scale even more substantial than 1989—these weapons might become vulnerable to seizure by Uighur militant groups.

Implications of Pakistan’s Inability to Neutralize FATA Militants

If Pakistan continues its lax attitude towards FATA militants and attacks on Chinese soil increase in severity and frequency, Beijing would likely see this as a continued threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. China already appears to be taking several courses of action to redress this problem.

Increased PLA Presence in Pakistan

One course of action, as mentioned earlier, is the reported demand for PLA bases in the FATA in addition to its current troop presence in northern Pakistan. When it comes to China’s territorial integrity, China has a history of responding forcefully when its borders are violated or threatened: in 1950 it invaded North Korea; in 1962 it invaded India; in 1979 it invaded Vietnam; and, since the 1990s, it has confronted other claimants in the South China Sea several times. PLA engineers have been assisting in earthquake recovery since last January; however, its not clear how long they will stay or whether the PLA contingent lacks security elements for its protection (India Today, January 4; Financial Times, November 3, 2011; Asia Times, October 26, 2011; Asia Times, August 1, 2011; ). Beijing has not tolerated any direct violation of its territorial integrity (outside of compromises in territorial dispute negotiations). suggesting it might attempt to deal with FATA militants more effectively within Pakistan if Islamabad cannot. The recent fallout between the United States and Pakistan also suggests Pakistani weakness that could spur Beijing to act or pressure Islamabad to boost the Chinese presence in the country. Islamabad’s demands of Washington correspond almost point by point with the Taliban’s list of demands in November as conditions for entering into peace negotiations: Pakistan’s review of its U.S. ties, suspension of NATO supply lines and closure of Shamsi Air Base (Asia Times, December 3, 2011; Long War Journal, November 28, 2011; Associated Press, November 21). This further underscores Pakistan’s weakness in face of militants and could prompt China to pressure Islamabad to support Chinese bases in the FATA or FANA. On January 4, Chief of Army Staff General Afhfaq Parvez Kayani left for Beijing on a five-day official visit at the invitation of Chinese authorities to discuss the complete range of Sino-Pakistani security and defense relations (Pakistan Today, January 4,). This visit deserves some scrutiny to assess how Beijing sees Pakistan’s security situation and what, if anything, China can do to protect its interests.

Slowing Future Chinese Investments in Pakistan

Another course of action is further withdrawal and deterrence of future Chinese investments in Pakistan. On November 22, militants targeted a convoy carrying Chinese engineers in a bomb attack in Balochistan. In September, China’s Kingho Group withdrew from a $19 billion coal deal in Balochistan after bombings in Pakistan’s major cities. In November, Pakistan sent a large delegation from Sindh to Beijing to try to garner Chinese investments. Downplaying security concerns, the delegation reiterated how Pakistan has taken special measures to protect China’s 120 projects and over 13,000 staffers throughout Pakistan (Xinhua, November 22, 2011; Global Times, November 18, October 25, 2011; Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2011). China’s massive investment losses in Libya and evacuating its 36,000 workers however are still fresh in Chinese minds—reminding them of the high cost of investing in highly unstable countries, especially in one that is the central base of several dozen terrorist organizations. With TIP’s close links with al-Qaeda that explicitly targets Xinjiang and Chinese citizens and al-Qaeda’s cooperation with other terrorist organizations, Beijing has legitimate fears that the status quo in the FATA is increasingly unsustainable.

Conclusion: Pakistan Between a Rock and a Hard Place

In light of recent U.S/NATO-Pakistani fallout, Islamabad is trying to play the China card and their “all weather friend” as an alternative to the United States. However, upon closer scrutiny, Chinese aid pales in comparison to U.S. aid and is not a feasible replacement in the near or medium term. Nor does Beijing want to take on the U.S. burden. For example, Center for Global Development published a report in May revealing that average recorded grant assistance to Pakistan for FY2004-2009 from China was $9 million compared with the United States at $268 million. Oxford University also published a report in February that revealed U.S. FDI flow in Pakistan averaged 28 percent of total share from 2001-2009, while China stood at a meager 2 percent of total share in the same period. As for military aid, a few defense deals between China and Pakistan is no comparison for U.S. military assistance at $2.5 billion in addition to economic assistance at $1.8 billion in 2010 [4].

There also is growing perception in Beijing that it must take proactive measures to protect its interests abroad (Asia Times, December 17, 2011; “Mekong Murders Spur Beijing to Push New Security Cooperation,” China Brief, November 11, 2011). Its willingness to deploy paramilitary forces to patrol the Mekong in December in response to the October killing of 13 Chinese sailors underscores how changing security pressures may lead Beijing to diverge from its previous policies of “nonintervention” and deploying troops abroad. China has long contributed to UN peacekeeping missions overseas, but this is the first time it will carry out sustained operations in another country without a UN mandate. By deploying more than 300 armed police to the lawless triple-border area of the Golden Triangle (Laos, Thailand and Burma) in a joint patrol, coupled with its new domestic anti-terror laws to pave way for military intervention abroad, this may be an indicator of how China will address TIP militants in the lawless AfPak border area of FATA to safeguard its growing economic interests if Pakistan fails to control its militants.

My hypothesis is that the division of the Punjabi nation in 1947 produced a Pakistani Punjab that was heavily weighted in favour of the martial castes. The trading castes, which tend to be more pragmatic and balance society’s extremism mostly left to come to India. This has produced the imbalance which explains Pakistan’s fondness for a state dominated by soldiers

Rangudu wrote:Has anyone posted this article on Pakjabi caste make up and how that links to the "thinking from the loin" attitudes?

My hypothesis is that the division of the Punjabi nation in 1947 produced a Pakistani Punjab that was heavily weighted in favour of the martial castes. The trading castes, which tend to be more pragmatic and balance society’s extremism mostly left to come to India. This has produced the imbalance which explains Pakistan’s fondness for a state dominated by soldiers