If MIG-35 is available at special Natasha prices

If we want to go the Sukhoi route then instead of ordering more SU30's we should instead go for SU35.
Gautam Datt
New Delhi, March 24, 2016 | Posted by Anand Jayaram | UPDATED 11:38 IST
India is keen to consider Boeing's offer to supply F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets to the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Sources said that New Delhi will take a hard look at the proposal in April when a high-level delegation will engage the Indian officials on the construct of the offer. US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter will be in India on April 10 in a visit that is expected to take lift cooperation to a new level.
Boeing has offered F/A-18 Super Hornets under the "Make in India" framework of the Indian government. Sources said the proposal is worth considering as IAF is facing acute shortage of fighter jets. The IAF has already made it clear that the 36 Rafale fighter jets that are being negotiated with France are inadequate to meet its operational requirement.
There is a view emerging in the Indian security establishment that F/A-18 Super Hornets can also negate the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan by the US. Super Hornet is a carrier based multi-role fighter which can be used by the Indian navy as well. Sources said the aircraft can meet both the IAF and Indian navy's operational requirement.
India had considered F-18 Super Hornet during the earlier hunt for 126 medium multi-role fighter jets. But the US entry lost out to the French Rafale.
With the government scrapping the proposed contract which could not be sealed even after prolonged discussions with the French side, it opened doors for other fighter makers to make fresh bids.
Defence minister Manohar Parrikar has said the government is working out the best deal with the French. The contract, said to be in the final lap of negotiations is stuck over the price of 36 jets being sought by the French side. Sources said the deal is working out to be worth Rs 60,000 crore.
There is a sense of urgency in acquiring new aircraft as IAF's force levels are depleting due to an ageing fleet. Sources said the "Make in India" proposal of F-18s will solve the problem on the long term basis. Boeing's proposal also involves significant transfer of technology with a substantial indigenous content.
The proposal will also benefit the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft "Tejas" programme which needs to be resurrected after prolonged delays.
Sources said the acquisition can be put on fast track considering the urgency. The government has already stressed on going for direct military sale the route which is faster instead of inviting global bids.
How is Russian support doubtful on China? If the question is to reduce dependence on Russia then dependence on USA is a chose that is not as good either, since it will not be deployed on one boundary due to sanctions alone and logistics chain deployed on another boundary. Plus it is dangerous to have any country interfering directly in deployment - especially during war time and new logistics and expensive weapons package. It is no good to have let project Pakistan not dismantled already which a problem, while Chinese were growing in strength.uddu wrote:imports are always a threat. In many many ways. The faster we can get rid of imports and build complete weapons indigenous the better.
FYI:All countries trying to sell to India now know that even at the risk of having a severely depleted air force India will not agree to any conditional offer and the question of agreeing to end user verification does not arise. Since PAF operates F-16 and IAF prefers a twin engined aircraft a F414 engined F-18 will be an ideal buy. We should insist on deep TOT for engines for giving the order.
And, India is in a FAR better situation than either in 2002 (when these items came on the radar) and in 2009.The Indian Navy is the only one of the armed forces that is comfortable with all the agreements. It has indicated as much to successive governments over the past decade. The pacts were first proposed in the year 2002.
The army and the air force are concerned over compromising sensitive data by signing the LSA, Cismoa and Beca. But they have indicated that the agreements may be signed if ways could be found around some of the clauses just as they were found when it came to signing an end user verification agreement with the US in 2009.
Has the RuAF accepted it yet? They had wanted some modifications and therefore shelved the project. No idea of current state.If MIG-35 is available at special Natasha pricesthen it is worth a dekho too.
IF the "MMRCA" is dropped, then yes. Here is a quote from the latest AWST:If we want to go the Sukhoi route then instead of ordering more SU30's we should instead go for SU35.
The Indian air force tends to be skeptical about the multiple "Make in Indian" offers, saddled as it is with an ever expanding type inventory. Already the largest operator od Su-30 MKI air superiority fighters (with an ambitious upgrade afoot), and with its fleet of MiG-29s nearly all upgraded, the service may not be as hard-pressed for high-performance medium-to-heavy jets. None of this, though, has dulled its push for the Rafale. The requirement is now all but inextricable from the air force's fleet planning. The senior Indian air force acquisition officer says there was no "pullback" from the Rafale deal - something made clear by how India committed to the procurement even before agreeing on price
Silly “two-front war” scenario and related IAF’s Rafale push at expense of Su-30
Posted on March 24, 2016 by Bharat Karnad
All war planning ought to be on the basis of the worst case. That’s a truism. But the worst imaginable circumstances still have to bear some relation to reality and should be based on reasonable probability calculus. That there is cooperation and collaboration between China and Pakistan in the conventional and nuclear military fields, leading to sharing of intelligence, and transfer of weapons and related technologies is to acknowledge a fact. To conclude from this that China will join with Pakistan in waging general military hostilities against India is, however, to indulge one’s fancies and is belied by history.
Time and again, having initiated conflicts that rapidly turned against it on the ground, Islamabad hoped, and fervently pleaded for, the Chinese militarily to intervene — open a second front, to stave off inevitable defeat. This happened in 1965 when Beijing, trying to please its partner, warned Delhi about some of its livestock on the disputed mountainous border being herded off by Indians which probable cause for war was immediately rendered laughable when, to Beijing’s mortification, Indian opposition leaders, the socialist Madhu Limaye, among them, marched to the Chinese embassy gates in Chanakyapuri offering a gaggle of bleating goats in train as recompense. In 1971, Yahya waited in Islamabad, Niazi in Dhaka, for the “yellow army” to save Pakistan’s goose/goat from being tandoored with the Indian army contingents speedily converging on the Pak forces in soon-to-be Bangladesh, and waited some more before giving up the ghost and abjectly surrendering.
This to say that no country — a calculating and cautious China least of all — will fight on another’s country’s behalf or help out if its means courting danger for itself, let alone save, even an “all weather friend” — Pakistan that has managed once again to muddle into yet another military mess of its own creation. China will do everything short of actually deploying its forces especially now and in the future when it knows that opening a war front in the north and east in concert with Pakistan doing the same in the west, for any reason whatsoever, could likely end — should the situation become dire enough to India to merit it — Agni-5s popping up mushroom clouds over the extended Shanghai region and abruptly ending China’s run as economic power. If the Chinese were not foolish enough to do this in the past when much less was at stake, it is likely they will be even more circumspect now and in the future when, other than concerns of avoiding irreparable damage and destruction to itself, will be preoccupied with displacing the US as the dominant great power rather than stepping into the breach for a whiny but risk-acceptant Pakistan on its flanks. So a two front war featuring China and Pakistan is not only inconceivable but the weakest possible predicate for Indian force planning.
So why is the IAF brass so vociferous in drumming up fear of precisely this contingency? To wit, Vice Chief AM BS Dhanoa in March 2016 who averred:”Our numbers are not adequate to execute an air campaign in a two-front scenario… Probability of a two front scenario is an appreciation which you need to do. But are the numbers adequate? No.” For his part, DCAS Air Marshal R K S Bhadauria revealed IAF’s plan behind such statements, saying a decision to fill the full MMRCA complement will be made after the 36 Rafales are first secured, meaning IAF will thereafter argue that having gone a third in with the Rafale, it makes sense to go full in with this same plane, damn the treasury-bankrupting costs of going in a third and, even more, fully with Rafale. (http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 648_1.html). Obviously then, the two-front war-talk is not for any grand reasons of geostrategics (assuming Vayu Bhavan has sense enough to read the unfolding geopolitical situation correctly). But because it serves IAF’s parochial purposes well, particularly in propelling its preferred but wasteful and unnecessary procurement of the French Rafale combat aircraft — a decision hanging fire for some years now. Such an improbable war scenario is being summoned up as a last gasp argument to push the Modi government into signing up for this white elephant of a plane. By doing so, Vayu Bhavan is resorting to an old and tested tactic favoured by the military — frighten the generally national security strategy-wise ignorant and illiterate political ruler-generalist bureaucrat (in MOD/Finance) tandem operating in Delhi into anteing up scarce funds for near useless military hardware purchases that invariably leave the country in a bigger financial-cum-national security hole than before.
But Let’s look at some details. Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha soon after assuming his post in Sept 2014 himself provided figures for a contract for 126 Rafales — $25 billion (or Rs 1,50,000 crore). Assuming the deal would be signed by end-2014, Raha had also stated that delays couldn’t be brooked because the last of the Rafales will enter service only by 2025 by when, and this he didn’t say, these aircraft would be way on the other side of antique. (http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/iaf ... BvyrJ.html)
Except two years later and properly worked out, this $25 billion is, actually the projected lifetime cost of just 36 of this aircraft inclusive of the necessary infrastructure, spares, weapons, etc. But two years is a long time and this figure is too big not to balk at. Whence, the Rafale decision, fortunately, is on the verge of becoming a non-starter, notwithstanding Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s impetuous and, hence, foolish decision to travel to Paris bearing the gift of a buy of a third of the requirement 126 MMRCAs at, as it turns out, about the same total cost! Quick on the uptake, Modi has perhaps realized the costs of his unmerited intervention and is, therefore, staying his and PMO’s (read NSA Ajit Doval’s) hand is pushing the Rafale regardless. In other words, he is leaving it to the Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, who has favoured the more cost-effective Su-30 MKIs, to extricate him and the country from a difficult situation by not peremptorily nullifying the deal as allowing it to wither away, die a slow death, in the Price Negotiation Committee. It saves Modi’s face with President Francoise Hollande to whom he had made the Rafale buy offer, even as Paris does a slow burn.
Seeking to do an end-run around Parrikar’s Su-30 option, Raha on February 18 this year volunteered that the Rafale, which he insists on calling “MMRCA”, and Sukhoi-30 requirements are “slightly different, [each with its] own capabilities.” “They complement each other but do not replace each other”, he intoned. Important to note he didn’t dilate on just what the differences are between the Rafale and Su-30, or how Rafale is indispensable. Su-30 is primarily an air dominance aircraft that can outdo the Rafale in air defence, interdiction/interception, and strike mission-roles as well. This is vouched for by all the reputed international aviation experts, among them Dr. Karlo Copp, the highly regarded Australian fighter aircraft analyst, who considers Su-30, all things considered on a comparative basis, the best combat aircraft flying, period. Indeed, so pronounced is Su-30’s superiority even a yokel would look askance at IAF’s choice of Rafale. More fundamentally, the low, medium, and heavy combat aircraft categories IAF’s force-structuring plans rely on are at best disingenuous, at worst ridiculous. (For analysis in detail about why this is so and for insights into other aspects of the country’s manifold military weaknesses, do read my book — ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’!)
The CAS then drew out an over-familiar arrow from the IAF’s quiver, namely, a warning about the supposed drawdown of combat squadrons and to deflect potential criticism about rank bad force planning by the IAF HQrs that obtained this deplorable situation, he maintained that air forces everywhere face the same problems of obsolescence in their respective cycles of operations. “It is not new or specific to Indian Air Force,” he told journalists at Aero India (with almost all media persons entirely innocent about what operational cycles or anything else remotely technical mean and thus are reduced to being just obedient regurgitators of whatever is proffered by uniformed types). Raha added that if the Rafale agreement were inked that day, the first squadron will be available only in three years and the rest in 5-6 years. (http://articles.economictimes.indiatime ... -arup-raha). Raha apparently hoped no would notice the discrepancy in the induction timelines he had glossed over. In 2014, he had claimed the last of the Rafales would enter IAF by 2025. By Feb 2016, apprehensive about the definite obsolescence of the Rafale by the 2nd decade of the 21st century becoming a factor in nixing the deal altogether, he had collapsed that time frame for the public’s and Modi govt’s consumption from 11 years to 9 years. Alas, this is a minor matter and akin, as the phrase goes, to dressing up a pig with lipstick.
In March 2016 VCAS Dhanoa, in a concerted attempt in line with Raha’s pronouncements seeking to derail Parrikar, pitched in with the implied criticism of Su-30 with its serviceability alleged in the 35%-40% range by assuming 90% serviceability of the Rafale saying “If we have 35 squadrons and 90 percent serviceability, it will be as good as having [the authorised strength of] 42 squadrons.” By this reckoning the natural solution for India would be to d what’s being planned for the production of Kamov utility helicopters — Tata will also make all the spares in-country, thereby ensuring high serviceability rates. That this solution has not been implemented for the Su-30MKI only confirms HAL’s and IAF’s duffer-headed policies. DCAS Bhadauria joined the melee by citing the US sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, asserting this made his life “more difficult” as he now had “to put more hi-tech platform [read Rafale] against it. The MMRCA is designed in such a way”, he explained, “that we need to offset this capability. If you demonstrate your deterrence, we should have peace because he will know that he will be hit very badly.” (http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... t-war-iaf/). This last suggests IAF’s assesment that Rafale can out-match Su-30, really?!! Bhadauria must know something the rest of the aviation world doesn’t.
It is hard to know what to make of the above sort of statements by Messers Raha, Dhanoa & Bhaduaria except to say it smells of quiet desperation to buy French and to persist with the cost-prohibitive import habit IAF (and the armed forces, generally) has cultivated over the years with the connivance of the political and bureaucratic establishment. Such import-tilt is sustained, moreover, by the extraordinarily resilient and entrenched system of payoffs established over the years by the arms vendors and their agents (“commissions” routed to secret offshore accounts, “green card” and equivalent, “scholarships” to prestigious universities and job placements for sons and daughters of secretaries to the central govt — which no one talks about because everybody’s hand, up and down the hierarchy, is in the cookie-jar).
And finally nobody seems to have noticed that the basic problem of combat squadron drawdown is not going to be addressed anytime soon by the Rafale. So, the question arises: Are Raha and his cohort serious about filling the immediate need or not? If they are, and Rafale is manifestly not the answer, why are they equally noisily avoiding indenting for more HAL Nasik-assembled Su-30MKIs, that will will be available at a fraction of the Rafale and in vastly big numbers? For everyone’s information, just the up-front $9billion cost of 36 Rafales will fetch India 130 of the fully armed Su-30s, with newly bought units inductable inside of two years. This only starkly highlights IAF’s insidious intent to acquire the Rafale at the cost of beggaring the country. This quite curious behaviour by those in high posts in the service is rightly a matter of public concern and may in time to come require investigation as it tilts against the national interest and toward the ultimately unclear and unexplainable weightage the IAF leadership has accorded a particular exorbitantly priced Western combat aircraft.
How much tech transfer are you expecting ? The Americans does not even give source codes their closest allies. They jealously guard their tech much more so than the Russians or Europeans. And the Americans can easily track F 35 just like they did with the Pakis F 16 during the Osama raidkit wrote:and meanwhile https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... te-423530/
is the F-35 Lightning II suddenly looking as a credible alternative to the Rafales ? ..esp if the americans can pitch in with an assembly line ? ( Read behind the scenes action on India making it to close ally status as regards tech transfers )
Three squadrons of F-35s on outright purchase basis with full access to object codes to integrate Astra, other Indian made missiles/bombs and the threat library. This all we need IF we must import to buy time for AMCA. We won't get 'ToT and if it were available, it would be prohibitively expensive.kit wrote:and meanwhile https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... te-423530/
is the F-35 Lightning II suddenly looking as a credible alternative to the Rafales ? ..esp if the americans can pitch in with an assembly line ? ( Read behind the scenes action on India making it to close ally status as regards tech transfers )
We'd get at least as much tech as we're getting through the ongoing Rafale deal. The South Korean deal involved 25 key technologies as part of the offset deal, of which the USG sanctioned 21 for transfer (the 4 denied consisted - AESA, RF jammer, IR beacon and EO pod). Also, the PAF F-16s were scrambled only after the Americans left, and were tracked by a USN E-2C not by spyware onboard.MANNY K wrote:How much tech transfer are you expecting ? The Americans does not even give source codes their closest allies. They jealously guard their tech much more so than the Russians or Europeans. And the Americans can easily track F 35 just like they did with the Pakis F 16 during the Osama raid
+!srin wrote:I came across this dilbert cartoon which immediately reminded me of the Rafale saga...
^+1Cosmo_R wrote:IF we import, buy the damn things via FMS and focus on building local capability in consumables (tires, gaskets, bombs, missiles) to lay the base for a supply chain for the AMCA.
Fully agree with this IF the IAF had indeed said, 36 raffy are enough for both fronts. you either go for the full complement of 120+The IAF's postualtion that the Raffy will solve the two front threat beggars belief. Unless PC Sorcar magically makes one Raffy to be on both fronts at the same time,the numbers cannot add up.
Nrao saar IMVHO the Shornet for Iaf most probably will require the 414 EPE injun to improve hot and high for where the IAF will operate them for. As far as Growler is concerned we will not get any of the current jamming stuff like next gem jammer etc given its only coming online or will be coming online shortly. That leaves the current which may or may not suffice against potential threats we face. F35 I am not so sure we will even get anything decent. Also with the F35 or F18 I suspect it will mean hosting a bunch of yanks to monitor assets etc not a comforting thought best avoided if possible. Not sure if we already are doing this for the P8s or C17s etcNRao wrote:Carter is expected to take the DTTI to "the next level". April 10 is the day.
All said and done, perhaps the F-18 in all forms is the way to go. IAF, IN including the Growler.
Better still the F-35, all variants.
That was on offer as part of Boeing's proposal for the MMRCA as well and there is little doubt that it would be offered in case of the outside possibility that the Shornet is ever reconsidered. Boeing and GE have enough clout in the Congress to even get the USN to bring ahead its plans to fund work completion, if they see that as a deal clincher for a large order. The upgrades are retrofittable on existing engines at the depot level.Nrao saar IMVHO the Shornet for Iaf most probably will require the 414 EPE injun to improve hot and high for where the IAF will operate them for
Current pods are no longer in dev/production and existing ones are not available for export. The NGJ is out of contention as even Australia, that operates older pods will find it tough to get the NGJ as is unless they make certain unique investments in support of the export variants as was made clear recently at a HASC sub. comm. hearing by the PEO. Regardless, the Growler and NGJ are not available on the export market outside of Australia, and is really is not relevant in a multi-role fighter context. There are other digital, integrated EW solutions available that could boost the Hornet's EW suite if that is required as is being currently done on the F-15C's and E's, using GaN AESA and digitization at the element level.As far as Growler is concerned we will not get any of the current jamming stuff like next gem jammer etc given its only coming online or will be coming online shortly. That leaves the current which may or may not suffice against potential threats we face.
The slate is clean, no MMRCA, but we have DTTI, which has made some progress - against bad headwinds (IMHO). The key is will India get what India needs. Not the glossy stuff, but real stuff that builds a MIC while providing for the Services.most probably will require