Kargil War Thread - VI

The Military Issues & History Forum is a venue to discuss issues relating to the military aspects of the Indian Armed Forces, whether the past, present or future. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
Post Reply
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 60255
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Post by ramana »

Up.

From old thread
1998

June 1998 - first and most important warning was a June 2, 1998 note, personally signed by the then Intelligence Bureau Director, Shyamal Datta
In June 1998 the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team (BIT) reported that ammunition supplies were being dumped and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector.


July 1998 - July, Intelligence Bureau informants reported the deployment of M-11 missiles on the Deosai Plains and new mine-laying activities.

Aug 1998 - In August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC. Pakistani artillery flowed in as winter approached, a reversal of the normal practice.

Oct 1998 - Pervez Musharaff appointed COAS
By October, RAW was sufficiently concerned about developments to issue an express warning about the prospect of a "limited swift offensive", pointing in particular to the "constant induction of more troops from peacetime locations like Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala and Okara into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." Its assertion that a war was possible provoked an immediate challenge by the Director-General of Military Intelligence, and an inconclusive verbal discussion followed.

Nov 1998 - Northern Command, in its own internal assessments, recorded that November 1998 saw a three-fold increase in Pakistani troop movement in the Kargil sector when compared with November 1997. Vehicular movement doubled, while pack-animal movement increased nine-fold. As late as November 1998, the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station issued warnings that Pakistan was "training Taliban troops who were undergoing military training as well as learning the Balti and Ladakhi language." These irregulars, the warning stated, were likely to be inducted into the Kargil sector during April 1999.


1999


Feb 1999 - On February 9, 1999, troops of the 5 Para Regiment spotted movement on the top of Point 5770, a strategic height in the southern Siachen area on the Indian side of the LoC.

Feb 1999 - The Lahore Declaration was a historic declaration signed by the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, and the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, in Lahore on February 21, 1999.

Mar 1999 - Again, on March 4, between eight and ten Pakistani soldiers were seen removing snow from a concrete bunker to the west of the summit of Point 5770. That evening, fire was exchanged over the area.

Strangely, the Siachen-based 102 Infantry Brigade removed the officer who had reported the intrusion, Major Manish Bhatnagar, not the Pakistani troops who had occupied the position. On the eve of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan, it is likely that India had no desire to initiate a bruising exchange of fire on Siachen. The 121 Brigade, which ought to have been told that Pakistan troops had demonstrated aggressive intent in an adjoining area, was not even informed of the development.

For one, despite both the flow of intelligence on possible infiltration in the Kargil sector, troops were actually pulled out from frontline positions. Soon after the loss of Point 5770, 9 Mahar Regiment was removed from its defensive positions along the Yaldor Langpa stream and stationed at a rear position near Leh. The 26 Maratha Light Infantry, which protected the crucial infiltration route from Mashkoh to Dras, was also pulled off forward duties.

Despite the summary removal of approximately a quarter of its troops, there is evidence to show that 121 Brigade did act. Troops were withdrawn from the Mashkoh area for just 80 days in the winter of 1999, down from 177 days in 1997 and 116 days in 1998. Yaldor was left undefended for 64 days from February to April, where troops had been withdrawn for 120 days in 1997 and 119 days in 1998. Kaksar, another key area, was undefended for just 38 days, where it was left open for over 200 days in previous years.


April

April 11 - India says it has successfully test-fired a longer-range model of its Agni ballistic missile.

April 14 - The AIADMK withdraws support from the ruling coalition. President K.R. Narayanan asks the government to seek a confidence vote in parliament.

April 17 - India's 13-month-old BJP-led government falls after losing a confidence motion by just one vote. THis may have been a trigger.

April 26 - India's parliament is dissolved and early elections are called.

why was it that commanders in Leh and Srinagar were so slow to respond not just to the intelligence warnings that were available, but to the growing worries of their own subordinates?

General Malik argued that no troops were withdrawn by XV Corps from 3 Infantry Division's area of responsibility. This is, without dispute, true, since 9 Mahar and 26 Maratha battalions remained around Leh. Yet, General Malik's letter does not explain why General Budhwar chose to pull back soldiers needed to guard the LoC to rear positions when both intelligence warnings and field commanders believed threat levels were escalating.

General Malik also pointed out that the headquarters of 70 Infantry Brigade was inducted into the Dras area in October 1998, suggesting that the Army was indeed taking the warnings it received seriously. However, he omitted to mention the critical fact that only its headquarters' staff, not the fighting force, had been deployed when fighting broke out in May 1999.

May

May 1999 - Chinese moves in LAC Ladhak
"Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings," Malik discloses in the book. He says it was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese army enhanced its level of activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil.

"This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil" Malik says which at military level, indicated a demonstrative support to Pakistan. Malik says this ran contrary to Beijing's assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India. The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights. He says India also received intelligence reports that PLA's Director in the Department of Armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.


May 7 - Chinese Embassy Bombing in Kosovo - China US relationship problem. This may have kept Chinese from entering thewar.

May 16 - 6 choopers discovered in Kargil sector

May 24 - First report of infilterators.At a meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on May 24, 1999, General Pal insisted that there "were no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes."

May 26 - India unleashes two waves of air strikes to flush out guerrillas on its side of a Kashmir ceasefire line, sharply raising temperatures in the region. The next day India confirms it has lost two fighter jets which Pakistan says they shot down.

May 28 - In Kashmir, a stinger missile brings down an Indian helicopter killing all on board.


June

June 12 - India and Pakistan hold "businesslike" talks over their Kashmir dispute but fail to resolve it; India says Pakistan tried to infiltrate the Turtuk Sector and puts the death toll at 267 Pakistanis and 86 Indians.

June 16, 1999 -The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh has said his visit to Beijing has led to better understanding between India and China on regional and global issues, including the security perceptions of the two countries. Speaking to newspersons in Beijing at the end of his two day visit, he said new initiatives are already on the anvil.

July

July 4 - India says it has recaptured the strategic Tiger Hill on its side of a military line of control in Kashmir.

July 9 - In Kashmir, the Indian army reports that it has all but ousted the infiltrators from the Batalik zone on India's side of the ceasefire line.

July 17 - India signals the end of the flare-up with Pakistan by announcing that all infiltrators have withdrawn from Indian-held Kashmir.

July 26 - India says its troops have cleared all infiltrators from their side of the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.

Need to add dates from Dec 1997 Gordon Ohler on Ghauri proliferation onwards.
Last edited by ramana on 03 Jun 2008 02:31, edited 1 time in total.
Rohit_K
BRFite
Posts: 630
Joined: 09 Nov 2006 22:53
Location: atop Sukkur Barage

Post by Rohit_K »

There was an interview with ISI's former chief on Geo tv(porki channel) that NDTV was showing a couple of minutes ago. Main points:

1. Operation was a failure. (well yeah )
2. Nawaz was briefed about every single move during the war.
Vivek_A
BRFite
Posts: 593
Joined: 17 Nov 2003 12:31
Location: USA

Post by Vivek_A »

Rohit: here you go..

Link to video of interview with Lt. Gen (Rtd) Jamshed Gulzar Kiani

Forward to 19:48.

This guy, along with humayun "monica lewinsky" gauhar, were the real authors of gola's book.
Vivek_A
BRFite
Posts: 593
Joined: 17 Nov 2003 12:31
Location: USA

Post by Vivek_A »

From the interview above: around 28:50


They didn't forsee the Indians using the AF.
Bofors ripped them a new one.
Kakkaji
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3894
Joined: 23 Oct 2002 11:31

Post by Kakkaji »

Rohit_K wrote:There was an interview with ISI's former chief on Geo tv(porki channel) that NDTV was showing a couple of minutes ago. Main points:

2. Nawaz was briefed about every single move during the war.
Rohit:

I think you either misunderstood or misinterpreted.

The guy is saying again and again that Nawaz was not on board during the planning. Even after the war started, Nawaz was given only short briefings and not the full picture.

This guy is dumping royally on Mush. RATS leave a sinking ship. :)

One more line I noted was where the guy says something to the effect "They may have larger numbers but I am quite confident that as a General and as a soldier, I am qualitatively quite superior to any Indian General". :roll:

The superiority complex is quite ingrained among RATS. No matter how many times they lose, they would still think they are superior. And they will continue launching misadventures.

BTW, did you guys notice how SDRE this corpse commander of the TFTA army looks?

In fact, he looks one of those extras in Hindi movies that play the role of a chhakka. :rotfl:

If the retd. Generals like this guy are running away from Mush, then surely Mushy's days are numbered.
Arun_S
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2800
Joined: 14 Jun 2000 11:31
Location: KhyberDurra

Post by Arun_S »

Good, I think truthful interview.
ranganathan
BRFite
Posts: 276
Joined: 06 Feb 2008 23:14

Post by ranganathan »

He didn't say anything that the world didn't already know. Pakis were getting slaughtered and Nawaz had no choice but to run on all 4s to US.
Sanku
BRF Oldie
Posts: 12526
Joined: 23 Aug 2007 15:57
Location: Naaahhhh

Post by Sanku »

ranganathan wrote:He didn't say anything that the world didn't already know. Pakis were getting slaughtered and Nawaz had no choice but to run on all 4s to US.
This is the first quasi-official admission from TSPA that Sharief was indeed in the dark as he always claimed and TSPA was running a show independent of Civilan control.

Not that we dont know this but the admission is the first and hence significant.
Lalmohan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 13257
Joined: 30 Dec 2005 18:28

Post by Lalmohan »

well, lets be cautious... a few days back we had a revelation from a pak army type who said that nawaz knew everything all along...

tamasha as usual, points are seeking to be scored. this is nawaz trying to mend fences with gullible SDRE's
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 60255
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Post by ramana »

Kargil Still unravels
PAKISTAN: Kargil Conspiracy Still Unravelling
By Amir Mir

ISLAMABAD, Jun 5 (IPS) - The ill-fated Kargil episode of 1999 continues to haunt Pakistan nine years after the crisis rocked South Asia. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif continue to exchange allegations and counter allegations as to who was in fact responsible for orchestrating the misadventure that resulted in hundreds of deaths and finally ended up in a huge diplomatic embarrassment for Pakistan.

The Kargil conflict exploded in May of 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir after the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants across the Line of Control (LoC), which serves as the de facto border between India and Pakistan. Initially, Pakistan blamed the incursion on independent Kashmiri insurgents. The Indian army and air force -- with international diplomatic support -- eventually forced the Pakistani force to withdraw across LoC.

In a new development that has generated a fresh debate across Pakistan over the Kargil issue, Musharraf's former close aide, retired Lieutenant General Jamhed Gulzar Kayani, who was the corps commander of Rawalpindi at the time of the Kargil war, said that then Premier Nawaz Sharif was not informed about the Kargil operation by then Army Chief General Musharraf.

Jamhed Gulzar told Geo television in a detailed interview that it was the Kargil issue that actually caused differences between Sharif and Musharraf, eventually leading to Sharif's ouster in October 1999. "Being the corps commander of Rawalpindi at the time of the Kargil operation, I can say with authority that Nawaz Sharif didn't know anything about the Kargil operation. Despite the fact that he was the prime minister, he was never briefed on the issue," Jamhed Gulzar said.

Speaking for the first time on the Kargil operation, Jamhed Gulzar said: "I am not sure from where he [Sharif] came to know, but it wasn't through the army since the Kargil operation was being kept as a closely guarded secret from Nawaz Sharif. It was because of Sharif that the forces from Kargil in Jammu and Kashmir were withdrawn which otherwise might have spread to a large- scale war."

Jamshed Gulzar pointed towards Musharraf without naming him. "After Sharif came to know of the Kargil operation, he immediately called top military commanders and his close cabinet members to discuss the situation. None of the military and political leaders favoured Kargil and all the blame was on one person," he said.

On Jun. 1, while asking the PPP government to set up a high level judicial commission to hold Musharraf accountable for the deaths of thousands of army jawans in the Kargil "misadventure", the Ex-Servicemen Society -- a group of the retired Pakistan army generals -- demanded an open trial of Musharraf on treason charges under Article 6 of the Constitution. Over 250,000 members of the Society are expected to join the Jun. 10 long march of the lawyers' community for reinstatement of deposed judges if Musharraf does not resign.

"The nation wants the new government in Islamabad to unmask the real culprit behind the Kargil misadventure that caused deaths of over 2,500 army jawans," said a former ISI chief retired Lieutenant General Hameed Gul, while addressing a news conference in Islamabad.

As the debate over Kargil goes on, neither Musharraf nor Sharif is ready to take blame for the Kargil action, with both holding each other responsible.

Normally, there should have been two versions on the issue -- the Pakistani and the Indian. The Indian version is well known: many Indians, civilians and retired generals, have written about it from both political and military points of view and have sought to establish the truth behind what for the Indians was initially a shock. Later, the Indian government appointed a four-member committee to determine what caused the debacle from their point of view, especially the failure of the Indian intelligence to get wind of Pakistani plans to move into the Kargil heights. Establishing the truth on the Indian side was easy, because there was only one party that was in overall command and that was the elected civilian government; the military merely carried out the orders.

However, on the Pakistani side of the border, the task of ascertaining the truth is difficult because there were two centres of power at that time. Musharraf has all along insisted that all parties involved, including the civilian authority, were on board. However, Sharif, who was then prime minister, insists that he was kept in the dark and that the army top brass had planned the operations on its own. The publication of two books -- Nawaz Sharif's "Ghaddar Kaun" (Who is the Traitor?) and Pervez Musharraf's "In the Line of Fire" -- has only added to the confusion, with the truth being a major casualty.

In his 2006 autobiography, "In the Line of Fire", Musharraf -- while rejecting Sharif's claim that he did not take him into confidence on the Kargil issue -- had furnished pictorial evidence of Sharif's visit to Kel in Kashmir in the south of Kargil and his briefing there by the army high command on Feb. 5, 1999, weeks before Premier Vajpayee's Feb. 19, 1999 visit to Pakistan during which the Lahore declaration was signed.

However, in his 2007 biography, "Ghaddar Kaun?", Sharif accused Musharraf of misleading the nation by distorting facts about the Kargil operation, saying "I have in my possession the audio recordings of General Musharraf's May 26 and May 29, 1999 telephonic conversation with General Aziz Khan which proves that the general wanted to keep me [Sharif] in the dark about the Kargil operation."

In his press briefing before leaving for London on Jun. 3, Sharif said the recent interview by a close aide of Musharraf has vindicated his long- standing position that he [Sharif] was kept in the dark by Musharraf about the Kargil operation. "Musharraf should be tried for treason charges since it has now been proved that he resorted to the Kargil misadventure without approval from the prime minister. Musharraf should also be tried for the deaths of over 2,700 jawans of the Northern Line Infantry of the army who were eliminated in the ill-conceived and uncalled-for war," he added.

However, according to Ayaz Amir, a noted political analyst and a member of the National Assembly, the real question about Kargil is not whether Sharif knew or not. "It is something else. What accounts for the army's institutional capacity to dream up ventures lacking any geo-strategic or political context? The 1965 war which ended up by derailing Pakistan and paving the way for the eventual separation of East Pakistan was one such venture. The army crackdown on the Awami League in East Pakistan in 1971 was another. And the Kargil misadventure makes up the third of this holy trinity," Amir explained, adding, "Sharif was supposed to have a limited attention span. Kargil throws up an intriguing question. Whose intellect span was more limited, Sharif's or that of the army command?"

In the words of retired Lieutenant General Ali Kuli Khan Khattak -- who quit the army after the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appointed Musharraf as Army Chief in 1998 over him -- Kargil was flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution. "The Kargil incursion was a far bigger tragedy for Pakistan than the civil war which led to the creation of Bangladesh and damaged the country's Kashmir cause, contrary to Musharraf's oft- repeated claim that his misadventure had helped revive the Kashmir issue at the international level," he said, stressing, "The Kargil episode was an unprofessional decision by someone who had served in the Pakistan Army for 40 years. As the architect of Kargil, Musharraf must answer critical questions as to whose brainchild it was and what exactly the broad strategic aim behind the operation was. Let the government appoint a Kargil Commission as had been done in India to hold a thorough investigation and let the nation know the truth about Kargil."

(END/2008)
Interesting no? So mainstream Army folks and politicians are lining up Mushy to charges of treason. Not mcuh of a legacy left for commandu.
John Snow
BRFite
Posts: 1941
Joined: 03 Feb 2006 00:44

Post by John Snow »

It looks like there is still small group in the army which is professional and beleives that army should be sub ordinate to civilian command , or is it that the loss of face and the complete exposure of the sherif badmash story coming out in the open. The million dollar question is when will the role High Sheriff's role be exposed in instigating musharaff?
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 60255
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Post by ramana »

Or they dont want the stigma of Kargil disaster and are trying to fix the blame so that Army is clean.
Kakkaji
BRF Oldie
Posts: 3894
Joined: 23 Oct 2002 11:31

Post by Kakkaji »

ramana wrote:Or they dont want the stigma of Kargil disaster and are trying to fix the blame so that Army is clean.
Yes. If all the crore commanders had opposed the operation, then just one or two Generals could not have carried it out. They were all in it together, and now they are trying to make Mushy the Bali ka Bakra while they wash their hands clean. Not that I have much sympathy for Mushy though.
A Sharma
BRFite
Posts: 1249
Joined: 20 May 2003 11:31

Post by A Sharma »

Die another day

SREEPATH TOKEKAR
Bad-boy buster
"The thrill of seeing an object in the air was inspiration enough," said the winner of Vishisht Sewa Medal, who took to the skies to thwart infiltration on Tiger Hill during the Kargil War. "We found out that the enemy had constructed base camps on the Line of Control." On May 29, 1999, they received pictures of locations of infiltrators. Before getting into combat gear, Tokekar, the flight lieutenant, called his wife to say everything was normal. "It is best to keep the professional and personal lives separate. Once you are up there, you do not think of anything but your operation and your enemy. There is no scope of thinking about either the future or the past. The present is what matters," he said.
The sight of over 250 huts of infiltrators constructed at Mushkoh valley "made me turn red with rage." Flying over Tiger Hill in itself was an unthinkable feat. "We descended from 26,000 feet to 11,000 feet and dumped 11 bombs on them. It took us three days. The idea was to go for an overkill. That worked."
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 60255
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

More drama going on in TSP wih former PAF and PN chiefs asking for a probe on their side of events in Kargil. Looks like with Lt Gen. Jamshed Kiyani's interview and these two folks calling for probes, the Pakjabi segement is reasserting itself. Wonder where is Amrika in all this? Are these Allah types?
SSridhar
Forum Moderator
Posts: 25372
Joined: 05 May 2001 11:31
Location: Chennai

Re: Kargil War Probe

Post by SSridhar »

Both PPP and PML(Nawaz) are united in the Kargil probe demand. It therefore looks like that there will be a probe, unless the Army preempts that with a coup. However, whether the report will ever see the light of the day is another matter.
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 60255
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

What if TSP Army wants to rid itself of Mushy now that he has served his purpose in being friendly with Amrika to stave of the 911 anger?
Luxtor
BRFite
Posts: 262
Joined: 28 Sep 2003 11:31
Location: Earth ... but in a parallel universe

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Luxtor »

So it seems that Mushy kept his Kargil operations a secret from Nawaz Sharif because he (Mushy) didn't want the same thing to happen this time like when Benazir Bhutto over-ruled his plans few years back where she practically ridiculed his stupidity. But never-the-less his attempt in Kargil proved that he is ever enduring in his stupidity. I never give any compliments to any Paki leaders because they're (were) all spokes in the same wheel but I must say Benazir read the Paki Kargil war plan perfectly as unworkable. :|
Lalmohan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 13257
Joined: 30 Dec 2005 18:28

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Lalmohan »

GOI had placed its bets on mushy as the best of a bad deal. is the move to discredit mushy specifically about kargil now a shot across the bows of GOI? Either, take us seriously, or perhaps a warning?
kaangeya
BRFite
Posts: 139
Joined: 03 Mar 2008 02:34

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by kaangeya »

India has no problem in dealing with anyone in TSP. Mess'araff had his uses, now his time is up. Lt.Gen. Kiani exhibits either great candour or simply an appreciation for reality. He admits that the Indian Army is quantitatively superior, not qualitatively (thanks to PMA lessons 1 TSPA = 10 IA). But disses the TSPAF - just a 4th of IAF - and TSPN not in the same league at all. Takes a lot to talk like that. The ability of the TSPA to launch anything more than a Brigade level offensive action is in doubt. And Kiani makes it clear that he was rattled by the prospect of a front-wide war that would have snapped their lines of defence.
pran
BRFite
Posts: 110
Joined: 09 Oct 2001 11:31
Location: internet

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by pran »

Since all reports point to Musharraf's complicity in the whole kargil episode , historical evidence suggests that these two bit Paki generals grow balls when they have a backer , in terms of diplomatic, military support. The timing and goals of this venture could have coincided with someone elses goals. i.e to draw India in the open war and secondly to brandish its nuclear assets. Remember Munir Akram's statements at UN and Riedel's out of the blue confession on what happened. What is Riedel motive for saying that Bubba stopped the war after a letter from Vajpayee. Vajpayee saw the game and let it know.
Mushy having met failure in the first attempt tried again with the parliament episode, to salvage his standing for his masters and draw out India and realized the cost would be too high.His fallout with Nawaz with full diplomatic support from the master kept him viable and the price the master has to pay to get the services. I am just waiting to see who made the offer to make Mushy grow balls and left him to fend on his own. The backers have taken an insurance policy on Mushy and the collateral lives out of Boston.
As the debate over Kargil goes on, neither Musharraf nor Sharif is ready to take blame for the Kargil action, with both holding each other responsible.

This side show has been going for quite a long time and some cracks are appearing.
John Snow
BRFite
Posts: 1941
Joined: 03 Feb 2006 00:44

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by John Snow »

unkil is a part of the problem, not solution. He instigated the GUBO in chief to start Kargil to become mediator in chief.
Luxtor
BRFite
Posts: 262
Joined: 28 Sep 2003 11:31
Location: Earth ... but in a parallel universe

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Luxtor »

kaangeya wrote:India has no problem in dealing with anyone in TSP. Mess'araff had his uses, now his time is up. Lt.Gen. Kiani exhibits either great candour or simply an appreciation for reality. He admits that the Indian Army is quantitatively superior, not qualitatively (thanks to PMA lessons 1 TSPA = 10 IA). But disses the TSPAF - just a 4th of IAF - and TSPN not in the same league at all. Takes a lot to talk like that. The ability of the TSPA to launch anything more than a Brigade level offensive action is in doubt. And Kiani makes it clear that he was rattled by the prospect of a front-wide war that would have snapped their lines of defence.
kaangeya, When did Kiani make such admissions? i.e. where did you read about it? Can you please post the link?
Thanks
Sanju
BRFite
Posts: 1217
Joined: 14 Aug 2005 01:00
Location: North of 49

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Sanju »

Luxtor wrote: kaangeya, When did Kiani make such admissions? i.e. where did you read about it? Can you please post the link?
Thanks
Listen to the full 30 min interview. He mentions it in there.
putnanja
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4727
Joined: 26 Mar 2002 12:31
Location: searching for the next al-qaida #3

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by putnanja »

Pakistan revisits the Kargil war
Pakistan revisits the Kargil war

Praveen Swami

General Jamshed Kiani’s charges against Pervez Musharraf aren’t news but they offer interesting insights into the Pakistan army’s internal politics.

“Kargil Ghazis,” they are sardonically called at officers’ messes across Pakistan: the warriors who received medals and promotions for fighting — and losing — a war Islamabad still refuses to admit it was involved in.

In order to legitimise the coup that brought him to power, President Pervez Musharraf insisted that the Kargil offensive he authored had been a success — and handed out sackloads of medals to prove it. In his version of events, the former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif’s perfidy cost Pakistan a certain triumph.

But earlier this month, a soldier, who was one of the retired General Musharraf’s closest aides, set about demolishing his one-time mentor’s account of what happened in Kargil. In print and television interviews, Lieutenant-General Jamshed Gulzar Kiani candidly described Kargil as a “debacle.” Mr. Sharif, he said, was not properly briefed on an ill-conceived operation in which Pakistani soldiers were sent to certain death.

Gen. Kiani’s insider account blows apart Gen. Musharraf’s claim that the Kargil war had Mr. Sharif’s support. Gen. Musharraf’s autobiography, In the Line of Fire, asserts that Mr. Sharif was briefed on January 29, 1999 and February 5, 1999. “Subsequently,” Gen. Musharraf wrote, “the PM was also briefed on March 12.” Director-General of Military Operations Lieutenant-General Tauqir Zia presided over a Sharif briefing yet again on May 17, 1999. We now know from Gen. Kiani who gave this last briefing that it was perfunctory — even deceptive.

While Gen. Kiani’s revelations have provoked a furore in Pakistan, much of what he said has long been known in India — because the Research and Analysis Wing, in one of the great communications-intelligence coups of all time, succeeded in getting it from the horse’s mouth.

RAW intercepted the telephone calls made by Gen. Musharraf from Beijing to his Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Aziz. On May 26, 1999, the two discussed the briefing provided to Mr. Sharif by Kiani, who was then serving as a Major General at the ISI. General Aziz told Gen. Musharraf that Mr. Sharif said he had come to know of the operation “seven days back” — likely just before the May 17 briefing.

Writing in the Royal United Services Institute’s Journal in April 2002, Pakistani defence analyst Brigadier Shaukat Qadir offered a version which was not dissimilar. “While preparations for executing the plan began in November/December 1999 [sic.; presumably 1998]”, Brigadier Qadir wrote, “the plan was casually broached with Prime Minister Sharif some time in December. He was presented with the same argument that the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into these (temporarily unoccupied) territories. Sharif, being the kind of person he is, accepted the statement at face value. The military leadership had not provided a complete analysis of the scale of the operation, nor had it set out its political aim and how it would be achieved”.

In Brigadier Qadir’s account of the story, Mr. Sharif, “who had been gloating over the drubbing that the Indians were getting, [later] began to feel uncomfortable. In all fairness to him, the military leadership had failed to apprise him of the politico-diplomatic fallout and he characteristically made no effort to analyse this aspect [himself]”.

If Gen. Kiani’s remarks aren’t in themselves revealing, they offer a useful prism through which we can examine the internal politics of the Pakistan army. In essence, his assault on President Musharraf is backed by a hardline, ISI-linked faction which is placing growing pressure on the army’s decision-making processes.

President Musharraf drew almost most of his close advisors from within the ranks of the military-led intelligence services. His chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Ghulam Ahmad, headed the political wing of the ISI in 1993. In the crucial days after September 11, 2001, Gen. Musharraf turned to ISI Deputy Director Lieutenant-General Iftikhar Husain Shah to be Governor of the sensitive North West Frontier Province. Lieutenant-General Javed Ashraf Qazi, who was made Education Minister with special charge of reforming madrasas, was a former ISI chief. So, too, was the ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani.

Until the rise of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq and the anti-Soviet Union jihad in Afghanistan turned the ISI into the core of the Pakistan army’s institutional power, it had been a dumping ground for the worst officers. By President Musharraf’s time, it had become the repository of the armed forces’ institutional interests — and the ultimate protector of the state’s ideological identity. The present army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani, notably, accepted charge of the ISI after serving as commander of a corps and Director-General of Military Operations — something that would traditionally have been seen as demotion.

Gen. Kiani — who then did not use the surname which identifies him as a member of the same Potohar-region clan to which the new army chief belongs — was among the many ISI-linked officers who benefited from the rise of President Musharraf. In 1999, when he deposed Mr. Sharif, Gen. Kiani was hand-picked to command the infamous Rawalpindi-based 111 Brigade, which has spearheaded each of the several coups in Pakistan’s unfortunate history. Just a month later, he was promoted and given command of the prestigious Rawalpindi-based X Corps. In the interview, he described himself as “totally loyal.”

Why, then, did General Kiani turn on his patron? Gen. Kiani’s war against President Musharraf seems driven, at least in part, by personal pique. On his retirement in March 2003, Gen. Kiani was appointed chairman of the Federal Public Service Commission. Problems soon arose, though, between him and his long-standing patron. For example, Gen. Kiani fought a running battle against an executive decision to give Post Office Director-General Major-General Masood Hassan an extension. In 2005, an irritated Gen. Musharraf summarily reduced General Kiani’s term from five years to three — and turned him into a bitter critic.

Gen. Kiani now joined hundreds of retired army officers who campaigned against President Musharraf earlier this year, soon after he handed over charge of the army to General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani. At a February 6 meeting in Rawalpindi, Gen. Kiani said the rest of Gen. Musharraf’s “eight-year rule is a complete mess-up of the country.” His own part in that rule, unsurprisingly, was not touched upon.

Among the issues Gen. Kiani raised was the welter of suicide bombings Pakistan saw in the wake of President Musharraf’s reluctant break with the jihadists last year. He urged President Musharraf to “please quit,” arguing that his policies were leading to “finger pointing at [the] Pakistan Army.” Interestingly, the meeting was called to discuss the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf was blamed by several speakers, including the former ISI chief, Gen. Durrani, for abandoning the Kashmir jihad.

Gen. Kiani’s interviews appear intended to help reverse Gen. Musharraf’s war against Islamists: a campaign he colourfully described as “using a hammer against an ant.” Many hardliners believe that Gen. Musharraf’s alliance with the United States and its counter-terrorism campaign in the NWFP exposed Pakistan to an existential threat similar to what it faced in 1971.

In his interview, Gen. Kiani argued that the wave of suicide bombings that followed the storming of the Lal Masjid in Islamabad was a predictable consequence of President Musharraf’s decision to fight “an American war on Pakistani soil.” He went on to argue that the U.S. was an unreliable ally, which had “ditched us” in the India-Pakistan war of 1965. “We could have prolonged or even won the war,” he insisted. Gen. Kiani also took the opportunity to reassure his audience that “as a soldier, as a general, I am far, far superior to an Indian army general.”
Only an instrument

Kargil is merely an instrument for discrediting President Musharraf’s anti-Islamist campaign. Many of the ‘Kargil Ghazis’ occupy important positions in Pakistan’s war against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda. Peshawar-based XI Corps commander Masud Aslam, for example, commanded 80 Brigade which was decimated in Kargil. He won a Sitara-e-Jurrat, or Star of Courage, for allowing the men he sent to be sent to their slaughter in an ill-conceived operation — a taint that hangs over his conduct of operations in the NWFP. Incidents like the destruction of the Spinkai town by the Pakistan Army’s 14th Division, which is reported to have displaced thousands, are represented by the army’s in-house hardliners as examples of just how little President Musharraf’s loyalists care for their own people.

Trapped in the web of lies he wove for himself on Kargil, Gen. Musharraf is in no position to evade the enemies now closing in on him. He is not the only one, though, caught in the trap. Pakistan’s army chief, the available evidence suggests, is yet to make up his mind on the pro-Islamist, anti-U.S. and, inevitably, anti-India posture the ISI ideologues would like to be put in place.

Signs are the hardliners are winning: Gen. Kayani has threatened to scale down the army’s counter-terrorism operations, and allowed jihadists operating against India greater freedom than in the past. Plenty of officers, though, believe that the battle against Islamists in the NWFP is in Pakistan’s own interests, and feel that the hardliners are courting disaster. The battle for the control of the army will be fought behind closed doors —but is certain to be bitter.
vinayd
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 8
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 08:48

Our casualties in Kargil

Post by vinayd »

Hello Everyone,

This is my first post here, although I have been reading your excellent forum for months now. I begin by complimenting you on the superb organization and content of this forum. It is, by far, the most informed forum on Indian matters I have had the privilege to visit. My compliments.

A little bit about me - family has military background. I am related to Flt. Lt Vijay Vasant Tambay (also spelled Tambe). Wanted to join the military myself, but a visual impairment prevented that dream from coming true.

My question is this: A few months ago, I began researching the Kargil war in more detail. The one piece of information that has not been definitively conveyed (I could be wrong - probably missing some important articles) is the cause of our fatalities. I read at various places that upto 80% of our brave soldiers perished to shell splinters, often fired from across the LoC. Something about that did not seem alright to me - after all, the major hurdle in Kargil was evicting infiltrators who had occupied strategic positions on high ground. So one would think that many of the casualties would come from fire originating from those positions.

Could someone please shed more light on this matter. It is possible that this has already been discussed elsewhere on this fine forum, in which case I request a pointer to the appropriate discussion.

Thank you.

JAI HIND.
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34981
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by shiv »

BharatBhakt - forum rules require that you have a username that looks like an ordinary name. No numerals allowed. If you post any name of your choice here - I will change your username for you.
vinayd
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 8
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 08:48

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by vinayd »

Thanks for bringing the rule to my attention Shiv.

I will then post under my real name which is Vinay.

Thank you,
Vinay
srai
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5866
Joined: 23 Oct 2001 11:31

Re: Our casualties in Kargil

Post by srai »

BharatBhakt wrote:...

My question is this: A few months ago, I began researching the Kargil war in more detail. The one piece of information that has not been definitively conveyed (I could be wrong - probably missing some important articles) is the cause of our fatalities. I read at various places that upto 80% of our brave soldiers perished to shell splinters, often fired from across the LoC. Something about that did not seem alright to me - after all, the major hurdle in Kargil was evicting infiltrators who had occupied strategic positions on high ground. So one would think that many of the casualties would come from fire originating from those positions.

...
Well ... artillery, while it may be an indirect fire, is usually called in support of forward operations by those who can see the opposing forces and provide accurate coordinates for the firings to occur. So in this case, those firing coordinates were being supplied by the infiltrators occupying strategic positions on the high ground and had clear view of the locations and movements of the IA jawans.
Jagan
Webmaster BR
Posts: 3032
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Earth @ Google.com
Contact:

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Jagan »

RayC saar, can you send me an email? your old vsnl email is bouncing.
Luxtor
BRFite
Posts: 262
Joined: 28 Sep 2003 11:31
Location: Earth ... but in a parallel universe

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Luxtor »

In the timeline leading up to the Kargil war listed above by Ramana, this particular item made me think, hmmm:
May 7 - Chinese Embassy Bombing in Kosovo - China US relationship problem. This may have kept Chinese from entering thewar.
It might be wishfull thinking on my part but does anybody else think that the Americans were warning the Chinese to stay out of the India-Puki Kargil conflict by bombing the Chicom embassy in Kosovo? If they did then it certainly worked. The Chicoms got the message that the U.S. will not allow the Chinese to interfere. If this possiblility was discussed before on these forums, I'm sorry to have brought it up. I always knew of the U.S. bombing of the Chicom embassy but didn't realize the significance of it in relation to the Kargil conflict until reading Ramana's timeline.

Thanks
svinayak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14222
Joined: 09 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by svinayak »

I was waiting for somebody to comment on that event of the timeline I built 4 years ago.
I wanted to see if anybody would connect the dots and see the deep games the major powers have been playing during the Kargil war
shiv
BRF Oldie
Posts: 34981
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Pindliyon ka Gooda

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by shiv »

bharatbhakt username changed to vinayd. plain vanilla "vinay" already in use
Lalmohan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 13257
Joined: 30 Dec 2005 18:28

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Lalmohan »

Unkil is more likely to have bombed the Chinese embassy if China was assisting the Serbs with their defense, particularly air defense network, perhaps even the fibre optic links between sites, which if I recall correctly they were providing to either the Serbs or the Iraqis. I don't think Unkil would worry that much if Chinese were flexing their muscles on the LAC - knowing that the war aims would have been limited. I do believe that the embassy hit was no accident
pradeepe
BRFite
Posts: 741
Joined: 27 Aug 2006 20:46
Location: Our culture is different and we cannot live together - who said that?

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by pradeepe »

Gen. Kiani also took the opportunity to reassure his audience that “as a soldier, as a general, I am far, far superior to an Indian army general.”
Si Senor. Point duly noted. Just keep getting your asses duly whipped every once in a while and then why just one general, we'll agree that you are better than all of the Indian generals put together.

:rotfl:
Luxtor
BRFite
Posts: 262
Joined: 28 Sep 2003 11:31
Location: Earth ... but in a parallel universe

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Luxtor »

pradeepe wrote:
Gen. Kiani also took the opportunity to reassure his audience that “as a soldier, as a general, I am far, far superior to an Indian army general.”
Si Senor. Point duly noted. Just keep getting your asses duly whipped every once in a while and then why just one general, we'll agree that you are better than all of the Indian generals put together.

:rotfl:
:rotfl: :rotfl: :rotfl:

I also hear that Gen. Kiani taught downhill skiing to the Puki army soldiers. :D
Mihaylo
BRFite
Posts: 762
Joined: 09 Nov 2007 21:10

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Mihaylo »

Just wondering, anybody else think that this Kiyani dude was a bearded Paki General and only now - because he is aligned with the mullahs in the ISI/Army - he has done away with the beard for better acceptability of his claims. His face seems freshly shaven :)

Also, what's with these Pakis. Its either the fault of the upper management or somebody else's fault that they failed in their (mis)adventures or claim a loss as a win . 1971 was mishandled by Yahya, Niazi was a bad general, the US ditched us in 1971, the seventh fleet didn't arrive, 1965 was a win, Kargil was a win (at first) then Musharraf screwed up in Kargil, etc etc etc. And ofcourse, a Paki General is better than an Indian General :(( :mrgreen:
anupmisra
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9203
Joined: 12 Nov 2006 04:16
Location: New York

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by anupmisra »

pradeepe wrote:
Gen. Kiani also took the opportunity to reassure his audience that “as a soldier, as a general, I am far, far superior to an Indian army general.”
Si Senor. Point duly noted. Just keep getting your asses duly whipped every once in a while and then why just one general, we'll agree that you are better than all of the Indian generals put together.

:rotfl:
No...what he is admitting openly to is that he got his ass whipped by a junior, less competent officer from the opposing side.
anupmisra
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9203
Joined: 12 Nov 2006 04:16
Location: New York

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by anupmisra »

Here's another view of the same Kiani interview
On a website euphemistically titled "Makepakistanbetter.com"

Lt. Gen. Jamshed Gulzar Kiani on Kargil

Usman Khalid, Director London Institute of South Asia
Last night (2 November) Lieut. General Jamshed Gulzar Kiani was interviewed on Geo TV in a programme that lasted two hours. He expressed strong opinions on many matters that have been tabooed subjects in Pakistan for many years. He asked for an inquiry into Kargil operations, which he called a 'debacle'. He also asked an inquiry into the assault on Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) and the girls' seminary (Jamia Hafza) of Islamabad and revealed that phosphorus bombs were used in the assault. He also called for the trial of General Pervez Musharraf for repeatedly violating the law - not relinquishing the office of Chief Executive on the expiry of three years given to him by the by Supreme Court, not relinquishing the Office of COAS at the end of 2004, promulgating the PCO, unlawfully dismissing the Chief Justice, Promulgating the PCO on November 3, thus making dysfunctional another 60 judges, supporting the illegal invasion of Afghanistan, handing over citizens of Pakistan and many Afghans and Arabs to the USA without due process of law. All these facts are well known but the press of Pakistan has acquired the confidence to air opinions on such matters only recently.

Although General Jamshed was not involved in the Kargil Operation, he expressed strong opinions on that operation. The anchorperson, Dr Shahid Masood, was more interested in 'who knew what and when' and General Jamshed Kiani eagerly 'exonerated' Mian Nawaz Sharif by saying he was not 'on board' and was not given a full briefing. He blamed General Musharraf for not taking the Prime Minister on board, sloppy logistics, and non-preparation for strong enemy response. Military briefings to civilian political leaders are always inadequate because civilian leaders are usually unfamiliar with the military jargon and the military are often unmindful of the political and diplomatic constraints that influence decision making by politicians. Mian Nawaz Sharif does not earn himself credit by claiming he did not know. It implies he was hoodwinked into war by a 'rosy picture'. A military inquiry into the Kargil operation would be helpful. If one has not has not been carried out already, it should be ordered now so that 'after thoughts' like the one articulated by General Jamshed does not become official history.

I regret to say that the programme did not shed new light on the subject. Wars never proceed according to plan. The question uppermost in the minds of the people is: 'since Pakistan withdrew from the territory it occupied in consequence of that operation, was it Pakistan's defeat? I will try and answer that question. Fortunately, I have no personal knowledge of the Kargil operation. All I know is what everybody read in the newspapers. The question who won is decided by answers to two questions: was the objective achieved, what is the public perception of the result. (hey, the porkis still think they won '65 and'71)Since I do not know the objective, I am using my soldierly judgement to figure out what might have been the objective.

Kargil Operations were carried out soon after India and Pakistan became declared nuclear powers. It was thought that a war between the two states on Kashmir was out of the question. Pakistan was advised to reconcile to the status quo. While such advice was being freely doled out by our friends, particularly the Americans, Indian troops occupying mountain tops above the Siachin Glacier was flying in the face of 'logic' and 'rationality' on which the advice was based. India is immune to the force of logic and rationality; it is driven by avoiding 'loss of face'. What it declares to be its right or its objective, it persists in striving for whatever the cost. The only way India can change its objective or course is by 'defeat'. It is important for Pakistan to be in a position to defeat India. Where its objectives are imperial and irrational, it is not hard to do so. If I was the Pakistani General or Leader, I had to drive the point home that a conventional war over Kashmir was not only possible, it could be won by Pakistan. That I consider was the 'objective' of the Kargil Operation.

It is quite possible that Mian Nawaz Sharif had been told that there was little chance India responding strongly to the occupation of Kargil Heights by Pakistan. These heights had been in Pakistani hands until the 1971 War. It could be argued, what could the Pakistanis do to get the heights above the Siachin Glacier vacated? Just to make that sure, Pakistan made the classical mistake of telling a lie. Pakistan said it was just the irregular Mujahideen who were fighting the Indian Army. The Mujhideen did not have artillery support. How come it materialised? As the operation progressed it became apparent it was this 'lie', which became the biggest constraint on the freedom of action of the Pakistani troops. India moved Bofor guns to the theatre in large number. Pakistan could not because it was sticking to the fiction it was a local skirmish. India then began to use its air force. That is where Pakistan had to decide if it should begin its climb up the escalation ladder. It wisely decided against it. I say wisely because the objective had been achieved. A war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is not just possible, it can be won if Pakistan is ready to climb up the escalation ladder. Kargil Heights are not the only high mountains in Kashmir. Pakistan can do a Kargil on India at dozens of points in Kashmir.

Climbing the escalation ladder is not hard, it just a question of the objective. With the limited objective that Pakistan had during the Kargil War, it was pointless escalating. India has to learn a similar lesson. India has tried to suppress the Kashmiri freedom movement since 1989. It has failed. The next time escalation would not work; Asymmetrical War has now come of age. The non-state fighters in the region have engaged two super powers - Soviet Russia and now America - in battle. Pakistan has the experience of fighting alongside them in Afghanistan and Kashmir and against them in Waziristan. The point General Jamshed made very forcefully in his TV interview was: why are we fighting against them?

Would the exit of Musharraf bring peace to Pakistan? Perhaps not! If Asif Zardari were just as eager to please the USA as Musharraf has been, the bombers, not the politicians, would write history. The secular winners of the NWFP elections - the ANP - have learnt their lesson. Resistance in Afghanistan is popular; verbal tirade against them may please the Americans but it would not help them win. At the same time, it is not necessary to win every battle; it is important to win the war. Kargil was one lost battle that paved the way for winning the war. The Mujahideen in Kashmir and Afghanistan have lost many battles and lives. But their victory is certain. In a long war the side that is on the right always wins. The war in Kashmir and Afghanistan are classical long wars. The length of the war cannot be predicted but the outcome is certain - victory for the side on the right.
Apparently the author has had too much iced zam zam cola. Brain freeze.
sanjaykumar
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6580
Joined: 16 Oct 2005 05:51

Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by sanjaykumar »

Gen. Kiani also took the opportunity to reassure his audience that “as a soldier, as a general, I am far, far superior to an Indian army general.”


Is it the Islamic millieu that permits such bombast?

If an Indian general made a homologous statement, he would be cashiered on the suspicion of feeble-mindedness.
Post Reply