Indian Foreign Policy

[derkonig]

^
NoKo is PRC's poodle. All those mijjile as well as nuke designs come from PRC.

[Avinash R]

Good idea of pooling in resources to benefit each other.

Assam-Bhutan health corridor to help the poor
June 06, 2008 03:37:02

New Delhi, Thanks to a unique border corridor, Assam's poor living close to the Bhutan border will be allowed into that country to get affordable and effective medical treatment.

The corridor, a joint venture of the two governments, will also allow Bhutanese who may be looking for medical treatment in India to cross into Assam.

The border areas falling in the corridor are the Bodo Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD) in Assam and Samdrup Jongkhar in Bhutan.

Giving shape to the project is Nedan Foundation, an Assam-based NGO, which is preparing a draft proposal to be signed by border commissioners of the two countries in August.

'The draft called 'Standard Operating Procedure' will be a ticket of sort that would help poor patients from both the countries to cross the borders to access medical benefits,' Nedan Foundation director Digambar Narzary told IANS on telephone from Kokrajhar, about 700 km from Guwahati.

To prepare the draft, Nedan is working in coordination with the immigration officials, police forces and various civil society organisations of India and Bhutan.

The opening of the corridor holds immense importance for the Bodo tribals who live in areas with negligible healthcare centres.

'Bhutan has some of the best medical health centres. The corridor would greatly benefit Bodo people, who will only have to cross the border to get themselves treated,' said Narzary.

Assam's Bodo areas are infamous for diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and dysentery. Every year, almost 1,000 people die without getting any treatment.

'In recent times we have also registered 75 HIV/AIDS cases in BTAD. In such a scenario, a proper and immediate healthcare network is the need of the hour. We are hopeful that Bhutan will be more than willing to provide us help,' said an official of Assam's health department.

'Moreover, we will also extend all sort of facilities to the Bhutanese who are on the lookout to get medical benefits in Assam and neighbouring states,' he added.

Out of the four districts of BTAD, three -- Kokrajhar, Baska and Chirang -- share the 700-km border with Bhutan. The fourth district is Udalguri.

On Feb 10, 2003, the central and Assam governments and the Bodo Liberation Tigers signed a memorandum of settlement to set up a Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in New Delhi. The area under the BTC jurisdiction is called BTAD.

The same border stretch is a vibrant trade zone. Hundreds of traders from both the countries sell their indigenous products twice a week in the zone.

'Trade ties between both the countries have always been very strong. Now we want to share our medical know how, first in the border areas,' said an immigration official of the new democratic government in Bhutan.

The India-Bhutan border was in the news during an operation the Royal Bhutan Army carried out to clear its jungles of Indian militant groups such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).

'End of militant activities has helped us to work on the latest project. The Indo-Bhutan area is today free from any terrorist activities and is safe for human passage,' said Narzary.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a two-day trip to Bhutan in May. The visit succeeded in cementing age-old political and economic ties between the neighbouring countries. It was the first visit by any Indian leader to Bhutan after the landlocked country embraced democracy in March.

Nedan Foundation works for the poor and marginalized ethnic groups living in the remotest areas of the northeastern region. The NGO is currently focusing on BTAD to empower tribal youth, women and children. It mainly works on issues like human rights, trafficking of women and children, gender equality and HIV/AIDS.

[ramana]

X-Posted. No link, sorry. From Hindu

Australia: a free-thinking ally of U.S.

P. S. Suryanarayana

India remains in the shadow of cross-currents among Australia, Japan, China, and the U.S. on several issues, including nuclear non-proliferation.

Under charismatic Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Australia has turned into a new-style ‘non-aligned’ or autonomous partner of the United States. Canberra was indeed Washington’s nodding ally until the exit of John Howard as Prime Minister a few months ago.

A relevant question in this new context is whether the global political order is gradually becoming a ‘non-polar system.’ As outlined by U.S. analyst Richard Haas, ‘a non-polar world’ will be dotted by numerous powers and also non-state actors with varying degrees of real influence. These issues have come into prominence, as a result of Mr. Rudd’s vigorous visit to Japan at this time, following his recent proactive tours of China and the U.S.

Unlike Australia under Mr. Rudd, two other long-standing allies of the U.S. — Japan and South Korea, both now led by old-fashioned loyalists of America — are passing through parallel phases of domestic political uncertainty. And, the challenges of long-term political survival, facing Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, can be traced to their separate but similar pro-U.S. stances. Mr. Lee recently came under fire for having ordered the resumption of U.S. beef imports into South Korea. Mr. Fukuda had assumed office to ‘resolve’ the crisis over Japan’s logistical support for Washington in its “war on terror” in the Afghan theatre.

Now, after holding talks with Mr. Fukuda in Tokyo on June 12, Mr. Rudd said the “broad and deep” Australia-Japan relationship “is embedded in the political cultures [of] both countries.” This, in Mr. Rudd’s view, “can endure differences [like those on whaling] as in fact our relationship with the United States endures differences [such as those over its continuing occupation of Iraq].” He also noted that Canberra and Tokyo would expand their maritime surveillance exercises and draw up new “plans in relation to defence logistics” which would be spelt out later.
Trilateral security cooperation

And, on “taking forward” Australia’s existing “trilateral security cooperation” with the U.S. and Japan, he was emphatic about the need for “a practical way” that would not alarm China or any other power. Cited in this regard was the imminent possibility of a military-conducted trilateral exercise to meet natural disasters.

Important in this scenario is that neither Australia nor Japan has now sought to co-opt India. By design or otherwise, India was part of the “core group” which the U.S. organised to rush navy-driven aid to the victims of the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia. The short-lived “core group” later ‘inspired’ a Japanese proposal, under Mr. Fukuda’s predecessor Shinzo Abe, for a quadrilateral forum of Asia-Pacific democracies, namely the U.S., Japan itself, Australia, and India. Unsurprisingly, China was not amused and made its position clear. At that stage, Australia, under Mr. Howard still, did not warm up to this idea of a four-power forum.

High-placed Japanese and Indian sources have told this correspondent that the U.S. was at first very lukewarm to Mr. Abe’s proposal before reluctantly agreeing to it. [b]Obviously, Washington was not satisfied with the cost-benefit calculations behind a possible strategic expansion of the U.S.-Japan-Australia framework to include India in China’s neighbourhood.[/b] And significantly, at this moment, neither Mr. Fukuda, U.S.-loyalist with a ‘realistic’ attitude towards China, nor Mr. Rudd has cared to pick up this idea of a quadrilateral forum from the scrapheap of contemporary history. However, India remains in the shadow of cross-currents among Australia, Japan, China, and the U.S. on several issues, including nuclear non-proliferation.

Asked, in Kyoto on June 9, about the chances of his altering course and agreeing to sell Australian uranium to India sometime in the future, Mr. Rudd made the following telling comment. “I understand full well the arguments put by the Government of India, and I have had presentations on this matter from the Government of the United States about the importance of India’s particular circumstances. We are very mindful of that. However, I would remind you of where our policy stands. .... We believe it’s important to maintain the integrity of the [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT].”

Pledging to keep the “fragmenting” NPT intact, and without blaming India, a non-signatory, he announced his move to form an international commission on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Australia would be one of the co-chairs, and Japan was later “spontaneous” in discussing the initiative.

Diplomats in the region have noted how Mr. Rudd, widely seen as being not just friendly but really empathetic as well towards China in a big way, has now sought to make common cause with Japan on its traditional priorities. One of them is non-proliferation, especially because Japan still swears by the NPT despite neighbouring North Korea’s nuclear weaponisation, now the subject of China-hosted Six-Party Talks. The other common cause relates to climate change, given Mr. Rudd’s political passion for planet-sustaining environment and given Japan’s leadership role in this domain. As for China’s place in his worldview, Mr. Rudd had said, after his talks with the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in Beijing on April 10, that “it is important to embrace this relationship.” At the same time, “we need to deal in a frank and straightforward way with disagreements when they arise,” he noted. He discussed Tibet with the Chinese leaders then; and significantly now, his absence on tour from Australia, during Dalai Lama’s visit there, is seen as a China-friendly gesture.

Expanding 6-Party Talks

On a wider canvas, Mr. Rudd has discussed with Chinese and U.S. leaders “the desirability of the Six-Party Talks being expanded into a broader security dialogue across East Asia.” And, he saw “a supportive attitude emerging” from both Beijing, a prime mover behind the talks, and Washington, a player eager to prolong its “forward military presence” in the region.

Relevant to Australia’s own regional stakes are its Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon’s comments in an interview to this correspondent in Singapore in early June. Canberra’s “U.S. alliance,” he said, “is one of the first pillars of our defence policy and will continue to be so into the future.” He also indicated that Australia would not like to see its independent ties with India and China through the “prism” of zero-sum calculations.

As a free-thinking ally of the U.S., Mr. Rudd has, therefore, proposed the creation of an Asia Pacific Community over time. He seeks to engage all the major players by making common cause wherever possible and discussing differences whenever necessary.

Most likely Rudd is allowed to appear free and thus finagle a new expanded six power talks to include all Asia with smoke and mirrors! One thing curious is the lack of synchronity between US thoughts and their actions vis a vis India.

[ramana]

The problem is that the Indian chatterati are intent on appearing to be non-threatening and are vacating all strategic space for India in order to get some illusive benefits from US the current hegemon of the West. However when the space exists, it is inevitable that somebody—almost anybody—will put the pieces together and bring on a new epoch. The unstated corollary is that if less than all of the space exists, some humans can waste a lot of effort and accomplish nothing lasting. So by vacating the space they are allowing poodles to fill in and grow. Timing has its own dynamic.

[Raju]

>>The problem is that the Indian chatterati are intent on appearing to be non-threatening and are vacating all strategic space for India in order to get some illusive benefits from US the current hegemon of the West.

not so much chatterati but the major culprit is the Indian bureaucracy. In absence of any leaders with vision, the bureaucracy was supposed to have taken over the role of providing vision and direction to the political leadership.

but the bureaucracy has set very low goals for themselves. they want to appear non-confrontatational to the west where they have interests and probably family and children studying. And then they are supported in this venture by the political chatterati who have a/c's in Swiss bank and Lichtenstein, Caymen Islands as a cut of WB loans, defence deals and what not .. they feel that in any confrontation with the west their bank balance will be under threat.

with these two operating together we can forget about strategic space.

[nkumar]

BK in WSJ-livemint:
http://www.livemint.com/Articles/2008/0 ... anute.html

Considering the banner headlines on the US presidential nomination race in Indian newspapers, one would think Barack Obama was in the race for power in India! Relations with the US are, in fact, headed for a downturn should he get elected US president, come November. John McCain is an uninspiring alternative, but at least he talks of “a league of democracies” in which India is bound to feature prominently, and not non-proliferation measures that will end up hurting India that Obama is set to pursue. As far as India is concerned, the main problem with Obama is precisely his non-proliferation stance. He is for preventing states from crossing the weapons threshold and is bent on making an example of India (and Pakistan) for obtaining these armaments; verily a latter day King Canute ordering the nuclear tide to roll back.

[putnanja]

PM learns to play ‘power game’, Home parallel in G8 case

On board the Prime Minister’s Special Aircraft, July 7: It was a throwaway line on the ways of the world that managed to reveal that India’s famously “apolitical” Prime Minister had a canny grasp of realpolitik after all.

“The world system,” he told reporters accompanying him to the G8 summit in Japan, “is not a morality play; it is a power game. Those who have power do not want to share it with others. So it is a struggle.”

He was talking of India’s case to join the powerful G8 Club as a full member but he could well have been referring to the events that had taken place back home. Nearly 11 months after his interview to The Telegraph daring the Left on the nuclear deal (“If they withdraw support, so be it”), the Prime Minister and his men were visibly buoyant at having stayed the course and won the day eventually.

And though he did not spell it out, that victory had come by waging a hard-fought power game — a personal struggle against his own party chief and a political battle against the Left.

And if he had broken bread with Samajwadi Party leaders, including the likes of Amar Singh, to achieve that objective, well — Indian politics, much more than the world system, was not exactly a theatre for morality.

But it is not domestic politics that particularly enthuses Manmohan Singh who was ready to go down on what many still regard as an issue of arcane foreign policy. It is India and her place in the world that obsesses him.

And buoyed by his success in staring down Messrs Karat and company on the nuclear face-off back home, Manmohan made it clear that he was all set to take on “the world community” in pushing India’s case for a place at the global high table.

Be it climate change, energy security, spiralling food and fuel prices or the world financial system, Manmohan made it clear that India had an opinion and would not be shy to state it.

Asserting that India would not give in to pressure to cut carbon emissions at the cost of development, the Prime Minister referred to his offer at the last G8 summit at Heiligendamm that India’s per capita emission of greenhouse gases would never exceed the “average of the developed countries and therefore if the developed countries make deeper cuts that will also be an incentive for us to move at a faster pace”.

On the issue of climate change, he said: “Our position has been made amply clear… India cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as a major polluter (with) greenhouse gases. Our contribution to emissions is less than 4 per cent. On per capita basis, it is among the lowest. For us, the topmost priority is development, to solve the problem of chronic poverty…. India accepts its responsibility (to work for sustainable development) but I do not think we are in a position to take responsibility by way of international target reductions and that is the broad thrust of our approach.”

On the spiralling oil prices, the Prime Minister accused international financial institutions of not doing enough. Iterating the need to create a forum where producers and consumers can sit together and work out modalities to introduce greater stability in pricing, he said: “And I regret to note that the international community has been far less active to deal with the problem of the oil crisis than was the case in the first crisis of 1973 or the second crisis of 1978.”

On calls for the expansion of the G8, the Prime Minister said: “Most countries agree a world forum that does not include countries like China, India and Brazil is not representative or well equipped to handle global problems in an increasingly interdependent world.”

Expansion may not be on the cards now but “sooner or later the world power structures” would have to alter their ways of seeing.

The Prime Minister also pointed out that the global food crisis had got closely interlinked with the energy crisis since “a large part of agricultural crops are now being devoted to the production of bio-fuel”.

The world must “look at this new disequilibrium which threatens to create a situation that countries may solve the energy problem but there will be increasing poverty and hunger,” he added.

And finally, the economist in him called for a re-look at “the balance of power in the international financial systems” since the bulk of savings originated in Asia today and the western institutions acted only as intermediaries. “I think the world has to find ways and means to recognise this new reality…,” he insisted.

[ramana]

The late MR. Venkateshwar Rao, killed inthe Kabul Embassy attack was an expert on Dari. I was intrigued to know what is Dari and Pashto.

Here is a link on Dari and Pashto from Wiki.


Link on geographical spread of Persianised languages MAP

From the first link looks like Dari is the language of Eastern Persia/Western Afghanistan.

Pashto is the language of the Pashtuns.
Rosetta Stone has software to learn Pashto but not Dari.

Are Dari speaking people of Afghanishtan Shia?

[ramana]

This is what PM was meaning when he said he would talk about climate change with G-8. From Pioneer, 9 July 2008.

West tries to pass the buck

Amit Jetley on why India and China must resist forced emission norms

Climate change, along with the world economy and human rights, will dominate the G8 summit currently being held in Japan at the Lakeside resort of Hokkaida Toyako. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is among those invited to this meet other than the leaders of the eight industrialised countries along with delegates from Australia, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea and South Africa. Climate change had dominated last year's G8 summit yet this year's rising interest rates as well as inflation figures may force the issue somewhat in the background. This meet also has importance as it comes about halfway to the completion of the UN millennium goals set for 2015.

Yet climate change will not be entirely put on the backburner as the Kyoto Protocol is set to expire in 2012, which lends the issue some urgency. Climatologists have warmed that this year's Summit is important as developed nations have to set reduction targets to replace the Kyoto Protocol. If an agreement is not reached, then global warming will result in a climate catastrophe before mid-century. Yet any consensus on the issue of climate change is likely to be evasive at this meeting.

There are disagreements between the nations and some of the participants are not in a position to assert themselves. Four members of the G8, Germany, Britain, France and Italy have already pledged to cut their emissions of carbon dioxide by 20 per cent of the 1990 levels no matter what the rest of the world does, and 30 per cent if other major powers do the same. But the United States, which also refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, insists on India and China to be held to the same standards. This is regarded as unfair by India and China for it is essentially the G8 countries that are responsible for global warming by emitting so much greenhouse gases in the last 100 years.

In fact, the per capita carbon emissions of India and China are well below that of the developed countries. Were these two countries to agree to the same level of emission cuts as expected of the US, it would adversely affect their development as well as perpetuate the disparity in the living standards of people in the rich and poor countries. India and China have rightly insisted that they would like the rich countries to commit to specific mid-term goals rather than put the onus on them.

I suspect that PRC will get a separate deal for themselves unless India looks out for herself.

[Paul]

Foreign relations of India

Good read.....may have some nuggets we have given a go-by

[ramana]

Telegraph, Kolkota, 26 Sept. 2008

TERROR, COME, SOON, SOON
- A strategic alliance with the US will extract its own price
Cutting Corners
ASHOK MITRA


There is no way to dodge the wages of indiscretion: Pakistan is currently in the process of grasping that lesson. It was one of the earliest countries to opt for the bondage of strategic alliance with the United States of America. Half a century later, the apparatus of decision-making, and not just in defence matters, is no longer in the control of the country’s nominal rulers. It is now too late for them to try to reclaim the sovereignty of their nation.

The fight against what it loves to describe as global terror is a total war to the US administration. National frontiers are irrelevant in the conduct of this war. As in Iraq, the much-touted invasion forces in Afghanistan too have been of little avail. The Taliban were driven out of the main towns, Kabul and Kandahar were ‘captured’ by American troops, a puppet government was duly installed. None of this has disturbed the underpinning of reality. The Taliban reorganized themselves in no time. They are once more omnipresent, here, there and everywhere, in Afghanistan. The Hamid Karzai regime has only a token presence in Kabul. Even the capital’s thoroughfares do not offer safe pasture to either American personnel or US-leaning members of the diplomatic corps though.

Emulating the Americans, the Taliban too have learnt to penetrate formal national borders; they have infiltrated, extensively, into Pakistan. Peshawar, in any case, has remained a free bazaar for AK rifles and similar other accoutrements of warfare for at least a score of years. Besides, the growth of indigenously nurtured anti-American sentiment has been inevitable in the wake of the US administration’s grand declaration of the resolve to obliterate Islamic terror. With every emerging story of American atrocities in Iraq or Afghanistan, emotions surge a little further in Pakistan. The entire country is now not far from being a cordial reception centre for eager beaver Taliban zealots. Scratch a Pakistani mind: one half of it leans in the direction of liberal democracy and the lure of material comforts snuggling up to Americans can supply, the other half is ideologically identified with the Taliban and jumps in joy as tidings reach of Americans receiving a bloody nose in any part of the world.

The Americans, for understandable reasons, are not prepared to put up with this kind of situation. As Pakistanis slowly feel their way towards establishing a functional democracy, strategists work overtime in Washington DC, to take cognizance of the new realities unfolding in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad; Peshawar perhaps has long since been written off as a lost cause.

Why flinch from facing facts — most Pakistanis would like to turn a Nelson’s eye on Taliban infiltration into their territory. Some latent sympathy for the Taliban cause apart, they do not quite grasp the rationale of fighting other people’s war. The Americans at the other end are not prepared to put up with any defiance of the covenants of the strategic alliance sealed long years ago. They have a number of ‘advisory’ kind of military and air force installations on the soil of Pakistan. Once convinced that Taliban hordes have crossed the border and are operating from within Pakistan, they cannot be deterred from launching a merciless counter-attack without caring a bit about Islamabad’s susceptibilities. Pervez Musharraf could be Pakistan’s all-power dictator courtesy Foggy Bottom; Ten Per -cent Zardari has recently been installed as the country’s president again only after his name was cleared with the US administration. Both civil and military authorities in Pakistan may, for the sake of form, post squeaky protests against American violation of their national sovereignty. They, however. know their protests are for the birds. The Americans mean business, and they are conversant with the fine print of the strategic alliance. It is again a historical process that has taken over. Give or take another five years, Pakistan would be as indescribably devastated a land as Iraq or Afghanistan is; global terror calls for global annihilation.

And that is not going to be the end of history. The nuclear deal India’s prime minister has struck with the US president is only a beginning. It will matter little whether in New Delhi the regime is a motley coalition headed by either the Congress or the Bharatiya Janata Party, the strategic alliance will take its own course. The local subedars will have to fall in with the official American will and endorse perceived American interests as their own. As the years roll by, Talibani penetration into Pakistan is bound to be increasingly more overt. Pakistan will become a replica of Afghanistan — a squalid no man’s land, but on a vastly larger scale; the Taliban’s suicide-bomber squads will compete for superiority with American air and land strikes. Before Indian authorities are even aware of what is happening, advance Taliban units could start operating along chunks of the Pakistan-India border, from the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir down to the Gulf of Kutch. Firmly ensconced in the American camp, New Delhi would not be able to afford not to accept the proposition of global terror being synonymous with Taliban terror and the enemy of the US ipso facto the enemy of India. That is what strategic alliance is about.

Anticipating the sequel is child’s play. Since, by virtue of the strategic alliance, the Taliban would be India’s declared enemy, they could be relied upon to return the compliment. They would now feel no compunction to infiltrate across the Pakistan-India border and set up clandestine dens, let us say, in and around Surat, in and around Amritsar, in and around Doda. India’s official security outfit has been vigorously promoting the thesis of local militants having intimate links with external agents. It would then very nearly be a case of demand creating its own supply; those disgruntled over Kashmir and the demolition of the Babri Masjid would join ranks with the Taliban.

In these circumstances, helmsmen in New Delhi might, on account of domestic political reasons, adopt for some while a Janus-faced stance; the Americans would suffer from no inhibition. They would plan and launch counter-attacks against the Taliban in right earnest from Indian soil, not bothering to take prior sanction from the Indian authorities; the approval would be taken for granted.

Such is the non-enigma of an entente struck between unequal parties. The interpretation of its content by the superior party is what counts. Official American eagerness to enter into alliances of this nature has always been based on the hope of increasing the effectiveness of the war against the global enemy. Fifty years ago, the Soviet Union was that enemy, now it is the Taliban. Once the strategic alliance is safely tucked in, India can hardly avoid being turned into an actual theatre of the global war. That is what transition from non-alignment to alignment spells. The explosions that shook New Delhi in mid-September are only a curtain-raiser. Having demurely subscribed to the catechism that an adversary of the US is our very own adversary, we have to make ourselves ready for enactment of grisly terror in our backyard on a permanent basis. Like revolution, global war against terror is no garden party. And it is going to be a far worse situation if we invite the terror to come and be our guest.

[Rye]

Ashok Mitra wrote:

In these circumstances, helmsmen in New Delhi might, on account of domestic political reasons, adopt for some while a Janus-faced stance; the Americans would suffer from no inhibition. They would plan and launch counter-attacks against the Taliban in right earnest from Indian soil, not bothering to take prior sanction from the Indian authorities; the approval would be taken for granted.

We should take this joker's view seriously when the USA operates from Indian territory without the GoI's permission -- till then Ashok Mitra can be considered to be full of Horse Manure.

[Nayak]

India is a necessary friend to carry out parallel interests: Dr Henry Kissinger

http://www.indiainfoline.com/news/inner ... 5296&lmn=1

India Infoline News Service / Mumbai Nov 20, 2008 11:34
Dr Kissinger emphasized that a foreign policy has to begin with objective necessity and that irrespective of the variations in foreign policies, national interest can not be invented.

I greatly respect India's foreign policy. It has been extraordinarily consistent throughout governments", said Dr Henry Kissinger Former Secretary of State (USA) and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate at the interaction organized by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in Mumbai.

Dr Kissinger emphasized that a foreign policy has to begin with objective necessity and that irrespective of the variations in foreign policies, national interest can not be invented. "There is always a certain rhythm followed in a country's foreign policy", commented the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate.

Terming the beginning of America's new administration as challenging, Dr Henry Kissinger said that it was a turning point in the history of America. "The enthusiasm of the younger generation is commendable and this election has created a new approach to racism".

Commenting on the challenges faced by the new administration, Dr Kissinger said that one of the biggest issues that will affect the region is to promote a non partisan approach. "The foreign policy to be followed would depend on the conviction of the degree to which America can change the domestic structure of every part of the world", stated Dr Kissinger.

Talking about the Indian and American relationship Dr Kissinger stated emphatically that its relationship has been uniquely close throughout the decades. "India and America has been a steady and a close partner and in dealing with big problems both the countries can work together and among China, India and America, the future foreign policy will be more significant and complex."

While addressing issues on terrorism, Dr Kissinger expressed that countries like India and America, in their foreign policies, should identify those key areas of cooperation and jointly work together to combat this global meanace. Better lessons could be learnt from the existing cross border relations of the two countries to nurture overall peace and harmony.

Calling Dr Kissinger's visit as a great opportunity, R Gopalakrishnan, Executive Director, Tata Sons Ltd said that as every other country, America also has its own challenges and issues and that a huge challenge before the new President Elect of America would be to mould its foreign policy in these critical times of economic upheaval.

[ramana]

So we are back to pre-colonial days with businessmen conducting Foreign Policy. I bet the MEA is too busy fixing things for the govt that it does not pay attention to this.

[warthog]

After India flexing it muscle in the gulf of aden,we are celebrating as its new age for the Indian might.What you fail to realize that Ins tabar had to wait for it to be attacked and even it then it hesitated.Only after seeing Rpg's it attacked in self defence.

India has blindly ratified the lost treaty
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nat ... of_the_Sea

In effect India has given its sovereignty to UN.
I was reading this BBC article
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7741287.stm

It shocked me that the Indian navy and the govt had to seek permission from the UN to pursue pirates.

This is the effect of the LOST treaty.If India has to be a superpower it should immediately pull away from international treaties which affect its strategic security like law of sea treaty and UN convention of biodiversity.Rather that ratifying humane things like UN convention on human rights(whcih India and Pakistan have yet to ratify) and India calls its self's a free democratic country.
here are some clips and articles on the effect of the law of sea treaty.
http://in.youtube.com/watch?v=D5Y24goa6o4
http://in.youtube.com/watch?v=tOZbWenLG2o
http://in.youtube.com/watch?v=RKgBEMSK3_I
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/artic ... E_ID=57745

US has not ratified it btw.
End supranational ism,global governence and push national sovereignty.

Our navy is at mercy at the UN.

[svinayak]

Dr Kissinger emphasized that a foreign policy has to begin with objective necessity and that irrespective of the variations in foreign policies, national interest can not be invented.

Is HK preaching to India.
Is he trying to say that India does not have national interest.

In his book when he was in Harvard says that India is not following policies which are for the national interest of the nation.

[Jaspreet]

In effect India has given its sovereignty to UN.
...
It shocked me that the Indian navy and the govt had to seek permission from the UN to pursue pirates.

An uninformed statement designed to incite jingoist sentiments.
What the BBC article really says is:

Delhi has formally been given permission to act under a UN resolution allowing navies to pursue pirates into Somalia's territorial waters.

Note that India didn't need UN permission to send its warships to Gulf of Aden or to sink the pirate mothership.
This UN permission is only so Indian navy can enter Somali waters. Why is there anything wrong with that?

[ramana]

The UN has a convention on aggression that prohibits it. Entering Somali waters without Somali permission would violate that. Hence getting the UN to endorse such move(entering Somali waters) is a good thing.

[Paul]

Are Dari speaking people of Afghanishtan Shia?

They subscribe to the Persian culture, may not necessarily be Shia. Eg: Tajiks.

[Prem]

Courtsey Ram Narayan Ji

Enough with the diffidence

Harsh V. Pant

Posted: Nov 20, 2008 at 2304 hrs IST

Barack Obama apparently takes his time in picking up the phone and calling Manmohan Singh after his victory. Indian strategic elites read in it the beginning of the end of the US-India strategic partnership. Headlines read “Obama snubs India” and a slight was perceived where none was intended.

Meanwhile, the first thing the Indian Government did after signing the security declaration with Japan last month was to underline that the agreement was not aimed at China. A regular feature of Indian diplomacy: even as China continues to weave circles around India, India continues to walk on shells for fear of annoying the Chinese.

These episodes merely highlight the broader strategic culture that pervades Indian foreign policy.

Despite the chest-thumping in recent years about India emerging as a major global power, its strategic and political elites display an insecurity that defies explanation. A powerful, self-confident nation should be able to articulate a coherent vision about its priorities and national interests. Various domestic constituencies have accused the government of betraying its “time-tested friends”, such as Iran and Russia, as if the only purpose of foreign policy is to make friends. The government failed to strongly defend itself, generating confusion about its policy priorities. Foreign policy cannot be geared towards keeping every other country in good humour.

Such insecurity makes India overboard with its concerns about Obama and reluctant to appreciate fully what George W. Bush has accomplished for Indo-US ties. It is perfectly reasonable for India to emphasise that while it doesn’t support many of Bush’s foreign policy ventures, it recognises the critical role he has played in transforming bilateral ties. Bush’s u-turn on Kashmir and non-proliferation might make him one of the most significant US presidents for India. Whether it was preventing the non-proliferation lobby from wrecking the deal or using his clout to bring recalcitrant NSG nations around, he spent political capital building a new partnership.

India’s concerns about some US foreign policy priorities and its acceptance of the Bush administration’s critical role in transforming ties are not mutually exclusive.

After all, India did not agree with many of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy priorities either. And yet when the Indian PM thanked Bush during his last visit to the US, critics in India went berserk. In a similar vein, notwithstanding Obama’s problematic stands on several issues impinging directly on Indian interests, there is no need for India to be hyperbolic in its concerns. If Obama does decide to go back on some of the initiatives of the Bush administration vis-à-vis India, then it would be as much a problem for broader US foreign policy as it would be for India. He won’t be doing India any favours by engaging India more substantively either. India is a rising power. The US and the world need it as much as India needs them. The visible lack of self-confidence among Indian elites in their nation’s ability to leverage the international system to its advantage will only weaken India. India should assess its interests carefully and learn to stand up for them.

India’s strategic diffidence is in full display in the case of China, where India has consistently refused to tackle the challenge that China poses to Indian interests. China has upped the ante on the border issue, and its rhetoric on Arunachal Pradesh is getting stronger. More alarmingly, intrusions into Indian territory are getting more brazen. In a recent incident, Chinese soldiers entered 15 kilometres into India at the Burste post in the Ladakh sector along the Sino-Indian boundary and burned the Indian patrolling base. The number of incursions by the Chinese has increased to 213 from 170 reported last year. As usual, India is left to reacting to these actions — actions that do not conform to India’s self-image of an aspiring global power either.

India’s China policy and its larger foreign policy continue to be premised on the liberal fallacy that strategic problems will inevitably produce satisfactory solutions merely because they are desirable and in the interest of all. As a result, the real issues are sidelined while the peripheral issues attain centrestage. India is too big, too proud and too significant a global player to worry about Obama’s phone call. Its sights should be on the real challenges to its interests and it should work towards preserving and enhancing them, without any apologies or explanations.

The writer teaches at King’s College, London

[warthog]

In effect India has given its sovereignty to UN.
...
It shocked me that the Indian navy and the govt had to seek permission from the UN to pursue pirates.

An uninformed statement designed to incite jingoist sentiments.
What the BBC article really says is:

Delhi has formally been given permission to act under a UN resolution allowing navies to pursue pirates into Somalia's territorial waters.

Note that India didn't need UN permission to send its warships to Gulf of Aden or to sink the pirate mothership.
This UN permission is only so Indian navy can enter Somali waters. Why is there anything wrong with that?

did you watch the youtube videos?.our navy cannot exercise fully in a sovereign way unless it withdraws from the law of seat treaty.
can you tell me who ratified it and does our constitution allow parliament ratification of international treaties or only cabinet.

this should be mainstream news.i am proud of my navy and my mili and my country but i cannot tolerate international treaties which threaten our national sovereignty and security.

can you do me a favor and create a separate article about the ramifications of the lost treaty on inda's future.

[ramana]

From Deccan Chronicle, 27 Nov 2008

Reforms in IFS are most welcome
By Inder Malhotra

AT long last, after a great deal of cogitation and debate, and with the approval of the Union Cabinet, a five-year plan for comprehensive reform, reorganisation and revamping of the Indian Foreign Service is ready for implementation. The core of the project is to double, over the five-year period, the IFS’ existing strength of 620. Of the extra hands, as they are recruited and trained, many more would be posted to the ministry of external affairs in New Delhi than would be sent to embassies in need of strengthening or new missions that might have to be opened.

In an age of grinding economic crisis and financial crunch, the proposed expansion of the Foreign Service may appear extravagant, especially because since the Fifth Pay Commission, a decade ago. the government has been committed to downsizing the bureaucracy and to avoid creation of new posts. But the need for a big increase in the strength of the diplomatic service is genuine and should be obvious. For a country of India’s size that also is major actor on the international stage — India is always included in the six powers that prop up the present world order, such as it is — a larger Foreign Service is surely necessary. (The other five are the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and Japan.)

Yet, India’s Foreign Service is among the smallest. That of Brazil is four times its size and China’s is seven times larger. The ration of officers posted at the headquarters to those deployed in diplomatic missions abroad is abysmally inadequate.

For instance, one territorial division, headed by a joint secretary, looks after as many as 23 countries. In a "better off" division one joint secretary, assisted by one director, two deputy secretaries and three under-secretaries, deals with three countries of such crucial importance as Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

In any rational arrangement, there should be a joint secretary in charge of each of these three countries, with someone above them, an additional or special secretary, supervising the region. The plight of the eastern division — in charge of China, Japan and the two Koreas — is not much different. Of the rest, the less said the better.

Of course, a mere quantitative expansion would be of no avail, if there is no corresponding increase in the quality of work. All the recruits to the service, like those to other all-India services, come through the competitive examination and are selected by the Union Public Services Commission. Moreover, everyone selected by the UPSC has a right to choose the service he or she wishes to join. Time was when those on top of the list used to opt for the IFS. But that has become a thing of the past. The powers of the IAS and the possibilities offered by the Indian Revenue Service have been more attractive.

Incidentally, the present pattern of recruitment is causing a problem in the South Block. Quite a few recruits who opt for the Foreign Service each year know very little English because they appear in the UPSC examination in Hindi and other Indian languages and are from schools and colleges where the medium of instruction is their mother tongue. Even at present the MEA has been sending such probationers to the Foreign Service Institute for special training in English. But this arrangement would need to be both enlarged and upgraded as the intake of officers increases.

A more important decision included in the five-year plan relates to training in foreign languages. Up to now this country, like others, was using in the realm of diplomacy the languages that are adopted by the United Nations. Because of the great and growing importance of the neighbouring countries, Pushtu, Darri, Tibetan and Myanmarese (Burmese) are being added. An essential feature of the plan to make the IFS more effective is that for the first 12 years of his or her service an officer would be posted only to those countries where the language of their choice is spoken. This reform is vital, and one can only hope that it would indeed be adhered to.

In the past, four officers specialising on China and fluent in Mandarin were posted, one after the other, as ambassador to Algiers. In several other cases, after the very first appointment in their careers, officers were never sent to areas of their specialisation.

The doubling of the IFS’ strength also has a flip side from the point of view of those joining it. Competition for promotions, especially for rising to the top jobs, would be much harder. The number of foreign countries is unlikely to increase, except marginally. To be an ambassador would, therefore, be doubly difficult. Also there would be only one foreign secretary though the number of secretaries might increase. The authors of the reform plan have also decided that no one who hasn’t had three postings in the country or countries that comprise the area of his or her specialisation can become joint secretary, and without having served as a joint secretary at the headquarters no one would be appointed ambassador. More imaginatively, at every stage of promotion, there would be a test as well as a refresher course.

Nothing, however, can be perfect. There are some shortcomings also in the Foreign Office’s reform plan. The most distressing of these is the refusal to resurrect the MEA’s Historical Division. The abrupt and inexplicable abolition of this useful institution many years ago was a disaster. Failure to being it back to life is catastrophic. Apparently, decision-makers feel that the functions of the Historical division can be outsourced, in bits and pieces, to think tanks and the groves of academe.

Ironically, at the time of its abolition some of the Historical Division’s functions were transferred to the Policy Planning Division (PPD) that, unfortunately, has been a pointless fifth wheel of the coach. The plan’s authors have regretfully concluded that nothing can make the PPD effective. Why have it in that case?

[Sudip]

I was wondering about the role that could be played by the Romas and gypsies in central asia and europe if properly leveraged by india due to their historical link to the nation. Similar to how NRIs/PIOs give us an extra edge. Although most of them are abhorred and socially segregated by their countries and might become a negative force but still worth a debate.

Here are some links i found regarding the progress made in this regard

http://www.indianmuslims.info/news/2008 ... tival.html

http://ignca.nic.in/id_exhib001_proceedings.htm

[putnanja]

PM wants next govt to decide key envoys

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has indicated to the External Affairs Ministry that key diplomatic appointments to Washington, United Nations and Pakistan should be left to the new Government after the general elections.

...
The Prime Minister apparently conveyed to the MEA that as these three appointments are crucial to foreign policy, these should be decided by the next government. This means that New Delhi will not have a High Commissioner in Pakistan for at least three months because the new government is likely to be sworn in by late May. Going by present trends, current Foreign Secretary Shiv Shanker Menon and Indian Ambassador to Germany Meera Shanker are front-runners for the jobs in Washington and New York.
...

[ramana]

And they both used to be in DC a few years back!

[putnanja]

Cybersecurity breach in key MEA computers

At a time when all its energy is focused on post-Mumbai diplomacy with Pakistan and the world, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has been hit by a cybersecurity nightmare.

Sources have confirmed to The Sunday Express that “several” of its over 600 computers have been infected by “spyware,” a programme that surreptitiously gets installed on a computer to track or take control of the user’s actions.

A detailed investigation is on to determine the damage as initial reports suggest the spyware is linked to a server located in China. Sources said the computers affected include those in the Ministry’s sensitive Pakistan section and in the offices of senior Secretaries and Joint Secretaries.

....

[putnanja]

MEA computers hacked, vital data intact

[shyamd]

Saran’s policy U-turn

Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s speech at the India Habitat Centre lecture series last week left many foreign policy experts puzzled. Saran, a special envoy of the PM on the nuclear deal, seems to have second thoughts about the pro-US tilt in our foreign policy. But, it was Saran, himself, who played a major role in shaping the policy. Saran declared that “India needs to be geared up for a more diffused and decentralised complex international landscape, with the US enjoying significantly diminished predominance”. Saran believes India needs desperately to hedge its foreign policy in view of the Sino-US strategy convergence, as the US is embarking on an unprecedented diplomatic offensive to co-opt China in its economic recovery. And in the bargain is willing to accommodate China’s regional and global ambitions.

For the full text of Saran's landmark speech

[Gerard]

Geo – Political Consequences of Current Financial and Economic Crisis: Implications for India.

Shyam Saran,
Special Envoy of PM
India Habitat Centre
28 February, 2009


Dr. Shankar Acharya,

Thank you for chairing this Session. I am deeply honoured by your presence. I would also like to express my appreciation to the India Habitat Centre and Mr. Raj Lieberhan for providing a forum for this interaction on a subject that has so far been off the radar in this country. It is my firm belief that even while we learn to cope with the more immediate impact of the on-going financial and economic crisis, we should look more closely at the manner in which the crisis may be changing, in a fundamental manner, the global geo-political landscape as well as the dominant ideologies which were accepted wisdom in most parts of our world.

Let us first look at the nature of the financial and economic crisis itself. It is a crisis that originated in the US and has now spread over the entire global economy. The Western dominance of the global financial markets and the global economy as a whole has been shaken to the core. It is possible that New York and London may no longer regain their undisputed status as the central financial markets of the world. With this has come an intellectual crisis engendering an open questioning of the western espousal of the magic of the market place, the belief in self-regulating market mechanisms and the relentless retreat of the state from virtually all key areas of economic life. These twin crises are beginning to spawn significant and far-reaching political consequences. One relates to the redistribution of political power based on real economic strength. The other relates to perceptions, which are equally important, shaking confidence in market based liberalism that has been the dominant dogma for the past two centuries and more.

First, let us examine the chief characteristics of the crisis.

In essence, it is the consequence of unsustainable imbalances in the global economy i.e. prolonged fiscal and trade deficits in the U.S. matched by fiscal surpluses and astronomical foreign exchange reserves in China, but also smaller surpluses in other economies such as the oil exporting Gulf and Japan.

These imbalances will need correction through a sizeable increase in saving and decrease in consumption in the U.S. and associated Western economies, while China will need to save less and consume more – China today saves over 40% of its GDP -. It seems to us that neither is likely to happen in the near future. In order to avoid a recession and promote the recovery of its economy, the U.S. has deployed and may continue to deploy progressively larger monetary and fiscal stimulus packages. The same is being witnessed in the market economies of Europe. This will push their economies in a direction opposite of the basic adjustment required, and can only be justified as a temporary palliative. The subsequent adjustments will have to be that much more significant and far-reaching, the larger the deficits are today. On the other hand, China’s saving rate is likely to remain high. Asians, including Chinese, respond to difficult times, by saving more not less, particularly, where social security safety nets are absent. China has announced a large spending package for infrastructure, but this will only increase the significant excess capacity that already exists in infrastructure, whether these are highways, ports or building construction.

The US and China have become joined at the hip over the past couple of decades. This is what Kissinger said in a recent article:

“China made possible the American consumption splurge by buying American debt; America helped the modernization and reform of the Chinese economy by opening its markets to Chinese goods. Both sides overestimated the durability of this arrangement.”

If this arrangement has to be progressively adjusted towards a new balance without risking economic collapse, an extraordinary and unprecedented level of consultation, coordination and understanding would be required between the two countries.

Let us consider what is required.

The US will need to reduce its trade deficit through a deliberate and graduated decline in the value of the US dollar. As this will lead to the progressive decline in the value of China’s vast dollar holdings – China currently holds US $ 1.1 trillion in US debt including US $ 652 billion in US Treasury debt - it will have to acquiesce in this erosion of wealth rather than seek to significantly diversify its reserves. Will China play ball?

China will need to resist the temptation to save its vast export industry from rapid decline and ruin, by devaluing its currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, or at least keep the current parity level. The U.S. interest, on the other hand, will be to persuade the Chinese not merely to maintain the current value of the Yuan, but to revalue significantly. Can these two contrary interests be reconciled? It is estimated that closure of export factories has already led to 20 million workers in China becoming unemployed. Will the creation of new jobs in the infrastructure sector help mitigate the retrenchment in the export sector? The evidence is that the latter, for the moment, is outpacing the former. What is the scale of destruction of its industry and rising unemployment, which a Yuan revaluation would further exacerbate, that China would be willing to tolerate?

For its part, the US appears to be working on the assumption that dependent as China is on the health of the global and particularly the U.S. economy, it will, in fact, be persuaded to do the unprecedented things that may be required. For this persuasion to work, the U.S. is embarking on an equally unprecedented diplomatic offensive to co-opt China in its economic recovery strategy.

For example:

There are increasing calls for a Sino-US global condominium, a so-called G-2, which would shape a new world order. Some like former Secretary of State, Brzezinski, have gone much further than others, calling for a “comprehensive, global partnership, paralleling our relations with Europe and Japan.” Brzezinski elaborated this further by recommending a US-China peacekeeping force to deal with failed states and a strategic dialogue to cover India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine and the Iran issue.

Though somewhat less dramatic, even Kissinger has called for taking Sino-US relations to a new level, at par with trans-Atlantic relations forged in the post-World War II period.

The new US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has echoed these sentiments by describing Sino-US relations as the most important bilateral relationship for the incoming Administration.

This implies an apparent willingness on the part of the US to accommodate China’s regional and global interests as a price to be paid for China refraining from tipping the US into a full blown economic and financial crisis through its own policy interventions and, hopefully, supporting US economic recovery. China is being invited to participate in the fashioning of new global governance structures and have a major voice in the management, if not resolution, of major regional conflicts.

China has not revealed its hand so far. It has certainly encouraged thinking in the U.S. and the West that it is the key to their economic recovery. This provides it with a significant leverage for achieving its foreign policy objectives even though on the ground it may be able or willing to do much less.

A brief look at the structure of the Chinese economy may be useful in this context.

The Chinese economy continues to be dominated by State-owned enterprises which are largely domestic market-oriented or are engaged in commodity production and trade. The country’s export economy, which is the most dynamic, is occupied by two categories of enterprises: These are either wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign companies or joint ventures between State-owned enterprises and foreign companies. There is yet only a small percentage occupied by private enterprise, though this segment is growing. The high growth rates enjoyed by the Chinese economy has been, and continues to be, generated by these two categories of enterprises. The export economy today constitutes over 40% of the country’s GDP. If this segment of the economy continues to decline as rapidly as currently, China may not be able to sustain the 7-7.5% GDP growth that its leaders believe is required to avoid widespread financial and political unrest in the country due to growing unemployment. If such unrest indeed becomes widespread, China’s leadership will certainly wish to first address this threat with all the instruments available, including economic and trade policies designed to protect their industry and employment.

The above scenario suggests that China’s role in global economic recovery may be more limited than is being envisaged in some quarters, although it is likely that China will emerge from this crisis in a relatively stronger position than before.

I would not like to leave behind an impression that only China is likely to be threatened by political and social unrest as a result of the global economic crisis. This affliction may, in fact, be quite widespread, affecting even mature and politically stable societies. The most vulnerable will obviously be countries that are already at the margin of economic survival. There may be more failed and failing states, the possibility of more widespread radical movements and an expansion of zones of conflict in different parts of the world. It will require the major states of the world to demonstrate a very high degree of collaborative engagement to keep a handle on these multiple crises, precisely at a time when their attention may be inexorably drawn inwards towards domestic preoccupations. Depressing as this may sound, it is a scenario that we should be fully prepared to confront. What is happening today in India’s neighbourhood is a visible pointer.

This is, therefore, one of those rare occasions in history when predicting even the near future is fraught with deep uncertainty. The one certainty is that the economic and financial crisis is putting all major countries and economies, through a global shaker and it is not clear which way the dice will eventually fall. What can be predicted with some degree of confidence is that the global landscape which will eventually emerge when the dust finally settles down, will be vastly different from what it is today.

Its contours, however, are not yet clear.

What are the implications for India?

For India, this is not necessarily a negative. It creates for us, other things being equal, greater strategic space. We will have more room for manoeuvre in managing our relations with a more diverse set of powers, and do so with more flexibility.

It should be our objective to encourage the trend towards a more diffused and diversified international order. This fits in well with our own instinctive preference for a multipolar world, which includes a multipolar Asia. We will need to work with other powers who share this objective. Our effort should be to build coalitions on different issues of shared concern and not primarily rely on a more limited range of strategic relationships.

This will imply a more energetic pursuit of our relations with countries like Russia and middle powers like Brazil, South Africa and Mexico. The European Union and, in particular, some of its individual members like France, can be useful political and economic partners. Europe seems currently torn between a desire to salvage Western dominance, on the one hand, and to lead the way towards an ambitious restructuring of the global political and economic governance structures on the other. We should encourage the latter trend.

With the US, we have built an extraordinarily broad-ranging relationship, which is likely to endure a change of political guard in either country. We must remain fully invested in this critical relationship, even while remaining alert to the possible threat to India’s interests as the US pursues its larger goals especially in our region.

Closer home in Asia, we will need deeper engagement with Japan and Indonesia and of course, a more nuanced diplomacy towards China. We have several areas of convergent interest with China, quite apart from a rapidly expanding trade and economic relationship. Our positions on multilateral trade, climate change and several other global issues are similar. At the same time, we should acknowledge that there are competitive components in our relations, which will need to be managed with prudence but firmness.

In this context, the prospect of a Sino-US strategic convergence has caused some anxiety in India. The situation is more complicated than it appears. China itself is hedging its bets by pursuing a number of parallel bilateral and regional strategies.

For example, while consulting closely with the US, it has also worked together with Japan and South Korea to create a North-East Asian swap arrangement and promised to consider a regional economic recovery package. China is also interested in adding substance to BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and put security issues also on its agenda. It is promoting both the Shanghai Cooperation process as well as a closer and more comprehensive relationship with South East Asia. It would be prudent for India to follow a similar hedging strategy as well, in its relations with other major powers and groupings. This will include an intensified engagement and dialogue with China itself, including on its interest in promoting a grouping of major emerging economies or on a new security architecture in Asia. India’s approach should be to position itself innovatively in a manner that enables it not only to ride-over this crisis with relatively less adverse impact but more importantly, to ensure a position of advantage for itself as a new international and geo-political landscape begins to emerge.

Our political prospects will inevitably be determined not only by how we weather the current storm, but whether we have strategies that enable us to emerge from the crisis as among the foremost of the economies of the world, and as one of the key drivers of the global economy. We will need to go beyond the defensive and survival-first strategies which currently dominate our thinking. Instead, we need to carefully assess what our strengths and vulnerabilities are as a continental-sized emerging economy, and articulate a forward-looking economic game plan on that basis.

What are our likely vulnerabilities?

At least for some time to come, the impact of the global crisis could well lead to diminished markets overseas and the revival of protectionist tendencies in those markets. There may be, similarly, diminished prospects for attracting inward investment from major capital-exporting countries. In short, the global economic environment may not be as supportive of India’s growth prospects as it has been during the past decade and a half. To the extent that our higher growth trajectory has been associated with the globalisation of the Indian economy, leveraging the liberal economic environment prevailing in major Western and other market economies, the downward pressure on our growth prospects may be unavoidable.

Secondly, all major economies will end up being more regulated than before. There will be more State intervention, initially by default and eventually by choice. There is a real possibility that a new economic orthodoxy will emerge where the state will, once again, become not only a regulator but a major economic actor. The tendency in countries like India would be to uncritically slip into a similar mode of thinking. Our statist legacy makes us particularly susceptible in this regard. We must guard against this.

What are the strengths we can leverage to position India as a leading economic and political power, post-crisis?

Some opportunities appear to be to be worth pursuing.

- For example, we should use the opportunity created by the crisis to consolidate pro-actively our economic interaction with our neighbours including through unilateral and asymmetric steps, if necessary. Our current policy line is that without a politically stable and economically prosperous neighbourhood, India will find it difficult to pursue its regional and global interests. It is time to put substance into this approach, even though current preoccupations with developments in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal do cause anxiety. As the economic crisis hits the economies of our more fragile neighbours, we should accelerate regional economic integration through a series of economic support measures. An India-initiated South Asia Economic Recovery Initiative could be explored.

- We could use the opportunity of depressed commodity and other prices to acquire productive assets abroad while they are cheap, buying energy and raw-material sources, for instance, and making strategic investments abroad. The political obverse of this would be a strong outreach in Africa and West Asia and other developing countries, revitalising our developing country constituency through targeted initiatives.

- The Indian IT industry is likely to be significantly impacted due to loss of overseas markets as well as protectionist trends. So far the IT industry has been focused on the export market. It has not looked at the domestic market as a significant business opportunity. Now could be the time to do this. More competitive conditions in both domestic as well as external markets require Indian industry to be more efficient and productive. This is where our IT industry can play a significant role, but this will require the dynamic sectors of the economy, the service sector and the manufacturing sector, to come together to deliver a major punch, once the global economy settles down into a new and altered landscape. There should be a willingness in business and industry to think through and come up with an ambitious and potentially winning strategy. They should seek government support for delivering on such a strategy rather than looking only for short-term relief.

- There is little doubt that for at least the next 3 to 5 years, if not more, we will find a buyer’s market in a wide range of sectors due to the global slowdown. There is already significant excess capacity in capital goods and infrastructure sectors. Not only are more economical prices on offer but probably better terms and conditions for technology transfer as well. There is a window of opportunity for government and business to take advantage of these favourable conditions, to accelerate the upgradation of our transport networks, build more state of the art airports and seaports, build ten instead of only one high speed rail freight corridors, extend mass public transportation networks to all major towns and cities, and most of all, solve the power problem once for all. The civil nuclear agreement is a timely instrument in our hands today. As investment in the nuclear renaissance in the developed world slows down, India could some source many more high capacity nuclear reactors on the most competitive terms, if it wishes to. The country can leverage its financial credibility in the global market, to raise the funds required. We have to package and project ourselves as part of the solution to the global economic recession and not as its tragic victim. As a sound, credit-worthy and growing economy, with relatively less exposure to the buffeting of the global crisis, we are still a good bet, a low-risk and potentially high-return economy. But we will need to communicate these strengths more effectively to the rest of the world than we have so far.

- The inter-related crisis of climate change and energy security has already triggered a wave of innovations in renewable energy, such as solar energy, bio-mass and wind energy. The United States and, to some extent, Europe are the chief repository of such innovations. We have several interesting initiatives being pursued in India as well, though these are scattered in different locations, both in the public and private sectors. It is inevitable that, for some time to come, many of the venture capital initiatives in the area of renewable energy in the US and Western Europe, may run out of steam as money flows dry up. The decrease in oil prices, even though temporary in nature, will further reinforce this trend. India must not lose its long-term perspective. Its energy security demands an accelerated and significant shift from dependence on fossil fuels, increasingly imported, to renewables especially solar energy. Here is an opportunity for Indian business and industry to plug into the innovation chains in U.S., Europe and Japan, to help us bring about that shift. Energy of every kind will always be a big and growing business in India. Renewable energy will be even bigger. We should have the wisdom and foresight to grasp the opportunity we have today, to emerge as leader of tomorrow. We should map our future as a modern, state of the art, carbon free economy and a renewable energy leader within the next couple of decades. A stimulus package that promotes these initiatives will create productive assets which will help overcome the deficits which will inevitably have to be bridged in the future.

What are the key messages for India in terms of the likely Geo-political Consequences of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis?

- Our diplomacy will need to gear up for a more diffused, decentralised and complex international landscape, populated by several major powers, with US enjoying a significantly diminished predominance. Though complex, the new international terrain will create more space for India to emerge as a key driver of global economics and politics. In the meantime, we will need to deal with the continuing uncertainty across the globe through hedging strategies, encompassing multiple and concurrent bilateral, regional and multilateral relationships.

- In relative terms, India’s economy is likely to be less severely impacted than economies that are much more globalised and export and FDI driven. This gives the country an opportunity to expand its regional and global profile, but this may require a significant reorientation of our diplomatic assets towards promoting regional economic integration and political stability in our own periphery. Our aim should be to emerge from this crisis as an economy in which each of our neighbours have a significant stake. This must be paralleled by a political engagement strategy that is nuanced and goes beyond the state-to-state level dynamics.

- We will need to restructure our economy to play on our strengths such as in IT and reduce our vulnerabilities, for example, in infrastructure. There should be a strategy to take long-term advantage of the depressed global market conditions both for capital equipment and strategic commodities, including nuclear energy. This is an opportunity for acquiring strategic economic assets abroad as well as critical technologies on more favourable terms.

- Finally, we should use the challenge of climate change to fundamentally shift the Indian economy from its reliance on depleting fossil fuels, to a significant use of renewable energy. This will promote India’s energy security and spur technological innovation and change, positioning India as a front-ranking power once the current crisis begins to recede.

Let me conclude by saying that we need to think in very unconventional ways to deal with a very unconventional crisis. In the Global 2020 Document – Mapping the Global Future – it is stated and I quote:

“Linear analysis will get you a much-changed caterpillar but it won’t get you a butterfly. For that you need a leap of imagination”. I am certain that imagination is one resource that is never in short supply in this country.

Thank you.

[svinayak]

I posted this on 3rd march

The chinese chose the route of accumulating reserves and it has essentially become a "who blinks first" game. The amri-khans on the one hand can threaten that if the Chinese offload their dollar reserves, the dollar would tank and be useless for the chinese anyway. The Chinese can threaten that thats exactly what they would do and tank the American economy.

I will try to change your thinking. What if China and US are both in this game and will screw the rest of the world. They can create protectionist trade barrier from other countries and trade between themselves.

The dollar will not be allowed to tank since they will make sure that other currencies will tank and dollar will become the currency of stability. They will coerce and create wars to tank other currencies.

[ramana]

There is big danger for India. The UPA was blindfolded into the Nuke deal with connotations of hedging PRC. Now uncle is kabash and both US and PRC are in a two step tango in a minefield.

If I were a mandrin babu, I would try to hedge with PRC.

[putnanja]

FILLING THE VOID - Getting re-elected is more important than diplomatic travel- K.P. Nayar

[putnanja]

The prime minister's SCO dilemma

[svinayak]

The prime minister's SCO dilemma

The diplomat believes that India's presence is "long overdue". India is the only country which is not represented at the level of the head of government. He adds, "For India, the last five years were a chronicle of wasted time. All serious powers were readjusting their relationships in the last 4-5 years."

Blind men of Hindoostan

[Baljeet]

The prime minister's SCO dilemma

The diplomat believes that India's presence is "long overdue". India is the only country which is not represented at the level of the head of government. He adds, "For India, the last five years were a chronicle of wasted time. All serious powers were readjusting their relationships in the last 4-5 years."

Blind men of Hindoostan

AcharyaJi
Not Blind men of Hindoostan but Soordas, Khusat, Sathiyaye, Pagal Buddhey of Bharat. These Bharat Mata key saput have made us proud again w.r.t Aussie Attacks.

[Gerard]

Stop whining about China

[Anabhaya]

Blind men of Hindoostan

Acharya, let's try working on this. K Subrahmaniyam has explained why it is a tricky issue for Indian PM to be attending SCO while we're only an Observer. Now I'm not going to make assumptions about who the blind men of Hindoostan are, I'd rather hear who they are from you.

And ofcourse, I think we would benefit if you also try telling us why you'd call them blind men. Is there a sort of realignment in foreign policy you'd have? Why?

I'm sure there is a lot of thought process going on behind your many cryptic onliners you sprinkle everywhere in this forum.

Please share the wisdom so we are enlightened too.

[brihaspati]

MMS's attending SCO will simply represent a hedging primarily by the UK, and secondarily by the USA, in preparation for facing the possibility of withdrawal from AFPaK. India's presence at the SCO need not mean any enhanced role or influence, but given the mousy nature of India's foreign policy now, it can mean greater danger of getting concessions and compromises officially stamped under some form of international legitimacy and obligation. On the other hand, India may not have the political will and visionary audacity required to play the SCO game to its own advantage, and it has nothing to do with Subramaniams covering excuse. He has given the perfect diplomatic answer that covers up the real weakness that makes GOI unable to use the SCO properly.

A really shrewd LOI would have used this see-saw politics of geostrategy, into its advantage, by extracting concenssions from both the axes - SCO and EU+UK+USA. But this is not possible for the current LOI. The key to using SCO properly is a simultaneous projection and willingness to back it up - of power into CAR, as well as south into IO - taking the main artery of power flow - blocking the trade/energy North-South route and the lateral East-West route overland.

[Prem]

Reg SCO, and UNCLE WEST
GOI, position is " Duvida me dono gaye , maya mili na Ram". GOI incapable of taking any firm stand
to further national interests and might end up not winning a single partner in CAR game.

[Gerard]

How neighbours view the elephant

So how do we see, as of now, the rest of South Asia behave towards India, whom they view as the "elephant" in the region? In three main ways.

One is the "pilot-fish" behaviour, an expression used by the Scandinavian Erling Bjol to describe post-World War attitude of Finland towards the USSR. It implies keeping close to the shark in order to avoid being eaten. Bhutan and Maldives probably fit the bill. According to the 1949 Treaty of Friendship between Bhutan and India, Bhutan's foreign policy was to be "guided" by India. In 2007, Bhutan managed to renegotiate a change to the treaty, particularly that requirement, perhaps as a reward for conducting operations against Bhutan-based anti-Indian insurgents.

In Maldives India had earned the gratitude of former president Gayoom by propping him up against coup attempts. No major change is expected under President Nasheed.

A second way is by making itself difficult to be overcome militarily by India. Pakistan has chosen to follow this route by acquiring "minimum deterrent capability" through its nuclear arms and ever expanding arsenal. However, analysts have argued that this situation creates a state of equilibrium that provides scope for stable relations. But for India, non-state actors in Pakistan, such as the Taliban and other Islamists, remain a source of anxiety. This understanding, buttressed by US pressure, appears to be leading Islamabad toward some positive action, something that Delhi will factor into the relationship.

The third way is by seeking to live "in concord with but distinct from" India. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal appear to be choosing this path. With Bangladesh's new Awami League led government of Sheikh Hasina there are some shared values with the Congress in terms of secularism, modernisation and market orientation, which should help bilateral relations. Yet, there persists in Bangladesh, including its very vibrant civil society, some deep-rooted suspicions of India. These involve issues of water-sharing, transit, non-trade barriers on the part of India, and unresolved maritime boundaries. They must be addressed. More work will need to be done by the Indian leadership to restore confidence in Indian actions among the common Bangladeshis.