Bharat Rakshak

Pakistan also later went on to 'improve' the P1 design. How did it do that? I don't think they have the tech to develop higher powered motors for those centrifuges. They were getting the centrifuge bodies built in Malasiya.
The likely improvements in centrifuge design was the result of the chinese running and improving on them, including the perviously mentioned Heating system for the centrifuges.
The 5000 ring magnet transfer we heard about was perhaps the improved P2 design being transferred from China.

Now look at Iran's centrifuges. They have a carbon composite body and are manufacturing most of the parts. Again certain critical components probably must be imported.

Pak helped NKorea build nuke weapons as early as 1990: Report
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 388181.cms


When US did not want India to supply any Nuclear information to Iran why then US is giving billions and billions while Pakistan is using that money to support local and internation terror training and then supply nuclear know how to North Korea to threaten US. So in fact US is funding Pakistan to supply Nuclear arms to North Korea if I follow the logical sequences.

I think here is where US needs to rethink her policy clearly whom they need to work with. Pakistan works between different countries to develop, sustain, grow and expand terror in all forms including a nuclear terror. If nuclear arms are spread it is merely because of the Chinese and US support to Pakistan. One needs to make sure that either Pakistan gives up its terror arms and join completly a democratic way to sort out her own problems and problems with neighbours. If not it is better to make Pakistan into small independent states to make sure that they are not too powerful.

Interestingly India does not have any expansionist strategy and is not bothered about any of her borders or neighbours.

^^^^^ Excerpt from the the Washington Post article cited in the PTI article printed in TOI:

Pakistani scientist depicts more advanced nuclear program in North Korea

By R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, December 28, 2009; A02

North Korea has constructed a plant to manufacture a gas needed for uranium enrichment, according to a previously unpublicized account by the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb program, a development that indicates Pyongyang opened a second way to build nuclear weapons as early as the 1990s.

Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan also said that North Korea may have been enriching uranium on a small scale by 2002, with "maybe 3,000 or even more" centrifuges, and that Pakistan helped the country with vital machinery, drawings and technical advice for at least six years.

North Korea's nuclear program is among the world's most opaque, and Khan's account could not be independently corroborated. But one U.S. intelligence official and a U.S. diplomat said his information adds to their suspicions that North Korea has long pursued the enrichment of uranium in addition to making plutonium for bombs, and may help explain Pyongyang's assertion in September that it is in the final stages of such enrichment.

Khan's account of the pilot plant, which he says North Korea built without help, is included in a narrative that depicts relations between the two countries' scientists as exceptionally close for nearly a decade. Khan says, for example, that during a visit to North Korea in 1999, he toured a mountain tunnel. There his hosts showed him boxes containing components of three finished nuclear warheads, which he was told could be assembled for use atop missiles within an hour.

"While they explained the construction [design of their bombs], they quietly showed me the six boxes" containing split cores for the warheads, as well as "64 ignitors/detonators per bomb packed in 6 separate boxes," Khan said. …………..

Washington Post

About the Pakistani proliferation to North Korea, the investigative report by Lt. Gen. Kidwai in circa 2004, which A.Q. Khan signed (and which he later claimed was under duress), clearly stated that between 1991-1997, AQ Khan was helping the North Koreans. He was also said to have helped in circa 2000. Whether A.Q. Khan denies it now or not, the Pakistani government itself has accepted this. Like her father who setup the nuclear-weapon/missile cooperation between Pakistan & China, his daughter setup a similar cooperation with North Korea during 1993-96.

Chapter of A.Q. Khan closed: Foreign office

As simple as that. Pakistan becmes 'Pure' all over again. The whole world is at ease. All is well that ends well. AoA.

Pakistan has reiterated that it has never transferred the nuclear technology while the chapter of Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan’s network has closed.

In a statement issued here on Tuesday, the Foreign Office spokesman said that there was no need to unnecessarily raise the issue of Pakistan nuclear assets.

He further said that AQ Khan network has been successfully dismantled, while information is this regard had been shared with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and all other concerned nations.

A few of Pakistan's Nuclear and Strategic sites - Google Earth pics

Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) Rawalpindi:
PARR-1 Research reactor, designed for highly enriched (90% uranium) fuel, designed and built in collaboration with the United States, commissioned in 1965, was raised from 5 MWt to 9 MWt and converted to low-enriched (20%) fuel in 1990. China assisted in fuel fabrication for the rebuilt and upgraded PARR-1 research reactor. PARR-I may have been used clandestinely to produce tritium for advanced nuclear weapons.
PARR-2 - training reactor, Pool-type, light-water, HEU, 27-30 kWt, designed and built in collaboration with the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (Beijing), went critical in late 1989.
New Labs Reprocessing Plant: Unsafeguarded facility for plutonium reprocessing. Recently doubled in size due to the addition of a new wing.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Chashma Nuclear Complex
CHASHNUPP-1
300MW PWR
Supplied by:
Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute(SNERDI)
China National Nuclear Corporation(CNNC)
East China Electric Power Design Institute(ECEPDI)
CHASNUPP-2
300MW PWR







_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Khushab Nuclear Complex
Khusab Nuclear reactor
50 MWt, heavy water and natural uranium research reactor and Plutonium production reactor









____________________________________________________________________________________________
Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP)
125 MW PHWR

____________________________________________________________________________________________
Uranium Enrichment Plants: Unsafeguarded facilities exist at the following sites.
Golra Sharif (Sector E-11 Islamabad)
Sihala - close to the police training academy, just outside Rawalpindi.
KRL - Kahuta

____________________________________________________________________________________________
Mines and Uranium processing facilities in and around Dera Ghazi Khan
Pakistan is opening several new mines for Uranium exploration. At least 4-5 different sites are being developed in addition to the earlier mines.







Chemical Plants Complex: Uranium extraction plant, DGK. This plant is also undergoing rapid expansion to almost double it capacity.








There is a similar pilot scale Uranium Milling facility outside Lahore, called Atomic Energy Minerals Centre (AEMC)
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Pak-Arab Fertilizer Ltd. Multan

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Sehwan Uranium mines, Sindh

_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Isa Khel and Kulbul Khel Uranium Mines, Mianwali.
Close to Chashma



_________________________________________________________________________________________________

Khan Research Laboratories: Kahuta


_________________________________________________________________________________________________

N weapons Storage Sites:

National Defence Complex, Fatehjang




_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Close to Masroor PAFB, Karachi


Quetta




Kamra PAFB



Sargodha






_________________________________________________________________________________________________

M-11 Missile storage sites

Dera Nawabshah



Shorkot Cantt, Jhang



Gujranwala



Taranawah Missile Complex






_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Pakistan Ordinance Factories: Wah
Location of manufacture of key components of Nuclear weapons, Assembly of North Korean, Chinese missiles.


_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Thal Firing Range



__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Here is the post at bbc.keyhole. Link
Thanks to Jagan and omlettebread for their initial work.

This file contains Google earth links to:
1. Pakistan Nuclear Sites
2. Pakistan Strategic Sites
3. Pakistan Airforce Bases.
Download link

Gagan wrote:A few of Pakistan's Nuclear and Strategic sites - Google Earth pics

Great work Gagan. Keep it up!

IDSA Monograph. PDF format

Trilateral Nuke Proliferation: Pak's Euro-Chinese bomb

The Washington Post on the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s offer to proliferate nuclear weapons to Baathist Iraq for USD 150 Million, which Iraq did not act upon as they lost the Gulf War round 1.

The material is drawn from David Albright’s just released book "Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies," :

Saddam Hussein weighed nuclear 'package' deal in 1990, documents show

By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, March 10, 2010

As troops massed on his border near the start of the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein weighed the purchase of a $150 million nuclear "package" deal that included not only weapons designs but also production plants and foreign experts to supervise the building of a nuclear bomb, according to documents uncovered by a former U.N. weapons inspector.

The offer, made in 1990 by an agent linked to disgraced Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, guaranteed Iraq a weapons-assembly line capable of producing nuclear warheads in as little as three years. But Iraq lost the chance to capitalize when, months later, a multinational force crushed the Iraqi army and forced Hussein to abandon his nuclear ambitions, according to nuclear weapons expert David Albright, who describes the proposed deal in a new book.

Iraqi officials at the time appear to have taken the offer seriously and asked the Pakistanis for sample drawings as proof of their ability to deliver, the documents show. "With the assurance of [Iraqi intelligence agency] Mukhabarat . . . the offer is not a sting operation," an Iraqi official scrawls in ink in the margin of one of the papers.

Khan's alleged interest in selling nuclear secrets to Hussein has been reported in numerous books and news articles. An internal Mukhabarat memo that surfaced in the late 1990s discussed a secret proposal by one of Khan's agents to sell a nuclear weapons design for an advance payment of $5 million.

But the newly uncovered documents suggest that Khan's offer of nuclear assistance was more comprehensive than previously known. A 1990 letter attributed to a Khan business associate offered Iraq a chance to leap past technical hurdles to acquire weapons capability.

"Pakistan had to spend a period of 10 years and an amount of 300 million U.S. dollars to get it," begins one of the memos. "Now, with the practical experience and worldwide contacts Pakistan has developed, you could have A.B. in about three years' time and by spending about $150 million." "A.B." was understood to mean "atomic bomb," ……………

Washington Post

Article on the US protecting the Islamic Republic of Pakistan from investigation of Pakistan's irresponsible nuclear proliferation:

Washington Post Omits Fact That Saddam’s Nuke Salesman Was Protected By U.S. Government

Whitewash fails to mention that deal to build nuclear bomb was offered by the Bush administration’s favorite peddler of weapons of mass destruction

Paul Joseph Watson
Prison Planet.com
Wednesday, March 10, 2010

The Washington Post has completely whitewashed new revelations concerning how close Saddam Hussein came to obtaining a nuclear bomb by failing to mention the fact that the provider, Khan Research Laboratories, was shielded from investigation by the U.S. government for decades.

“As troops massed on his border near the start of the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein weighed the purchase of a $150 million nuclear “package” deal that included not only weapons designs but also production plants and foreign experts to supervise the building of a nuclear bomb, according to documents uncovered by a former U.N. weapons inspector,” reports the Post today.

“The offer, made in 1990 by an agent linked to disgraced Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, guaranteed Iraq a weapons-assembly line capable of producing nuclear warheads in as little as three years.”

However, the report completely fails to even mention the fact that Khan Research Laboratories, the source from which Saddam would have procured a nuclear bomb, was protected from investigation by the U.S. government since at least the mid-1970’s, as investigative journalist Greg Palast exposed in a 2001 BBC report. …………………..


Prison Planet

National Journal interview datelined March 11, 2010 of David Albright on the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s proliferation of nuclear weapon technology.

NJ: We tend to think of nuclear weapons capability as the purview of a handful of elite powers that jealously guard their arsenals and technology. But you make clear that secret sharing and clandestine smuggling networks have enabled proliferation since the dawn of the nuclear age. The Soviet Union stole nuclear secrets from the United States and assisted China in acquiring the bomb, with Beijing in turn enabling Pakistan to go nuclear. The U.S. helped Great Britain acquire nuclear weapons, just as France aided Israel. India procured plutonium from Canada under the guise of a civil nuclear program. So why did you decide to focus on Pakistan and the black market in nuclear technologies formerly run by A.Q. Khan, the "father" of the Pakistani bomb?

Albright: Because in many ways A.Q. Khan represents our worst nightmare. It would be equivalent to the head of one of our national laboratories, like Los Alamos or Lawrence Livermore, deciding to secretly sell to the highest bidders not only nuclear equipment and technology but also nuclear weapons designs. That may sound preposterous to Americans, but it happened in Pakistan and it may be happening in North Korea as we speak. Khan's clients included North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. So Khan and his smuggling buddies developed a transnational network that did what only states were capable of in the past, which is sell facilities for enriching uranium along with weapons designs. That smuggling network bypassed all international controls on the transfer of nuclear technology, and it operated largely undetected for years.

NJ: In your new book, you also detail the case of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Khan's rival in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, who tried to help Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda acquire a nuclear weapon.

Albright: Yes, Mahmood is a very scary guy. He was an Islamic fundamentalist and true believer who thought that Pakistan and Afghanistan should be united as the core of a new [Islamic] caliphate, with nuclear weapons at the center of its capabilities. He was eventually forced out of Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1990s because of his extremist views. Mahmood then moved to Afghanistan where he contracted with the Taliban government, which in turn put him into contact with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. In later interrogations by Pakistani authorities, Mahmood admitted that he and bin Laden talked about how Al Qaeda could acquire the components and know-how to make a nuclear weapon.

NJ: Given that bin Laden and his Qaeda deputies have enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal areas ever since 2001, how can the United States be sure that they haven't developed further contacts with officials in Pakistan's nuclear program?

Albright: The short answer is, we can't be sure. U.S. intelligence agents tell me that the Pakistani nuclear weapons program is not as airtight as Islamabad insists. When you understand how much money is involved in this trade; how much of it is conducted offshore and outside the gaze of watchful eyes; and how hard it is to monitor or police people-to-people transfers of information, equipment or materials, you can't help but worry about the fact that Al Qaeda continues to operate in Pakistan.

National Journal Online

arun wrote:The Washington Post on the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s offer to proliferate nuclear weapons to Baathist Iraq for USD 150 Million, which Iraq did not act upon as they lost the Gulf War round 1.

The material is drawn from David Albright’s just released book "Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies," :

In his book, Albright argues that Khan could have been stopped if governments and private businesses had been more willing to share intelligence. He cites results of a secret Dutch investigation into Khan's activities in that country in the 1970s, a probe that confirmed Khan's theft of sensitive nuclear blueprints, yet failed to result in a broader inquiry of a serious security breach.

"One of the very few early opportunities to stop him was lost," he writes.
Washington Post

Whom is Albright trying to kid ? Doesn't he know about how US helped Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons ? In the specific case of A.Q. Khan, let us remember what the former Dutch Prime Minister had to say:

In a disclosure that is likely to embarrass American authorities, the former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers has revealed how the CIA protected the controversial Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan and saved him from going to prison after he was caught stealing secret designs from a Dutch uranium plant in 1975. Mr. Lubbers, who was Minister of Economic Affairs at the time, told a Dutch radio station on Tuesday that because of pressure from the CIA no action was taken against Dr. Khan and he was quietly allowed to return to Pakistan. Mr. Lubbers also said that the information was kept away from the country’s Parliament, and the “scandal” became public only in 1979 thanks to a Dutch TV programme. Legal proceedings were launched against Dr. Khan and he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment in absentia. In 1985, Dr. Khan appealed against the judgement and the court ordered a retrial on grounds that proper procedures were not followed in the original trial. But, according to Mr. Lubbers, Dr. Khan was not put on trial a second time — again because of pressure from the CIA. Mr. Lubbers, who was Prime Minister then, was asked in the programme why his Government succumbed to CIA pressure. He admitted that, looking back, he believed it was a mistake but said at that time the political climate in Europe was such because of the Cold War “you had to listen to the Americans.” He said that Dr. Khan, who had a Dutch wife, continued to “slip in and out of Holland illegally” and the secret services including the CIA knew about it.

Washington Post touches upon the role of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in proliferating nuclear weapon technology to Iran.

Citing documents provided by A.Q. Khan to Simon Henderson the Post opines that “The account also conflicts with the Pakistani government's assertion that Khan proliferated nuclear know-how without government approval.”.

Elements at the highest levels of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan were clearly complicit in the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology to Iran:

Most observers now think Khan's work for Iran was directed by "senior elements of Pakistan's military, if not by its political leaders," said Leonard S. Spector, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. ………………
Khan's written statement to Henderson states that after Shamkhani's arrival in Islamabad on a government plane, he told the chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff committee that "he had come . . . to collect the promised nuclear bombs."

When the chairman, Adm. Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey, proposed to discuss other matters first and then "see how Pakistan could assist the Iranians in their nuclear program," Shamkhani reportedly became irate, Khan wrote. He reminded Sirohey that "first Gen. Zia [ul Haq, the Pakistani president until 1988] and then Gen. Beg had promised assistance and nuclear weapons and he had specifically come to collect the same."

Such a transfer was theoretically feasible. Although Pakistan exploded no nuclear bombs until 1998, the U.S. intelligence community concluded it had the capability to make weapons by 1986. ……………………

Khan said that after hearing Shamkhani's demand for three finished weapons, Sirohey demurred and that other ministers backed him up. But Beg pressed then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her top military aide "to honour [Beg's] . . . commitment," Khan wrote.

Under pressure, the aide asked Khan to "get components of two old (P-1) discarded machines and pack them into boxes with 2 sets of drawings," which were passed to Iran through an intermediary, he said. P-1 is the designation for the centrifuge model used in Pakistan.

Asked to comment, Sirohey said he did not recall the meeting "or ever hearing about a deal to sell nuclear weapons to Iran."

In an interview, Beg denied bartering nuclear weapons for cash. He said that when an Iranian delegation "asked me about nuclear technology" in 1988, he advised discussing it with Bhutto. .......................

Washington Post datelined March 14, 2010:

Pakistani scientist Khan describes Iranian efforts to buy nuclear bombs

^^^ Arms Control Wonk on the story with comments by article co-author Jeffery Smith besides Simon Henderson who made the A.Q. Khan document available to the Washington Post:.

Leaks and Motives of AQ Khan

Huh now that Unkil is desperately looking to put IRAN's nuclear programme out of commission we suddenly see old stuff being regurgitated in WSJ and of course by wonkers.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan had previously claimed that the March 10 (See here) and March 14 (Click) articles in the Washington Post on the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology to Iraq and Iran were rubbish:

FO rubbishes reports alleging nuclear proliferation

However despite describing the articles as rubbish, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan seems worked up enough about the Washington Post articles to approach the Lahore High Court to gag A.Q Khan:

Petition filed against Dr. Qadeer at Lahore High Court

What gives? THis new AQK accusation appears to be remarkably timed,to coincide with pak's request for parity with India in a similar N-deal.THis is another charade from Pak,meant to give it the appearance of a genuine "non-proliferator",while even AQK is part of this farcial act of duplicity meant to deceive international opinion that Pak is changing its proliferating ways.The scheme has definitely been conceivbed by the US which wishes to reward its favourite catamite with as much military moolah that it can carry.Pak wants N-tech,so the US must find a way in which pak's dismal rtack record of proliferation can be whitewashed and what better way then to pretend to go after the Dr.Jekyll-Hyde "monster" of proliferation,AQK himself!

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 25420.html

Pakistan's nuclear 'godfather' in new inquiry

Reports link AQ Khan to attempts to sell nuclear secrets to Iraq and Iran
By Andrew Buncombe and Omar Waraich in Islamabad

Excerpt:

In a petition before a court in Lahore, the government applied for permission to interrogate the "godfather" of the country's nuclear programme and prevent him from further speaking publicly about sensitive issues. The move follows the recent publication of two articles in a US newspaper which provided further details to longstanding allegations that Dr Khan – with the knowledge of the Pakistan military – was involved in efforts to illicitly transfer the technology to Iran and Iraq.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan seems to have completed the process of sweeping the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear weapon technology proliferation saga under the carpet.

A.Q. Khan who was involved in the most egregious example of nuclear weapon technology proliferation the world has seen after a slap on the wrist period of house arrest is now a free man:

Lahore High Court declares Dr. AQ Khan a free man

X-posted..

"kenop"

I think the author (V K Sood) will have to write a couple of more articles to complete the figure of 3.5
Saudi role and interest in Paki nuclear program

In evaluating Pakistan’s relations with its major benefactors, we tend to consider only the United States and China and normally overlook Saudi Arabia’s role. The kingdom provides ideological succour and, nowadays, Wahhabi sustenance and financial support exert influence on Pakistan’s domestic politics. There has to be some mutuality of interests in this bilateral with Pakistan playing on the kingdom’s insecurities in relation to Iran and Israel, its own domestic dissidence and its vulnerabilities as an oil rich country in a turbulent neighbourhood.
....

Khan’s travel itinerary during his days as the merchant of Armageddon was very instructive. In the ten years till his network was ‘discovered’ in 2004, Khan visited Dubai more than 40 times, apart from visiting 18 other countries. Among the destinations were Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Turkey and, probably, most often Saudi Arabia. (What to do Mecca is there)The role Saudi Arabia paid in the development of the Pakistani bomb in the 1970s is well known. A grateful Zulfiqar Bhutto renamed Lyallpur, Pakistan’s third-largest city, as Faisalabad to acknowledge the Saudi monarch’s generosity.
...
In 1994, a Saudi UN diplomat, Muhammed al Khilewi, was defected with about 10,000 documents among which were some that showed linkages between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and a pact had been signed by the two countries that in case of a nuclear attack on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan would retaliate against the aggressor. It was during the 1990s that the Saudis began to provide financial assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programme when North Korean missiles were traded with the financial backing from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis also came to Pakistan’s rescue after the 1998 nuclear tests when they provided Pakistan with 50,000 barrels of oil per day free, to overcome the effect of sanctions.

In May 1999, Saudi deputy premier Prince Sultan bin Abdel al-Aziz, on a visit to Pakistan, was shown the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant — a privilege that was not granted by Pakistan’s military to their Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto some years earlier. A.Q. Khan had briefed the visiting Saudi minister. Prince Sultan also visited the Ghauri missile factory. Later in the year, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Khan discussed possibilities of cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in agriculture and genetic engineering.
...

A great deal will depend on how the US reacts to these developments. Adverse US reaction against a Saudi nuclearisation, following an Iranian nuclearisation, is not a given. Pakistan, as a cash-strapped country, could sell its lethal goods to an insecure regime and acquire nuclear depth.

------------

TSP takes the cake. They gave nuke umbrella garuntees to KSA with their purloined nukes! Even their own HEU bum didnt expode and had to get PRC made weapons for testing in 1998. And yet they werre giving nuke umbrella to the custodian of the two mosques!

And what was the KSA reason for seeking the TSP nuke umbrella? Iran?They (KSA) would get US umbrella if it was Iran.

Does the KSA think they need TSP umbrella against Israel? Do they really think the TSP is an independent power? Do they understand the Pakjabi elite that runs TSP?

Also by now those CSS2 missile that KSA bought from the PRC should be junk. So what are their plans for upgradation or modernization?

ramana wrote:Also by now those CSS2 missile that KSA bought from the PRC should be junk. So what are their plans for upgradation or modernization?

KSA is already in talks with PRC.

Ramana,

Iran as well as Israel.

South Korea and Taiwan had secret projects aimed at a nuclear capability, despite explicit US nuclear guarantees. Why? The American reconciliation with the PRC 1969-71 led them to worry about whether they could rely on those guarantees in the long term.

The Saudis could never be sure of the US on the Iranian front, especially after Khomeini's death. There were repeated attempts since then at rapprochement on both the US and Iranian sides. There was always opposition from hardliners on both sides, but there was also a little more progress each time until the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005.

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is far deeper than the one between the US and Islamic Revolutionary Iran. The Saudis are terrified that their Shia minority in the oil producing eastern province will rise up on behalf of the Iranian mullahs, they're scared that the Iranian government appears more pro-Palestinian than they do, historical fears of Persia as the regional superpower, etc.

The 'war of the cities' during Iran-Iraq war when both countries used ballistic missiles to attack each other's cities also had a major impact on Saudi desire for ballistic missiles, and the ability to reach either Tehran or Tel Aviv.

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/daw ... -840-hh-07

Our civilian government should also prepare to answer questions on how — in a time of fiscal crisis, when food inflation and loadshedding are crippling our economy and driving poor Pakistanis to suicide — we are paying for our nuclear programme. Even Obama, who seems to have all the answers to Pakistan’s nuclear programme, has indicated that he does not know what became of a secret $100m grant that the Bush administration gave Pakistan to secure its nuclear stockpile.

^^^

Good question. Pakistan wants American funding for setting up reactors too. This is to "help with energy security", so that Abduls sweating the load shedding dont run off and become Jihadis. (I am not joking, this is true. Pakis want a nuclear deal along with a massive grant to improve their power generation & distribution. This was one of Kayani's demands)

X post:
Pakistani centrifuges launched Iran's nuclear program 24 years ago

Iran’s Ali Akbar Velayati on the clandestine supply of centrifuges by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to Iran.

Claims the Pakistani Government knew nothing of the clandestine supply of entrifuges :

Ahmadinejad calls UN veto power 'satanic tool'

By ALI AKBAR DAREINI (AP) – 17 hours ago
TEHRAN, Iran …………………………

In a revelation likely to add to their suspicions, however, a former foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, was quoted as telling a newspaper that Iran obtained its first centrifuge from Pakistan in 1986.

It was Iran's first public confirmation of a clandestine transfer of nuclear technology specifically from Pakistan. ……………

Velayati, Iran's former foreign minister, said he flew in a private plane to Islamabad to personally receive Iran's first centrifuge.

"I think it was in 1986 when we traveled to Pakistan on a private plane. We were told there was a mission that I had to take to Iran. We took it to Iran and later learned that it was a centrifuge. ... We didn't tell Pakistani authorities about it," Velayati was quoted as saying by the weekly Panjereh.

After years of denials, Pakistan admitted in 2005 that its top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, sold crucial equipment to Iran, but it said it knew nothing of his activities when they occurred.

Iran has in the past confirmed that it purchased nuclear equipment from international dealers, including some from the Indian subcontinent, but Velayati's revelation was the first public acknowledgment that Iran obtained its first centrifuge machine from Pakistan.

Velayati, now a top adviser to Iran's Surpeme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said he didn't meet Khan in person but that the disgraced father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb "didn't have any unpleasant opinion about Iran."

AP via Google

Dr. Matthew Kroenig of Georgetown Uty, in his book "Exporting the Bomb" says AQK transfers were TSP state policy and had complete backing in all his transfers. He is speaking on CSPAN and says TSP was motivated to tie down a common enemy that is US. All the countries that AQK transfers took place had enmity with US. It was to tie up US that it was done. This happened during the interval of abandoning TSP and 9/11.

ramana wrote:Dr. Matthew Kroenig of Georgetown Uty, in his book "Exporting the Bomb" says AQK transfers were TSP state policy and had complete backing in all his transfers. He is speaking on CSPAN and says TSP was motivated to tie down a common enemy that is US. All the countries that AQK transfers took place had enmity with US. It was to tie up US that it was done. This happened during the interval of abandoning TSP and 9/11.

The TSP State policy were dictated by PRC. And, TSP did PRC's bidding because it needed the bombs and their delivery systems to destroy India. That desire to destroy India came from the seeds sown by the British Empire after it took over India from the EIC, who then transferred the 'Pakistani Portfolio' lock, stock and barrel to the Americans after 1947, who continued with the same British perfidy. So, in a way, karma catches up.

The odd thing is Dr Kroenig was saying its basically variance with US policy that promotes transfers. He was saying that India too could do that to Vietnam as there is lot of resentment in India about role of PRC and more importantly US being benign about such transfers. he didn't come across as credible even if his data is accurate as he had a perpetual grin on his face while talking about such a sreious subject.

I felt he is not mature enough if he thought Vietnam could be a foil for India for Viets are nobodies foil.

Nothing new this has been PRC's dipolmacy since the long march. They have always created and supported rouge nations whom they use as pawns to further their own geostrategic designs right from N Korea during the korean war to N Vietnam, Pakis, Libiya, Iran, Burma and now Sudan they play to both sides of gallery milking concession from all parties. Pakis have taken a leaf out of their strategy where they are the ones who create problem and them impress upon people that they are the part of the solution so they need to be engaged.

The Great China-Pak Nuclear Nexus - K.Subrahmanyam

The Iranian nuclear ambitions are likely to be more to counter a two-front encirclement of Shias by Sunni Pakistan and Sunni Saudi Arabia. China appears to be taking full advantage of this conflict to make deals for oil with Saudi Arabia as well as Iran by selling them missiles, lending tacit support to Iran on sanctions and providing Pakistan additional capacity to make plutonium warheads to supply Saudi Arabia. Many observers believe the supply of civil nuclear reactors is only a cover for China to continue to sustain its nuclear proliferation to Pakistan going back to Bhutto’s agreement with China in June, 1976

X Posted.

US Intelligence sources on the Islamic Republic of Pakistani led nuclear proliferation networks coming back to life owing to interest from such diverse countries as Brazil, Burma, Iran, Nigeria, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.

Excerpt from the US State Department Briefing and link to the Washington Times article:

abhishek_sharma wrote:State Dept Press Briefing

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/08/145639.htm

QUESTION: Today, I read an interesting article in The Washington Times. It is about a revival of the proliferation at work built by the Pakistani Abdul Qadeer Khan. Do you know who is this? Of course. (Laughter.)

MR. CROWLEY: We are quite – we are very aware of A.Q. Khan. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Well, I’d like to know if – yes, everyone knows. I’d like to know if – as the intelligence agents in United States’ department is concerned about this possibility to have this revival in this proliferation (inaudible) working and about some contacts they would – had with some countries as – including Brazil and Nigeria and North Korea too?

MR. CROWLEY: A lot to that question. Obviously, the A.Q. Khan network has – or is responsible for some of the most serious cases of proliferation in recent decades. We have worked intensively with Pakistan and other countries to shut down that network. And while A.Q. Khan himself is out of business, according to the Government of Pakistan, we watch his network very closely for signs that others within his realm are still in business. It is something – it’s an ongoing focus of ours, and because we – this is a part of our broad international effort to try to stem sources of proliferation around the world. So it is an area of ongoing concern.

Nuke-smuggling network in demand

Agents seek to lure group 'out of retirement'

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 ... in-demand/

Nations Said to Court A.Q. Khan Associates

Is Pak doing a little muscle-flexing by reviving N-proliferation as a threat?
Are they playing this as a card, in response to perceived pressure from WikiLeaks, Blackwill op-ed, etc?

If so, then it shows they are going for nuclear blackmail in the most naked way, in order to apply counter-pressure on the US.

Helen E. Purkitt, Stephen F. Burgess - South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Publisher: Indiana University Press | 2005-04-20 | ISBN: 025321730X | 336 pages |

South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction offers an in-depth view of the secret development and voluntary disarmament of South Africa's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons program, Project Coast. Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess explore how systems used for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in South Africa were acquired and established beyond the gaze of international and domestic political actors. On the basis of archival evidence from Project Coast and their own extensive interviews with military and political officials, Purkitt and Burgess consider what motivates countries to acquire and build such powerful weaponry and examine when and how decisions are made to dismantle a military arsenal voluntarily. Questions such as how to destroy weapons safely and keep them from reappearing on international markets are considered along with comparative strategies for successful disarmament in other nation-states.

Has anyone tried to map the TSP and South African supplier networks? I find it odd that those who supplied TSP weren't connected to those who supplied SA.

Charges urged in Swiss nuclear case
Trio of engineers accused of having links to alleged smuggling ring of Pakistani scientist AQ Khan.

Last Modified: 23 Dec 2010 13:31 GMT

A Swiss magistrate has said three engineers suspected of giving nuclear weapons to the Khan network in Pakistan should face smuggling charges.
...
But the trio have maintained their innocence, saying that they worked as spies for the CIA and exposed Libya's nuclear ambitions and topple Khan's smuggling network.
...
The case into the alleged smuggling ring was slowed down after the Swiss government repeatedly ordered evidence destroyed, allegedly under pressure from senior US officials.
...

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europ ... 66230.html

C.I.A. Secrets Could Surface in Swiss Nuclear Case

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/world ... nukes.html

The book, “Fallout,” by Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz, scheduled to be published next month, tells how the C.I.A. sent the men coded instructions, spied on their family, tried to buy their silence and ultimately had the Bush administration press Switzerland to destroy evidence in an effort to keep the Tinners from being indicted and testifying in open court.

KS is spot on! Iran is just trying to stay alive when beseiged by the Saudi-Paki conspiracy as well as fears about Israel too.

Here's more on the CIA nuke peddling to AQK!

What about CIA nuclear peddlars? These swines sold N-tech to AQK! So much for the US's clean hands reg. nuke peddling.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 68248.html

Swiss men with CIA links face nuclear secrets trial
By Tony Paterson
Friday, 24 December 2010

False Identity Passports
Used by Mossad and CIA agents. Read
An insider's intelligence thriller
www.chameleonconspiracy.com

A judge yesterday called for the prosecution of three Swiss engineers suspected of smuggling nuclear weapons technology following allegations that the US pressured Switzerland to destroy incriminating evidence to conceal their work for the CIA.

Swiss federal magistrate Andreas Mueller made his recommendations at the end of a six-year investigation into the activities of engineers Urs Tinner, his brother Marco and their father Friedrich, who were arrested in 2004 on suspicion of smuggling but later released. They said they had worked for the CIA since 2003 as informers.

The three are suspected of supplying technology to a nuclear smuggling ring in Pakistan run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a nuclear scientist reputed to be the "father" of Pakistan's atomic bomb. Mr Khan, who now lives under government surveillance in Pakistan, is suspected of having aided Iran, Libya and North Korea with uranium enrichment programmes.

The Tinners are alleged to have played a bizarre dual role as nuclear weapons smugglers who at the same time worked for the CIA as informers and banked on the agency's protection. "There are many parts," Mr Mueller said yesterday. "It's like a puzzle and if you put the pieces together, you get the whole picture."

The Tinners claim to have helped supply the CIA with information about nuclear projects in Libya. They also admit to working for the Khan network and according to independent US reports they supplied the CIA with key information about its activities.

But they claim not to have known that Mr Khan's aim was to produce nuclear weapons and they deny having supplied him with the relevant technology.

Allegations that the US had pressured Switzerland to bury the case against the Tinners surfaced in 2008, after the Swiss government ordered 100 pages of evidence against them to be shredded. Copies of the documents have since reappeared.

Philip ji , In this case you are wrong.Yes tinners did work for CIA and allegedly Mossad too.But the reason was to contaminate the supply chain of Iranian nuclear program with faulty equipment and which they did.

By the way CIA and Mossad are intelligence agencies and they are supposed to have contacts with all sorts of peddlers,smugglers,runners etc.They are the ones who are going to provide you with intelligence as they have the information.In fact an intelligence agency which doesn't have such contacts is most probably an incompetent agency unable to fulfill its role.

Wake up buddy.Come out of 1980's cold war mindset.