Atleast in the quote above - I read clean to be a synonym of unconditional."No post and pre-conditions should be laid and there is a need for clean, unconditional exemptions from NSG guidelines on the import of nuclear reactors,"
In other words, he claims that India expect a 'clean' and 'unconditional' waiver. He does NOT state what each of these are and how they are distinct.Mr. Kakodkar said India, not being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, expected the U.S. to work out a clean and unconditional exemption from the NSG for India. “India has made its position very clear that it expects clean, unconditional exemption after recognising it as a unique country,” Mr. Kakodkar told a select group of journalists here. India has to reach a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the NSG has to change its guidelines to allow international nuclear trade with India to operationalise the India-U.S. nuclear deal.
Precisely what I asked earlier. Having the draft itself would be ideal. Barring that, at least all the terms involved need to be clearly defined. If multiple definitions are likely, those of each relevant party is worth understanding. This is not 'thought policing'; I'm not asking anyone to make any particular conclusion, but that they explain the basis of their argument as well.Pulikeshi wrote:Also, whats the point of running around with "tail on fire" till some one leaks the draft
I second that. No intervention needed.fanne wrote:Suraj Sir,
May I say you post smack of thought policing. I have been here from day 1 when BR was launched and barring few small period of thought policing by one other moderator (who I dont see active now), I have never seen this intolerance of an viewpoint. You might not agree with Raja Ram but can you please give him his space. I have heard lots of your view on economics which by defination is not even a science (and thus is lots of vaporware), if emperical evidence, gut feeling unsubstainable theories can form the basis of economics, I don't see what is wrong with Raja Ram post. He has been predicting and theoririzing since past many years and I am confident to say that he has not been off mark too much!!
Let me define unconditional and clean for you as I understand it (and it is good for me, please dont fail me for poor defination!! ). Unconditional is where we get a waiver that does not ask us to do this or that to begin with. Clean (which does not go as far as unconditional) is what US hinks we should be doing and that does take into account Hyde act. If these two terms is bad enough for DDM and Indian ministers to fret about, it is bad for me.
Thanks and with regards,
fanne
Raja Ram,Raja Ram wrote:I disagree once again to the characterization that I have presented a conclusion. It is an observation based on facts and reports. There was no need to actually go about and define to satisfy the need of every postor, even if they happen to be moderators. As long as the post in itself makes sense, not offensive and does not in any manner disruption, there is no need for subjecting a postor to a cross examination as it were.
I also disagree that what I had posted in anyway constituted a strawman.
If this is the level of scrutiny that one has to pass through to make posts, I am unwilling to do that. I shall stop posting in this forum as I do not seem to make the changes requested of me.
Fellow postors have a nice discussion.
Yeah its the commies and jholawalas..but surprisingly couldn't find Arundhati Roy, Teesta Sethalwad, Praful Bidwai etc ( have they lost their pensGerard wrote:Open Letter to the Prime Minister to Scrap the Indo-US Nuclear Deal
check the signatories....
).Then the govt has to fall, and the 123 Deal must be thrown out like the Dhabol Power Deal was.rajrang wrote:I am afraid you may be correct. It is even possible that other countries are aware of this.Sanjay M wrote:US Draft on NSG Falls Short of India's Expectations
I'll laugh if Congress has to walk away from this deal!
They'll have ventured all this way for nothing.
On the other hand, Congress may be corrupt enough to totally sell out the national interest, and accept even the worst deal.
I disagree. The US has a larger gameplan in mind, not just a few measly dollars from an industry in which they are not competitive and which they will more than make up for anyway through arms sales and other market opening moves (retail, insurance, etc.)Pulikeshi wrote:I think the poster who fancies that the U.S. is trying to protect her economic interests is spot on.
Perhaps POTUS is attempting to give COTUS an economic sweetner to up the deal.
What condition(s) would this sweetner constitute?
Read the great game threadsraj wrote:
The US has a larger gameplan in mind, not just a few measly dollars from an industry in which they are not competitive and which they will more than make up for anyway through arms sales and other market opening moves (retail, insurance, etc.)
The intent of Hyde is to accomplish the quantitative and qualitative capping of India's nuclear weapons, while at the same time freeing up a certain amount of tech flows thereby enabling India to present a much more robust posture vis-a-vis China and balance China in Asia. An important corollary of this will be India developing a security dependency on the US, which is the best guarantee of India being a dependable ally of the US (ala Europe and Japan).
It is up to India to get what it wants and needs from this deal without necessarily signing on to the entire US gameplan and subscribing to all its objectives.
Is that possible? We will see. It is all still unfolding.
1. There are no other examples of NSG "agreements" with other countries. The NSG was set up as the 'London Suppliers Club' in response to India's 1974 test. It did not get real teeth until Russia was bamboozled, in the aftermath of the Cold War, to join in 1992 with the explicit assurances that this was a voluntary organization of nations, there was no treaty underpinning this grouping, and all that was required of member nations was to apply their 'national laws' on export control diligently in support of the laudable objective of non-proliferation. China joined NSG in 2004. This waiver is the first of its kind by NSG, and an attempt by the US to end the nuclear related 'cold war' it initiated and led against India for 34 years. The question is: will India snatch defeat from the jaws of victory by ending the cold war on US terms or will it do so on India's terms.Suraj wrote:Raja Ram: Please define what 'clean' and 'unconditional' are, and why they are distinct, with examples from real NSG agreements for other nations for each case, as much as possible.
Please don't build a strawman on the base of poorly defined phrases; it will just start another long whinefest filled with more emotions than substance, and I'll be compelled to intervene.
'Unconditional': no change in the current NSG practice of each member nation following their national laws. This explicitly means that no NSG member will be bound to follow another NSG member's actions (which may be mandated by that member's domestic laws). If this is not the case, India will -- by buying any reactors/fuel from NSG countries under any subsequent arrangements -- be effectively accepting a 45-nation multilateral commitment which is worse than CTBT because it does not provide for withdrawal under the supreme national interest clause available in all international treaties. Even worse, India will become liable to future changes in Chinese, Australian, Irish, Austrian, etc. laws impacting the operation of nuclear reactors in India. This is akin to GoI providing an open invitation to everyone around the world to press India's pressure points whenever it suits them."Clean" - No explicit or implicit references to any other soverign or other multilateral arrangements (civil or non-civil) in the specific waiver to India from NSG guidelines. No future provisions that NSG might come up with will any way impact the waiver to India.
"Unconditional" - No explicit or implicit conditionalities imposed on the waiver other than what has been agreed to by India in the bilateral 123 agreement and the IAEA India specific agreement. In other words the waiver cannot be revoked under any other circumstances by the NSG as long as India complies with its end of the bargain.
NSG is created to target India. That is the real purpose of this group and really does not have international law backing this group. By excluding India they wanted to pin India in a corner and make India in future to agree to terms which they wanted.sraj wrote:1. There are no other examples of NSG "agreements" with other countries. The NSG was set up as the 'London Suppliers Club' in response to India's 1974 test. It did not get real teeth until Russia was bamboozled, in the aftermath of the Cold War, to join in 1992 with the explicit assurances that this was a voluntary organization of nations, there was no treaty underpinning this grouping, and all that was required of member nations was to apply their 'national laws' on export control diligently in support of the laudable objective of non-proliferation. China joined NSG in 2004. This waiver is the first of its kind by NSG, and an attempt by the US to end the nuclear related 'cold war' it initiated and led against India for 34 years.Suraj wrote:Raja Ram: Please define what 'clean' and 'unconditional' are, and why they are distinct, with examples from real NSG agreements for other nations for each case, as much as possible.
sraj wrote:Raja Ram: may I add my voice to the others urging you to continue posting. Your posts are higly regarded.I disagree. The US has a larger gameplan in mind, not just a few measly dollars from an industry in which they are not competitive and which they will more than make up for anyway through arms sales and other market opening moves (retail, insurance, etc.)Pulikeshi wrote:I think the poster who fancies that the U.S. is trying to protect her economic interests is spot on.
Perhaps POTUS is attempting to give COTUS an economic sweetner to up the deal.
What condition(s) would this sweetner constitute?
The intent of Hyde is to accomplish the quantitative and qualitative capping of India's nuclear weapons, while at the same time freeing up a certain amount of tech flows thereby enabling India to present a much more robust posture vis-a-vis China and balance China in Asia. An important corollary of this will be India developing a security dependency on the US, which is the best guarantee of India being a dependable ally of the US (ala Europe and Japan).
It is up to India to get what it wants and needs from this deal without necessarily signing on to the entire US gameplan and subscribing to all its objectives.
Is that possible? We will see. It is all still unfolding.
How does it follow that the NSG agreement being conditional imply:sraj wrote:If this is not the case, India will -- by buying any reactors/fuel from NSG countries under any subsequent arrangements -- be effectively accepting a 45-nation multilateral commitment which is worse than CTBT because it does not provide for withdrawal under the supreme national interest clause available in all international treaties. Even worse, India will become liable to future changes in Chinese, Australian, Irish, Austrian, etc. laws impacting the operation of nuclear reactors in India. This is akin to GoI providing an open invitation to everyone around the world to press India's pressure points whenever it suits them.
Suraj: NSG is a nuclear cartel, just as OPEc is an oil cartel. Both exist without any treaty underpinning or validation under international law.Suraj wrote:sraj: Thanks for the additional details on the terminology. Considering that neither is the NSG draft available, nor is there prior precedent, from the following:How does it follow that the NSG agreement being conditional imply:sraj wrote:If this is not the case, India will -- by buying any reactors/fuel from NSG countries under any subsequent arrangements -- be effectively accepting a 45-nation multilateral commitment which is worse than CTBT because it does not provide for withdrawal under the supreme national interest clause available in all international treaties. Even worse, India will become liable to future changes in Chinese, Australian, Irish, Austrian, etc. laws impacting the operation of nuclear reactors in India. This is akin to GoI providing an open invitation to everyone around the world to press India's pressure points whenever it suits them.
* Indian actions being adjunct to national laws of others.
* Inability to withdraw in the national interest
Or are these just hypothetical worst cases ? What precedent exists at all for one country to be adjunct to another's laws ? And what bilateral or multilateral treaty exists that does not provide for withdrawal on national interest ?
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multinational body concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials.
It was founded in 1975 in response to the Indian nuclear test of the previous year. The test demonstrated that certain non-weapons specific nuclear technology could be readily turned to weapons development. Nations already signatories of the NPT saw the need to further limit the export of nuclear equipment, materials or technology. Another benefit was that non-NPT and non-Zangger Committee nations, then specifically France, could be brought in.
A series of meetings in London from 1975 to 1978 resulted in agreements on the guidelines for export, these were published as INFCIRC/254 (essentially the Zangger "Trigger List") by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Listed items could only be exported to non-nuclear states if certain International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards were agreed to or if exceptional circumstances relating to safety existed.
The name of the "London Club" was due to the series of meetings in London. It has also been referred to as the London Group, or the London Suppliers Group.
The NSG did not meet again until 1991. The "Trigger List" remained unchanged until 1991, although the Zangger list was regularly updated. The revelations about the Iraqi weapons program following the first Gulf War led to a tightening of the export of so-called dual-use equipment. At the first meeting since 1978, held at the Hague in March 1991, the twenty-six members agreed to the changes, which were published as the "Dual-use List" in 1992, and also to the extension of the original list to more closely match the up-to-date Zangger list. A regular series of plenary meetings was also arranged as was the regular updating of the two key lists.
Initially the NSG had seven members, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, USSR, United Kingdom, and United States. In 1976-77 membership was expanded to fifteen with the admittance of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Twelve more nations joined up to 1990. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union a number of former republics have been given observer status as a stage towards future membership. The People's Republic of China joined in 2004.
As of 2005 the NSG has 45 members: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.
In July 2006, the United States Congress allowed US laws to be amended to accommodate civilian nuclear trade with India. (See: United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act). With the submission of India's safeguards agreement to the IAEA Board of Governors, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is expected to consider a proposal to ease restrictions on exports to India.
Even as hope of power sufficiency emanates from the India-US nuclear deal, the audit says 6,53,172 million units of power were supplied last fiscal against a demand of 7,26,222 million units.
The 73,050-million unit deficit was largely in Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, and Uttar Pradesh.
These states accounted for 80 to 90 percent of the total power demanded.
The audit by the ministry statistics and programme implementation (S&PI) said Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka and Kerala met at least 90 percent of their power needs.
Some of the states and union territories that supplied 100 percent or marginally less electricity were Puducherry, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Goa, Chandigarh, Dadar and Nagar Haveli, Tamil Nadu, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal.
"There was a shortage of 64,368 million units in April 2007-February 2008, which rose to 73,050 million units by March-end," a ministry official, who did not wish to be identified, told IANS.
Given the fact that only around 56 percent of India's rural population or 78 million households do not have access to electricity, the mismatch between demand and supply will widen in time to come if the supply side is not improved, the official said.
"It has to be done on the priority basis as the government intends to provide access to electricity to all the households by 2009."
The government has estimated that India will require an installed capacity of over 200,000 megawatt (MW) by 2012 to meet the electricity demand, which will be 60 percent more of what the country has at present.
"By 2020, India will require 400,000 MW of electricity. Energy is going to be required in a large quantity in view of rapid economic growth. The government also aims to increase per capita consumption of electricity to 1,000 units by 2012," said the official.
At present, about 26 percent of installed power generation capacity in India is hydropower against 50 percent in the 1960s, while around 66 percent is thermal generation including gas.
The official said nuclear energy constituted only about three percent of the country's total power generation, and non-conventional energy sources, of which wind energy is predominant, accounted for about five percent.
"The share of hydropower in electricity generation will go up with the government launching a 50,000 MW hydro initiative. It aims at making optimum utilisation of available hydro potential of the country," the official said.
There is cloud over the expectation that with the Government's successful squelching of the Left's opposition through the confidence vote in the Lok Sabha and completion of the negotiation on the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nuclear agreement with the US will have a smooth passage.
It had so far been assumed on the Indian side that the 123 Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement already sewn up, all that remained was securing the approval of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) to the entire arrangement, enabling India to acquire the fuel, equipment and technology needed for augmenting the generation of atomic power in line with its master plan.
Indeed, some analysts in India were even jubilant that once the NSG okays the deal, it was immaterial whether or not the US Congress ratified the 123 Agreement, and India can straightaway begin dealing with suppliers other than the US in the NSG.
It now transpires that the deal's passage is not going to be that easy. To head off the possibility of India dealing with preferred members of the NSG without reference to the US, there is apparently a move either to time the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the NSG decision and the US Congressional ratification of the123 Agreement to take place simultaneously, or even to make the US Congressional ratification of the 123 Agreement precede the other two processes so that the US is able to retain its hold on the subsequent operations under the deal. By way of double precaution, the US has reportedly secured a `political understanding' from Russia and France that they would not rush to conclude export deals with India following the NSG waiver but wait until the US Congress ratifies the 123 Agreement.
A more disturbing connotation has been put on the US perspective by the statement of the US Ambassador, Mr David C. Mulford, at a media meet on July 23, that the NSG waiver is bound to take into account not only the prescriptions in the IAEA safeguards and the 123 Agreement but also `the determinations' the President has to make under the Hyde Act.
PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATIONS
The determinations the President has to make and apprise the Congress impinge on the activities of almost the entire Department of Atomic Energy, bringing within their purview nuclear facilities within as well as outside the safeguards scheme, that is, meant for both strategic and non-strategic purposes.
For example, the Congress has demanded to know from the President every year the quantity of uranium mined, milled, processed and utilised by India, especially for production of nuclear explosives devices, the rate of production in India of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; the amount of electricity India's nuclear reactors produced for civil purposes and the proportion of such production that can be attributed to India's declared civil reactors; and an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices.
The President has also to report to the Congress how well India has cooperated with the US in its efforts "to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran" to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons capability.
There is besides Section 106 of the Hyde Act which is categorical that all exemptions and waivers granted under the Act shall cease to be effective if India is found to have detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment.
The deal is as good as sunk if there is any attempt on the NSG's part to make its decision contingent on India's compliance with the `determinations' of the Hyde Act.
B. S. RAGHAVAN
This one quote is enough to prove that our nuke vote in BR has a gross misunderstanding of the understanding of the deal itself. Many said, they understand the deal very well.By way of double precaution, the US has reportedly secured a `political understanding' from Russia and France that they would not rush to conclude export deals with India following the NSG waiver but wait until the US Congress ratifies the 123 Agreement.
Acharya,Acharya wrote:I second that. No intervention needed.fanne wrote:Suraj Sir,
May I say you post smack of thought policing. I have been here from day 1 when BR was launched and barring few small period of thought policing by one other moderator (who I dont see active now), I have never seen this intolerance of an viewpoint. You might not agree with Raja Ram but can you please give him his space. I have heard lots of your view on economics which by defination is not even a science (and thus is lots of vaporware), if emperical evidence, gut feeling unsubstainable theories can form the basis of economics, I don't see what is wrong with Raja Ram post. He has been predicting and theoririzing since past many years and I am confident to say that he has not been off mark too much!!
Let me define unconditional and clean for you as I understand it (and it is good for me, please dont fail me for poor defination!! ). Unconditional is where we get a waiver that does not ask us to do this or that to begin with. Clean (which does not go as far as unconditional) is what US hinks we should be doing and that does take into account Hyde act. If these two terms is bad enough for DDM and Indian ministers to fret about, it is bad for me.
Thanks and with regards,
fanne
fanne-saar,fanne wrote: I have heard lots of your view on economics which by defination is not even a science (and thus is lots of vaporware), if emperical evidence, gut feeling unsubstainable theories can form the basis of economics, I don't see what is wrong with Raja Ram post.
AK:We don't know what that phrase means. Kakodkar/GoI has never defined it
"clean, unconditional" means India should be able to do what ever she pleases. AK has been saying that even prior to J18. In fact he has said that IAEA does not know enough to police India! (J18 was NOT the start of all this tug-of-war, BTW.)No post and pre-conditions should be laid
I was referring to this partRaviBg wrote:I don't think Suraj said anything objectionable or is doing "thought policing".
My only interest in intervention is in ensuring such a chain reaction doesn't start, because such a line of discussion invariably goes downhill. It makes no difference whether the argument is 'it is well known that the US is out to screw us' or 'it is well known that India will be the world's biggest economy in 20XX so just sign the deal and we'll have cheap power for our Xboxes'. Neither of those approaches are any good.
I was only referring to the intervention regarding the discussion going in a chain reaction to downhill.Katare wrote:
Acharya,
I disagree with you.
Hi,vishwakarmaa wrote:Majority of educated people in India take pride in their english language skills and take pride in chiding chinese on their lack of english skills.
...
All talks of desis proclaiming India tobe their home is hogwash. Done for self-interest. Not through love.
I'm not sure I agree with all of this. It's not terrible to want an Unconditional NSG waiver which reduces dealing with NSG-members to bilateral agreemtents. This is not inferior to CTBT, since CTBT is itself an international net, rather than mere bilateral restriction. Unconditional is better than UN-conditional.sraj wrote:'Unconditional': no change in the current NSG practice of each member nation following their national laws. This explicitly means that no NSG member will be bound to follow another NSG member's actions (which may be mandated by that member's domestic laws). If this is not the case, India will -- by buying any reactors/fuel from NSG countries under any subsequent arrangements -- be effectively accepting a 45-nation multilateral commitment which is worse than CTBT because it does not provide for withdrawal under the supreme national interest clause available in all international treaties. Even worse, India will become liable to future changes in Chinese, Australian, Irish, Austrian, etc. laws impacting the operation of nuclear reactors in India. This is akin to GoI providing an open invitation to everyone around the world to press India's pressure points whenever it suits them.
One would think that the Bush admin, if it were acting in good faith, would have been more willing to maintain an upfront position on this, to allay Indian fears. I don't like the fact that we're having to wriggle in under the wire and go through all kinds of contortions to pass through this. This is like Agni Pariksha -- if you have that many doubts about me, then screw you and your royal line.3. With all due respect to moderators on this forum (old and new), I strongly disagree with the terms 'strawman' and 'whinefest' used in the above context. One thing we seem to miss is that unless the NSG draft is made public before it is passed by NSG, it will be a fait accompli by the time we see it. If we don't like it then, the real whinefest can begun because there will be nothing else to do. This is the time to raise the alarm, and call out the US on its shenanigans (well recorded in the run-up to Hyde and 123). Bottomline: GoI does have alternatives to this deal, if the deal is not on terms acceptable to India.
Even if India's nuclear safeguards proposal is approved by the IAEA, it does not mean a smooth ride for the nuclear deal. Many NSG countries may insist that India must formally enter the non-proliferation regime and give up its nuclear weapons programme. Rekha Chakravarthi & Gretchen Smith on the long road ahead
The political impasse in India has finally ended and, for now, it appears that the India-US nuclear deal may make it through one hoop of what has now become a three-ring circus. Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon has already provided the IAEA Board of Governors with an overview of the draft Agreement, well in advance the IAEA vote, and according to reports, without opposition. The US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, William Burns, has also stood in front of the IAEA, to bolster support. And, most importantly, India has received the blessing of IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, who has been a strong advocate of the deal. With this in mind, India's prospects look good.
What can India expect at the IAEA? Although the 35-member Board is expected to approve the draft Agreement without any major changes, thereby enabling India to approach the NSG, India is still likely to face some challenges in the IAEA. One of which, is the request of the Board provide clarifications or changes in the draft Agreement, such as spelling out what corrective measures India would take in the event of fuel disruption. The unspecified measures, found in the preamble of the draft, have emerged as a major concern in India and the non-proliferation community, who argue that such measures provide India with a flexibility to unilaterally remove reactors from international safeguards. India, however, may decline to spell out its "unspecified sovereign rights" and be forced to provide a new draft.
Are there any spoilers? How can they be addressed? There is also the possibility that India will be confronted with spoilers such as Pakistan, which is reportedly working to block a consensus on the draft Agreement. Pakistan is said to have questioned the Agency's hurry to obtain approval for the draft and demands that India provides the list of facilities to be brought under safeguards prior to the Board meeting. The United States is trying to dissuade Pakistan from making these demands. For India, this development is concerning, as the IAEA normally operates using a consensus and an opposition, of any size, could spell trouble. Although the IAEA can choose to use a voting method instead, it is rarely used, especially in relation to safeguard agreements. Such a development would be problematic for India, as any difficulties it has at the IAEA will follow it to the NSG, as 26 of the 35 Board of Governors also belong to the NSG.
What will be the next step, if India receives an IAEA stamp of approval? It is important to recognise the weight that rests on India's shoulders as it enters the NSG. After all, this is the arena in which India could gain atomic freedom or watch its' hopes could go up in smoke. Although many focus on the ultimate aim of the agreement, endorsement by the American Congress; it is important to recognise that India does not need to reach this step to gain energy independence.
If the NSG chooses to re-write its rules, India will be able to enter into a cooperative agreement with any NSG member state. But, as with the IAEA, there are many scenarios that India could face. The following five scenarios could be predicted.
Scenario 1: NSG sets difficult conditions and/or reasonable conditions India walks out. India faces stiff opposition from a number of countries who insist that India sign the NPT and/or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to obtain a waiver. Bringing India under the NPT would be a non-proliferation coup; however, for India still believes that the NPT is unjust and flawed, and neither the NPT nor the CTBT align with India's security concerns. In the event that NSG sets 'difficult' conditions, India walks out of the NSG negotiations.
It is also possible that the NSG exempts India from signing the NPT and/or CTBT, but insists that it sign the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The FMCT aims to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or the NSG insists India make its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing permanent. These are reasonable conditions from the point of view of the NSG; however, from an Indian vantage, any attempt to limit its nuclear capability is seen as compromising India's security concerns. In this scenario, as with the one above, India leaves the NSG negotiations.
Scenario 2: India insists on a clean exemption; NSG accepts or rejects. India presses for a clear and unconditional exemption without any reference to nuclear testing. Despite not being a signatory to the NPT, India has adhered to its provisions and hopes that the NSG recognises this. Moreover, the US has also promised to prod the NSG to give India a clean exemption. Assuming that the US lobbies hard for a clean exemption, the NSG provides India with a full waiver. But, countries with stringent domestic laws that would prevent them from cooperating with India in the event of a nuclear test may reject an unconditional waiver.
Scenario 3: China states that it supports India but wishes to enter into a similar agreement with Pakistan. Pakistan's "good friend" China creates difficulties for India. China insists on a criteria-based exemption that would apply to countries who had not signed the NPT. The rationale behind such a move would be to ensure that China can enter into a similar agreement with Pakistan. Although it appears that the People's Republic has changed its mind, given its stated interest in Sino-Indian nuclear cooperation, China has not categorically stated that it will back India at the NSG. The NSG is unlikely to approve a Sino-Pakistani accord, given Pakistan's proliferation plagued record, and India finds it hard to clear this hurdle.
Scenario 4: India experiences opposition from governments on the lines of non-proliferation and legal concerns. States such as Japan, Australia, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Belgium Poland and Finland express concern over how this deal would affect the non-proliferation regime. These States argue that the regime is showing signs of decay and this would signal to the rest of world, most notably Iran and North Korea, that there are no serious consequences for possessing nuclear weapons outside the NPT. They also argue it would show that the sentences given to States that defy international laws are temporary and can easily be repealed. Given the power of these states, it possible, although not certain, that they could block India's approval at the NSG.
On the other hand, countries such as Ireland, Sweden and New Zealand, may express concern on a legal basis. Although these countries protest, they do not serve as a stumbling block as international treaties have often been rewritten. Further, the US applies diplomatic and economic pressure to achieve its objective. In this scenario, India overcomes its opposition and moves to the next stage in the three-part act.
Scenario 5: India receives a full waiver by all NSG nations and is able to operationalise its exploratory agreements with Russia and France. India is also ready for approval by US Congress. In this scenario, India receives the full support of all NSG nations without any difficulties. While waiting to receive the final sign-off from the American Congress, India is able to operationalise the exploratory agreements it has already signed with France and Russia. Further, India is able to enter into civilian nuclear agreements with other NSG states and achieves its coveted energy independence.
It is important to recognise that there is one more step that lies beyond the NSG wavier. And, there is a question of when India will cross the finish line. As the Hyde Act requires the bill to remain on the floor for a minimum of 30 continuous legislative days, and there are less than 25 legislative days left before the US Congress adjourns on 26 September, it is possible that this will take place after the Bush administration leaves office. Technically it is possible for India to complete this step under Mr Bush, but it will require Speaker of the House, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, to call a lame duck legislative session. Congresswoman Pelosi has repeatedly stated that she has no intent to do so, but given the momentum of the deal, anything is possible.
-- Writers are researchers at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies