Nuclear Threat From Pakistan : Boom or Bluff ?

[Anujan]

What happens if
..IN gets better of Pk and rapidly thrusts deep into pure-land
.. PK uses taKtikal nook on their side of IB to alter the balance of power and to save itself from total destruction.
.....as a result of cold start on account of another 2611
This is reverse of what Ravi is proposing.

Read Sundarji's article on who and what we should strike with Nukes. The shrewd man chose targets to completely decimate PA and to attack economic targets/ports such that Pak is not a viable country for a hundred years.

Complete destruction of Corps sized formations of Pakistan on their staging area was always on the agenda.

[Karna_A]

There is another scenario here that could prove to be true in a few years or by 2020.

(a) Iran gets nookes
(b) Taliban takes over AFG
(c) Taliban executes few hundreds of hazaras
(d) Iran declares war on Taliban
(e) Taliban threatens to nook Iran (This has happened before in 1998)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... h8915.html

In August 8, 1998 the Taliban assisted by Al-Qaeda, attacked the Afghan city of Mazari Sharif killing 11 Iranian diplomats and journalists along with thousands of Afghan civilians, in what was considered an attack motivated by takfir against Shia.[19]

More infuriating for Iran was the fact that

Tehran had earlier contacted the Pakistan government to guarantee the security of their Consulate, because the Iranians knew that ISI officers had driven into Mazar with the Taliban. The Iranians had thought that Dost Mohammed's unit had been sent to protect them so had welcomed them at first. .... At first the Taliban rescued to admit the whereabouts of the diplomats but then as international protests and Iranian fury increased, they admitted that the diplomats had been killed, not on official orders but by renegade Taliban. But reliable sources said that Dost Mohammed had spoken to Mullah Omar on his wireless to ask whether the diplomats should be killed and Omar had given the go-ahead."[20]

http://www.usip.org/resources/iran-and- ... ear-factor

In the late 1990s, it nearly went to war with Afghanistan over the murder of nine of its diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif in August 1998 by a Taliban-controlled militia. The assassinations occurred against a backdrop of violence along the Iranian-Afghani border stemming from Afghani drug trafficking. During this period, Iranian officials' greatest fear was that Pakistan's leadership would eventually become “Talibanized”—if, for example, the Musharraf government were overthrown by younger, more radical military officers sympathetic to the Taliban and its philosophy—and that they would face an extremist Sunni regime with nuclear weapons on Iran's border.

(f) Iran preemptively nookes TSP.
(g) TSP nookes Iran

This makes TSP nookes both Boom and Bluff.

[ramana]

x-posted...

So my question to anyone who is wiling to tale it on is "When India is already under risk of being hit by Pakistanis nukes and has been threatened several times, what is the basis for the conclusion that the same nukes are somehow going to become more dangerous to India just because the Taliban take over Pakistan? Is there a hidden assumption here (not necessarily by you Rajaram-avarhal) that the Pakistan army are somehow more gentle and more rational towards India and that the Taliban control of those nukes somehow raises the risks for India.

Let me try.

The conventional wisdom on BRF is, nukes in the hands of Pakistan Army are as dangerous to India (if not more) than nukes in the hands of the Taliban. Meanwhile, nukes in the hands of the Taliban are more dangerous to other countries besides India... so it is a situation not any worse, or potentially preferable, to nukes in the hands of the Pakistan Army.

Strictly speaking, this is true, IF you consider only the two extremes, ie.
1) Nukes in the hands of TSPA
2) Nukes in the hands of the Taliban.

But I think there is a middle ground which does potentially pose a greater threat to India than the current situation, if the Taliban ends up in control of Afghanistan. We can comfort ourselves with thoughts that in the long run NW Pakistan will be devoured by Pakthun nationalism, etc. But for a significant window of time, the danger to India remains real, and vastly increases over and above the present situation.

Let me attempt to illustrate with a possible scenario.

1) Approximately July 2013, most American troops have been withdrawn from AfPak. A Pakistan-brokered, Washington-blessed "coalition" government is in Kabul, with various Taliban leaders exercising real power and Karzai (if at all present) relegated to a figurehead status. The Tajiks and other Northern Groups have begun a desperate war of secession in the North of Afghanistan, but this is irrelevant to our scenario. Meanwhile the TTP and other groups are using the period to rebuild their capabilities and relative peace reigns in FATA for the time being.

2) Up to this point, let us assume GOI's policy towards Pakistan has remained the same, and Pakistan's attitude to the GOI has remained the same, as it is today for the most part. Pakistan keeps insisting that India discuss Kashmir and Water. India keeps agreeing to talks, but insists that the terrorism issue must be resolved first. Meanwhile Hafeez Sayeed and others on India's wanted list are roaming around free and conducting their activities. For the purpose of this scenario I am not going to assume that things get any better or worse, compared to 2010, for India up to July 2013.

3) September 2013, the ISPR makes a media statement that shakes the world. Five of Pakistan's crown jewels have gone missing. It is hinted that agents of the Taliban may be responsible. The world media goes into a frenzy of fear.

(NOTE that Pakistan could not do this today, or at any time when the American military is in AfPak in strength. If they made such a statement today, within hours the 82nd Airborne would take possession of *all* known nuclear installations in Pakistan, and US Special Forces would be kicking ass and taking names from Chitral to Gwadar, on a concerted one-point mission to get to the bottom of the missing nukes.

When American forces are no longer present on Pakistan's borders and off Pakistan's coast in large numbers, the ISI will have a lot more wiggle room to get away with such tricks. It takes great effort to overcome operational inertia, and considerable time to redeploy US armed forces for a de-novo invasion of Pakistan.)

4) Islamabad comes under severe pressure of all kinds to find and retrieve the nukes. They ask for aid, demanding items useful to a nuke search (F-22s, warships, AMRAAMs, M1A1s, magnifying glasses and money.) Washington may acquiesce or refuse...but in the short term, at least, the West has no option but to watch what happens while putting homeland security and intelligence assets on round-the-clock alert.

5) The world media watches with bated breath. Two weeks later, tears of relief are cried on the airwaves... the ISI, America's Ally, has found one of the missing nukes through its operatives in FATA! Praise and aid are heaped upon Pakistan as a saviour of the world.

6) Two weeks after this, more news reports emerge that two more of the missing nukes have been retrieved by the ISI! Pakistan is praised to the skies. No country has ever been such a reliable ally of the West, such a tenacious sentinel against "Al Qaeda" terrorism.

7) One week later, a JDAM goes off in an Indian city... Mumbai, perhaps, or Bengalooru. With devastating consequences for the Indian economy. The Pakistanis express heartfelt sympathy to India while denying that the blast indicated a bomb of Pakistani design. They also caution India against taking "ill-advised steps" and put their nuclear delivery systems on high alert.

8 ) The same or next day, Ilyas Kashmiri issues a statement from somewhere he declares is "Taliban-protected territory." He says 313 Brigade has possession of not one more, but in fact fifty more nuclear weapons. They will be detonated in Indian cities one by one until India gives up Kashmir.

9) Following this, Taliban ministers in Kabul deny any connection to Ilyas Kashmiri or the JDAM.

Question: What are the GOI's options at this point?

A) Nuke Pakistan in retaliation, and escalate to an all-out nuclear war in which far more than Mumbai or Bengalooru are destroyed?

B ) Take Ilyas Kashmiri at his word that 313 brigade carried out the attack with Taliban aid/protection, and nuke Kabul or elsewhere in Afghanistan?

C) Take military action against Pakistan below the nuclear threshold, while the West screams at us to cease and desist because Pakistan is their heroic ally and their best hope of securing any missing nukes? Any military action could easily be escalated by Pakistan to nuclear conflict, so this runs the same risks as "A".

D) Give up Kashmir? You know there will be lots of pressure from various quarters within and outside India to do this, or at least talk about it with Pakistan.

E) Nuke all of Pakistan and all of Afghanistan and lose more of our cities to Pakistani nukes in turn?

F) Not retaliate, and live with the loss of Mumbai and potential loss of other cities, while we wait for Pakhtun nationalism to eventually consume NW Pakistan?

G) Other?

Does this explain how the combination of US withdrawal from AfPak, and elevation of Taliban to governance in Afghanistan, makes the situation MORE dangerous for India than it is today? Essentially it affords Pakistan an additional degree of plausible deniability. That's what we saw during the IC814 hijacking.

Today, Pakistan doesn't NEED such a second degree of plausible deniability to carry on with its current level of terrorism against India. They simply use the first degree of plausible deniability and claim "we are also a victim of terrorism" even after Delhi, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Hyderabad, Mumbai and all the other atrocities they have perpetrated over the past decade. Our GOI, by talking to Pakistan regardless of this...converts Pakistan's plausible deniability into credible deniability. But I won't go further into that subject in this post.

However, even though they have got away scot-free with perpetrating Mumbai, even the Pakis may not have the b@lls to carry out something like a JDAM attack with the level of first-degree plausible deniability they currently enjoy. Besides, with the US breathing down their necks at present, it would be an impossibly difficult thing to pull off.

Withdrawal of the US from AfPak gives the Pakis a new level of operational freedom, and the return of the Taliban to Kabul gives the Pakis a second degree of deniability which they could potentially use to engage in real nuclear terrorism against India.

Please feel free to criticize the scenario if you find holes in it.

[Aditya G]

Recommended reading...

http://www.maritimeindia.org/pdfs/Artic ... 3aug10.pdf

THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR RESTRAINT
AND STABILIZATION IN SOUTH ASIA
Adm.(Retd.) Arun Prakash

....

It is now conceivable that with active Chinese assistance, Pakistan will be able
to mate plutonium warheads with the Babur, and then go on to adapt the missile
for firing through the torpedo tubes of its diesel Agosta 90B submarines.
Admittedly this combination cannot be compared with a SSBN but with airindependent
propulsion (AIP), the Agostas could form a functional third leg of a
Pak nuclear triad. The Israelis have already demonstrated this template with
their Harpoon firing Dolphin class diesel submarines.

Command Structures

In the nuclear context, one must take note of this interesting observation by
Pakistani physicist Dr. Abdul Hameed Nayyar: “The Generals who command
Pakistan’s army, dominate national security, and control nuclear policy…even
when there is an elected civilian government. Their military mind-sets…lead
them to find many reasons to continue to seek strategic parity with India… to
support a larger nuclear arsenal.” To this we can now add the Indo-US nuclear
deal as an added rationale for the Generals to justify the production of more
fissile material, and diversification of the Pak arsenal.

Under these circumstances, it would be prudent for India to assume that no
matter who is the notional Head of Government, it is the Pak army which calls
the shots in matters relating to nuclear deterrence. A brief comparison of the
manner in which the two neighbours have gone about evolving their nuclear
decision-making structures is educative.

....

Doctrinal Dichotomy

While India has a stated commitment to NFU, Pakistan has deliberately
maintained an opaque nuclear posture for a long time which, in essence, seeks
to keep India off balance with regard to when and under what conditions
Pakistan might choose to use nuclear weapons. Certain statements made, in
January 2002, by Lt. Gen. Kidwai, in an interview with Paolo Cotta-Ramusino,
Secretary General of the Pugwash Conference have, so far, served as the sole,
but deliberately imprecise, indicators of Pakistani intent in the extremely
sensitive arena of nuclear deterrence.

Kidwai stated that permissive action links (PALs) were not considered
necessary because Pakistani nuclear weapons remained in a disassembled state,
but added in the same breath that the warheads could be mated “very quickly”.
Their nuclear arsenal was aimed solely at India and would be used only "if the
very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake". In elaboration of the last
statement, he outlined four scenarios which have now come to be known as the
“Red Lines”:

• India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory.
• India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces.
• India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan.
• India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large scale
internal subversion in Pakistan.

Currently, the nuclear deterrents of the two adversaries are enveloped in a cloak
of opacity, and there is a total lack of communication between those who are
entrusted with conceptual and physical management of the two arsenals. This
can engender nothing but mistrust and insecurity; both catalysts for an arms
race. I have cited some of the material grounds for the unstated sub-continental
arms race under way, but an examination of a few aspects of the doctrinal
equation gives cause for even more uneasiness.

Both adversaries have declared their espousal of a credible “minimum”
deterrent, conveying the impression that they would be content with a small
number of nuclear devices. Indian strategists, initially, offered various posture
options, ranging from “recessed” or “de-mated” to “non-weaponized”
deterrence. India’s politicians, hazy and ill at ease with the whole subject, spoke
of “a few” or “a few tens” of nuclear weapons as sufficient to deter a nuclear
adversary. PM Vajpayee went so far as to declare in Parliament that the “fact
that we have become a nuclear weapons state should be a deterrent itself.”

Such talk turned out to be delusionary, because when the Strategic Forces
Commander considered the task of a NFU state delivering “massive retaliation”,
he found the mathematics quite straightforward. He must be prepared to lose a
proportion of his warheads to an enemy first strike, and then have enough
remaining to inflict “unacceptable damage” as mandated by the Doctrine. The
elements of an arms race were in place; the more warheads Pakistan and/or
China produced, the more we would need, for our deterrent to remain credible.
There is irony in the fact that, in public discourse, Pakistani experts now
describe India’s NFU undertaking as “frivolous”. They assert that as the smaller
player, Pakistan cannot declare its doctrine and must retain an element of
ambiguity. At a recent Track II dialogue in Copenhagen, a former PAF Air
Vice-Marshal likened the sub-continental situation to the NATO-Warsaw Pact
equation in Central Europe wherein the conventionally inferior NATO forces
retained the option of graduated “Flexible Response (FR).” With the entry of
Babur on the scene, and availability of an AIP diesel submarine, he also
mentioned the need of a Pakistani “triad” to ensure second strike capability.
RAdm Raja Menon, India’s foremost strategist makes a pertinent comment:
“Pakistan’s disbelief in our NFU and reliance on FR are a contradiction in
terms. Surely their doctrine of falling back on a graduated FR is made possible
only because they are sure that we will not launch a first strike. They must
choose one option: either believe in India’s NFU or act on the premise that we
will launch first. Otherwise Khalid Kidwai’s red lines can be termed frivolous
too.”

....

[ramana]

We should reapparise the thread in light of the wikileaks and update our knowledge.

Please post TSP related nuke stuff here.

[svinayak]

Recommended reading...

http://www.maritimeindia.org/pdfs/Artic ... 3aug10.pdf

In the nuclear context, one must take note of this interesting observation by
Pakistani physicist Dr. Abdul Hameed Nayyar: “The Generals who command
Pakistan’s army, dominate national security, and control nuclear policy…even
when there is an elected civilian government. Their military mind-sets…lead
them to find many reasons to continue to seek strategic parity with India… to
support a larger nuclear arsenal.” To this we can now add the Indo-US nuclear
deal as an added rationale for the Generals to justify the production of more
fissile material, and diversification of the Pak arsenal.

These are bogus arguments by Paki generals which is being done as a propaganda.
Pak generals will say that India has more 1 B population and can justify the production of more
fissile material, and diversification of the Pak arsenal.
Pak generals will say that India is rich and will more rich in future and can justify the production of more
fissile material, and diversification of the Pak arsenal.
Pak generals will say that India is everywhere in the world and can justify the production of more
fissile material, and diversification of the Pak arsenal.

[ramana]

X-post from Mil Forum:

They didn't test 6 bums.
The Chinese tested their new bum design (possibly a Neutron bomb?), because soon after that the chinese were claiming that they had (acquired) neutorn weapons tech. To which BARC scientists also said that that technology was not unusual or unachievable for BARC.

The Pakistanis tried to test their own bomb a week or so earlier, but it didn't do off, or it didn't go nuclear. Numerous well regarded observers have hinted at this. Then musharraf had to rush to Beijing to request them to preserve H&D, and so the chinese brought their own weapons and tested them. Meanwhile they were scared that the IAF will intercept the shipment midway, so they made that story of IAF planning to attack the test site

The videos of a hillock squiggling are of the first day's test. Again that same evening different pakistani netas, scientists and faujis were saying different things about the number of bombs tested and the yeilds, because these guys were all over TV to take credit. It was laughable because everyone was obviously lying, and with the world watching.

They tested something two days after the first test. That didn't even disturb the seismographs too much, but that site was nevertheless identified as a very low yield explosion 50 odd kms west of the original test site. That probably was the pakistani design that had been re-tested.

So they probably tested between 2-3 devices and 1 chinese device.

1. 1 pakistani device a few days before the actual publicized test - failure
2. 28 May 1998 - Televised test of 1 Chinese device, possibly one Pakistani device tested simultaneously - result the chinese device probably performed as per the expectations of the chinese designers. Pakistani device did not contribute to the yield - ?Failure.
3. 30 May 1998 - 1 Pakistani device tested 2 days later - again failure / very low yield.

Then there were stories of two North Korean transport aircraft that were parked at Chaklala Air force base, Pindi during the entire events. It was speculated that the Chinese device had been brought in by air on these N korean transport planes.

My 2 naya paisa.

You should post more often.

[ramana]

Indian Air Force in Wars:Jasjit Singh

Pakistan, after its first test of a nuclear device at Lop Nor with Chinese assistance in 1983, planned to take over Siachen Glacier and adjoining areas up to the Karakoram Pass (not to be confused with the Chinese built highway of the same name far to the west in Gilgit region of Kashmir).22 The Indian Army, in a pre-emptive move in early 1984 was able to just occupy the high crest marking the watershed before the Pakistan army could get to it the same day.

22 On the first anniversary of its nuclear tests, Dr Samar Mubarakmand (in charge of building the bomb) publicly stated that Pakistan had tested a nuclear device in 1983; see Gulf Today, 31 May, 1999.

[ramana]

Pakistan without nukes

Pakistan without nukes
That will rank as important in preserving world peace as the death of Osama Bin Laden, says N.V.Subramanian.

11 June 2012: So long the United States and its allies desist from denuclearizing Pakistan, it will remain a menace to world peace. Pakistan's nuclear weapons have insulated it from Western intervention that have been misguidedly directed in the past and present against Iraq, Libya and Syria. It is under the nuclear overhang that Pakistan has prosecuted terror wars against India, making escalatory retaliation inconceivable.

Nukes make Pakistan brash and bold in its Afghan misadventures. In the immediate post-9/11 phase, the United States threatened to bomb Pakistan back to Stone Age if it didn't disengage with the Taliban regime. Its then military dictator, Parvez Musharraf, grudgingly complied with US orders. The United States hasn't gotten anywhere as tough since.

It is true that Pakistan has a long history of supplicating to the United States unlike the destroyed states of Iraq, Libya and Syria. Pakistan was a US Cold War ally right up to the breakup of the Soviet Union. It played a key role in the 1970s' US-China gang-up against the USSR. And in all this period, the Pakistan military was close to the Pentagon, which looked the other way at Pakistani provocations against India.

But 9/11 was supposed to mark the US-Pakistan breakup, but it hasn't happened quite as sharply. After the Stone Age threat, the United States lapsed into a mindless, unwinnable war in Iraq. Barack Obama returned the focus to Pakistani terrorism in Afghanistan against NATO forces and Indian diplomatic/ civilian assets, but it hasn't notched up higher than drone attacks against terrorists holed out in FATA. The root cause of Pakistani terrorism is its nuclear weapons. But nothing has been done about it.

Now if the US could scare Pakistan right after 9/11 despite its nuclear weapons, why not since? That is a detail only the US government can provide. But from the outside, some guesswork is possible.

It is a fact that Pakistan has scaled up its inventory of nuclear weapons, surpassing India's, according to some estimates. Pakistan's excuse is the stalled FMCT negotiations, India, and in particular its bogus fear that the Indo-US nuclear deal frees up domestic uranium for bombs.

What seems more likely is that a large number of well-dispersed nukes would make a US denuclearization raid unsuccessful. But would that fact make Pakistan less scared of a US "Stone Age" bombing campaign? No. Then why hasn't the US reiterated that threat since after 9/11, especially with evidence of Pakistani terrorism against US and other NATO forces in Afghanistan?

Why hasn't it moved towards full-fledged invasion of Pakistan, overriding dissuasive factors such as propping up Pakistani democracy, its alliance with Saudi Arabia, and so forth?

This writer suspects that the US suspects that Pakistan has positioned fissile assets to be "leaked" to terrorists in the event of a US invasion. In the face of external aggression, Pakistan's reflex would be to target India. It has done so with terrorism in the past, and may ratchet up the nuclear option now.

But the US perhaps apprehends that, apart from the reflexive strike on India, the leaked weapons may be employed against it, against invading American forces, and in Europe (if not in the mainland), which has a growing tribe of Al-Qaeda volunteers. It is this that prevents US intervention in Pakistan.

But how long can the United States turn away from the cancer called Pakistan? Its nukes are a threat to world peace in ways deterrence theory cannot imagine. Neither Pakistan nor the world can afford to have Pakistani nukes. They must be taken out for a nearly final solution against terrorism.


{Threaten the Chinese who supply the nukes to TSP and then see what happens}

Denuclearization of Pakistan must be accorded the same priority as the hunting down of Osama Bin Laden. This writer argued that Al-Qaeda would be finished as a centralized terrorist organization without Bin Laden. So it has. Minus nukes, Pakistan would be compelled to return to civilized and peaceable nationhood.

[ramana]

On CSPAN Book TV program there was the author, Brian Michael Jenkins, spoke about a French revolt in 1961 when the rebels tried to seize a nuke test article/weapon. Even though it was historical stuff the discussion was only about Pakistan and its fragility and the top concern of US being the loss of Nukes to rogue factions or terrorists.

he also stated without contradiction by anyone that US has provided PALs to TSP.

One can understand what that means!

how can US electronics links be implemented on A TSP owned Chinese designed nuke weapon?

Also an audience member claimed that the famous CHIC-4 test, the very basis of the TSP arsenal was also the subject of a rogue PLA attempt to hijack it!!!

http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/04/when-a ... uring.html

When Armies Divide: Securing Nuclear Arsenals During Internal Upheavals


The Pentagon reportedly has secret plans to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons against terrorists, a jihadist coup, or civil war. It also has conducted war games to explore how it might try to secure North Korea's nuclear arsenal in case of a coup or collapse of the regime.

Either of these missions would be a daunting military task, requiring a large-scale military commitment. More dangerous, though, would be a mission to contain nuclear weapons in a case where an army divides against itself, creating a chaotic and unpredictable strategic landscape.

History suggests that armies guarding nuclear arsenals do not abandon their posts during political upheavals. In China, the Soviet Union and Pakistan, military unity was preserved, the chain of command survived, soldiers followed orders.

But when armies divide, this might not be true. The difference between disarmament and disaster could well rely on the loyalty of those who have, or can gain, custody of nuclear weapons.

Precedents are few, but we have one real-life case.

In 1961, France was testing nuclear weapons at its Sahara test site in southern Algeria, an unusual situation to begin with, since French forces were at the same time engaged in a bloody war against Algerian nationalist guerrillas. The first three nuclear tests went well, but the final preparations for the fourth test coincided with a rebellion by commanders of the French forces in Algeria who feared that French President de Gaulle was about to betray their cause and agree to an independent Algeria.

At the outset of the uprising, the leader of the revolt called the general commanding the test site, telling him: “Do not detonate the small bomb. Keep it for us. It may be useful.” Fortunately, the rebels never followed up on the call and made no attempt to actually seize the weapon.

While the rebellious generals struggled to consolidate their control in Algeria, Paris pushed for the test to be conducted. And it was, although with disappointing results, leading some to suggest that the test had been deliberately scuttled to ensure that the rebels could not get their hands on the device.

Constantin Melnik, who was at RAND in the 1950s, returned to Paris in 1959 to become the Coordinator for Intelligence in the office of France's prime minister. He describes a chaotic situation:

“There appeared to be virtually no government in Paris....The army [in Algeria] was in revolt...(and) 'dangerous' officers commanded French units in Germany and France....[President de Gaulle's supporters] concluded that the rebels were preparing to advance on Paris...(and) they accused the heads of the security services of being traitors....Old rusting Sherman tanks protected government buildings—they had no ammunition....A plane was ordered to be ready to bring de Gaulle to London if the rebels attacked....The minister of defense ordered arms to be distributed to civilian 'volunteers'….One member of de Gaulle's cabinet thought the only solution was to bomb Algeria.”

In 1961, the French army's revolt was viewed as an internal matter for France. A similar event today would be very different, but the French case foreshadowed many of the issues that would arise should upheaval grip a modern-day nuclear state.

Every situation is unique, highly dependent on personal relationships beyond the ken of outside observers. There is great uncertainty about individual loyalties, which, in such circumstances, are fluid. A nuclear weapon may be of little use as a military weapon, but could have tremendous psychological value. The ability of outside actors to understand developments, let alone influence them, is likely to be very limited.

With an army divided, any type of foreign intervention would be complex and fraught with extraordinary risk—success would be a long shot. But the loss of a nuclear weapon or fissile material would change the world.

Brian Michael Jenkins is senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation and author of the new eBook, When Armies Divide: The Security of Nuclear Arsenals during Revolts, Coups, and Civil Wars.

This commentary appeared on RAND.org and Global Security.org on April 12, 2013.

[ramana]

Spinster emailed me that Fredrick Forsythe wrote Day of the Jackal, a plot to kill DeGaulle from their concerns of lpdkng Algeria.

[ramana]

Deconstructing the Pak bomb - The Hindu

Cant seem to open the article

[svinayak]

Check who is in RAND now
http://www.rand.org/about/people/d/dossani_rafiq.html

[Prem Kumar]

Pakistan without nukes

While it is true, its a futile call for help to an unwilling entity. U.S stands to gain nothing from de-nuclearizing Pakistan unless a rogue dirty bomb goes off anywhere in the West. If anything, the U.S has been doing its best to achieve the "Claymore effect" - i.e "this side faces the enemy" - vis-a-vis Al-Qaeda & Pakistan. It is making a sustained effort to infiltrate/control/intimidate radical Islam so that the latter's actions stay away from the West and towards India, Africa etc. Time will tell if this strategy will succeed.

India had the opportunity & the means to de-nuclearize Pakistan. Yes - it would have meant probably a large scale sustained investment to keep it de-nuclearized. But we should have had the cojones to do it. It was at least worth a try. No point in crying to Unkil.

[SBajwa]

Acharya

Who is Rafiq Dossani? a closet paki or a deshbhagat?

[sivab]

http://www.eurasiareview.com/02122013-i ... -analysis/

India-Pakistan And Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Step Closer To The Abyss – Analysis

By Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

The Futility of TNWs

In March 2013 a workshop was conducted under the aegis of the Naval Post Graduate School Monterey. It sought to examine the escalation dynamics in a South Asian crisis under a nuclear overhang. A scrutiny of the scenario suggested that a vertical escalatory spiral was central to the paradigm and therefore intrinsic to its anatomy was an inexorable traction to extremes. First blood had been drawn by a Pakistan State sponsored terror attack, it targeted leadership at a very large public gathering leading to extensive casualties; in most strategic lexicons this is an act of war. The demands of the Indian side, unfortunately, were given short shrift. Had some movement been made towards apprehending and handing over the terrorists, the situation could have been defused.

Accordingly, a swift punitive military thrust was launched by Indian forces across the LOC and a Maritime Exclusion Zone was decreed. Forces primarily used were the less intrusive Air and Sea arms. This in turn escalated to action that was not restricted to the LOC. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) into the battle area attained inevitability. To Indian Leadership the question posed was how would offensive Indian forces respond? In the event a deliberate decision was made to search out and strike the nuclear tipped Nasr batteries as with other tactical artillery pieces without discrimination; and should a nuclear Nasr launch occur on Indian Forces it would be regarded as a First Strike and India would reserve the right to launch massive retaliatory strikes to the dictates of her Nuclear Doctrine. The adversary balked from deploying TNWs.

What is it All About? The Essence of Stability

Marshall Ferdinand Foch, one of the lesser of the meat grinding generals of the First World War when faced with the bewildering nature of the larger strategic situation is said to have countered with a fundamental question, De quoi s’agit-il? – What is it all about? Indeed this poser if understood and answered in the context of nuclear stability would bring us to the complexities that face nations with the coming of a weapon that can obliterate the very purpose of warfare; in the circumstance the separation of the conventional from the nuclear is a logical severance. A major divergence from the Two-Bloc-Nuclear-Face-Off of the past is nuclear multilateralism. In this altered plurality the true enemy is the dynamic that rocks the equilibrium.

The essence of stability is to find agreement on three foundational truths. Firstly, technology, while it provides for modernization it invites covertness whereas its impact demands transparency. Secondly, that the army in Pakistan is the real power centre, and therefore for India to engage an enfeebled civilian leadership is self defeating. Thirdly, TNWs make for a dangerously unconvincing deterrent correlation.

Why would a nation turn its back on the prudence of the past six decades and deliberately reduce the nuclear threshold through the introduction of TNWs and in a situation of mortal internal collapse, invite the increasing probability of the breakdown of nuclear deterrence? After all it was the Pak foreign Minister Mr. Aga Shahi in dialogue with the American Secretary of State in 1979 who suggested that the “value of nuclear weapons lies in its possession and not in its use”. TNWs are marked by several features that prop up the illusion of control and the misguided belief that the adversary would, for some reason, abjure the opportunity to escalate response. Its deployment will attract pre emptive suppressive action and doctrine for employment follows conventional field axioms with the risk of accidental, unauthorized or mistaken use. It therefore promotes only one cause and that is the Pakistani military establishment’s hold on that hapless state. Recognizing the politics of the South Asian region and the emasculated nature of civilian leadership in Pakistan; the dangers of adding nuclear violence to military perfidy, as recent proliferatory history and Jihadist terror acts have shown, is more than just a reality.
The NATO Paradigm

Pakistan in defense of TNWs often cites the NATO analogy . However, by the 1980s NATO was doctrinally imbued with the idea of the irrelevance of nuclear weapons against less than existential threats. With this conviction, both Britain and France perceived the use of nuclear weapons (of any yield) as a failure of deterrence and therefore not a realistic alternative to conventional forces. Employment of TNWs through the doctrine of ‘flexible response’ did not provide the lever to control the escalatory ladder. The strategy, even in concept lacked conviction for limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms.

The Burden of God’s Gift

The South Asian nuclear imbroglio is evolving under circumstances that are unique. A shared antagonistic history; geographic contiguity; a political and structural contradiction between a centralized de facto military leadership and a democratic dispensation; a yawning economic gap; and, awkwardly a self ordained military that (mis)perceives in antagonism an existential peril and a reason for self perpetuation. India also views the complicity of China in the Pakistan nuclear weapons programme as suggestive of doctrinal links that permit a ‘Janus’ faced approach to the latter’s no first use posture.

Pakistan contends that the articulation of a nuclear doctrine is unnecessary for the purpose of establishing deterrence. Unfortunately, a nation that announced its nuclear weapon status and views it as “God’s gift” must also realize that a deterrent relationship is essentially about mutual knowledge of purpose. Ambiguities, deception and carousing with non state actors can only serve to obfuscate.

The Challenge: Contending with Pakistan’s Perspective

The impending introduction of a sea-based deterrent into the Indian arsenal, rather than being seen as an element of stability that will enhance credibility of the second strike, is perceived through a curious logic as an asymmetric trend that somehow adversely impacts crisis stability. Given the opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear underpinnings, descent to TNWs and duplicity of policies, it has become increasingly prickly for India to either understand nuclear thinking in Islamabad or to find coherence between a mania for parity, the rush for stockpiling fissile material and the loosening of controls over nuclear weapons.

More puzzling is the strategic notion that the perceived conventional imbalance between the two countries may be countered by Pakistan exercising one of two options: firstly, secure an assured second-strike capability; secondly, place the arsenal on ‘hair trigger alert’ and then the argument goes, introduce TNWs as “another layer of deterrence” designed to apply brakes on India’s military doctrine of Cold Start (ala NATO’s discredited formulation). As Feroz Khan posits, “Pakistan’s flight-testing of the short-range, nuclear-capable rocket system Hatf-9 (Nasr), was introduced to add ‘deterrence value’ to Pakistan’s force posture.” The author in a bizarre contradictory temper adds “due to the proximity of targets, short flight times and the technical challenges of assuring information accuracy, the likelihood of inadvertence is high.” He further holds that “…central command and control will become untenable and the ‘Nasr’ with its marked footprint will attract punishing pre-emptive conventional attack. Thus, battlefield nuclear weapons such as Hatf-9 will pose a ‘use it or lose it’ choice, precipitating a nuclear exchange that may not be intended.” The unbiased political examiner is left bewildered that if such be the imbalances in the power matrix, then why does Pakistan not seek rapprochement as a priority of their military, economic and political policies? The answer perhaps lies in asking, “Who stands to gain in this power play?”

Conclusion: the Quest for a Response

Pakistan espouses an opaque deterrent under military control steered by a doctrine obscure in form, seeped in ambiguity and guided by a military strategy that finds unity with non-state actors. The introduction of TNWs exacerbates credibility of control. It does not take a great deal of intellectual exertions to declare whose case lowering of the nuclear threshold promotes. Two options present themselves to the Indian planner; firstly to generate specialised forces that continuously track and mark TNWs and incorporates an airborne conventional capability to neutralise them. The second option is a soft one that aims at dispelling the veil of opacity that surrounds the nuclear deterrent. What may have impact is a combination of the two.

Nietzsche astutely warned that “And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee”. Thus far nuclear relations in the region have been bedeviled by a persistent effort to combat the monsters that the shroud of covertness has cast; it has left us the unenviable task of out staring an abyss. Nietzsche in the circumstance would have advised an assault on the first causes – dispel opacity and engage the military through dialogue and from a position of total preparedness.

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar
Former Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Forces Command of India & Distinguished Fellow, IPCS

[kumarn]

India and Pakistan seem to differ in the vary nature of deterence they expect from their nuclear capability. While India expects deterence against nuclear war, the pakis expect their nuclear capability to bestow them deterence against an Indian conventional attack. Therefore, both shall never be able to stablize their deterrence. So, the options are:
1. India reduce the threat of its conventional forces - basically, play dead.
2. Threaten complete annhilation even if they move a nuclear muscle.

I suspect india is doing both 1 and 2. But either is not viable beyond a certain point. 1 is comes under pressure because of constant provocation from the pakistani side. 2 is the declared policy but past track record of india does not inspire confidence.

Life is difficult! Hence some pretend to be ostriches - pakistani nuclear capability is a bluff! Some hope that the west will intervene in case of a standoff - basically not let them use. Some, hope that the continued descent of pakistan into chaos would force its benefactors to divest it off its capability! But, none of the above seems to be happening.

Is there a third option for India?

[svinayak]

Acharya

Who is Rafiq Dossani? a closet paki or a deshbhagat?

It is the grey area. But has lot of info about NRIs and how things work among Indian elite.

[ramana]

TSP and its backers wont believe that India will play dead until its dead.
So far the threat of massive retaliation has been the only one that they complained about as they founnd it credible in their world view or weltanschang as Kaushal used to remind us..

[Rishirishi]

x-posted...


So my question to anyone who is wiling to tale it on is "When India is already under risk of being hit by Pakistanis nukes and has been threatened several times, what is the basis for the conclusion that the same nukes are somehow going to become more dangerous to India just because the Taliban take over Pakistan? Is there a hidden assumption here (not necessarily by you Rajaram-avarhal) that the Pakistan army are somehow more gentle and more rational towards India and that the Taliban control of those nukes somehow raises the risks for India.

Let me try.

The conventional wisdom on BRF is, nukes in the hands of Pakistan Army are as dangerous to India (if not more) than nukes in the hands of the Taliban. Meanwhile, nukes in the hands of the Taliban are more dangerous to other countries besides India... so it is a situation not any worse, or potentially preferable, to nukes in the hands of the Pakistan Army.

Strictly speaking, this is true, IF you consider only the two extremes, ie.
1) Nukes in the hands of TSPA
2) Nukes in the hands of the Taliban.

But I think there is a middle ground which does potentially pose a greater threat to India than the current situation, if the Taliban ends up in control of Afghanistan. We can comfort ourselves with thoughts that in the long run NW Pakistan will be devoured by Pakthun nationalism, etc. But for a significant window of time, the danger to India remains real, and vastly increases over and above the present situation.

Let me attempt to illustrate with a possible scenario.

1) Approximately July 2013, most American troops have been withdrawn from AfPak. A Pakistan-brokered, Washington-blessed "coalition" government is in Kabul, with various Taliban leaders exercising real power and Karzai (if at all present) relegated to a figurehead status. The Tajiks and other Northern Groups have begun a desperate war of secession in the North of Afghanistan, but this is irrelevant to our scenario. Meanwhile the TTP and other groups are using the period to rebuild their capabilities and relative peace reigns in FATA for the time being.

2) Up to this point, let us assume GOI's policy towards Pakistan has remained the same, and Pakistan's attitude to the GOI has remained the same, as it is today for the most part. Pakistan keeps insisting that India discuss Kashmir and Water. India keeps agreeing to talks, but insists that the terrorism issue must be resolved first. Meanwhile Hafeez Sayeed and others on India's wanted list are roaming around free and conducting their activities. For the purpose of this scenario I am not going to assume that things get any better or worse, compared to 2010, for India up to July 2013.

3) September 2013, the ISPR makes a media statement that shakes the world. Five of Pakistan's crown jewels have gone missing. It is hinted that agents of the Taliban may be responsible. The world media goes into a frenzy of fear.

(NOTE that Pakistan could not do this today, or at any time when the American military is in AfPak in strength. If they made such a statement today, within hours the 82nd Airborne would take possession of *all* known nuclear installations in Pakistan, and US Special Forces would be kicking ass and taking names from Chitral to Gwadar, on a concerted one-point mission to get to the bottom of the missing nukes.

When American forces are no longer present on Pakistan's borders and off Pakistan's coast in large numbers, the ISI will have a lot more wiggle room to get away with such tricks. It takes great effort to overcome operational inertia, and considerable time to redeploy US armed forces for a de-novo invasion of Pakistan.)

4) Islamabad comes under severe pressure of all kinds to find and retrieve the nukes. They ask for aid, demanding items useful to a nuke search (F-22s, warships, AMRAAMs, M1A1s, magnifying glasses and money.) Washington may acquiesce or refuse...but in the short term, at least, the West has no option but to watch what happens while putting homeland security and intelligence assets on round-the-clock alert.

5) The world media watches with bated breath. Two weeks later, tears of relief are cried on the airwaves... the ISI, America's Ally, has found one of the missing nukes through its operatives in FATA! Praise and aid are heaped upon Pakistan as a saviour of the world.

6) Two weeks after this, more news reports emerge that two more of the missing nukes have been retrieved by the ISI! Pakistan is praised to the skies. No country has ever been such a reliable ally of the West, such a tenacious sentinel against "Al Qaeda" terrorism.

7) One week later, a JDAM goes off in an Indian city... Mumbai, perhaps, or Bengalooru. With devastating consequences for the Indian economy. The Pakistanis express heartfelt sympathy to India while denying that the blast indicated a bomb of Pakistani design. They also caution India against taking "ill-advised steps" and put their nuclear delivery systems on high alert.

8 ) The same or next day, Ilyas Kashmiri issues a statement from somewhere he declares is "Taliban-protected territory." He says 313 Brigade has possession of not one more, but in fact fifty more nuclear weapons. They will be detonated in Indian cities one by one until India gives up Kashmir.

9) Following this, Taliban ministers in Kabul deny any connection to Ilyas Kashmiri or the JDAM.

Question: What are the GOI's options at this point?

A) Nuke Pakistan in retaliation, and escalate to an all-out nuclear war in which far more than Mumbai or Bengalooru are destroyed?

B ) Take Ilyas Kashmiri at his word that 313 brigade carried out the attack with Taliban aid/protection, and nuke Kabul or elsewhere in Afghanistan?

C) Take military action against Pakistan below the nuclear threshold, while the West screams at us to cease and desist because Pakistan is their heroic ally and their best hope of securing any missing nukes? Any military action could easily be escalated by Pakistan to nuclear conflict, so this runs the same risks as "A".

D) Give up Kashmir? You know there will be lots of pressure from various quarters within and outside India to do this, or at least talk about it with Pakistan.

E) Nuke all of Pakistan and all of Afghanistan and lose more of our cities to Pakistani nukes in turn?

F) Not retaliate, and live with the loss of Mumbai and potential loss of other cities, while we wait for Pakhtun nationalism to eventually consume NW Pakistan?

G) Other?

Does this explain how the combination of US withdrawal from AfPak, and elevation of Taliban to governance in Afghanistan, makes the situation MORE dangerous for India than it is today? Essentially it affords Pakistan an additional degree of plausible deniability. That's what we saw during the IC814 hijacking.

Today, Pakistan doesn't NEED such a second degree of plausible deniability to carry on with its current level of terrorism against India. They simply use the first degree of plausible deniability and claim "we are also a victim of terrorism" even after Delhi, Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Hyderabad, Mumbai and all the other atrocities they have perpetrated over the past decade. Our GOI, by talking to Pakistan regardless of this...converts Pakistan's plausible deniability into credible deniability. But I won't go further into that subject in this post.

However, even though they have got away scot-free with perpetrating Mumbai, even the Pakis may not have the b@lls to carry out something like a JDAM attack with the level of first-degree plausible deniability they currently enjoy. Besides, with the US breathing down their necks at present, it would be an impossibly difficult thing to pull off.

Withdrawal of the US from AfPak gives the Pakis a new level of operational freedom, and the return of the Taliban to Kabul gives the Pakis a second degree of deniability which they could potentially use to engage in real nuclear terrorism against India.

Please feel free to criticize the scenario if you find holes in it.[/quote]


Good writing, but I would like to add a few things.

1
TSP will have to consider the possibility of an nuke going up in Islamabad, with Indians blaming it on the Jehadi elements. India and TSP has a history in Tit for Tat.....

2
TSP will scare the Shi.... out of the global community (even the muslim world). Not that it would stop them.

3
India could decide to go for an all out strike (if it has one). The reason would be, that It is TSP bombs, its their fault that they are loose, and India is in no mood to risk another bombing.

4
We have to consider the possibility that there are already present hidden nuclear devices in India and TSP.

The congress party is in a desperate situation. The elections in Delhi and other states suggests that they may be eliminated in the coming election. An external threat could be used to take away the attention from the AAP.

[Prem]

How come no Chotta Motta nuke not given to Uighurs yearning for freedom from Chinese oprerssion.

[kumarn]

As if on cue:Indian Mujahideen wanted to nuke Surat, Yasin Bhatkal tells cops

Bhatkal told the interrogators that he had asked his Pakistan-based boss, Riyaz Bhatkal, over phone whether the latter could arrange a small "nuclear bomb". According to him, Riyaz responded, "Anything can be arranged in Pakistan".

[member_28336]

As if on cue:Indian Mujahideen wanted to nuke Surat, Yasin Bhatkal tells cops

Bhatkal told the interrogators that he had asked his Pakistan-based boss, Riyaz Bhatkal, over phone whether the latter could arrange a small "nuclear bomb". According to him, Riyaz responded, "Anything can be arranged in Pakistan".

Most hardened terrorists and spies are taught how to spread mis-information and send investigators on a spin once they are caught. Hmmm...

[ramana]

https://bharatkarnad.com/2017/01/25/aba ... -promises/



Recall that during Op Brasstacks in 1987 when Pakistan army feared its inability to contain an Indian armoured rush headed by Lt Gen Hanut Singh’s II Corps, and General Khalid Arif, VCOAS but de facto COAS on the other side, had taken the calculated risk of concentrating his main force plus army reserves –North and South, at the chicken-neck to cutoff Kashmir from the rest of India if India proceeded to bisect Pakistan at the Indus, the canny Zia ul-Haq arranged for Kuldip Nayyar to “interview” AQ Khan, ex-Bhopal, and so-called “father of the Pakistani Atom Bomb” (though all the fathering and mothering was done by the Chinese nuclear scientists who had transferred the design and start-up materials — fissionable uranium, etc) and Dr Mubarakmand of the Pak Atomic Energy Commission, AQ Khan, and company were merely involved in screwing it all together). Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons only in 1990, but AQ Khan’s exaggerated hints of Paki nukes at the ready and all that nonsense, hit its mark. Rajiv Gandhi and his government lost their nerve and called off the breakaway Op Trident, as his mother had done in early 1982, when she had bailed out virtually at the last possible minute on the early-1982 strike on Kahuta planned jointly with Israel, and again early in 1984 when she stayed the IAF from carrying out its mission to take out Kahuta [planned incidentally by the late Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, then Director, Operations (Offensive) at the Air Hqrs]. [The joint Indo-IsraeIi plan had, as I have mentioned in my books and writings, been communicated to me by Major General, Aahron Yaariv, Moshe Dayan’s legendary MI Chief during the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and I had written about it in the autumn of 1987.]

Rest not relevant to this thread......

[Gagan]

One wonders what would have happened if the IAF had levelled Kahuta in 1984.
The Pakistanis simply HAD to take out Indira Gandhi after this...

[ramana]

And they did.

[Gagan]

Someone's deterrence just went up in smoke!

Sandeep ‏@SandeepUnnithan 10h10 hours ago

'Yield of Pak N tests couple of KTs...their (tactical N) doctrine born out of necessity?' Dr Anil Kakodkar @FINSHQ

Pakis have been trying to make virtue out of failure.
All they have are fizzles. They call them "tactical warheads"

[ramana]

Its quite some time since this thread saw inputs.
This is my thinking.
Operation Parakram saw the Chinese take away the TSP strategic nukes that were in TSPA hands.
Low yield nukes were still retained by TSP.
For sake of plausible deniability, TSP still retained the KSA share of strategic nukes.
KSA was using the TSP as strategic front-yard for their nukes in the many storage magazines bunkers built to withstand near miss attacks.

In the aftermath of #Pulwama attack on 14 Feb 2019, GOI retaliated against Muzzafarabad, Chakothi, (both POK) and Balakot (KP or proper Pakistan) with air strikes by 12 Mirage 2000 planes.
The strike on Balakot was significant as it used Israeli made SPICE 2000 precision weapons. One of which was a penetrator to hit the armory/magazine building at the site.
After this strike TSP closed their airspace to air traffic. There were three Boeing 777 cargo configuration originating from KSA that traveled to Pakistan and returned to KSA. The conjecture is KSA took back their nukes as Balakot strike showed they were not safe to store. India could attack the storage sites while hitting "non-military" targets.
We know where the planes went in KSA but that is not relevant now.

So in all likelihood the TSP has only a few low yield nukes*.
A remarkable thing is there are no nuclear flashpoint threats from TSP during current crisis.
Only people shouting hoarse are the DC NPA minions still peddling this nooklear flashpoint bokwas.

* I have some thoughts on these also and will post once above sinks in.

[ArjunPandit]

that probably explains that why even paki chaprasis are not issuing threats and pretending to be the mature ones. Nuke nude got a new meaning on BRF today

[ramana]

This was the nuke threat India faced since 1986 when Zia Ul Haq revealed Nuke capability acquired form China to Kuldeep Nayar.
Rajiv Gandhi panicked and called off Brasstacks.

X-Post...

A modest proposal from the Brigadier:

https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/i ... desman.htm

"We should fire at them and take out a few of their cities—Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta," he said. "They should fire back and take Karachi and Lahore. Kill off a hundred or two hundred million people......."

[Rudradev]

Consider the following scenario.

Paki nukes were never, ever under the control of Pakis alone.

They were always double- or triple- or quadruple-locked. The other keys required to deploy/activate were always in the hands of US, China, and/or KSA.

In 1987 the existence of so-called Paki nukes was telegraphed to us by A Q Khan in an interview with paid media mouthpiece Kuldip Nayyar. This was done with US approval. The reason was that we were engaged in Brasstacks at this time and the US did not want us to attack Pakistan for fear that it would disrupt the role of Pakistan in the anti-Soviet Afghan war effort. So the US allowed the nukes to become public in an effort to suppress what they saw as India's designs.

From this point onwards India knew that the Paki nukes have multiple locks/keys in different hands. The impression was strengthened by the Lop Nur proxy tests of Paki nukes by China a few years later.

In the early '90s, the US saw an opportunity (with Cold War ended) to rip Kashmir away from India, by allowing a Paki terrorist campaign to flourish in J&K under the nuclear blackmail umbrella. Robin Raphel set up the Hurriyat for exactly this purpose (giving political cover to the endeavour). She also got India sanctioned under the MTCR and ensured that we did not receive cryogenic engine tech from the (then weakened) Russians.

Throughout the '90s the Clinton administration wanted to ensure that India never weaponized her nukes, and that Kashmir could if possible be separated from India. Pakistan was key to the second part of this project. Hence the fiction that Pakistan had independent control of an undeclared nuclear arsenal was allowed to persist. However, that only increased the urgency in India to weaponize and test again... which we did in 1998.

1998 was a moment of truth for the Americans. They were already seeing signs of Pakistan becoming a jihadi hub with potential to threaten Western interests. When India tested, they had to prioritize one or the other of their imperatives:

1) Either go all out to denuke India after the tests, via sanctions and international opprobrium... but this would mean ensuring that Pakistan didn't test weapons, and thereby lost credibility for its nuclear-terrorist blackmail, in the process jeopardizing the attempt to snatch Kashmir.

2) Or, let Pakistan test nuclear weapons, maintaining the illusion that Pakistan had independent control over its weapons and could continue nuclear-terrorist blackmail on Kashmir. But this would mean that the case for CRE on India would be greatly weakened and admitting the possibility that India would ultimately be accepted as a de-facto nuclear power.

Between the "de-nuke India" people and the "separate Kashmir from India" people in the Clinton administration, the latter won. Pakistan was allowed to test its weapons (though both India and Pakistan were slammed with sanctions thereafter to appease the "de-nuke" crowd).

The next moment of truth came during Kargil. The TSPA thought they could pull a fait-accompli to change the LOC, knocking over the first domino that would eventually collapse Indian sovereignty over J&K. India drove them back WITHOUT crossing LOC; Pakistan cried to US for help, didn't get it, and then tried to raise the nuclear flashpoint bogey to salvage something out of the exercise.

Note: in 1998, post-Pokhran/Chagai, the "separate Kashmir from India" people in the Clinton administration had been favoured over the "de-nuke India" people. Pakistan probably thought this meant that an adventure like Kargil would get full US support. However, post-Kargil, the equation was turned on its head. The "de-nuke India" people were once again on the ascendant (re: "nuclear flashpoint" etc.) and the "separate Kashmir from India" people had been dealt a blow by India's resolute response to the intrusions.

Importantly, in addition, the VERY FACT that Kargil ended without any sign of nuclear weapons deployment by Pakistan demonstrated something very clearly to Indian strategic planners. We were right all along. Without US/China/KSA support, the Pakis did NOT have autonomous control over their nukes.

9/11/2001 changed everything yet again. The US needed Pakistan's logistical support for its war in Afghanistan. To justify supporting Pakistan financially and militarily again, the Bush administration started to make the "strong, stable Pakistan is in everyone's interest" argument to India. This was based on the (false) notion that Pakistan's nukes were under its own control, and if the Pakistan govt. collapsed, those nukes could find their way into jihadi hands. Of course this could never happen as the so-called Pakistani nukes were really under US/PRC/KSA control all along.

India knew this... which is why we felt comfortable raising the stakes during Parakram. We KNEW that no matter what happens, the spectre of "all-consuming nuclear war on Indian subcontinent" was just a paper tiger. That is why we mobilized for aar-paar-ki-ladai after the Parliament attack. It was time to call the bluff, NOT ONLY of Pakistan's nuclear-terrorism blackmail, BUT of the US, China, and KSA which had colluded in that blackmail and were the real keepers of Paki nukes.

The US, still needing Pakistan's logistical support in Afghanistan, had NO choice but to do two things:

1) It prevailed on Musharraf to make his 2003 speech promising not to allow Paki territory to be used for terrorism against India. The pledge was at least partially honoured and despite many grave incidents, overall terrorism from Pakistan generally declined after 2004 (See https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countrie ... ph2016.htm ) The post-Parakram decrease in terrorist activity gave India a window to complete LOC/IB fencing, thus ensuring that any renewed attempts by Pakistan to infiltrate terrorists would be much more difficult.

2) The US came clean to India that yes, so-called "Paki" nukes are actually US/PRC/KSA controlled and cannot be autonomously deployed. This was a death-blow to the "denuke India" nonproliferationists in DC. It was also accompanied by an olive branch in the form of the Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (2005), support for India's entry into Wasenaar/NSG, etc. In return India agreed to keep quiet re: what we knew about the US, Chinese, and KSA role in Pakistan's so-called nuclear program from 1987 onwards.

The situation for the last 10-15 years, then, is as follows.

> US knows that India knows that so-called "Paki" nukes, at least strategic nukes, cannot be autonomously deployed by Pakistan. The Pakis know it too... that India does not fear devastation of its cities by multiple-KT bombs because India knows Pakistan cannot use them.
> PRC has tried to launch more FUD on this front by helping Pakistan build plutonium reactors (Khushab and elsewhere). This has given Pakis a small window of credibility to say that post-2005, it has accumulated some amount of fissile material which it has then been incorporating into multiple "low-yield, short-range" devices. THIS is the maximum extent of plausible deterrence by Pakistan against India today.
> As Abhijit Iyer-Mitra and others have indicated, the IA has gamed many scenarios in which a Cold-Start-type retaliation against Paki terrorism would NOT be deterred by the existence of Paki tactical nukes. Hugging the cities, etc.
> Most recently we have demonstrated the will to use both ground and airstrikes to punish Pakistan for its sponsorship of terrorism against India. The panicked reaction to Balakot: a failed, pusillanimous retaliatory airstrike by PAF, and the total folding of Imran Khan after loss of an F-16 (giving back Abhinandan, arresting 44 Tanzeem leaders) have to be seen in this light.

The situation now is that PAKISTAN knows that India knows that it has no meaningful nuclear deterrent. The US has known it since they came clean with us around 2005. The only people who want to pretend as if everything was just the way it was in 1998 are the ageing, toothless Non-Proliferation idiots like Krepon and Perkovitch (who still continue to mumble about "most dangerous nuclear flashpoint" whenever a phataka goes off in Srinagar).

[ramana]

You give too much credit to US. They were colluding with TSP all along till Orange saw the game.

As part of deescalation after Parakram, Paki share of Chinese strategic nukes were taken back.
US was quite comfortable with it as they knew the KSA quota as still there.
Now not there after Balakot. This exposed the ownership of nukes.
KSA was playing coy. Their nukes were in TSP. They had Chinese IRBMS now second generation of such missiles.

and blame Iran all along!!!

Anyway now the KSA duplicty is exposed and will have its consequences.
Same time the nukes are in triple custody and Iran would now its not just KSA getting them from TSP storage.
Might reduce tensions in West Asia.
-----
Time for me to say whats on my mind about the low yield PU based nukes.
The first P-5 to talk about need for sub-strategic nukes, after end of Cold War and fall of Soviet Union was UK, right after Desert Storm.
And looks like they implemented it before NPT was renewed in perpetuity.
CTBT came along and to force India was signed by the P-5.
China realised they need a similar low yield sub-strategic weapon and had it tested at Chagai.
The first round of Badmash tests were done and there is no need for more of the same especially after he said "Hisab chuka sake!"
Then why the Chagai test of Pu weapon when there was no Pu in TSP?
So Chinese need to proof it. Thats what was going on.
Now think if its Chinese design, you think TSP can suddenly assemble these low yield weapons in the large numbers that NPA mules want us to believe?

I think even these are Chinese weapons and under their tutelage.

So would say if TSP uses any such weapons then ma kasam Chinese should get it.
------

[Mort Walker]

There are a couple of things here:

1. Do we know how much Pu239 has and is being produced by TSP? I would speculate very little.
2. TSP has not demonstrated the ability to launch their own satellites, the accuracy of their missiles is very much in doubt despite PLA assistance. If they can put a satellite in orbit by themselves or with PLA assistance, then and only then will there be anything to worry about.
3. Given 2, launching a full fledged offensive to de-nuke and make TSP completely nuke nood is justified before TSP has such capabilities.

[krishna_krishna]

Then why the Chagai test of Pu weapon when there was no Pu in TSP?
So Chinese need to proof it. Thats what was going on.

------

This is true statement, in fact Musharafff has been on record to state that they went Pu route with Chagai test (and not Ur.).

[arun]

India ‘Exposed’ Pakistan’s ‘Nuclear Bluff’ by Carrying Out Air Strikes on JeM Terror Camps at Balakot: Arun Jaitley :

India.Com

[arun]

X Posted with a hat tip to Karan M.

Sushant Sareen opines that PM Modi has trumped the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s “madman with nukes” strategy:

Balakot air strikes: the end of the madman theory

SUSHANT SAREEN

If Pakistan thinks they can scare Modi by playing mad, the Balakot air strikes show that he can scare them even more. Pakistan's madman theory has been turned on its head.

For nearly thirty years now, Pakistan has been playing the madman with nukes. The strategic deterrence posture of Pakistan has been based on first-use of nuclear weapons against any conventional attack on Pakistan, especially from India. Innumerable times over these three decades, Pakistani generals and politicians have, at the drop of a hat, threatened the use of nuclear weapons against India.

Having convinced the world that they consider nuclear weapons as weapons of war not weapons of deterrence, Pakistan had successfully deterred India from using its conventional superiority to punish Pakistan for its relentless and remorseless export of terrorism.

Rationality is, however, a subjective thing, and irrationality is a game two can play. While it was perfectly rational for Pakistanis to play irrational, it was quite irrational for India to play rationally in the face of Pakistan's act of irrationality. Many analysts and strategists had been advocating the need to call Pakistan's bluff, but until the airstrikes on the Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist camp in Balakot, Indian leaders preferred to play according to the Pakistani playbook. Balakot has, however, changed the playbook, not just India’s, but also perhaps Pakistan’s. ……………….

From Observer Research Foundation:

Balakot air strikes: the end of the madman theory