Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

[nachiket]

I will say, IAF is being criminal in not inducting Tejas MK1 (post FOC) and not wait for MK2, which will come, when it comes, going by history, it will be not before 5-6 years it gets FOC.

Mk1 has NOT obtained FOC. It hasn't even obtained IOC-2 yet. Besides, the IAF has already ordered 20 Mk1s. HAL has yet to start serial production because the development isn't complete yet. Several tests are yet to be done. Otherwise the SP-1 and 2 should have been flying by now.

[Karan M]

A big plus the IAF can do is set up its own equivalents of the Naval orgs like WEESE, Naval designers etc. These folks can then be embedded in R&D programs, provide proper/timely inputs, program manage and also solve the ownership issue (whose program is this anyhow) that dogs some of these programs. With full service involvement, the insecurity exhibited by some of these industry program owners will also reduce - they don't have to worry that replacing under development y gizmo or x widget with an OTS alternative will be looked down on by the service, can take more risk and most importantly, know the service is fully onboard to fund/see the program through to induction. That's arguably the biggest contribution of the IN to Indian shipbuilding. Replicating that at HAL shopfloor or even ADA design centers will be a huge plus. Services will also have to give a certain amount of freedom to these folks and offer them a viable career path, rather than have them jump back into staff/combat commands losing the hard won developmental experience. Merely taking folks from the service and putting them as program heads has not worked - they need mentors and organizational support within AHQ. Same as the IN is now building its own ships, the IAF can do likewise for combat platforms.

[NRao]

Merely taking folks from the service and putting them as program heads has not worked - they need mentors and organizational support within AHQ.

Someone from NAL once said, IAF needs people who fly planes (and associated things), while people who lead the likes of NAL need people with an aerunautical background (implying such labs should not be led by AF people with only flying experience).

[Karan M]

True, but several of the successful missile programs had ex-services folks as program heads. They bring that critical user perspective which allows for right decision making early on in the project, plus the service looks at them and says our guys. Now the thing is that these rtd guys who transfer to R&D/DPSU will not always be treated properly or given same amount of credibility. So its important that they have institutional backing. A program manager need not be an expert in the domains, he can have functional leads handle those areas where SME is required.

[Victor]

Is it that simple ? Will an airborne COIN force with the potential of causing casualties in a civilian populace with lower level of training than the regular IAF actually work?

Air power is emblematically escalatory.

agupta, you obviously mean well but escaltory or not the supreme power within India's borders must be forcefully demonstrated to be the Indian Government's and that it has a very short fuse when India's laws are broken. If insurgents choose to bring in heavy machine guns or manpads, we should pulverize them with laser guided bombs.

These are critical times against remorselessly determined enemies who want nothing less than to finish us off and there is absolutely no room for sending out dharmically considerate non-violent messages. Dithering and pussyfooting will only make things worse if we don't act decisively. It is this kind of indecisiveness that has allowed thousands of soldiers and civilians to be slaughtered on a regular basis with impunity and for the democratic process to be subverted by use of plain thuggery. Imagine what can happen in wartime. If this is your idea of what India's 'sensitivity" should be, with due respects it stinks.

On the borders, the insurgents are pakistanis for all practical purposes and an extension of the paki army and ISI. They come in to kill us and they should be mercilessly cut down without a second thought and with minimal cost to us in lives and material. Right now, we put our jawans on the line and many pay with their lives. Why should this be when we can wipe them out remotely? How difficult is it to completely depopulate the border for 5 km and make it a no-go killing zone in which even a rat cannot survive?

Inside our maoist infested forests, what type of 'civilians' will be moving in groups armed with guns that our IR/NV capabilities can show? Should we ask them politely what they are doing or blow them up without a thought? What is the message we want to send? A simple warning should be sent out "surrender with your weapons or be killed". Nothing else should be required.

The use of modern surveillance, targeting tech and weaponry is far more likely to avoid civilian casualties even in densely populated areas. The point being, insurgents should learn that there is no place to hide. And if civilians choose to keep company with them, there is a price to pay.

I am not suggesting that we let loose a rag tag bunch of half-trained numbskulls to indiscriminately bomb and strafe populated areas. Any air wing of the RR or BSF will obviously be staffed by trained pilots, likely on deputation from the IAF or army like RR folks are from the army. I didn't suggest RR because it has "rifles" in its title, nor BSF because a force like this will not be operating only in border areas. Nomenclature is irrelevant but a powerful airborne police force with a clear eyed and ruthless mandate is absolutely necessary.

[Philip]

JS in his last piece mentioned the 3 flaws that the MIG-21 had,posted earlier.The LCA design was meant to correct these flaws.I think with the Bison,we've upgraded the MIG-21 as much as was realistically possible.The IAF has been patiently waiting for MK-1 to arrive,the CoAS said he is happy with the progress now,but it will take,as others have said at least 2 years before the aircraft becomes truly operational.What has to happen is to augment the very low production rate of HAL,just 8 per year for the first few years.The LCA is also now at the crossroads,a heavily redesigned MK-2 will at our rate of development take a min. of 3-4 years to perfect,which means that series production of this avatar will start only late in the decade,by 2018-2020.That will give us just the 40 odd MK-1s of the first lot.The suggestion by some analysts/experts to do a detailed review before embarking upon MK-2 and instead/in the interim, improve the Mk-1,an easier,faster task,is the other option.Apart from accelerating the development issues,establishing the infrastructure for the production line is absolutely essential.It was not too long ago that one analyst said that HAL had just realised that setting up a production line "was a technology in itself".The tales are aplenty of poor quality of MIGs built by HAL.
As for FBW,why we did nothing to improve the Jaguar further barring the Darin upgrades is a mystery.I remember seeing in the '80s a design for an upgraded Jaguar,new wing,engines,etc.The proposed upgrade now by Raytheon is a decade late.

The IAF appears to have worked out its order of battle for the next decade with the Rafale being the key acquisition,due to its "omni-role" capability,where in conjunction with the MKIs,and lower down the LCAs and upgraded MIGs and M-2000s,etc.,it is confident of being able to deal with the combined Sino-Pak threat.From 2020 onwards,the FGFA is expected to maintain the qualitative edge that we possess at the moment.This is absolutely vital for us as China may even field two stealth fighters being developed by then.and it is certain that Pak will get one of them.The Chinese production rate of aircraft is also a worrying factor.We will thus need around 200 FGFAs eventually.This will still leave us with the "gap" of about 5-6 sqds. in numbers when the MIG-21s retire,even with accelerated LCA production to achieve the 42 sqd. target.The Q is how are we going to fill the gap,what are the options?

The COIN Q.I've been mentioning this for some time.This is one area where we have lagged in thought.Armed attack helicopters are vulnerable to MANPADS.In the recent conflicts we've seen Apaches,Chinooks, et al hitting the deck. The US and the Soviets sorted out this problem with the A-10 and Frogfoot.As a recent expert said,the A-10 can fly as low as possible,where a JSF cannot,take punishment and do the business.Tasked with those ops,the hugely expensive JSF would be a sitting duck,and this is supposed to be one of its tasks (USMC)! There is a relook at extending the life of the A-10s which are nearing retirement age. Other air forces have found an alternative to jets,turboprops like the Tucano and armed trainers of various types.Turboprops are easy and economical to operate. Both the Hawk and new Yak-130 "Mitten",a lead-in light attack trainer are also quite capable of support to ground forces fulfilling the IA's needs.But with the induction of the PC-7 as our basic trainer,the Pilatus family of aircraft including the PC-21 would be the easiest to induct and most economical choice to also serve the COIN role.If there is any major delay to the IJT,the PC-21 can fill the need as it obviates the need for an IJT and has become the global standard for mil. trainers.

[vina]

Here it is finally HAL rejects IAF proposal to produce Pilatus trainer

See. Fundamentally it is this. All this rubbish about Pilatus being cheaper, is IFF (ie IF and ONLY IF), an el cheapo Pilatus is screw driver assembled at HAL , with it's depreciated and already paid back facilities and assembly line and experienced staff.

Sure, now let the IAF rope in Tata, Mahindra, Taneja and whoever and ask them to build it and when those guys bake in the recovery of the required Capital Expenditure and the fees and learning curve and profits into the next 100 trainers the IAF wants, and the price shoots up exponentially, the IAF will have serious egg on it's face when someone points out, that the trainer you said was Rs 30 crore is actually Rs 80 to Rs 100 crore! Why just the land acquisition setting up an assembly line and training and everything will take it years before even a single one rolls out.

HAL has said, we will not screw driver assemble the Pilatus and support it. So build it yourself or go to a private guy we don't care. So this kind of thing is exactly why the IAF wants to do a "Merger and Acquisition" by stealth of HAL and put their own guy as head , so that instead of the BRD, HAL can be IAF's BRD and they can get a read made screw driver assembly factory and do all the screw driving of everything they want to import and assemble and the uniformed types can boss around and throw their weights around.

[fanne]

one other complaint I have is, with MIG27 retiring, IAF will have no dedicated CAS plane that can take heavy punishment, get the work done and come back home. You do not need super duper tech to do this, you need time, no one is developing that plan. Maybe IAF doctrine may not want to do CAS (and as armchair general, let me question that), but if it wants, then they can start that project.

[Victor]

Does HAL have the authority to reject anything? Last I knew it was not a private fiefdom and they are to do as ordered by MoD. But if it comes down to that, it was a damn smart move by Browne. He cleared the deck for a straight purchase from Pilatus. Cheaper, better and most important, faster. Let HAL focus its energy on getting the IJT and LCA thru the pipeline.

[Philip]

Yes,he moved the goalposts."Stand and deliver" or stand aside.

[chackojoseph]

I will say, IAF is being criminal in not inducting Tejas MK1 (post FOC) and not wait for MK2, which will come, when it comes, going by history, it will be not before 5-6 years it gets FOC.

Mk1 has NOT obtained FOC. It hasn't even obtained IOC-2 yet. Besides, the IAF has already ordered 20 Mk1s. HAL has yet to start serial production because the development isn't complete yet. Several tests are yet to be done. Otherwise the SP-1 and 2 should have been flying by now.

IOC is a state of Mind and paper procedure. IOC-1 ensures that LCA flies without similar risk which most fighter aircraft or aircraft's have. IOC-2 is about IAF's ASR points. 150 odd Thandaars exists even before FOC. You can get FOC after induction too. IAF is using this aircraft for familiarization at Sulur and adding to FOC flights. You should remember that the basic safety of the the aircraft was cleared when we cut short the phase I trials and moved on to create TD-2.

[chackojoseph]

Dont you think its time to retire the 40 year canard, Vina ?

The IAF completed its role of down-selecting the Hawk and Alpha Jet as its choices in 1986. It does not have acquisition powers. Its the GoI/MoD that kept delaying AJT acquisition until the early 2000s ( 2002?)

It killed every home grown basic trainer ? It soldiered on with the HPT-32 because incompetent HAL pulled a "oh, the old one kills ? Buy a new one " routine. Your earlier contention was that the HTT-34 proposal existence was proof enough that HAL ARDC knew how to solve the problem - so why the hell not did they retrofit the "successfull" solution instead of the 20 odd other things they tried over the next 15+ years and kept failing...to the point that MoD kept funding academic efforts to find solutions until the late 200x ?

Keeping H&D up and not admitting they made a mistake was more important to HAL than establishing credibility with customers ? Yeah - thats a winning strategy.

I really do think HAL should be allowed to invest its own money into HTT-XX as soon as there are no captive customers - they think they can make a competitive aircraft - go right ahead and compete in the open market. Or better off - spin off the light/small aircraft group as a separate consulting group or small company since HAL claims that pursuing this is COMPLETELY independent of the other priority efforts on IJT/MTA/SARAS etc. Lets then see if the HAL the manufacturing company buys this companies designs or elects to go into a JV with some other screwdriver assembly organization. Dood ka doodh, pani ka pani....

Rather its the time to talk about it. Which was the trainer aircraft which IAF ordered for creation for the particular period? Once HPT's have been created and their intended life was getting over, why was there no initiative in advance for a trainer.

HAL initiatives from 1960's : TASA, ACF-300, HAC-33, GAF I, HCP-25, HJT-17, HJT-39, HT-3, HT-10, HT-11, HTT-34, HTT-35, HTT-38, HTT-40, AJT, HF-24 variants and HP-18. HAL has its share of blames on quality, costs etc. But don't blanket blame the organisation.

World over, military aviation has immensely contributed to the growth of the nation and large extent civil aviation. IAF has actually killed Indian aviation.

IAF is a confused organisation when it come to equipping:

Jaguar: A plane which has found no use in its entire career.

They went to check out Lightening and ended up buying GNAT without plans.

Knee jerk response to F-16 : MiG 23, MiG-29 and Mirage - 2000. Where were the plans?

SU-30 MKI was a political decision and it is now IAF's frontline aircraft. The genius organisation took almost 7 years to decide what equipment will go into MKI.

They wanted 60 Mirages to augment their fleet and went on to become mother of all deals in next 25 years and no results.

FGFA is more of a political offering from Russia. IAF did not plan for a 5th gen while MiG- LFI, SI-37 etc were being proposed and prototypes being built.

[chackojoseph]

1) HAL design capability did not go after creation of ADA. ADA had LCA mandate.
2) So out of 3 trainers, 1 had an issue. Made in 1970's, the plane should have been out of service and new replacements should have come atleast by 1995. Why IAF did not commission replacements for Deepak? All planes have issues. None are perfect.
3) AJT took 20-30 years to come and IAF did not try to design anything.
4) IJT project commenced in 1997. Prototype flew in 2003. Engine under power issue was not IAF's mistake, but AL-55 was a new engine and it was further delayed by 2 years. The flaw here is that IAF should have allowed continued development with lazrac and should have ordered few in order to further development. Here HAL is to blame 75% (figuratively).

The fundamental problem with IAF is that it does not allow generational developments. There was a void between 1970 till now to make a replacement for Deepak.

Even in history of US and Russian Af's, there have been hits and misses, but they always had generational projects. Competence is built up that way and is not produced out of thin air after IAF places a project requirement after delay. IAf killed everything from 1970's to 1980's. There was huge void. HF-24 engineers were out of touch. Aircraft design and production was non existent etc, until LCA project came up.

Look at what IAF purchased few years back - HAWK, which has been upgraded and redesigned for generations.

[chackojoseph]

That comment demonstrates an understanding gap on converting technologies to products. You ignore the difference between a TD aircraft and a production article fighter aircraft ? THe big advantage of the Thandaar leaving aside its technology/capabilities (which may or may not meet the PAF needs - we will never know since they were beggars not choosers) is that the Chinese know how to do production. THey actually were paying attention when doing all the license production and took their manufacturing/production technology development needs seriously - which is what an OEM manufacturer is supposed to do - you know, for their pay checks, even if they don't have sexy self-designed planes to build. You come to work, practice on your tools, jigs, reverse-engineer, understand the tooling design process etc... not set up "magazine reading clubs" (that's a honest to god HAL Bangalore invention). So whatever technology comes out of their design houses, the Chinese can produce it... which is exactly where the LCA is stuck - in the LSP phase.

I don't agree your assessment on Thandaar. The plane was a proven model, then re-designed by Americans under peace pearl and then Russians redesigned. Anyway, I think we have once discussed this IOC - FOC thing longtime back. IOC-2 is specs as per paper. LCA still represents much advancement over Mig-21's.

[Victor]

I am pretty much convinced the IAF is already looking for another IJT. The Sitara's "inherent assymetry problem" is a mind boggling discovery a decade down the line. In layman's language that sounds like a fundamental aerodynamic design flaw. The IAF will never accept another patched-up death trap of a trainer under any circumstances and my gut feel is the Sitara is a goner.

[Philip]

The IAF has (air chief's interview) given time for the IJT to be perfected,but he too says that there is a deadline as the Kiran's are entering retirement and that after that hinted that other options will have to be considered.Coming back to the HTT-32,there were over 100 engine failures and 28 fatalities,the last being two instructors which was the last straw for the IAF.As AH has said,can any organisation accept fatalities and the OEM get away scot free? It only happens in India.I posted some months ago the same poor qlty with the MIG-21s ,where the IAF had to show HAL burnt "new" engines,no space between engine and fuselage,etc.,before they acknowledged the faults.Back to the AJT issue.The La Fontaine committee on flight safety way back 3 decades ago found that an AJT was essential,LF then became ACM ,and for over two decades the MOD sat constipated over the issue as rookie pilots kept getting killed for want of a trainer.Finally,we became virtually the last nation in the world to order the Hawk,which now is inferior to the superb Yak-130 and M-346 ,the latter which has been ordered by Israel,S'Pore and Italy.

How many years is it now since the IAF placed its initial order for the LCA? Just take a look at this report,where parliament was informed that we would have 6 sqds. of LCAs by 2017 (120 MK1s and MK-2s).Is it realistically possible? Who has been BS'ing whom? A decade ago APJAK said that by 2010 we would have "200" LCAs built.The tall tales keep continuing ad infinitum.

http://www.defencenow.com/news/572/iaf- ... -2017.html

IAF to Induct Six LCA Squadrons By 2017
Indian Air Force plans to induct six squadrons of indigenously developed Light Combat Aircraft 'Tejas' by the end of the 13th five-year plan, the Indian Parliament has been informed.

That would mean, IAF will have at least 120 LCAs in its fleet of combat aircraft by the end of 2017. Of these, 40 will be Tejas Mark-I and the rest Mark-II.

"IAF plans to induct six LCA squadrons by the end of the 13th Plan," Defence Minister AK Antony informed Rajya Sabha, the upper house of parliament.

He said Tejas got its initial operational clearance on January 10, 2011, and the LCA development process is progressing towards final operational clearance.

"The Initial Operational Clearance-1 (IOC-1) for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft has been achieve on January 10, 2011. Presently, LCA development activities leading to final operational clearance are in progress," he added.

"Action for induction of Tejas into IAF has been initiated. IAF has placed orders for 40 aircraft from on Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)" he added.

HAL will produce only 40 of the Tejas Mark-I aircraft powered from the General Electric F404 engine that provides the plane a thrust of about 80 Kilo Newtons.

"Tejas Mark-II aircraft is under development with an alternate higher powered engine with considerable improvements," Antony said. Tejas Mark-II will be powered by GE F414 engine producing 90 Kilo Newtons. India had in 2011 placed an order for 99 of the F414 engines from General Electric for the LCA programme.

Antony said the final cost of the Tejas programme will be available only after the development phase of Mark II is completed.
"Scope for cost reduction of Tejas Mk-I has been examined and the same is assessed as not feasible in view of limited quantities (to be produced)," he added.

Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) is the nodal organisation for the development of Tejas. India has already sanctioned Rs.11,845.20 crore ($2.3 billion) to ADA for development of Tejas till date. The total expenditure incurred so far on Tejas project is Rs.5,051.46 crore ($1.1 billion).

Now the beauty is that we've already contracted for 99 GE 414 engines without even having a few prototypes flying to validate the improved design! That explains the extreme urgency with which the approval for the MK-2 is being rushed even before MK-1 has been inducted.It has been more than two air shows since the 414 was selected.Why was there not an effort to build the MK-2 in the intervening years.Surely a mock-up of the engine,or even a real one, could've been used to determine the changes to intakes,fuselage,location of key components/eqpt.,etc.?

Here is one facebk. blog on the future IAF order of battle upto 2032.Let's see and list what is realistically achievable with this timeframe.

https://www.facebook.com/notes/indian-a ... 8069333536

Current inventory and future of IAF (till 2032):
23 April 2013 at 13:52

These articles deal with the current inventory and future of IAF (till 2032), ROLE of IAF and the possible roles of IAF’s assets in case of a conflict. Please keep in mind that the articles deal only with INDIAN AIR FORCE and nor with the Indian Navy’s Air Arm neither with the Indian Army’s Air Arm.

Indian Air Force was established on 8thOct,1932 as a support to the RAF. It has come a long way from that to become not only the 4th largest air force in the world but also one of the finest and respected forces around the world.

In the words of the Air Chief Marshal Norman Browne, Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) of the IAF-

“IAF is witnessing an unprecedented phase of modernisation and capability enhancement [which can be] witnessed across the capability spectrum …” The most vital capability enhancement is perhaps the IAF’s modernisation of its fighter fleet, which has caused some concern in recent years due to the shrinking number of combat squadrons. According to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (15th Lok Sabha), the present number of combat squadron has dwindled to 34 against the sanction strength of 42. Moreover, the number is likely to reduce further to 31 during the 12th Plan(2012-2017). To arrest the declining trend, the IAF has made a two-prong approach: upgrading existing fighters (MiG-29, Jaguar and Mirage 2000) while inducting new ones. The aim of the IAF is to increase its combat squadron strength to 40-42 by the end of 14th Plan (2022-27) and eventually to 45 squadrons by the 15th Plan (2027-2032).

Now let’s take a look on the current inventory of IAF with segment wise breaking :-

Fighter,Air Superiority and Ground Attack Aircrafts:- As of 2012IAF has

Fighter(interceptor and air superiority) : MIG21Bison – 121, MIG 29 – 75, SU-30 Mki – 170,

Attack:Jaguar – 149, MIG 27 –90,

Multirole:Mirage M 2000 H – 50
Future(till 2032): The IAF is all set to induct in its fleet over 400 new fighters that include three new types of combat planes - Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), French Rafale and Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) and an additional 42 SU-30MKIs. The additional SU-30MKI is part of the $4.5 billion defence deal signed between India and Russia during President Putin’s December 2012 visit to New Delhi. The newly contractedSU-30 MKI will be license produced by the HAL, taking Indian aerospace company’s total order of the fighter to 222, and the total cost of procurement of 272 Su-30MKIs to $12billion.

Beginning with inductions of new type of fighters, the IAF has already placed orders for 40 LCAs (20 each in Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) and Final Operational (FOC) standards) of MK-I version with GE404 engine. These planes are planned for induction in the 12thPlan (2012-2017). There is also a further plan to induct more LCAs of MK-II version with superior GE F414 engines, 99 units of which have been contracted for $800 million. All together, as many as six LCA squadrons (108 fighters) are to be inducted by the end of the 13th Plan (2017-2022).

The much touted approximately $20 billion medium multi role combat aircraft (MMRCA) deal, in which French Rafale emerged as the winner, looks set for contract finalisation in early part of the next financial year (2013-14). As per the plan, the first Rafale squadron comprising of 18aircrafts will be inducted in 3-4 years after contract signing. The rest 108aircraft, which will be manufactured by the HAL under the transfer oftechnology agreement with France, are to be inducted in the following sevenyears.

The induction of LCA and MMRCA is soon going to be over-shadowed by what is poised as India’s
biggest ever defence programme to acquire200-250 Fifth Generation Fighter Aircrafts (FGFA) –
though in a recent interview the AirChief has however indicated a lower figure of 144 fighters.
Consequent to 2007 inter-governmentalagreement between India and Russia for joint development of FGFA, both the sides signed a Preliminary Design contract in 2010 at the cost of $295 million to be shared equally. Drawing upon the basic structural and systems design of the Russian PAK-FA, the FGFA for the IAF is now visualised as a single seat fighter with advanced features such as stealth, super-cruise, and ultra-maneuverability.HAL, the Indian joint partner in the developmental efforts of the FGFA, has committed $6 billion dollars for the initial developmental efforts. Total programme cost on the Indian side including for the induction is estimated to be $30billion. The IAF is hopeful of inducting the aircraft from 2020 onwards.

Current Upgrades: The contract for upgrading MiG-29s was signed in 2008 with RAC MIG of Russia at a cost of US $964 million. This program is to be completed by 2014. The first three upgraded MiG-29s (known as MiG- 29UPG) were handed over to India by the Russian company in December 2012.Three more fighters are to be upgraded in Russia and the remaining 63-oddplanes are to be upgraded in India with support from the Russian partner. The service life of the upgraded aircraft has been extended to 40 years. Among other features the upgraded MiG include Phazatron Zhuk-M radar, beyond-visual range combat ability and the mid-air refuelling.

The contract for modernising Jaguars to DARIN-III Standard was signed with India’s state-owned
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) in 2009at the cost of Rs 31.1 billion. The work is scheduled for
completion by 2017. The first upgraded Jaguar was successfully flight tested by the HAL on
November 28, 2012. Among other features the upgraded aircraft incorporates new state-of-the-art
avionics architecture including Mission Computer (MC), Engine and Flight Instrument System (EFIS), and autopilot. The retrofitted Jaguar will “result in a major operational improvement with regard to all weather air to ground, air to sea and air to air capabilities through incorporation of multi mode radar”, says R. K. Tyagi, Chairman, HAL.

In July 2011, the MoD signed a $2.4billion contract with French companies Thales, and Dassault
Aviation and HAL for upgrades to the IAF’s Mirage-2000 fleet procured in eighties. As per the
contract, out of 50-odd fighters, two will be upgraded in France, two at HAL with French support,
and the rest by the HAL. The entire process is expected to be completed by 2021. The
improvements include new avionics,radars, mission computers, glass cockpits, helmet-mounted
displays, electronic warfare suites,weapon delivery and precision-targeting systems, which will
bring the fleet to Mirage 2000-5 standards and extend the service life by 20 years. A separate
contract valued €959 million has also been signed with MBDA to provide 450 MICA missiles to arm
the upgraded fighters.

THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIDENTIAL DATA REVEALATION IN THIS ARTICLE.
We are grateful to TOI,The Hindu,Defence Review of Asia,Flightglobal.com for theresources and materials and no copyright is demanded by the authors.

[chackojoseph]

Sorry - on generational developments- not true at all; HAL was always allowed to come back with a HPT-32 Mk2 upgrade to fix the issues. It was HAL that wanted to try more and more new designs rather than fix/upgrade. THey beat a quick retreat on the HTT-3 when challenged to show how an engine upgrade would overcome the current issues.

Production was non-existant? Sir, we were license producing various Mig models, Jaguars and even the Ajeet in the 70s/80s. What else do you need to learn production technology - two different design and manufacturing philosophies... that's actually a perfect learning set up to learn to build up competence (if you have any interest or motivation in things like that)

Striking some material to stick to the topic's narrow focus - with your permission i hope.

Its 2 trainers in this category - Deepak and Kiran. Not 3. Success on Kiran led to IJT. Failure on Deepak led to current situation. So I'd day just desserts and we won't talk about IJT for focus reasons.

The IAF did not commission a replacement because HAL kept telling them they could fix it... and basic trainers do get replaced infrequently. 20 plus yrs is not unheard of for a basic trainer. And the IAF has limited funds and higher priorities that are over budget already viz LCA, Bison Upgrade, MKIs, IJT etc - what would you have sacrificed to bail HAL out of its misery of being accountable for the Deepak design issues ?

"All planes have issues; none are perfect" - so you have no minimum acceptance and safety criteria ? That's your excuse for this plane's record - keep in mind a simple basic trainer that cannot do its job reliably ???? In that case, you are basically saying that having a track record like the HPT-32 is OK/acceptable/normal and HAL's behavior is also OK/Acceptable/normal. In which case, we have no common ground to discuss this further. You and I have vastly different expectations of what an Indian can expect for his tax money to serve his defenders... you are willing to accept trainee pilots dying due to either incompetence/lack of accountability, I am not.

You see, the first HPT-32 delivery was in 1984 and first crash occurred in 1989 and of Navy. Deliveries were completed in early 1990's. First IAF Deepak crash occurred in 1995. second in 98 and then 99. It was not a serious issues until, in 2002, there were 3 crashes. Coinciding GAG said that the aircraft is old and obsolete. Your assertion on HPT-32 track record for its timeline is incorrect. The frequent crashes are happening after 2002, an ideal time where new project should have started replacing it. it was reliable until it was old.

Your assertion that IAF kept asking for obsolete Deepak fix is something you need to ponder. By reading your post, it sounds that IAF was asking for a fix right from long time.

Your assertion that it should have been taken to Mk2 , instead of creating a new one is also debatable. Its first generation aircraft and HAL proposed different design. I think IAF should have taken it and we would not be in such trouble. I don't agree that since HAL was proposing a new design, it was at fault.

I have not commented on production. I have only mentioned r&D. Including Ht-2, there were 3 trainers.

Really, 20 years are unheard for trainers then what is 25 year wait for AJT and funds for it? I don't agree with that too.

And that trainee pilot crashing (and please no emotional atyachaar on this) etc is to be squarely blamed on IAF, as it left the plane to age and also not try to create a AJT project for nearly 25-30 years.

What I am saying is that the Thandaar can exist in the 100s before FOC because the Chinese can actually mass produce it. And that capability is whats missing on the LCA - we're stuck at LSP stage which is the fine tuning of the design to enable mass production. WE have shown we can do the design/tech part...where we are failing now (at HAL coincidentally) is on the production side

There is no problem with mass producing LCA. We are not struck with LSP stage, the order is for LSP. We are waiting for IOC requirements of IAF. They want only 20 of them in MK-1. Within 2-3 years (6 -7 per year is possible unlike current 4), all can be delivered. I cannot see why LCA needs a full fledged production line for 20 a/c. I totally disagree with that too. Anyway, your original point was entirely different. Read your previous post.

[Sagar G]

Here is an IAF guy talking about the trainer issue,

In 1984, HAL unveiled a prototype of the HTT-34 at the Farnborough International Air Show. This new aircraft was essentially an HPT-32 airframe, powered by a more powerful 420 shaft horsepower Allison 250-B17D turboprop engine. Compared to the HPT-32, performance of the HTT-34 was reported to be far superior. But for some reason not easy to fathom, the IAF did not appreciate this rare initiative on the part of HAL and did not evince interest in the new product. The project was shelved and in due course, was consigned to the archives.Thereafter, there was no further initiative either from the IAF or from HAL with regard to replacement of the HPT- 32 fleet which in the normal course would have become due by around 2020. In the fitness of things, there should have been a definitive plan in place by 2010 if not earlier for the replacement of the HPT-32 fleet. Sadly, there was none!

From SP's Aviation Issue May 2013 Article "Quality is the Key" pg.50 by By Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey

Though he gets it a bit wrong when he says that there was no further initiative after HTT-34 but even he cannot fathom why didn't IAF evince interest for an HAL initiative.

[GeorgeWelch]

Compared to the HPT-32, performance of the HTT-34 was reported to be far superior. But for some reason not easy to fathom, the IAF did not appreciate this rare initiative on the part of HAL and did not evince interest in the new product. The project was shelved and in due course, was consigned to the archives.

. . . even he cannot fathom why didn't IAF evince interest for an HAL initiative.

More performance isn't necessarily a positive in a trainer. Often it can be deadly as it gives less reaction time and it also costs more as it burns more fuel.

The other possibility is that they consider the HPT-32 obsolete and simply changing the engine isn't sufficient to change their mind.

[Sagar G]

More performance isn't necessarily a positive in a trainer. Often it can be deadly as it gives less reaction time and it also costs more as it burns more fuel.

Can you prove the same regarding HTT-34 ???

The other possibility is that they consider the HPT-32 obsolete and simply changing the engine isn't sufficient to change their mind.

Read what I have posted properly before coming up with imagined scenarios. From the link,

The HT-2 was replaced with the HPT-32, once again designed, developed and produced by HAL. Powered by the American 260-horsepower AVCO Lycoming O-540 piston engine, deliveries of the HPT-32 began in 1984, five years before the HT-2 fleet retired from service.

How come within the same year when HPT-32 deliveries began and HTT-34 prototype was unveiled did the former become obsolete ???

[Philip]

History in brief in chronological order reg. the trainers issue.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/may ... ers-07391/

May day: India’s New Basic & Intermediate Flight Trainers

Oct 10, 2013 13:18 UTC by Defense Industry Daily staff
Latest update
HJT-36 takeoff

India’s current intermediate training curriculum rests on a dwindling stock of HJT-16 Kiran jets. They were first introduced in 1968, though another 65 Kiran Mk.IIs entered service beginning in 1985. They serve as the bridge between existing basic flight trainers, and the IAF’s advanced Hawk Mk.132s.

HAL received a 1999 contract to develop the HJT-36 Sitara as an intermediate... {click to expand +}
Keep reading for the whole story with recent events put in context

HPT-32 Deepak trainer

India’s stalled defense procurements have become an international joke, but they’re not funny to front-line participants. The country’s attempts to buy simple artillery pieces have become infamous, but their current problem with trainer aircraft is arguably a more significant wound.

You can’t produce pilots properly without appropriate training, but the IAF’s fleet of 114 locally-designed HPT-32 Deepak basic trainers has been grounded since August 2009, because they aren’t seen as reliable enough or safe enough to fly. Since then, equally aged HJT-16 Kiran external link jets are being used for both Stage-I and Stage-II fighter training. That yawning gap has added urgency to a replacement buy, but progress has been predictably slow. With its high-end Hawk AJT jet trainer deals behind them after 20+ years of effort, can the IAF take the next step, and plug the hole in the middle of its training? In May 2012, it did.

India’s Trainer Choice(s)
Basic Training: Pilatus Wins the Competition
PC-7 Mk.II

By June 2011, Switzerland’s Pilatus had emerged as the IAF’s preferred basic choice with their PC-7 Mark II external link, which is in wide international use with over 20 air forces. The PC-7 Mark II, introduced in 1994, adds all of the avionics advances and some airframe changes from the P-9M, but uses a very cost-efficient Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-25C engine. The engine provides less power, in return for a lower price and lower operating costs. Ejection seats, an anti-g system, and On-Board Oxygen Generating System (OBOGS) help round out its capabilities; and the plane is still touted as being suitable for aerobatics, tactical flying, and night flying. All of these things mark a sharp step up from the HPT-32.

Overall, Pilatus touts the PC-7 as a trainer that can cover both basic and intermediate roles, at very low operating costs. Like the HPT-32s, PC-7s can be armed, and this has been done by a number of customers.

To win, Pilatus beat Korean Aerospace’s KT-1 and Hawker Beechcraft’s T-6C in the finals. Embraer’s EMB-314 Super Tucano armed trainer, Finmeccanica’s M-311 jet trainer, and Grob’s G-120 TP didn’t make it past the technical trials, and a HAL proposal for a locally developed “HTT-40 trainer” also lost out at some point in the process.

In May 2012, the IAF has signed a contract to import 75 PC-7s from Pilatus in fly-away condition, and they reportedly plan to have Hindustan Aeronautics Limited license-build another 106 in Bangalore. HAL has been having problems handling their workload, though, so India may have to decide how many future orders to source from Switzerland instead. The country reportedly plans to exercise a 37-plane option with Pilatus in late February 2013.

Some Indian pilots will train on the PC-7s in Switzerland, then return to India as trainers themselves.
Intermediate Trainers: HAL’s IJT
HJT-36 takeoff

India’s current intermediate training curriculum rests on a dwindling stock of HJT-16 Kiran jets. They were first introduced in 1968, though another 65 Kiran Mk.IIs entered service beginning in 1985. They serve as the bridge between existing basic flight trainers, and the IAF’s advanced Hawk Mk.132s.

HAL received a 1999 contract to develop the HJT-36 Sitara as an intermediate trainer successor, but the firm has missed its 2007 in-service date very badly, and a number of crashes have raised concerns. HAL is contracted to deliver 12 limited series production aircraft and 75 production IJTs, but the Sitara still hasn’t achieved initial certification as of late 2013, and remains saddled with serious aerodynamic issues. The question is whether the plane can enter service by 2015, and whether it will be safe if it does.

The PC-7 fleet is touted by Pilatus as being fully capable of assuming the intermediate training role, but even if the IJT proves to be poorly-suited or unsafe, India has a long history of pursuing indigenous programs well past the point of crisis. Choking the IAF’s pilot training pipeline may be crippling enough to force movement, so there’s a potential opportunity. It’s just a low-odds opportunity.
Contracts & Key Events
2012 – 2013

PC-7 Mark II
Oct 10/13: IJT. HAL is having serious flight and safety problems with its HJT-36 Intermediate Jet Trainer. The plane has an inherent asymmetry that makes the aircraft roll around 16 degrees during stall trials. That’s very dangerous to trainee pilots, and has forced the suspension of stall testing. HAL is still saying that they hope to get the HJT-36′s Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) by the end of December 2013, but “insiders” don’t consider that very likely.

HAL is contracted to deliver 12 limited series production aircraft and 75 production IJTs, but the IJT program has been in trouble for several years now. The original IOC date was supposed to be 2007, but a string of crashes (q.v. April 29/11) and other problems have pushed the likely date back by 7 years or more. It’s not a very good advertisement for HAL’s “MTT-40″ lobbying, and the longer-term question is whether continued IJT problems will push effective fielding beyond the old HJT-16 fleet’s safe life. Sources: Indian Express, “HAL struggling with jet trainer project”.

July 30/13: Currency exchange. India’s Business Standard follows up on its earlier report about HAL’s HTT-40 trainer offer by discussing an IAF clarification, but won’t quote that clarification or link to it. That’s bad practice and questionable ethics, especially when other sources note the IAF statement’s citation of persistent delays and problems across all of HAL’s aircraft production programs. With that said, the Business Standard makes an important point along the way.

The flyaway price of each PC-7 Mk.II trainer in the contract is reportedly SFR 6.09 million. Since payment is linked to delivery, India’s declining rupee is steadily making each subsequent trainer more expensive. The IAF had given a mean figure of INR 300 million for the 2014 delivery year, but on May 24/12 when the contract was signed, the conversion worked out to INR 360.8 million each. Today’s conversion is INR 394.7 million – a 9.4% cost hike. India’s RBI is stepping up its defense of the currency as it approaches record lows, but a current account deficit amounting to 4.8% of GDP requires broader policy changes to avert further decline.

Currency exchange factors weren’t part of the cost figures in IAF Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne’s letter to Defence Minister A K Antony earlier this month, and the letter also gave wrong information regarding some basic specifications like the PC-7′s flight speed. That’s bad form indeed, and could become a club in the Minister’s hands if he wishes to pursue this issue. India’s Business Standard external link | India Today external link | Reuters external link.

July 29/13: Changed standards. India’s Business Standard reports that the IAF changed a number of key specifications for its trainer competition, after laying down a more stringent Preliminary Air Staff Qualitative Requirements (PSQR) for the HTT-40. Items changed include zero-zero ejection seats (lowered to 0/60), instructor visibility levels from the rear cockpit, the ability to the instructor to simulate front-seat instrument failures in flight, glide ratio reduced from 12:1 to 10:1, and the need for a pressurized cabin.

The report adds an important missing piece, which seems to explain HAL’s sudden ability to offer their HTT-40 for 42% less: lower standards. India’s critical shortage of IAF basic trainers pushed the service to look abroad, rather than risk serious damage to pilot training while waiting for a developmental plane. Once that decision is made, it’s entirely normal to set performance requirements to a standard that invites more competitors and better deals. Especially when dealing with established offerings, whose performance has proven more than adequate to train thousands of pilots in air forces all around the world.

These moves are especially notable because India has had serious problems with a number of important military programs, which remain in limbo to this day because of poor (and often late) framing of unusual requirements with no reference to the marketplace, followed by rigid insistence that vendors provide off-the-shelf, unmodified solutions. Current high-profile casualties of that approach include external link India’s LUH/RSH light helicopter program, a body armor program for soldiers, the lightweight assault rifle program, 2 armored personnel carrier programs that included an urgent deployment need, upgrades to India’s BMP-2 APCs, new anti-tank missiles, the QR-SAM and MR-SAM air defense programs, and 155mm towed and self-propelled howitzers. Taken together, this is a huge and serious set of gaps in India’s military capabilities, and adding basic flight training to this list would have been catastrophic.

Lower standards could allow a legitimate price reduction from HAL, though one has to acknowledge that estimates for an airplane that exists only on paper are wildly unreliable. In contrast, bids from abroad involved tested, in-production aircraft that are known to be able to meet both performance and cost specifications. Those considerations also factor in to vendor ratings, if the buyer is competent. India’s Business Standard external link.

April 15/13:India’s Business Standard reports that the option for 37 more PC-7 Mk.II trainers is being stalled by HAL. The state-owned firm is demanding that the IAF buy 108 of their undeveloped HTT-40 trainer instead, in order to meet India’s requirement for a total of 183 basic trainers.

They’re leaning on defense minister Antony’s recent fetish for India-only production, in order to avoid “corruption” in defense procurement. We use fetish here in its traditional sense: a key component of animist magic that is performed as a placebo, in return for tangible recompense. To review:

After a long history of late or deficient performance on other aircraft programs, and a INR 600 million per trainer bid (vid. Dec 19/12) that got them thrown out of the competition, HAL has miraculously discovered that they can offer the HTT-40 for just INR 350 million per plane, a 42% reduction that’s suddenly cheaper than Pilatus’ proven INR 385 million figure. This will include development of an armed HTT-40, and HAL is also claiming lower life-cycle costs.

Bids for blueprints-only aircraft tend to be followed by “unexpected” price hikes once political commitment makes it hard to back out. That same commitment dynamic may be driving HAL itself, after their corporate investment of about INR 2 billion (about $36 million) to develop the HTT-40. The corresponding life cycle cost estimates are also likely to be too low, and experience shows that truthful figures require a flying fleet like Pilatus’, not paper promises without a prototype.

Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force will find it difficult to train its pilots, because HAL is lobbying to block planes the IAF says it needs, by making promises it almost certainly can’t keep. All in return for money and political favors. Which, somehow, doesn’t qualify as corruption. India’s Business Standard external link

March 13/13: IJT. In a Parliamentary reply external link, Minister of State for Defence Shri Jitendra Singh says that:

“Indian Air Force (IAF) has signed two contracts with HAL for delivery of 12 Limited Series Production Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) aircraft and 73 Series Production IJT aircraft. The IJT aircraft is presently targeted to be inducted in IAF in the year 2014 onwards.”

That would make 15 years from initial contract to induction for HAL’s HJT-36 Sitara intermediate trainer jet, which is already late. Even so, 2014 gives the IAF a very narrow window in which to shelve this project, and they probably won’t. The opportunity, such as it is, is that the IAF envisaged possible orders of 200-250 IJTs, for use in “Intermediate Stage 2″ training. That leaves about 115-160 aircraft as potential pickups for a rival like the PC-7 MkII, if HAL’s IJT runs into delivery, service, or cost issues.

Feb 4/13: Options clause. India’s Business Standard reports external link the IAF will exercise their contract option to buy another 37 Pilatus trainers at the same price, which is reportedly INR 300 million per plane. This brings India’s Swiss-made order total to 112:

“A top IAF official told Business Standard, “The contract for 75 Pilatus trainers, which was signed last year, includes an options clause that allows India to order an extra 50 per cent of the contracted number of aircraft (i.e. 37 trainers) at the same price as the first 75 trainers. We will exercise this options clause this month.”

Feb 2/13: the first 3 Indian PC-7 Mk.IIs arrive at the Air Force Academy in Dundigal, near Hyderabad. They were flown in by the Swiss pilots. MSN India external link | WebIndia123 external link.

1st PC-7s arrive

Dec 19/12: HHT-40s and IJTs. India’s Business Standard reports external link that HAL had also been a contender in the basic trainer competition, with a proposal to develop and build 106 “Hindustan Turbo Trainer – 40″ (HTT-40) planes. The problem was that HAL was about twice as expensive as foreign-built aircraft, at Rs 60 crore per plane. Basic trainers aren’t exactly a strategically vital competency, so that was it for HAL. The paper even suggests that additional PC-7 Mk.IIs beyond the initial 75 could be manufactured in Switzerland.

The other question the paper raises involves the IAF’s missing solution for “Stage 2″ intermediate training, between the PC-7 and the jet-powered Hawk AJT. Pilatus touts their plane as being effective through Stage 2, but HAL continues its 14-year old quest to develop an Intermediate Jet Trainer. A 2011 crash has set that option back again, and more problems or unfavorable cost comparisons could earn the PC-7 another slice of business.

May 24/12: PC-7 contract. India and Pilatus sign a contract for 75 PC-7 MkII turboprop aircraft, their integrated ground based training system, and a comprehensive logistics support package. The contract also contains an option clause for extending the contract to 105 planes. Indian reports place the initial contract value at INR 29 billion, but Pilatus rates it higher, at “in excess of 500 million” Swiss Francs. In dollar terms, it’s worth over $525 million.

Delivery of the PC-7s and their associated training systems is scheduled to begin by the end of 2012, and the 30-plane option clause will expire in May 2015. As part of this contract, Pilatus will establish in-country depot level maintenance capabilities at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which will allow the IAF to fix the planes in country, instead of having to send them back to Switzerland. Pilatus has also entered into the required 30% value industrial offset contract, and says that it is “our intention to leverage the offset opportunity to establish manufacturing capability for the region in support of our business plans for India.”

It’s a very good week for Pilatus, who just won a 55 plane order from Saudi Arabia for 55 of its top of the line PC-21 trainers. India’s contract is the largest single contract in the company’s history, and will extend Pilatus’ global fleet of turboprop trainers to more than 900 aircraft. IANS external link | PTI external link | Swissinfo external link | Flight International external link.

PC-7 contract

May 2-3/12: KAI aside. India’s Minister of Defence Shri AK Antony, in a written reply to Shri PiyushGoyal in Rajya Sabha:

“The proposal for procurement of Basic Trainer Aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF) is awaiting consideration of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)… A representation submitted by M/s Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), one of the bidders, has been found to be devoid of merit.”

Korean Air Industries (KAI) had alleged flaws in the selection procedure, on the grounds that Pilatus’ bid was incomplete. Antony’s written response sets off a flurry of reports, indicating that the PC-7 deal’s major bottleneck has been cleared. India MoD external link | Times of India external link | Flight International external link | Jane’s external link.
2009 – 2011

July 18/11: Indian media reports that Pilatus’ rivals are pressing the nation’s government to keep their aircraft in the race, but the IAF is sticking by its preference. The PC-7 Mk.II is said to be a lot less expensive than the most modern offerings like Pilatus’ PC-21. That was a key to its win, but it’s also a plane in wide use around the world.

Pilatus is conducting commercial negotiations with the Indian government, after which India’s parliament must approve the budget for the deal. If the billion-dollar, 181 plane deal is approved, 75 aircraft would reportedly be delivered by Pilatus in flyaway condition, with another 106 to be built by HAL in India. India Strategic external link | Flight International external link.

June 18/11: Contract details. The daily Le Temps reports that Pilatus Aircraft is about to sign a record SFR 850 million (about $1.01 billion) deal to supply 75 PC-7 MkII trainers to the Indian Air Force (IAF), which could eventually be extended to as many as 200 of the single-engined turboprops.

Pilatus declined to comment on the report that the trainer had been selected as the winner of offers invited by India in 2009 for a new trainer. Aviation Week offered quotes that stressed the absence of a deal, quoting Indian chief of air staff, Air Marshal P.V. Naik as saying that:

“Of the three short-listed firms from the U.S. [T-6], Korea [KT-1] and Switzerland [PC-7 Mk.II], the bid made by Pilatus has emerged the lowest… We have started price negotiations with the Swiss vendor for supplying 75 aircraft…”

Other contenders that didn’t make the IAF’s short list reportedly included Grob’s G-120 TP, Embraer’s EMB-314 Super Tucano, and Finmeccanica’s jet-powered M-311. See The Hindu external link | France 24 external link | Oman Tribune external link | Aviation Week external link.

April 29/11: IJT. HJT-36 prototype #S-3466 crashes in the Krishnagiri district of Tamil Nadu. It’s the 3rd crash in 4 years for the intermediate flight trainer, which was supposed to become operational in 2007. A crash at Aero India 2007 had a plane swerve off the runway just as the pilot was getting airborne; and in February 2009, the 2nd prototype landed on its belly. DNA, “IJT aircraft crashes for third time in 4 years”.

IJT crashes

Oct 2/09: An Indian Express report external link says that India is urgently seeking up to 180 trainer aircraft to replace or augment its trainer fleet at all levels, in the wake of problems with the lower-tier HPT-32 fleet and contract issues with its upper-tier Hawk AJT program.

The report adds that a plan to buy 40 additional Hawk AJTs has hit a roadblock, due to differences over price between BAE and the IAF.

Oct 1/09: HPT-32s. Plans to phase out India’s grounded HPT-32 basic trainer fleet will intensify India’s needs for trainer aircraft at all levels. Indian Express quotes external link Air Chief Marshal P V Naik:

“The IAF lost two experienced instructors in a fatal crash of HPT-32 this year. We have ordered an inquiry and a study on the aircraft, as we have had a lot of problems since their induction in 1984. We hope to use it only till 2013-14″…

Sept 2/09: HPT-32s. India’s Business Standard external link:

“The Indian Air Force (IAF) is desperately short of aircraft for training its flight cadets. With the entire fleet of basic trainers – the HPT-32 Deepak – grounded after a series of crashes, advanced training is suffering equally due to unexpected delays in the manufacture of the Hawk advanced jet trainer (AJT) in India…

Who has been hurting the most? The IAF or HAL? Secondly,the IAF has no control over HAL and has had to put up with its shoddy track record for decades,so to blame it for the current trainer crisis is simply ridiculous.

[symontk]

[quote="agupta] On HAL and ADA, .... Creating a new organization does not suddenly cause engineering talent to start gushing out of the ground. Remember the LCA DEsign bureau set up right next to the ADA building on the brand new campus? And I specifially said "fighter"

[/quote]

Won't the same thing apply if IAF BRD's start manufacturing Rafael? or better designing MRCA?

[GeorgeWelch]

More performance isn't necessarily a positive in a trainer. Often it can be deadly as it gives less reaction time and it also costs more as it burns more fuel.

Can you prove the same regarding HTT-34 ???

What are you asking me to prove? That the faster you're going, the less time you have to react? Or that a bigger engine uses more fuel?

How come within the same year when HPT-32 deliveries began and HTT-34 prototype was unveiled did the former become obsolete ???

But what year did HPT-32 development begin? It's not unusual for a service to realize that a plane no longer meets it needs some time between when it is ordered and when it is delivered. For an extreme example see the C-27J where the USAF is delivering planes straight from the assembly line to the storage lot.

[Sagar G]

What are you asking me to prove? That the faster you're going, the less time you have to react? Or that a bigger engine uses more fuel?

For what you said previously "More performance isn't necessarily a positive in a trainer. Often it can be deadly as it gives less reaction time and it also costs more as it burns more fuel".

Please prove that better performing HTT-34 was (according to you) more "deadly".

But what year did HPT-32 development begin? It's not unusual for a service to realize that a plane no longer meets it needs some time between when it is ordered and when it is delivered. For an extreme example see the C-27J where the USAF is delivering planes straight from the assembly line to the storage lot.

Development began in late seventies and nowhere did IAF indicate that the plane wasn't meeting it's need and it's a basic trainer we are talking about not a 5th gen fighter. The biggest issue with HPT-32 was that of safety which unfortunately/strangely couldn't be solved so your theory of obsolescence has no ground w.r.t. the time frame when it arrived.

[chackojoseph]

More performance isn't necessarily a positive in a trainer. Often it can be deadly as it gives less reaction time and it also costs more as it burns more fuel.

The other possibility is that they consider the HPT-32 obsolete and simply changing the engine isn't sufficient to change their mind.

Actually, this is one way of putting it. At the same time, information is insufficient to understand if that was the reason for rejection. HAL used to make a plane and then offer upgraded engine. Ditto with Kiran, Marut and Ajeet. IAF always agreed for that.

[vic]

HTT-40 is advanced enough to take over some roles of IJT which will give savings.

[vic]

Frankly I think that HTT-40 should perform the role of BTT and IJT. While LCA lite should perform the role of Hawk and Combat trainer.

[GeorgeWelch]

For what you said previously "More performance isn't necessarily a positive in a trainer. Often it can be deadly as it gives less reaction time and it also costs more as it burns more fuel".

Please prove that better performing HTT-34 was (according to you) more "deadly".

"More performance" = faster
faster = less time to react
less time to react = more likely to have an accident
more likely to have an accident = deadlier

Speed is dangerous. It's why you have speed limits on roads. It's why you don't give someone their first driving lesson in a Formula 1 car.

nowhere did IAF indicate that the plane wasn't meeting it's need and it's a basic trainer we are talking about not a 5th gen fighter.

There is a difference between "not meeting it's need" and deciding not to invest more in it because others could do better.

The biggest issue with HPT-32 was that of safety which unfortunately/strangely couldn't be solved so your theory of obsolescence has no ground w.r.t. the time frame when it arrived.

Just because the largest current issue is safety in no way means that the IAF doesn't see other deficiencies in the plane.

[GeorgeWelch]

Actually, this is one way of putting it. At the same time, information is insufficient to understand if that was the reason for rejection.

Agreed that we don't know the reason. I was merely offering a plausible explanation to counter those that seemed to believe it could only be for nefarious reasons.

[Sagar G]

"More performance" = faster
faster = less time to react
less time to react = more likely to have an accident
more likely to have an accident = deadlier

Speed is dangerous. It's why you have speed limits on roads. It's why you don't give someone their first driving lesson in a Formula 1 car.

All this still doesn't explain what you claimed regarding HTT-34 in your previous posts. Don't see the point being made here w.r.t. HTT-34 by bringing in "speed limits on roads" and F1 cars.

There is a difference between "not meeting it's need" and deciding not to invest more in it because others could do better.

What "other" indigenous option did IAF have at that time ??? How can you say that IAF came to the conclusion that HTT-34 wasn't any better than HPT-32 even without testing it out ???

Just because the largest current issue is safety in no way means that the IAF doesn't see other deficiencies in the plane.

This reply as well doesn't show anything near to proving what you said before regarding HPT-32 obsolescence w.r.t. that timeframe.

I am asking very specific questions based on your claims and I want specific answers regarding that. Reminding you of what you said

More performance isn't necessarily a positive in a trainer. Often it can be deadly as it gives less reaction time and it also costs more as it burns more fuel.

The other possibility is that they consider the HPT-32 obsolete and simply changing the engine isn't sufficient to change their mind.

Now give me specific answers regarding your claim/hypothesis/theory of,

1. HTT-34 being deadly because of superior performance.
2. HPT-32 was obsolete w.r.t. that time frame.

[Sagar G]

Agreed that we don't know the reason. I was merely offering a plausible explanation to counter those that seemed to believe it could only be for nefarious reasons.

How come based on half baked knowledge (as accepted by you) about the trainers in question you are "offering a plausible explanation" ???

[Victor]

I was merely offering a plausible explanation to counter those that seemed to believe it could only be for nefarious reasons.

The plane was falling out of the sky and killing too many pilots, including instructors, and HAL couldn't fix it. It had become a death trap. Where is the confusion here?

[chackojoseph]

Agreed that we don't know the reason. I was merely offering a plausible explanation to counter those that seemed to believe it could only be for nefarious reasons.

The major problem with the plane was its engine. There were issues being pointed out since few years after its induction. HAL has given a design with better engine. Had air force okayed it in 1984, we would have probably not seen this situation with focus to engine.

In early 1990's there was a high level HAL - IAF joint committee to recommend the fix. It did not solve the problems and IAF still wouldn't budge on newer project.

Now that is relating only to engine.

Over all, Deepak was approved with short comings right from the beginning. If you know, the plane had piecemeal orders and there was sufficient time for a new design.

[Abhibhushan]

The major problem with the plane was its engine.

I do not think this is quite true. The main problem was an unreliable LP fuel system which caused random engine failures. This was aggravated by a poor glide characteristic of the aircraft. This resulted in fatalities at a rate not acceptable for a light training aircraft. HAL was unable to address this problem over a long period of time. The engine itself was a proven entity used all over the world in thousands.

There are a few other matters to ponder over in this regard.

• There were no engine failures during the first three or four years of operation. There after, it became a huge problem. Was there a study by any one to inquire what if anything had changed to precipitate this spate of engine failures?
  
  The HTT34 that was flown by HAL was actually an HPT 32 modified with a new engine. I do not think the LP fuel system was tinkered with. Since the original engine could not be really faulted, and the suspected fuel system remained unchanged, would it have been rational to expect the problem to disappear with the change of the engine?
  
  In any case, was there ever a proposal from HAL to modify the HPT 32 fleet to HTT34 standard? Did HAL test the HTT34 prototype to an greed IOC /FOC level to prove that the fuel supply problem has been licked?

I have to admit that I do not possess the necessary information. In the meanwhile, BRFites are free to continue bashing the IAF.

[wig]

Fighter jets getting facelift with modern gadgetry
excerpts

As of now, the IAF is upgrading some 210 fighter jets in its fleet to meet the challenges and equip the planes with the gadgetry of today’s war fighting scenario. The upgrades will be on the Mirage-2000, MiG-29 and Jaguar, all purchased in the 1980s from France, Russia and the UK, respectively.

The next phase will be to upgrade the older lot of Sukhoi-30 MKI planes to equip them with latest radars like the ‘X-band’ allowing a simultaneous track on 30 aerial targets and engage at least six of them. Also the radar signature will be reduced and it will have a new longer range missiles.

The upgrade was anyway needed to bring the planes in tune with latest technology, but the slow place on deciding on the purchase of 126 Rafale has added a tinge of urgency. The IAF Chief had said on October 4: “Negotiations are still on. I cannot place a timeline on when the deal will be signed…The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Dassault are in talks and hope they come with an agreement”.

Besides this, starting next year, three different versions of the MiG 21 planes are to be phased out. Also the MiG 27, another Soviet-era plane used by the IAF, will be phased out. These two planes form the lowest layer of IAF fighter jets in terms of technology. The MiG 29, the Mirage-2000 and the Jaguar are the second layer while Sukhoi-30 MKI is the frontline top-layer.

The IAF has a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons (some 16 to 18 planes in each) but it has just 33. The 34th, a Sukhoi-30-MKI squadron, is being raised at Sirsa in Haryana.

The upgrades will make the IAF carry on with the older planes for at least 15 more years. The MiG 29 fleet of 62 twin-engined planes inducted in the mid 1980s is being upgraded at a cost of $964 million. The upgrade will convert these planes into multi-role fighters, a new avionics suite, latest radars. Similarly the fleet of 51 Mirage-2000 planes is being upgraded under a $2.4 billion contract by Dassault Aviation, its manufacturer. This will also have a new radar, a night vision compatible digital cockpit, helmet-mounted sights and new missiles.

Fitness exercise

* The upgrades will be on the Mirage-2000, MiG-29 and Jaguar, all purchased in the 1980s from France, Russia and the UK, respectively.

* The next phase will be to upgrade the older lot of Sukhoi-30 MKI planes to equip them with latest radars like the 'X-band' allowing a simultaneous track on 30 aerial targets

* The Jaguars, around 100 with the IAF, called the ‘deep penetration strike aircraft’, will get a new engine and weapons delivery system

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20131021/nation.htm#4

[chackojoseph]

The major problem with the plane was its engine.

I do not think this is quite true. The main problem was an unreliable LP fuel system which caused random engine failures. This was aggravated by a poor glide characteristic of the aircraft. This resulted in fatalities at a rate not acceptable for a light training aircraft. HAL was unable to address this problem over a long period of time. The engine itself was a proven entity used all over the world in thousands.

There are a few other matters to ponder over in this regard.

• There were no engine failures during the first three or four years of operation. There after, it became a huge problem. Was there a study by any one to inquire what if anything had changed to precipitate this spate of engine failures?
  
  The HTT34 that was flown by HAL was actually an HPT 32 modified with a new engine. I do not think the LP fuel system was tinkered with. Since the original engine could not be really faulted, and the suspected fuel system remained unchanged, would it have been rational to expect the problem to disappear with the change of the engine?
  
  In any case, was there ever a proposal from HAL to modify the HPT 32 fleet to HTT34 standard? Did HAL test the HTT34 prototype to an greed IOC /FOC level to prove that the fuel supply problem has been licked?

I have to admit that I do not possess the necessary information. In the meanwhile, BRFites are free to continue bashing the IAF.

There were no engine failures, but engine was the major concern and somewhere in 1990-91, there was a HAL-IAF team which gave recommendations. Finally it led to crash during implementation and the fleet was grounded. I think, this is repeat of what I said in the post above.

[Kartik]

We might just see IAF trainees and instructors using iPads for the Hawk fleet

Hawk Trainer iPad trial to start in South Africa

Use of the devices is also to be assessed during trials to be conducted by the UK Royal Air Force and international Hawk operators Australia and India, BAE says.

[pushkar.bhat]

I think we need to read Anil Chopra's article (linked by Philip) and IAF press statement together - I think IAF is proposing use of BRD for license manufacture of PC-7 MKII after the initial numbers slated for purchase are acquired.

Why should BRD handle assembling basic trainers? HAL can do the same just as well. Its a basic trainer after all.

Is BRD's mandate to manufacture/assemble aircraft?

The BRD manufactured Avros so they can license produce the PC-7 MKII. Answering why they should do it well because they can..

[Austin]

Mahindra’s aerospace facility launched near Bangalore

Mahindra Aerospace, the aerospace venture of the Mahindra Group, inaugurated its aerostructures facility at Narsapura, about 50 km from Bangalore, on Monday. “The facility is aimed at positioning the Indian footprint in the global aerostructures supply chain,” said Anand Mahindra, Chairman, Mahindra Group.

Mr. Mahindra also announced that Mahindra Aerospace has entered into a “strategic” technology partnership with the Spanish Tier I aerostructures supplier, the Aernnova Group. Mr. Mahindra said the company has invested about Rs. 150 crores in the facility, which is likely to generate an initial turnover of Rs. 200 crores per annum. The facility, spread over 25,000 sq. metres, will employ about 400 personnel.

Mr. Mahindra said the group’s acquisition in 2010 of two Australian companies — Gippsland Aeronautics, a manufacturer of small aircraft, and Aerostaff, an aircraft component manufacturer — had given it a toehold in the global aircraft component supply chain. He said smaller turboprop aircraft had a bright future, especially in connecting smaller towns and inaccessible locations in the country.

Hemant Luthra, President, Mahindra Systech, said Mahindra’s acquisitions and the partnership with Aernnova would help it get Tier I certification. “This would help Mahindra Aerospace target a wider range of the available aerospace market,” Mr. Luthra said. He said the agreement with Aeronova provides for transfer of technology.

When asked what the prospects were of an aircraft flying out of the Mahindra stable, Mr. Luthra said the aerospace venture may start producing its eight-seater turboprop aircraft “within a time span of two years”. He said Gippsland has so far exported 250 aircraft from Australia, mostly for use in tourism, for humanitarian aid missions and for adventure sports in the US, Canada and Europe. The company is now developing a 10-seater turboprop, targeting a launch in 2014. Also under development is a five-seater, in association with the National Aeronautical Laboratory, Mr. Luthra said.

[Sagar G]

Was there a study by any one to inquire what if anything had changed to precipitate this spate of engine failures?

I don't have any official data about this but looking around for the same and reading from multiple sources whatever teeny tiny data is out there on the net HAL did try many things and most probably they did a study about that as well.

The HTT34 that was flown by HAL was actually an HPT 32 modified with a new engine. I do not think the LP fuel system was tinkered with. Since the original engine could not be really faulted, and the suspected fuel system remained unchanged, would it have been rational to expect the problem to disappear with the change of the engine?

I don't think that you are right here, sample this from the article "Quality is the Key" by Air Marshal (Retd.) B.K.Pandey (link in previous page)

Several modifications were carried out on the aircraft by HAL to solve the problem of interruption of fuel flow in certain conditions of flight, but none were successful. AVCO Lycoming refused to join hands to solve the problem unless HAL reversed all the modifications carried out by them. Clearly, this was not a practical possibility and hence in the resulting stalemate, the IAF was left with no option other than to take the very difficult step of premature withdrawal of the HPT- 32 fleet. The IAF was not prepared to accept further loss of life.

Also they approached IIT Kanpur through CEMILAC and they submitted a technical report in 2007 titled Solution of HPT-32 Engine Cut-Off Problem by A. Kushari and N. G. R. Iyanger. So HAL did try whatever it could to find a solution to the problem but unfortunately couldn't.

In any case, was there ever a proposal from HAL to modify the HPT 32 fleet to HTT34 standard? Did HAL test the HTT34 prototype to an greed IOC /FOC level to prove that the fuel supply problem has been licked?

How come will HAL propose modification from HPT-32 to HTT-34 when IAF didn't show any interest at all in HTT-34 ??? When IAF showed no interest in the first place then there is no question of any agreed too IOC/FOC for the same. I produce another quote from Air Marshal (Retd.) B.K.Pandey from the same article as quoted from previously

In 1984, HAL unveiled a prototype of the HTT-34 at the Farnborough International Air Show. This new aircraft was essentially an HPT-32 airframe, powered by a more powerful 420 shaft horsepower Allison 250-B17D turboprop engine. Compared to the HPT-32, performance of the HTT-34 was reported to be far superior. But for some reason not easy to fathom, the IAF did not appreciate this rare initiative on the part of HAL and did not evince interest in the new product. The project was shelved and in due course, was consigned to the archives.Thereafter, there was no further initiative either from the IAF or from HAL with regard to replacement of the HPT- 32 fleet which in the normal course would have become due by around 2020. In the fitness of things, there should have been a definitive plan in place by 2010 if not earlier for the replacement of the HPT-32 fleet. Sadly, there was none!

So it's not only "IAF bashers" as perceived by you but a system man like yourself is also surprised by the disinterest of IAF regarding the initiative from HAL.

I have to admit that I do not possess the necessary information. In the meanwhile, BRFites are free to continue bashing the IAF.

This is a false charge, moderators here are very strict about anything being said about our armed forces and any misplaced word attracts a warning and if continued still attracts a ban so please let's keep our personal biases aside and try to have as much as possible in-depth analysis as our collective thinking permits.

Here is some more data providing some insight into the problem, from Vayu Aerospace Jan-Feb 2013 issue an article tilted The HPT-32 grounding an Alternate Logic

The recent article in Vayu V/2012 ‘Requiem for the HPT-32’ was carefully researched and provoked much thought. The fuel divider and the collector tank location and capacity are the prime suspects. However there still appears to be some uncertainty : the fuel divider was taken off the list of suspects by investigators and there was the case of an engine stoppage while on the ground. There is a certain uncertainty. It is true that unless the fuel supply is smartly cut off, a warm fuel injected engine will continue to ‘diesel’ even after the ignition is shut off. This ‘cut off’ is one of the major functions of the fuel divider. However this function “gets out of the way”, so to speak, when the throttle is opened beyond idle or near idle. If the fuel divider is the culprit, all the seventy odd incidents of engine stoppage would have occurred at idle or near idle conditions. Also, if maintenance is a problem NO failures should have occurred with a new or “not overhauled” fuel divider. Has this been the case? Regarding the fuel pipe line being not as per FAR standards, the standard requirement is that the pipeline should be able to handle one and a half times the TO fuel flow rate. For the engine in question, the TO fuel flow is approximately 1.3 litres per minute or 20 ml per second corresponding to fuel flow velocity of about 0.7 metres/sec which is not too bad. In any case the main restriction to flow would be the filter just upstream of this line. Actually at the idle case, the fuel flow would be around 200 ml per minute so both the usable header tank capacity and the pipeline are unlikely to be prime suspect. By my estimate, even with the usable 3.5 litre the engine could chunter on for a quarter of an hour at flight idle or three minutes full power, both being times more than enough to get the aeroplane at least into level circuit if not land. That too under flight conditions of no bank or turn during the descent because a bank would recharge the header ! It is also to be noted that there was an engine stoppage on the ground, when the aeroplane was near as level and feed / collector capacity problems could not have occurred. Finally it is bemusing to accept a failure rate of 77 failures in 400,000 flight hours and that too in a system that is ‘on’ every minute of the flight if a single component or system is at significant fault. In my view there is clearly room for an alternate hypothesis.

Quoting from the first page since that's only what is available on the net somebody with subscription to VAYU can please post about this article and the article talked about by the author in the beginning to which he is responding.