India Nuclear News And Discussion

[somnath]

^^^Abhishek,

there is never any "equality" of anything in life...People simply try and make the bets they can out of what they have got..

are not going to ask India to do anything that we are not prepared to do ourselves;

Kissinger was willing to let that be for India, not for anyone else...And the salient point in question was not ACHIVEMENT of global non-proliferation, something over which we have very limited concern (beyond Pak)..What the US was asking of us was to be on their side in structring a new non-proliferation order, in exchange for a recognition of our nuke status..It was upto us to take them up on the offer and see where the discussion went...At the very least, a new order which included us would have enabled us have a greater say in Paki proliferation, rather than what happened - a new order (NSG et al) where we were the pariahs...

No politician, rather very few behave on goodwill, they look at hard national interest...And Kissinger was being the pragmatist when he offered a deal to India, he was again being the pragmatist when the US went ahead and creatd NSG to "punish" India....

[Virupaksha]

that also meant ditching the USSR who had just helped us to stare down the US posture just 3 years ago.

If that was not balooney, I dont know what was.

[Gerard]

Insurance cover for nuclear accidents likely

[somnath]

that also meant ditching the USSR who had just helped us to stare down the US posture just 3 years ago.

If that was not balooney, I dont know what was.

Please go through AG Noorani's article carefully, and if possible Moynihan's book as well..

“He then said: ‘Even if we and the Soviets agreed, you are unlikely to agree unless France and China also agreed. That is why perhaps you are making the suggestion because you know that all nuclear weapon powers will not agree.’ He then asked me: ‘Would you sign such an international agreement if USA and USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] agree to do so?’ I told him that I could put it to my government and we might consider it if it was a real step towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament without any discrimination against the nuclear non-weapon powers. He admitted that such an agreement was unrealistic at the present moment but may be a possibility in the future.”

would suggest that we start some studies on the hint that Kissinger threw when you saw him that he wished to discuss some kind of an agreement between the nuclear powers, in which he included India, regarding non-proliferation.

Kissinger would like to enter into a confidential bilateral or multilateral understanding with us that no nuclear country would transfer nuclear technology including underground nuclear explosive technology to any other (non-nuclear?) country except under adequate safeguards. He said if some suitable formula could be worked out he would then be able to meet criticism in the Congress and elsewhere and India’s position as a nuclear power would be recognised by the whole world. He did not think China would join any such understanding, but France and other nuclear powers would”

Kissinger wasnt naive, far from it...He was fully aware that any global non-proliferation effort ha to have USSR on board in some shape or form...the question of "ditching" therefore did not even arise...BTW, in international relations, it happens all the time..When post-USSR Russia needed American cash, they didnt wait long to "ditch" the "friendship" relations with India - their views on Kashmir (articluated first by Krushchev years back) changed on a dime, the cryogenic engine agreement cancelled peremptorily...At that time Russia did not "remember" the support India gave them on Afghanistan, or during the Prague spring, or the uprising in Budapest, or across a range of issues!

[Virupaksha]

I dont know if we are reading the same article or not, but my reading is the exact opposite of yours.

“a) We recognise India as a nuclear power and would like to deal with you as such;

“b) India has a nuclear weapons capability but we do not wish to split hairs or argue as to whether you are going to use such capability or not;

“c) We are only anxious that other countries like Pakistan should not develop nuclear weapons. That would not only upset the present military balance on the subcontinent but encourage others to go in for nuclear weapons;

“(d) We are not going to ask India to do anything that we are not prepared to do ourselves;

“(e) It may be advisable for India and U.S., either bilaterally or jointly with other nuclear powers, to agree that they will not transfer nuclear explosive technology to non-nuclear countries or other nuclear technology except under strict safeguards. (He hoped that India would agree to this.)



“I told him that while we could not make a public declaration unilaterally that we would not transfer the benefits of such technology to other countries, however, if there was a consensus among the nuclear powers, then we might consider joining such a consensus.

This meant we were ready to join in the consensus as and when China also joins in. China joined the "consensus", nsg in 2004. We made the nuclear deal in 2005. Exactly what was said, if there was consensus among nuclear powers (read China also agrees to such conditions), we will agree to the rules.

In fact I will say that we stuck to our principle and "officially" joined such an effort only after the consensus was built, exactly as the statement says. Infact we did exactly to the letter in 2005 what we said in 1974

Kissinger’s formulations fully accorded with India’s interests and its claims.

This was author's opinion and was clearly balls. China wasnt ready to join such a consensus and thus the actual pact on ground wasnt in India's interests and claims.

Kissinger would like to enter into a confidential bilateral or multilateral understanding with us that no nuclear country would transfer nuclear technology including underground nuclear explosive technology to any other (non-nuclear?) country except under adequate safeguards. He said if some suitable formula could be worked out he would then be able to meet criticism in the Congress and elsewhere and India’s position as a nuclear power would be recognised by the whole world. He did not think China would join any such understanding, but France and other nuclear powers would”

He himself agrees China wouldnt agree to such undertaking, read as China will definitely pass on nuclear tech to Pakistan which it duly did.

“He then said: ‘Even if we and the Soviets agreed, you are unlikely to agree unless France and China also agreed. That is why perhaps you are making the suggestion because you know that all nuclear weapon powers will not agree.’ He then asked me: ‘Would you sign such an international agreement if USA and USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] agree to do so?’ I told him that I could put it to my government and we might consider it if it was a real step towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament without any discrimination against the nuclear non-weapon powers. He admitted that such an agreement was unrealistic at the present moment but may be a possibility in the future.”

diplomatese for stuff it.

would suggest that we start some studies on the hint that Kissinger threw when you saw him that he wished to discuss some kind of an agreement between the nuclear powers, in which he included India, regarding non-proliferation.

Unless you know that all the participants were going to accept something, you want to throw away the bargaining chips?? When it is clear that your immediate competitor, China is not even going to think of being a participant?

Kissinger would like to enter into a confidential bilateral or multilateral understanding with us that no nuclear country would transfer nuclear technology including underground nuclear explosive technology to any other (non-nuclear?) country except under adequate safeguards. He said if some suitable formula could be worked out he would then be able to meet criticism in the Congress and elsewhere and India’s position as a nuclear power would be recognised by the whole world. He did not think China would join any such understanding, but France and other nuclear powers would”

basically every one on the earth except the one with whom you have a problem will sign a document to restrict yourselves.


Kissinger wasnt naive. He was trying to box India, by stating that China was off limits.

and you want me to think that this was a great opportunity missed

In case you forgot, India's nuclear weapons started development exactly after India lost in 1962 and China exploded the bomb. US, USSR, France, UK all these countries were secondary for the nuclear bombs and I dont think these were part of ANY nuclear threat perception.

P.S: regarding the book. I unfortunately do not have access to the book. If there is online link or you can scan the relevant pages, it would be great. Thanks

[Virupaksha]

if you want to say Oh, what did we gain by staying out? China anyway gave it to Pak.

My simple reply is, did the officials know it in 1974 that they will be unsuccesfull to stop it? Who knows they could have planned to give it countries like Taiwan, vietnam at that time or use that sort of threat to China to deter it from giving weapons to China.

That we were unsuccesfull in stopping China and US to give nukes to Pak doesnt mean, we didnt try.

So can you please stop protraying Kissinger's offer as something like the best discovery after fire for India, when it clearly wasnt. Signing that accord meant immediately we lose a chip from our hands with absolutely no gain.

You think that US would have continued to build nuke power plants in India after PNE?

and all this apart from soviets reaction

[somnath]

^^^ Raviji

Do a bit of reading up on India's nuke history - it would enable you make the right assumptions and probably lead you to different conclusions..

In case you forgot, India's nuclear weapons started development exactly after India lost in 1962 and China exploded the bomb

Not at all, depending on how you define what a "nuclear weapons programme" is within the broader nuclear development ambit, India's weapons development programme is as old as the nuke programme itself...Homi Bhabha was very clear on retaining the option, een JLN for all his pacific instincts, said that he cannot constrain himself to NOT have the option for suceeding generations...Days after the Chinese exploded the bomb (in 1964, not 1962), Bhabha gave controversial radio interview where he said that India too could make the bomb very quickly, and above all, do it at a cost that would be "cheaper" than building conventional deterrence..The interview created a huge furore in Parliament and LBS was at pains to defend Bhabha (which he really didnt - he wasnt at all comfortable with the classy, upper class Bhabha)..

Who knows they could have planned to give it countries like Taiwan, vietnam at that time or use that sort of threat to China to deter it from giving weapons to China

Again sir, the very assumption is wrong...India repeatedly, verifiably made undertakings (before 1974, after 1974 and ever after) to the world community that it will never proliferate any nuke weapons related tech...That was a bottomline, and we went to great lengths to adhere to that - (there are amusing stories of Raja Ramanna in Saddam's Iraq looking or nuke weapons)...

So the point on a "global consensus on non-proliferation" was anyway right up our alley..the fact that there was no consensus was a reality as well..Joininig an effort to create a non-proliferation regime did not really come in the way of ny of our stated strategic objectives or choices...It was an American objective (remains one), they were asking for our support in exchange for a recognition of our status...Very similar to the nuke deal now - we have agreed to be part of the system, because the rest of the world recognises us to be part of the system...

There was no specific "Russian" problem at all, barring at a symbolic "signalling" level maybe...SU, like any great power shared the US view on preserving its monopoly over the levers of power, nuke weapons included..Even if there was, the prize was bigger - a possible recognition of nuke weapons status..Who knows, the NSG would have been set up with us as founding members!If China kept out of the system, well it would have been in a gloabl system minus China! China could have still given the tech to Pak..As a founding part of the system, our ability to influence events thereafter would have been far greater than what it was as a pariah...

You think that US would have continued to build nuke power plants in India after PNE

Finally, dont know - the discussions never happened, right? But really, if you still think that the nuke deal is about power plants, then you are in the same group as the agitprop objectors in the Left and the Right...It isnt, it doesnt even matter to India - the power needs of India are so great, and capital costs for nuke power so high that it will always be a small part of the energy grid...

It is about being at the high table to influence policy as a full member...

[Virupaksha]

Bhabha's "retaining the option" is different from actually going on to make the bomb. We might have "retained the option" even before, but we actually went on to make the bomb clearly only after China's bomb.

And from your statement itself, it is clear that we were not actively trying to make a bomb until China did.

Committing to restraining yourselves to not pass on nuclear tech when it was clear that China was going to pass on to Pakistan, I wouldnt say that it is something which doesnt have a loss.

i) We "retained the option" to build a bomb from 50 to 67, then we built the bomb.
ii) We "retained the option" to weaponise the bomb from 74 to 83, then we weaponised the bomb.
iii) We "retained the option" to spread nuke tech, but we didnt do it.

There is a tremendous difference between
I) not doing now - aka "retained the option" and
II) commiting to not do

(I) clearly doesnt imply (II). Until 2005, we were only doing (I) with (iii) but now we are now doing (II) with (iii).

Obviously you understand that during the "retaining the option" time of bomb, if somebody said, "You are anyway not making the bomb, what is the use of retaining the option? Give it up, you lose nothing". Where would we be? This was clearly what was being "offered" by US for nuke proliferation issue.

What was being offered from US side? nothing. NSG wasnt even a paper organisation then and China wasnt going to join as such. One shouldnt throw away your options just for those kinds of benefits.

By the way, such kinds of "balloons" are floated quite regularly in diplomatic circles. They are basically used to gauge and understand what is it that the other party needs. The trick is to react only when something concrete is offered.

Clearly nothing concrete was offered and I personally would not give much credence to the Indian silence of such US balloons.

P.s: I said in my previous post "India lost in 1962" not China exploded the bomb.

[Virupaksha]

Kissinger wasnt offering India a seat in NPT.

Also remember that this was in the backdrop of the NPT (nor does NSG even today), which doesnt even ban bombs, forget tech, for US inside NATO and for Russia in Soviet states.

[Kanson]

"Can you develop an atomic bomb?" Bhabha assured him that he could and in reply to Nehru's next question about time, he estimated that he would need about a year to do it. ... He concluded by saying to Bhabha "Well, don't do it until I tell you to."

[svinayak]

I dont know if we are reading the same article or not, but my reading is the exact opposite of yours.

This was author's opinion and was clearly balls. China wasnt ready to join such a consensus and thus the actual pact on ground wasnt in India's interests and claims.

The author is known for his agenda and is a leftist and does not understand Indian national interest
But they are trying to create an alternate national interest and that is troubling

[somnath]

And from your statement itself, it is clear that we were not actively trying to make a bomb until China did
........
i) We "retained the option" to build a bomb from 50 to 67, then we built the bomb.
ii) We "retained the option" to weaponise the bomb from 74 to 83, then we weaponised the bomb.
iii) We "retained the option" to spread nuke tech, but we didnt do it.

Sir, one, your dates (regardless of the techincal minutae of what is meant by "retaining" the option") are all wrong -

1. Not just the "option", but incremental steps required to produce an explosive device were taken right from the very begining...By the late '60s, we had pretty much everythind ready to produce an explosive device if the political direction came around..

2. Weoponisation did not "start" in 1983..Any country with the capability to produce an explosive device technically has the weapon - hence the sheer oxymoronic nature of the term PNE..Ergo, we had the capability since the late 60s, and proved that capability in 1974..

3. Now if by weaponisation you mean crafting payloads that can be easily stored, delivered on currently available combat platforms (rather than beoig rolled over from a transport aircraft), electronic locks the works..Well THAT work started only in 1987...the famous incident during the airshow in Delhi, when Rajiv Gandhi pulled aside VS Arunachalam and directed him to craft the capability end-to-end...this was the aftermath of brasstacks..

And no way Homi Bhabha could have given a short time and ( defined cost) estimate in 1964 if we didnt have most of the work done already....

you might want to read George Perkovich's fantastic book, "India's nuclear bomb" - its a one-stop learning shop on the topic..

And two, the bigger aspect is of what defines capability - first the ability to build an explosive device, and second, the ability to build the entire end-to-end infrastruture...Kissinger's proposals included an "understanding" of the fact that India would weaponise, he said it in as many words...So really, the real deal is no different from circa 2005 - the real deal is a recognisiton of our weapons status, in exchange for something..That something was not substantially different in 1974 than 2005...In fact the biggest mistake in 1974 was not to have followed up with a full scale weaponisation programme..the reason was simply - IG did the PNE to shore up her own image, not with a grand strateic view...And in the same cynical self interested view, America could not be the counterparty to do deal with!

iii) We "retained the option" to spread nuke tech, but we didnt do it.

This is absolute bunkum...We were right at the forefront of global non-proliferation efforts..Even when we were put under the kosh, we stayed true to that...the option of giving nuke weapon tech to anyone simply did not arise..

Kissinger wasnt offering India a seat in NPT.

Who knows what could have transpired if a discussion took place? Maybe that would have been part of our wishlist to join the Amercian bandwagon? Just as membership of NSG etc was today...In any case, if the US was ready recognise the nuke weapons status of India, NPT is besides the point..

The author is known for his agenda and is a leftist and does not understand Indian national interest

Acharya, dont go by the author's "views", but the facts remain the same whoever uses it......And BTW, being a "leftist", he should have more qualms about doing a deal with the US, no?

[Kanson]

And no way Homi Bhabha could have given a short time and ( defined cost) estimate in 1964 if we didnt have most of the work done already....

you might want to read George Perkovich's fantastic book, "India's nuclear bomb" - its a one-stop learning shop on the topic..

Bhabha gave different number at different time and the reason why he acted this way is complex to debate at this point.

But we know that Nehru resisted developing bomb even after 1962 debacle.

"Study of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes" program was started in 1965, which is the official approval & date for developing bomb peaceful or otherwise.

In April Shastri gave Bhabha formal approval to move ahead with nuclear explosive development. On 5 April 1965 bBhabha initiated the effort by setting up the nuclear esplosive design group Study of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP). Bhabha selected Raja Ramanna - Director of Physics at AEET - to lead the effort.

That spring Bhabha met with T.S. Murthy, bright student then undergoing training at the French nuclear laboratory at Saclay, in Paris. Bhabha confided that Shastri had approved of conducting a nuclear test, and that he was prospecting for a test site. Then Bhabha suggested he scout out the French for useful information, especially regarding polonium technology used for first generation neutron initiators for weapons. By mid year test were conducted with large amounts of high explosives to calibrate seismographs used for nuclear test monitoring.

If we are interested in developing bomb, such acts would have been carried out much earlier.

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/I ... velop.html

[somnath]

^^^ The dates are not really the point here..The real point is whether we had a chance to move on with full weaponisation in 1974 with American support, or at least "understanding"...It seems we could have at least attempted...We didnt, why? Because IG didnt really have the strategic foresight, and simply used the nuke and the anti-americanism for cynical politics...

[svinayak]

Because IG didnt really have the strategic foresight, and simply used the nuke and the anti-americanism for cynical politics...

Nobody with kind of wild imagination will come up with this kind of scenario.

When a country goes nuclear it affects the entire nation and its future and the future of the people for many hundred years. This is not for a single person or some small group of people. This is about *national interest*.

Somebody who understands the concept of the nation and national interest will understand this.

[Virupaksha]

Somnath,

Your argument is predicated upon "Who knows what would have happened if India accepted it?". I would say that should be read as "Who knows what would have happened if India curtailed itself". You havent told me one CONCRETE offer from US. You couldnt tell me one thing which the US was going to give.

"Who knows what would have if Nehru wasnt ruling in 1960s"
"Who knows if Ashoka didnt win in Kalinga war"
"Who knows if Constantine didnt collate the bible"
The answer to these questions is all "Who knows"

Kissinger was clearly floating a balloon trying to read our red lines.
The correct response to such kind of balloons is, we will do it if everyone does it. - which was what India did. Basically kind of throwing the balloon back and asking to come back with something concrete. Clearly US/ Kissinger didnt come back with anything concrete.

There clearly is nothing to read in these kind of balloons.

These are all "hawabaazis"/"fights of air" - written in (auto)biographies praising their western overlords. Of course they would never even try to see whether it was in India's interest or whether India was going to gain (except again hawa baazis like morality) by performing such an endeavour.

You still are yet to answer, what CONCRETE thing was US going to give if India restrained itself permanently in 1974 - that too from a country which just 2 year ago sent its aircraft carrier to threaten it.

When you answer that question after Mistrov's/Pitrovich/wherever book, then we can talk about a deal. Whether it was a correct/right deal or not? There is no deal right now to even talk. Simply asking India to restrain is a "give" for India, where is the "take" part for India?

P.S: by the way, it isnt global if China doesnt sign it. So you may see a contradiction in it, where as for any truly neutral observer, it clearly isnt.

P.S2: Clearly you dont get the difference between
i) We wont do nuke-proliferation now. We wont do if all accepts to not doing it.
ii) We wont do nuke-proliferation, irrespective of others doing it.

[somnath]

^^^ The "takes" for India in the proposals are quite clear - I have highlighted them before...

About this,

P.S2: Clearly you dont get the difference between
i) We wont do nuke-proliferation now. We wont do if all accepts to not doing it.
ii) We wont do nuke-proliferation, irrespective of others doing it.

Clearly, unambiguously, it is the second...There has never been any question of proliferation...

[GuruPrabhu]

When a country goes nuclear it affects the entire nation and its future and the future of the people for many hundred years.

Boss, considering that nukes themselves are about 65 years old, what sort of data are you using to predict "many hundred years"? An answer longer than 3 words would be very welcome The fourth word may just explain everything about your deep conspiracy database.

[svinayak]

When a country goes nuclear it affects the entire nation and its future and the future of the people for many hundred years.

Boss, considering that nukes themselves are about 65 years old, what sort of data are you using to predict "many hundred years"? An answer longer than 3 words would be very welcome The fourth word may just explain everything about your deep conspiracy database.

The countries relationship with other nuclear nations change and it will effect the economy and long trade relationship with rest of the world. The nature of the relations with other people and country will change since the nuclear weapons has been politicized internationally. The effect of trade blocs, sanctions, power blocks will last several decades for large nations.

India leaders may have had this in mind when they delayed weaponisation until the threat was more imminent and rest of the world became aware of the that. Countries which have ambition of geo politics and control have done overt weaponisation.


I dont know what ideology you follow or what is your view of the world and national security of India- assuming you are Indian. A simple reading of many books in this subject will give common sense knowledge of the global relations after the nuclear weapons became mainstream.
But we can see where you are going with your comments on CT etc. If you want good discussion you can be more serious in your post.

[Virupaksha]

^^^ The "takes" for India in the proposals are quite clear - I have highlighted them before...

Can you restate the concrete "takes" once again for unwashed abduls like me. Because I couldnt see any.

About this,

P.S2: Clearly you dont get the difference between
i) We wont do nuke-proliferation now. We wont do if all accepts to not doing it.
ii) We wont do nuke-proliferation, irrespective of others doing it.

Clearly, unambiguously, it is the second...There has never been any question of proliferation...

There I would dare say you have misread India's position and is at the root of our disagreement.

[Amber G.]

Meanwhile, a nice reading about computer worm and how it effected (AQ Khan origin) P1 centrifuges in Iran..

Long but interesting read from todays NY times:
Israel Tests on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay

[somnath]

There I would dare say you have misread India's position and is at the root of our disagreement.

Really? any reference to the fact that proliferation has been an "option" in our nuclear politics?

[Virupaksha]

1) Your skipping of my question about "concrete takes" makes me to understand, that you have already conceded to me the point, that all Kissinger offered was hot air.

2) I cant prove a negative. But disproving my statement is actually easier. An unambiguous public statement before nuke deal , if it is an agreement even better from our national leaders,i.e. prime ministers without the words "global non-proliferation" in it should suffice. Back room chitchats where such rigour is not followed sorry do not cut the ice. Find me one and I will immediately apologize.
India's position for me is clear from the ambiguity personified in our nuclear position and our staid silence on India's nuclear non-proliferation though we were eloquent on global non-proliferation. As long as there is no public commitment to India's nuclear proliferation irrespective of our public position on "global non-proliferation". Before this nuke deal we never did nuke-proliferation and at the same time never signed one that restricted us. So my position remains the correct assessment of the then, India's position on nuke-proliferation.

[somnath]

1) Your skipping of my question about "concrete takes" makes me to understand, that you have already conceded to me the point, that all Kissinger offered was hot air.

No skipping boss - just that tired of pointing out things to someone for whom facts dont come in the way of an opinion!

Anyway, here goes (last time)..

http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2611/ ... 108200.htm

Kaul hosted a dinner on July 16 and sent a report of the talks not only to the Foreign Secretary but also to the Prime Minister: “I told Kissinger I was glad to see that the two Super Powers had expressly recognised the difference between peaceful and military purposes of underground nuclear explosions in the latest agreement signed in Moscow. He replied: ‘I knew that you would use this to justify your own explosion. I have taken a very sober and realistic view of your explosion and I would not be surprised even if you went in for nuclear weapons

Kissinger would like to enter into a confidential bilateral or multilateral understanding with us that no nuclear country would transfer nuclear technology including underground nuclear explosive technology to any other (non-nuclear?) country except under adequate safeguards. He said if some suitable formula could be worked out he would then be able to meet criticism in the Congress and elsewhere and India’s position as a nuclear power would be recognised by the whole world. He did not think China would join any such understanding, but France and other nuclear powers would

Kaul reported to the Prime Minister: “I asked him about what sort of discussions on nuclear questions he wanted to have in Delhi. He replied as follows.” The points Kissinger made are extremely important:

“a) We recognise India as a nuclear power and would like to deal with you as such;

“b) India has a nuclear weapons capability but we do not wish to split hairs or argue as to whether you are going to use such capability or not;

“c) We are only anxious that other countries like Pakistan should not develop nuclear weapons. That would not only upset the present military balance on the subcontinent but encourage others to go in for nuclear weapons;

“(d) We are not going to ask India to do anything that we are not prepared to do ourselves;

“(e) It may be advisable for India and U.S., either bilaterally or jointly with other nuclear powers, to agree that they will not transfer nuclear explosive technology to non-nuclear countries or other nuclear technology except under strict safeguards. (He hoped that India would agree to this.)

He wrote: “The Nth power has finally come forward…. The challenge is no longer keeping India from going nuclear; it is stabilising a new nuclear ‘power’ within the international framework and trying to dissuade others from following suit.”

If there isnt enough "takes" here, I dont know what other "takes" anyone could have expected...

2) I cant prove a negative. But disproving my statement is actually easier. An unambiguous public statement before nuke deal , if it is an agreement even better from our national leaders,i.e. prime ministers without the words "global non-proliferation" in it should suffice

That is why its so important to do a bit of reading..You dont have to resort to not-so-sophisticated sophistry to prove a point...Seems you dont even read news articles on the nuke issue...

Anyhow - no time to find out various quotes of PMs etc, but here's the 123 agreement - this is what India has signed up to..

http://www.usindiafriendship.net/viewpo ... nt2007.htm

AFFIRMING that cooperation under this Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation...

AFFIRMING their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

[vera_k]

You are giving too much weight to what Kissinger said or did. As Perkovich's book says, Kissinger was overruled by the US Congress on non-proliferation matters when it comes to India. The same dynamic was pretty much seen with Rice battling Congress over IUCNA. So the national consensus in the US was (and is?) against any laxity when it comes to India and non-proliferation.

[Virupaksha]

Somnath,

You clearly missed

An unambiguous public statement before nuke deal

[CRamS]

AmberJi,

I posted this in the Indo-US thread last night

I was speculating a while back that the computer worm, Stuxnet, that hit Iran could be a US and/or Israeli opertation. It now appears to be the case according to this NYT report

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world ... uxnet.html

I also speculated that the recent GSLV failures in India could be due to US sabotage. From the above report:

The worm hit primarily inside Iran, Symantec reported, but also in time appeared in India, Indonesia and other countries.

I have a question for the cyber-security gurus here:

1) From the above report, it appears to me that human in the loop is key, i.e, for those computers not reachable via the public Internet, somebody has to go and inject that worm into an Intranet system through a USB drive or something else. Yes/No?

2) Anyone knows if ISRO or BARC or any of India's sensitive installations use the Siemens PCS-7 control system software. This Stuxnet seems to be designed to specifically target PCS-7, and that too of a particular configuration according to the above report.

[Virupaksha]

Somnath,
ok, rinse and repeat my own post http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 2#p1010392
again, what does "recognition" mean?
i) entry into NPT as nuke state - absolutely no indications were given.
ii) Continued engagement in nuke field - absolutely no indications were given

in short all only hot air from US side to India.

I have taken a very sober and realistic view of your explosion and I would not be surprised even if you went in for nuclear weapons

Are they our overlords or emperors, that we have to see the above as some "take"? basically hot air

Kissinger would like to enter into a confidential bilateral or multilateral understanding with us that no nuclear country would transfer nuclear technology including underground nuclear explosive technology to any other (non-nuclear?) country except under adequate safeguards. He said if some suitable formula could be worked out he would then be able to meet criticism in the Congress and elsewhere and India’s position as a nuclear power would be recognised by the whole world. He did not think China would join any such understanding, but France and other nuclear powers would

An agreement clearly where US interests against India are taken care of, but not India's. Not even hot air

Kaul reported to the Prime Minister: “I asked him about what sort of discussions on nuclear questions he wanted to have in Delhi. He replied as follows.” The points Kissinger made are extremely important:

“a) We recognise India as a nuclear power and would like to deal with you as such;

doesnt expound on what "recognition" means and recognition as such for us means nothing. They are not our overlords or emperors and we are not clamoring like dogs, for their "recognition". accepting such a thing as "take", means we are accepting their overlordship. I wouldnt even honour the above statement with hot air.

“c) We are only anxious that other countries like Pakistan should not develop nuclear weapons. That would not only upset the present military balance on the subcontinent but encourage others to go in for nuclear weapons;

Their sincerity of this "anxiety" at THAT time was clear when they said China was off limits and later when they and China helped cross Pakistan the nuclear threshold. Those are clearly words which were intended to give India a bad feeling of not accepting this and a scare crow, with nothing in it. Seems like you are seeing this as something "real".

And I would give these Kissinger's rants exactly as much value as I would give ahmadinejad's rants. To analyze these rants, it is important to analyze the audience for these rants. Per my reading it is US diplomatic coterie, congress and POTUS. It is to show them "We tried to be understanding of the Indians (by giving hot air), but these "Indians are bast*rds anyways" ".

The not coming back with anything substantial and their later actions, point only to these possibilities. We have to wade through Kissinger's duplicity with words and analyse his sayings by what he actually did. I guess nobody needs any kissinger's hypocrisy and duplicity examples as they are aplenty.

[saip]

About the Stuxnet worm, does it affect Paki centrifuges? They use if I remember next generation centrifuges, but they may be similar to P1s

[somnath]

Somnath,

You clearly missed

An unambiguous public statement before nuke deal

Boss, go to a bookshop, pick up George Perkovich's book - it has detailed accounts of how key policy-makers behaved/talked on the issue...Or use Google - read up on Rajiv Gandhi's (impractical) global disarmament proposal..Or any statement on India's proliferation record by mandarins...

As an aside, you might want to think how proliferating nuke tech to others could be of any use to India...Proliferate to whom? Taiwan? Japan? South Korea?

[Virupaksha]

Somnath,

You clearly missed
An unambiguous public statement before nuke deal

Boss, go to a bookshop, pick up George Perkovich's book - it has detailed accounts of how key policy-makers behaved/talked on the issue...Or use Google - read up on Rajiv Gandhi's (impractical) global disarmament proposal..Or any statement on India's proliferation record by mandarins...

As an aside, you might want to think how proliferating nuke tech to others could be of any use to India...Proliferate to whom? Taiwan? Japan? South Korea?

wait a min. Rajiv Gandhi said "global disarmament" and that somehow negated what I said?
he didnt say India's disarmament did he?

Options are endless, its our own eyes blinding them.

[somnath]

he didnt say India's disarmament did he?

Do some reading..Go through the speech - read references to how India does not "proliferate".....

[Virupaksha]

http://www.bearve.net/blog/speeches/raj ... ar-weapons

This is by the way, the speech you are speaking about. read it through

[somnath]

^^^ YOu are right - RG's speech doesnt have any allusiosn to India's commitment on non proliferation..

But given that I made the faux pas, I need to make amends!

This is speech by (then) FM Jaswant Singh:

http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd46/46india.htm

We remain committed to nuclear non-proliferation.

7. India is a nuclear-weapon state. Though not a party to the NPT, India's policies have been consistent with the key provisions of NPT that apply to nuclear-weapon states. These provisions are contained in Articles I, III and VI. Article I obliges a nuclear-weapon state not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other country or assist any other country to acquire them and India's record on non-proliferation has been impeccable

nothing new - successive Indian FMs and PMs have made the same statements..

[Virupaksha]

exactitude and subtlety lead to a completely different picture. It is not for nothing that Indian diplomats when it comes to high level agreements clamour over each word.

Recall the time during NPT when India was asking for security guarantees for non-nuclear states, in exchange for not going nuclear and this was just 7 years before 1974.

events over rode things but India had kept its options open, though didnt take the plunge.
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/184/4144/1351.extract

PS: I dont wish to continue this line of discussion any further and thus will not be responding.

[somnath]

Ahh,

From this:

unambiguous public statement before nuke deal , if it is an agreement even better from our national leaders,i.e. prime ministers without the words "global non-proliferation"

to

Recall the time during NPT when India was asking for security guarantees for non-nuclear states, in exchange for not going nuclear and this was just 7 years before 1974

So Right to make weapons = Right to proliferate weapons tech!

Good show! As for Argentine-India nuclear agreement, it was a civilian nuke tech agreement - the Argentines had similar ones with Germany, Canada, Brazil BEFORE the Indian agreement...

It was nice discussing with you...

[ramana]

End of an era! He was one nationalist Leftist.

Pioneer Reports:

Political commentator Bhabani Sen Gupta dead
January 18, 2011 9:20:41 PM

PTI | New Delhi

Eminent political scientist, writer and foreign affairs commentator Bhabani Sen Gupta died here today of prolonged illness.

The veteran scholar breathed his last at the Apollo Hospital early this morning, his family said. He was 89.

Professor Sen Gupta is survived by his son Shivaji Sengupta, daughter Sree Sengupta, daughter-in-law Susmita Sengupta, and seven grandchildren.

A respected and influential political commentator on international affairs, most notably on Southeast Asia and Indo-American relations, Sen Gupta authored over 15 books in English.

His books included analyses on Afghanistan, the Soviet era and on the regional issues in South Asia. Some of his notable works are 'The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations among China, India, Pakistan, and the USSR', 'The Gorbachev Factor in World Affairs: An Indian Interpretation', 'Communism in Indian Politics', and 'Afghanistan: Politics, Economics, and Society Revolution, Resistance, Intervention' among others.

Sen Gupta, also known as Chanakya Sen, was also a prolific writer in Bengali and some of his more famous books include Rajpath-Janapath, Mukhyo Mantri, and She Nohi She Noni.

His family and friends would assemble on January 22 at Chittaranjan Bhavan to remember him, the family members said.

[Varoon Shekhar]

Kaiga-4 operational, connected to grid.

MUMBAI: The fourth unit of 220 MW Kaiga Generating Station (KGS-4) located in Uttar Kanada district of Karnataka was connected to the southern power grid in the early hours today, after the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) granted clearance to it.

KGS-4, which achieved first criticality on November 27 last year, was "synchronised with the southern grid at 01:56 hours", general manager (corporate communication) R R Kakde of Nuclear Power Corporation of India said here in a release.

With the synchronisation of KGS-4 with the grid, India's nuclear power capacity has gone up to 4780 MW, with 20 reactors in operation. The installed capacity of Kaiga station is now 880 MW, making it the third largest after Tarapur (1400 MW) and Rawatbhata (1180 MW), he said.

The unit, fuelled by indigenous uranium, will supply electricity to Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry.

NPCIL has also achieved new landmarks of generating over 4000 MW and over 95 million units of power a day. This is a 100 per cent increase over what was being generated

Read more: India's 20th nuclear reactor connected to power grid - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... z1BUgWMAVb

[Sanatanan]

from a blog dealing with nuclear issues (22nd Jan 2011)
Saskatchewan wants to buy small reactors

. . .
Saskatchewan doesn’t want an 1,100 MW reactor. It doesn’t have the population, electricity demand, or the grid to support one. According to government statistics, the population in 2010 was 1.05 million people. Interesting, it is about the same size, in terms of people as the population of Rhode Island. While that state has a land area of less than 1,000 square miles, Saskatchewan has a land area of 652,300 square miles. Two cities, Saskatoon and Regina, hold about 450,000 people or just under half the total population.
. . .
“In this province, particularly when you have such a diffused population base, you need nodes of generation to keep the grid balanced. So 300 MW reactors make eminent sense.”

The only remaining question is who is going to supply the SMR? Stay tuned.

This may be an ideal chance for India to export its 220 MWe PHWR, a model, with which Canadians are quite familiar. Nat U is plentiful in Canada, so can use U mined in Canada itself!! Because of its very high neutron economy, a PHWR (in combination with a fuel cycle that incorporates spent fuel reprocessing to extract the reactor grade Pu isotopes - under safeguards, of course -- and also help segregate the radioactive fission products), provides the best energy output obtained per kg of Uranium mined. If India can get Canada to buy its 220 MWe Class Reactors at a fair price, the nuclear deal could stand justified, else, in my view, not. May be we could treat it as a test case.

[vish_mulay]

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/chennai/ ... r-best-949

Unique atomic fuel mix to make Kalpakkam’s FPBR the best
Jan. 23: India is confident of commissioning the first-of-its-kind prototype fast breeder reactor (FBR) next year with the technology challenges confronting it having been overcome.

The 500 MWe reactor, being developed by the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) here, uses a unique mix of uranium and plutonium which significantly enhances the capability to generate electricity per tonne of fuel utilised.

“Our anxiety about technological challenges for the construction of the country’s first 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) is over and we are at the closure for technology delivery,” IGCAR director Baldev Raj said.

Has this been posted before? if so apologies in advance.