Bharat Rakshak

Young Egyptians mount unusual challenge to Mubarak
A Facebook-fueled youth movement has called for more protest, challenging a government that says it won't tolerate it. Security forces have blocked activists' Twitter accounts but not their anger.

Draped in a scarf and smoking a water pipe, Ahmed Maher sat in an outdoor cafe, looking too relaxed to be an often-jailed dissident and the leader of a youth movement that has shaken the Egyptian government by rallying thousands of protesters into the streets this week.

"It never stops," Maher said, looking down at his cellphone, muted but flashing incessantly. "After the revolution in Tunisia, we are able to market the idea of change in Egypt. People now want to seize something."

A 28-year-old construction engineer, Maher, who says he has been beaten while imprisoned, heads the April 6 youth movement, which has organized protests and plotted strategies through Facebook to outmaneuver the police. The social network technology symbolizes why a young generation of Egyptians, not beholden to ideologies or religion, but driven by the belief that the country owes them opportunity, is so dangerous to longtime President Hosni Mubarak.

Maher's movement has called for another round of demonstrations Friday, a direct challenge to a government that has said it will no longer tolerate public dissent. Security forces have blocked activists' Twitter accounts, but they have not been able to counter the venom that has protesters ripping the president's pictures from walls while cursing his son, who many Egyptians expect will someday succeed him.

One year ago, when activists questioned whether Egyptians possessed the courage to rebel, the political opposition was energized by Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who returned home to lead the National Front for Change. Maher and others, at the time, said the opposition had found its galvanizing presence.

But for months, ElBaradei was unwilling to engage in sustained street protests and was often out of the country. That may change with the return here of the former chief United Nations nuclear inspector, who said he would join demonstrations Friday.

"There's still a lot of potential around ElBaradei, Maher said. "He's a symbol. Maybe it's making people think we can't rely on someone else, we have to do it ourselves."

Other hopes for rebellion, including protests against human rights abuses and police torture, flared for a few days but disappeared. Last year, many thought demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria over a blogger allegedly beaten to death while in police custody would trigger a national revolt. They didn't.

Then Tunisia exploded and the rhythms of the Arab world were broken.

The Egyptian protest that brought more than 10,000 people into downtown Cairo on Tuesday had been planned before the electrifying events in Tunisia. But activists regrouped and marketed the spirit of Tunisia, startling both themselves and their government with the rage and turnout against Mubarak.

"I think people are now more willing to sacrifice their own lives," Maher said. "They finally see that even if they die, it's for a larger cause. That's the climate here now."

Muppalla wrote:<OT>

abhischekcc wrote:Delhi is rife with the news that Sonia Gadhi has fled the country with to avoid getting arrested, that's why she was absent during Republic Day parade.

Tunisia effect reaches India too.

She did not feld. She went to London to party away from INC party for a break. It was a private jet per a blog and the schedule of the flight is known only to the pilot who is not of Indian origin.
</OT>

ramana wrote:Good observation: Return of the Mameluks. Its same in TSP where Generals takeover in a trice.

Its realted to the idea of an Islamic State.

The Sultan is head of govt and the military. That is what gives power to him for Zawabit.
.

abhischekcc wrote:Mupalla,

Any link to the blog?

Comment: In Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria long time leaders are trying to reinvent themselves or, perhaps just stall for time so they can safeguard their wealth and families.

In Critical Decisions, Irving Janis made the point that catastrophic failure means the whole leadership group must be replaced in business and in politics. There are no second chances; no do-overs. The irony is that by the time failure is recognized, it is too late for the incumbent regime to fix it, even if it has the insight and capabilities. People always want new blood.

That creates a dilemma for incumbent leaders. They all have a set of resources for handling the normal range of challenges. They also have reserves they can draw on in the event of a crisis. However, the only way a regime's leaders can be certain a crisis is occurring is when the normal resources prove incapable of continuing the challenges, as occurred in Tunisia. This is as true for police forces in urban America as it is for security personnel in Cairo.

Recognition that a crisis is emerging, in practice, always occurs after damage has already taken place and forces have faltered. That means that leaders are almost always in a reactive mode. The police have to be overrun before the Army can be called in.

To be proactive would be to act with what appears to be unjustified and unnecessary force because the police have not failed yet. It is a dangerous time because the damage can be so great that the reserve forces of order cannot or might choose not to restore order. In Tunisia, for example, the reserves, in the form of the Army, balked and the head of government fled. Internal uprisings can get out of control with little warning, as a result.

The final point is that the usual diplomatic mantra is that the US has relations with governments and its policies are not tied to people. And yet in every Middle Eastern state, the widespread perception is that US policy is identified with individual rulers, from the Kings of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco to the strong men in Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria and Egypt. The practice works and policy support flourishes until the leaders are overthrown.

Strongman rulers cannot all of a sudden be generous democrats.

Lalmohan wrote:yes but the regime honchos are all unkil-pasand
they are unkil's sob's
losing them all in one go is not good for unkil

WASHINGTON—With events moving rapidly in Egypt, the Obama administration sharply shifted its tone Friday, expressing "deep concern" over "unfolding" actions and urging "open communications" after Egyptian President Hsni Mubarak shut down Internet and cell services in the world's largest Arab country.

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley took to the social-networking site Twitter to say, "Events unfolding in Egypt are of deep concern. Fundamental rights must be respected, violence avoided and open communications allowed."

That message was a change from Thursday's calls for restraint, which were accompanied by mild expressions of support for Mr. Mubarak.

On PBS Thursday night, Vice President Joe Biden said, "Mubarak has been an ally of ours in a number of things. And he's been very responsible on, relative to geopolitical interest in the region, the Middle East peace efforts; the actions Egypt has taken relative to normalizing relationship with—with Israel. …I would not refer to him as a dictator."

Those comments garnered criticism Friday as police and armored vehicles took to the streets of Cairo with water cannons, tear gas, and in some cases, live fire to suppress the rapidly spreading protests.

Mr. Crowley's comments on Twitter echo what now appears to be a pivotal speech made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton earlier this month in Qatar, in which she urged the non-democratic leaders of North Africa and the Middle East to embrace calls for democratic change.

"Reform is vital to Egypt's long-term well-being," Mr. Crowley said. "The Egyptian government should view its people as a partner and not as a threat."

A succession of rallies and demonstrations, in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Algeria, inspired by the popular outpouring of anger that toppled Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, pose a thorny problem for U.S. policy in the region.

The unrest has placed the future of some of the U.S.'s closest strategic allies into question, and raised the specter that grass-roots anger at leaders perceived as corrupt and out-of-touch could be seized upon by Islamic radicals hoping to ride the anger to power.

Muppalla wrote:I have a feeling someone is increasing the cost of Uncle when the economy is under stress.

Lalmohan wrote:yes but the regime honchos are all unkil-pasand
they are unkil's sob's
losing them all in one go is not good for unkil

Lalmohan wrote:who or what is aunty?

Lalmohan wrote:i am at a loss to understand why BRF members continue to assume that britain still has any power/clout/influence on the international stage and that too in geopolitics. comeon guys, their power, their ability to actually do anything significant - formidable as it was - ENDED a long time ago.

paramu wrote:Al Jazeera is the media that provides extensive media coverage mid-east revolts, and it is filled with ex-BBC staff.

Lalmohan wrote:i am at a loss to understand why BRF members continue to assume that britain still has any power/clout/influence on the international stage and that too in geopolitics. comeon guys, their power, their ability to actually do anything significant - formidable as it was - ENDED a long time ago.

brihaspati wrote:What USA had sowed it is reaping now....

USA chose to erase all alternative ideologies and trends - so why the surprise and shock!

Lalmohan wrote:this hummus revolution is quite harmful to unkil's position, but at the same time, it appears not to be al qaeda led...

if we have to look for external agent provocateur... who are the suspects?
Russia?
China?
Iran?

But the dangers to U.S. interests of what comes next in the Arab world are hard to exaggerate. Were demonstrations to spread in a big way to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, a catastrophe could be looming. A more enlightened, pro-American regime than the one now in Jordan is hard to imagine. As for the Saudi royal family, it is probably the worst possible form of government for that country except for any other that might credibly replace it. Imagine all that weaponry the United States has sold the Saudis over the decades falling into the hands of Wahhabi radicals. Imagine Yemen were it divided once again into northern and southern parts, or with even weaker central control issuing from the capital city of Sanaa. The United States would be virtually on its own battling al Qaeda there.

Right now all these uprisings look somewhat the same, as they did in Eastern Europe in 1989. But like in Eastern Europe, each country will end up a bit differently, with politics reflecting its particular constituency and state of institutional and educational development. Poland and Hungary had relatively easy paths to capitalism and democracy; Romania and Bulgaria were sunk in abject poverty for years; Albania suffered occasional bouts of anarchy; and Yugoslavia descended into civil war that killed hundreds of thousands of people. The Arab world is in some ways more diverse than Eastern Europe, and we should therefore heed the uniqueness of each country's political and historical situation in calibrating U.S. policy.

Washington's hesitation isn't hard to understand: for all the energy and passion on the street, Mubarak's regime very well could survive and would remember well any wavering of U.S. support. Other regimes in the region might be quite concerned if the U.S. failed to back its long time ally. And popular movements which might replace Mubarak would not likely be as supportive on foreign policy, putting at risk key U.S. policies such as the blockade of Gaza. It's easy for me, as an analyst, to push the United States to be forceful in support of the Egyptian protestors but I can understand why the administration appears cautious. That said, the arguments for caution are crumbling rapidly.

Mubarak's regime has been wounded at its core, and even if he survives in the short run the regime will have to make major internal changes to regain any semblance of normality. An Egyptian regime which spends the next years in a state of military lockdown will hardly be a useful ally. It's not like there's an active peace process to compromise. The Islamist scarecrow shouldn't work, given the Muslim Brotherhood's limited role in events (despite the efforts of the Egyptian regime to claim otherwise).

More broadly the costs to the Obama administration with Arab public opinion of being on the wrong side of this issue will be enormous. This isn't about the "magical democracy words" of the past few years -- it's about a moment of flux when real change is possible, whether or not the United States wants it. Accepting Mubarak's fierce gambit now would put an end to any claim the United States has of promoting democracy and reform for a generation, and alienating the rising youth generation on which the administration has placed so much emphasis. It would also make Cairo the graveyard of Obama's Cairo speech and efforts to rebuild relations with the Muslims of the world. The United States will be better positioned to push such changes in the right direction if it maintains a strong and principled position today -- regardless of whether Mubarak or someone else ends up in control. The cautious strategy right now is the same as the principled one, whether Mubarak falls or if he survives.

President Hosni Mubarak is not going anywhere: that's the message of his late night televised statement. And it is hardly surprising. Whatever we may think of him, he is not going to grab the gold and head for the hills (or sands), Ben Ali style. There is no reason to assume that he doesn't believe what he said: Mubarak views himself as a loyal Egyptian citizen who has steered a difficult course between the quest for stability and economic modernization and the exigencies of democracy. He believes that the quest for safety, jobs and security must bound the limits of freedom, or there will be chaos (fawda). He has spent his life striking this difficult balance, he told us, and thus he is not about to give up now.

That this reasoning will fall on deaf ears is something Mubarak either doesn't understand or will not tolerate. This action presages a more severe crackdown, but one that might be followed by an effort to heal wounds. Indeed, when a severe-looking Mubarak promised a "dialogue," he may have been signaling his desire to emulate previous Egyptian leaders by reaching out to the opposition after a period of discontent and renewed repression.

This cycle goes back to 1974, when Anwar Sadat initiated his "Infitah" policy. Seven years later, following his efforts to repress dissent, he was gunned down by a radical Islamist and member of the military, who proudly declared, "I have shot the Pharaoh." The man sitting next to Sadat, Vice President Mubarak, took the mantle of the presidency and then declared a new day of political reconciliation and openness.

Is it back to the future? Can Mubarak -- or indeed anyone from the top echelons of the political pyramid -- distance themselves from the very system over which they have presided for thirty years?

I have my doubts. What I am sure of is that the mass protests of the last days have revealed a new social landscape -- one that could help turn a popular rebellion into a democratic revolution. Whether this happens through a prolonged struggle to recast liberalized autocracy from within, or a shorter street battle that topples the regime, is hard to say. But one thing is clear: Egypt's new social landscape is defined by an alliance of angry youth whose political identities cannot be reduced to religion or faith.

In making this assertion, I am not embracing the "post-Islamist" thesis that has received renewed attention since Tunisia's revolution burst on the scene. Indeed, rumors of the inevitable irrelevance of Islamists have been greatly exaggerated. But what we do have in today's Egypt, and in Tunisia as well, is the growing desire of a vulnerable urban middle class youth to bridge the gap between Islamist and non-Islamist identities and agendas.

If Islamists and non-Islamists, as well as Muslims and Copts, can join together, they will undercut the fear-mongering strategies that autocrats throughout the Arab world have long used to secure support from those groups that fear an "Islamist" takeover. This is reason enough for veteran Islamists to set aside the ambiguities that characterize their ideologies, and in so doing, fully embrace the premises and rules of democratic pluralism.

For starters, a caveat. As with the various WikiLeaks revelations, it's a mistake to view these documents (which detail all sorts of confidential negotiations) as "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

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Second, the above caveat notwithstanding, the documents put to death the idea that Israel has no Palestinian "partner for peace." On the contrary, they reveal a PA leadership that is desperate for peace --

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Third, I can't make up my mind about the PA itself. A good case can be made that they've become complicit in the occupation and that the much-heralded "Fayyadism" --

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Fourth, these releases can also be read as the final obituary for the Oslo peace process.

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And if we step back and take a larger and longer view, it begins to look like the U.S. position in the Middle East, which seemed so dominant after the fall of the USSR and the first Gulf War, is now crumbling. Hezbollah just formed a government in Lebanon, possibly after the United States convinced former PM Saad Hariri to go back on a compromise deal over the U.N. tribunal investigating the murder of his father. Iraq is now governed by a Shiite government with extensive links to Iran and is denying the U.S. any future military role there. A democratic government in Turkey, while not anti-American, is charting an independent course. The Mubarak government in Egypt, long a close U.S. client, has been shaken, and even if it survives the current turmoil, its long-term status is up for grabs.

The problem is this: The United States has no idea how to deal with a Middle East where the voice of the people might actually be heard, rather than being subject to the writ of various aging potentates. And having followed policies for decades that are unpopular with most of those same people, we may be about to reap the whirlwind.