Re: Deterrence
Posted: 27 May 2014 08:20
Tons of options in between. We have to break them piece by piece just like they've been trying to do with us.
Thanks for posting.ShauryaT wrote: Let me start that with a paper, which seeks to explore such lines.
Countering Pakistan’s Asymmetric Warfare
All individuals in a society buy into some variant of ideology. When things happen in the social world that do not affect the vast majority on a personal level, they become touchstones for our ideology, foci of reaction that either positively or negatively end up reinforcing the ideology of our choice. This is very different from what happens when reality itself comes into direct contact with the lives of a large mass of people.It is not only reality which enslaves us. The tragedy of our predicament when we are within ideology is that when we think we escape it into our dreams, it is precisely at that point that we are within ideology. This is the ultimate illusion. Ideology is not imposed upon us; it is the sum of our spontaneous relationship with the social world, and determines how we perceive each meaning of all things that happen.
Rudradev ji, a very sound thesis. I agree that this can be factored into deterrence theory. But it can work both ways - In terms of gauging how close the enemy is to their "ideological touchstone", a lot depends on the "level" of their ideological brainwashing - because that determines their sense of existential threat and regret. A "strategic" view of deterrence means there are more factors that determine the dynamics of individual encounter with reality versus mass ideological reaction:Rudradev wrote:According to the Yugoslavian philosopher Slavoj Zizek:All individuals in a society buy into some variant of ideology. When things happen in the social world that do not affect the vast majority on a personal level, they become touchstones for our ideology, foci of reaction that either positively or negatively end up reinforcing the ideology of our choice. This is very different from what happens when reality itself comes into direct contact with the lives of a large mass of people.It is not only reality which enslaves us. The tragedy of our predicament when we are within ideology is that when we think we escape it into our dreams, it is precisely at that point that we are within ideology. This is the ultimate illusion. Ideology is not imposed upon us; it is the sum of our spontaneous relationship with the social world, and determines how we perceive each meaning of all things that happen.
Agnimitra, may I point out that "visible" actions of territorial protection by India and a perceived failure of the government in "visibly" protecting the borders combined with a media onslaught that suggests that India is softening up are, like Rudradev's Babri or family burning in Mumbai, "ideological touchstones" that we (lay people) feel deeply about.Agnimitra wrote:RudraDev / ravi_g ji,
China has already tested India's specific ideological quotient w.r.t. certain territories, via its repeated incursions, most prominently the DBO incursion. Forget nuclear warfare, India was not even prepared to formulate a conventional response to these incursions in Ladakh and Arunachal P. So these territories have been determined as being "softened" in terms of Delhi's ideological calculus. I am not sure if that's the way Delhi chunkians want to keep it, or whether it was just a lack of spine. For instance, STFU-TSP intentionally keeps its Afghan borders "soft". Anyway - India similarly needs to find out which other parts of India-facing Pakhanastan can be "softened". This continuous process is strategic deterrence.
Anand K ji, publishing a very "clear, logical, reaction-oriented" behavioral choice of one's own helps to set parameters in a game with an enemy that barely has control of its own collective mind (wadhera versus jernail versus kernail, etc). The goal here is to game a Nash equilibrium towards a set of choices that favours one's own medium-term national priorities.Anand K wrote:Perhaps this is why we have decided to publicize a fixed NFU + MR strategy - too much uncertainty regarding your enemy. Add to this other issues like close proximity, limited resources, internal security and post-war calculus etc etc. Perhaps we have "resigned" ourselves to committing to fight if the provocation is grave enough - even if it's in the nuclear shadow. And in that case there's no use talking about graded response or escalation ladder if nukes are used from Pakistani side.
shiv ji, as I said to Anand K above, you are imagining a more chunkian behind-the-scenes scenario to make GoI look good - I am not saying you are wrong or right. But the fact is that you currently have the "space" to argue like that only because of the low ideological sensitivity of the Indian people to what happened. "Territorial integrity" itself is sort of low ideological sensitivity - considering we already got threashed and a lot of our territory taken in 1962...considering that devout Hindus, Sikhs and Indian Buddhists need to line up for limited Chinese visas to make the pilgrimage to Kailasa-Mansarovar..etc. On top of this already low ideological sensitivity, you are justifying a violation of even the current territorial boundaries of India.shiv wrote:The fact that a weak image is openly allowed with no attempt to clear up what is obviously an emotional ideological touchstone (territorial integrity) could mean that media reports of weakness and softness are not necessarily accurate.
Pakistan: A Military Challenge in The Backdrop of
Conclusion
Two factors which emerge are that Pakistan is neither deterred nor
dissuaded by India’s conventional or nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the
strategy and doctrine has to be evolved to send a clear signal of zero
tolerance to provocation. Of course, the cost is heavy but there is no option
but to undertake massive retaliation by combined arms, to meet these
parameters. A proactive strategy should have tenets of punitive actions to
ensure degradation of war-waging capability and a deterrence to disrupt and
dissuade Pakistan from waging proxy war. But to be able to do that, India will
have to build the capabilities and capacity needed to sustain and survive the
friction of war. When a nation goes to war, the timeframe and escalation level
should not be the limiting or binding factors. The limiting factor for conflict
termination should be the objectives of war and nothing else. Whatever may
be the means, whatever may be the methods, what must be definite is the
certainty of punishment, to deter Pakistan from future misadventures.
The concept needs to be evolved into a short swift war to fight forward
rather than luring the enemy deep into one’s territory. The armed forces
need to move forward from a war of annihilation to a war of manoeuvre to
defeat the strategy rather than concentrating on the destruction of the army.
Flexibility and resilience needs to be built to swiftly change from a “defensive
campaign” to an “offensive campaign” without wasting time. In the end, it is
imperative to remember what Sun Tzu had said, that no nation has benefited
from war and certainly not from a protracted war.
PS: Shiv ji, the above by your favorite analystThose acquainted with my writing are no doubt aware of my antipathy for Dr. R Chidambaram, erstwhile Chmn, AEC, and for the last decade, S&T adviser to the PM whose removal has been advocated by me post-1998 tests. He has been the greatest retardant of the nuclear weapons program — by placing it in the no-testing mode. He’s finally gone, and good riddance. What little good he did do — by calculating the equation of state for the fissile material in our n-weapons was long ago frittered away by his dogmatic championing of the “no need for more N-tests”-thesis, which has been lapped up great many in the policy Establishment and the commentariat, who are a little too mindful of the American don’ts than is good for the national interest.
That the former scientific adviser to the PM V Saraswat’s name is being bandied about as RC’s replacement is problematic for three reasons: (1) He is absolutely innocent of any intimate knowledge of N-weapons/warheads, (2) lacking any technical insights of his own, he has blindly toed the RC line — and believes that software and simulation is enough to make modifications in the failed thermonuclear design (S-1 tested in 1998) and to render the extant fusion arsenal credible. The third reason is in a generic sense similar to RC’s — he’s wedded to the idea of the ballistic missile defence system, he being the chief promoter of this project. Physics, as I have argued, is against the BMD, but Saraswat has managed to keep this exorbitantly priced project funded by making wild promises of superior performance that cannot be supported by the orchestrated tests DRDO has conducted so far. It has screwed up the country’s deterrence posture. As S&T adviser he’ll ensure a lot of good money goes down that sinkhole. It’s one of the many projects that India cannot afford, and ought to be if not shut down altogether, continued with as only a technology demonstrator.
Does it now?It has screwed up the country’s deterrence posture.
I am amazed that he talks of physics. The man knew less than my first year college level physics when I attended his talk. He was blabbering some nonsense.ShauryaT wrote:
PS: Shiv ji, the above by your favorite analyst
No one who is serious about nuclear weapons relies on a nascent BMD to be part of any doctrine. It is best that this is pursued as a TD project for now and any incorporation of these systems is done only after due user testing in realistic conditions. The last thing we need is ANY semblance of reliance on an unproven BMD to further the illogical coded version of a blanket NFU that no one believes.Anand K wrote: I mean, what are WE exactly trying to do with pursuing a BMD dimension - is it supposed to be complementary to the stated NFU + MR stance or is it supposed to be something else altogether?
Shaurya you are merely echoing Karnad. Incidentally I disagree with this nonsense TD/Tech Demonstrator project business. Projects must have some aim/purpose. Just because other nantions have done X is does not mean that we should do exactly the same thing. We can and must follow our own path based on out threat perceptionShauryaT wrote:No one who is serious about nuclear weapons relies on a nascent BMD to be part of any doctrine. It is best that this is pursued as a TD project for now and any incorporation of these systems is done only after due user testing in realistic conditions. The last thing we need is ANY semblance of reliance on an unproven BMD to further the illogical coded version of a blanket NFU that no one believes.Anand K wrote: I mean, what are WE exactly trying to do with pursuing a BMD dimension - is it supposed to be complementary to the stated NFU + MR stance or is it supposed to be something else altogether?
abhishek_sharma wrote:LeT, JuD trying to acquire WMDs, claims book
This is correct. The author is saying what has been occurring to me in recent days. The Pakistani army, JuD and LeT are getting ideologically closer - with Pakistan's "Army Two" of pious jihad pasand Muslims being the government paid functionaries as opposed to "private parties" like JuD.“The JuD believes it is likely to acquire access to nuclear technology by not going against the Pakistani State. It may come sooner than we con imagine given the JuD’s ability to realise its plans systematically and cool headedly,”
Don't be fooled by a minor success. America's interceptor missile-defense system is still a failed $40 billion boondoggle.
Overall, out of 17 highly scripted intercept attempts from 1999 to 2014, the system hit its target nine times, a 53 percent success rate. For the first eight tests, the system had five hits, or 63 percent. But in the last nine tests, the system has hit only four times: a depressing 44 percent success rate. These numbers attest that, despite the recent hit, this is still a prototype technology that should not have been put into production.
Shivji,shiv wrote: As far as India is concerned, we must be ready for nuclear war. India may get hit by a few nukes, but we must be ready to nuke the shit out of Pakistan. The situation is too serious for any lesser plans.
You have "cornered me" and I must respond.prahaar wrote: Shivji,
Your assertion seems ominous. When compared to your past assertions about the idea of fighting a nuclear war, indicate a breakdown of deterrence, do you believe that it will break down in the indicated period of 2020-2021? And again based on your previously stated implications, "nuke the shit out of Pakistan" may not be sufficient. So what is the level of arsenal that India should plan?
Is my reading correct or have I misunderstood?
Although the 42-page-long BJP election manifesto had only one short paragraph addressing strategic nuclear policy, that presumably does not reflect the priority that the newly elected government will attach to the subject. It is well-known that the BJP lays great importance on national security, of which nuclear policy forms an important component. Indeed, one of the first tasks undertaken by the Modi government was the appointment of a National Security Advisor.
Sooner or later the new government will undertake, perhaps quietly, a review of our nuclear doctrine. Now is an appropriate time to offer suggestions on what needs to be revised and what can be left as is.
The current official nuclear doctrine, released by the Cabinet Committee on Security on January 4, 2003, summarises our nuclear policy in eight succinct points. Of these, only a few of them really call for significant modification, because in recent years things have been relatively stable on the South Asian nuclear front.
This is despite the fact that both India and Pakistan continue to produce weapons-usable Plutonium at the Dhruva reactor and the Khushab reactors respectively. Pakistan may also be continuing to produce some weapons-grade Uranium at its centrifuge plants, despite its overall Uranium ore constraints. All this fissile material is presumably being assembled into warheads. So both arsenals have been growing, as have all the attendant dangers of maintaining a nuclear force. Nevertheless the situation has, by and large, just been “more of the same.” Therefore there is no call for any radical change of our nuclear doctrine. But a few features do need to be clarified and others underlined.
No First Use
During the election campaign, the only brief reference to nuclear issues was a statement attributed to Narendra Modi that he would retain the principle of No First Use (NFU). His statement is very welcome, particularly since simplistic expectations were that Mr. Modi would bring a more hawkish approach to nuclear issues. Maintaining a doctrine of NFU, apart from being generally in tune with India’s non-aggressive ethos, has considerable diplomatic value. After our 1998 nuclear tests elicited the anticipated international opprobrium, the inclusion of NFU thereafter in the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine helped soften the criticism, especially in comparison to Pakistan, which till today retains the option of a first strike.
However, although NFU has moral and diplomatic value, there should be no illusions about its impact on hard strategic decision makers on the other side. What matters to them is not any statement of intentions (like NFU) but the actual capabilities of the adversary. Pakistani colleagues one meets in Track II invariably say they set little store in our NFU. It makes no operational difference in their nuclear plans.
What matters more for nuclear confidence building is the actual state of alert. India has been sensibly following a system of keeping its warheads de-mated from their missiles and delivery aircraft. This introduces a minimum built-in delay in launching an attack after the decision to do so has been made. It greatly reduces the risk of an accidental or hastily decided launch. The new government should continue our policy of a de-mated de-alerted posture.
One clause currently in the Doctrine merits some revision. It states that “ ....[our] nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere...retaliation to a first strike will be massive.” Now, threatening retaliation “against a nuclear attack on Indian territory” is one matter. It is the basic component of nuclear deterrence and should apply whether the attack on our territory is small or big, as long as it is nuclear.
But adding on the phrase “or on Indian forces anywhere” is a different matter. The rationale behind it was presumably to deter a nuclear attack on our forces should they enter alien territory or the high seas in combat. Such an eventuality is not implausible after Pakistan developed the Nasr — a nuclear capable battlefield missile which could be used on Indian forces if they march deep into Pakistani territory. However, threatening retaliation against that with a massive nuclear attack from our side can boomerang on our credibility. Pakistan’s battlefield nuclear attack is likely to be small (by nuclear standards). They would not want to spread much radioactivity on their own soil. It is also unclear whether they can develop a sufficiently miniaturised warhead to fit the Nasr, and how much damage such a warhead could do. It may achieve at most a few hundred fatalities. This is still a terrible loss of Indian soldiers and armoury. But it would be far from being “mass destruction.”
However, such a battlefield nuclear attack will place India in a dilemma. Having threatened in our Doctrine to inflict a “massive” nuclear retaliation, can we really go ahead and kill lakhs of their civilians in response to a much smaller attack, that too on their own soil? It would be a disproportionate response, which would go against our national sensibilities and attract widespread criticism from around the world. Surely, there are more proportionate non-nuclear ways of inflicting punitive retaliation.
Yet, if we do not counter attack after having threatened to do so, that would invite derision that we are “a soft state” incapable of hard nuclear decisions and would erode the credibility of our future deterrence, not only against Pakistan, but also against China.
It may therefore be better to limit massive nuclear retaliation only against nuclear attacks on our country and say nothing in the Doctrine, one way or the other, about attacks “on Indian forces anywhere.” Should the latter take place, we always have the option of some appropriate, measured retaliation.
What deterrence needs
Next, consider the characterisation in our Doctrine of our nuclear force as a “credible minimum deterrent (CMD)”, where the requirement of “minimum” has been spelt out as what is needed to “inflict unacceptable damage” to the adversary. These represent a very judicious choice of words selected, in fact, by the last BJP administration. It is designed in part to temper over-zealous weapon enthusiasts from going on an endless spree of building nuclear bombs. It recognises the dangers of possessing an unnecessarily large arsenal of nuclear weapons, beyond what is essential for deterrence. The new government must ensure that the agencies concerned respect CMD in spirit and substance.
Unfortunately, our arsenal of nuclear bombs has already gone way over the minimum required to “inflict unacceptable damage” on any rational government, be it Pakistan or China. (Should Pakistan someday be taken over by irrational extremists to whom death of lakhs of civilians is “acceptable”, then no arsenal, however large, will deter them anyway. With respect to China, what deterrence needs is not more bombs than what we already have, but longer range missiles capable of reaching major Chinese cities.)
As to credibility, large arsenals, beyond a point, do not enhance it. What does is a show of determination and toughness on other non-nuclear fronts, such as terrorism or border incidents.
(R. Rajaraman is professor emeritus, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)
Thanks for the response, the post was not meant "corner" or any such. My main focus was about whether India can respond to a nuclear attack by Pakistan without being nuked by any other nuclear powers (under the guise of stopping non-P5 darkies trying to kill each other). In other words, can India fight and win a nuclear war with Pakistan without other P5 not trying to wash hands in the behti Ganga.shiv wrote: The good thing about the LeT and Taliban is that they are anti-US and having both entities infiltrate and take over the thinking of the Pakistani army is advantageous to us. It is good for India if rabidly anti-US elements can be seen to control Pakistani nuclear weapons. I believe they already do - but the US refuses to see it. We need to increase the threat we put on Pakistan and reassure them that their nukes will be met with a response that leaves nothing in Pakistan. You can think up the numbers yourself - but rather than number I like to think of specific targets that will ensure that all Pakistani jihad leaders will be vaporized and dead at the end of a nuclear exchange. Jihad and the Ialsmic nation will be holy ash, in other words.
Please post if here if they do not publish it.SSridhar wrote:I have sent my comments in 3 parts. Let me see if they publish.
Christine Fair is at pains to point out that this is no longer the case - Punjab is not the main recruiting ground. She has referred to this in her Hudson institute video - with data and graphs and her take on it.Johann wrote: - Pakjab, the recruiting base of the Army is still in love with the Army, and trusts it more than any other organisation out there.
According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, religion (has) deeply divided the Pakistan military now. Perhaps it might be more accurate to think of it as two militaries. The first, -The Army One -headed by Gen.Kayani seeks to maintain the status quo and the Army’s pre-eminence in making national decisions. The second- The Army Two - is Allah’s army. This awaits a leader even as it launches attacks on Pakistani military installations, bases, top-level officers, soldiers, public places, mosques and police stations. Soldiers have been encouraged to turn their guns on to their colleagues, troops have been tricked into ambushes, and high-level officers have been assassinated. Allah’s army hopes to launch Religion as the Foundation of a Nation |95 its final blitzkrieg once the state of Pakistan has been sufficiently weakened by such attacks.176
What separates ‘Army-One’ and ‘ISI-One’ from ‘Army-Two’ and ‘ISI-Two’? This may not be immediately evident as both were reared on the ‘Two-Nation Theory’ and are thoroughly steeped in anti-Indianism since their early days in Army Cadet Colleges at Petaro and Hasan Abdal. They also share a deep-rooted contempt for Pakistani civilians. This attitude has resulted in roughly half of Pakistan’s history being that of direct military rule. Still, they are not the same. The One’ers are “soft Islamists” who are satisfied with a fuzzy belief that Islam provides solutions to everything, that occasional prayers and ritual fasting in Ramzan is sufficient, and that Sufis and Shias are bonafide Muslims rather than mushriks or apostates. They are not particularly interested in defending the Sunni states of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or the GCC. But should a lucrative overseas posting come the way of an individual soldier or officer, well, that may be another matter. While having a dislike of US policies, they are not militantly anti-US.
Army-Two and ISI-Two, on the other hand, are soldier ideologues who have travelled further down the road of Islamism. Large numbers of them regularly travel to Raiwind, the headquarters of the Tabligh Jamaat and whose preachers are still allowed open access into the Army, despite restrictions. The Two’ers are stricter in matters of religious rituals, they insist that officers and their wives be segregated at army functions. They keep an eye out for officers who secretly drink alcohol, and how often they pray. Their political philosophy is that Islam and the state should be inseparable. Inspired by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, who preached that 7th century Arab Islam provides a complete blueprint for society and politics, they see capturing state power as a means towards creating the ideal society along the lines of the medieval Medina state. Many Two’ers are beardless, hence hard to detect. They are fundamentally anti-science but computer-savvy. For them, modern technology is a tool of battle. Like the proverbial ostrich, the One’ers fiercely defend the myth of army unity. They dismiss mutineers as isolated individuals.
I have said ever since the start of this thread something to the effect that anyone who uses nuclear weapons will change the thinking of everyone else in the world.prahaar wrote: My main focus was about whether India can respond to a nuclear attack by Pakistan without being nuked by any other nuclear powers (under the guise of stopping non-P5 darkies trying to kill each other). In other words, can India fight and win a nuclear war with Pakistan without other P5 not trying to wash hands in the behti Ganga.
True this was my position until recently but for the past few weeks I have been basing a change of view on various factors (reports and my own analysis) that the thinking of the LeT and Pakistan army are coming close enough for them to become fused into one entity where one cannot say that PA dominates LeT or LeT dominates PA. They are one and the same - with LeT being the non uniformed wing of the Pakistan army.ShauryaT wrote: I thought Shiv ji always maintained that there is no difference between LeT/TTP and PA and the PA is the big dog. LeT et al would not exist, were it not for the PA and the ideology of the Pakistani state.
I have no fundamental disagreement with this assessment and I am not going to make the patronizing argument that "one must not underestimate one's adversary"ShauryaT wrote: As for the PA not backing down and escalate to exchange of Nukes....their record shows otherwise.
+1.shiv wrote:Shaurya you are merely echoing Karnad. Incidentally I disagree with this nonsense TD/Tech Demonstrator project business. Projects must have some aim/purpose. Just because other nantions have done X is does not mean that we should do exactly the same thing. We can and must follow our own path based on out threat perception