Geopolitical thread

[akashganga]

blind link deleted by moderator

[Pranav]

Max Boot's take on western interests in Afghanistan:

Bin Laden's Death Changes Little
It's immaterial whether the Taliban and others are currently targeting the U.S. homeland. We can't allow them to create a fundamentalist caliphate stretching from Kabul to Kashmir.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... lenews_wsj

This goes against Anatol Lieven's argument that Afghanistan should be handed over to the Paks, more or less.

IMHO, Boot has a better appreciation for the fact that the Paks are not controllable by the west to the same degree that they once were. Lieven regards the Paks with the indulgence of a colonial officer for his loyal troops, even worrying about their marriage prospects. The unmentioned elephant in the room, for both Lieven and Boot, is China.

[Gerard]

William Hague plans shift in diplomacy to station more envoys in Asia

William Hague is due to unveil changes to the way Britain deploys diplomats around the world, with fewer to be stationed in Europe and more to go to emerging powers, such as China and India, in what he claims is the biggest strategic shift in the service for decades.

[Samudragupta]

Power Play: Turkey's Bid to Trump Iran

Today is a turning point in history. Nothing will ever be the same again.” So said Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan shortly after nine Turks aboard a Turkish ship died in a May 2010 clash with Israelis. The ship had challenged Israel’s embargo on terror-related goods bound for Gaza. Some observers said that the prime minister shook visibly as he spoke that day.

Erdogan was indeed marking a historic turning point. But not in Turkish-Israeli relations. Rather, he should have been seen—and in fact has been seen throughout the Middle East—as signaling a much broader and more ambitious regional agenda for Turkey, one that will impact its relations with Iran. And to the degree that this agenda succeeds, Erdogan’s words will be seen as prophetic: nothing hereafter will be the same.

Among Turks there seems little doubt that the Erdogan government was complicit in the “flotilla affair,” and that the prime minister looked forward to a confrontation that, one way or another, would show him dramatically standing against Israel. Under his leadership, Turkey’s once firm relations with Israel had already decayed. The Turkish radicals on board the ship heading toward Gaza were not surprised when an Israeli ship interdicted them; violence seems to have been in their plans. Investigations are under way. But this is a region resistant to the niceties of depositions; it sees a higher truth in this affair.

The Middle East has known for some time of Erdogan’s determination to change the nature of his country’s strategic vision. Under his tightening leadership, Turkey is distancing itself from a century of Western orientation and half a century of Western alliances. It pursues a patient and careful course toward a leading, or even dominant, role in the greater Gulf region, and perhaps in the universe of Muslim-majority countries more generally.

No explicit declaration marked this change, for none was wise or needed. Erdogan still calls Turkey a bridge to the Muslim world and tells Westerners that he will be an honest broker between them and it. But the Muslim world understands very well that Turkey has tilted toward the East. Until recently, Erdogan had quietly pursued this shift in three main ways: positioning Turkey to benefit from the decline of the Arab states whose leadership of the region has dramatically deteriorated in the past decade; reaching out to Iran, the most openly aggressive claimant for regional leadership and standard bearer for hostility toward the West; and slowly redefining Turkey’s domestic priorities and politics. Few expected the EU to embrace Turkish membership, but Erdogan adroitly used the EU rejection to undermine Ataturk’s Westernizing legacy. There is a certain artistry, if not originality, in plotting behind the brim of Ataturk’s Western ideals to favor the headscarf.

There have, of course, been less subtle signs of the shift eastward. In 2003, Turkey barred the passage of US troops into Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In 2005, Erdogan honored Iran’s newly elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the halls of Istanbul, despite Ahmadinejad’s calls for genocide. And in 2006, Erdogan embraced Hamas after its victory in Palestinian elections, and then Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, despite his indictment for war crimes in Darfur. Even before the flotilla sailed for Gaza, Erdogan’s criticism of Israel had already grown shrill. But the change in Turkey’s posture toward Israel has in large part been a tool to advance the country’s reorientation, rather than in any sense its cause.

Erdogan’s comments following the flotilla affair marked a new stage in his quest rather than a change in his goals. He has declared Turkey’s intent to step to the fore as a leader of angry, threatening, anti-Western elements that seek to control the Islamic world. “Turkey’s hostility,” Erdogan pointedly proclaimed in his “turning point” speech, “is as strong as its friendship is valuable.” It was an advertisement for Middle Eastern consumers: we will be the enemy of your enemies, a shelter to our friends.

In the Muslim realm, radical and jihadi precincts included, Erdogan’s message was understood and applauded. Arab publics cheered Turkey as a new leader of hostility against Israel. The deputy head of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, taking for granted Turkey’s role as chief instigator of the flotilla, urged the heirs of the Ottomans toward even more forceful action against Israel—advice he has repeated since. Zawahiri recalled with praise centuries of “Turkish” rule of the Muslim world.

Al-Qaeda’s endorsement confirms Erdogan’s push to be seen not merely as a leader of the Muslim world, but the leader. While he had previously played merely a supportive role to Iran, with the flotilla affair Erdogan pressed Turkey’s case. One of the many subtle implications of his “turning point” remark is that Turkey and Iran are now rivals, as well as collaborators in the drive to create an internationally more aggressive Middle East. It is unlikely that Ahmadinejad missed this nuance.



This development should not be entirely surprising. Once Erdogan and his party chose to redefine Turkish identity in a more Islamic, and perhaps Islamist, way, and once Turkey set its eyes east and south toward the ancient Muslim heartlands, a rivalry with Iran was likely.

Iran’s regional ambitions are hardwired into the theocratic regime both by its revolutionary doctrine and the limited legitimacy of its rulers. This is especially true now as different factions of the mullahs’ ruling elite compete for ownership of the “revolution.” As the Arab states’ power and influence in the region has declined, Iran has sought, with some success, to take their place. These ambitions have been advanced in the short term by the removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein and by the erratic recovery in Iraq and continuing conflict in Afghanistan, but far more by Iran’s unchecked pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran draws, too, upon the attraction of its enormous proven reserves in natural gas and oil (second and third largest, respectively, in the world). But the mullahs’ regional ambitions wash up against Iran’s ancient rival, Turkey.

In the form of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey for centuries led the greater Middle East. Today its population and economy are slightly larger than Iran’s, and its economy and conventional military are stronger. Despite limits in its democratic processes, Turkey’s government enjoys substantially more stability and legitimacy at home and abroad than Iran’s does. In addition, the Iranian political elite must deal with a traditional “quietist” school of Shiite Islam, now prospering in neighboring Iraq, that scorns theocratic rule. By contrast, as a Sunni country, Turkey may more readily garner support in a largely Sunni Middle East. Indeed, the country has historically invoked its role as the natural leader of the Sunnis to buy peace at home and fend off pressures from abroad. In Ottoman times, it did so in the aftermath of a losing war in the eighteenth century, and again in the late nineteenth. In that era, Sunnis as far afield as India responded positively to that claim; the recent statements of al-Qaeda’s Zawahiri show that Turkey may again attract such support.

The emergence of a Turkish-Iranian rivalry was somewhat delayed by the political problems Erdogan faced when he took power in 2002 with only a minority of the electorate behind him. Turkey’s longstanding secular political tradition meant that he had to move cautiously and cleverly in pursuing the domestic redefinition of Turkish identity. For Erdogan knew his history: the Turkish military had repeatedly thwarted previous Islamist-oriented parties, including, only a decade earlier, one in which Erdogan was a leading figure. So he pursued, initially, the safe course of leaning more toward Iran, and following its lead, albeit at a distance. Hence the warm reception accorded Ahmadinejad and other friendly gestures.

But Erdogan’s party was reelected in 2007 with an increased plurality and a greater majority in Parliament. Since then, he has further weakened internal opposition. While it will not be easy for him to gain and keep broad Turkish support for his plans, there are signs of his progress so far. He recently rejected with virtually no protest several of the military’s candidates for senior promotions; and civilians, not the military, will draft the new National Security Document—both changes from past patterns. Meanwhile, the opposition press has been systematically muzzled—a dash of tax intimidation, a touch of party-supported competition, a measure of prison for alleged seditious activity. Most recently, the constitutional referendum held in September passed with an unexpectedly large majority. Several of the amendments it approved significantly enhance Erdogan’s power. One of them will allow him to take greater control of the heretofore independent judiciary, which had remained a source of opposition; a second reduces the military’s control of its own criteria for membership, especially its power to exclude soldiers on religious grounds. Moreover, the referendum sets the stage for a complete rewriting of the Constitution, which had already been proposed.

In the meantime, Erdogan’s government is pursuing the prosecution of high-level officers for their role in an alleged coup planned in 2003. There are increasingly credible claims among Turks that this is a fraudulent prosecution, knowingly based on forged documents. This might cause Erdogan some domestic difficulties, but the appearance of ruthless dishonesty may confirm for both supporters and opponents alike the depth of his desire for control.

Having fewer constraints on the bases of his power, the prime minister can act with a freer hand in the foreign sphere. Indeed, the two areas at this point may be mutually reinforcing. Erdogan’s behavior in the flotilla crisis won him massive domestic demonstrations of support as he headed into the referendum campaign and positioned his party for the next general elections in 2011.



It is perhaps only a historical oddity, but still a curious one, that a modern struggle for leadership of the greater Middle East and its ancient Muslim heartlands brings to mind rivalries there five hundred years ago. Turkey and Iran are the diminished heirs of two great Muslim Empires of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shiite Safavid Empire. The Ottomans’ four-hundred-year rule (1517–1917) of vast, especially Arab, Muslim lands arose amidst its rivalry with the Safavid state, a state founded on the basis of new, radical Shiite teachings. Indeed, the Shiite Safavids claimed a particularly close connection with the divine. Their soldiers believed the Safavid leader a divine incarnation, and they attacked the Ottoman border with millenarian utopian fervor, fomenting Shiite rebellions in Anatolia. The present border between Turkey and Iran roughly tracks the border that emerged from Ottoman-Safavid wars, and this rivalry led to long-lasting changes throughout the region. Before the conflict, the Ottomans were more preeminently a European power with an Anatolian hinterland. Afterward, Ottoman ambitions had expanded, and by a chain of events they had not only defeated the Safavids but found themselves quickly in control of present-day Iraq, Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and North Africa. From that time forward, the Ottomans became the standard bearer of Sunnis and put forward a claim, often accepted, to the ancient and prestigious title of caliph.

The defeated Safavid Empire left its own lasting legacy: the conversion of Iran from a majority Sunni to an uneasy Shiite land. The essentially theocratic Islamic Revolution of 1979 revived radical Shiism and its ambitions, toppled a regional order based on the Shah, and projected power into Syria, Iraq, the Gulf, Lebanon, Central Asia, and more recently the Palestinian community. In time, Shiite-Sunni conflict intensified, infamously in Iraq but also in Lebanon and Pakistan. The political and military struggle between Sunnis and Shiites, Turks and Persians, for preeminence in the ancient Muslim heartlands, especially Iraq, may not determine the Middle East’s future, but its influence has stalked this region’s politics for centuries.

Atop these ancient layers lie more modern sources of rivalry created by the current regional framework of states and their particular characteristics. For example, Turkey remains interested in having an influential role in Azerbaijan. A high-level Turkish delegation recently visited and concluded agreements there. Azeris are Shiites, but they are ethnically Turkish and Turkish speaking and maintain a tense relationship with Iran, which must remain concerned with Turkish-Azeri relations because approximately one-quarter of its population is Azeri and rests uneasily under “Persian rule.”

Iraq, too, presents an arena of competition because of its genuine desire to protect itself from Iranian ambitions, the internal Shiite-Sunni divide, and the Kurdish question, which looms large in Iraqi and Turkish politics, and even in Iran, with its own large Kurdish minority. (Recently there have been notably violent attacks on Iranian officials and soldiers in Iran’s “Kurdistan,” though the provenance of these attacks is not clear.)

Lebanon and Syria present yet another Muslim arena for competition. Lebanon is nearby and riven internally, not least along a Sunni-Shia divide. In the recent past, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s support for Kurdish separatists led to an actively hostile Turkish-Syrian border. Turkey has in the last few years undertaken a rapprochement with Syria. Nevertheless, both Syria and Lebanon have increasingly become satellites of Iran. Turkey must inevitably be concerned about further consolidation of Iranian influence near its borders—for example, through the enhanced power of Hezbollah.

Ahmadinejad’s recent state visit to Lebanon (his first) and the enthusiastic reception he received have real as well as symbolic implications. The trip endorsed, and provided support for, the ever-growing power of Hezbollah but also declared how far the ruling mullahs feel that Iranian writ may run. Iran is in effect claiming an “imperial sphere” that reaches across Turkey’s southern border. Iranian flags lined Lebanese roads and signs declared, “Welcome to the protector of Lebanon.” A Lebanese politician observed that “Lebanon will become an Iranian base on the shores of the Mediterranean.” Moreover, Ahmadinejad made the centerpiece of his visit the declaration of renewed hostility to Israel and the United States, saying, “Our world today stands on the verge of change, a change that is starting from our region. Lebanon is an example . . . for the unwavering resistance to the world’s tyrants and a university for jihad.” Ahmadinejad thus announced his own version of a “turning point” and emphasized, as he has in the past, an abiding goal that the “Zionists be wiped out.” Although his visit served several of his own purposes, including domestic ones, one of its most important initiatives was to renew a claim for the leadership role that Erdogan sought to grab through the flotilla affair.



Conflicting interests can be resolved; history is not destiny. The course of Turkish-Iranian relations and the region remains unknown and subject, in part, to Erdogan’s domestic goals, the agendas of others (including the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons), and the roles the Great Powers play.
In the near term, Erdogan may revert to a more cautious mode. He might be satisfied with “profit taking” after the flotilla affair. (One indication of this is the next installment in the Turkish film series Valley of the Wolves—very popular in Turkey and elsewhere—which will open with a flotilla scene. As a Turkish film critic recently said, the film will thus capitalize on Turkey’s regional popularity. Erdogan will capitalize, too.) He has sent a high-level delegation to Washington to reaffirm Turkish-American ties. This fits his ongoing claim that Turkey has not turned decisively to the Muslim East and remains a “bridge” between the West and Islam—a claim that is no longer easily credible, but which serves his other ends. Erdogan continues to seek more control over domestic Turkish politics—further rewriting the Constitution to enhance his power, curbing Kurdish separatists, and controlling the military with measures like the prosecution of officers for alleged conspiracies. In the long term, Erdogan may find that it will not suffice merely to bring the military under control; he may want to put his imprint on it and incorporate it into his foreign and domestic designs.

Erdogan has reasons to prefer a cautious approach, but history reveals, especially in the region, that it is hard to tame a radical agenda: Others act on their fears or hopes; Erdogan must know that the prestige of being Israel’s greatest enemy exposes him to crises created by others. The consolidation of control by Iran’s most revolutionary elements may permit, or even force, him to adopt a more aggressive policy to stay in the game. Hamas or Hezbollah may act for reasons of their own. Erdogan may find it tricky to limit entanglement without jeopardizing his desired role. In the spring of 1967, Syria sparked an escalation of Arab threats and military preparations that soon swept Egypt and other Arab states into an unwanted Six-Day War for which they were ill prepared. Events may not follow Erdogan’s chosen course or calendar, despite caution or cleverness.

Erdogan may even see some advantage in Iran’s determined drive for nuclear weapons. Assertive heirs of the Ottomans may not welcome Iranian nuclear weapons, but after observing diplomacy between Ahmadinejad and the West, Erdogan may well conclude that only a successful Israeli strike will slow Iran. By joining Brazil to mediate a transparently unacceptable nuclear deal with Iran, Erdogan raises his profile and hedges his bets: If the West falters, or if it succeeds, he has not weakened the Muslim world or exposed Turkey to Iran. In the near term, there are other opportunities for Turkish regional gains: Iran’s nuclear bid has weakened its economy and stirred up opposition among Sunni states; in the wake of an Israeli strike, should one occur, Turkey will raise its public voice in anger, even if among its leaders there is some private relief.

But Turkey’s own nuclear ambitions—and not just Iran’s—loom in Erdogan’s maneuvers. In the shadow of Iran’s headlong rush, Turkey has quietly pursued a nuclear course of its own. In 2006, Erdogan revived the country’s long-delayed plans for nuclear power; in 2007, the Turkish Parliament acted affirmatively; in 2010, Turkey and Russia agreed to build a nuclear plant in Turkey this decade. Nuclear power may or may not make economic sense for earthquake-prone, resource-poor Turkey, given that it straddles major energy transit lines. Nuclear technology presents an entirely separate strategic calculation. The Iranian example shows that nuclear enrichment capabilities are best won quietly, a task for which Erdogan is well suited. But as Turkey seeks a leading and aggressive Muslim identity, loosening Western ties, will Erdogan see Turkey’s safety or prestige ensured by having nuclear weapons only in the hands of Russians, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, and Western powers—and likely Iran’s as well?

Today Turkey and Iran pursue their regional ambitions with a watchful eye on the interests of greater outside powers. At the moment, there is a powerful and growing belief in the region that the United States is withdrawing—not only from Iraq, but from any forceful role in the region. This may not properly reflect President Obama’s policy; and even if it did, some may claim it is not possible for years to come. However, there is enough ambiguity, for example, in our policies toward Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Israel, to inflame our enemies and cause uncertainty among our friends. They know the perversity of this region where persistent efforts may win gains, while lesser efforts likely fail. On the occasion of Ahmadinejad’s Lebanese tour, for instance, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared, “We would hope that no visitor would do anything or say anything that would give cause to greater tension or instability in that country.” Many in the region share that hope, but they will be most interested in what deeds accompany our words.

Looking at Western European states, the Middle East cannot help but see rising domestic Muslim constituencies and declining interest in international efforts that might clash with determined Islamist aims. It also sees Russia, China, and India becoming more assertive, not to mention more willing to bargain for their own ends. This reflects not only these nations’ growing power in the world but also their increasing interest in energy resources, transportation infrastructure, and the heightened regional roles of states closer to them—states like Turkey and Iran.

So the Great Powers offer (or just as importantly, seem to offer) the leaders of Turkey and Iran new pieces in a game long played in the lands that stretch from the Bosphorus to the Straits of Hormuz. For example, the new Turkish national security strategy reportedly will remove Russia from its list of enemies, and Russia and Turkey are focused on pipelines critical to both that would have enormous strategic impact on Europe. Meanwhile, Iran has used Russian and Chinese interests to forestall UN sanctions. Even in earlier days, the Ottomans or Persians time and again allied with Russia to struggle against one another. The region is practiced in such maneuvers.

Turkey and Iran may yet follow anti-Western paths more similar than not. American problems might deepen if Turkey or Iran manipulates outside powers for support. Recently Turkey staged one of its regular “Anatolian Eagle” joint military maneuvers. This time, atypically, American and Israeli forces were absent, replaced by Chinese planes and pilots. The Chinese reached Turkey by flying, with Tehran’s permission, through Iranian airspace.

Dealing with this new configuration of power and ambition calls for a determined policy by America, one that deals realistically with the landscape we face, not the one we wish for. There are prospects for us in this landscape, but diplomacy, however adept, will accomplish little if, correctly or incorrectly, the region doubts our will to follow through.

In the 1930s, Ataturk admonished Turks to free their public life from dysfunctional ways. He warned that the choice was not ideological or aesthetic but pragmatic. “Civilization,” he said, “is a fearful fire which consumes those who ignore it.” And fire spreads—especially when fed by a volatile mix of gas, oil, religion, and ambition

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/arti ... -2011.html

[Hari Seldon]

Spengler in Asia Times. INteresting and consequential, if true.

The hunger to come in Egypt

At the rate it is going, Egypt will be broke by September while the chaotic political situation threatens to disrupt food supplies. Street violence will become the norm rather than the exception - all discussion about future political models and its prospective relations with Israel will be overshadowed by the country's inability to feed itself.

Paints a dire situ of the country only. The anti-coptic violence is just 1 early symptom, perhaps. Islamism will take over a starving country because the islamists can always offer kuffr wealth, land, food and goats to their followers....

Egypt is running out of food, and, more gradually, running out of money with which to buy it. The most populous country in the Arab world shows all the symptoms of national bankruptcy - the kind that produced hyperinflation in several Latin American countries during the 1970s and 1980s - with a deadly difference: Egypt imports half its wheat, and the collapse of its external credit means starvation.
...
It will look like the Latin American banana republics, but without the bananas. That is not meant in jest: few people actually starved to death in the Latin inflations. Egypt, which imports half its wheat and a great deal of the rest of its food, will actually starve.

Time will tell, of course.

[abhishek_sharma]

Hillary Clinton headed to Greenland for Arctic summit

Why is Hillary attending the Arctic summit?

[ManishH]

From BBC report on Carving up the Arctic

...what is happening in the Arctic is like the Scramble for Africa in the 19th Century when European nations raced to secure resources.
However, it is not just a race for oil and gas. Russia hopes that the Northern Sea Route will open up and allow northern European shipping to get to the Far East a third quicker than via the Suez Canal.

[Johann]

Spengler in Asia Times. INteresting and consequential, if true.

The hunger to come in Egypt

At the rate it is going, Egypt will be broke by September while the chaotic political situation threatens to disrupt food supplies. Street violence will become the norm rather than the exception - all discussion about future political models and its prospective relations with Israel will be overshadowed by the country's inability to feed itself.

Paints a dire situ of the country only. The anti-coptic violence is just 1 early symptom, perhaps. Islamism will take over a starving country because the islamists can always offer kuffr wealth, land, food and goats to their followers....

Time will tell, of course.

The Copts are ~15% of the population, and not a particularly wealthy 15% any more.

There is a three cornered fight between the Army, the Islamists, and labor unions and the working class.

The Army would rather ally with the Islamists than cut its size and shift funds towards development and food security. They might even drum up a little tension with Israel (not hard since the Israelis are so jumpy) to justify their bloated size.

Most of the Brotherhood's leadership are very well educated, and would happily sell out the working class to the Army in exchange for a share of power (they are happy with 30%, enough to veto anything they don't like) and visible help for the middle class.

[abhishek_sharma]

In the war of American decline, should Americans fight battles at home or abroad?

[Klaus]

Hillary Clinton headed to Greenland for Arctic summit

Why is Hillary attending the Arctic summit?

Even as Indian and other IOR planners make plans on imposing a blockade on Straits of Malacca (in case of Chinese misadventure) and reducing piracy in the Gulf of Aden region, the NATO powers are colluding to make the IOR irrelevant yet again by trying to open up the Arctic to shipping and energy exploration ventures. The sooner these projects accelerate, the faster Central Asia and IOR will start reducing in global significance.

Make no mistake about it, China is going to get into this Arctic Ocean game at some stage, that is what their plans are with respect to their Russian Far East strategy.

The question is, how is India going to get a finger in this pie? The formation of cliques based on exclusion (on any pretext) continues unabated.

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

^^^Regarding the "Arctic Ocean game".....

I have studied the issue with some focus, for almost twenty years.

I wouldn't worry about India losing out because global trade will pass through the Artic instead of the IOR. From what I understand, the current trend toward melting polar ice caps will suddenly and drastically reverse when the 'ocean conveyor' collapses, as it is now showing signs of doing. This is the means by which cold water is circulated throughout the oceans, and global warming/climate change is wreaking havoc with this life-sustaining dynamic. It might not happen this year or the next, or even within the next twenty years.... but it is certainly coming unless we can dramatically cut our greenhouse gas emissions.

The result will be a planet that is far too hot around the equator, and at the same time, far too cold nearer the poles. Only a pair of fairly thin bands of land right around the boundary between the tropics-and-temperate regions will be inhabitable. (Assuming we don't experience another 'pole shift'.) Needless to say, there won't be room for everyone, nor water, nor food.

Don't bother following the MSM for this topic -- they've been almost entirely useless.

[Nesoj]

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/14/military ... ights.html

The deputy chief of air staff told the house, according to the MNA, that drones used for spying flew from Shamsi airbase in Balochistan, while those carrying out missile attacks took off from Afghanistan and that the Shamsi airbase had been under the control of the UAE, and not of the PAF, since the 1990s.

This is an admission made in the 'in camera' hearings in the Puki parliament

What is the UAE basing here :-
- Desert falcons ?
- or just a training base to train their pilots ?
- or a deterrent against Iran (boxing from either side) ?

[Klaus]

^^^Regarding the "Arctic Ocean game".....

Very interesting info! I guess that India would be well served by promoting a few Uttara Gangotri's (on the lines of Dakshin Gangotri) R&D establishments in the Arctic, just as a means of putting up tent over there. We have the vast Russian coastline which serves as an excellent beach head for such expeditions. Added to that, we have the invaluable experience in setting up Himadri & Dakshin Gangotri (which is much more difficult from a logistics perspective).

So I think a delay by India in going for 2-3 Uttara Gangotri's will not be to its interests! As far as macro-climate patterns are concerned, the entire world is going to be affected at the end, nation-states cannot use climate change as an excuse for inaction in such ventures. Just my 2 cents!

IOW, we need more Himadri research stations on Russian coastline.

[RajeshA]

Hillary Clinton headed to Greenland for Arctic summit

Why is Hillary attending the Arctic summit?

Even as Indian and other IOR planners make plans on imposing a blockade on Straits of Malacca (in case of Chinese misadventure) and reducing piracy in the Gulf of Aden region, the NATO powers are colluding to make the IOR irrelevant yet again by trying to open up the Arctic to shipping and energy exploration ventures. The sooner these projects accelerate, the faster Central Asia and IOR will start reducing in global significance.

Make no mistake about it, China is going to get into this Arctic Ocean game at some stage, that is what their plans are with respect to their Russian Far East strategy.

The question is, how is India going to get a finger in this pie? The formation of cliques based on exclusion (on any pretext) continues unabated.

Klaus ji,

Sometime back I wrote a few related posts in the Managing Chinese Threat Thread. Some relevant posts would be

• China's race to the Arctic
• Route through Northeast Passage faster than expected
• China's efforts to bypass Malacca Straits

Will write to you per email, what I think India can do!

[Klaus]

Thanks RajeshA ji. Your thoughts have laid out clearly what I intended to convey in my post. It is a tall ask and our fears are well-founded indeed!

[devesh]

^^^Regarding the "Arctic Ocean game".....

I have studied the issue with some focus, for almost twenty years.

I wouldn't worry about India losing out because global trade will pass through the Artic instead of the IOR. From what I understand, the current trend toward melting polar ice caps will suddenly and drastically reverse when the 'ocean conveyor' collapses, as it is now showing signs of doing. This is the means by which cold water is circulated throughout the oceans, and global warming/climate change is wreaking havoc with this life-sustaining dynamic. It might not happen this year or the next, or even within the next twenty years.... but it is certainly coming unless we can dramatically cut our greenhouse gas emissions.

The result will be a planet that is far too hot around the equator, and at the same time, far too cold nearer the poles. Only a pair of fairly thin bands of land right around the boundary between the tropics-and-temperate regions will be inhabitable. (Assuming we don't experience another 'pole shift'.) Needless to say, there won't be room for everyone, nor water, nor food.

Don't bother following the MSM for this topic -- they've been almost entirely useless.

i don't have much info on the Arctic, but don't be fooled by the Global Warming alarmism. climate change is happening yes, but there might not be anything that humans can do about it. climate change is cyclical. there are periods of warming and cooling. 1000 years ago, when population was miniscule and industrial activity nill, there was a bout of global warming for 150 years. the whole greenhouse gas emissions theory is bunk b/c 1000 years ago, the same emissions would have been several magnitudes lower than present, and yet warming was happening. the effect of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is miniscule to non-existent....the fact that climate change is cyclical and the demographic and industrial facts about the last several millennia pretty much proves this.

climate change could still be happening and what you say about drastic temperature variations from poles to equator could still come true, but greenhouse gas emissions have little influence on this phenomenon. climate change is vastly more complex than the bullsh** theory about greenhouse gas emissions.

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

^^^devesh,

With respect, and not wanting to derail the topic of this thread; you are wrong about climate change/global warming not having anything to do with greenhouse gases (GHGs). You have cited a nonsense argument spouted by AGW denialists, and it is plain wrong.

Yes, there was a period of warming about 1000 years ago, but your contention that it has nothing to do with GHGs is completely disregarding one of the major sources of GHGs -- volcanic activity.

If you follow the scientific research, you will understand that a large body of evidence is drawn from tiny air bubbles that are trapped in antactic ice shelves, going back a couple of hundred thousand years. Scientists have been drilling for core samples from these ice shelves, and running the trapped air samples through GCMS machines (gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer), in order to ascertain the composition of the earth's atmosphere at the time that air was trapped in the falling snow, subsequently compacted into ice, layer upon layer -- which they can stratify quite accurately, by the depth of the ice core samples.

What this research shows, matches perfectly with climatic records -- in so far as temperature/climate has been recorded by humans; including the period of warming you have referred to.

I said it before, and I'll say it again, devesh -- don't rely on the The MSM for any insights into AGW (Anthropogenic Global Warming). The MSM is controlled by corporate interests, and they don't want you to understand the science and the impending catastrophe all of humanity is facing. They just want you to keep shopping and spending your money.

[devesh]

^^^
MSM is the most active believer in GHG scam. it is the MSM which most frequently sprouts GHG. and the corporate interests like Oil Companies are very much interested in bringing in anti-GHG legislation b/c it helps them in new conquests. the notion that Oil companies are inimical to laws such as Cap and Trade is utter non sense. Oil companies have consistently, and covertly, supported the advent of carbon trading and other such non sense. enron and later other oil majors have actively cooperated with Clinton and later Democrats including Obama to increase their efforts of bringing in carbon trade multi-trillion dollar scam....

i have done some research into the ice core studies and the results show that carbon concentration is preceded by warming, and not the other way around. warming happens first and then carbon concentration goes up.

in modern times, emissions from volcanoes is a miniscule portion of total emissions. water vapor is the most significant source of green house gas effect and our Earth, atmosphere, and the broader influences of the Sun enforce a system of dynamic equilibrium which made sure that any "positive feedback" effects due to water vapor are cancelled out. there is a lot of research on water vapor (the largest and most dominant portion of the GHG effect).

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

^^^devesh, again, not wanting to derail this thread (nor spend too much time arguing with you about this);

... MSM is the most active believer in GHG scam. it is the MSM which most frequently sprouts GHG. and the corporate interests like Oil Companies are very much interested in bringing in anti-GHG legislation b/c it helps them in new conquests.

The MSM will do a bunch of scare mongering about AGW, but they do nearly no fact-based reporting from scientifically authenticated, peer-reviewed researchers. In the guise of being "fair and balanced" they will gather what they think are advocates for either side -- one "pro" and the other "con" -- when the reality in the scientific community is that 99% of credentialled climatologists, atmospheric chemists, paleontolgists, ecologists, etc., are all believers in AGW. The MSM makes it look like there is still scientific controversy, when in fact, there is not, among scientists in relavent disciplines.

If the powerful oil companies are so interested in bringing-in cap and trade, then where is it? What cap and trade legislation is there in the United States?

Even more to the point -- who the hell says cap and trade is the only way to address emissions? As an environmentalist, I can tell you quite unabashedly that I am against cap and trade, because I don't think its effective. I would much rather see a carbon tax, which would not have all the middle-men that a cap and trade regime would have, and the revenues could go towards subsidies for non-carbon energy sources. But no -- all the focus in the MSM is on cap and trade, and carbon taxes are poo-pooed as being too expensive.

Please stop drinking this "kool-aid" -- that stuff'll kill you (and the rest of us too)!

... the notion that Oil companies are inimical to laws such as Cap and Trade is utter non sense. Oil companies have consistently, and covertly, supported the advent of carbon trading and other such non sense. enron and later other oil majors have actively cooperated with Clinton and later Democrats including Obama to increase their efforts of bringing in carbon trade multi-trillion dollar scam....

It is clear to me you don't know what you're talking about. Again -- what cap and trade regime is there in the United States? Texas-based Enron working with US democrats? Including Obama (who wasn't even a Senator when Enron folded in 2002)?

You don't even know what you don't know. It's rather shocking to me how indignant you seem to feel, when you have no clue about what you're talking about.

... i have done some research into the ice core studies and the results show that carbon concentration is preceded by warming, and not the other way around. warming happens first and then carbon concentration goes up....

First of all, the emissions from volcanoes consist of volcanic ash, which blocks the sun's rays (insolation), which causes a cooling effect, to a certain extent. Greatly counteracting this cooling effect, the major GHG emissions from volcanoes are "sulphur oxides" SO2 -- which have no carbon in them. Not all GHGs have carbon in them, and if you focus only on carbonized elements, you will not understand the data or the research or the resultant findings. This is yet another one of those bits of disinfo that pollutes the public consciousness, thanks to the disengenious efforts of the MSM.

Another thing that hasn't received adequate treatment in the MSM, is that as global temperatures rise, and the ice caps retreat and the permafrost thaws, that the lichens on the surface, and the accumulated plant material that had been frozen for millenia -- this stuff starts to decay, and the resulting emissions, in the form of carbon dioxide and mostly methane (which is a much stronger GHG than CO2 is), this ends up being released into the atmosphere. So therefore, after a period of warming, carbonacious gases in the atmosphere, such as CO2 (carbon dioxide) and CH4 (methane) do indeed go up. But for you to say that this disproves climate science is wrong-headed in the extreme.

I think you should go back and do more research. Don't rely on the MSM. Go straight to the IPCC to hear it from the horse's mouth, so to speak. Read more carefully this time.

... in modern times, emissions from volcanoes is a miniscule portion of total emissions. water vapor is the most significant source of green house gas effect and our Earth, atmosphere, and the broader influences of the Sun enforce a system of dynamic equilibrium which made sure that any "positive feedback" effects due to water vapor are cancelled out. there is a lot of research on water vapor (the largest and most dominant portion of the GHG effect).

It is clear that you have misunderstood the science, and again, it demonstrates to me that you're getting a lot of faulty information, probably from the MSM. Allow me to explain:

1] As the earth's atmosphere warms, it will hold more water vapor,

2] more water vapor will also trap more heat,

3] this represents a dynamic "positive feedback loop", wherein more trapped heat means more water vapor which means more trapped heat -- so nothing is "cancelling out" the way you suggest -- quite the opposite, things are "spiralling out of control",

4] as a concomitant corrollary, more water vapor in the atmosphere means more cloud-cover, which means cooling too, with the result that we will see more extreme weather, harsher storms, stronger hurricanes and tornadoes, and more preciptiation and flooding.

Does this sound familiar?

devesh, with respect, I am now going to retire from this particular topic of discussion, at least in this thread.

If you really are interested in the topic, and I hope you are, I sincerely suggest that you do more thorough research, and not rely so much on the MSM. Seriously, go to the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and read the real research by the real scientists who have the credentials to back them up. Beware of the AGW denial machine, which is funded by the fossil fuel lobbies (not just oil, but gas and coal too), because they have been spending tens of millions of dollars in the media and on lobbyists in the halls of government around the world, trying to hide the truth -- which is that global warming/climate change is real, and it represents an existential threat to all of us.

[abhishek_sharma]

Foreign Military Activities in Asian EEZS: Conflict Ahead?

PDF

[svinayak]

Many people think the lines on the map no longer matter, but Parag Khanna says they do. Using maps of the past and present, he explains the root causes of border conflicts worldwide and proposes simple yet cunning solutions for each.

TEDTalks is a daily video podcast of the best talks and performances from the TED Conference, where the world's leading thinkers and doers give the talk of their lives in 18 minutes. Featured speakers have included Al Gore on climate change, Philippe Starck on design, Jill Bolte Taylor on observing her own stroke, Nicholas Negroponte on One Laptop per Child, Jane Goodall on chimpanzees, Bill Gates on malaria and mosquitoes, Pattie Maes on the "Sixth Sense" wearable tech, and "Lost" producer JJ Abrams on the allure of mystery. TED stands for Technology, Entertainment, Design, and TEDTalks cover these topics as well as science, business, development and the arts. Closed captions and translated subtitles in a variety of languages are now available on TED.com, at http://www.ted.com/translate. Watch a highlight reel of the Top 10 TEDTalks at http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/top10

[SwamyG]

“The Trap of Eastern Partnership”

But what shall people do for whom reasoning (and acting) in terms of “national interest” will be – or already is – forbidden? The “denationalized” and “de-socialized” goal of liberal life is evident, and this goal is realized with enthusiasm by leading Transnational Corporations. Already 30 years ago I wrote[3] what I repeat at present: “The only collective goal of human activity, admitted in the Global Empire, should be the “giving happiness to the majority,” acquisition of private property, especially of these mobile, shining items, which are subjects of a competitive mass production and distribution.”

In this manner adult people, behaving like children afflicted with an ever more widespread illness called “autism”, make themselves slaves of these shining products of technical development. And from money, which helps everyone to become owner of these idols of happiness, radiates nearly “godlike” strength, which strength effectively destroys all “totalitarian”, socialist and national principles of collective life.

This Power of Money changes people into isolated “atoms” circulating everywhere in search of a “job”. But money are only unanimated objects, which already 3000 years ago were well known to Mediterranean cultures. And from these remote times it is known that behind the domination of money are hiding bankers. The Greek philosopher Aristotle demanded to hate these ultra-sedentary men, for “they are getting rich while doing nothing”.

From the point of view of Greek philosophy, “the liberal project of economic partnership” simply represents the project of interception of all political power and of all mind control of capable-to-read-newspapers populace, by World’s oligarchy – and in particular by the oligarchy which is descending from the religious mafia of Old Covenant. This results from the fact that we know only one antique scripture which permits usury as a weapon for the enslavement of “pagan nations”. This “virus” of creeping-like-a-cancer financial gangsterism is hidden inside V Book of Moses, chapt. 23, 20.

So we have since already 3000s years the creeping aggression of “chosen people” against the population of the whole planet. This population, as demands it in the Bible, shall “bless the god of Israel” and shall work as slaves for the priesthood of this antique god of money and private property, “for the nation and the kingdom that will not serve you will perish, and these nations will be utterly laid waste” (Isaiah chapter 60, 10-12). This “virus” of destruction of all capable-to-reason humanity carry with himself in his Holy Black Book each orthodox pop, each catholic priest and each protestant pastor of our “blessed by god” Judeo-Christian civilization. And without neutralization of this virus of “monetarization” of mankind, we all will change ourselves into slaves of chosen (by money) people, wittily described as M-KGB – “Mammonist Koalition of Global Businessmen”.

[abhishek_sharma]

Imperial secrecy

Violence breaks out on the Georgian - South Ossetian boundary

Why Is the IMF Chief Always a European? Because Europeans choose him.

Brazil would like a non-European IMF chief, but won't fight for it

Should the IMF move beyond Europe?

The great shrinking superpower

[Singha]

russia expels israeli diplomat over industrial espionage
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43092165/ns ... ws-europe/

[devesh]

a US Jewish bigwig from Simon Weisenthal Center asks, "How would the United States like to deal with a Mexican government which is filled with Al-Qaeda?" he was asking that in reference to Obama waxing eloquent about a weapon-less Palestine....

for India, this will be a repeat of 1990's. i guess there was always the danger with Obama that the Clintonites would come back to influence his thinking. it is happening. if Kashmir question is raised, India will be in the hot seat again. last time PVNR and then ABV dealt with US fantasies of neutering India. this time we have Manmohan. is he ready???

it is extremely disturbing that he is asking Israel to accept '67 borders......those borders are indefensible and only the present boundaries made sure that Arab fantasies about wiping out Israel didn't come to fruition. if this kind of treatment can be given to Israel, India can expect a crisis multiplied by 10. Clintonites have a distinct contempt for India and this time they'll try to extract blood.

Obama might even 'wink wink nudge nudge' a possible Paki-PRC alliance......the Israel proposal is an indication of things to come. mark my words: if Israel is receiving this kind of open attack by Obama himself, India will receive much worse....I fully expect US to back a Paki-PRC nexus just to spite us and show how little they care for Yindia.....

[Vikas]

Devesh ji, Fortunately for us, USA is no longer the power that they were during PVNR and ABV's time. They are power in decline and hardly have the gumption to take up Kashmir cause. Anyways Palestine-Israel is a far bigger cause to chase than a Kashmir which would never satisfy Arab street. No one in his sane mind is going to give Jehadis and Pakis a victory which would bring blow back to western nations in no time. India is not the fruit jehadis are after. It is Israel and KSA. Shyamd can vouch as to how much Kashmir crops up in Jehadi discussion and literature.

I am not saying that K-word coming back into american diplomatic parlance would not irritate India but thats all it can do. Irritate India and nothing much. All said and done, MMS is not a fruit seller trying to sell Kashmir to Pakis to please Unkill. He made unkill drool over merre $10b worth of planes and then kicked them out of the race.

[devesh]

^^^
I didn't say Manmohan was a traitor. i reserve that word for Sonia and her son. but I seriously doubt whether Manmohan has the guts and sheer political muscle to withstand the kind of pressure that PVNR and ABV did. I don't think Manmohan is a sell out. but at the end of the day, he is at the mercy of Sonia.

Kashmir might become a central issue again b/c US needs to appease Pakis. look at all the new analysis coming out of US; they're already talking about how Pakistan was humiliated. Balance of Power will be the guiding principle of US, in its dealings with India, for years to come. some predict that this Cold War mentality will disappear. but i'm not so optimistic. US cannot allow India to peacefully rise. that threatens US power and posture...

[Pranav]

it is extremely disturbing that he is asking Israel to accept '67 borders......those borders are indefensible and only the present boundaries made sure that Arab fantasies about wiping out Israel didn't come to fruition. if this kind of treatment can be given to Israel, India can expect a crisis multiplied by 10. Clintonites have a distinct contempt for India and this time they'll try to extract blood.

Obama might even 'wink wink nudge nudge' a possible Paki-PRC alliance......the Israel proposal is an indication of things to come. mark my words: if Israel is receiving this kind of open attack by Obama himself, India will receive much worse....I fully expect US to back a Paki-PRC nexus just to spite us and show how little they care for Yindia.....

Don't worry, that is just for show. Obama does not have that much power.

[anmol]

Visegrad A New European Military Force
George Friedman
22 May 2011

With the Palestinians demonstrating and the International Monetary Fund in turmoil, it would seem odd to focus this week on something called the Visegrad Group. But this is not a frivolous choice. What the Visegrad Group decided to do last week will, I think, resonate for years, long after the alleged attempted rape by Dominique Strauss-Kahn is forgotten and long before the Israeli-Palestinian issue is resolved. The obscurity of the decision to most people outside the region should not be allowed to obscure its importance.

The region is Europe — more precisely, the states that had been dominated by the Soviet Union. The Visegrad Group, or V4, consists of four countries — Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary — and is named after two 14th century meetings held in Visegrad Castle in present-day Hungary of leaders of the medieval kingdoms of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia. The group was reconstituted in 1991 in post-Cold War Europe as the Visegrad Three (at that time, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were one). The goal was to create a regional framework after the fall of Communism. This week the group took an interesting new turn.

On May 12, the Visegrad Group announced the formation of a “battle group” under the command of Poland. The battle group would be in place by 2016 as an independent force and would not be part of NATO command. In addition, starting in 2013, the four countries would begin military exercises together under the auspices of the NATO Response Force.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the primary focus of all of the Visegrad nations had been membership in the European Union and NATO. Their evaluation of their strategic position was threefold. First, they felt that the Russian threat had declined if not dissipated following the fall of the Soviet Union. Second, they felt that their economic future was with the European Union. Third, they believed that membership in NATO, with strong US involvement, would protect their strategic interests. Of late, their analysis has clearly been shifting.

First, Russia has changed dramatically since the Yeltsin years. It has increased its power in the former Soviet sphere of influence substantially, and in 2008 it carried out an effective campaign against Georgia. Since then it has also extended its influence in other former Soviet states. The Visegrad members’ underlying fear of Russia, built on powerful historical recollection, has become more intense. They are both the front line to the former Soviet Union and the countries that have the least confidence that the Cold War is simply an old memory.

Second, the infatuation with Europe, while not gone, has frayed. The ongoing economic crisis, now focused again on Greece, has raised two questions: whether Europe as an entity is viable and whether the reforms proposed to stabilize Europe represent a solution for them or primarily for the Germans. It is not, by any means, that they have given up the desire to be Europeans, nor that they have completely lost faith in the European Union as an institution and an idea. Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to expect that these countries would not be uneasy about the direction that Europe was taking. If one wants evidence, look no further than the unease with which Warsaw and Prague are deflecting questions about the eventual date of their entry into the Eurozone. Both are the strongest economies in Central Europe, and neither is enthusiastic about the euro.

Finally, there are severe questions as to whether NATO provides a genuine umbrella of security to the region and its members. The NATO strategic concept, which was drawn up in November 2010, generated substantial concern on two scores. First, there was the question of the degree of American commitment to the region, considering that the document sought to expand the alliance’s role in non-European theaters of operation. For example, the Americans pledged a total of one brigade to the defense of Poland in the event of a conflict, far below what Poland thought necessary to protect the North European Plain. Second, the general weakness of European militaries meant that, willingness aside, the ability of the Europeans to participate in defending the region was questionable. Certainly, events in Libya, where NATO had neither a singular political will nor the military participation of most of its members, had to raise doubts. It was not so much the wisdom of going to war but the inability to create a coherent strategy and deploy adequate resources that raised questions of whether NATO would be any more effective in protecting the Visegrad nations.

There is another consideration. Germany’s commitment to both NATO and the EU has been fraying. The Germans and the French split on the Libya question, with Germany finally conceding politically but unwilling to send forces. Libya might well be remembered less for the fate of Moammar Gadhafi than for the fact that this was the first significant strategic break between Germany and France in decades. German national strategy has been to remain closely aligned with France in order to create European solidarity and to avoid Franco-German tensions that had roiled Europe since 1871. This had been a centerpiece of German foreign policy, and it was suspended, at least temporarily.

The Germans obviously are struggling to shore up the European Union and questioning precisely how far they are prepared to go in doing so. There are strong political forces in Germany questioning the value of the EU to Germany, and with every new wave of financial crises requiring German money, that sentiment becomes stronger. In the meantime, German relations with Russia have become more important to Germany. Apart from German dependence on Russian energy, Germany has investment opportunities in Russia. The relationship with Russia is becoming more attractive to Germany at the same time that the relationship to NATO and the EU has become more problematic.

For all of the Visegrad countries, any sense of a growing German alienation from Europe and of a growing German-Russian economic relationship generates warning bells. Before the Belarusian elections there was hope in Poland that pro-Western elements would defeat the least unreformed regime in the former Soviet Union. This didn’t happen. Moreover, pro-Western elements have done nothing to solidify in Moldova or break the now pro-Russian government in Ukraine. Uncertainty about European institutions and NATO, coupled with uncertainty about Germany’s attention, has caused a strategic reconsideration — not to abandon NATO or the EU, of course, nor to confront the Russians, but to prepare for all eventualities.

It is in this context that the decision to form a Visegradian battle group must be viewed. Such an independent force, a concept generated by the European Union as a European defense plan, has not generated much enthusiasm or been widely implemented. The only truly robust example of an effective battle group is the Nordic Battle Group, but then that is not surprising. The Nordic countries share the same concerns as the Visegrad countries — the future course of Russian power, the cohesiveness of Europe and the commitment of the United States.

In the past, the Visegrad countries would have been loath to undertake anything that felt like a unilateral defense policy. Therefore, the decision to do this is significant in and of itself. It represents a sense of how these countries evaluate the status of NATO, the US attention span, European coherence and Russian power. It is not the battle group itself that is significant but the strategic decision of these powers to form a sub-alliance, if you will, and begin taking responsibility for their own national security. It is not what they expected or wanted to do, but it is significant that they felt compelled to begin moving in this direction.

Just as significant is the willingness of Poland to lead this military formation and to take the lead in the grouping as a whole. Poland is the largest of these countries by far and in the least advantageous geographical position. The Poles are trapped between the Germans and the Russians. Historically, when Germany gets close to Russia, Poland tends to suffer. It is not at that extreme point yet, but the Poles do understand the possibilities. In July, the Poles will be assuming the EU presidency in one of the union’s six-month rotations. The Poles have made clear that one of their main priorities will be Europe’s military power. Obviously, little can happen in Europe in six months, but this clearly indicates where Poland’s focus is.

The militarization of the V4 runs counter to its original intent but is in keeping with the geopolitical trends in the region. Some will say this is over-reading on my part or an overreaction on the part of the V4, but it is neither. For the V4, the battle group is a modest response to emerging patterns in the region, which STRATFOR had outlined in its 2011 Annual Forecast. As for my reading, I regard the new patterns not as a minor diversion from the main pattern but as a definitive break in the patterns of the post-Cold War world. In my view, the post-Cold War world ended in 2008, with the financial crisis and the Russo-Georgian war. We are in a new era, as yet unnamed, and we are seeing the first breaks in the post-Cold War pattern.

I have argued in previous articles and books that there is a divergent interest between the European countries on the periphery of Russia and those farther west, particularly Germany. For the countries on the periphery, there is a perpetual sense of insecurity, generated not only by Russian power compared to their own but also by uncertainty as to whether the rest of Europe would be prepared to defend them in the event of Russian actions. The V4 and the other countries south of them are not as sanguine about Russian intentions as others farther away are. Perhaps they should be, but geopolitical realities drive consciousness and insecurity and distrust defines this region.

I had also argued that an alliance only of the four northernmost countries is insufficient. I used the concept “Intermarium,” which had first been raised after World War I by a Polish leader, Joseph Pilsudski, who understood that Germany and the Soviet Union would not be permanently weak and that Poland and the countries liberated from the Hapsburg Empire would have to be able to defend themselves and not have to rely on France or Britain.

Pilsudski proposed an alliance stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and encompassing the countries to the west of the Carpathians — Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. In some formulations, this would include Yugoslavia, Finland and the Baltics. The point was that Poland had to have allies, that no one could predict German and Soviet strength and intentions, and that the French and English were too far away to help. The only help Poland could have would be an alliance of geography — countries with no choice.

It follows from this that the logical evolution here is the extension of the Visegrad coalition. At the May 12 defense ministers’ meeting, there was discussion of inviting Ukraine to join in. Twenty or even 10 years ago, that would have been a viable option. Ukraine had room to maneuver. But the very thing that makes the V4 battle group necessary — Russian power — limits what Ukraine can do. The Russians are prepared to give Ukraine substantial freedom to maneuver, but that does not include a military alliance with the Visegrad countries.

An alliance with Ukraine would provide significant strategic depth. It is unlikely to happen. That means that the alliance must stretch south, to include Romania and Bulgaria. The low-level tension between Hungary and Romania over the status of Hungarians in Romania makes that difficult, but if the Hungarians can live with the Slovaks, they can live with the Romanians. Ultimately, the interesting question is whether Turkey can be persuaded to participate in this, but that is a question far removed from Turkish thinking now. History will have to evolve quite a bit for this to take place. For now, the question is Romania and Bulgaria.

But the decision of the V4 to even propose a battle group commanded by Poles is one of those small events that I think will be regarded as a significant turning point. However we might try to trivialize it and place it in a familiar context, it doesn’t fit. It represents a new level of concern over an evolving reality — the power of Russia, the weakness of Europe and the fragmentation of NATO. This is the last thing the Visegrad countries wanted to do, but they have now done the last thing they wanted to do. That is what is significant.

Events in the Middle East and Europe’s economy are significant and of immediate importance. However, sometimes it is necessary to recognize things that are not significant yet but will be in 10 years. I believe this is one of those events. It is a punctuation mark in European history.

[ramana]

GF is a madcap. He is fighting imaginary ghosts everywhere seeing enemies where there are none. wonder why people want to pay him for his ravings.

[Hari Seldon]

George bheja-friedman has a good conman snake-oil show going. Why would he want to stop?

Besides, his misleading western powers into tilting at windmills creates space for turd world SDRE underperformers like aamchi yindia to stay off the radar a wee bit longer, hopefully.

[Guddu]

GF should not be relied on to comment intelligently on India specific issues, but he has a good handle on european affairs. I think visegrad is a significant development...time will tell.

[UBanerjee]

Each analyst may have different areas of expertise- the above analysis vis a vis Eastern Europe is fairly illuminating I think about the future course of Europe, whatever claptrap he may put out re the Indian subcontinent. (btw the term South Asia has to be cut out whenever possible)

There is a tendency to assume European integration is destined. But I think the current fractures are symptoms of deeper forces that will drive apart this process. The entire process is currently allowed by the German guilt instilled by the Anglos and French- how long will that last? I wonder if exposing the British empire's record would allow the Germans some perspective on the narrative they've been handed, that their crimes are not somehow superhuman and ahistorical.

For another, one major force driving European integration was a need to present a body capable of standing up to the US and the Soviets as something in itself. In other words the minnows band together to sit at the table with the sharks. But is this still a motivating rationale?

[svinayak]

http://mapper.nndb.com/start/?map=3624

Map clearly shows that the Obama campaign and his cabinet choices have many connections to international banking institutions, including the federal reserve. It also demonstrates that many people in the banking community openly supported Obama's Campaign.

PEOPLE
Warren Buffett Billionaire in Omaha
Duane L. Burnham CEO of Abbott Laboratories, 1989-98
James Dimon CEO of JP Morgan Chase
William A. Osborn CEO of Northern Trust, 1995-2008
Linda Walker Bynoe CEO of Telemat Limited
Valerie B. Jarrett CEO of The Habitat Company
John W. Madigan CEO of Tribune Co., 1995-2002
William C. Foote CEO of USG
Michael H. Moskow CEO, FRB Chicago, 1994-2007
Jill M. Considine Chairman of Depository Trust Company, 1998-2006
Paul Volcker Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 1979-87
William M. Lewis, Jr. Co-Chair Investment Banking at Lazard
Amelia C. Fawcett COO of Morgan Stanley Intl., 2002-06
Martin N. Baily Council of Economic Advisers, 1995-96, 1999-2001
Jeffrey A. Frankel Council of Economic Advisers, 1997-99
Kristin J. Forbes Council of Economic Advisers, 2003-05
Matthew J. Slaughter Council of Economic Advisers, 2005-07
William Curt Hunter Dean of Business, University of Iowa
Jessica P. Einhorn Dean, School of Advanced International Studies
Alan Greenspan Federal Reserve Chairman, 1987-2006
James S. Crown Henry Crown and Company
Charles L. Evans President and CEO, Chicago Fed
Timothy F. Geithner President of the New York Fed
Paul Wolfowitz President of the World Bank, 2005-07
Barack Obama President-Elect of the United States
Martin Feldstein Reagan economist
Jerry I. Speyer Tishman Speyer Properties
William M. Daley US Secretary of Commerce, 1997-2000
Lawrence H. Summers US Treasury Secretary, 1999-2001
David W. Heleniak Vice Chairman of Morgan Stanley
Michelle Obama Wife of Barack Obama
Robert Zoellick World Bank president
James Wolfensohn World Bank president, 1995-2005

[RajeshA]

There is a tendency to assume European integration is destined. But I think the current fractures are symptoms of deeper forces that will drive apart this process. The entire process is currently allowed by the German guilt instilled by the Anglos and French- how long will that last? I wonder if exposing the British empire's record would allow the Germans some perspective on the narrative they've been handed, that their crimes are not somehow superhuman and ahistorical.

For another, one major force driving European integration was a need to present a body capable of standing up to the US and the Soviets as something in itself. In other words the minnows band together to sit at the table with the sharks. But is this still a motivating rationale?

The Germans are for some time not acting on the basis of any guilt! Pacifism in Germany is considered a national interest in itself, as it frees Germany to pursue its economic expansion. The Germans snigger when they hear French chest-pumping and talk about nuclear umbrellas. The Germans are happy at the moment to be considered the economic engine of Europe and want to consolidate Europe around this engine. They have excellent relations with those countries they invaded in the past - Poland, Israel, etc. They have excellent relations with the "superpowers" of Europe - UK, France, Italy and Russia.

The Germans know that they have to subsidize much of European spending ways, but even that they consider as part of the game, for it allows them to keep the rest of Europe firmly suckling at German breast and allows the Germans to keep their influence, both political but mainly economic, in European countries. Nothing moves in Europe without the Germans having a say in it.

[Agnimitra]

From MKB's blog:

Two US visions of Sunni-Shia politics in Middle East

Lewis of course did great damage to the US's Middle East policy by advocating that America's geopolitical interests lay in exploiting Shia-Sunni sectarianism in the Middle East by putting together a phalanx of Sunni Arab states, which would be natural allies of Israel, and thereupon to confront Iran. Lewis wove an entire thesis toward this political end by portraying the Iranian Shias as essentially Persians who by being Indo-Aryans are inherently hostile to Jews - unlike the Arab Sunnis including the Wahhabis. The edifice that Lewis erected was on weak foundations and it lies in complete ruins today -- and alongside the debris of US regional policies -- and the Arab Spring will ensure that the edifice can never be made habitable again.

Today, much of what Vali Nasr wrote and spoke about over the years stands vindicated. There is great validity in Nasr's assessment that:
A) Since 1991, Sunni militancy, and not Iranian Shi'ism, has been the ideological force animating Islamic activism.
B ) Militant Sunni forces are growing in prominence as the expression of Sunni frustration.
C) Sunni miltancy and Wahhabi activism pose the greatest danger to US interests.
D) Shia revolutionary activism, on the other hand, is essentially a spent force.
E) Iraq - and not Iran - will be the first country to become openly Shia.
F) The Shia revival in Iraq may well lead to other regime changes in the region.
G) The US cannot, perhaps, afford to openly embrace the Shia revival without alienating many in the Arab world.
H) However, the challenge of Sunni militancy coupled with the promise of change brought about by the reemergence of Shia political influence in the Middle East demands new US thinking and policy toward Islam and the challenge of Islamic activism.

[svinayak]

The change in America and its foreign policy

http://www.amconmag.com/blog/crossing-the-tea/

Crossing the Tea
Share|
Evangelicals are not a part of the Republican coalition—they are the coalition.
By Michael Brendan Dougherty | May 11, 2011
Since the Reagan era, Republicans have described their political coalition as a “three-legged stool.” Fiscal conservatives, national security conservatives, and social conservatives together hold up the fortunes of the party. This rhetorical stool is often used like a prop in pro-wrestling: to bludgeon recalcitrant office-seekers into submission.
But the metaphor is also supposed to signify a division of labor: Fiscal conservatism is the purview of the Republican business class or libertarians, national security is handled by neoconservatives, and somewhere out in the hinterlands the religious right will hand out pamphlets about abortion and knock on doors come election time.
This picture is a lie.
In their activist fervor, their enthusiasm for the ideas, and their electoral clout, religious conservatives are the base of all three legs. White evangelical Protestants make up almost third of the total electorate, and four out of five of them vote Republican. The religious right is more convinced of American righteousness in the exercise of its military might than the neoconservatives are, and more invested than Wall Street in lower taxes.
The Tea Party, confusedly hailed by the media as a grassroots libertarian spasm, turns out on inspection to be the religious right wearing a tricorn hat and talking about Obamacare. Neoconservatives who call for confrontation with Iran, a closer relationship with Israel, and pressing the War on Terror are not echoed by religious conservatives—they’re drowned out by them. In economics and military matters, no less than in social issues, conservative evangelicals are more Republican than Republicans.
“I’m all three,” says Richard Land, the president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, political arm of the Southern Baptist Convention. “I’ve always believed in low taxes and a strong national defense.” Similarly, Jordan Sekulow, deputy director of governmental affairs at the American Center for Law and Justice, a Christian legal group, notes that for the evangelical right conservatism is a seamless garment.

Conservative Christians don’t need to be told by anyone that America ought to stand by Israel. Evangelicals with a Dispensational theology already “speak out for Zion’s sake” (Isaiah 62:1). Hagee’s group, Christians United For Israel, is more passionately Zionist than any American neoconservative because its mandate, so its members believe, comes from Scripture, not an interpretation of political necessity or cultural affinity. Every year, CUFI draws one of the largest conservative Christian crowds to Washington, D.C. Hagee can pack a convention center when neoconservative foreign-policy confabs barely fill a presentation room at the American Enterprise Institute.
Increasingly, conservative Christians don’t need a target list from anyone else, either. Scores of thousands of politically active Christians have gone on month-long missions to the Third World or taken politically charged tours of the Holy Land. Their churches have sister congregations in troubled spots along the coasts of Africa, Latin America, and Pakistan.
“These issues of genocide and intervention take on a personal hue,” says Carter. “I think this is the right opportunity for some Christian patriots to say what Christian thinking on foreign policy should look like. It wouldn’t look like neoconservatism. But so far no one’s really come up with it.” Until then, the nationalist passions of conservative Christians are as important to Republican candidates and policymakers as their positions on abortion, helping to connect the average Republican voter to the foreign-policy preferences of Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz.

[Prem]

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terroris ... e-to-India

Iran blocks Merkel's flight en route to India
Iran has not said why it denied German Chancellor Merkel's plane entry to Iranian airspace, although relations between the two have deteriorated over Iran's nuclear program and EU sanctions.

[svinayak]

How Buddhism is linked to state in Japan

http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/Buddhis ... dhism.aspx

In Japan, it was not possible for the sangha to maintain its independence and a series of military governments regulated and subordinated the practice of religion to national requirements. In Japan, religion and state have always been closely connected. The word a religious organization is matsuri. The word for government administration is matsuri-goto. The state was a form of religious expression and religious expression was state regulated. Some of the schools of Buddhism that arose in Japan more than accommodated to this environment by advancing teachings with a strongly nationalistic flamour. It is these forms of Buddhism that have, in large measure, found their way to North America. Buddhism that places religion in a subordinate position to the state is actually being practiced in a number of places, but this is not the original variety and should not be part of the New Buddhism either.

Read more: http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/Buddhis ... z1Nxkm4UDD

[abhishek_sharma]

An hour with Fareed Zakaria (Video)