http://indrus.in/articles/2012/06/29/ge ... 16095.html
Beijing wants to diversify its geopolitical strategy towards Pakistan and the South Asia as awhole.
First, Beijing seems to be confident that because of its involvement in military activities inAfghanistan, the U.S. positions in Pakistan have been subtly but irreversibly weakening.The new ‘equation’ of geopolitical power in Central Asia is indicative of China emergingas a dominant economic “actor” in the area. Beijing carries out the tactics of gently pushingthe U.S. out of Pakistan through the time tested and proven practice of foreign economicrelations expansion. In addition, Pakistan is counting on China's substantial financialassistance, as well as cooperation in the ‘classical’ energy field, primarily the constructionof hydropower stations along the lines of tested Chinese projects (based on the experience ofthe ‘Three Gorges’ project on Yangtze River) in the mountains.
Second, true to its strategic principle of ‘economy defines geopolitics,’ China activelyparticipates in the modernisation of transport infrastructure in Pakistan. In fact, theimplementation of projects in this area is subject to reaching a two-in one objective: toensure safe transportation of energy carriers on the Persian Gulf - South China Sea route andlimit the U.S. influence in the regions of the Middle East, South and Central Asia that area ‘sensitive’ spot for China. The above-mentioned project - the Gwadar port in the north-western part of the Arabian Sea - is an ideal place for observing the movement of vehiclesand naval vessels coming from the Persian Gulf towards the East, and - if necessary - canbe used to protect the vehicles delivering energy resources to the Far East. In particular, theactive participation of experts from China in modernising bases and stations of PakistanNavy submarines, which can also be used by Chinese submarines, speaks in favour of thisassumption.
Third, according to media reports, China intends to seek permission to open a military basein Pakistan. Military experts believe that there are at least three strategic objectives pursued:providing a ‘soft’ military-political pressure on India; limiting U.S. influence in Pakistan andAfghanistan; direct supervising over the activities of the ‘Uighur separatists’ in the NWFP ofPakistan.
Fourth, according to Indian press, China has become a major supplier of military equipmentto Pakistan. Currently, the Pakistani army is allegedly armed with Chinese militaryequipment to the tune of 70 percent. Moreover, citing some military sources in Delhi, theIndian press says: If the prospect of receiving the Russian fifth generation fighter by theIndian Air Force is materialised, Pakistan will turn for help to China also carrying research inthis area of military construction.
And finally, for Pakistan, China remains an indispensable ally and partner in theimprovement of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since 1976. And there is noevidence of terminating that assistance in the foreseeable future.
Thus, the strategic policy of China towards Pakistan is a complex symbiosis of at least threegeopolitical ideas: 1) restraining the political Islam influence (i.e. the forces operating fromthe Pakistani territory) on the development of internal processes in China (mainly in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region), 2) limiting the role of India in South Asia, and 3)the ‘gentle replacement’ of the U.S. out of the South and Central Asia.
Does the development of Sino-Pakistan relations affect the interests of Russia? It seems thatthe answer would be yes, and there are two reasons for it.
1. The transformation of Pakistan into a sort of ‘nursery’ of political Islam and internationalterrorism, and the constant threat of ‘exporting’ radical ideas and practices to the adjacentterritories of China and Central Asia cannot leave Russia inactive. It seems that Russia needsa change of foreign policy behaviour algorithm regarding Pakistan, that is, the country'sreturn to the role of active external participant in the South Asia social processes. Theincreasing complexity of the geopolitical ‘equation’ in the region fits the long-term interestsof the Russian Federation, since the struggle for peace in Central Asia, figuratively speaking,begins in Pakistan. Restoration of political dialogue and foreign economic relations with thiscountry to at least the mid-1960s level will allow Russia to actively influence the foreignpolicy of Pakistan.
2. The “return” of Russia to South Asia suggests that there should be an organisational andinstitutional framework appropriate to the given task of maintaining dialogue about thepeace, development and tranquillity of this pivotal region. Discussing and resolving (on amultilateral basis) the security issues of South Asia will enhance the pro-active participationof Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), subject to full membershipin the organisation of India and Pakistan. Moscow can and should balance the active roleof Beijing in this international organisation, keeping in mind that the effectiveness of theSCO as a political tool of international security, ultimately, depends on it. It is also worththinking about Russia's participation in a particular format in the activities of the South AsianAssociation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).