LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
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Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
ts,
Its been a while since I ranted on this. So! There is a fallacy in your arguments. As new gizmos, mijjiles and doodads became visible, they were added to requirements of Mk1. This simply doesnt happen without consequences. In fact, it is the very reason why trivial manufacturing issues -- delamination and deviations, water ingress, etc werent sorted out in due time. Since IAF wont accept a flying platform without Derby, and derby test contract will take X years, everything can get spread over the X years. This means test articles get produced at a rate of 1 per two years. Only Y tests will get done, and the water test and manufacturing tolerances will be in year Z-1.
The simple fact is that the LCA was meant not as a flying craft, but as a negotiation device. It is not in the interests of ANYONE in the purchase chain, and even the users (given their low confidence in HAL products) to see it as a weapon or flying platform that might replace anything.
Now this isnt really a controversial statement. The thinking on part of the users' goes : "When foreign designed craft are manufactured, screwdrivered and maintained so poorly that we lose X lives, why increase the risk where even the design is not TFTA?" The thinking on part of everyone NOT a user goes "I have to think of my retirement, better not upset any cosy arrangements or topple any laden apple carts". The thinking on part of developers goes "what can we do onlee? Its a manufacturing issue. Is the lunch ready?". The thinking at HAL goes "think of the order book! Without large multi year screwdrivering we would be privatised. Then what?" And of course, the middlemen exist in all shapes, sizes and uniforms.
Its NOT a technology issue. None of the above qualify. Not water ingress. Not python derby. Not the gun. Not the manuals. Nothing.
It is NOT a manufacturing issue. The quality will be the same "quail shaft failure" grade. But it is that quality everywhere. Anywhere in the world.
The amazing thing is that the LCA will Serve. Some. Service. Role. Hand wringing apart, this is the gist of it. There is enough positive that can be disclosed to keep these whines to a minimum. But notice how even irrelevent details as number of test flights have a lid on it.
It is all maya. And you may not agree with even the sun rising in the east but the Hawk didnt magically get M346 class requirements, nor did the Su class get an AESA or derby. If the LCA had been permitted to deploy, the AMCA (papier mache mk7) would have had all that and more by now. Thats where the creep needed to go. Not in we will make one Saras and give up when it crashes. Not in we will make 9 Hansa and then call ourselves masters. Not in lets buy longEZ kits and deploy them in numbers.
Flying craft need squadron service. Delay that, and you make the development cycle decades longer. Lets ask for disclosure of details at the same brochure grade as the rest of the world. Without even that, old old old CAG reports and questionable DDM reporting make for a very unreadable debate.
Its been a while since I ranted on this. So! There is a fallacy in your arguments. As new gizmos, mijjiles and doodads became visible, they were added to requirements of Mk1. This simply doesnt happen without consequences. In fact, it is the very reason why trivial manufacturing issues -- delamination and deviations, water ingress, etc werent sorted out in due time. Since IAF wont accept a flying platform without Derby, and derby test contract will take X years, everything can get spread over the X years. This means test articles get produced at a rate of 1 per two years. Only Y tests will get done, and the water test and manufacturing tolerances will be in year Z-1.
The simple fact is that the LCA was meant not as a flying craft, but as a negotiation device. It is not in the interests of ANYONE in the purchase chain, and even the users (given their low confidence in HAL products) to see it as a weapon or flying platform that might replace anything.
Now this isnt really a controversial statement. The thinking on part of the users' goes : "When foreign designed craft are manufactured, screwdrivered and maintained so poorly that we lose X lives, why increase the risk where even the design is not TFTA?" The thinking on part of everyone NOT a user goes "I have to think of my retirement, better not upset any cosy arrangements or topple any laden apple carts". The thinking on part of developers goes "what can we do onlee? Its a manufacturing issue. Is the lunch ready?". The thinking at HAL goes "think of the order book! Without large multi year screwdrivering we would be privatised. Then what?" And of course, the middlemen exist in all shapes, sizes and uniforms.
Its NOT a technology issue. None of the above qualify. Not water ingress. Not python derby. Not the gun. Not the manuals. Nothing.
It is NOT a manufacturing issue. The quality will be the same "quail shaft failure" grade. But it is that quality everywhere. Anywhere in the world.
The amazing thing is that the LCA will Serve. Some. Service. Role. Hand wringing apart, this is the gist of it. There is enough positive that can be disclosed to keep these whines to a minimum. But notice how even irrelevent details as number of test flights have a lid on it.
It is all maya. And you may not agree with even the sun rising in the east but the Hawk didnt magically get M346 class requirements, nor did the Su class get an AESA or derby. If the LCA had been permitted to deploy, the AMCA (papier mache mk7) would have had all that and more by now. Thats where the creep needed to go. Not in we will make one Saras and give up when it crashes. Not in we will make 9 Hansa and then call ourselves masters. Not in lets buy longEZ kits and deploy them in numbers.
Flying craft need squadron service. Delay that, and you make the development cycle decades longer. Lets ask for disclosure of details at the same brochure grade as the rest of the world. Without even that, old old old CAG reports and questionable DDM reporting make for a very unreadable debate.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
tsarkarji. With respect your analogy is complete nonsense. Please allow me to explain. Supposing you did not buy a car but were told that a car is being designed. And without actually seeing the car you called it "Khadi Gramodyog" then the story would be reflective of the truth. The words "Khadi Gramodyog" were told to me in person by a senior IAF officer even before the LCA's first flight.tsarkar wrote:Its more to do with mindset shaped by this -shiv wrote:Khadi GramodyogSuppose BR members bought a new car (LSP, not TD, not PV) and went for a drive in the monsoon and then have cabin, engine, music system, we, our better halves & kids drenched, surely won't we be using the choicest words in our vernacular vocabulary? Or will we bash on regardless to office or social occasion, stepping out partly or completely soaked, and saying to all & sundry, so what, indigenous haiWater seepage observed during the flight testing to prove all weather clearance, in critical areas of aircraft including cockpit, radar, DFCC, avionics bay, etc. which required design solutions
I'm sure this would've been fixed by now, but a bad impression will linger.
You who naturally get upset when armed forces officers are criticized without adequate information or with misinformation must apply the same standards to what you say or type. I felt I must butt in because you are now cooking up analogies to suit your viewpoint
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
A fundamental aspect of the R60 vs. R73 argument is the origin of the weapon in question. If we compare our experience with say the US, Russia, Britain or France, the key takeaway is that the aircraft design and production house is in lockstep with the missile manufacturer as well as the air force that will be the primary buyer, i.e. the domestic air force. These agencies are all in the same country/ political unit (e.g. EU). They work together as a team and communicate roadmaps for their products. Missile development is not instantaneous; each missile takes some years to move from concept to design to test to production. It is thus possible for the designers of a new aircraft to acquire a roadmap of weapons evolution for that platform, and provision their design accordingly.
In the case of the R60, UAC or Mig MAPO would have been provided with a roadmap of missile evolution by Vympel and the VVS wherein they would be informed of the selection of the R73 well in advance of its deployment. That would give the aircraft manufacturer time to adapt the design to accept the new weapon whenever it would be available, and also rejig existing platforms where needed.
Unfortunately in India's case, the platform (LCA) was an ab initio design by an agency completely new to the game, the missile manufacturer was in a third country, there was no direct communication between the two, and the consumer, the IAF, would not have received much advance notification of the development of the R73. The Russians have the reputation for being uncommunicative (it is only their fifth column on BR that is aggressively vocal), and would in all probability not provided much advance notice of the existence of the R73 to the IAF. Lastly given the siloed existence of the ADA, the DRDO and the IAF, any communication that might have been possible would not have happened in time.
It might be argued that the ADA should have been aware of the rapid development of technology and hence provisioned for it. That is however a fallacious argument, since they had no way of knowing what to provision for. The R73 at 105 kg weighs twice as much as the R60. They would not have known whether to provision for an additional 20 kg, 40 kg, 50 kg or whatever.
Under these circumstances, no one can be blamed, whether it is the IAF, the DRDO or the ADA. They managed with what they had and designed and delivered a product under very difficult circumstances. The net result apart from the LCA is the internal expertise built up in aircraft and missile design. It is time to stop pointing fingers and instead continue working to evolve domestic engineering and manufacturing to the point where all relevant products are manufactured locally, which when it happens would go a long way towards obviating this problem.
In the case of the R60, UAC or Mig MAPO would have been provided with a roadmap of missile evolution by Vympel and the VVS wherein they would be informed of the selection of the R73 well in advance of its deployment. That would give the aircraft manufacturer time to adapt the design to accept the new weapon whenever it would be available, and also rejig existing platforms where needed.
Unfortunately in India's case, the platform (LCA) was an ab initio design by an agency completely new to the game, the missile manufacturer was in a third country, there was no direct communication between the two, and the consumer, the IAF, would not have received much advance notification of the development of the R73. The Russians have the reputation for being uncommunicative (it is only their fifth column on BR that is aggressively vocal), and would in all probability not provided much advance notice of the existence of the R73 to the IAF. Lastly given the siloed existence of the ADA, the DRDO and the IAF, any communication that might have been possible would not have happened in time.
It might be argued that the ADA should have been aware of the rapid development of technology and hence provisioned for it. That is however a fallacious argument, since they had no way of knowing what to provision for. The R73 at 105 kg weighs twice as much as the R60. They would not have known whether to provision for an additional 20 kg, 40 kg, 50 kg or whatever.
Under these circumstances, no one can be blamed, whether it is the IAF, the DRDO or the ADA. They managed with what they had and designed and delivered a product under very difficult circumstances. The net result apart from the LCA is the internal expertise built up in aircraft and missile design. It is time to stop pointing fingers and instead continue working to evolve domestic engineering and manufacturing to the point where all relevant products are manufactured locally, which when it happens would go a long way towards obviating this problem.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
It is easy to see that many of these problems (including the drag issue and pylon weight limits etc. for R-73 vs R-60) simply stem from the initial requirement of an aircraft which was as small and light as the Mig-21 so that it could replace them 1:1 and at the same time provide a payload and performance which comes closer to the M2k than the Mig-21. The design team started off with a significant handicap and had to stick with it since changing the design at a late stage would mean unacceptable delays. In 20/20 hindsight it seems inevitable, but the ADA didn't really have any choice when they started off. If the LCA had been designed around the M53/F100 or similar engine than the Kaveri/F404 and was longer and heavier, we might not have seen any of these problems. Basically the LCA Mk2 but better, since it was going to be designed that way since day 1. But that wasn't really an option back in the day because of the smallest-lightest hangup.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Hobbes these are excellent points.Hobbes wrote: In the case of the R60, UAC or Mig MAPO would have been provided with a roadmap of missile evolution by Vympel and the VVS wherein they would be informed of the selection of the R73 well in advance of its deployment. That would give the aircraft manufacturer time to adapt the design to accept the new weapon whenever it would be available, and also rejig existing platforms where needed.
Unfortunately in India's case, the platform (LCA) was an ab initio design by an agency completely new to the game, the missile manufacturer was in a third country, there was no direct communication between the two, and the consumer, the IAF, would not have received much advance notification of the development of the R73.
I have been arguing about the Small Diameter Bomb in other threads, but I would like to mention that the problem the US faced was very similar. They needed effective bombs that could be accommodated in some numbers the bomb bays of the F-22 and F-35. They did not ask for changes in the size of the bomb bay. They asked for a suitable munition to be developed.
It is debatable whether the R60 R73 saga is lack of foresight of ADA or lack of foresight of IAF. To me it is definitely one of lack of cooperation between the IAF and the design and manufacturing agency. There has been mutual contempt and recrimination/blame game which is shocking for two strategically important pillars of the nation.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Seems like Indian products are made for testing adinfinitum while flawed imports area quickly pressed into service and the services hide these flaws from the public.
GOI needs to ban imports of weapon systems.
GOI needs to ban imports of weapon systems.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
The R73 is about 1.5 times R60 weight. So taking g loads and all that it, almost new design of the wing and fuselage interface leading to delays.
IAF needed R73 over R60. And they informed in a few months as Tsarkar showed. Maybe ADA did not pushback thinking not too difficult to implement.
Anyway water under bridge.
Derby hence Radar are crucial for air combat role.
IAF needed R73 over R60. And they informed in a few months as Tsarkar showed. Maybe ADA did not pushback thinking not too difficult to implement.
Anyway water under bridge.
Derby hence Radar are crucial for air combat role.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Nowhere have I asked more Mk1 to be ordered, nor am I stating that production lines should not be setup, maintenance personnel trained etc. - these are your straw man arguments.eklavya wrote:Tejas Mk 2 is an iterative development of the Mk 1. The focus should be on making the Mk 2 design work and setting up scale production facilities. The obsession with "order more Mk 1" is downright bizarre. The obsession should be with achieving FOC, getting production line going, inducting into squadron service, getting aircrew and and maintenance personnel trained up, maintaining high availability, developing tactics, etc. If all this is happening, more orders may follow. It's been nearly a decade since the first 40 were ordered, ordering 100 would not have made the development go faster/better.Raman wrote:What are the threats that the IAF will face over the next 25-30 years that will be tackled by LCA Mk2 but not LCA Mk1 (as is)?
As I see it, the increments in STR/ITR, drag, etc. will not result in such a qualitative difference that renders the Mk1 moot. Additional upgrades like an AESA, IFR, etc. can be applied in successive blocks, or as an MLU to the Mk1.
Will it kill us if MiG-27 and Jaguar replacements are not BVR capable right out of the gate instead of a couple of years down the road?
I do not understand the IAF's reluctance to go in for iterative development.
What I find difficult to understand is that the IAF will not touch it with a barge pole until it is fully BVR + IFR capable when these can be added to the IOC-2 airframes at modest cost down the road. I'm arguing that the IOC-2 standard could well have been FOC standard for Block 1.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Nothing "bizarre" about ordering more MK-Is. Large orders normally have a +ve impact on production itself, reduce individual item cost, make things like supply chain more robust and build confidence on the production side of the equation. It also keeps the lines humming, skills in place, provide a great jumping point for the next version, etc.Tejas Mk 2 is an iterative development of the Mk 1. The focus should be on making the Mk 2 design work and setting up scale production facilities. The obsession with "order more Mk 1" is downright bizarre.
Rest of your suggestions still stand, but are independent of ordering more MK-Is. There would be some overlap, but if at all it should have a +ve impact on the rest of the project (FOC, etc). Certainly will not interfere with those aspects that you mention.
True.What I find difficult to understand is that the IAF will not touch it with a barge pole until it is fully BVR + IFR capable when these can be added to the IOC-2 airframes at modest cost down the road. I'm arguing that the IOC-2 standard could well have been FOC standard for Block 1.
They did that for the MKI after all.
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Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
It is certainly around 100* but I have never seen doing it 180* and I do not think it is possible.fanne wrote:IR, there are enough video of Su30 DOING 180 DEG AOA (i.e. nose pointing exactly apposite of flight) and the plane recovering level flight after that.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
I am pretty sure they are well past 100 degrees AOA and pretty much at 180 in the flip that they do at high AOA , and low speed. Of course it is instantaneous and generally also results in a loss of altitude since its a post stall maneuver..The X-31 also did those in its demo years back but again, at those extremely high AOA's of >100 expect some serious altitude loss..Your recovery is also significantly delayed at 30,000+ altitudes compared to much lower. For all practical purposes, unless an extreme emergency this regime on the flanker will never be exploited in actual combat..It will still use its excellent high AOA capability but never to do something like this..
Here is the Su-37 doing it
Here is the Su-37 doing it
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
So now you are down to cheap shots. Good going I say. When facts stare in your face that lives are lost due to outdated platform you cite many reasons for their deaths but not willing to accept something better than what is losing those precious lives in the first place. Of course IAF would not send non-airworthy aircraft for operations even when it is well known that MIG 21 frame / Technology is past its expiry date and hence all those issues. Well your pseudo patriotism is causing lives when it can be mitigated by accepting iterative , evolutionary mode of development and induction of LCA which was primary purpose of replacing MIG21.eklavya wrote:
People pose as patriots and take cheap shots at the IAF. There were many reasons for the MiG-21 accident rate: lack of AJT, manufacturing issues, maintenance issues, training issues, bird strike, etc. Every issues was/is being dealt with. Nothing is more precious that the lives of our aircrew. They cannot be imported, cannot be borrowed, cannot be made overnight and cannot be replaced, not at any cost, so we need to give them every chance to come back alive and victorious after every mission. IAF does not send non-airworthy aircraft for operations. Accidents still happen and it is very saddening.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Theres another thing thats downright bizarre. Your whole line of argument.eklavya wrote:
Tejas Mk 2 is an iterative development of the Mk 1. The focus should be on making the Mk 2 design work and setting up scale production facilities. The obsession with "order more Mk 1" is downright bizarre. The obsession should be with achieving FOC, getting production line going, inducting into squadron service, getting aircrew and and maintenance personnel trained up, maintaining high availability, developing tactics, etc. If all this is happening, more orders may follow. It's been nearly a decade since the first 40 were ordered, ordering 100 would not have made the development go faster/better.
Tejas MK2 is not an "iterative" development. For how iterative development works, please refer to F-16, and also Bandar programs. The MK1.5 with the Aesa is iterative.
HAL has made a proposal this year to hike production capacity to 16 a/c a year. On one hand IAF wants/wanted 126+80 options Rafale to fill up the squadrons costing almost 120-150 million a pop.
Here they actually have a way to fill up the numbers quick @ 30 million per unit, if they act in time.
Also for the next 20-30 years, atleast on the western front, IAF will be faced primarily with "iterations" of the bandar and recently acquired F16s. The MK1 can today and will be able to hold its own against this quality of opposition. And all the while be backed by the heavy hitting Sukhois.
A ramping of the production line now is the need of the hour.Not only it will bring economies of scale, it will smoothen the production line and supply chain and also ensure IAF Squadron Nos dont take an alarming hit in the next 5-7 years.
The DMs pro activity on this front has been reassuring.
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... -progress/
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
It important to mention the air speed, altitude etc when talking about AoA, ITR, STR etc. I'd definitely like to see the Su30 doing 180 degree AoA at Mach 1+, 40k feet altitudeVipul Dave wrote:It is certainly around 100* but I have never seen doing it 180* and I do not think it is possible.fanne wrote:IR, there are enough video of Su30 DOING 180 DEG AOA (i.e. nose pointing exactly apposite of flight) and the plane recovering level flight after that.

Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
How about a 360?Vipul Dave wrote:It is certainly around 100* but I have never seen doing it 180* and I do not think it is possible.fanne wrote:IR, there are enough video of Su30 DOING 180 DEG AOA (i.e. nose pointing exactly apposite of flight) and the plane recovering level flight after that.
It also does a turn on a dime - literally.
No idea how much of these moves can be used in combat tho'.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
That Su-37 in the video is not demonstrating high AOA flught. The pilot is doing a backward somersault. the same thing is done by this MiG 29 OVT - watch from 1:20 for 10 seconds. Watch from 1:55 again for sustained high AOA flight
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5GO1sokk7o
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5GO1sokk7o
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Very High AOA regime is in the low subsonic domain for all aircraft in the class..At faster speed you'll be G limited.abhik wrote: It important to mention the air speed, altitude etc when talking about AoA, ITR, STR etc. I'd definitely like to see the Su30 doing 180 degree AoA at Mach 1+, 40k feet altitude
Last edited by brar_w on 13 Jul 2015 20:14, edited 2 times in total.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
shiv wrote:That Su-37 in the video is not demonstrating high AOA flught. The pilot is doing a backward somersault. the same thing is done by this MiG 29 OVT - watch from 1:20 for 10 seconds. Watch from 1:55 again for sustained high AOA flight
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L5GO1sokk7o
Shiv, the maneuver being demonstrates is the Kulbit or somersault, which is basically an extension of the cobra to extend it to complete an extremely tight loop..You can see the direction where the aircraft is heading before it begins to bleed altitude and loose energy and it finally completes the loop post stall and performs a recovery.. Post Cobra it is easily surpassing 100 degree AOA..What the highest transient AOA is exactly, would be something only the pilot would be able to tell us for sure..
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kulbit
Well these moves may not, but the point of air-show maneuvers and demonstrations is to showcase the performance of an aircraft in the low subsonic regime. The Flanker maneuvers over the years have shown how it can perform at those high AOA's and do so effortlessly and is easy to recover post stall. TV only makes things faster and easier.No idea how much of these moves can be used in combat tho'.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
This is the wrong thread for Su-30 AOA discussion - I have moved my post here
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 5#p1869505
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 5#p1869505
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Coming backto LCA and refocus on achieving FOC, can some one ask the defence journos to find out why Cobham is late and behind the eight ball?
The contract for 6 quartz radomes was awarded in Sept 2013 with delivery date of Jan 2015. Its now July 2015. What is the new schedule and what is causing the delays?
The Derby firing and IFR is linked to this milestone.
And its not in ADA hands.
While at it can someone confirm the LRUS have been re-qualified for gun trial shock and vibration loads?
All are linked to the LCA achieving the air combat role.
The contract for 6 quartz radomes was awarded in Sept 2013 with delivery date of Jan 2015. Its now July 2015. What is the new schedule and what is causing the delays?
The Derby firing and IFR is linked to this milestone.
And its not in ADA hands.
While at it can someone confirm the LRUS have been re-qualified for gun trial shock and vibration loads?
All are linked to the LCA achieving the air combat role.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
This is a great time to take a bet.ramana wrote:Coming backto LCA and refocus on achieving FOC, can some one ask the defence journos to find out why Cobham is late and behind the eight ball?
I bet Cobham have not been able to meet the specs demanded.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Shiv, Sad day if that is the reason. Means the radar power has to be increased. Means back to drawing board.
On the other hand the Uttam AESA (EL/M 2052) will have to be fast tracked.
Which might be a good thing.....
But ADA needs to keep the IAF in the loop and have weekly status updates so we don't hear blame games.
KaranM or tsarkar, on the Harrier EL/M 2032 what are the TRT numbers on it?
We know LCA version has ~150 TRTs?
On the other hand the Uttam AESA (EL/M 2052) will have to be fast tracked.
Which might be a good thing.....
But ADA needs to keep the IAF in the loop and have weekly status updates so we don't hear blame games.
KaranM or tsarkar, on the Harrier EL/M 2032 what are the TRT numbers on it?
We know LCA version has ~150 TRTs?
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
You will win this bet.shiv wrote:This is a great time to take a bet.ramana wrote:Coming backto LCA and refocus on achieving FOC, can some one ask the defence journos to find out why Cobham is late and behind the eight ball?
I bet Cobham have not been able to meet the specs demanded.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
yes Shiv garu you will win this bet. Following that the IAF will ask to improve the receiver reference sensitivity for the RX modules and then send it back without FOC
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Guessing here that that will come in about 10 years in a phased manner. Only rub is that whether that is possible in military scenario where platform compatibility, parts, license restrictions, and geopolitics come into play.Vivek K wrote:GOI needs to ban imports of weapon systems.
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Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
http://www.saiindia.gov.in/english/home ... of2015.pdftsarkar wrote:If the performance specifications were realistically unobtainable, then were these bought to the notice of the Empowered Committee and waivers been applied for?maitya wrote:how about specifying realistic performance parameters in the ASR?
No. This is a national project not run on IAF money. So IAF cannot shut it off. Empowered Committee providing oversight comprises COAS, SA to RM, DG ADA and Secretary Defence Production. All other members other than COAS are independent of IAF. Had this been brought to their notice, then surely they could’ve ensured a waiver?maitya wrote:moreover, disagreeing to IAF ASR would have meant no program to work on, in the first place.
Lets take each of the weapons scope creep –maitya wrote:Only criticism can be, if IAF was fore-sighted enough with specifying the other future-proof requirements of the ASR
R-73 was introduced as part of Sukhoi Su-30MKI package that was signed in 30th November 1996. R-73E for Tejas was specified in March 1997. Informing within four months surely is a quick enough timeframe.
M62 Russian Bomb. This is the Russian FAB M62 bomb http://weaponsystems.net/weapon.php?wea ... 0FAB%20M62 The same bomb was used to crater Tezgaon airfield at Dhaka in 1971 http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... dacca.html
However, IAF never intended Tejas carry an old, if effective, weapon. After Kargil, IAF specified a new version from IMI Israel, called Improved Fragmentation Bomb IFB 500. Looks similar outside but very different under the skin.
http://www.imi-israel.com/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=66597
Imagine the effectiveness of this weapon on rat infested sangars. Again, this weapon, standardized across IAF, was specified & developed after Kargil (1999) and could not have been specified for Tejas earlier.
http://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/nr/rdonlyre ... od_imi.pdf
Next item to cause delay was CMDS. Now, CMDS would’ve saved Ajay Ahuja’s life in Kargil. My elder brother & our family had gone to Vaishnodevi with Ajay & his family just the year before in 1998 and our memories are still warm & fresh like yesterday. CMDS was specified across the fleet after Kargil.IFB-500 is fully compatible to interface with western and eastern aircrafts – Mirage 2000, Jaguar, SU-27 and others
Last item to cause delay was Derby & Python. Now, thankfully, IAF had not specified R-77, otherwise valuable time would’ve been wasted integrating a dud missile. Nor was Tejas IOC/FOC tied to Astra development. Derby + Elta 2032 was proven on the Sea Harrier in 2009 and it was specified for Tejas the same year.
http://www.livefistdefence.com/2009/07/ ... [b]Tuesday, July 07, 2009[/b]As part of the Limited Upgrade Sea Harrier (LUSH), the Indian Navy will shortly conduct its second live firing test of the Israeli Derby beyond visual range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM), a weapon system that has been integrated to the last of the Navy's Sea Harriers as part of the upgrade programme. While the first live firing of the Derby active-radar seeker missile was conducted using the aircraft's primary sensor, the next test will be from one of the Navy's upgraded Sea Harriers with its radar switched off. Guidance will be provided from another platform, either on the ground or in the air.
July to December is 5 months.It was only in December 2009 the Air HQ communicated the requirement of specific BVR missiles viz. Derby and Python-5 Missiles on LCA as part of the FOC.
So in all these cases, none of the requirements could’ve forecasted or foresighted earlier than they were done.
http://www.saiindia.gov.in/english/home ... of2015.pdfmaitya wrote:It's this intellectual dishonesty of constantly criticizing of something, in this case weight-creep, a key contributor of which is the scope-creep that they themselves have asked for in the first place.
The only scope-creep was weapons, that added to timelines and not weight, as Vina has clarified, a few coats of Kevlar in the right places. Can you kindly specify what scope-creep added to weight-creep? Some forum members keep talking vaguely about scope-creep contributing to weight-creep but seem to be completely lost when asked to specify the scope creep.There were no revisions to the ASR by IAF, except in respect of weapon requirements, as discussed in Para 2.3.2.
Delay has been because of a protracted development process. And success has been iterative rather than on the first time itself.
Development Issues
http://www.saiindia.gov.in/english/home ... of2015.pdf
RWR fitted on LCA Mk-I is having issues such as degradation of direction finding accuracy, reset in air, etc and DARE is in the process of resolving these issues.
CMDS fitted on LCA Mk-I exhibited deficiency in misguiding enemy missiles and ADA/BDL are in the process of modifying the design to overcome the flaw.
We've all seen the air inlet at the base of the vertical tailfin to cool the engine bay undergoing multiple design iterations. The trailing edge root extension being more smoothly blended into the fuselage. All these design iterations took time.The first Electromagnetic test result of production Radome, supplied (December 2011) by HAL showed (June 2012) high loss of signal power resulting in significant reduction in radar range thereby affecting its performance. The Empowered Committee (June 2013) noticed that the losses of signal power were due to design deficiency and choice of Kevlar3 material. Subsequently, due to this deficiency, ADA had to conclude (September 2013) a contract with M/s Cobham, England for development and supply of six Radomes with quartz4 material at a cost of GBP 2.5 million (`22.75 crore) by January 2015 for testing on LCA.
Production Issues
Audit observed (October 2014) from the Empowered Committee (EC) meetings (September 2012 to July 2014) that the LSP aircraft manufactured by HAL had the following deficiencies:
(a) Design deficiencies in fuel system, brake management system, brake parachute, undercarriage system;
(b) Quality problems (September 2012) on the MMR with HAL manufactured Radome (also discussed in Chapter III Para 3.1);
(c) Water seepage observed during the flight testing to prove all weather clearance, in critical areas of aircraft including cockpit, radar, DFCC, avionics bay, etc. which required design solutions;
(d) Structural problems like fuel leak, cracking of turkey feathers, de-lamination, and contour deviation;
(e) The performance of aircraft was affected by low reliability of critical LRUs like Jet Fuel Starter (JFS), Cockpit Pressure Transducer3 (CPTCV) on the aircraft.
I agree with you & Dileep on this that those not connected with Program Development or complexities involved gave damning soundbytes. However, the damning soundbytes needs to be mapped against the overtly optimistic soundbytes given by the Tejas developers & producers. I can quote pages after pages on optimistic timelines that had to be revised. Surely, they being in the know of things, could’ve given realistic timelines.[/quote]maitya wrote:And as far as this program goes, the 99% of those media articulation by IAF is downright damning
Excellent, well documented post TSarkarji. Another couple of points that need some clarification:
1) while forumites charge that the IAF has asked for unobtanium, tks makes it clear that it was the drdo/ada combine that set up such ambitious program goals, even the AF thought were way impractical...
2) can an informed poster provide a source which shows that the AF conjured up str/itr specs that were to exceed m2k+ mig29 turn rates,
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
In 2012 I had started a thread called "Industrial Development and the Evolution of Military Aviation"
The second post of that thread is relevant here:
Quote:
I had some thoughts about when an aircraft is "really really" ready for service. I will cross post that here. I don't mean to be harsh about anyone - but it seems to me that there have been nations in the past who have been forced to equip their armed forces with "less than world class" equipment that was faulty and unreliable. but they went ahead and suffered that, leading to a robust world leading industry some decades down the line.
There is a semi-philosophical question that asks "When is a fighter really ready for operational flying?"
I don't know the real answer to this question but I guess a safe answer would be "A fighter is ready for operational flying when it is capable of performing the roles envisaged for it in an air force which inducts the fighter, is reliable, and is available in adequate numbers and is fully serviceable when required"
Clearly this is a broad general definition where specifics are left vague. But using the above broad definition I am tempted to think that Air Forces of the world induct aircraft only when they reach that stage as per the definition above. But hey presto, when I look back at the history of military aviation, this is what I find, from WiKi and I post that at the bottom. If you read the list you find that the richest and most powerful country on earth has a record of inducting fighters long before they were really ready. Many were plain unsafe. I am sure the US could have turned to Britain or France for imports. But they did not.
I post his in the context of when the LCA will be declared as ready, but I do feel a separate thread on the evolution of military aviation along with industrial development may be a good idea.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_ ... Phantom_II
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Dy ... 1_Aardvark
The second post of that thread is relevant here:
Quote:
I had some thoughts about when an aircraft is "really really" ready for service. I will cross post that here. I don't mean to be harsh about anyone - but it seems to me that there have been nations in the past who have been forced to equip their armed forces with "less than world class" equipment that was faulty and unreliable. but they went ahead and suffered that, leading to a robust world leading industry some decades down the line.
There is a semi-philosophical question that asks "When is a fighter really ready for operational flying?"
I don't know the real answer to this question but I guess a safe answer would be "A fighter is ready for operational flying when it is capable of performing the roles envisaged for it in an air force which inducts the fighter, is reliable, and is available in adequate numbers and is fully serviceable when required"
Clearly this is a broad general definition where specifics are left vague. But using the above broad definition I am tempted to think that Air Forces of the world induct aircraft only when they reach that stage as per the definition above. But hey presto, when I look back at the history of military aviation, this is what I find, from WiKi and I post that at the bottom. If you read the list you find that the richest and most powerful country on earth has a record of inducting fighters long before they were really ready. Many were plain unsafe. I am sure the US could have turned to Britain or France for imports. But they did not.
I post his in the context of when the LCA will be declared as ready, but I do feel a separate thread on the evolution of military aviation along with industrial development may be a good idea.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_ ... Phantom_II
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vought_F-8_CrusaderIn air combat, the Phantom's greatest advantage was its thrust, which permitted
a skilled pilot to engage and disengage from the fight at will.[37] The massive
aircraft, designed to fire radar-guided missiles from beyond visual range,
lacked the agility of its Soviet opponents and was subject to adverse yaw during
hard maneuvering. Although thus subject to irrecoverable spins during aileron
rolls, pilots reported the aircraft to be very communicative and easy to fly on
the edge of its performance envelope. In 1972, the F-4E model was upgraded with
leading edge slats on the wing, greatly improving high angle of attack
maneuverability at the expense of top speed.[38]
The J79 engines produced noticeable amounts of black smoke, a severe
disadvantage in that the enemy could spot the aircraft.[39] This was solved on
the F-4S fitted with the −10A engine variant which used a smoke-free
combustor.[40]
The F-4's biggest weakness, as it was initially designed, was its lack of an
internal cannon. For a brief period, doctrine held that turning combat would be
impossible at supersonic speeds and little effort was made to teach pilots air
combat maneuvering. In reality, engagements quickly became subsonic.
Furthermore, the relatively new heat-seeking and radar-guided missiles at the
time were frequently reported as unreliable and pilots had to use multiple shots
(also known as ripple-firing), just to hit one enemy fighter. To compound the
problem, rules of engagement in Vietnam precluded long-range missile attacks in
most instances, as visual identification was normally required. Many pilots
found themselves on the tail of an enemy aircraft but too close to fire
short-range Falcons or Sidewinders. Although in 1967 USAF F-4Cs began carrying
SUU-16 external gunpods containing a 20 mm (.79 in) M61 Vulcan Gatling cannon,
USAF cockpits were not equipped with lead-computing gunsights,until the
introduction of the SUU-23, virtually assuring a miss in a maneuvering fight.
Some Marine Corps aircraft carried two pods for strafing. In addition to the
loss of performance due to drag, combat showed the externally mounted cannon to
be inaccurate unless frequently boresighted, yet far more cost-effective than
missiles. The lack of a cannon was finally addressed by adding an internally
mounted 20 mm (.79 in) M61 Vulcan on the F-4E.[38]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Amer ... uper_SabreThe Crusader was not an easy aircraft to fly, and was often unforgiving in
carrier landings where it suffered from yaw instability, and the
poorly-designed, castered nose wheel made steering on the deck problematic. It
earned a reputation as an "ensign killer" during its early service
introduction.[9] The nozzle and air intake were so low when the aircraft was on
the ground or the flight deck that the crews called the plane "the Gator." Not
surprisingly, the Crusader's mishap rate was relatively high compared to its
contemporaries, the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk and the F-4 Phantom II.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-105_ThunderchiefThe F-100A officially entered USAF service on 27 September 1954 with 479th
Fighter Wing at George AFB, CA. By 10 November 1954, the F-100As suffered six
major accidents due to flight instability, structural failures, and hydraulic
system failures, prompting the Air Force to ground the entire fleet until
February 1955. The 479th finally became operational in September 1955. Due to
ongoing problems, the Air Force began phasing out the F-100A in 1958, with the
last aircraft leaving active duty in 1961. By that time, 47 aircraft were lost
in major accidents.[2] Escalating tension due to construction of the Berlin Wall
in August 1961 forced the USAF to recall the F-100As into active service in
early 1962. The aircraft was finally retired in 1970.
By the time the F-105 mock-up had been completed in October 1953, the aircraft
had grown so large that the Allison J71 turbojet intended for it, was abandoned
in favor of an even more powerful Pratt & Whitney J75. Anticipating a protracted
development of the engine, it was expected that the first aircraft would use the
smaller Pratt & Whitney J57. Near the end of 1953, the entire program was
canceled by the USAF due to a number of delays and uncertainties regarding the
aircraft, however on 28 June 1954, the USAF officially ordered 15 F-105s (two
YF-105As, four YF-105Bs, six F-105Bs and three RF-105Bs) under the Weapon System
designation WS-306A.[5][9][10]
By the time the F-105 mock-up had been completed in October 1953, the aircraft
had grown so large that the Allison J71 turbojet intended for it, was abandoned
in favor of an even more powerful Pratt & Whitney J75. Anticipating a protracted
development of the engine, it was expected that the first aircraft would use the
smaller Pratt & Whitney J57. Near the end of 1953, the entire program was
canceled by the USAF due to a number of delays and uncertainties regarding the
aircraft, however on 28 June 1954, the USAF officially ordered 15 F-105s (two
YF-105As, four YF-105Bs, six F-105Bs and three RF-105Bs) under the Weapon System
designation WS-306A.[5][9][10]
The YF-105A prototype first flew on 22 October 1955, with the second YF-105A
following on 28 January 1956.[9] In spite of being powered by a less potent
J57-P-25 engine with 15,000 pounds-force (67 kN) of afterburning thrust (the J75
was expected to generate 24,500 lbf (109 kN) with afterburner), the first
prototype attained the speed of Mach 1.2 on its maiden flight.[11] Both
prototypes featured conventional wing root air intakes and slab-sided fuselages
typical of the early jets; Republic viewed the YB-105As as not being
representative of the true capability of the aircraft due to numerous changes
prior to production.[12] Insufficient power and aerodynamic problems with
transonic drag, as well as Convair's experience with their F-102, had led to a
redesign of the fuselage in order to conform to the Area rule, giving it a
characteristic "wasp waist".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Dy ... 1_Aardvark
Lacking experience with carrier-based fighters, General Dynamics teamed with
Grumman for assembly and test of the F-111B aircraft. In addition, Grumman would
also build the F-111A's aft fuselage and the landing gear.[20] The General
Dynamics and Grumman team faced ambitious requirements for range, weapons load,
and aircraft weight.[21] The F-111 design also included new features on a
production military aircraft, such as variable-geometry wings and afterburning
turbofan engines.[20]
The F-111A mock-up was inspected in September 1963. The first test F-111A was
rolled out of the General Dynamics' Fort Worth, Texas plant on 15 October 1964.
It was powered by YTF30-P-1 turbofans and used a set of ejector seats as the
escape capsule was not yet available.[18] The F-111A first flew on 21 December
1964 from Carswell AFB, Texas.[22] The first F-111B was also equipped with
ejector seats and first flew on 18 May 1965.[23][24]
To address stall issues in certain parts of the flight regime, the engine inlet
design was modified in 1965-66, ending with the "Triple Plow I" and "Triple Plow
II" designs.[25] The F-111A achieved a speed of Mach 1.3 in February 1965 with
an interim intake design.[18][25] Cracks in the F-111's wing attach points were
first discovered in 1968 during ground fatigue testing, and an F-111 was crashed
the following year due to the issue. The attach structure required redesign and
testing to ensure adequate design and workmanship.[26] Flight testing of the
F-111A ran through 1973.[27]
The F-111B was canceled by the Navy in 1968 due to weight and performance
issues, along with the need for additional fighter requirements.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Excellent CM - ask for unobtainium as proof, 

Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
for LCA Mk2 and onward, DRDO should uprate specifications for thrust, t:w, mtow, aoa, turn rates, stealth, radomes, radar range, etc by +30%. this should not mean design for under-performance but to purely look at satisfying growth/spec creep.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
SaiK wrote:for LCA Mk2 and onward, DRDO should uprate specifications for thrust, t:w, mtow, aoa, turn rates, stealth, radomes, radar range, etc by +30%. this should not mean design for under-performance but to purely look at satisfying growth/spec creep.
SaiK Its not like having some buffers and parameters unassigned for later use.
Every extra feature adds weight and makes it sluggish. All shows up in AOA or ITR/StR.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
agree.. but take this example: GE F414 INs6 same size and weight, but they can increase power to 116kN on their enhanced engine. I am sure there is the design challenge in keeping the same physical dimension and weight and still increasing the performance.
just thinking harder onlee
just thinking harder onlee
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Again, I don't understand why the FOC should be held up. Current setup allows for 50-60km BVR engagements. You can fix some of these things later on. Don't keep delaying for one reason or the other. Call it FOC-I and be done with it and let's get the production going. Then have FOC-II that will improve range with new redesigned radome and that can be retrofitted when available.ramana wrote:Shiv, Sad day if that is the reason. Means the radar power has to be increased. Means back to drawing board.
On the other hand the Uttam AESA (EL/M 2052) will have to be fast tracked.
Which might be a good thing.....
But ADA needs to keep the IAF in the loop and have weekly status updates so we don't hear blame games.
KaranM or tsarkar, on the Harrier EL/M 2032 what are the TRT numbers on it?
We know LCA version has ~150 TRTs?
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
And have retd jarnails and karnails make comments about 3.75 legged cheetah. Harrumph!! Meanwhile let us fly sooper sophishticated MiG-21 and MiG-27. We will fite with bhat bhe have!
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 2022
- Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
^It doesn't matter what crap we fly currently (and how many pilots die in the process), when we get a new aircraft, it must be like superman without vulnerability to kryptonite. Otherwise, its like khadi gramodyog and not huffy and tuffy enough.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Forget about MiG-21/27s. Even Mirage-2000s with its Super-530D and its MICA can't engage targets beyond that 60km mark.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Now that you've raised the point about specification, it would be interesting to find out whether performance characteristics of a RADAR unit is given w/o considering the type of Radome it will be mated with or assuming that it will be mated with certain type (Shape and material) of Radome?shiv wrote:This is a great time to take a bet. I bet Cobham have not been able to meet the specs demanded.ramana wrote:Coming backto LCA and refocus on achieving FOC, can some one ask the defence journos to find out why Cobham is late and behind the eight ball?
If it is former, than a fighter radar with claimed range of 'X' will have X-Delta performance when it is mated to a radome. And Delta will vary with the type of material on Radome and its shape. But there is bound to be 'Delta' degradation.
In this case, your assertion about 'not meeting specs' would mean that 'Delta' prescribed to be met by Cobham radome to ensure minimum drop in performance is something which cannot be met by the material and design.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Presume production of the airframe etc at HAL is continuing regardless of FOC date?srai wrote:Call it FOC-I and be done with it and let's get the production going. Then have FOC-II that will improve range with new redesigned radome and that can be retrofitted when available.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
Derby range is also 50 km:srai wrote:Forget about MiG-21/27s. Even Mirage-2000s with its Super-530D and its MICA can't engage targets beyond that 60km mark.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Python_(missile)
EL/M-2032 range is apparently 150 km:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/EL/M-2032
RDY range is apparently 140 km, RDY-2 potentially higher:
http://www.mirage-jet.com/Variants/DASH5/RDY/rdy.htm
Exploiting the full potential of the EL/M-2032 is obviously important to maximise situational awareness and to give the pilot the best opportunity to win any engagement.
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
I have one question:
Why it is so that first IAF has to come up with ASR and then pass on to DRDO and then they give their opinion and then feedback flows back and forth, allegations and finger pointing for decades to come, blah blah.. Why not the IAF and DRDO seat together right from the start in single committee to come up with ASR?? I mean they are same team, aren't they?? Seat together right from the start, discuss all facets of the proposal and come up with doable ASR for 1st stage along with a road-map for life-long upgrades with futuristic technology. I am aam abdulla and I don't get it why its not done this way.
Or do they actually co-operate with each other from start and I am unaware of this?? But if so, then why this discord between user and developer??
Why it is so that first IAF has to come up with ASR and then pass on to DRDO and then they give their opinion and then feedback flows back and forth, allegations and finger pointing for decades to come, blah blah.. Why not the IAF and DRDO seat together right from the start in single committee to come up with ASR?? I mean they are same team, aren't they?? Seat together right from the start, discuss all facets of the proposal and come up with doable ASR for 1st stage along with a road-map for life-long upgrades with futuristic technology. I am aam abdulla and I don't get it why its not done this way.
Or do they actually co-operate with each other from start and I am unaware of this?? But if so, then why this discord between user and developer??
Re: LCA Tejas: News and Discussions
I think this post in Rafale thread deserves crossposting here
With original link which Philip omitted in the post
With original link which Philip omitted in the post
Philip wrote:Praval,the AM concerned was in service when he was first selected to head the ADA,even passed by the PM! Babudom and vested interests kept him from taking up the post ,waited till he retired and he was too decent to fight/lobby for the post.The saga is also available in the memoirs of a retd. IAF officer.This has been posted much earlier on BRF.I am reposting some of it again.It gives a good insight into the origins,gestation of the project and why it has suffered so much of delay,the story continues even today!
Sorry for posting this in the Raffy td. but it is part of the whole debate and gives an insight into what the IAF really wanted .
One fine morning at about that time I received a call from my AOC in C Air Marshal JR Bhasin. The Air HQ desired that the DRDO would take on the task of designing and building a modern fighter aircraft that could be used by the air force. An outline of a proposal received from the DRDO was available with the Command HQ. The Air HQ had decided to seek field level opinion about the proposal and tabulate the wish list of the operators so that a consolidated response could be put out to the MOD and the DRDO. For this purpose a very broad based conference had been planned at the Air HQ where the operational commands and the VCAS and DCAS were to present their wish list in the form of a presentation. To prepare for the conference at Delhi, the AOC in C wanted all his field commanders and staff to apply their minds on the subject and then come down to the Command HQ at Jodhpur for a session of brain storming. He had sent a copy of the papers received from the Air HQ to me by post and I should get that by the next day. We had about four days to think about the task and to gather at Jodhpur.
I became rather exited. It is not often that one is invited to participate in shaping of the future. My base Jamnagar was one of the most active fighter stations of the Air Force. I knew that my unit commanders and their subordinate staff would be as excited about the project as I was. I called in my unit commanders and the Chief Operations Officer (COO) and informed them about the impending task. The anticipation for the detailed information to arrive was delectable.
The details were received through mail next morning. It was contained in a few pages of print. It described the intention to build a single engine tail-less delta plan-form aircraft powered by an engine designed by the GTRE. It was to have a multi-purpose radar designed and built within the country that was to be totally contemporary and to be highly capable in the air to air / air to ground / maritime roles. The aircraft was to be an unstable platform controlled by ‘fly by wire’ technique. It was also to contain all functionalities of a small agile low-observable fighter that could be found anywhere in the world at that point of time. Its projected weight was to be seven tons empty. It was to be designed and developed within about ten years. This dream, the DRDO felt, was achievable. Personally I disagreed with that statement.
Group Captain KN (Pinki) Pillai was at that moment commanding the TACDE based on my station. Wing Commander Sunil Gulati was commanding 29 Squadron. Wing Commander Jeff D’Souza was commanding 45 Squadron. Group Captain Ravi Kumar was my Chief operations Officer. We quickly got into a huddle to formulate a point of view on the missive we had received. The discussion soon heated up and we included other senior pilots and engineers from the units into the discussion. The source of the heat generated was the vagueness of the objective of the exercise.
Indeed, the write-up that we had received was rather confusing. The project seemed extremely ambitions. An airframe to be built with extensive use of composite material of which we had no previous experience, an engine that was still on paper, a radar set that was to be better than our imported best and yet be lighter in weight and perhaps a bit smaller in size, an electronic control system for an unstable platform (the struggle with the control laws for the Gnat being still vividly in our memory), a completely unconventional digital man/machine interface while we had no experience at all of the new fangled concept of a ‘glass cockpit’, and all this within a decade! It sounded implausible. At the same time, the paper sent down to us clearly gave us the impression that this super duper futuristic aircraft was what we were required to commit for in ten years’ time. Our Hunters, Gnats, Maruts, Mig21s would all start winding down in the nineties. If we did not start planning for these replacements realistically from now (the early eighties), we shall have undermined the ability of the air force to perform its task.
The vigor of our discussion soon pushed us into smoke and sparks rather than a beam of focused light and we had to draw back and ask ourselves whether we knew what we were talking about. What in our collective wisdom should be the focus of our comment? At last we summarized our views as follows:
We felt that the proposed aircraft was over-ambitious. We felt that we were not likely to succeed in building the aircraft within a decade. We hastened to add that we had no quarrels with the concept of dreaming big; we only needed to remain practical and credible in our endeavor.
We felt that development of critical technologies in radar and engine should be pursued with vigor but that effort must not be tied to an aircraft project clearly identified for time-bound induction into the air-force as the risk of delay or failure of the project would be too high
We reminded ourselves that in ten years time our force strength would decline. We felt that our energies would be better spent in upgrading our present strength of aircraft with better technologies in sensors and weapons. We felt that in the MiG 21 BIS we had the most optimized 7 ton fighter aircraft available in the whole world. It was however already more that 20 years old. It was therefore attractive as a target platform for substantial technological up-gradation. If we could modernize its avionics, give it a nav-attack system, add electronic self-defence capabilities, add more modern communications and add newer guided weapons and hopefully put in a modern by-pass engine into the airframe then we would have a formidable aircraft on our hands. We felt that we would be capable of handling such a development.
Having cleared our own minds, we got down to the task of preparing a presentation to convince the rest of the Air Force.
It is easy to have a gut-feeling. It is also easy to convince yourself that your feeling is based on logic and reason. Perhaps it is even easy to find support for the ideas you are feeling from amongst your friends and your immediate colleagues. It is quite a different thing how ever to present your idea in front of a large audience comprising your bosses and perhaps a segment of critical friends. It was therefore a hard grind to prepare the presentation that was to be given to the AOC in C at Jodhpur.
We started the presentation with a bald and bold set of statements laying out the three summary views we had arrived at. We were sure that such a start would shake up the audience. To substantiate the first point we put the outline of the proposed LCA as received under a microscope, put every goal stated to a comparative study with the standards achieved by the MiG21 BIS, the Mirage 2000 and a general study of achievements within public knowledge anywhere in the world. We talked of structural weight and structural volume, we talked of clean aircraft design and of drag and lift, and we talked of thrust weigh ratios and of range and endurance. We talked of Specific Fuel Consumption and fuel carrying capacities within the airframe. Bit by bit we tried to prove that to create a structure that was somewhat lighter than the MiG21 and then extract aerodynamic performance from it that almost equaled the Mirage 2000 (which was about two tons heavier) would need us to technologically improve our performance in every single element of design and construction of the airframe and engine by at least fifteen to twenty percent from our currently known capabilities or aspirations. (We were yet to build a single operational jet engine). We felt that a time frame of ten years for this scale of achievements was implausible.
We now took up the case of proposed sensors. The proposal put out by the DRDO did not include a laser rangefinder for air to ground role. The assumption therefore was that the onboard radar would have to provide primary range data for air to ground role as well as air to air role. The problem as we saw it was we had never designed any airborne radar of any sort. The radar on the MiG 21 was rudimentary. None of the aircraft of the older generation like the Hunter/Gnat/Mystere/Marut had any airborne radar. The radar fitted in the maritime Jaguars were yet to enter service. The radar fitted to the Mirage 2000 had come without any transfer of technology. It was not clear whether we were capable or creating a duplicate that would be even better in performance. The proposed LCA was smaller that the Mirage 2000. Even if we had access to Mirage 2000 radar, would it fit into the smaller volume of the LCA? There was no indication that this had been considered. Therefore, we were totally dependent on the success of the proposed MMR. If that failed or was subjected to any delay the whole LCA project would be endangered.
We also dwelt on the Kaveri as the proposed engine for the LCA. The engine was far from a reality. Even if the first few prototypes of the LCA flew on some other engine, to commit to a production run of an aircraft yet to be built based on a maiden venture on an engine yet to be designed needed a leap of faith we were unable to make.
Thus I made our first point: If the DRDO is confident of achieving everything they have aimed at, God-Speed to them. We are however skeptical about their time frame of one decade. Therefore, we recommend that the effort of the DRDO be taken up as a national project not related to Air Force funds and plans. If the DRDO succeeds in its venture and a useable aircraft is produced, the Air Force can always induct that product as soon as it is available.
We then moved over to the second point of our presentation. A modern offensive air weapon system like a fighter aircraft contains many technologically advanced components that in 1982 were not produced in the country. Apart from an aero engine and an air interception radar, many other things like secure communication, Electronic Countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, pilots’ man/machine interface, survival equipment for the aircrew, oxygen systems, intelligent weapons and advanced sensors and so on. If we ever wanted to be capable of independent and effective military air and space operations, it would be necessary for us to master these technologies. We therefore felt that any research and development under taken by DRDO in these fields should be vigorously supported by the Air Force. Successes in these fields would enhance our abilities across the board. There was therefore no need to tie any of these R&D to any specific project. R&D on all component development should proceed vigorously.
The third point of our presentation was centered on our need to get some useable and effective aircraft into the air force within a decade. We mentioned that the Gnat was a spent force, the Hunters were becoming difficult to maintain, the SU-7 and the Type 77s would soon finish their lives. We needed credible replacements and we saw no inductions on the horizon. We therefore felt that a midlife upgrade for the MiG21BIS Type 75 was urgently needed. We felt that an upgrade should concentrate on new electronics and weapons. We also felt that if a less thirsty engine could be found for induction that would increase its radius of action it would be very good. We felt confident that the talent available in India was capable of delivering such an upgrade. We suggested that irrespective of what the DRDO plans about a project called LCA, the MiG21BIS upgrade program must be taken up without delay.
Having created the presentation, we polished it for a couple of days. The task of verbal delivery of the presentation was shouldered mainly by me and Pinky Pillai with able help from the rest of the members of the team. We had many talented young officers on the station. Our audio visual support for the planned presentation came to a high standard. We then proceeded to Jodhpur for the conference.
The other two major stations of the SWAC, Jodhpur and Bhuj, had kept their presentations simple. They functioned on the premise that the DRDO would deliver what ever was being promised. They just asked for a few additional items like laser ranger. The presentation at Jodhpur was an easy walk-over for us. We evoked a lot of opposition that we readily overcame. Our presentation was technically superior as we had much more resources and manpower than the other stations. After a day of debate we were chosen as the SWAC team for the presentation at the Air HQ.
The Gathering at the Air HQ was big. Mr Shahariyar, the Scientific Advisor to the Chief of the Air Staff was the organizer for the meeting as he represented the DRDO to the Air Force. However, the Directorate of Air Staff Requirements (DASR) under Air Vice Marshal JW (Johney) Greene took over the actual conduct of the conference, as ultimately they would have to become the nodal agency for induction of an indigenous aircraft.
In 1982, the SWAC was the youngest of the operational commands. We were therefore called upon to make our presentation after the other commands had had their say. The morning was tending to become a bit monotonous. It seemed to me that most of the presentations were based on thin air! At long last it was my turn. The auditorium was full of dignitaries. The Chief, Air Chif Marshal Idris Latif was present. All his PSOs and most of the ACASs and Directors were also present. There was a senior rep from the Navy. The HAL, the NAL and many other DRDO Labs were represented. The hall was actually overflowing with middle ranking officers, many of them standing two or three deep in the rear. The SWAC team took the stage. Very soon all the monotony of the morning was gone. The audacity and challenge of our presentation shook up the audience. I am however not sure whether the Chief took to our presentation kindly. He was an ardent supporter of the concept of the LCA. Our open disbelief of the DRDO’s claims and aims ran contrary to the theme of the conference. There was a frown on his face as we rambled on, and he left the hall before we came to the end of our presentation. He did however come back to be present during the vociferous Q&A session that followed.
There were some more presentations to be done after we finished. The day rolled on after a lunch break. Some time before the end of the proceeding and the summing up, I was told not to plan my departure from the Air HQ without checking with the DASR. We had planned to return on the following day. Pinky and I cancelled our plans and stayed back. Next day when we reported to the DASR, we were asked to prepare a paper summary of our presentation that included not only what we had said in the presentation but also the substance of the discussions that had followed. We struggled for a couple of days and submitted a paper. It was not a very hopeful one.
After returning to Jamnagar, we did not get involved with the LCA project at all. I had a station to command and that took all my attention. I enjoyed my job so thoroughly that I did not spare a thought for the LCA during my stay in Jamnagar. Apparently however, I did not do a good job of of my base command. I was overlooked by the promotion board. I was sent away as the CI of the Defence Services Staff College at Wellington. It was a slot for an AVM but I filled it in my lower rank hoping that the next promotion board will elevate my rank. Once again, I enjoyed my job and scarcely spared a thought for the LCA for the duration of my stay as the CI(Air) at the DSSC.
TheAir Force is ultimately a small society. Over a period of time and for any seniority band, every body gets to know (about) everybody else. From the DSSC at Wellington, I had many occasions to go down to Bangalore. There, I invariably met ****** (then Air Commodore **********) who was then the Commandant of the ASTE (Aircraft and Armament Testing Establishment). He was a keen observer of the progress of the LCA project and, like most of us, wished it well. During one of these visits he told me that the DRDO had asked him to come and join the LCA team at a senior level. He was not however keen to leave the Air Force and go over to DRDO permanently. He was willing to do a limited tenure there on deputation. The DRDO had requested the Air Force for him to be deputed and the Air Force had declined to let him go. We had long interactions about the LCA, primarily laced with disappointment and lack of hope. The initial inputs for our 1982 conference had been put together by the HAL design bureau. A design study for this project had begun in 1983 but we had very little information filtering through on its progress The progress on Kavery was slow, the information on MMR was vague. Some other developments from the electronics fields were somewhat more encouraging. We had very little idea about the progress of the aerodynamic/structural development. NAL seemed upbeat about their progress on composites.
On 31 October 1984 I was in Nashik with the Industrial And Demonstration Tour for the Staff College students. The news of the assassination of the PM and the mayhem that followed stopped us on our tracks. A few extra days were spent at Nashik under high uncertainties. To keep myself occupied at that time, I spent a lot of time with my friend Wing Commander P Ashok. He was then the Chief Test Pilot with HAL Nashik. In the process, I ran into Sri Kota Harinarayana. Kota was then with CRE and was located in Nashik. He was a man on the go. Ebullient and enthusiastic, he spent a lot of his time on design studies for the proposed LCA, though he was not in the LCA development team as yet. At that moment, he had just completed a study of wing-leading edge- root extension on a MiG 21. He had proposed it and had been authorized to carry out the experiment. He was quite excited about it and he took me to see the aircraft that had been modified. To me, it looked like a small modification, somewhat like the HT2 leading edge root extensions incorporated to provide a stall warning buffet. The MiG21 LREX experiment had by then been completed and the authorized number of sorties had been flown by Ashok. I did not investigate about the results of the experiment. However Sri Kota Harinarayana was really full about all the theoretical studies he was involved in for the proposed LCA. He was indeed very keen to join in the LCA effort. Soon thereafter, we learnt that the development tasks for the LCA had been shifted from the HAL Design Bureau / NAL to a new entity called ADA and Sri Kota Harinarayana had been placed as the head of ADA. The ADA took in a fair number of people from the HAL design Bureau. The lead designers from HAL / NAL who had worked on the project so far slowly drifted away.
By the middle of 1985 I moved on from the DSSC to take over the command of Ari Force Station Kalaikunda. It was a hectic tenure that kept me busy. The LCA did not enter in my thought process except an an object of keen interest. I was involved in a flying accident in February 1986 and spent the next few month in hospitals or in convalescence, plastered up to my hip. In August 1986 I retired from the Air Force. I was then only 52 years old. I was sure of my abilities. I was interested in the LCA project. It seemed to me that project management for the project needed to be strengthened. I felt sure that with my recent experience of managing the Jaguar project I could contribute. I therefore wrote a letter to Sri Arunachalam, who was then heading the DRDO, offering my services. There was a very prompt response to that letter. The SA to RM welcomed my gesture and promised to follow it up after due consultation with ADA. It was a very sweet letter, but that was the last I heard from the DRDO.
After my retirement I had more time on my hand. I kept track of the progress of the LCA project to the best of my ability. However, for the most par we only got bad news. By 1990 it had become quite clear the the time lines for the Kaveri will not match the time line for the LCA. The two projects had to be separated. Yet, the DRDO seemed blind to this need. The MMR progress was uneven. Some collaborative effort was necessary. There was no indication in the public domain that this need was being recognized. We got to know that the project definition phase for the LCA had been completed by 1989. A full scale engineering development (FSED) phase-I was sanctioned in 1993. It is difficult to list what exactly transpired relating to the project between 1989 and 1993. A higher risk alternative of digital quad-redundant path had been chosen for the fly by wire system, but no investments were being made for testing the system being developed. Instead of harnessing our own capability, the DRDO plumped for American help. This decision blew up in our face in 1998. Time ticked on. It became obvious to us that project management for LCA was not adequate.
By 28 Feb 1993 ****** had reached his age of retirement. He was then a full Air Marshal holding the post of Vice Chief of the Air Staff. Dr Abdul Kalam was then the SA to RM. He wanted ****** to take over the LCA project in the existing vacancy of Director General ADA as he had done good work earlier on the very successful “Jaguar Darin” project. ****** was willing to take on the challenge provided his name was proposed jointly by DRDO & Air Force so that he was not identified as an “Air Force” man or a “DRDO” man and he could function freely in the interests of the project. Accordingly, the SA to RM routed the file through the CAS who concurred with the proposal and forwarded it to the RM Sri Sharad Pawar in Feb 93. It is learnt that the same got approval from three out of the four members of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) within a couple of months but was held up by the PMO for more than two years on various pretexts. It was examined by a few more search Committees all of whom had concurred with the original selection of ******. Dr Kalam intervened again and ******* appointment was finally cleared by the PM in Jun 95. The file was then passed to the Establishment Directorate for issue of an official letter of appointment. Even after another one full year, this letter had not been issued. It looked as if no one other than Dr Kalam was interested in strengthening the LCA project Management, and even he was powerless to enforce his will in the face of departmental apathy/antipathy.******was determined not to pursue his own case but act only if the formal appointment letter was issued. That post still remains vacant after almost two decades! That was that.
Once again it is difficult to list what exactly happened to the project between 1993 and 1998 beyond the public domain information that the FSED Phase – I was in progress and what ever information is included in Air Marshal Rajkumar’s book on the Tejas. In 1998 USA imposed an embargo on all support for the LCA and confiscated all data and documentation in possession of our team working there on proving the digital flight control system on an F-16 simulator. It seems that the team had not taken the precaution of backloading all their data every day. A lot of hard work now had to be redone by the team on their return to India. Ultimately, the LCA Technology Demonstrator-I flew for the first time on 4 Jan 2001.
Notwithstanding the passage of 19 years between our first conceptual meeting in 1982 and the first flight in 2001, we were all thrilled. The Air Force sanctioned the building of 5 prototype aircraft and 8 limited series production aircraft to help the project progress. As an act of faith, it also ordered first 20 and then another 20 aircraft to be built with the GE404 engine as the power plant. It was implicit in this action that the aircraft will obtain its full operational clearance by the time it enters squadron service.
From that first flight in 2001, it took another decade for the LCA, now named Tejas, to reach a partial ‘initial’ operational clearance in January 2011. This clearance appears to be a decorative clearance. By now the 5 prototype vehicles and 6 of the 8 limited series production aircraft have flown. More than one year has gone by since this partial IOC. The project seems to have hit some rough patch. Full IOC is yet to come. Progress appears slow. We have brilliant people working in the ADA, NAL, HAL, ADE, NFTC and the host of other organizations involved with the LCA. But is the Project for the LCA being managed well? That is the question. The long gestation period for this very important national project saddens me. My grand daughter Prakriti was born about a year after the project definition for the LCA was completed. Prakriti will graduate out of the UCLA in a few weeks, while I wait anxiously for the Tejas to collect it’s matriculation certificate!
Now a days when I think about the Tejas, many scenarios, many ‘what if’ s if you like, cross my mind. What if we had allowed the HAL design team to handle the development without going through the ADA route? What if ****** or I were allowed to take on the project management? in 1983 – in 1986 – in 1993 – in 1996 ? What if we had the guts to depend on our own people for the development of the digital flight control system, some thing that we were ultimately forced to do anyway? What if we had listened to internal doubts expressed in muted tones and then in thunderous debates that the Kavery project will not and cannot match with the Tejas project in good time? This obvious decision had to be forced down our gullet after a long period of wasted time. (Those readers who had not been aware of the Tejas Project at that time may like to look up the transcript of the Address made by ****** at the ASTE Seminar on Flight Testing on 10 December 1997. The full transcript was published by the Vayu Magazine). What if we had realized a couple of years earlier that the MMR will need foreign collaboration to fit into the Tejas program? What if we had coordinated our testing program more tightly with the existing assets of ASTE and HAL Flight Test Division rather than creating a brand new set-up of NFTC for the purpose? (I hasten to add that NFTC and Phillip Raj Kumar who was tasked to set it up did perform excellently. I only wonder whether we could have saved some time and resources?)
I also wonder if my original presentation in 1982 had any effect on the responses of the Air Force in relation to the LCA project? I have never regretted stating my opinion and my assessments during that presentation. I am glad that we were not swayed by over enthusiasm. I am glad that our assessment of the time required for the LCA project were more real than what was then the current wisdom. I am glad that the up-grade project of MiG21BIS to BISON standard came about. I am however sad that our professional judgement on our courses of actions to fulfill the task allotted to the Air Force is now criticized by people who do not carry the responsibility of keeping the Air Force fit for its tasks. And above all, I am saddened by the realization that in this project of developing the LCA we seem to have not reached our true potential. I know we can reach where we aim to. It has taken a long time. We are not yet there. But, we must continue till we succeed. A definitive determination to be honest to the nation, Politically, Administratively, Technologically and Morally, would help. There is no room for defeatism.
Last edited by chaanakya on 14 Jul 2015 21:11, edited 1 time in total.