Bharat Rakshak

WASHINGTON -- Conservative Minnesota Rep. Michele Bachmann opened the Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington Thursday with a speech focused on America's debt - and specifically the money owed to "friendly Chinese bankers" and Chinese President Hu Jintao.
"With all the money that we owe China, I think you might correctly say, Hu's your daddy," she quipped.

Bachmann told an audience of enthusiastic conservative activists that "we have seen President Obama usher in socialism under his watch over the last two years." She said the health care law passed last year is the "crown jewel of socialism" and said repealing it "is the motivation of my life."

Bachmann, who is considering a presidential campaign, has aligned herself closely with the Tea Party movement, having founded the Tea Party caucus in the House and offered a "Tea Party rersponse" to President Obama's State of the Union address. She opened her speech with a reference to that speech, over which she was mocked for not looking directly at the camera.

"Someone told me I needed to find the right camera, so there it is," she said.

Bachmann offered red meat to her young audience at the conference, a cattle call for GOP presidential contenders that had about 11,000 registered attendees. She repeatedly referenced the socialism she ascribed to the Obama administration, calling it a "formula for destruction of job creation," and warned that her audience could soon be paying a 75 percent tax rate to cover the nation's debts.

"Socialism might sell well in a Harvard faculty lounge, but when it comes to finding a job, not so much, not so much," she said.

"The most egregious moral wrong of all is that today's government is intentionally consuming the labor of future Americans that aren't even born," she added. "...no generation has been more selfish than the current generation that is running Washington DC."

Philip wrote:The "Diplomat" says that US drones can trump the PLAFs J-20 stealth.

http://the-diplomat.com/2011/02/07/us-d ... dium=email

China's Communist Party has expressed concern at the country's neighbours, including India, being drawn into a United States-led “anti-China alliance,” suggesting a seven-step strategy, from using China's economic clout better to building new alliances to counter American influence in the region.

An article published in the latest issue of Qiushi (Seek Truth), party's official magazine and an influential journal that is circulated among its members, called for a review of China's foreign policy and for the country to come up with an adequate response to new challenges posed by the U.S.

Last year has been seen by many in China as a particularly testing period for its diplomacy, with rising tensions with many of its neighbours and concerns at the U.S.'s renewed engagement in the Asia-Pacific.

“The U.S. seems highly interested in forming a very strong anti-China alliance. It not only made a high-profile announcement of its return to East Asia but also claimed to lead in Asia,” said the article, whose author was named as Xu Yunhong.

“What is especially unbearable is how the U.S. blatantly encourages China's neighbouring countries to go against China,” it added.

“Countries like Japan, India, Vietnam, Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Korea are trying to join the anti-China group because they either had a war or another conflict of interest with China.”

The journal is perhaps China's most influential publication on policy issues, published by the Communist Party and often used to articulate policy positions in clearer terms than the diplomatic language used by government officials.

While it remains unclear whether the article reflected the government's views, many Chinese strategists in official think-tanks have increasingly voiced similar anxieties about the U.S. attempting to “contain” a rising China by courting its neighbours.

Many of China's neighbours, including Japan and even Vietnam, have recently sought closer military alliances with the U.S., blaming an increasingly assertive Chinese military for creating tensions. Last year saw territorial disputes between China and several of its neighbours resurface. China's relations with Japan deteriorated over disputes over islands in the East China Sea, while new Chinese claims over the entire South China Sea triggered concerns among its South-East Asian neighbours.

India, too, has been increasingly perceived by some strategists in China — particularly in military circles — as moving closer to the U.S. and as a key element in this supposed “containment” strategy.

The article said, “The probability for India to cooperate with China is also not great,” referring to the potential for the two countries to work together on economic issues to counter the U.S.

“India has stayed closely allied with the U.S. in recent years, and [U.S. President Barack] Obama promised to support India for a permanent membership in the UNSC [United Nations Security Council],” it said.

“India's purchasing power of foreign exchange reserves is very limited anyway, so it cannot influence the overall situation much,” it added, suggesting China needed to use its economic clout to challenge the dominance of the U.S. currency.

U.S. measures

The article, which was translated by the website Chinascope, identified six measures used by the U.S. to contain China: trade war, an exchange rate war, a public opinion war, military exercises, an anti-China campaign and developing alliances with neighbours.

It called for a seven-pronged response, from using China's rising economic influence and better-organised military exercises to building alliances with countries that were not close to the U.S., with a focus on Europe and South America. “What is the most powerful weapon China has today? It is our economic power, especially our foreign exchange reserves. The key is to use it well,” it suggested.

China needed “to send a clear signal to our neighbouring countries that we don't fear war, and we are prepared at any time to go to war to safeguard our national interests.”

China's neighbours, it added, needed “China's international trade more than China needs them.” China's economic strength was “the most effective means to avoid a war.”

SSridhar wrote: India sees China as part of Pakistan 'containment strategy'

Acharya wrote:

SSridhar wrote: India sees China as part of Pakistan 'containment strategy'

What is especially unbearable is how the China blatantly encourages India's neighbouring countries to go against India,”

By Our Foreign Staff 6:10AM GMT 14 Feb 2011
The 'dry canal' would link Colombia's Atlantic and Pacific coasts by rail, according to Juan Manuel Santos, the president of Colombia.

"It's a real proposal... and it is quite advanced," he told The Financial Times. "I don't want to create exaggerated expectations, but it makes a lot of sense."

The project is one of several Chinese proposals designed to help boost transport links between the two continents.

It is also hoped the rail link would help encourage the US to ratify a four-year-old free-trade agreement. Agreements with Colombia and Panama, which would eliminate most tariffs for both countries, have stalled since they were signed in 2006 and 2007.

The Panama canal represents roughly 5 percent of world trade, with 13,000 to 14,000 ships passing through it every year.

Panama Canal closed due to deadly floods 09 Dec 2010
Panama canal widening raises fears about tolls 19 Aug 2009
Sino-Colombian trade stood at more than $5 billion in 2010, making China Colombia's biggest trade partner, after the US.

"Colombia has a very important strategic position, and we view the ocuntry as a port to the rest of Latin America," Gao Zhengyue, China's ambassador to Colombia, told the newspaper.

The report also said talks are most advanced over a 491 mile railway and expansion of the port of Buenaventura.

The £4.7 billion project is funded by the Chinese Development Bank and operated by China Railway Group.

VikasRaina wrote:^^ Philip, We cannot build a bloody footbridge properly without causing national shame, who is going to take us seriously.

While China was not in favour of a move by the G4 group of nations — India, Brazil, Germany and Japan — to push for a concrete outcome on United Nations Security Council reforms in the current General Assembly session, it is unlikely to oppose India's bid when the reforms process comes to a vote, according to analysts and officials here.

Charm defensive


China knows it must have better ties with India. But accepting the legitimacy of India's ambitions is hard for Beijing, writes JOHN LEE DEMOCRATIC INDIA ENJOYS ADVANTAGES THAT AUTHORI TARIAN CHINA DOES NOT.

CHINA FUMED AT THE EASE WITH WHICH THE US WAS ABLE TO EMBRACE INDIA AS A LEGITIMATE NUCLEAR POWER AFTER DECADES OF DIPLOMATIC HOSTILITY

In a recent security conference in Washington, a Chinese delegate caused an awkward silence among the congenial group at a post-event drinks session when he stated that India was “an undisciplined country where the plague and leprosy still exist. How a big, dirty country like that can rise so quickly amazed us“. It is this Chinese sentiment of disdain and also grudging admiration that explains much of Beijing's attitude towards New Delhi. Indeed, one needs to go beyond strategic and military competition to understand the depth of rivalry between Asia's two rising giants.

China shares land borders with 14 countries. Over the past 30 years, it has made concerted attempts to improve relationships with all of them by settling border disputes.
In the case of Russia, China granted significant concessions in order to improve its relationship with Moscow. But the one exception is India. Outstanding disputes such as the one over the Switzerland-sized area of Arunachal Pradesh continue to bedevil relations. China's militarisation of the Tibetan plateau -including placing a third of its nuclear arsenal in that region -is a direct challenge to Indian sensibilities. Indeed, India is the only country not formally covered by China's `no first use' nuclear policy. Add to these the growing naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean that is driven by resource competition and insecurity and we have what Chinese leaders openly admit to be a “very difficult relationship“ with India. These factors point to the persistence of the IndiaChina rivalry. But they do not fully explain why Beijing has made little effort to work towards settlement of these disputes with New Delhi, as it has with its other land-based neighbours. A more complete explanation needs to take into account the non-material factors behind China's strategic rivalry with India.

The first factor is one of shock and surprise at India's continued rise. Until the late 1990s, people at the highest levels in China were dismissing India's prospects. It was only early this century that China abandoned viewing India through the lens of the 1962 war when Indian forces were decimated and New Delhi humiliated. Because Indian national scars and weaknesses are there for all to see, little is hidden or explained away. China met India's re-emergence initially with disbelief, then with disdain, and now with wariness. Beijing does not react calmly to strategic surprises and its gruff response to Indian ambitions in Asia is evidence that Beijing is yet to determine a grand strategic response to India's re-emergence.

Second, Chinese leaders view the region in hierarchical terms. And the hierarchy is not just based on economic and military benchmarks but also on culture and history. The Chinese see the idea of Asia as having a Chinese core with a number of cultures and polities in the periphery. They call themselves the `Middle Kingdom' for a reason.

Hence, they see little room for another culture and civilisation with equally big historical claims in their concept of Asia. In East and Southeast Asia, Indian culture and civilisation plays second fiddle to Chinese culture and civilisation. But in south and central Asia, Indian cultural influence and `soft power' far exceeds China's. As the other great foundational civilisation in Asia, India presents a unique challenge to China that other big Asian powers such as Japan do not. Hence, just as China demands `respect' from the West, Beijing will have grave difficulty accepting that there is another big country also driven by a sense of its enduring civilisation on its doorstep.

Third, as much as both countries will seek to deny it, there is an ideological contest taking place between the rise of authoritarian China and democratic India. The traditional Chinese response to Western expectations that it pursue political reform is to point out that democratic politics would derail the economic progress of such a big, developing country. India is a direct contradiction of this reasoning.

Moreover, democratic India enjoys advantages that authoritarian China does not. For example, China silently fumed at the ease with which the United States was able to embrace India as a legitimate nuclear power after decades of diplomatic hostility. The rapid improvement in military-to-military relationships between India and countries such as America, Japan and Indonesia exceed the progress of such relationships with China -despite 15 years of a Chinese `charm offensive'. As Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, himself not a noted democrat, has observed, few countries in East and Southeast Asia fear India's rise even as they remain wary of China's.

Finally, as far as the Chinese are concerned, India has something which few other democracies in Asia have: a preparedness to go to war. This immeasurable national and political characteristic is highly respected by the Chinese.
That such a potentially big country like India has it greatly concerns Beijing.

In a sense, these are compelling reasons why China should want to construct a better relationship with India. Its strategists know this. But fundamentally accepting the legitimacy of India's rise -and therefore its ambitions -is the harder task for Beijing.

John Lee is a research fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney, and the Hudson Institute, Washington DC The views expressed by the author are personal

How much would it take to get you to relocate to China? Would 150 million yuan ($23 million) do the trick? If so, pack your bags—if you are a Nobel laureate, that is. Science has learned that the Chinese government will soon announce a new initiative to lure up to 10 winners of prestigious inter national science prizes—including the Nobel Prize—to China each year by offering what may be the heftiest reward ever paid to individual researchers.

Some prizewinners may be salivating, but at least one prominent Chinese-American scientist aware of the new program blasts it as a massive waste of resources. “It is better to invest in a whole new generation of talent than to buy reputation,” says David Ho, director of the Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center (ADARC) in New York City. “Someone should step up and put an end to this folly.”

The initiative will be a new component of the Chinese government's Recruitment Program of Global Experts, commonly known as Qianren Jihua. Launched in 2008 with the goal of recruiting up to 2000 experts from abroad over 5 to 10 years (Science, 31 July 2009, p. 534), the program so far has tallied 1143 recipients, including 880 “innovative talents” to work at universities and research institutes. The rest are “entrepreneurial talents” recruited to run high-tech companies.

Despite Qianren Jihua's impressive numbers, many observers say the program is foundering. Initially, it mandated that awardees spend 6 to 9 months a year in China for a minimum of 3 years. Most recruits, however, have not signed contracts or moved to China, says Li Ning, a public policy researcher at the University of Guam. The main reason awardees give for not having signed contracts is that they haven't received start-up funds.

Qianren Jihua “is a huge disaster right now,” claims Mu-ming Poo, part-time director of the Institute of Neuroscience of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai. That sentiment is shared by many contributors to blog sites on Chinese science.

The new component dubbed “Top Qianren” is likely to make the program even more controversial. Its first catch, sources say, is 78-year-old French virologist Luc Montagnier, who won the 2008 Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine for co-discovering HIV. Shanghai Jiaotong University recruited Montagnier, who intends to lead research into electromagnetic radiation from highly diluted pathogen DNA (Science, 24 December 2010, p. 1732), a phenomenon that many scientists dismiss out of hand. University President Zhang Jie and Montagnier did not respond to messages before Science went to press.



In the original Qianren Jihua, the program's sponsor, the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (Zhongzubu), provides each recruit with a $150,000 tax-free relocation allowance. Beyond this subsidy, awardees must negotiate salaries and start-up packages with recruiters. Eager to please Zhongzubu, university and institute officials routinely dangle start-up funds of $1.5 million or more to entice candidates—then fail to deliver, says Xu Ruiming, a structural biologist at CAS's Institute of Biophysics in Beijing. Xiao-Fan Wang, a cancer researcher at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, says some Qianren recipients “sincerely wanted to go back but have to reconsider when they see no research funding.”

...

Most of these awardees cannot spend six or more months in China, as the program envisioned, without reducing the commitment to their current employers. To accommodate them, Zhongzubu created a Qianren category last year that allows recipients to spend as little as 2 months a year in China. The government expects fewer than 100 awardees each year to choose the short-term category, says Zhang.

The failure to land many big fish has prompted Zhongzubu to cast for small fry. Last month, the government launched Young Qianren Jihua, which over the next 5 years aims to recruit from overseas 2000 researchers under age 40. The government will provide young recipients with a relocation allowance of about $75,000 and research funds ranging from $152,000 to $456,000 over 3 years. Requirements include Ph.D.s obtained from foreign universities and overseas work experience of 3 years or more.

At 1000 or so pay grades higher will be the Nobel laureates and other elites who accept a Top Qianr en award. They'll never have to worry about funding again.

• Majority of the focus on India is in the academic journals very little in strategic journals. Though it is increasing in the strategic journals
• There seems to be a steady de-hyphening of India-Pakistan.
• Chinese are either dismissive of India, by talking about the "Great power dream" or by characterizing India as a "Petulant child"
• The researcher has expressed surprise about anger and vituperation against china in India, especially in seminars and discussions. This is in contrast to the non charged vocabulary coming out of china unlike india. Please note that this refers only to the publications from academic and strategic circles only. It does not refer to forums like bharat-rakshak or indiadefence or globaltimes, etc.
• Chinese ASAT was being used as justification in india for a asat programme of her own.
• Chinese view their ASAT capability in terms of being pushed towards it as russia and us have long standing asat capabilities or programs.
• Chinese also view their ASAT capability as a means to get the Americans to return to the conference of disarmament. Or to make Americans treat them at-par with russia or as an equal of America.
• Chinese are surprised at the lack of interaction with India. In most indo-china conferences most of the academics come from china, but from india most of the strategist come. So there is a discordant note, as the academic will come with a different viewpoint rather than the strategist.
• A number of chinese academic personnel have trouble getting visas to come to India. Not only in scientific community but across the board. From India the problem of stapled visas, arunachal pradesh, etc rear their head.
• Stability and cooperation. There is a lot talk about this in China. Pity the researcher did not elaborate.
• While there is growing spotlight on India, it has more to do with indo-us relationship. the interest has always peaked when clinton came to India, when the indo-us nuke deal was discussed, with obama visited India. In other words it is Indo-US combine which concerns them not India per-se as such.
• We tend to group all the views as unidirectional view. But there are significant pockets of views on India in china. Pockets whose views are varied.

Johann wrote:The CPC wants Mainland Chinese to believe that democracy equals chaos or at the very least severe inefficiency. Unfortunately Taiwan went ahead and became a democracy, but has yet to be enveloped by chaos. The same for South Korea. How inconvenient.

Rony wrote:

Johann wrote:The CPC wants Mainland Chinese to believe that democracy equals chaos or at the very least severe inefficiency. Unfortunately Taiwan went ahead and became a democracy, but has yet to be enveloped by chaos. The same for South Korea. How inconvenient.

When ever the CPC wants to show that democracy equals chaos and inefficiency, they ALWAYS point at India as example.They dont want to show examples of developed economies like west or south korea or japan or taiwan.