Bharat Rakshak

There is a system within the US Marines that alerts the immediate families of high-ranking marines when their marine will soon be deployed to an emergency situation where they will not be able to talk to their spouses or families.

That alert just went out, says our source.

This senior Marine told our source that the Pentagon will deploy "multiple platoons" to Egypt over the next few days and that the official reason will be ‘to assist in the evacuation of US citizens."

Our source was told that "the chances they were going over there went from 70% yesterday to 100% today."

Frank Wisner, President Barack Obama's envoy to Cairo who infuriated the White House this weekend by urging Hosni Mubarak to remain President of Egypt, works for a New York and Washington law firm which works for the dictator's own Egyptian government.

Philip wrote:A few clarifications.Mao several times durign his era "let the snakes out of the hole",only to "chop off their heads".The best example was during the cultural revolution,letting a "thousand flowers bloom" and then cracking down with a vengeance.As said,Li Peng,etc., followed his example at Tian-an-men sq.

Revealed: US envoy's business link to Egypt

Obama scrambles to limit damage after Frank Wisner makes robust call for Mubarak to remain in place as leader.

By Robert Fisk in Cairo
Monday, 7 February 2011

Frank Wisner, President Barack Obama's envoy to Cairo who infuriated the White House this weekend by urging Hosni Mubarak to remain President of Egypt, works for a New York and Washington law firm which works for the dictator's own Egyptian government.

Mr Wisner's astonishing remarks – "President Mubarak's continued leadership is critical: it's his opportunity to write his own legacy" – shocked the democratic opposition in Egypt and called into question Mr Obama's judgement, as well as that of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

The US State Department and Mr Wisner himself have now both claimed that his remarks were made in a "personal capacity". But there is nothing "personal" about Mr Wisner's connections with the litigation firm Patton Boggs, which openly boasts that it advises "the Egyptian military, the Egyptian Economic Development Agency, and has handled arbitrations and litigation on the [Mubarak] government's behalf in Europe and the US". Oddly, not a single journalist raised this extraordinary connection with US government officials – nor the blatant conflict of interest it appears to represent.

Mr Wisner is a retired State Department 36-year career diplomat – he served as US ambassador to Egypt, Zambia, the Philippines and India under eight American presidents. In other words, he was not a political appointee. But it is inconceivable Hillary Clinton did not know of his employment by a company that works for the very dictator which Mr Wisner now defends in the face of a massive democratic opposition in Egypt.

So why on earth was he sent to talk to Mubarak, who is in effect a client of Mr Wisner's current employers?

Patton Boggs states that its attorneys "represent some of the leading Egyptian commercial families and their companies" and "have been involved in oil and gas and telecommunications infrastructure projects on their behalf". One of its partners served as chairman of the US-Egyptian Chamber of Commerce promoting foreign investment in the Egyptian economy. The company has also managed contractor disputes in military-sales agreements arising under the US Foreign Military Sales Act. Washington gives around $1.3bn (£800m) a year to the Egyptian military.

Mr Wisner joined Patton Boggs almost two years ago – more than enough time for both the White House and the State Department to learn of his company's intimate connections with the Mubarak regime. The New York Times ran a glowing profile of Mr Wisner in its pages two weeks ago – but mysteriously did not mention his ties to Egypt.

Nicholas Noe, an American political researcher now based in Beirut, has spent weeks investigating Mr Wisner's links to Patton Boggs. Mr Noe is also a former researcher for Hillary Clinton and questions the implications of his discoveries.

"The key problem with Wisner being sent to Cairo at the behest of Hillary," he says, "is the conflict-of-interest aspect... More than this, the idea that the US is now subcontracting or 'privatising' crisis management is another problem. Do the US lack diplomats?

"Even in past examples where presidents have sent someone 'respected' or 'close' to a foreign leader in order to lubricate an exit," Mr Noe adds, "the envoys in question were not actually paid by the leader they were supposed to squeeze out!"

Patton Boggs maintains an "affiliate relationship" with Zaki Hashem, one of Egypt's most prominent legal firms. It was founded in 1953 and Zaki Hashem himself was a cabinet minister under Mubarak's predecessor, President Anwar Sadat, and later became head of the Egyptian Society for International Law.

By a further remarkable irony, one of Zaki Hashem's senior advisers was Nabil al-Araby, one of the 25 leading Egyptian personalities just chosen by the protesters in Tahrir Square to demand the overthrow of Mubarak. Nabil al-Araby, a former member of the UN's International Law Commission, told me yesterday that he ended his connection with Zaki Hashem three years ago and had "no idea" why Mr Wisner had come out in support of Mubarak's continued rule. He himself believed it was essential Mubarak make a dignified but immediate exit. "The head must go," he said.

When Frank Wisner joined Patton Boggs in March 2009, the company described him as "one of the nation's most respected diplomats" who would provide clients with "strategic global advice concerning business, politics and international law". The firm stated specifically that "it looks to Ambassador Wisner to use his expertise in the Middle East and India to assist its American and international clients."

Stuart Pape, managing partner at Patton Boggs, said at the time that "it is a real coup for the firm to have Ambassador Wisner – one of the most experienced and highly regarded diplomats – join our ranks... His in-depth knowledge of global politics and the international financial world is a huge asset for our clients."

We still do not know exactly what kind of "expertise" he has bestowed upon the dictator of Egypt. But his remarks at the weekend leave no room to doubt he advised the old man to cling on to power for a few more months. The vast network of companies with family connections to Mubarak's regime is, of course, one of the targets of the pro-democracy demonstrators in Egypt.

A spokesman for the State Department said he "presumed" Mrs Clinton knew of Mr Wisner's employment by Patton Boggs and the firm's links with the Mubarak government, but refused to comment on any conflict of interest for the envoy. A spokesman for Patton Boggs could not be reached yesterday.

The example of Enron and Wisner proves beyond
a reasonable doubt that the US state is not a neutral actor in world
affairs and that US transnational corporations are part and parcel of
the corruption within the US Empire. The hearings in Washington on
"campaign finance reform" do not bother with this level of corruption,
for most of those who are running the investigation are beholden to
business interests. Enron, for instance, will not be a part of the
investigation, since it is deemed to be a patriotic US entity out to
create jobs for US workers and to accumulate wealth to defer the costs
of the US's mercenary army.

Vijay Prashad is Assistant Professor of International Studies at Trinity
College in Hartford, Connecticut.

An unnamed "senior U.S. official" has also suggested that the Obama administration is dead set against a substantial political role for the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, the official reportedly suggested that what the United States wants is a purely "secular" government in Egypt (i.e., one with no Islamist influence) as if that's even possible in a country that is overwhelmingly Muslim.

By Tim Ross, Christopher Hope, Steven Swinford and Adrian Blomfield 07 Feb 2011

Mr Suleiman, who is widely tipped to take over from Hosni Mubarak as president, was named as Israel's preferred candidate for the job after discussions with American officials in 2008.

As a key figure working for Middle East peace, he once suggested that Israeli troops would be "welcome" to invade Egypt to stop weapons being smuggled to Hamas terrorists in neighbouring Gaza.

The details, which emerged in secret files obtained by WikiLeaks and passed to The Daily Telegraph, come after Mr Suleiman began talks with opposition groups on the future for Egypt's government.

On Saturday, Mr Suleiman won the backing of Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to lead the "transition" to democracy after two weeks of demonstrations calling for President Mubarak to resign.

David Cameron, the Prime Minister, spoke to Mr Suleiman yesterday and urged him to take "bold and credible steps" to show the world that Egypt is embarking on an "irreversible, urgent and real" transition.

Leaked cables from American embassies in Cairo and Tel Aviv disclose the close co-operation between Mr Suleiman and the US and Israeli governments as well as diplomats' intense interest in likely successors to the ageing President Mubarak, 83.

The documents highlight the delicate position which the Egyptian government seeks to maintain in Middle East politics, as a leading Arab nation with a strong relationship with the US and Israel. By 2008, Mr Suleiman, who was head of the foreign intelligence service, had become Israel's main point of contact in the Egyptian government.

David Hacham, a senior adviser from the Israeli Ministry of Defence, told the American embassy in Tel Aviv that a delegation led by Israel's defence minister, Ehud Barak had been impressed by Mr Suleiman, whose name is spelled "Soliman" in some cables.

But Mr Hacham was "shocked" by President Mubarak's "aged appearance and slurred speech".

The cable, from August 2008, said: "Hacham was full of praise for Soliman, however, and noted that a 'hot line' set up between the MOD and Egyptian General Intelligence Service is now in daily use.

"Hacham noted that the Israelis believe Soliman is likely to serve as at least an interim President if Mubarak dies or is incapacitated." The Tel Aviv diplomats added: "We defer to Embassy Cairo for analysis of Egyptian succession scenarios, but there is no question that Israel is most comfortable with the prospect of Omar Soliman."

Elsewhere the documents disclose that Mr Suleiman was stung by Israeli criticism of Egypt's inability to stop arms smugglers transporting weapons to Palestinian militants in Gaza. At one point he suggested that Israel send troops into the Egyptian border region of Philadelphi to "stop the smuggling".

"In their moments of greatest frustration, [Egyptian Defence Minister] Tantawi and Soliman each have claimed that the IDF [Israel Defence Forces] would be 'welcome' to re-invade Philadelphi, if the IDF thought that would stop the smuggling," the cable said.

The files suggest that Mr Suleiman wanted Hamas "isolated", and thought Gaza should "go hungry but not starve".

"We have a short time to reach peace," he told US diplomats. "We need to wake up in the morning with no news of terrorism, no explosions, and no news of more deaths."

Yesterday, Hosni Mubarak's control of Egypt's state media, a vital lynchpin of his 30-year presidency, started to slip as the country's largest-circulation newspaper declared its support for the uprising.

Hoping to sap the momentum from street protests demanding his overthrow, the president has instructed his deputy to launch potentially protracted negotiations with secular and Islamist opposition parties. The talks continued for a second day yesterday without yielding a significant breakthrough.

But Mr Mubarak was dealt a significant setback as the state-controlled Al-Ahram, Egypt's second oldest newspaper and one of the most famous publications in the Middle East, abandoned its long-standing slavish support for the regime.

In a front-page leading article, the newspaper hailed the "nobility" of the "revolution" and demanded the government embark on irreversible constitutional and legislative changes.

THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH
An eyewitness to the 2005 presidential polls in Egypt, Aditi Bhaduri reacts to the churning that the country is going through at the moment


It was exactly a decade ago that Hanan Ashrawi, sitting in her office in Beit Hanina in the outskirts of Jerusalem, told me: “If the Arab world does not change by its own will, it will be changed. If there is no peaceful transition to democracy it will take place violently and I believe that there is a public opinion in the Arab world that is simmering... there is a demand for serious reform and serious democratization... it will not happen by default or by itself, there has to be an active movement. The Arab world has to be part of the contemporary world; it cannot keep falling short, falling behind. There is no room in history for all those who fall by the wayside.”

Ashrawi had then just assumed the role of spokesperson of the Arab League, something unique in a region where women do not enjoy great political or economic participation, and was expounding the failure of the Arab League in solving the Palestinian issue. Not surprisingly, she resigned soon after. Her words, however, seem to be coming true a decade later in the events that have unfolded first in Tunisia, and now, in Egypt. The Arab world is not a homogeneous one. North Africa or the Maghreb is as distinct from the countries of the Levant as the latter are from the oil producing Gulf states. But it is fitting that this churning in the Arab world began in Tunisia — a modern, secular state, with an educated middle class which has distinguished itself from the other countries in the region, taking advantage of its colonial past. And it is not surprising that this unrest has spilt over into Egypt.

Egypt is the unofficial capital of the Arab world. There is an Arab saying: Cairo writes, Beirut prints and Baghdad reads. Egyptians dominate the Arab intellectual scene. The country is home to the hallowed Al-Azhar University, where Muslims from all over the globe study to perfect their knowledge of the juridical aspects of Islam, but whose alumni also include the late Houari Boumedienne, former president of Algeria and leader of the 1954 anti-colonial revolution against the French, and the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas. All Arab Nobel laureates, except for Yasser Arafat, are Egyptians. The Egyptian film and music industry sets the cultural trends in the region. Democratic leanings have made themselves felt here from time to time.

I was in Cairo in 2005 when Egyptians went to the polls to elect their president. The Opposition was brutally crushed, with candidates challenging President Hosni Mubarak’s rule being thrown into prison. But Egyptians did not take it lightly. The Kefaya movement — kefaya means enough — was launched, challenging Mubarak’s 25-year-old rule, which he had kept in place with the emergency law since 1981. Its activists were an odd mix of Islamists, Christians, leftists, students, Arab nationalists, intellectuals, with a great number of women in its fold. Their main demands were: transparency in the funding of political parties, multi-candidate presidential elections, and placing a term limit on the presidency. On May 25, 2005, a referendum was held to amend the 76th constitutional clause whereby more than one candidate could stand for the presidential polls. The change was felt to be merely cosmetic — the conditions for contesting the elections virtually negates the possibility of any independent candidate from contesting, while making it impossible for any candidate to win except for Mubarak himself, who was then standing for the fifth term. The Kefaya and the Opposition parties gave a nationwide call to boycott the referendum and held demonstrations in central Cairo. Less than 30 per cent of the electorate voted, though the State-controlled media announced that there was a 75 per cent turnout. I watched how demonstrators suffered police brutalities, the women among them sexually assaulted. Since then, women turned up every Wednesday, dressed in black, calling for the resignation of the minister of interior, on whose orders they had been assaulted.

To show up the sham, the main opposition parties then — the Al Ghad and Tagammu — and two independent candidates — the activist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the feminist and novelist, Nawal El Saadawi — announced their intention of standing for the presidential polls (this, too, was a first in the Arab world). But repression followed soon after. The candidate for the Al Ghad party, Ayman Nour, was arrested on charges of forging signatures, while others were barred from campaigning, holding meetings, travelling, or appearing on the State-controlled media. Most of the major opposition parties decided to boycott the polls and Mubarak went on to become president for the fifth time.

But Egyptians had not taken it lying down. Neither was there much sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood, who later went on to occupy one-fifth of the Opposition seats in parliament. An impetus for the anti-government movement had then actually been the second Palestinian intifada. Egyptians watched how disillusioned Palestinians rose up against the Israeli occupation, as also against their own corrupt Palestinian Authority. A year later, Egyptians were demonstrating against the Iraq war, and part of their ire was directed against their own government for its inability, or rather unwillingness, to do anything about it. Anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments were perceived to be safer alternatives to exhibiting displeasure with the Egyptian government, which was one of the two Arab countries to maintain diplomatic ties with Israel, and was being paid for it by the United States of America. Yet, the aid never percolated down to the masses, while unemployment and poverty levels increased. Like most autocratic Arab governments, Egypt found it convenient to deflect the people’s angst from itself towards Israel and the US, the countries the Arabs love to hate but long to visit. But Egyptians are also aware of the role that Egypt has played since 2005 in turning Gaza into the prison that it is.

{Shades of Paki behavior. Anger at YYY than Paki Army is allowed as a transfer of anger. And Paki Army is the one who made Pak into a prison with exit control monitoring and US operatives with diplomatic immunity are shooting in Pak streets}

What transpired in 2005 was unprecedented for the Arab street. Six years later, it is only to be expected that an uprising would be of a greater magnitude. Mubarak is now in the 31st year of his rule, the emergency law is still in place, the parliamentary elections held two months ago were totally rigged. Commentators around the world are sceptical that any political vacuum now maybe filled in by the Muslim Brotherhood. This may be true, but it may also be that the popularity enjoyed by the Brotherhood is being exaggerated. After all, in the Palestinian territories it was the Palestinians who were most uneasy with the idea of Hamas coming to power. If the Brotherhood does come to power, it will not have the support of any of the Arab states, just as Hamas did not. Even Salafist Saudis are against the idea of a religious radical group seizing power in any Arab country. And the churning in Egypt may not even stimulate a similar churning in any other Arab state for now.

However, the old order changeth, and it is doubtful that any amount of platitudes by Mubarak will redeem him, even temporarily, in the eyes of those he has treated as his subjects. The first day of demonstrations resulted in four dead, 500 arrested, and angry protests flaring up in every corner of the country. It has got worse now. The overthrow of the Mubarak regime will not signal the immediate democratization of Egypt’s polity. The path ahead is a painful one, but the best start would be to have Mubarak gracefully yield the reins of government to Mohamed ElBaradei, who can then head an interim government till truly free and fair presidential elections, scheduled for September 2011, are held.

Indian experts feel Mubarak's ouster is imminent

February 09, 2011 3:05:41 AM

PTI | New Delhi

As the protest in Egypt entered the 15th day, experts and politicians here today opined that the ouster of Hosni Mubarak is imminent but it will take a little time even as they did not feel that the protests will lead to a massive uprising in the Arab world.

Though some of them questioned the element of "spontaneity" in the protests, they said the development marks the beginning of poly-centric world order.

Addressing a round-table on the situation in West Asia organised by Observor's Research Foundation, senior CPI(M) leader Sitaram Yechury said he did not think that the protests in Tahrir Square was spontaneous.

"There has to be a certain amount of organisation," he said, adding that he does not think that Muslim Brotherhood has organised it.

He said the "unemployed youths" engineered the protest.

"For more than the US, Mubarak has been a henchman for Israel. Israel will not be happy if Mubarak is removed," he said, adding that it was not going to be a "massive uprsing" in the region.

"Every interested player is trying to channelise the course of action on their own way," he said.

Yechury said a second term for US President Barack Obama would be difficult if he is not in tune with Israel on Egypt. He said the Muslim Brotherhood has acted in a matured way which was a "pleasant surprise" for him.

Noting that one should not underestimate people on streets, CPI General Secretary A B Bardhan said viewing the Muslim Brotherhood as a danger is like "falling into the trap of Israel".

"No doubt this movement will see the end of Mubarak. It will not be tomorrow, it will not be in September. It will be somewhere in between. He will have to go," he said.

Former Foreign Secretary M K Rasgotra said he was disappointed at the statement made by Indian government on the issue saying it was not "forthright". He expressed fears that the protests could result in escalation of oil prices.

Former diplomat M K Bhadrakumar said the protests were not a kind of Islamic awakening as Israel was propagating. He said the American and Israel interests are at divergance.

Kanwal Sibal, another former Foreign Secretary said, the protests were essentially a local problem.

WILL PAKISTAN BE NEXT?
- It is to be hoped that the Arab future tilts towards democracy
KANTI BAJPAI


The crises in Tunisia and Egypt have surprised the world even as they have shocked the incumbent leaderships. The knock-on effects on South Yemen and Jordan suggest that there is widespread popular disaffection in the Arab world. Is this a pointer to rebellion brewing in the Muslim world beyond the Arab countries? What about Pakistan in particular? Could it be next?

What we are seeing in Tunisia and now in Egypt is large-scale popular rebellion against long-standing authoritarian leaderships. Both are fairly advanced Arab countries in terms of per capita income ($7900 and $5400 respectively in purchasing power parity terms), literacy (78 per cent and 66 per cent), exposure to the media and electronic communications, and political awareness. Both have respectable population growth rates, with Tunisia slightly below the world average and Egypt somewhat above. Both are growing economically at a decent rate — at between 3.5 and 4.5 per cent respectively. Unemployment is probably the most disturbing element, with Tunisia at 14 per cent and Egypt at 10 per cent.

There is trouble also in Yemen and Jordan. How do they stack up against Tunisia and Egypt? Yemen has a per capita income of $2400 and Jordan of $5000. Literacy is at 59 per cent and 91 per cent respectively. Population growth rates are 2.97 per cent and three per cent, well above the global average of 1.17 per cent. Economically, they are both growing at five per cent. And unemployment is 35 per cent and 13 per cent. This suggests that Jordan is somewhat closer to Tunisia and Egypt.

Why then, given quite different profiles, at least between Yemen on the one hand and Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan on the other, are both sets of countries in political difficulty? Do the economic and social characteristics of countries not matter?

There is a view that economic and social deprivation leads to rebellion. An alternative view is that economic and social progress, up to a threshold, gives rise to rebellion. The four profiles sketched in here suggest that the latter view is more credible, as three of the four States represent middle-level developing countries that have attained a certain threshold of economic and social progress. Economic and social progress creates political awareness and a level of political mobilization that is necessary for an agitational movement. Economic and social progress is also influential in determining the nature of the movement. If one had to make a vulgar prediction, it is that Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, as relatively rich and modern societies, will handle the present crises somewhat better and move in the direction of a fairly moderate, liberal alternative. Not so Yemen.

Is there anything that the four countries have in common besides being Arab and Muslim and sharing some economic and social features? One striking common feature is their political leadership which has been in the same hands for three decades. Discontent is as much political, therefore, as it is economic and social.

Where is Pakistan in comparison? Its per capita income is $2600 dollars, close to Yemen’s. Literacy is 54 per cent, again Yemen-like. Population is growing at a more moderate pace, at 1.84 per cent. Economic growth is running at 2.7 per cent, lower than Yemen and barely keeping up with population growth. Unemployment stands at 15 per cent, well below Yemen’s rate. In sum, Pakistan’s economic and social profile is more like that of Yemen than of Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan.

Yet, compared to the four Arab States, Pakistan has certain political characteristics which make massive street protests against the incumbent government unlikely. It has had a history of rather effective street protests — in 1969 to oust Ayub Khan, in 1977 to oust Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and in 2009 to oust Pervez Musharraf. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely to happen in the wake of Tunisia and Egypt.

For one thing, and perhaps most importantly, Pakistan has not had the same leadership for 30 years. Nobody in Pakistan, not even a dictator, has ruled for more than 11 years. Pervez Musharraf, the last authoritarian leader of that country, did not quite make the 11-year ‘limit’, being at the helm from 1999 to 2009.

Secondly, the present government in Pakistan is a popularly elected one. There is discontent in the country, but the Zardari government was elected in a free and fair election and his political capital has not run out — he has not hit the 11-year limit. Nor has it been possible to focus public anger against any one leader. President Asif Ali Zardari is not personally liked, but he is not the only focus of dissatisfaction. The prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, runs the day-to-day affairs of the State with a fairly capable group of ministers. Responsibility is more diffuse in Pakistan.

This brings me to a third feature of the Pakistani system, namely, its relative openness. Pakistan today is not authoritarian in the way that Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen are. There are political spaces and freedoms available to dissenting groups, most obviously parliament. The effect of this is to let pressure dissipate.

Fourth, Pakistan has a lively and relatively free media. Popular expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction are allowed fairly free rein, particularly in periods of civilian rule. Even during military rule, Pakistan’s press has had a fair degree of commentative and reporting freedom. Political unhappiness is therefore not bottled up as in the Arab world.

Another key difference is that Islamic forces in Pakistan have not been suppressed in the way that they have been contained in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. It is not clear to what extent Islamic groups have instigated or taken over the protests in those three countries. In Egypt, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood is becoming more evident. What is worrisome in the Egyptian movement is that the only organized force within it is the Brotherhood. There is a danger, therefore, that the Islamists will manipulate the post-Mubarak phase to their advantage and marginalize the liberals. In Pakistan, by contrast, the Islamists are pretty much out in the open and have the patronage or acquiescence of political parties and the army. Pakistani Islamists may not need a popular movement against the government of the day. They already set a good deal of the agenda and frequently act as a veto group.

Finally, young people have been a crucial force in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, but Pakistan’s youth, particularly educated youth, have really not played much of a role in agitational politics since the late 1960s. Some segments of young people have been drawn into Islamic radicalism, others have joined the mainstream political parties. Yet others have emigrated to the West or are politically apathetic. Those who have joined Islamic radicalism and those in the mainstream parties are not terribly interested in agitational street politics: the radicals are attracted to terrorism and sectarian conflict — Shia versus Sunni — or cultural reformation; and those in the political parties give vent to their views within the political process.

If this is correct, Pakistan is unlikely to be a candidate for the kind of protests we are seeing in the Arab world. Pakistan already has a richer democratic history than these countries. It also has much more instability and political violence. We must hope that the Arab future tilts towards democracy rather than instability and violence.

The author teaches international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

How Chicago, New York and London caused Egypt unrest

An unlikely catalyst for the unrest in Egypt is the resurgence of commodity speculation in western markets. To facilitate a democratic transition in Cairo, Western leaders need to curb the speculation that has triggered a spike in the prices of basic items in emerging markets.
by
M.D. Nalapat
Director, Department of Geopolitics, Manipal University


In case the 1979 example of the Shah of Iran being deserted by the United States and West Europe - after having been their security surrogate in the region for fifteen years - was not sufficient to educate West Asia's rulers about the "Fair Weather" nature of the relationship of these chancelleries with them, Egypt has provided fresh evidence of this reality.

The West always finds a champion in the region. As in Sri Lanka, where they encouraged General Sarath Fonseka to stand against Mahinda Rajapaksa in the 2010 Presidential polls in Sri Lanka (Fonseca had direct command of the Sri Lankan military which the same global community believed had committed grave violations of human rights in the final stage of the campaign against the Tamil Tigers), this time around, it was Mohammad El Baradei, the former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Nobel Laureate, who was seen as the white knight riding to the rescue of US-European Union geopolitical interests. This, in a country where both Iran as well as the Muslim Brotherhood have been at work for years cultivating the underclass that had been ignored by the Egyptian elite and their international backers.

There are many reasons beyond the obvious, for the collapse of regimes in West Asia and Africa.

First, there is the activity in Iran. For the Khameini regime in Iran (the West mistakenly calls it an "Ahmadinejad" government, given that the Supreme Leader controls key swathes of the administration, including foreign, security, education and economic policy), events in Egypt are a comeuppance for the US and the EU, which backed the losing side in protesting against what was once again a rigged election in Iran in 2009.

Since that time, Teheran has greatly boosted its clandestine capabilities and activities in the region, with the intention of promoting chaos, should there be an attack on the regional Shia superpower by the US, the EU or Israel. Most of the effort has gone into assisting those in favour of the collapse of regimes that side with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) against Iran, and which have most recently been outed in Wikileaks.

In a way, this effort by Iran is akin to the Central Intelligence Agency’s boosting of the military capabilities of religious extremists across the western half of Asia in the jihad against the former Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Just as there has been a huge blowback for the US from that particular adventure, there is likely to be blowback across Iran from the current policy of giving clandestine support to "pro-democracy" forces. (That policy of Iran was accelerated after the victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections in Gaza and the continuing electoral strength of Hezbollah-backed political outfits in Lebanon.)

Then there are the regimes of West Asia. Within the region, both the Saudi Arabian as well as the Qataris ruling structures have adopted a policy of hedging their bets, backing both NATO as well as the opposition to NATO. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this is represented by the Wahabbi International, which has turned "multiculturism" on its head by using the freedom of belief, lifestyle and speech in modern democratic societies to enforce a clear separation between its own followers and the rest of the community in countries such as Germany, France and even the UK. These days, such exclusivist (self-ghettoizing) trends are also becoming evident in Canada and in parts of the US. Of course, within the countries where it is dominant, such as Saudi Arabia, North Sudan or Yemen, the Wahabbi International makes short shrift of the freedoms that it demands for its practitioners in the democracies. In such a double-faced reaction, it shares several characteristics with its Khomeinist twin in Iran.

...which has turned "multiculturism" on its head by using the freedom of belief, lifestyle and speech in modern democratic societies to enforce a clear separation between its own followers and the rest of the community in countries such as Germany, France and even the UK. These days, such exclusivist (self-ghettoizing) trends are also becoming evident in Canada and in parts of the US.

Egypt: Update. Vice President Suleiman briefed President Hosni Mubarak on the national dialogue meetings, 1 TV reported 8 February.

Mubarak underlined the importance of continuing the process and signed a republican decree to form a constitutional committee responsible for implementing the required amendments to the constitution and ad hoc legislative amendments, Suleiman said. He gave directives to the prime minster to form a follow-up committee responsible for monitoring the implementation of agreements reached by the parties at the national dialogue.

A third fact-finding committee will be formed to investigate the clashes between pro- and anti-Mubarak protesters whose findings will be referred to the prosecutor-general, Suleiman said. The national dialogue will continue and Suleiman will brief Mubarak on reports from the follow-up and constitutional committees in operation from Feb. 8 and from the fact-finding committee upon its formation.

Comment: This seems to be part of the media program to depict Mubarak as no longer involved in the day-to-day running of the government, i.e., that the leadership transition in the exercise of power is in progress. He remains the ultimate authority for approvals.

Security. Tens of thousands of demonstrators on 8 February rallied in front of the Al Qaed Ibrahim Mosque in Alexandria, Egypt, demanding that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak step down, Al Jazeera reported. This is the only report of this information. Demonstrations also occurred in Tahrir Square in Cairo. Both were peaceful

Special Comment: Good news and bad news. The good news, arguably, is that the US has eased its pressure for immediate change in Egypt. The White House spokesman acknowledged the change, explaining that free and fair elections would be nearly impossible to arrange in 60 days without causing instability, should Mubarak resign.

The other element of good news, again arguably, is that Vice President General Suleiman is obviously in charge of daily government operations, supported by Prime Minister Shafiq,. Both are deflecting attention from Mubarak to some extent. It is always politically useful for a subordinate to act as a body shield. It is an old bureaucratic technique.

Beyond protecting the boss, the two have had some success in stabilizing the security situation and their efforts seem to have created a bit of a lull in the confrontation. Both men are retired military officers. Shafiq is a a hero pilot of the Yom Kippur war when Mubarak was the head of the air force.

The bad news is that Suleiman has never been a friend of liberal republican democracy or opposition groups. As the Los Angeles Times analysis pointed out, Suleiman has been a bulwark against Islamic extremism. The two men are the public face of the Egyptian armed forces. That means there will be more and probably more violent demonstrations, if a revolution is taking place. If not, the armed forces-backed political system will make course corrections and survive.


The other bad news is that NightWatch reviewed the recent events in Egypt in the past two months and found the Muslim Brotherhood committed the first overt act. To refresh memories, on 19 January the Brotherhood delivered five demands to the Egyptian government that it had to meet in order to avert a crisis. The Day of Rage came six days later.

On 19 January the Brotherhood spokesman, Muhammad Mursi, said the group wants Cairo to revoke the state of emergency; dissolve the People's Assembly and hold free and fair elections; amend the constitutional articles that led to vote rigging in Egypt's last elections, hold presidential elections according to those amendments; and fire the current government and form a national unity government responsive to the Egyptian people's demands.

The Brotherhood warned the government. Few news outlets reported the ultimatum, but the Mubarak government took it seriously enough to make preparations for a crisis. The preparations proved inadequate. The timing suggests the Brotherhood has been the organizing force behind the demonstrations, but was unable to maintain control. Its leaders at least knew ahead of time that something significant was about to happen a week ahead.

The bad news in the five demands is their virtual identity with political changes the US supports. All of them have been mentioned by senior US officials in the past two weeks. US interests and Brotherhood interests have no basis for convergence. If the Brotherhood wants free and fair elections, it expects to benefit from them.


The demands of the Brotherhood and the success of Hezbollah in Lebanon suggest some Islamist groups are repackaging themselves as democrats to come to power or increase their public freedom of action. Paraphrasing a recent statement by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, democracy is a way station on the path to other goals.

Arrangements, costing around Rs200 crore, went in vain as Sultan of Oman Qaboos bin Said "postponed" his visit to Jodhpur, following anti-government protest in Arab state Egypt.

Sultan and his queens were supposed to arrive on February 8 on a personal visit, but anti-Hosni Mubarak protests in Egypt forced the king to remain in Oman and closely monitor the growing public dissent in Arab region.

According to embassy sources, about Rs200 crore was spent on various arrangements, including booking of around 250 rooms in hotels such as famous Umaid Bhawan Palace, customising booked suites, transporting luxury cars, kitchen wares and delicacies.

Said planned to set up his secretariat in Umaid Bhawan Palace in order to carry out the governmental tasks and lower ranked staff already arrived here to oversee preparations.

Hotel sources maintained that the visit has not been cancelled but "postponed" for some time. With this, most of king's staff returned, leaving his private secretary and protocol consultant to settle dues. They are expected to leave tomorrow.

He planned to visit the city to experience the rich Rajasthani culture.