Pashtun Civil War

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 19 Jul 2008 08:22

I believe that one tactic that Al Qaeda salafists have successfully employed in the Pashtun areas straddling the Durrand is to fudge the clannish loyalty and subsume it under the greater cause of Islam. I also believe that the expulsion/extermination of Shia in the Parachinar area is the first step to unite the Sunnis across the clannish divide, the attack on Berelvis by the Deobandis currently in progress in the Khyber agency is the next step at uniting the Sunnis under the Deobandi banner thereby further eroding the clannish affinities. The elimination of jirga elders under the guise of US spies is therefore done to make the clans rudderless.

Y I Patel · Post by **Y I Patel** » 19 Jul 2008 11:03

Wow.

Pakistan had to withdraw brigades from 1 Strike Corps.

Wow.

Hi Johann. Rip Van Winkle here.

Wow.

And then they withdraw brigades from 31 Corps.

Wow.

WTF is this piece of news hiding here?????

Holy $hit.

Wow.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 19 Jul 2008 11:42

Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan
by Rizwan Hussain (Author)

# Hardcover: 288 pages
# Publisher: Ashgate (28 Feb 2005)
# Language English
# ISBN-10: 0754644340
# ISBN-13: 978-0754644347

Pakistan's interaction with Afghanistan was to an extent influenced and fashioned by the historical legacy of pre-1947 Afghan-British Indian relations. This intriguing study explores how the Pakistan Army's involvement with the Afghan islamists became integrated with the Pakistani elites' post-Cold War strategic agenda. The analyses take into account the nature of the Pakistani polity and the foremost role of the Pakistani military in policy formulation. Particular attention is given to the interrelationship between the changes in the geopolitics of the Southwest and South Asian regions with the security policies of the Pakistani decision-making elite. Security concerms play a pivotal role in Pakistan's attempt to create a client state in Afghanistan in order to enhance Pakistan's wider economic and political influence in the region. Continued interest in the region since the events of 9/11 make this volume highly suitable for courses on South Asian studies, international relations and political Islam. It will also attract readers interested in terrorism and contemporary politics of South and West Asia.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 19 Jul 2008 20:48

Yogi please report to the Great Game thread!

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 20 Jul 2008 23:24

I am reading a paper wherin it is said that Pakistan could be considering a third option as the Afghan-Pakistan border. This is the border of the Mughal empire which extended from Northern edges of Kandahar, Ghazni, Kabul on to Badakshan (Raja Birbal was killed here in a expedition).

First and second options are the Indus and the present Durand line.

I think in the hullabaloo of the GWOT and the short term memories our generation is inflicted with, we are getting too fixated on the Durand line, our rivalry with Pakistan wherin we are ready to concede the Indus as the new border.

There was always a forward policy in vogue amongst the predecessors of the British. It should be recalled that Alexander spent many years fighting the frontier tribes and by the time he got to the plains his troops were so exhausted they were not ready to go further. This IMO was a truely successful implementation of the buffer state policy that British claim to have coined(Ref: Alfred Lyall ). In fact the soviet retreat from Afghanistan is eerily similar to the attempted Greek invasion of ancient India. More attention needs to paid to what happened then.

Raja Jai Singh was a true example of a frontier viceroy in whose footsteps Nalwa and other later day Bristish Generals were following.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 23 Jul 2008 05:23

other nuggets from the paper. IT is by Tariq Mahmood - published by Monterey Naval academy.

In 1967, the United Pashtunistan Front (UPF) was formed in New Delhi, under
the Chairmanship of Mehr Chand Khanna, former Minister of Works, Housing and
Rehabilitation in the government of India. The political purpose of the Front was made
clear in a resolution passed on July 16, 1967, which endorsed the demand for
Pashtunistan as a homeland for the Pathans. India, it said, “owed a debt of gratitude to the
people of the Frontier who had been among the leaders in the battle for freedom, which
for the Pathans had only resulted in their being ‘thrown to the wolves’ in Pakistan.”111

During the late 1990s, one reason Pakistan welcomed the Taliban’s religious
movement was that it worked against secular Pashtun nationalism, which, because of the
country’s long standing rivalry with Afghanistan, was viewed as a great danger. Pakistan
assumed that the Taliban would recognize the Durand Line. However, the Taliban
refused to recognize the Durand Line, not dropping Afghanistan’s claim to parts of
Pakistan. As per Ahmed Rashid, the Taliban fostered Pashtun nationalism, albeit of an
Islamic nature, and began to affect Pakistani Pashtuns. The triumph of the Taliban has
virtually eliminated the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. On both sides, Pashtun
tribes were slipping towards fundamentalism, and becoming increasingly involved in
drug trafficking. Ultimately, Pakistan became a victim of its own vision at the hands of
the Taliban, as the areas that were astride the Durand Line, including the FATA in
Pakistan, became a virtual Jihad highway, having links to Al-Qaeda with the revival of
radical Islam.
Since August 2003, Afghanistan has, again, revived the celebration of
Pashtunistan Day, which is being promoted amidst misperceptions regarding the validity
of the Durand Line.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Jul 2008 09:00

Could you link it?

Thanks, ramana

TSP always has illusions of grandeur. Akbar lost Kandhar in 1584. Aurngazeb didn't succeed in evicting the Persians. after his death the are became badlands and an Afghan identity was created in the aftermath of Persian raids by Nadir Shah. Durrani created the rentier state and they have become established.

The Sikhs under Ranjit Singh created the buffer state and the British formalized it with the Durand line. Maybe modernity can revive the Afghan economy to sustain a nation state.

kahan Mogolon ke shan, aur kahan pakjabis gustaki!

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 23 Jul 2008 23:47

Ramana: Please check email.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 23 Jul 2008 23:48

Lose of Kandahar by India is similar to India losing Tibet. THis was a forward buffer maintined by Indics aginst western hordes/

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 24 Jul 2008 00:18

The troubling thing is it was lost by the Mughals to Persians and has spun away from the Indian circle. Ashoka had brought it back from the Achemanian Persians first after the epic ages.

Am reading Caroe's Pathans and realize the influence of the Persians through the ages. As Acharya says the bounty of India is so large that frontiers/buffer areas are often lost by successive invaders/rulers in Indian history without consequences till a few centuries.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 24 Jul 2008 01:40

Both Persia and India lost significant territories in the past 700+ years. Persia has lost her influence in the caucasus(Georgia, azerbaijan), west afghanistan (Herat, Mazar)and central asia(turkomen areas) to the Russians, Arabs and the Turkics.

The vestieges of their influence can still be felt in far off places like Tajikistan. I think both the ancient civilizations ( blood cousins actually - I had posted a link to a book written by a Parsi on this in non western world view thread) have lost a lot in the past two milleniums.

However as I said in the Great Game thread, it is not in our interests to have the Persians get a foothold in the game as they will compete with us for adjacent territories. We are getting off the ground slowly and have plenty of low hanging fruit ripening to fall in our lap...India's western territories will come back in the coming decades. Once this happens, Balochistan and southern afghanistan should form the outer rings.

I have always held the opinion that Pakistan's push in Afghanistan is actually the Indic civilization claiming it's sphere of influence through it's outcast child. This is why I have expressed concern at the nascent Afghan emirate's eastern borders moving to the indus....(although it doesn't mean we support the pakis against the afghans).

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 24 Jul 2008 21:29

Paul wrote:Ramana: Please check email.

Thanks Paul. Slowly reading it.

Atish · Post by **Atish** » 26 Jul 2008 10:56

Paul,

Can you please link to the book once again. I have been struck by the amazing similarities between Sanskrt and Farsi.

Atish.

Raju · Post by **Raju** » 26 Jul 2008 11:32

the loss of Indic buffer areas like Kandahar & Tibet should be viewed in a natural light of dharma receding during the strongest stage of Kaliyuga.

these areas will get incorporated into the Indic civilization once again as dharma regains ground lost during kaliyuga. Everything should be viewed in its natural progression or regression as per times. It is nothing to be alarmed about. All the lands that were lost will be taken back one-by-one.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 27 Jul 2008 23:27

Atish: It is a doc..unfortunately I do not have the link. Please send me your email ID.

Ramana: Ikram Sehgal has been slandering the Pupulzai line of the Durranis saying they supplied women to the Sikhs. What does Caroe have to to say about the Sub divisions of the Durranis. If it is there in the book can you please write it up here.

Accoeding to Rashid, Karzai drove to Kandahar form Quetta with 300 of his relatives to bury his father(killed by Taliban) in the family graveyard. The Taliban did not dare stop him.

Need to understand the sub tribes of the Durrani clan to understand who is the most powerful. The ISI may try to prop up a proxy from Barakzai, or Ahmedzai clans

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 29 Jul 2008 09:27

http://bp1.blogger.com/_zUe7sq7m3h0/SHx ... FP+map.jpg

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 10 Aug 2008 07:45

Air power used to rescue 180 besieged soldiers
By Anwarullah Khan
KHAR, Aug 8: Troops backed by jets and helicopters launched an attack on Friday to rescue about 180 paramilitary personnel besieged by militants in the Lowi Sam area of the Bajaur tribal region.

Two fighter jets and six Cobra helicopters pounded militants� positions in the area. Heavy artillery was also used to end the siege.

Sources said that militants had suffered heavy casualties, with officials claiming that 27 militants had been killed. Five soldiers lost their lives.

Witnesses said that despite the use of air power, security forces had not been able to break the siege and rescue the soldiers.

The militants encircled the soldiers when they tried to enter Lowi Sam.

Tehrik-i-Taliban�s spokesman Maulvi Umar claimed that the militants had killed 65 soldiers and captured nine during clashes on Wednesday. He also claimed that a number of vehicles of the forces had been captured.

The fighting started when militants intercepted a vehicle in Lowi Sam, a stronghold of the Taliban. The sources said that army troops had not been used in the offensive undertaken by paramilitary forces.

Army spokesman Maj-Gen Athar Abbas, when contacted by Dawn, did not say anything about the besieged soldiers. He said that the Frontier Corps Headquarters in Peshawar should be contacted for information. The FC Headquarters, however, declined to make any comment.Local people said that 13 members of a family were injured when a mortar shell hit the house of a tribesman near Khar. They were taken to the headquarters hospital.

Another eight people were injured in mortar attacks in Inayet Kali area and Haji Lawang village.The sources said that clashes between the forces and militants had spread to Ragan, Salary, Umary and Inayet Kali with the Taliban attacking convoys of security forces in the areas.

Meanwhile, the exodus from Lowi Sam continued on Friday. A large number of families have moved to Peshawar and the adjacent Mohmand tribal region.

Markets and educational institutions remained closed in Khar and other parts of the region bordering Afghanistan.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 10 Aug 2008 09:11

As a loose analogy - think of the Mandal commission unleashing a new set of mongrels on the street - Mulayam singh Yadav, Laloo, paswan, Sharad Yadav etc. They have all carved out their own fiefdoms and wiped out the influence of alsation pedigree Jagjivan Ram who was a Sarkari Harijan.

indeed the very idea of pakistan is undergoing a compression. for pakjabis and sindhis,
the new emirates are probably a unsafe foreign country right now.

a generation of kids will never get to see the beautiful places in the frontier areas,
stuff they will read about in history books only. just like we read of the khyber
and gandhara.

*sniff sniff*

for now I think the Indus as the border between Indic sphere and the new emirates is
fine. in a few decades as pakjab collapses we can move in and stablize the situation.
chances are the warlords might also kill and weaken each other over time, giving
opportunities to "re-negotiate" the border for mutual security and economic benefits.
Russia seems to keep an array of small republics attached to its border, so can we.

good thing is the Islamists hate the PRC even more than we have reason to. so
chances of PRC expansion into afghanistan are minimal. Uighurs have been ruthlessly
suppressed and will welcome a nice rear area to stage their fight from.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 10 Aug 2008 18:25

Any volunteers for a comprehensive write-up on the Pashtun War of Independence, giving urls/ references of everything on these threads for the past couple of years?

This can have immense value.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 14 Aug 2008 08:19

Y I Patel wrote:Wow.

Pakistan had to withdraw brigades from 1 Strike Corps.

Wow.

Hi Johann. Rip Van Winkle here.

Wow.

And then they withdraw brigades from 31 Corps.

Wow.

WTF is this piece of news hiding here?????

Holy $hit.

Wow.

The first reports about these movements were in the summer of 2006, following the Pakistanis push in to South Waziristan. ARN, ARC, V Corps, FCNA, etc all seem to have contributed. Althought the Pakistanis have sort of tried to keep the withdrawals balanced, it certainly seemed that I Corps/ARN in particular was particularly heavily tapped.

The PA has clearly done its best to limit its exposure to both casualties, and to a weakened eastern flank by maximising FC responsibility for the campaign in FATA. Of course the Pakiban is just too big and strong for the FC to handle in places like Bajaur.

The Pakistanis have been irresolute about establishing positive control over the FATA - for one thing they would have to strip formations on the eastern border far more extensively. But the Pakistanis are unwilling to cede Peshawar and NWFP to the Pakiban. That's what the reinforcements to XI Corps are really about in the end.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 14 Aug 2008 08:23

Johann: Glad to see that you have stirred out. Need your perspectives on the Caucasus jollies. It seems very clear that there is a major media disinformation campaign in full swing, reminescent of the 2003 "WMD" hype. CNN etc. are going all-out, even mislabeling videos, to whitewash the ugly realities of the Georgia dictator.
Added later..
Oops! Sorry, I see that you have posted on that thread, thanks!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Aug 2008 00:47

B. Raman in his article FATA is Fallujah says that many Shias were killed in the Kurram Agency area. What is the tribal composition of Kurram Agency? Which tribes are Shia and which are Sunni?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Aug 2008 01:07

Good map of FATA/NWFP

NWFP and FATA Map

Parachinar is the big town in Kurram Agency.

Kurram Agency

The district has an area of 3,310 km² (1,278 sq. miles); the population according to the 1998 census was 448,310[1]. It lies between the Miranzai Valley and the Afghan border, and is inhabited by the Pashtun Turis, a tribe of Turki and Pathan origin who are supposed to have subjugated the Bangash Pashtun about six hundred years ago. The language of the tribe is Pashto, but unlike majority of the Pashtuns they are Shias.

So is it a inter-Pashtun rivalry or overthrow the Turis by the Bagash Pashtuns a la Hutsi-Tutsi in Rawanda?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Aug 2008 01:15

FATA description

So FATA is the buffer between NWFP, Baluchistan and Afghanistan. No wonder it was administered from Delhi in British days and is not part of NWFP.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Aug 2008 02:06

Should have done this long ago.

WikiPashtun Tribes

Wiki Durrani

wikiGhilzai

The short answer is Durranis are the successors of Abdali and are named after he took the title Durrani and form 16% of all Pashtuns! There are more Pashtuns in TSP than in Afghanistan.

The Ghilzai are the old Khiljis of the Delhi Sultantate era.

Can one you software gurus try to do an image enhancement on this pic of Mullah Omar who is said to be a Ghilzai?

Omar

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 23 Aug 2008 02:27

One more....Niazi

One question: How could Gulbuddin Hekmatyar end up seeking asylum in Iran? He is a Ghilzai Sunni Pushtun...maybe just an exception but thought it was interesting.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Aug 2008 02:39

He is being hounded by uncle and thats enough for Iran. they should have put him in prison for the atrocities committed on Shias in Afghanistan. OTH he might be saved for later role?

shaardula · Post by **shaardula** » 23 Aug 2008 04:18

ramana wrote: Can one you software gurus try to do an image enhancement on this pic of Mullah Omar who is said to be a Ghilzai?

Omar

are you referring to this image?
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/e ... d_omar.jpg

nothing useful can be done.

fata & nwfp
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:NWFP_FATA.svg

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 25 Aug 2008 11:05

X-post

Paul wrote:

BRFite

Joined: 25 Jun 1999 06:01 am
Posts: 584 ANother nugget that has come out in recent days: in the clash between the Sikhs led by Budh Singh and Syed Ahmed Barlevi in the NWFP areas in 1830s, Barelvi was betrayed by the Durrani Pushtuns who were uncomfortable at the prospect of this hot headed fanatic disrupting their cosy arrangements with the Sikh rulers........so much for the propaganda that Pukhtuns have never been defeated by anyone.

The Brits picked up on this idea and subverted it for their convenience.

Jihad and retribalisation in Pakistan - Ayesha Jalal’s new book
Jump to Comments
This is an important book. We are posting another review by Khaled Ahmed here. This review also cites some revealing passages..

BOOK REVIEW: Jihad and retribalisation in Pakistan

Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia
By Ayesha Jalal
Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore 2008
Pp373: Price Rs 695
Available at bookstores in Pakistan

Not far from Balakot, the votaries of the Sayyid are fighting on the side of Al Qaeda against ‘imperialist’ America and its client state, Pakistan, and killing more Muslims in the process than Americans, just as the Sayyid killed more Muslims than he killed Sikhs

Ayesha Jalal studies the jihad of Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed (1786-1831) in India as the most immaculate articulation of the theory of jihad in Islam. Sayyid Ahmad may have conceived his holy war against East India Company while living in Rai Bareilly in the central region of northern India, but he moved his warriors to where Pakistan’s North Western Frontier (NWFP) province is today because he thought that the Pashtun living in the tribal areas under non-Muslim Sikh occupation were better Muslims than the settled Muslims of the plains.

Here was the first indication that Islamic utopia could be constructed more easily in a tribal society. He probably wanted to take on the British after creating a mini-state on the pattern of Madina in the NWFP and probably hoped to reform the contaminated Muslims of the plains as a means of enhancing his challenge to the British. Al Qaeda too discovered the Pashtun straddling the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan as the tribal matrix where an Islamic utopia would grow into a centre of the global caliphate devoted to reforming and uniting Muslims living unhappily as subjects of today’s nation-states.

Sayyid Ahmad was feared by Muslims in the urban centres of India and was wrongly called a Wahhabi — a negative term pointing to the intimidation and violence associated with Saudi Islam — because they thought he would use ‘retribalisation’ as a method of returning them to the true faith. Pakistan fears Al Qaeda and its Pashtun foot soldiers as it sees the same kind of process in evidence under what is called Talibanisation.

Historian Ayesha Jalal has a fair claim to knowing the various communal narratives of Muslim India, as proved in her 2000 monumental work Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850. One can say that her latest book on Jihad has grown out of this earlier work and that her identification of one of the most ideologically ‘explained’ holy wars in the 19th century India is intended to understand the location of Al Qaeda inside Pakistan’s Tribal Areas in the 21st century. She writes on page 16:

‘The geographic focal point of the jihad of 1826 to 1831 on the northwest frontier of the subcontinent corresponds to the nerve centre of the current confrontation between Islamic radicals and the West. The jihad movement directed primarily against the Sikhs was transmuted in the course of the war into a conflict pitting Muslim against Muslim. This feature of intrafaith conflict in a jihad as armed struggle has not diminished its appeal for contemporary militants, who evidence many of the same failings that undermined Sayyid Ahmad’s high ideals. The martyrdom of those who fell at Balakot continues to weave its spell, making it imperative to investigate the myth in its making’.

The story goes like this. Sayyid Ahmad, convinced of his own semi-divinity and admired by a large number of followers for his exact adherence to Islam, marched from Rai Bareilly in Central India in 1826 in the direction of the north-western city of Peshawar with a an ‘army’ of 600 local Muslims optimistically posing as warriors. The aim was to establish an Islamic state on the land of the Pashtun. As he meandered through the various regions of India and Afghanistan, he was greeted by Muslim rulers not very keen to support him in his jihad. But in Kandahar, 200 Pashtun warriors joined him, clearly in expectation of the loot which jihad in their view brought in its wake. Some Yusufzai tribesmen, irritated by Sikh rule, also joined his lashkar.

If he thought he was walking into a ‘people’ of uniform views, he was mistaken. The Durrani Pashtun of Peshawar were not particularly enthusiastic about his movement. Scared of the internecine Pashtun warfare, they had become allies of the Sikhs and paid tribute to them.

In the first engagement with the Sikh army near Peshawar Sayyid Ahmad suffered a defeat because his soldiers took to looting after the first attack and thereby allowed the Sikhs to regroup and attack again. The next battle at Hazro met with the same fate: the Pashtun warriors took to looting before the battle was won and failed to gain decisive edge later on. The warriors fought over the spoils of war and the various groups carried off what they thought was their share, no one listening to the Sayyid.

The lure of loot attracted 80,000 more local warriors to his lashkar which now became an army. At the battle of Shaidu, the warriors of Islam outnumbered the army of Budh Singh, the general who represented the suzerain Maharaja of Lahore, Ranjit Singh. This time a part of the Islamic army refused to fight, and the Durranis actually poisoned the Sayyid fearing his growing spiritual power, and let him be defeated as their imam. Weakened by poisoning, he nevertheless sought solace in marrying an Ismaili girl as his third wife. A RAPE trait/Paki gens used to have a good time in their bunkers with women in 1971 while their trrops were suffering direct hots from Indian arty

As author Jalal points out, the parallels are shockingly close. Sayyid Ahmad’s main objective was the expulsion of the British from India (p.70). Osama bin Laden’s foray into Pakistan is also a phase in his jihad against America. Sayyid Ahmad was under pressure from the puritans of the faith from India to first wage war against the ‘Muslim infidels’ and for this he had to enforce sharia on the Pashtun population of Hazara which was under his military control:

‘The scope of the laws was broadly defined to include the compulsory enforcement of Islamic injunctions relating to prayers and fasting, as well as a ban on usury, polygamy, consumption of wine, distribution of a deceased man’s wife and children among his brothers, and involvement in family feuds. Anyone transgressing the sharia after swearing allegiance to Sayyid Ahmad was to be treated as a sinner and a rebel. Any breach was punishable by death, and Muslims were prohibited from saying prayers at the funerals of such people. Two weeks later, after another meeting of tribesmen, Sayyid Ahmad began appointing judges in different parts of the frontier…the moves infringed on the temporal powers of the tribal chiefs and seriously undermined the prerogatives of local religious leaders (p.94)’.

The three conditions that Sayyid Ahmad and the Taliban fill are: fighting enemy number one (the British, the Americans) through a secondary enemy (the Sikhs, Pakistan); mixing local Islam with hardline Arab Islam; and using the tribal order as matrix of Islam. The Taliban derive their radical Islam from the Wahhabi severity of the money-distributing Arabs; the mujahideen of Sayyid Ahmad derived their puritanism from Shah Waliullah’s ‘contact’ with the Arabs in Hijaz in 1730.

In the battle of Balakot, Sikh commander Sher Singh finally overwhelmed Sayyid Ahmad after he was informed about his hideout by his Pashtun allies. Ahmad fought bravely but was soon cut down. To prevent a tomb from being erected on his corpse, the Sikhs cut him to pieces but ‘an old woman found the Sayyid’s severed head which was later buried in the place considered to be his tomb’ (p.105).

Author Jalal notes that in the battlefield of Balakot, where Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly was martyred in 1831, another kind of ‘cross-border’ deniable jihad is being carried out by other mujahideen. She writes: ‘To this day Balakot where the Sayyid lies buried is a spot that has been greatly revered, not only by militants in contemporary Pakistan, some of whom have set up training camps near Balakot, but also by anti-colonial nationalists who interpreted the movement as a prelude to a jihad against the British in India’ (p.61).

Not far from Balakot, the votaries of the Sayyid are fighting on the side of Al Qaeda against ‘imperialist’ America and its client state, Pakistan, and killing more Muslims in the process than Americans, just as the Sayyid killed more Muslims than he killed Sikhs. According to Sana Haroon (Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland; Hurst & Company London 2007), Ahmed Shah Abdali had induced descendants of Mujaddid Alf Sani to move to Kabul after his raid of Delhi in 1748. In 1849, Akhund Ghafur set up the throne of Swat and put Syed Akbar Shah on it as Amir of Swat, the Syed being a former secretary of Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly.

It was a Wahhabi war in the eyes of mild Indian Muslims. It was therefore a virulently Sunni war which pointedly did not attract the Shia. It is difficult to believe that Urdu’s greatest poet Mirza Ghalib (1797-1869) could have supported the jihad (p.61). Writers have claimed that he wrote in cipher and used complicated metaphor in his poetry to attach himself surreptitiously to jihad; but that is not true if you read his Persian letters recently made accessible in the very competent Urdu translation of Mukhtar Ali Khan ‘Partau Rohila’ in a single volume Kuliyat Maktubat Farsi Ghalib (National Book Foundation Islamabad 2008).

Far from being attracted to the movement of jihad inspired by anti-Shia saints like Shah Waliullah and Shah Abdul Aziz, Ghalib praises an opponent of the Sayyid, Fazle Haq, and is more forthright about his own conversion to Shiism from the Sunni faith. Like Al Qaeda’s war against America, Sayyid Ahmad’s jihad was a Sunni jihad, an aspect that must be made note of. Al Qaeda today kills Shias as its side business.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 25 Aug 2008 11:09

This article needs to be critiqued in detail....however the irony needs to be noted. The Brits encouraged the barelvi to carry out war on the sikhs and his idelological descendants wage war on the inheritors of the Bristish empire.

Ranjit Singh must be laughing from his grave at the discomforture of the anglo-saxons.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 25 Aug 2008 22:00

Very good article. Confirms a lot of stuff on this thread.
The article does not address the British perfidy in giving leave of absene to Mulsim soldiers in the British Indian Army regiments to join the jihad as they thught that Barelvi was fighting agaisnt the Sikhs.

Looks like the new Durranis have to be found! Maybe if the uS presses hard the TSPA will do the needful to OBL.

namit k · Post by **namit k** » 25 Aug 2008 22:23

why dont we, some how provide pashtuns, some anti tank and anti aircraft stuff we got in kashmir which was ' made in pak/china'

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Aug 2008 02:24

Paul & SSridhar,

Caroll Quigley in his lecture on "Comaprative National Cultures". which you can get a pdf of from the wiki page on his name, says that the abundance of weapons in the population allows the overthrow of ancien regimes and in a couple of generations leads to some sort of popular representation.

Is the Pashtun Civil war happening because of the abundance of arms availiable due to their particpation in the war against the FSU in Afghanistan? By same token the turmoil in FATA is due to the availability of advanced fire power (compared to their jezail rifles) from the Afghan Taliban and the Dera Adam Khel region?

In other words the Pahstuns are able to rebel as they now have the wherewithal for such an act, as previosuly they had to resort to Red Shirt type agitations agains the superior British firepower in the Army. Which all measn that an independent Pashtun state is a foregone conclusion. Its a matter of when and not whether.

vsudhir · Post by **vsudhir** » 28 Aug 2008 02:53

Is the Pashtun Civil war happening because of the abundance of arms availiable due to their particpation in the war against the FSU in Afghanistan? By same token the turmoil in FATA is due to the availability of advanced fire power (compared to their jezail rifles) from the Afghan Taliban and the Dera Adam Khel region?

In other words the Pahstuns are able to rebel as they now have the wherewithal for such an act, as previosuly they had to resort to Red Shirt type agitations agains the superior British firepower in the Army. Which all measn that an independent Pashtun state is a foregone conclusion. Its a matter of when and not whether.

Wow.

Quite true, possibly. The seedha parallel is with the US war of independence which banked heavily upon armed local level militias.

What scares me now is the abundance of firepower among malcontent groups in India - primarily the Maoists. Not because Indians in general don't have popular representation (and hence the need to take to arms doesn't arise like in America) but because these groups reject the notion of popular representation under a democratic process. Akin to what the Pushtu are up to now. I don't believe the Pushtu, should they succeed in overthrowing the imperial occupying TSPA power will rush in for democracy or anything like that.

JMTs etc.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 28 Aug 2008 04:29

That is a part of it….plus the act that Pakhtuns are junior partners in the Paki establishment. The anti pakistani actions of the mujahideen were waved away by the establishment as nadaani. Zia in fact even tried to emulate the Jirga system in the PA.

I remember an India today article published around 1990 (after the ojhri ammo blast) which warned the mujahideen were coming coming to Kashmir and they had more small arms than the combined armies of India/Pakistan combined.

On a sidenote....My father once told me that the root cause of the troubles in the NE India is the vast quantities of small arms the Brits abandoned there in the aftermath of WWII.

On the pakhtun state....to start with I think there will be a secular afghan state west of durand line and the nascent islamic amirat east. They will merge later on the terms of the later is the rule when a choice has to be made between a secular vs islamic systems of jurispendence.

That is when the real fun starts.......

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 28 Aug 2008 04:51

Looks like the new Durranis have to be found! Maybe if the uS presses hard the TSPA will do the needful to OBL.

The new Durranis are always there there they never went away, ready to sell their souls to the next bidder....they sold their souls to the anglo saxons for the past 200 years.

When the pakhtuns state remerges (read the recent khalilzad flap in this context - he may be unwittingly helping to create this islamic super emirate monster in the not too distant future) they will come to us again....my worry is as I said before, a punjabi super nationalism may emerge as the reaction, which we do not want to happen, the answer is in indian nationalism. but alas we we have wasted precious years and the country still needs more time to unite. In the meantime other parasites have started to flourish in our frontyard.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 28 Aug 2008 09:26

ramana wrote:Caroll Quigley in his lecture on "Comaprative National Cultures". which you can get a pdf of from the wiki page on his name, says . . .

Ramana, will read it. Thanks for pointing.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 29 Aug 2008 22:56

Paul and SSridhar, Can you guys color the map to show the extent of pakiban as we know? Dark Green for the areas under control of the Pakiban and lighter green for the contested areas.

I think we should work on an all points scenario for the future of Pakiban combining elements of Pashtun Civil War, the undertow in Afghanistan and the Isalmization of Pakistan the civil-military tug and the role of US in the area.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 29 Aug 2008 23:39

vsudhir wrote:
What scares me now is the abundance of firepower among malcontent groups in India - primarily the Maoists. Not because Indians in general don't have popular representation (and hence the need to take to arms doesn't arise like in America) but because these groups reject the notion of popular representation under a democratic process. Akin to what the Pushtu are up to now. I don't believe the Pushtu, should they succeed in overthrowing the imperial occupying TSPA power will rush in for democracy or anything like that.

JMTs etc.

These are manufactured groups which can be neutralized ideologically and militarily. Any Indian govt can do this with proper policy framework , political process and economic incentive. The more we start analysing this situation we see that there is lobby which makes sure that the govt does nothing to take care of this

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 30 Aug 2008 03:33

The Afghan odyssey

A multi-pronged multi-dimensional strategy must include an on-going dialogue as well as continuing military operations and economic initiatives.

Ikram Sehgal

While rendering enormous sacrifices, Pakistan's "war against terrorism" has been subject to major shortcomings. Other than deficiencies in the political and military fields, there has also been gross dereliction in failing to pursue practical economic initiatives. The root causes of poverty in the border areas of Pakistan adjoining Afghanistan is unemployment, enduring frustration at lack of opportunities has been used by religious extremists to foment violence in furtherance of their own particular agenda.
Because of extenuating circumstances, the tribal fabric had frayed considerably. By failing to reinforce the tribal system we denied the tribals a position of strength from which to negotiate with the militants. Before venturing into FATA militarily we should have not only war-gamed the consequences but trained our troops in the type of counter-insurgency being faced by Coalition troops across the border. Frontier warfare or guerilla warfare as taught in Command and Staff College is outdated. Air mobility and electronic capability that the Coalition possesses is a critical necessity for us, this we have only partially. In this type of terrain it is virtually impossible to counter an insurgency without exploiting the heliborne potential.
Our intelligence agencies should have coordinated their initiatives to ensure they are not at cross-purposes in pursuing national objectives. They are professionals who should not be detracted for personal political objectives from their primary mission. Lack of democracy denied the campaign the necessary political support within FATA or in the adjoining Frontier Province. Stakeholders were not consulted but sidelined, even assaulted at times. One does not make friends by killing and injuring them or their kith and kin. Having violated the solemn word that the Quaid had given the tribals about the sanctity of their territory, we should have explained patiently that incursion was necessary but temporary.
In prosecuting the war against the Soviets in the 80s, religion was promoted over Afghan nationalism. When the Soviets left in 1992 they sowed the seeds of future violent dissension and between the Islamic forces and Afghan nationalism by facilitating the Northern Alliance to take power in Kabul. Atrocious governance by the Northern Alliance accentuated the polarization and created conditions for the Taliban to emerge. With Pakistan in danger of being declared a terrorist State in 1992, the ISI was forced to clear out those from their ranks who had run the Afghan war. This was needed but should have been more discretionary. An enormous asset of experience and goodwill built up with the Afghans over a decade of blood, sweat and tears was lost. The emergence of Taliban provided a brief window of opportunity for the ISI to re-build its "Afghan" potential, by 1997 its influence over the Taliban had waned to such an extent that when meetings with the Taliban hierarchy were requested, these were usually refused. The ISI was decimated with respect to both goodwill and effectiveness, particularly in the south of Afghanistan. The CIA similarly faced an exodus of Afghan experts with field experience in the region. By the time of 9/11, both the US and Pakistan were left with a good many intelligence operatives long on theory and short on actual hands-on field experience.
One needs a major economic effort to ensure livelihood for the population of the border region, Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) are at least a start. With 100 able-bodied men with families to feed having 5-6 jobs on offer, how do the rest survive? It is no surprise they are mostly guns for hire, doing service with tribal militias, with militants, with drug smugglers, etc! The Afghan Transit Trade (ATT) has existed at best as a scam meant to line the pockets of some Pakistani bureaucrats and Dubai-based businessmen, we need to stop ATT. FATA must become a free trade area (FTA) and let Afghanistan (and other Central Asian Centers) source all its requirements from this FTA. A constant source of income will give FATA tribals not only livelihood but reason to protect their means of livelihood.
A product of the "cocktail circuit", Hamid Karzai had family in the US residing in and around Washington, wired into the corridors of power. The US surmised he had the right stuff to be the leader for Afghanistan for the present and the future. There is a world of difference between having a gift of the gab on the social circuit and dealing with ground realities in an ideological insurgency. A dubious move in the short term, in the longer term Karzai as Head of State was a gross miscalculation, the Americans must now recognize it as an unmitigated disaster.
The Zirak and the Panjpai comprise the two main factions of the Durranis. The tribes among the Zirak are the Achakzai, Alikozai, Popalzai and Barakzai while the Panjpai have the Noorzai, Maku, Khogiani, Ishaqzai and Alizai tribes. The Karzais are Popalzai notables from the Ziraks, they do not command as much respect among the Pakhtuns as the Panjpai, and for good reason. The Ziraks are notorious among the Afghans for always lining up with whoever is the winner. During the Ranjit Singh period, the Ziraks were happy to be in bed (almost literally) with the Sikhs (almost all Sikh leaders had Durrani wives), later they were quite comfortable allied with the British. They did try lining up with the Soviets but were rebuffed or "monarchists" as opposed to the socialist model being put in place. Unlike the warring Panjpais, the Zirak did not show any great fervor in opposing them and mostly preferred to stay out of the Afghan war, living mostly in Quetta, Peshawar and Islamabad. A retired ISI officer vividly remembers Karzai among the list of 250 families given to him by the then Home Secretary Balochistan Lt Col Agha Aman Shah in 1985 for doling out of ISI funds for their upkeep. When the ISI operative protested that none on the list were physically involved in the Afghan war, the Home Secretary told him that the Zirak Durranis had ruled Afghanistan historically, and would continue to do so. A regular recipient of ISI handouts for years, Karzai's attacks on ISI and Pakistan are not unexpected.
The failure of leadership in such a critical environment can be fatal. Karzai is quick to blame all his failures on Pakistan; this shameless shifting of responsibility defines his bankruptcy as a leader. When the US decided they were not making headway politically in Iraq, they changed the leadership. Remember one of Clausewitz's principles of war, "never reinforce failure", the war cannot be won by supporting a puppet. Afghanistan's foremost leader must be a Pakhtun respected by and acceptable to Afghan races, preferably someone who had participated in the war against the Soviets. What stops the Americans from tapping people like Professor Abdul Rasool Sayyaf and Engineer Ahmad Shah, among others?
A multi-pronged multi-dimensional strategy must include an on-going dialogue as well as continuing military operations and economic initiatives. While Pakistan must do all in its power to contain and eliminate terrorism within our borders, the US could help their cause and ours by choosing a more able Afghan leader across the border, if not acceptable to Pakistan at least to a vast majority of Afghans.

(Ikram Sehgal is an internationally renowned columnist and the Editor of the Pakistan Defence Journal)

Sehgal in his frustuation airing some dirty laundry here....hidden in the innermost closets of Pakistan for a long long time.

Good psy-ops value. I wonder why this is coming out now. Is this the sign of a squabble as the beginning of the end nears amongst the RAPES?

Ramana: The other value of this article is it helps us uncover the byzantine relationships in the pukhtun circles