India to consider sending 120,000 troops to Afghanistan

[Arun_S]

I don't know if 120K is the number being proposed, but the idea that a country with the economic profile of ours cannot support that amount is not wholly reasonable.

Following is my assessment to your comment and related questions to that assumption:

• 1.) India can afford it? - Yes.
  2.) Does GoI has will to spend that kind of money? - No
  3.) If money made available can India send send and sustain a expeditionary contingent of 120,000 or even 80,000? - No.
  • A. Because Indian force and logistics is unprepared for such mission to a land locked country and questionable support of Iran and logical support by NATO/US.
    B. Because irrespective of one or nine pregnant women, the baby (IA to build that capability) will take 9 months to deliver.
  Follow the money trail. If GoI does not allocate money for new role of Indian Army, you know it is not real.

[Bhaskar]

I don't know if 120K is the number being proposed, but the idea that a country with the economic profile of ours cannot support that amount is not wholly reasonable.

Following is my assessment to your comment and related questions to that assumption:

• 1.) India can afford it? - Yes.
  2.) Does GoI has will to spend that kind of money? - No
  3.) If money made available can India send send and sustain a expeditionary contingent of 120,000 or even 80,000? - No.
  • A. Because Indian force and logistics is unprepared for such mission to a land locked country and questionable support of Iran and logical support by NATO/US.
    B. Because irrespective of one or nine pregnant women, the baby (IA to build that capability) will take 9 months to deliver.
  Follow the money trail. If GoI does not allocate money for new role of Indian Army, you know it is not real.

Even thinking about sending a force as big as 120K is out of the question.
There are only 51K ISAF forces.
Also, if we go with a force this big, we will outnumber the Afghan Army which has a strength of 80K.

Thinking about even sending a force more than 25K would be wrong...

[kasthuri]

Apart from the strategic perspective of sending the troops to Afghanistan, one should also look into the possibility of Keeda's hand's on Mumbai massacre. This will supplement our need to get there.

[NRao]

Is there a political will? I am not too sure if there is one.

Rest is all under control. Without a doubt.

[pushkar.bhat]

This entire thread seems more like urban legend or a dream under state of halucination than a trial ballon.

We don't need to send 120K soldiers to afghanistan and definitly never to fight someone elses war. Can we have a vote on weather this thread needs to continue.

[sanjaykumar]

1,200 troops would restore some credibility to this thread if not GOI.

[Bhaskar]

Dutch soldier dead
Royal Marines killed by teen suicide bomber shows UK needs allies in Afghanistan battle
looks like Western Countries need a lot of help in Afghanistan...

[Rahul M]

SHIV ji, could you check your geocities email plz ?

[Lalmohan]

Dutch soldier dead
Royal Marines killed by teen suicide bomber shows UK needs allies in Afghanistan battle
looks like Western Countries need a lot of help in Afghanistan...

they do, most of the non US Nato forces are very very strained. I met an officer of a very illustrious british regiment recently who was comparing northern ireland ops with afghanistan - he said that the former was dangerous, but geographically small permitting extensive air mobile ops, and with lots of safe bases, and contact time was limited. by comparison, afghanistan is full on continuous high intensity ops, lots of wear and tear on the equipment and men. they are not really trained for this type of ops, its not contained CI and its not air-mobile combined arms war either (like shock and awe). the main issue seems to be the extended periods of contact that the men have to manage - although despite the british combat fatal casualty figure reaching 111 yesterday - its still pretty low.

and the British are probably better funded and equipped than the Dutch

[NRao]

This entire thread seems more like urban legend or a dream under state of halucination than a trial ballon.

We don't need to send 120K soldiers to afghanistan and definitly never to fight someone elses war. Can we have a vote on weather this thread needs to continue.

That the US wanted Indian troops for Iraq is rather well known - that was some elses war for sure.

But, Indian "war" in that region (Afghanistan) predates "someone elses war". Suprising post IMHO.

[Bhaskar]

Dutch soldier dead
Royal Marines killed by teen suicide bomber shows UK needs allies in Afghanistan battle
looks like Western Countries need a lot of help in Afghanistan...

they do, most of the non US Nato forces are very very strained. I met an officer of a very illustrious british regiment recently who was comparing northern ireland ops with afghanistan - he said that the former was dangerous, but geographically small permitting extensive air mobile ops, and with lots of safe bases, and contact time was limited. by comparison, afghanistan is full on continuous high intensity ops, lots of wear and tear on the equipment and men. they are not really trained for this type of ops, its not contained CI and its not air-mobile combined arms war either (like shock and awe). the main issue seems to be the extended periods of contact that the men have to manage - although despite the british combat fatal casualty figure reaching 111 yesterday - its still pretty low.

and the British are probably better funded and equipped than the Dutch

NATO troops aren't trained for Afghanistan. Indian Army is better trained compared to all of the NATO forces...
The Western countries need a lot of help ... So if India does offer sending troops (lets not talk about the number), US would be crazy if it refuses the Indian offer.

[Lalmohan]

bhaskarji, with respect - what i have seen of nato ops in afghanistan (on tv) also does not seem to be normal ops for IA. possibly units stationed in rajasthan have the closest training - but they train for heavy duty armoured thrust and not for intense CI. our CI ops are infantry heavy in dense vegetation or population zones, not mobile in sparse desert terrain - our ability to do CI in mountains and forests/jungles is 2nd to none, but afghanistan is not quite the same

having said that, we understand the pakis and talibunnies and their turf better than the average european squaddie

[kasthuri]

If what M.K. Bhadrakumar says in this article is true, then sending the troops will be a much complex affair.

All roads lead out of Afghanistan

[James B]

^^^Kasthuri, nice article. If indeed Unkil is playing this 'great game' of central asia, deployment of Indian troops will be very complex and things will get murkier by the day with too many players involved in this game.

[Airavat]

Bhadrakumar deliberately ignores Afghanistan's relationships with its neighbours: extreme hostility to Pakistan, and friendship with Iran. What kind of moron ascribes the war in Afghanistan to the interests of "big oil"? And his conclusion smacks of dhimmitude:

The million-dollar question is Obama's sincerity. If he genuinely wants to end the bloodshed and the suffering in Afghanistan, tackle terrorism effectively and enduringly, as well as stabilize Afghanistan and secure South Asia as a stable region, he has to make a definitive choice. All he needs to do is to feel disgusted with the "collateral damage" that the great game is causing to the human condition, and seek an inclusive Afghan settlement in terms of the imperatives of regional security and stability.

.....in other words surrender to Pakistani terror and give them a veto over Afghanistan's future. Despite being a former diplomat, Bhadrakumar is a leftist appeaser of Islamist terror. He also writes for the hard-core leftist site "countercurrents". Just read his countercurrents article on the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which we know was done by the Pakistan army:

Even the death of a sparrow is a tragedy. Too many Indian lives are being lost in Afghanistan. The death of a brigadier, certainly, is a huge loss to India's armed forces. It is about time to ask questions why this is happening.

The Afghan army has pronounced ethnic fault lines. Ethnic Tajiks account for close to 70% of the officer corps of the army. So, when India trains Afghan army officers in its military academies to fight the Taliban - who are a predominantly Pashtun movement - India is needlessly stepping into a political minefield of explosive sensitivity.

Again, some others in India's strategic community hold a belief that it is time India began to flex its muscles in its region. At any rate, there is a widespread perception in the international community - including former US officials who held responsible positions and even British statesmen - that Afghanistan is the theater of a proxy war between Pakistan and India.

First, it is tragic, immoral and contemptible if India indeed is cynical enough to overlook the suffering that it would be inflicting on the friendly Afghan people - who barely eke out a living as it is - by making them pawns in India's "low intensity" wars with Pakistan. Second, such a proxy war is contrary to India's broader regional policy, which is to make Pakistan a stakeholder in friendly relations with India. Third, India would be annoying or alienating the Pakistani military, which is a crucial segment of the Pakistani establishment. Fourth, it undercuts the climate of trust and confidence, which is gathering slowly but steadily in the overall relationship with Pakistan.

Finally, it is plain unrealistic to overlook Pakistan's legitimate interests in Afghanistan. It is inconceivable that Pakistan would take in its stride any Indian activities in Afghanistan, which it perceives as threatening its security interests. (Sophistries apart, Delhi's calculated political decision to maintain consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif is a case in point.)

The Bonn conference in the winter of 2001 following the invasion of Afghanistan was the occasion for an ancient country like India to have pointed out to the world community that there could be no durable peace unless the vanquished and the defeated party was also brought into the settlement. The Europeans would have understood. But India's political leadership let the country down. Instead, India revived belief in its role to battle evil. On the other hand, if India had plodded through, the myth might have easily fallen away. And that might have offered a permanent solution to India's Taliban problem.

And yet another article where this gentleman explored the roots of Muslim anger in India following the train bombings in Mumbai by the Pakistanis in 2006:

There is every reason to believe that this week's violence in Mumbai has been in the nature of a riposte to the pogroms in Gujarat.

Something as horrendous as the Gujarat riots of 2002 had no parallel in India's modern history. Even more fearsome is the reality that the BJP-led government in Gujarat connived in the mindless violence let loose against the Muslim community in the form of organized pogroms.

In the Muslim world, Islamism is "objectively progressive", to use Marxist idiom. It is in the vanguard of reform and change; it argues for human rights and democracy.

Recognize Bhadrakumar for what he is: a leftist dhimmi willing to GUBO to the Pakistan army. Not surprising that he sees "no role" for India in Aghanistan.

[Stan_Savljevic]

We have ~8000 soldiers on UN payroll. Are we going to pull some or all of them to cover our backside against the China threat?
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/pe ... pktp08.htm

[NRao]

If what M.K. Bhadrakumar says in this article is true, then sending the troops will be a much complex affair.

All roads lead out of Afghanistan

Recent events have shown that militants are capable of holding NATO to ransom by disrupting the supply routes to Afghanistan via Karachi port.

Too simplistic a statement. The "militants" are part of the Pakistani Army strategic assets. They are not a different or separate entity.

Apart from the Karachi route, there are three alternate routes to supply the troops in Afghanistan:

There is one more: Gwadar corridor straight up north. I think this is the most viable route.

The big oil stuff has been on the plate for a long time, but, it included Pakistan too (and the author seems to have missed that very important aspect). Pakistan would love to get the funds for transiting oil, but seems to have become more enamored by the Caliphate dream.

I do not think any nation can live with a terrorist Pakistan - oil or no oil. Certainly India cannot accept it. The Great Game will always be played, but India, in particular, has a lot more pressing need. The topic of sending India troops to the region is NOT about a great game. It has solely to do with neutering Pakistan. That is it.

Let the US battle a Great Game.

[kasthuri]

Thank you Airavat for the nice pointer articles. I didn't know who this M.K. Bhadrakumar was - finally turned out be one of the great GUBO commie.

[vsudhir]

Airavat saar,

Thx much for clearing up any doubts abt MKB. Even industrial-grade bore-drillers would fail against this doofus' thick skull.

[shynee]

Pakistan's present and future war

Saturday, January 03, 2009
Samson Simon Sharaf

India has carried out a revaluation of its strategic options with Pakistan, and the coming years could witness an all-out strategy of coercion by it, a strategy so effectively applied by Israel in the Middle East. India's biggest advantage in conceptual and technical military cooperation with Israel lies in the fact that its technology is largely indigenous and facilitates material transfer with no end-user problems. Pakistan is already engaged in a war of attrition and the future will be a serious test of its strategy of defiance and ability to ride out the crises as a cohesive nation state.

India's quest for security and response to perceived external threats is shaped and complicated by its past. India desires to exist as a great power with a capability of bullying its neighbours and turning them into vassal states. Pakistan has been the major impediment towards this India's quest for great-power status. Wary of the freedom struggle in Kashmir, an exaggerated threat of Islamic militants and fear of another Two Nation Theory from within, Indian strategists have been toying with the idea of using a small but lethal rapid-reaction force for a limited duration inside Pakistan. However, India cannot accomplish what it has failed to do in the past six decades, unless the breeze blows in its favour.

In the post-9/11 scenario, India sees an opportunity and is acting as a neo-realist to minimise the importance of Pakistan through high-profile coercion in line with international perceptions. In this India is even ready to forego its traditional mantra of keeping the great powers out of the region and to align with them for short-term gains. In the final analysis, India wishes to frame a politically discredited, ethnically fragmented, economically fragile and morally weak Pakistan. This can only happen if the role of the armed forces in Pakistan's policymaking is reduced, Punjab divided and the rallying call of Kashmir taken care of for good.

The Indian military structure is geared towards such a capability with active assistance from Russia and Israel, and now the USA and UK. Having allied itself closely with Israel, India will now seek a continuous harassment through heightened military coercion, control of river waters, diplomatic isolation and covert interference. Mumbai and any such incidents in future will continue to provide reason for such intimidation, all in concert with the US and western strategic objectives in the region.

Interestingly, much of the blame for having landed in the box and then pushed into a vulnerable position must also be shared by the Pakistani establishments of the past decade. Pakistan's declared nuclear capability was meant to deter all types of conflicts and pave the way for sustained economic growth, international stature, and a political solution of the Kashmir dispute, Through Kargil, Pakistan led India and the world to believe that notwithstanding a nuclear shadow, a limited military conflict in an existing conflict zone was still possible. Kargil, and later 9/11, changed international perceptions on an armed freedom struggle in Kashmir as well as Pakistan's relevance to the new form of threat: non-state actors. Seen in the backdrop of 9/11, it was the second effect that finally resulted in disownership of the freedom fighters in Kashmir by Pakistan while also resigning the Kashmir question to the impossibility of backdoor diplomacy.

The nuclear capability of Pakistan provides a very small window of opportunity to India to carry out a physical offensive action across the LoC or the international border. This action could be a raid in the form of hot pursuit through ground or helicopter-borne troops, precision air strikes with or without stand-off; remote-controlled targeting through a guided-missile attack, and in the worst case, an attempt to seize objectives close to the international border with little military but considerable political significance. India had a fully developed chemical weapons programme even before it signed the chemical weapons convention as a country not possessing chemical weapons. But it declared its arsenal soon after signing the convention and is not averse to using quickly diffusing chemical weapons. After 9/11, India has held war games and fine-tuned these concepts and implemented some in a very limited manner during the escalation on the LoC.

Hot pursuit, as the name suggests, is only possible in an already hot theatre like the LoC. These are launched through ground troops or heliborne forces. Such an option has little probability because of the bilateral ceasefire. But such an option, however remote, cannot be ruled out.

With the active assistance of Israel, some Indian aircrafts have acquired a beyond-visual-range, precision stand-off capability, something witnessed during the Kargil conflict. India may use its air force remaining inside its own territory and launch laser-guided munitions diagonally inside Pakistan. However, the selected targets should be within 20 kilometres of the LoC or the international border.

Precision strikes imply that Indian aircrafts will physically violate Pakistan's airspace and launch precision surgical strikes against selected targets from a very high altitude, or conventional bombing runs, or use heliborne troops. In such a situation, these aircrafts will be vulnerable to Pakistani air defence and the PAF.

In the cold start strategy, India positions forces with offensive capabilities in military garrisons close to the international border, equipped, trained and tasked to capture some nodal points along the international border, before the Pakistani forces can react. India may not succeed in such an operation without a massive air cover. In Indian strategic calculus, the timing and lightening speed of such operations will solicit immense international pressure on Pakistan so as to curtail Pakistan's conventional and nuclear response.

Notwithstanding such options hinging on military and diplomatic brinkmanship, India will benefit from the use of Israeli armed and surveillance drones operated by Israeli crews from inside India. Historical precedents for such cooperation already exist.

The whole body of war fighting reasoning in such limited conflicts warrants a level of rationality and comprehension of a common strategic language between the belligerents. This is technically impossible. Different actors would draw varying conclusions from an animated Graduated Escalation Ladder (GEL) always vulnerable to a Fire Break Point that could result in uncontrolled conventional and nuclear escalation. It is, therefore, most important that the decision to graduate a conflict rest solely with the political leaders of the country, wherein a common strategic parlance could be evolved with more ease.

Taking a leaf from the Israeli opaqueness in its nuclear doctrine, India over time has applied a conceptual innovation in her nuclear strategy. The Indian revision in the nuclear doctrine implies the ambiguity in the "no first use clause" through a declared no first use and pre-emptive retaliation to create a perception that it is making a coercive transaction from doctrine of limited conventional war to an opaque level of conflict in which the nuclear weapons remain in a very high state of alert. The implication is that India may flirt with the concept of a limited strategic coercion in the shadow of a very high non-degradable nuclear alert beyond Pakistan's capability to neutralise. It is also my opinion that, as of now, after having signed the Nuclear Deal with USA, India benefits from an extended US nuclear umbrella, and strategic and diplomatic support.

There are reliable reports from Afghanistan that Indian contractors are busy building billets and accommodation in Kabul and Bagram to station two Indian divisions in the area. At the same time, bids have been invited by the US Corps of Engineers to construct a divisional size cantonment in Kandahar. Hypothetically, troops in the garb of protection for Indian investments will actually seal off Afghanistan's Pakhtun regions from the North. Then the US, NATO and Indian troops will go for an all-out counter insurgency operation in the cordoned off Pakhtun areas. The effects of spill-over into Pakistan would be pronounced and the Durand Line would become a figment of imagination. Premised on the romantic notion of Pakhtun nationalism, the doors to Pakhtunkhwa would be opened. The USA would then select the shortest route to Afghanistan through the Arabian Sea and Balochistan.

Whatever the concept, scope and objective of such limited escalations, India, with its newfound allies, has decided to maintain a constant vigil and coercion of Pakistan over a prolonged period of time but well below a Fire Break Point. The obvious targets, in tandem, with its allies, will be addressed through diverse instruments like control of rivers, economics, diplomacy, international pressure, internal law and order, military intimidation and even insurgency. A trillion-dollar question is: will the USA be ready to occupy Balochistan for a secure supply corridor?

The war has already begun. The question is. When did it begin?

The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistani army.

[Bhaskar]

Pakistan's present and future war
There are reliable reports from Afghanistan that Indian contractors are busy building billets and accommodation in Kabul and Bagram to station two Indian divisions in the area.

Very Very Interesting article Shynee, a good find...

I think we should see more news that India is planning to send troops to Afghanistan by tommorow...

[BajKhedawal]

This is a superb idea.

I just don’t understand some of the comments advocating that we would be doing this on behalf of the Brits or the Amrikhans. Why do we care if the US will use us and then betray us, so what? Let them think we are doing their dirty work.

We should be (and ARE) in to serve and protect our own interest. This is our neighborhood. Work towards getting POK and COK back, and then get the heck out of there. If not now, when! We have Farkhor Air Base in Tajikistan, if need be we have access to Iranian port of Chabahar via Zaranj-Delaram road in the south, we have generated enough goodwill by playing mother Teresa now's the time to reap the rewards.

Our military is and have been more than a match for the abduls. We will be doing a huge favor to the neighborhood. I am sure the chinkis will be grateful to have a buffer between the rabid dogs and their north western border and so will keep quite. If Amerikhan is thinking of opening a land route via CAR then Ruskies too will be grateful to have a friendly India in the hood.

I don’t think we are short of resources by any measure, let alone the number of boots we can land in Afghanistan. Why follow NATO, US example? If by our reason 1,20,000 makes sense, so be it then.

Look at these rudimentary benchmarks; we are a Goliath with David’s genius. It’s about time we made our presence known.
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country- ... y_id=India

[RayC]

M K Bhadrakumar’s ‘All roads lead out of Afghanistan’ appears to be a trifle naïve if he feels ‘The measure of success of president-elect Barack Obama's new "Afghan strategy" will be directly proportional to his ability to delink the war from its geopolitical agenda inherited from the George W Bush administration.’.

Consequent to the demise of the USSR, Cheney’s Defense Department in the waning days of the Bush Administration The Defence Policy Guidance (DPG) drafted in the early months of 1992 provided a blueprint for maintaining US pre-eminence precluding the rise
of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American
principles and interests.

Basically, the DPG intended:

ESTABLISH FOUR CORE MISSIONS for U.S. military forces:
• defend the American homeland;
• fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars;
• perform the “constabulary” duties associated with shaping the security environment in
critical regions;
• transform U.S. forces to exploit the “revolution in military affairs;”
To carry out these core missions, we need to provide sufficient force and budgetary
allocations. In particular, the United States must:
MAINTAIN NUCLEAR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, basing the U.S. nuclear deterrent upon a global, nuclear net assessment that weighs the full range of current and emerging threats, not merely the U.S.-Russia balance.
RESTORE THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH of today’s force to roughly the levels anticipated in the “Base Force” outlined by the Bush Administration, an increase in active-duty strength from 1.4 million to 1.6 million.
REPOSITION U.S. FORCES to respond to 21st century strategic realities by shifting
permanently-based forces to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia, and by changing naval deployment patterns to reflect growing U.S. strategic concerns in East Asia.

The Bush-Cheney administration is perhaps the ultimate expression of the "oil equals security" mindset. The administration's geopolitical strategy-based in significant part on the threat or actual use of force-in large part revolves around the perceived need to maintain access to oil reserves, particularly in the Persian Gulf, but around the world as well.

Therefore, to believe that when all these parameters set out have made cognizable gain from the time of President Bush senior to the current President, it will suddenly be abandoned by the President elect is a trifle far fetched! It must also be remembered that the President Elect has a chip on his shoulder since he is a Black and cannot seriously deviate from the whiteman’s policies which have given substantial gains to the US that is assisting the US to maintain her superiority.

Further, all nations which has a sizeable Moslem population in the periphery of Pakistan and Afghanistan and which are not Islamic Republic are wary of the advancing hordes of fundamentalist Islam and therefore, the main non Western players in the world are quite pleased to see the US and Europeans battling it out in Iraq and Afghanistan – the longer the better; since it is keeping the fundamentalists off their back, as also keeping the Western Powers at bay and depleting their national exchequer, apart from having less of a inclination to ‘engineer’ the world at the expense of their interest. That is why China intervened in Pakistan over the Mumbai massacre, rather than the usual pious platitudinous communiqué! These Nations will not to anything that would upset the apple cart.

The US national policy, no matter who is the President, cannot change drastically. It is in the interest of the US to attract more into their camp, more so the peripheral nations of their adversaries. It is after many years the US has been able to de-construct their challenger, the USSR, and its “Empire”. It is also the US’ aim to encircle China and 'keep her 'gainfully' employed' and so it would not be surprising, if the US is not playing a role in the Uighur or Tibetan unrest.

Has Obama is option to change policies and weaken the US interest?

[pushkar.bhat]

That the US wanted Indian troops for Iraq is rather well known - that was some elses war for sure.

But, Indian "war" in that region (Afghanistan) predates "someone elses war". Suprising post IMHO.

Rao Sir,

Sending troops to another country is a serious matter.

1. IMHO in the current economic scenario neither the Indians or the Pakistani's or for that matter the Americans, the Russians and the Chinese can afford to fight a war.

2. Any war needs to have a purpose. The purpose always is defending ones own territory or capturing someone else's territory. The primary objective of this expeditionary force will be to achieve neither of the two.

3. India's strategic interests in the region are better served through the deployment of "other type" of Indian forces and sharing Indian CI expertise with ISAF.

4. Supplying such a large force in a landlocked country like Afghanistan will be a logistical challenge and will not be feasible with the current dispensation in Islamabad.

5. Please remember that the Soviet Deployment in Afghanistan was close to 120K and we all know how big a disaster it was.

IMHO as and when the time comes India will and would have deployed strategic resources to the region. However, any rumor of deployment of 120K Indian resources to Afghanistan is a Figment of imagination.

[IndraD]

I do think that rather than sending troops we should focus on CI operations and other types of operations while constanty chanting mantra of we are friends, we are victims of terror while undermining Pak in thousand ways. Some one wrote if Kasab can be made to agree for a dastardly act for a peanut of Rs 120000 then we can invest much more, we must immidiately undertake such operations.

Also We shouldn'forget what happened to IPKF in SL. Some people suggest it was because of lack of coordination between RAW and IA, what is the chance same thing wouldn't repeat again, seeing current defunct status of RAW. Also I am against idea of becoming condom for US srmy. Why don't we put our own house in order, let's build the internal security to the point there are no bomb blasts and ULFA/IM inside are rendered weak to the point of being defunct.

[RayC]

While I don't think that deployment of Indian troops in Afghanistan is a good idea, yet it must be remembered that India is building Iran's Chhaber port which leads to the road that India has built in Afghanistan.

In addition, New Delhi has offered to build and finance a 400-km railway line from the port to a place close to a highway that India is building in Afghanistan. This would enable it to move goods to Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan. At present, India moves goods through the Bandar Abbas port which normally takes 8-10 days. The movement from Chabahar would cut down the time to less than half. Also Indian goods would move quickly to the Central Asian republics and the highly time-consuming movement to Russian ports would be avoided.

Therefore, this opens up a supply route. The US can lighten their logistic baggage by contracting Indian companies for non lethal goods and not upsetting Iran.

It must also be remembered that Shia Iran is not enamoured with the Sunnis wherever they be.

[IndraD]

Yes I do support sending out troops for decimating ULFA.

[John Snow]

Before embarking

We need Ships both water kind and Air kind to support logistics in a very large scale.

That means a great proportion of Defense funding will have to go to IN and IAF, the IA brass will never allow this to happen. IA and its leadership still romances the Desert Fox in operation Desert storm days.

IA is not reallyequiped to be rapid deployment force. IA strategy and tactics need a total revamp before a mission like 80,000 tp 120,000 troops be sent to anywhere except Indian side of borders east or west.

IA is still wedded to Russian school of sending Brave soldiers on foot to scale peaks and dislodge enemy. While IAF did what was required (yes we lost Sqdr Ahuja and two more in Kargil IIRC)

To an extent Army aviation and Helicopter units directly under IA will help minimally. IA has to have atleast Two dimensional capability, Land and Air. Air transport, CLAW and Heliborne units for swift execution of missions. No sixty day notice, just two weeks notice IA is ready and poised to strike.

Dont use IA like police force, Naxal ,ULFA, etc,, there other ways to deal with if there is a political will

[RayC]

Before embarking

We need Ships both water kind and Air kind to support logistics in a very large scale.

That means a great proportion of Defense funding will have to go to IN and IAF, the IA brass will never allow this to happen. IA and its leadership still romances the Desert Fox in operation Desert storm days.

IA is not reallyequiped to be rapid deployment force. IA strategy and tactics need a total revamp before a mission like 80,000 tp 120,000 troops be sent to anywhere except Indian side of borders east or west.

IA is still wedded to Russian school of sending Brave soldiers on foot to scale peaks and dislodge enemy. While IAF did what was required (yes we lost Sqdr Ahuja and two more in Kargil IIRC)

To an extent Army aviation and Helicopter units directly under IA will help minimally. IA has to have atleast Two dimensional capability, Land and Air. Air transport, CLAW and Heliborne units for swift execution of missions. No sixty day notice, just two weeks notice IA is ready and poised to strike.

Dont use IA like police force, Naxal ,ULFA, etc,, there other ways to deal with if there is a political will

Sadly the IA does not decide the Budget.

Lest us not glamorise what the IAF did in Kargil. Indeed, what did they do, notwithstanding the PR of Patni.

[suneels]

Hello
Please read "the Young British Soldier" by Kipling, before thinking of sending troops to Afghanistan, everyone who has tried it has finally had to give up in the end.

Just let the Jirgas shoot each other up and then deal with whoever is left standing alive

The Young British Soldier

"When the 'arf-made recruity goes out to the East
'E acts like a babe an' 'e drinks like a beast,
An' 'e wonders because 'e is frequent deceased
Ere 'e's fit for to serve as a soldier.
Serve, serve, serve as a soldier,
Serve, serve, serve as a soldier,
Serve, serve, serve as a soldier,
So-oldier _of_ the Queen!

Now all you recruities what's drafted to-day,
You shut up your rag-box an' 'ark to my lay,
An' I'll sing you a soldier as far as I may:
A soldier what's fit for a soldier.
Fit, fit, fit for a soldier . . .

First mind you steer clear o' the grog-sellers' huts,
For they sell you Fixed Bay'nets that rots out your guts --
Ay, drink that 'ud eat the live steel from your butts --
An' it's bad for the young British soldier.
Bad, bad, bad for the soldier . . .

When the cholera comes -- as it will past a doubt --
Keep out of the wet and don't go on the shout,
For the sickness gets in as the liquor dies out,
A' it crumples the young British soldier.
Crum-, crum-, crumples the soldier . . .

But the worst o' your foes is the sun over'ead:
You must wear your 'elmet for all that is said:
If 'e finds you uncovered 'e'll knock you down dead,
An' you'll die like a fool of a soldier.
Fool, fool, fool of a soldier . . .

If you're cast for fatigue by a sergeant unkind,
Don't grouse like a woman nor crack on nor blind;
Be handy and civil, and then you will find
That it's beer for the young British soldier.
Beer, beer, beer for the soldier . . .

Now, if you must marry, take care she is old --
A troop-sergeant's widow's the nicest I'm told,
For beauty won't help if your rations is cold,
Nor love ain't enough for a soldier.
'Nough, 'nough, 'nough for a soldier . . .

If the wife should go wrong with a comrade, be loath
To shoot when you catch 'em -- you'll swing, on my oath! --
Make 'im take 'er and keep 'er: that's Hell for them both,
An' you're shut o' the curse of a soldier.
Curse, curse, curse of a soldier . . .

When first under fire an' you're wishful to duck,
Don't look nor take 'eed at the man that is struck,
Be thankful you're livin', and trust to your luck
And march to your front like a soldier.
Front, front, front like a soldier . . .

When 'arf of your bullets fly wide in the ditch,
Don't call your Martini a cross-eyed old bitch;
She's human as you are -- you treat her as sich,
An' she'll fight for the young British soldier.
Fight, fight, fight for the soldier . . .

When shakin' their bustles like ladies so fine,
The guns o' the enemy wheel into line,
Shoot low at the limbers an' don't mind the shine,
For noise never startles the soldier.
Start-, start-, startles the soldier . . .

If your officer's dead and the sergeants look white,
Remember it's ruin to run from a fight:
So take open order, lie down, and sit tight,
And wait for supports like a soldier.
Wait, wait, wait like a soldier . . .

When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.
Go, go, go like a soldier,
Go, go, go like a soldier,
Go, go, go like a soldier,
So-oldier _of_ the Queen!

-- Rudyard Kipling

[somnath]

This has to be among the most harebrained ideas discussed on BR!

Sending 120k troops:

1. Without a clear political objective
2. Non existant logistics lines - the only ones are through Pakistan
3. No idea of costs

Someone mentioned India can afford the costs of deployment in Afghanistan. the US spends about 2.5 BILLION dollars to maintain less than half that number in Afghanistan. Thats approx 30 billion dollars every year, about equal to India's defence budget.

All of this, when Afghanistan is perefect special ops territory, and by all accounts (importantly Paki ones!), we are doing pretty well!

[Philip]

JE,if we wish to be an imperialist power,then we must have most importantly of all "imperialist leadership".I do not see this species in India,either in Delhi on the horizon.Instead,we have a species of self serving individuals with both eyes on the main chance.Serving our white masters is still considered an honourable occupation and this is where arguably,we might find the Indian armed forces doing the porters job for the allied expeditionary forces in that country,engaged in a crusade against the Taliban." Gen.Gunga Din",for that will be the name of the CO of Indian supporting forces,will have to take his orders from the Great White Chief.This won't go down well at all with our janata in the house and I can't see us acting in such a tragicomic play on our own.Furthermore,even if we did make travel plans to explore the ruined Bamiyan statues,the pigsty will unleash its grunting hordes into J&K in retaliation, ultimately making us cutting short our Afghan tour to deal with the invasion.In the current eo crisis globally,Uncle Sam will also be unable to foot the bill on our account.

From the current situ,it is more likely that our uniformed tribe of travellers,might instead be visiting lands nearer home to our west and north!

PS:Here's how the battle is better won,both in Afghan's dusty plains and across the border too.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 435471.ece

Death from above: how Predator is taking its toll on al-Qaeda
Unmanned and heavily armed drones are killing off the 'senior management'

A Predator drone: from as far away as Nevada, in the heart of the US, controllers on the ground are able to strike at bases used by the leadership of al-Qaeda in the borderlands of Pakistan. Casualties have been heavy and new leaders are often not well-known

Michael Evans

The top hierarchy of al-Qaeda has taken such a hit from US missile strikes that Osama bin Laden and his deputy have had to replace people in the terrorist organisation with men they have never met, according to Western intelligence sources.

A dozen of al-Qaeda’s “senior management” have been killed by Predator drone attacks, which have been so effective in locating their targets that the militant group has been forced to move from traditional outdoor training camps to classroom-style facilities that are hidden from view.

After the success of the new weapons, which are unmanned and operate by remote control from 15,000 feet, the United States is to step up its drone attacks. On January 1 Hellfire missiles, operated from an air force base in Nevada, hit targets in the South Waziristan region of Pakistan, close to Afghanistan, and yesterday two missiles slammed into the stronghold where Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani Taleban leader, is believed to live.

The killings have had a huge impact on the structure, organisation and effectiveness of al-Qaeda, limiting the capacity for commanders to liaise with each other, further separating the top command from the lower ranks and introducing a high degree of uncertainty and a constant awareness of the likelihood of death lurking in the skies.

Times Archive
Soviet role in Kabul threat to peace, Mr Carter declares
Afghanistan President executed after Soviet-backed coup
US warns Moscow it is ready to defend Pakistan

Nato 'making same mistakes as Soviet army'
US drones kill seven in Pakistan attack

Bin Laden, al-Qaeda’s figurehead leader and Ayman al-Zawahiri, his Egyptian deputy, have had to rely on the loyalty of their associates to stay alive and remain hidden from the American surveillance networks.

Predators, armed with Hellfire missiles and precision-guided penetration bombs, have already succeeded in targeting two individuals believed to have ranked number three in the al-Qaeda chain of command: Hamza Rabia and Abu Laith al-Libi. They have also killed Mohammed Atef, reputedly the chief of military operations, and several of the group’s most experienced explosives and biological weapons specialists.

One of the consequences of the Predator attacks has been that al-Qaeda has had to give up its traditional terrorist training camps. Sending recruits out into the open to receive military-style jihadist instruction in combat and bomb-making has become too risky. “As soon as they are spotted, the Americans attack with Predators,” a counter-terrorist source said. Now terrorist training in the tribal regions in Pakistan is carried out “in the classroom”, less visible from the air and making it more difficult for the Americans to monitor the scale of the recruiting.

Communications between the top echelon and operatives is now restricted to human couriers. Mobile and satellite phones are never used by the core leaders because they know that American signals intelligence will be able to pinpoint individuals as soon as the devices are switched on.

Since the Americans acquired missile-armed Predators and the newer model, called Reaper, the CIA and Pentagon have focused on killing terrorist targets rather than monitoring and tracking the activities of suspected al-Qaeda figures. The killing option has led to an increasingly successful record.

Despite a number of attacks that led to civilian deaths, in more recent Predator missions – particularly over the past four months – the intelligence has been more accurate. In one mission in November a Predator strike on a compound in the village of Ali Khel in North Waziristan killed two of the most senior al-Qaeda operatives, Abu Zubair al-Masri, an Egyptian explosives expert, and Rashid Rauf, the British Pakistani who is alleged to have been linked to the Heathrow bomb plot of August 2006.

There were claims that Rauf was not in the compound at the time, but counter-terror officials firmly believe that he was there and that he died.

The killing of al-Libi, reputed to be a number three in the al-Qaeda hierarchy, in January last year was one of the biggest blows for bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. He was head of the Libyan fighting group of al-Qaeda and was regarded as an important director. He was also a charismatic, respected religious figure and operational planner who could smooth the way for al-Qaeda in the tribal areas whenever there were confrontations between the terrorist leaders and their Pakistani hosts over the constant threat posed by the American Predators.

Another serious loss to al-Qaeda was that of Abu Abeda al-Masri, the head of external relations who died of natural causes after becoming ill with hepatitis. He was a significant loss in terms of the threat to the UK because his role was to train Britons.

Another key Predator victim was Abu Suleiman al-Jusayi (or al-Jazairi), an Algerian who was an al-Qaeda trainer and explosives specialist. He had been involved in a series of European terrorist networks. He was killed in the Bajaur tribal district of Pakistan in June.

One of the most sought-after American targets was Abu Kabbah al-Masri, al-Qaeda’s most experienced biological weapons scientist. He was engaged in the chemical and biological trials that were uncovered in Afghanistan in 2001. He was known to be continuing his experiments in the tribal regions of Pakistan. He was tracked by the Americans and killed by a Hellfire missile in the second half of last year. Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, another poisons expert, is also believed to have been killed by the Americans in a Predator attack.

The only al-Qaeda commander to have been killed by other means in the past 12 months was Abu Ghadiyah, who was in charge of the production line of suicide bombers from Syria into Iraq. He died during a controversial US commando helicopter raid across the border from Iraq in October.

Aerial assault

— Armed predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been in use since 1999

— The aircraft is controlled from the ground using satellite systems and onboard cameras

— The MQ9 craft, which is used in Afghanistan, is 11m long, has a 20m wing span and a cruise speed of up to 230mph. Each can carry four Hellfire missiles and two bombs

— Three systems were bought by the RAF last year for £500m

Sources: Jane’s Information, US Airforce, RAF, Times archives



.

[Singha]

we can talk all day whether someone has written a arthashastra on afghanistan or
The next Ashoka has been anointed to lead the imperialist hordes but bottomline is we
wont be getting rid of Pak-e-stan without some serious work on its western frontier.

ISAF today is between 30,000-50,000 depending on where one searches. These Govts have
no real stomach to continue the fight although the troops are pretty good and well equipped. Key problem is their armed forces are too small to permit shorter tours of duty
and rotating brigades in and out (US and India dont have this issue)

I see India gradually taking over from ISAF and staying on with the US to make sure the
job gets done....a ringside seat to the birth of free balochdesh and expantion of durand
line plus a good share of the spoils in reconstruction.

[Philip]

Quite an international gathering! The great successses so far for the US/NATO forces there,is that they've cornered the Taliban forces into a pocket of just 75% of the country and they've ensured that Afghanistan's chief export of the poppy crop is at record levels!

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... claim.html

British Muslims fighting alongside Taliban, commanders claim

UK soldiers in Afghanistan have killed British Muslims fighting alongside the Taliban, commanders claim.

By James Kirkup, Political Correspondent
Last Updated: 6:09PM GMT 02 Jan 2009

British troop commanders believe that UK nationals are among the enemy dead. Photo: REUTERS
Military intelligence reports suggest that a small number of UK nationals are among the range of foreign fighters who regularly clash with British troops in Afghanistan.

British military sources have told The Daily Telegraph that they believe that some of those Britons have been killed fighting against their own country's forces.

The revelation comes amid growing concern among British military and intelligence officials about militants based in Pakistan launching attacks on British interests in Afghanistan and at home.

Foreign fighters enter Afghanistan from Pakistan's lawless border areas, home to the reconstituted al-Qaeda leadership.

British commanders in Helmand say that they have intelligence suggesting that British Muslims are among the enemies they face, albeit in small numbers.

"We're talking about ones and twos at a time," said one officer. "It's not big numbers, but they are there, definitely."

Some of those British Muslims may have been killed in battle with British troops, military sources said.

Confirmation is near-impossible, but British troop commanders believe that UK nationals are among the enemy dead.

One officer said: "We can't say for sure. If they don't carry passports, who can you say what nationality a corpse is? But it's a reasonable assumption that we've killed some of them."

Another security source highlighted the case of Rashid Rauf, the Birmingham man wanted by British police in connection with a 2006 plot to bomb transatlantic airliners.

Rauf is believed to have been killed inside Pakistan in a CIA missile attack in November. "He's not the only [British Muslim] to die out here," said the source.

In August, Brigadier Ed Butler, the former commander of UK forces in Afghanistan, told the Telegraph that there are "British passport holders" in the Taliban ranks.

And earlier this year, it was revealed that RAF Nimrod surveillance planes monitoring Taliban radio signals in Afghanistan had heard militants speaking with Yorkshire and Midlands accents.

The Ministry of Defence says it does not comment or give estimates for the number of enemy dead. But privately, British officers in Afghanistan estimate that several thousand Taliban fighters have been killed since 2006, among them the citizens of several foreign countries.

Foreign fighters entering Afghanistan from Pakistan are a significant component of the eclectic mix of enemy forces UK troops face.

Patrick Mercer, the chairman of the House of Commons sub-committee on counter-terrorism, said it was "to be expected" that British Muslims were among the enemy dead in Afghanistan.

He said: "The terrorist operations undertaken by British citizens at home and abroad shows the scale of British Muslims' involvement in extremism around the world.

"It should not come as a surprise that some of the enemy dead in Afghanistan can be traced back to the UK."

The ease with which al-Qaeda and its associated groups can operate along the Afghan-Pakistan border is causing growing concern in Whitehall.

In December Gordon Brown visited Islamabad and told Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistani president, he must do more to stop militants operating in the border area and launching operations inside Afghanistan.

In particular, Mr Brown demanded more Pakistani action against the training camps set up by extremist groups inside Pakistan.

Several known British terrorists have passed through those camps. Mohammed Siddique Khan, the ringleader of the July 7, 2005 bomb attacks in London, trained at a Pakistani camp.

He went to the camp with the intention of passing into Afghanistan to fight against British forces there, but was persuaded to return to Britain instead.

International Jihadis are also said to be active inside Pakistan. Earlier this month Major General Tariq Khan, a senior Pakistani officer, said that over 300 foreign fighters are still operating in Pakistan's tribal region that borders Afghanistan.

British commanders and intelligence officers working in Afghanistan have largely abandoned the term "Taliban" in favour of the phrase "enemy forces."

They say the change in language reflects the diverse nature of the forces they face, which include local tribal fighters, Afghan nationalists, drug gangs and hired gunmen paid by the Taliban leadership.

[Rahul Shukla]

First of all, thanks for taking the time to type up a very detailed and informative post.

Ok, let's assume for arguments sake that you're right. You're postulating a scenario where India is "weakened" as a result of an Indo-Pak conflict to the extent that it becomes a "very attractive" target for China... what does this mean, in real terms?

I can only assume that it means Pakistan has so badly thrashed all our formations deployed along the LOC/IB, that we have to rely on units normally deployed on the Chinese border to defend our homeland against an overwhelming Pakistani assault. There is no other way in which Eastern/Central command would see their warfighting capability severely degraded as a result of an Indo-Pak conflict... even in terms of fuel, ammunition, supplies etc. the Pakistanis would run out long before we did.

No.

The impact of war goes beyond mere attrition of military assets and includes economic, social, political and psychological factors. This is especially true if war is being fought on one’s own turf. War means social disruption and a suspension of trade and commerce. It means depletion of currency and fossil reserves. A country needs time to recover and restore normalcy after fighting an all-out war. I have no doubt that India can win a war against Pakistan. However, after that first war is over, the capacity and willingness to fight another major war is diminished especially against an even more powerful enemy (China).

So anyway. Let's assume that the worst happens and, as you predict, China launches a full-fledged assault in the NE which we are unprepared to meet because our China-specific formations were redirected to deal with Pakistan.

Unlikely as this scenario is-- if it ever came to pass, which would you rather have? 120,000 more troops within our borders to help defend the homeland? Or those 120,000 standing watch for Unkil against the hashish-jirgas of Paktia? Because there's no guarantee we'll be able to use them against Pakistan from the Afghan front, if they depend on the US and NATO for air-support, intel and supplies.

I never proposed to that India should deploy its China specific formations to Afghanistan. The specific military composition, strength and source of any forces deployed will be decided solely by GOI/MOD. The Indian Army will not support the proposal if there is any risk of not being able to meet a conventional threat either from Pakistan or China.

It is clear that no nation can afford to deploy 120,000 of its troops to a foreign land and not make necessary changes either in tactics or hardware to account for their relocation. India will have to change its war-plans to compensate for this deployment. That can either mean anything from a temporary increase in size of the military to utilizing force-multipliers to neutralize the manpower shortfall.

If possible, I’d very much like to have troops on both sides of the Pakistani frontier and go for a pincer move when hostilities commence. I agree that this will make it tougher for India to defend approaches to New Delhi (rectifiable). But it will also make Pakistan’s task of defending Peshawar, POK, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Quetta and Gwadar equally difficult. The unavoidable expenditure on strengthening Pakistan’s defenses in the west due to the mere presence of 2 well-equipped Indian Divisions in Afghanistan will be unsustainable for Pakistan given their economic condition and military status. The forces that must liberate Baluchistan for securing an alternate supply route to Afghanistan do not necessarily have to first conquer all of Sindh.

If Indian troops will depend upon US for air-support, intel and supplies, then US will be exclusively dependent on India for execution of GOAT and other developmental activities in Afghanistan. So Uncle is not the only one with leverage. Whether or not Indians get to use troops deployed in Afghanistan against Pakistani terrorists and/or army, depends upon the provisions of the rules-of-engagement negotiated between India and US.

The presence of that large a number of Indian troops in Afghanistan makes an Indo-Pak conflict inevitable.

As for Unkil himself intervening on our behalf against a Chinese move to grab AP ...hey, the Georgians expected the same thing when the Russians grabbed South Ossetia. As a supplier of one of the largest contingents to the American Coalition of the Willing in Iraq, what did they receive? John McCain declaring that "We are all Georgians!" LOL

If Unkil today counsels us to exercise "restraint" against even the Pakis, I don't believe for a moment that he would go up against the Chinese (with all their billions in US treasury bonds) for our sake.

With all due respect saar, Georgia is a bad example to use. In fact, there are no examples that can be used here.

“As a supplier of one of the largest contingents to the American Coalition of the Willing in Iraq…” It all sounds very impressive until I press upon you the reality that Georgia had only 2,000 troops in Iraq at the height of its deployment strength. Georgia sent 800 troops to Iraq in 2004 and another 1,200 troops in 2007. Out of those 2,000 troops, 1,700 were manning check-posts on the Iranian border in a relatively peaceful province and 300 were posted on Police duty in the Green Zone. When the Georgians ordered their troops to return during war with Russia in August 2008, the US simply reassigned infantry units from interior provinces of Iraq to the border supplanted by PMC (private military contractor) personnel with minimal impact on the conduct of Iraqi operations.

The Georgian contribution to the Iraq war amounts to measly 1.67% of the Indian offer of 120,000 troops for Afghanistan. The United Kingdom, which is the second largest supplier of troops to the Coalition of the Willing, has only 4,100 troops in Iraq at present which amount to a slightly less measly 3.42% of the Indian offer of 120,000 troops for Afghanistan. The second largest contributor to the Afghanistan campaign is again the United Kingdom with a total deployment of approx. 8,000 troops which amount to a mere 6.67% of the Indian offer of 120,000 troops.

If India cannot buy and exercise leverage over the US with these kinds of numbers, it can only be due to India’s own stupidity and ignorance.

With all due respect, your equal-equal rhetoric here suggests that you favour an across-the-board system of tit-for-tat responses to Chinese containment measures against us. This is impractical. The unfortunate truth being, we don't have the economic or military muscle to play equal-equal with them at this point in time.

I am fully in favor of challenging the Chinese geopolitically on terms where we are strong. Our naval superiority is one of the few relative strengths we have, so I'm all in favor of expanding those exercises with Singapore and Japan in the South China sea.

I do not propose any equal-equal/tit-for-tat response to Chinese containment measures. India needs to find its own unique solutions to challenges presented by China. I have mentioned numerous times that India does not have the economic and/or military muscle to play equal-equal with China. In regards to your proposal of naval exercises with Singapore and Japan, I am confused because that is the very example which, according to you, was certain to elicit a military response from China.

The worst situation we could create for ourselves, though, would be sending 120,000 troops to Afghanistan. This not only provokes the Chinese by posing an apparent geostrategic challenge on their Western border... but at the same time, it also leaves India less well-equipped to deal with a Chinese response.

Sure, pick a fight with the neighbourhood bully, but pick it on your own terms. Do not pick it after tying one hand behind your own back... you're very unlikely to make him see your point of view that way.

The Chinese need to be told that this is India’s response to their provocative geo-strategic challenge on our Western border. You seem to be excessively concerned about the perceptions of the Chinese and repeatedly propose that India must not take any steps that may make the Chinese feel “challenged” on frontier X or Y. What about the “challenges” propagated by the Chinese across ALL of India’s frontiers?

I am fully aware that there are risks and rewards of sending 120,000 Indian troops to Afghanistan. I share your concern that US will not readily come to accept the ‘dharmic view’ that TSP needs to be dismantled – especially not until alternate supply lines have been secured. However, IMHO the presence of 120,000 Indian troops in Afghanistan all but guarantees an Indo-Pak conflict.

And therefore, I am proposing my own terms of picking a fight with Pakistan. I want Pakistan panicked, paranoid and militarily squeezed from the east and the west. I want to force Pakistan to act in a manner that guarantees a confrontation with India but I want to respond to such aggression primarily on Pakistan’s western frontier. The Indo-Pak border must remain as quiet as possible so that FDI continues unhindered. If India forces Pakistan to a fight in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are useless because of Uncle’s presence.

It's not a question of whether Moscow would be "opposed" to Indian troops deployed in Afghanistan. You're right, they probably would not.

However, consider what you're expecting from them in lieu of a proposed Indian deployment in Afghanistan (which in itself does not benefit them directly in to any great degree). Your wish list includes (a) a guarantee of keeping supply lines open to Indian troops in Afghanistan regardless of any of the myriad geopolitical compulsions that may arise to the contrary... including but not limited to a worsening of Moscow's relations with NATO and (b) menacing the Chinese by mounting aggressive maneouvres in their Far East if China threatened our territory.

Given the degree to which we've seen the Russians become very canny and very watchful of their self-interest even in dealings like the Gorshkov sale, do you think that's a realistic expectation? Realistic enough to gamble the welfare of our troops on?

Why exactly would US/NATO willingly worsen their relations with Russia knowing full and well the importance of Russian contribution to allied Afghan supply lines? If anything, it will only make both sides willing to compromise and/or defer acting upon issues related to NATO expansion and European BMD. A Sino-Indian war is also not in Russian national interests. Russia will actively seek to prevent such a conflict and it will not be the first time.

Whether we like it or not, the time is fast approaching where Uncle is going to have to choose between Afghanistan and Pakistan. We can and should act in a manner that helps Uncle make up its mind in favor of India.

Without Indian assistance, US will have no option but to surrender Afghanistan to Paki sponsored proxies and withdraw. The one question that dictates the deployment of Indian troops is whether or not Afghanistan’s descent into chaos subsequent to a US/NATO withdrawal is in Indian national interests. If not, then we have no choice but to act to defend our national interests in Afghanistan and deny that space to Pakistan.

All the more reason to have our 120,000 troops here at home. Where is this vaunted Afghanistan deployment going to come from, by the way? I hope for Allah's sake that they aren't going to be culled from any of the units deployed along the LOC or IB, now of all times. Unless we're giving up on taking an Indo-Pak war into Paki territory, I hope they aren't going to be drawn extensively from our strike corps (1st, 2nd, 21st) either.

So at the expense of which unit will they be deployed? Our other formations are either in reserve or ranged along the Chinese border, as far as I know. Sending a significant number of them to Afghanistan might only encourage the Chinese to launch any assault they might have been planning.

Quoting myself, “The specific military composition, strength and source of any forces deployed will be decided solely by GOI/MOD. The Indian Army will not support the proposal if there is any risk of not being able to meet a conventional threat either from Pakistan or China. It is clear that no nation can afford to deploy 120,000 of its troops to a foreign land and not make necessary changes either in tactics or hardware to account for their relocation. India will have to change its war-plans to compensate for this deployment. That can either mean anything from a temporary increase in size of the military to utilizing force-multipliers to neutralize the manpower shortfall.”

Maybe we disagree on the definition of "existential" threat. India will be knocked out of the running as a geopolitical competitor to China, in the aftermath of a nuclear war in which the Pakis use Chinese WMD against us. We will suffer greatly in many respects, especially in economic terms; however, there's little doubt that we would survive as a political entity. This is certainly not something any Indian wants to see happen, but it's not an existential threat either.

By contrast, the USA and USSR actually deployed enough nukes to pose existential threats to each other during the cold war... those nations would have literally ceased to exist as governable entities had an exchange taken place. Indian nukes pose an existential threat to Pakistan, partially because we have a far better warhead-to-target ratio than the Pakis, and partially because of Pakistan's inherent lack of viability as a state.

I see your point. Agreed.

Here, I believe, is the crux of our disagreement.

I do not think there will be any Paki @ss-whipping even if India sends 120,000 troops to Afghanistan. We will have limited operational control over those troops, but with supply lines, air support and intel dependent on the Americans, there is no question of using them strategically in any way the Americans don't agree with. Whatever we may agree to on paper, the Americans will control the reality on the ground. If we realize later on that we don't like this state of affairs, it will be a lot harder for us to withdraw those troops once having committed them.

If the Americans choose to counsel restraint after the next terrorist attack on an Indian city, that is what our 120,000 jawans in Afghanistan will be forced to show... restraint. Far better to have them at home, so that there's scope to actually deploy them in our own interest.

If the Republic of India, after sending 120,000 troops to fight in Afghanistan (more than double the number of American troops) fails to exercise leverage over American strategic thinking, whose fault is it? If Americans control the air-support, intel and supply lines then Indians control the actual implementation of GOAT on the ground. So both sides have leverage. India is going to have its own set of demands as a pre-requisite for such a deployment. Yes, Uncle would very much like 120,000 idiots to go and die at his command but it is up to Indians to deny Uncle that luxury while still being in Afghanistan and defending Indian national interests.

Americans will ALWAYS counsel restraint after EVERY terrorist attack on ANY city in India. It is irrelevant whether or not Indian troops are in Afghanistan. India can act now if it has the spine and even more when 120,000 of its troops are in Afghanistan.

Please indicate where in any of my posts, on this or any other topic, I've advocated sitting quietly and doing nothing.

Do you honestly think that "doing nothing" is the only alternative to this Afghan deployment scheme? Meaning: either we let Unkil keep fighting his "War on Terror" at the expense of Indian civilians getting killed by Pakistani terrorists... or we offer up 120,000 of our jawans to Unkil as pawns and hope he will be more grateful to us than he was to the Georgians? Sorry, I'm holding out for a better way.

I have never accused you of proposing inaction and I am not doing so even now. We simply differ on our preferred course of action.

But pawns, you say? So it is a chess-match all right. That means you got to go in the other guys domain and fight. If Uncle is fighting Pakistani sponsored terrorists in Afghanistan then it is 100% India’s business to see that Pakistan is defeated in Afghanistan. Uncle is unable to defeat Pakistani terrorism specifically because of Uncle’s reliance on Pakistan itself. India needs to take that initiative away from Pakistan and render it useless for Uncle.

And Georgians… well, forget about the 2,000 Georgians. Their past contribution to GOAT absolutely does not compare in any way, shape or form to the proposed Indian offer. I can guarantee you the US response would have been different if the Georgians were providing 120,000 troops in Iraq or even 60,000. Why? Because in that case their departure would have had a “material” impact on US operations in Iraq.

NAM is an unnecessary bogey to raise in today's context. NAM was a platform of self-righteousness for nations who exercised no real power of their own, to project their facade of neutrality upon while actually cutting backroom deals with the superpowers. The LAST thing India needs is to "pick a side" in America's war with anybody, until and unless there are unmistakable guarantees of America's interests converging entirely with our own in the prosecution of that war. And I mean *entirely*.

Refraining from jumping in bed with Washington before it makes its intentions entirely clear, does not equal "NAM part deux". First let Obama-not-Dubya take the war to NWFP, THEN we'll punch across the Indus and take the TSPA in the rear while they are fighting him.

Uncle cannot take the war to NWFP in excess of token strikes and secret strides by Special Forces because Uncle relies on Pakistan to supply those very forces. Once the issue of supply lines is sorted out, Indian interests by and large converge with American interests in the region. India needs to utilize its influence on Russia to make CAR supply lines a reality for its own troops with Uncle being the accidental beneficiary - much in line with Pakistani brokering of China and US.

America’s war is the Iraq war. The war in Afghanistan is 100% India’s war. We’re just arriving fashionably late to the party, as usual.

[kasthuri]

Old news (6/2006) but something along the topic.

Pak to US: Limit Indian troops in Afghanistan

I don't know how much leverage would TSP would have now.

[kasthuri]

Another interesting article on sending the troops, however does not mention the feasibility of the project.

Indian presence essential in Afghanistan

Indian presence essential in Afghanistan

A substantial Indian military presence in Afghanistan bodes well for India in many aspects, Sushant K Singh writes for Pragati.

By Sushant K. Singh for Pragati

Afghanistan at the crossroads and India, as a close ally of the Karzai government, has an important role to play. The debate on Indian involvement in Afghanistan is sharply polarized - between one group, which wishes to restrict Indian involvement to providing non-military support, primarily in the infrastructure and human resource development projects; and the another, which advocates Indian military involvement in Afghanistan. The arguments dominating the debate are put forth by those opposing Indian military involvement in Afghanistan: problems of overreach, difficult experiences of the US and NATO forces, uncertain commitment of the US in the region and fear of trapping the Indian armed forces in the Afghan quagmire. The most entreating argument put forth is that the current policy of soft power projection pursued by India there has so far been successful and thus warrants no change.

Shifting the battleground

A significant Indian military presence in Afghanistan will alter the geo-strategic landscape in the extended neighborhood by expanding India’s power projection in Central Asia. India has historically had a friendly relationship with both Iran and Russia. With Iran, India can also ride on the goodwill created by Zaranj-Delaram highway, which has provided a road link between Afghanistan and Iran. These nations could well be more amenable to an Indian military presence than they have been to the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani state will be denied the strategic depth it seeks by installing a favorable dispensation in Afghanistan. The Pakistani establishment will be compelled to divert its energies from their eastern to their northern borders. Loud protests can be anticipated from Pakistan against India’s active military involvement in the region, but the involvement of the United States will restrict Pakistani antipathy to voluble complaints. US officials have, moreover, long been frustrated at what they view as Pakistan's failure to do enough to combat militants along its border with Afghanistan.

An Indian military involvement in Afghanistan will shift the battleground away from Kashmir and the Indian mainland. Targeting the jihadi base will be a huge boost for India’s anti-terrorist operations, especially in Kashmir, both militarily and psychologically.

Until the time Islamic fundamentalist forces are active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, India’s battle to contain terrorism in Kashmir will always be a defensive one. This is because ISI and other jihadist forces across the border have the ability to calibrate the level of terrorism in India. India can counter this effectively only if it has the capacity to strategically ratchet up pressure either of Pakistan’s fronts.

Consequences of failure

Some defense analysts have argued that India should not commit itself militarily to Afghanistan because Afghanistan will fall, yet again, to the Taliban as US and NATO forces are likely to pull out soon. Well, this argument ignores the fact that unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is related to the terrorist attacks on the American homeland and winning it is about ensuring US national security and pride. It is clear, and more so from the pronouncements of both presidential candidates, that the US is in Afghanistan for the long haul.

Moreover, the majority of troops in Afghanistan are a part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a NATO mission, mandated by the UN, where a significant share of soldiers and equipment comes from European countries. India must move to reinforce their commitment to see the job done. The consequences of a Taliban victory in Afghanistan will be terrible for India to bear. Clearly, letting US and NATO forces fail in Afghanistan is not an option for the Indian state. There can be no better strategic justification for sending our troops to Afghanistan than to secure our long-term interests.

Some Indian analysts mistakenly contend that this is a war waged by the US against Islamic countries and India will end up being a stooge of the West by sending its troops in Afghanistan. This view ignores the fact that India has been under attack from Pakistan-supported jihadists that have imperilled the Indian state for nearly two decades now. India cannot be dissuaded from framing an appropriate response to terrorism just because this act closely aligns India with the US.

Military paradigm

The memory of India’s intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war in the late 1980s animates any discussion on foreign troop deployments. But fears that an Indian deployment in Afghanistan will meet the same fate are unfounded. For in the intervening decades, the Indian Army has successfully fought a similar insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. Indeed, an Afghan deployment will include the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy and help enhance India’s joint operations capability. It will also enhance their external cooperation capital as they will operate in a truly multinational environment with armed forces from advanced countries.

Like the 13,000 US soldiers under the Operation Enduring Freedom operating independently alongside the NATO-ISAF, the Indian military presence should have an independent command structure. Geographically Indian troops could be deployed in western Afghanistan, allowing US and ISAF forces to concentrate on the provinces adjoining Pakistan.

India’s soft power

The presence of Indian military in Afghanistan and provision of aid for infrastructure development and human resource training in the war-ravaged country are not mutually exclusive options. In any case, the ferocity of the enmity of jihadist elements against the Indian state will not be subdued, if India shuns military deployment in favor of solely executing developmental projects. Moreover India will find it much easier to successfully execute civil projects once it has stabilized the security climate by taking military control of a region. Soft power has to be an important component of any successful counterinsurgency operation; but it has to be augmented by hard power – of having military boots on ground. It will also send a strong message to the local Afghan nationals that India is in there for a long haul, putting lives of its soldiers to risk, and not restricting itself to merely throwing some alms at them, through developmental aid or projects.

[kasthuri]

Folks,

There is a parallel thread along the same topic running in a TSP defense forum. The link is:

Link removed.

I just browsed through them and did not read anything specific. Interested junta with enthu, pls post them if you find anything there.

[A_Gupta]

India built the Zaranj-Dilaram highway - completed in July 2008, that was a great thing to have done, good strategic thinking.

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080716/j ... 556171.jsp

If at all a large-scale Indian deployment in Afghanistan is possible, it will be because of the Chabahar-Zaranj-Dilaram route.

Even if India cannot deploy now, I applaud the planning (and I hope war gaming) effort. India needs to put all the pieces in place while waiting for the opportunity to pounce.

[milindc]

kasthuri,
Links to deaf and dumb fora is prohibited. Please remove the link.