Bharat Rakshak

vic wrote:China is moving beautifully to really scr*w USA

shiv wrote:

vic wrote:China is moving beautifully to really scr*w USA

What we need to do is to support the US to "balance" things out. Conditional support of course.

ramana wrote:Now that the NoKo sat launcehr/missile is launched it shows the pattern of WMD spread among PRC minions. US is very sure that NoKo is really after long range missile. However there is not much capability shown by NoKo in developing nuke warheads.
On other hand we have TSP with more than reasonable qty of warheads being produced but with shoddy long range missiles( eg. recent Hatf-V test ).

So is it possible that these two rogue states TSP and NoKo are busy mfg one side of the WMD systems? NoKo for the launchers and TSP for the payloads?

North Korea: Update. US sources report that the North Korean satellite is not in a stable orbit and is tumbling. This portion of the launch cycle failed.

Comment: The real concern of the US, Allied powers and the UN should be that this rocket is a working model of an Iranian ballistic missile. North Korea lacks the finances to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile without foreign support. North Korea never develops a weapons system unless it has a customer who fronts the primary finances

No open sources have reported, yet, the presence of Iranians at the launch, but they have reported Iranian technicians were observers of the April failed launch. This is the same system. Last week one news agency reported Iran has established a permanent military liaison office in North Korea.

More pertinent is the North's practices of financing developmental weapons systems. North Korean missile sales and arrangements with Syria, Pakistan, Iran and Libya showed that the North requires a customer to pay the development costs up front. North Korea has no money for this effort so it persuades a customer to pay before North Korea finalizes development. The customer in this instance is Iran.

Once the North develops a workable prototype, the North buys enough materials to make a missile for itself for every one it makes for the customer. The customer gets a working missile system and a finished launch complex before North Korea gets one, but the North ultimately does get one.

This is an alternative to Western practice. It is distributive and places the burdens of development costs on the customer, not on the developer.

NightWatch judges that North Korea launched an Iranian ballistic missile prototype on 12 December. North Korea and Iran will benefit from the science.

ramana wrote:Now that the NoKO sat launcher aka Missile has its first flight we can expect it to make it into TSP arsenal with or without US blessing.
Here is TOI article with a picture of the vehicle.

Noko Rocket launch unwarranted:India

Cant seem to get the picture.

vasu raya wrote:Based on the preceding discussion, if the warheads are in TSP, the long range rockets with NK, thats like recessed deterrence we used to talk about and they perhaps hope this keeps them under the US radar, and then there is the Chinese participation with storage facilities along mountain side tunnels in addition to TELs and guidance technologies.

US cannot take away the rapidly multiplying TSP nukes in an unilateral action, maybe NK's rockets are an easier target, although what can they do if the TELs are 'traveling' within China for few years, the Karakoram highway being built gives them access to TSP as well. TELs are camouflaged since it may not be possible from sat images to determine the Chinese ones from NK ones.

SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea's next step after rattling the world by putting a satellite into orbit for the first time will likely be a nuclear test, the third conducted by the reclusive and unpredictable state.
A nuclear test would be the logical follow-up to Wednesday's successful rocket launch, analysts said. The North's 2009 test came on May 25, a month after a rocket launch.
For the North and its absolute ruler Kim Jong-un, the costs of the rocket program and its allied nuclear weapons efforts - estimated by South Korea's government at $2.8-$3.2 billion since 1998 - and the risk of additional U.N. or unilateral sanctions are simply not part of the calculation.
"North Korea will insist any sanctions are unjust, and if sanctions get toughened, the likelihood of North Korea carrying out a nuclear test is high," said Baek Seung-joo of the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses.

ramana wrote:X-posts....

ramana wrote:Now that the NoKO sat launcher aka Missile has its first flight we can expect it to make it into TSP arsenal with or without US blessing.
Here is TOI article with a picture of the vehicle.

Noko Rocket launch unwarranted:India

Cant seem to get the picture.

and

vasu raya wrote:Based on the preceding discussion, if the warheads are in TSP, the long range rockets with NK, thats like recessed deterrence we used to talk about and they perhaps hope this keeps them under the US radar, and then there is the Chinese participation with storage facilities along mountain side tunnels in addition to TELs and guidance technologies.

US cannot take away the rapidly multiplying TSP nukes in an unilateral action, maybe NK's rockets are an easier target, although what can they do if the TELs are 'traveling' within China for few years, the Karakoram highway being built gives them access to TSP as well. TELs are camouflaged since it may not be possible from sat images to determine the Chinese ones from NK ones.

ramana wrote: OTH it could house a reentry vehicle in future.

Wastern comments that NoKo launch prep can be detected by Western satellites begs the question about those without such facilities are at mercy of they being informed.

In theory, North Korea is a client state of China. But China hasn't been able to halt North Korea's drive for nuclear weapons. And China has no interest in doing so, rather liking the idea of a loose cannon threatening South Korea, Japan, and America with nuclear weapons. And China really doesn't want a unified Korea under Southern control. This is so important that China is willing to take the diplomatic hits for supporting their rabid attack dog, rather than reining them in.
So North Korea goes on its merry little psychopathic, nuclear way:
Even though North Korea ignored China's appeal not to test its new longer-range missile, the new leadership here appears intent on remaining a steadfast supporter of its wayward neighbor because it considers the North a necessary buffer against the United States and its allies.Thanks, China!
I hope we have multiple copies of memos to Peking expressing our sincerest regret that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have gone nuclear. Oh, and maybe Vietnam, too, for real laughs.I'm sorry, could you explain to me again how China's rulers are deep thinking, long-range pondering, patient geniuses?

sustained Western diplomatic pressure and international sanctions imposed since North Korea first conducted a nuclear test in 2006 have cut into its traditional markets in the Middle East. North Korea is also losing business in Myanmar, which has committed to cutting military dealings with Pyongyang as a price for improved relations with the West. Also, there's shrinking demand for the kind of poor quality, Soviet-type weaponry of 1960s and 1970s vintage that Pyongyang produces and that have limited applications on the modern battlefield.Arms control expert Joshua Pollack said North Korea accounted for more than 40 percent of the approximately 1,200 ballistic missile systems supplied to the developing world between 1987 and 2009, mostly before the mid-1990s. But he said Pyongyang's client base has shrunk since then because of a "sustained pressure campaign by the U.S. to get buyers of North Korea war materiel and technology to stop.""The main effect of sanctions and interdiction has been to put the heat on buyers, whenever the U.S. and its partners have some leverage over them," said Pollack, but he added that "Iran and Syria don't care about what we think."North Korea is still believed to have missile cooperation with the two countries. But with the Syrian leadership fighting to survive a civil war, that market might also dry up. And Iran has now surpassed North Korea in missile development. It has already conducted successful space launches and, in addition to having adapted North Korean designs, is creating its own more sophisticated and more militarily useful medium-range missile, said Greg Thielmann of the Arms Control Association, a nongovernment group based in Washington.For years, North Korea was a leading provider of missile systems, particularly to nations in the Middle East. Its first major client was Iran, during its long war with Iraq. They signed a missile development deal in 1985, and North Korea began mass-producing short-range Scuds, aided by Chinese know-how and using Soviet designs. It then graduated to medium-range missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers (600 miles).According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, since the 1980s, North Korea has earned possibly hundreds of millions of dollars by selling at least several hundred short- and medium-range missiles to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.The launch of the Unha-3 rocket was a handy showcase of North Korea's technical capabilities - sending a satellite into space uses a similar technology as firing a long-range missile. The three-stage Unha-3 rocket, with a potential range of 8,000-10,000 kilometers (5,000-6,000 miles), succeeded after failures since 1998."The rocket launch dispels doubts about North Korea's missile capabilities and redeems the country's reputation among buyers," said Baek Seung-joo, a North Korea specialist at the South Korean state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. "The launch put an end to years of failure and embarrassment."

North Korea: For the record. International astronomers and space watchers report that the North Korean satellite is in orbit, but continues to tumble. Other than North Korean assertions that it is a weather satellite, its purpose is unconfirmed because the satellite does not appear to be functioning.


Comment: Several commentators today remarked that North Korea has no delivery system for delivering a nuclear warhead. It's not clear what planet these people are on, but the No Dong is Pakistan's Ghauri is Iran's Shahab -3. All are nuclear capable.

In addition, North Korea re-engineered the Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile, put it on a truck launcher, fielded it in North Korea and sold a firing unit to Iran. It is the most tested nuclear-capable missile developed by the Soviets. It has only carried nuclear warheads.

North Korea has more than one nuclear warhead delivery system and prudence commends that analysts accept it has those delivery systems because it has nuclear payloads for them to deliver.

Hwasong-5 – initial Scud modification. Road-mobile, liquid-fueled missile, with an estimated range of 330 km. It has been tested successfully. It is believed that North Korea has deployed some 150–200 such missiles on mobile launchers.

Hwasong-6 – later Scud modification. Similar to the Hwasong-5, yet with an increased range (550–700 km) and a smaller warhead (600–750 kg). Apparently this is the most widely deployed North Korean missile, with at least 400 missiles in use.

Nodong-1 – larger and more advanced Scud modification. Liquid-fueled, road-mobile missile with a 650 kg warhead. First production variants had inertial guidance, later variants featured GPS guidance, which improves CEP accuracy to 190–250 m.[89] Range is estimated to be between 1,300 and 1,600 km.

Nodong-2 – further improved variant of the Nodong-1, successfully tested in 2006. Range is estimated at about 2,000 km.

Taepodong-1 – two-stage Scud-derived missile. Has been tested with a satellite payload in 1998. The satellite failed, but the missile apparently flew without significant problems, therefore it is North Korea's longest-ranged operational missile with its 2,500 km maximum range. According to some analysts, the Taepodong-1 could have an intercontinental range of nearly 6,000 km with a third stage and a payload of less than 100 kg.[90][91]

Musudan-1 – a modified copy of the Soviet R-27 Zyb SLBM.It was tested successfully as the first or second stage of Unha. Despite the failure of the satellite the first and second stages of the missile apparently flew without problems. The missile, also known under the names Nodong-B, Taepodong-X and BM25, has a range of 4,000 kilometers.

wig wrote:N. Korea likely to test fusion-boosted fission bomb able to reach U.S.

North Korea's next nuclear test could enable it to use a smaller, more sophisticated bomb mounted on a long-range ballistic missile to strike the U.S. mainland, Japanese government sources said.

Pyongyang will likely experiment with a fusion-boosted fission bomb in a "high-level" nuclear test it said would target the United States, according to the source
a fusion-boosted fission bomb induces nuclear fusion with slight nuclear fission, enabling more efficient nuclear fission. A fusion-boosted fission bomb can therefore be made about one-fourth the size of an ordinary nuclear bomb.

Either uranium or plutonium can be used to develop the bomb.

North Korea said Jan. 24 it will carry out a third nuclear test in opposition to a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the launch of a long-range ballistic missile--that Pyongyang claimed to be a satellite--in December.

In a statement, the country's National Defense Commission said the "high-level" nuclear test, as well as the long-range rockets North Korea plans to fire, will be targeted at the United States, which it declares its enemy.

The Japanese government has concluded that North Korea is ready to test a fusion-boosted fission bomb, and sources said Pyongyang will be able to put it to practical use after a single test.

Japan has been monitoring North Korea's nuclear development program with the United States and other countries. It has analyzed nuclear-related materials North Korea has imported and nuclear-related facilities it has constructed or developed.

While North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006 resulted in an explosion equivalent to less than 1 kiloton of trinitrotoluene (TNT), the second test in 2009 generated an explosion of several kilotons.

In May 2010, North Korea also announced it had succeeded in achieving nuclear fusion.

According to Akihiro Kuroki, a managing director at the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, a fusion-boosted fission bomb uses substantially smaller amounts of explosives and buffer materials than an ordinary nuclear bomb.

North Korea is believed to possess an atomic bomb similar to the one dropped on Nagasaki on Aug. 9, 1945, which weighed about five tons.

A successful test of a fusion-boosted fission bomb is expected to enable the reclusive communist country to reduce it to a little more than 1 ton.

North Korea is also developing an improved version of the Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile, which will be able to carry a nuclear bomb of between 800 kilograms and 1 ton.

North Korea is believed to have studied other countries' development of fusion-boosted fission bombs.

The United States first succeeded in testing an ordinary nuclear bomb in 1945 and is said to have developed a fusion-boosted fission bomb in 1956.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korea ... 1301250058

Gerard wrote:Activity seen at North Korean atomic test site

ramana wrote:Nightwatch on Unqa-3 launch....

He is sounding more like BRF person railing at DDM.

The documents appear to have been information that Pakistan had received in China in the early 1980s. They include detailed, dated, handwritten notes in English taken during lectures given by Chinese weapons experts who were named by the notetakers. These notetakers appear to have been working for Khan, based on their cryptic notations deriding a rival Pakistani nuclear weapons program led by Munir Khan, the chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Organization. The design appears to be for a Chinese warhead that was tested on a missile, has a mass of about 500 kilograms, and measures less than a meter in diameter.

ramana wrote:Do you have a link to the Stan madrasa trip report?.

Amber G. wrote: Pu program in NK seems to be frozen (or they may even have gone backward ..) total inventory is (by all accounts) about 25 Kg (less than 40 Kg)

North Korea has put a cover over the entrance of a tunnel at its main underground nuclear test site to foil American intelligence efforts to determine whether a detonation there is imminent, a South Korean military official and media reported on Friday.
<snip>

abhishek_sharma wrote:What to Expect from a North Korean Nuclear Test

ramana wrote:Abhishek,
The FP site wants registration. So what does he want to say in a few words?

Pyongyang lashed out harshly at the United States following the most recent U.N. Security Council resolution condemning its December missile test. The Kim Jong Un regime threatened to increase its nuclear deterrent both quantitatively and qualitatively and vowed to conduct a third nuclear test at a "higher level." So what might we expect from another test? Why, what, how will we know, when, and what difference will it make?

First, why test? Without additional nuclear tests, North Korea is greatly limited in its ability to miniaturize a nuclear device to fit on one of its missiles. The 2006 and 2009 tests demonstrated that North Korea can build a nuclear device, but that its nuclear arsenal is likely limited to bulky devices that would need to be delivered by plane, boat, or van, thereby greatly limiting their deterrent value. To make its nuclear arsenal more menacing and provide the deterrent power Pyongyang's vitriolic pronouncements are aimed to achieve, North Korea must demonstrate that it can deliver the weapons on missiles at a distance.

During my previous visits to the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which housed both its plutonium production and its uranium enrichment facility, North Korea's nuclear specialists told me that the first two nuclear devices tested used plutonium as the bomb fuel. Pyongyang voluntarily suspended its plutonium production in 2008 and I estimate it has only 24 to 42 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient for 4 to 8 primitive nuclear devices, with no more in the pipeline. Yet with only two plutonium tests, one successful and one only partially successful, they need more tests to have confidence that they can build a smaller nuclear warhead.

The next test, however, could just as well be designed to demonstrate a highly enriched uranium (HEU)-fueled bomb. For years, Pyongyang had consistently denied having a uranium enrichment program, but in 2010 North Korean officials showed my Stanford University colleagues and me a modern centrifuge facility for uranium enrichment, ostensibly dedicated to making low-enriched uranium reactor fuel for electricity production. Based on what we were shown and our subsequent analysis of the time scales for constructing this facility, I concluded that Pyongyang must have a covert centrifuge facility, and that it has likely also produced HEU. I believe the amount of HEU produced to date is relatively small, but quite likely sufficient for a nuclear test.

What will they test? The most likely choice is an HEU device. Pyongyang threatened to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal; it can only do so with HEU, but it has a limited plutonium inventory and has decided to suspend plutonium operations. One can only speculate why it made that choice. Its plutonium facilities could have continued to produce one bomb's worth of plutonium per year. It is possible that the North Koreans believe they can develop a significantly larger HEU production capacity. In addition, the reactor operations necessary to produce plutonium are fully visible from satellite imagery because the reactor's cooling tower emits a visible steam plume, whereas the location and operations of uranium centrifuge facilities cannot be monitored from a distance, as was clearly demonstrated when we were shown the previously undiscovered Yongbyon centrifuge facility.

The apparent decision to pursue HEU devices is also puzzling because plutonium bomb fuel is more suitable for miniaturized nuclear devices than HEU (which is why the modern nuclear arsenals of established nuclear powers use plutonium). Yet Pyongyang may have decided it would require too many tests and too much plutonium, which is in short supply, to demonstrate a miniaturized plutonium device. And, it is likely that A.Q. Khan sold the North Koreans a Pakistani HEU design that could be mounted on some of North Korea's short or medium-range missiles. If Khan provided both design and test-performance data, Pyongyang may have decided that HEU, albeit less effective than plutonium, was a quicker and more certain route to miniaturized nuclear devices.

In an article co-authored last summer with Frank Pabian in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, we speculated that it is possible that the North Koreans may decide to test both plutonium and HEU devices -- simultaneously in one test tunnel. One more plutonium test provides valuable information on the yield-to-weight ratio, critical for miniaturized designs. An HEU test allows them to move to a possibly expanded future arsenal. Multiple simultaneous tests have been conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union, and most recently in 1998 by India and Pakistan. Such tests have some technical limitations and are more challenging to conduct, but they have the huge advantage of not incurring additional political cost -- in other words, they can get two for the price of one.

Pyongyang had previously announced that it has mastered nuclear fusion technologies, prompting some observers to predict that the next test could be a fusion-boosted device or possibly even a thermonuclear device, typically referred to as a hydrogen bomb. North Korean nuclear specialists are undoubtedly familiar with these technological advancements and likely have tried their hand at designing such devices, but I consider application of these concepts to be still out of reach of their specialists, unless they are prepared to conduct multiple nuclear testing campaigns.

How will we know? A successful nuclear test will be easily detected because its seismic signals will be monitored around the world by the International Monitoring System established under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to monitor potential clandestine nuclear tests anywhere in the world. Both the 2006 and 2009 tests gave indisputable seismic evidence of nuclear tests. This one may be even easier to detect because Pyongyang has vowed to test at a higher level.

But what exactly did Pyongyang mean by a "higher level?" Was it just a higher explosion yield? That is possible, because much of the international community dismissed the 2006 test as a failure and the 2009 test as not very successful. The yield of the 2006 test is estimated at somewhat less than 1 kiloton (1,000 tons of TNT equivalent). Experts are still divided on the yield of the 2009 test; our best estimate is between 2 and 7 kilotons. In any case, if the North Koreans can explode a device with a yield in that range, then they most likely can produce a Nagasaki-like bomb with a yield of 20 kilotons. Perhaps that is what Pyongyang means by a higher level.

More likely, however, and consistent with Pyongyang's pronouncement that it will also increase its nuclear deterrent qualitatively, is an attempt to test a more sophisticated, miniaturized design. How will we know? Pyongyang will almost certainly claim that the test was successful and will tout its sophistication. It will be difficult to distinguish truth from propaganda, but experience shows there is often a nugget of truth in North Korea's claims. It will also be difficult to discern from seismic signals if one or two devices were tested if they are simultaneous and closely spaced.

Aside from seismic signals, which tell us only the size of the explosion and do not allow us to differentiate between plutonium and HEU, nor tell us anything about the sophistication of the device, there are only a few other signals that can be monitored. If the nuclear blast carried out in the tunnel deep underground causes sufficient fissures in the overburden rock, then gaseous fission products can escape and may be detected by airborne instruments or radiological monitoring stations around the world. The U.S. government reported that it picked up such signals after the 2006 test with offshore airborne monitors. It announced that these signals gave definitive proof that North Korea had detonated a nuclear device, but did not specify whether it was plutonium or HEU. There are different telltale signatures for HEU and plutonium devices, but they must be detected and analyzed very rapidly to allow conclusive identification. There were no reports that anyone detected radiological signals after the 2009 test. This could likely be a result of better containment or just bad luck of not having the detectors in the right place at the right time.

If a next test is well contained, then we may learn nothing about the device detonated. However, one of the risks Pyongyang takes in trying to demonstrate a test at a higher level is that they may produce fissures that allow radioactive seepage or possibly cause a major blowout from the tunnel. The U.S. testing program experienced such problems even after having conducted hundreds of tests. Unrecognized complex geological conditions apparently led to a blowout during the 1970 underground Baneberry nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site. The blowout released a radioactive cloud nearly 10,000 feet high. Were something similar to happen in North Korea's next test, we would be more likely to learn technical details about the type of device detonated due to radiological contamination. However, spewing a radioactive cloud over the skies of Northeast Asia would create an enormous political storm from the nearby countries.

When will they test? Overhead imagery of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site demonstrates conclusively that North Korea is prepared to test. A third test tunnel, identified by the south portal, has been ready for nearly a year. It has been kept prepared through summer floods and winter snow. There has been a flurry of recent activity there and at the west portal, site of the 2009 test, and a nearby support area. Security appears particularly strict around the west portal, potentially indicating that the test device is or will be housed there until emplacement into the south tunnel. Everything we can see indicates North Korea is technically ready to test with little notice. When to test is now largely a political decision.

What difference will a test make? A successful test will make Pyongyang's nuclear weapons appear more threatening and make its deterrent more credible because it may then possess a missile-deliverable nuclear weapon. It may also set North Korea on a path of substantially expanding its nuclear arsenal through stepped-up HEU production. It may make Pyongyang more aggressive and provocative in dealing with South Korea and Japan. However, one more test does not fundamentally change the security threat North Korea poses. Pyongyang can threaten South Korea, Japan, or U.S. regional assets, but it can only use its nuclear weapons if it is prepared to accept the destruction of the regime.

A successful test will, however, destabilize the region -- precisely the scenario China has tried to avoid by supporting Pyongyang over the years, and the reason it is in China's interest to use all its influence to stop the test. The combined military forces of South Korea, Japan, and the United States will be forced into higher alert status. A test will likely drive them to increase their ballistic missile defense protection against North Korea, which will clearly complicate relations with China.

One of the most damaging results of another test will come from potential cooperation with Iran. Sharing Pyongyang's nuclear test experience with Tehran similarly to how it has shared missile technologies will greatly increase the Iranian nuclear threat. Iran now has the capacity to enrich uranium to weapons grade, although it has claimed to have enriched it only to lower levels for peaceful purposes. It would be very difficult for Iran to continue its peaceful nuclear façade if it tested to further its nuclear weapons capabilities. However, if Pyongyang were to involve Iran or share its testing experience, that would change the picture dramatically. Should Iran make the decision to build nuclear weapons, it is more likely to do so without necessarily testing its own device.

But perhaps the greatest impact of another North Korean nuclear test is that it will signal that the new regime, like its predecessors, has chosen bombs over electricity. Another nuclear test will make it impossible for the new South Korean government or the second Obama administration to look for resolution of long-standing enmities by focusing on issues beyond the nuclear dispute. Normalization of relations, a peace treaty, access to energy and economic opportunities -- those things that come from choosing electricity over bombs in the nuclear arena and have the potential of lifting the North Korean people out of poverty and hardship -- will be made much more difficult, if not impossible, for the next five years, if not longer.