GSLV D3 Launch Failure

[Anujan]

I don't know how much vibration testing was done. There has been a history of underestimating the amount of vibrations - Like during some of the Atlas missions.

[SSSalvi]

Time (s) velocity (km/s) altitude (km) event
262.8 4.113 127.5
...
...
505.0 5.023 65.9

Interesting. The 3-digit resolution on the velocity does not seem enough, but after CUS ignition, it gains altitude (at seemingly constant velocity-if there were 4 digits we would know) upto atleast 3:10. So, there is a motive force. After that there is a big gap (ISRO would have all the gap data) and at 3:17 the velocity reduces while the altitude increases (inertia). By this time, CUS probably shut off.

I plotted the graph and added trendlines.

Velocity is continuously falling from 293 ( GS2 Shutoff/seperation ) to 329 seconds indicating that there is no force operating to increase the velocity ( Velocity falls from 4.898 to 4.892 ) .

After that the kinetic energy attained by previous ignitions is finished and the free fall starts increasing the freefall velocity from 4.892 to 4.899... from 329 to 373... onwards upto 5.203 at 505 seconds.

So.. even if the cryo ignited it did not impart any force towards increasing the velocity of the rocket.

[vina]

I don't know how much vibration testing was done. There has been a history of underestimating the amount of vibrations - Like during some of the Atlas missions.

That is always done. In fact, I was googling around (bored at work..simulations running in background, time to kill) and found this Paper on GSLV , by Perumal, Madhavan Nair and other grand pooh bahs of ISRO. Talks a lot about structural and aerodynamic vibration analysis.

More importantly, it talks about the stage separation mechanisms for the GSLV. It seems that the 2nd stage separates by firing through the inter-stage and before the 1st stage cuts out. Here the GSLV is different from the PSLV where ullage motors are used .

Interestingly, the 3rd stage separates from the 2nd stage, by firing of retro rockets on the 2nd stage.. So the Russian engine handled the ullage and other stage concerns and ignition considerations by itself.

I wonder if the Indian CUS attempted to do something similar like the Russian engine, or was there changes in the separation mechanism for GSLV MKII over the MKI version like having ullage motors or a firing the engine via the interstage before 2nd stage engine cut out.

[Sanjay M]

Maybe as the design matures, the ullage motor component could be dispensed with, by finely adjusting the timing of the engine firing, as you've said. But then again, it's not even clear that the ullage motors are there right now.

ISRO chief Radhakrishnan has stated the intent to re-attempt another flight within a year. But what is the earliest that another launch could be re-attempted? What is the limiting factor here? Is it construction of the vehicle stages/components? How soon could these be fabricated?

[Shankar]

So.. even if the cryo ignited it did not impart any force towards increasing the velocity of the rocket

The main engine never ignited - no matter who says what
and the proof of that is telemetry data

it is the stage separation energy that maintained the velocity for some time and then it started bleeding off

now why the ignition was quenched or never started
If the solid motor used for ignition worked that is everyone is saying and the telemetry also then the propellant mix ration was wrong either too much fuel or too little
since oxygen is injected later after hydrogen followed by ignitor starting the chances are too little oxygen was delivered
or the flame was not stable because of inadequate throat sizing

lets see what comes out of fault analysis

in the mean time we at BR will dig deeper and deeper

[Sanjay M]

The main engine never ignited - no matter who says what
and the proof of that is telemetry data

I agree with you, Shankarovsky, that's exactly what commentators in other forum sites are saying. Unless ISRO can release some other qualifying telemetry data, it's hard to believe that this thing ignited and produced any meaningful thrust, going on velocity readings alone.
What other useful readings could they have? Are any temperature measurements taken in the engine itself?

Does anyone know what the full span of instrumentation is? What are all the various readings taken and sent back as telemetry?

it is the stage separation energy that maintained the velocity for some time and then it started bleeding off

now why the ignition was quenched or never started
If the solid motor used for ignition worked that is everyone is saying and the telemetry also then the propellant mix ration was wrong either too much fuel or too little
since oxygen is injected later after hydrogen followed by ignitor starting the chances are too little oxygen was delivered
or the flame was not stable because of inadequate throat sizing

lets see what comes out of fault analysis

in the mean time we at BR will dig deeper and deeper

It really would have been nice if cameras had been onboard the rocket, not just for informational purposes, but also just to preserve the moment for posterity on video.

[ramana]

S^#(SSS, Shankar and SanjayM) What you three are saying is the same. The cryo engine if it did ignite it was for a miniscule amount of time and hence in effect it was a non event.

Of the above three posts, SSSalvi's post is evidence based and most likely situation.

[SriKumar]

You forget the increase in the potential energy as the altitude increased during this time. Inertia can keep it going, but the velocity cannot remain constant while the altitude *increases* (Earth is still pulling it down). Velocity has to reduce. (Hint: increased altitude = increase in potential energy. KE (=velocity) therefore has to reduce in the absence of a motive force. Inertia alone is not enough).

What energy saar?. I know only 9th grade Fizzycs . Energy busienss was in the 10th standard I think . From NCERT Fyzzics book, I remember only one thing out of all that and that is .

v = u + at .. I can remember simple stuff like that and plug numbers.

Okay. Now you say this.

The data stream (for 2-3 seconds) at 3:08 and 3:20 and 3:25 are interesting

So, u at 3.08 secs is around 5:02 KM/S , so assuming that the engine had not ignited, what should be the velocity after 2 seconds ?.

v = 5.02 - g*2 = 5.02 KM/S - (9.8/1000 Km/s^2)*2 sec .. Now you have (9.8/1000) is approx 0.01 (in fact less, coz you have to account for g at 400 kms or so above earth surface , but as an approx it should be fine) .. So in 2 secs, the velocity will be 5.00 k/ms , in 5 secs a 0.05 km/s decrease.

Of course you have better eyes than me, but I suspect it would be difficult to find trends in 2 to 5 sec interval in a graph of that scale, unless you have some secret facility to zoom in on those particular intervals in question via a feed to ISRO's data centers.

Jeez man, you went from 'something called inertia' to 'I suspect it would be difficult to find trends'. Quite a change, eh? This is conphusing, onlee. Please to explain your original comment on how 'something called inertia' can actually increase potential energy without loss of velocity. You did not use v=u+at to make that claim originally.

v = 5.02 - g*2 = 5.02 KM/S - (9.8/1000 Km/s^2)*2 sec .. Now you have (9.8/1000) is approx 0.01 (in fact less, coz you have to account for g at 400 kms or so above earth surface , but as an approx it should be fine) .. So in 2 secs, the velocity will be 5.00 k/ms , in 5 secs a 0.05 km/s decrease.

Saar, you being a quant. revel in numbers onlee, me...I get conphused with numbers, especially vectorial quantities....I like simple scalar quantities, like energy onlee. So, in 2 seconds, the drop in velocity will be 0.02 km/sec, agreed (BTW, alt. is not 400 kms). Now, we can subtract that from 'u' if and only if the velocity vector is along the gravity vector. Now, unless you had a direct feed from ISRO data centers which said that it was flying directly up, we need a cosine (or sine) function, along with the theta angle, multiplying the velocity to complete the vectorial subtraction you just did. So, 5.02 -.02=5.00 does not add up (figuratively speaking). All we can say is that the drop is by 'x' amount. But that is beside the original point (which was really about inertia and energy- nice scalar quantities).

[Sanjay M]

Ramanov & clan, it looks like a pure ballistic curve following stage separation:



Gee, I'm worried that ISRO's "mature organization" may be trying to put out a little more spin than the empirical data warrants. That'll do it no service in getting to the root of the cause and rectifying the problem.

[negi]

Gee, I'm worried that ISRO's "mature organization" may be trying to put out a little more spin than the empirical data warrants. That'll do it no service in getting to the root of the cause and rectifying the problem.

LMAO ; what is this supposed to mean ?

[SriKumar]

Velocity is continuously falling from 293 ( GS2 Shutoff/seperation ) to 329 seconds any force towards increasing the velocity of the rocket.

In the numbers you posted, the velocity does stabilize at certain times (per the 3 decimal point accuracy we have, it may change if 4 decimal point data was available) but I agree that it never increases. It is clearly due to inertia from 298 to 301 when there is no power- or to Shankar's point, force due to stage separation . However, the plot (the first one posted by SanjayM taken from another forum) has about 5+5 = 10 data points from about 3:15 to 3:30. It would be instructive to see those data points. If it is un-powered during this phase, the data characteristics should be similar to 298 to 301 where it is unpowered by design (GS2 jettisoned, CUS not ignited). The gaps in the current data are tantalizing e.g. no data 1-2 second(s) after CUS. Also, if there was data at 3:11, then 3:08 to 3:11 could have been compared with 298 to 301. About 10 data points from 3:15 to 3:30 seems to exist (per the plot), but it may be tricky to compare that with the data from 298 to 301 because the flight vector may have changed in these 2 durations.

[negi]

For Jingos drooling over the Cryogenic engine.

Russia's liquid propellant engines

Visit Page 13 for KVD-1 (the Russian Cryogenic stage which powered our previous GSLVs , this is the most comprehensive piece of literature I found on this 1960's vintage engine . )

Unlike the newer cryogenic engines from the Bear's stable this one burns a hydrogen rich mixture in gas generator to run the turbine .

[SSSalvi]

For Jingos drooling over the Cryogenic engine.

Russia's liquid propellant engines

Visit Page 13 for KVD-1 (the Russian Cryogenic stage which powered our previous GSLVs , this is the most comprehensive piece of literature I found on this 1960's vintage engine . )

Unlike the newer cryogenic engines from the Bear's stable this one burns a hydrogen rich mixture in gas generator to run the turbine .

And I think that by chance the indegeneous engine may be similar upto all the scew levels also.

[Neela]

Cryogenic Engine ignited. Fuel pump possibly failed

[SSSalvi]

So far, the one and only oxygen/hydrogen
liquid-propellant rocket engine in Russia
known to have passed through full-scale
ground testing routine has been the KVD-1 engine.
Even despite more than 35 years have
gone since the time its development was first
initiated, the engine has never been tested in
flight. In the meantime, that is precisely the
one Indian Space Research Organization selected
for the cryogenic upper stage of their
GSLV rocket

The first sentence itself is very interesting from the reference given by Negi in last post.

Russians never tested it inflight... but all engines have worked for GSLV

[Sanjay M]

Did ISRO select this engine, or was this the one the Russians were willing to give to us, because it was the least useful to them?

[negi]

^

Following should answer your query.

The First Russian LOX-LH2 Expander Cycle LRE: RD0146
--
V. Rachuk *, and N. Titkov†
Konstruktorskoe Buro Khimavtomatiky Voronezh, Russia

So the only LH2-LOX engine suitable for upper stage of LV which Bear had to offer was KVD-1 (rest of them were too huge and powerful for our use) ; more importantly their major engine design and development entity NPO Energomash was receiving financial assistance from Unkil's P&W Rocketdyne .

[PratikDas]

Did ISRO select this engine, or was this the one the Russians were willing to give to us, because it was the least useful to them?

At the end of the day, does it really matter? 1960s or not, the engine is useful to us. Even if we are 'inspired' by the engine down to the last screw and manage to make our version work, thats progress as far as we are concerned, right?

[Sanjay M]

At the end of the day, does it really matter? 1960s or not, the engine is useful to us. Even if we are 'inspired' by the engine down to the last screw and manage to make our version work, thats progress as far as we are concerned, right?

True enough, everybody has to walk before they can run. But then I'd suggest more attempts at joint development with Brazil, or someone else. We need to find some other partners, as we're not as first-tier as we'd like to think. China seems to be quite ahead of us then, with their Long March 5.

[Craig Alpert]

GSAT 4 Rocket Lost But 'Precious' Payload Safe

[PratikDas]

...
True enough, everybody has to walk before they can run. But then I'd suggest more attempts at joint development with Brazil, or someone else. We need to find some other partners, as we're not as first-tier as we'd like to think. China seems to be quite ahead of us then, with their Long March 5.

I think of what happened as failing the IIT-JEE in the first attempt. There is always the next attempt.

I feel we are so close to the finishing line that we shouldn't think of making it a relay race, i.e. I think we've come too far to get other countries involved now, which would be a slap on the face of everyone who has worked on the engine. Like disha said, let them come to us, otherwise they won't value ISRO's blood and sweat over the CUS. At this stage, I agree because so much blood and sweat has indeed been spent. But collaborations could have been conceived two decades ago when we had nothing to lose, with another country that had nothing to lose - like Brazil with their economic crisis in the 80s.

That this finishing line was drawn in the 1960s is best ignored for now because if we don't cross this one then we're not crossing anything beyond it either.

But with the same token, I think we should stop deprecating the blood and sweat of the more advanced nations as well. We seem to forget that the US and Russia didn't get 7 cryogenic engines each from somewhere to stare at and sculpt. I find all this talk of ISRO "leaping to the state of the art" in one hit while the others took billions of dollars and half a century to be very condescending. Perhaps it is needed for morale. We should just set a roadmap for ourselves - like we have done with the GSLV Mark III, Chandrayaan II, Avatar - and keep tracking the milestones.

[Sanjay M]

In retrospect, I don't think ISRO chief K. Radhakrishnan should have rushed to make an announcement about the nature of the failure within mere minutes of the event. He should have just stated that the mission objectives as a whole were not fully achieved. He began immediately making comments about vernier thrusters, etc, and then within the next day or two there were announcements that the cryo engine did ignite and burn for 1 sec, but no supporting data has been released. It's hard to believe it ignited based on the velocity numbers alone. It makes it look like ISRO was rushing to put some positive spin on events by asserting that the engine ignition had occurred, even if the data wasn't supporting this. They should publish the data in support of their claims.

[negi]

An excellent primer on Soviet Liquid propellant rocket engines

History of LPRE in Russia--George P. Sutton
Los Angeles, California, 90049


Quoting a few paragraphs which might be relevant to the ongoing discussion.

It is well known that high-frequency combustion vibrations at
1000–20,000 cps can destroy a TC in much less than 1 s by structural
failure or burn out. Therefore, the occurrence of this vibration
must be completely eliminated during engine development. These
gas oscillations were Žfirst encountered by the Soviets with large TCs
in the late 1940s and early 1950s and have plagued the development
of several of their large engines since that time. These gas oscillations
usually occurred either during steady-state operation or
during the thrust transient at the start, but occasionally also during
shutdown or thrust changes. Investigations of these phenomena
were given a high priority, were worked on intensively by many of
the design bureaus in the 1950s–1970s, and included research and
development (R&D) efforts at the Keldysh Research Institute, other
institutes, and some universities.

As a result of these investigations the Soviets, just as the other
countries, obtained a better understanding. The high-frequency
combustion vibrations were intimately associated with the combustion
processes and their energy release mechanisms.Pressure waves
could resonate at high amplitudes in an axial, radial, or tangential
mode. Several remedies have been effective in eliminating the
sudden occurrence of high-frequency destructive vibrations. They
included these:

1) Early solutions were to change the resonant frequencies by
changing chamber geometry(diameter or length).Some
types of vibrations were more likely to happen with larger chamber
diameters. During an early LPRE development in about 1946,
when chief designer Alexander Isayev went from a single large TC
to four smaller TCs of the same total thrust, he found it easier to
cure a troublesome vibration. This is in part a reason for using four
TCs in several LPREs.

2) Instabilities occurred more readily with
certain propellant combinations, and a change of propellant has at
times been effective. For example LOX/hydrocarbon is more likely
to have combustion vibrations than LOX/alcohol. The early OR-2
engine was switched from gasoline to alcohol.

3) They used cooled
metal baf es as early as 1949 (initially in the shape of a cross) near
the injector to eliminate transverse gas vibrations. This was Ž rst
achieved early in one of Isayev’s TCs.

4) Vibrations occurred at
certain regions of the chamber pressure vs mixture ratio spectrum,
often during thrust buildup or throttling and occasionally during
shutdown or thrust changes. A change in start sequence, transient
 flow, or local mixture ratio was sometimes effective.

5) Certain injection elements, patterns, or oriŽfices were more stable, and minor
changes in their geometry sometimes had a large in consequence. The
Soviets had a long history of using spray nozzle elements in their
injectors, and they learned how to change the detail dimensions of
these elements to control the  ow, swirl, and the location of the
impingement of the two propellants and, thus, the axial location of
the maximum energy release. In some cases, it was was possible
to eliminate instability by making certain changes in the geometry
or the  ow of individual spray elements or in the distribution of
spray elements over the face of the injector,  ow densities, or local
mixture ratios over the surface of the injector. This resulted in some
complex injection patterns described later.

6) If gas bubbles enter the combustion chamber, they can often trigger instability. Therefore,
precautions were taken to drain properly or eliminate gas bubbles in
the propellant feed lines and to prevent tank pressurizing gas from
entering the tank outlet during maneuvering  flight operations.

7)Theory now permits designers to calculate estimated values of the
likely gas resonance and harmonic frequencies in all three modes
(axial, radial, or tangential).This allows the designers to design the
LPRE, its structure, and key components so that their natural resonance
frequencies will not coincide with those of the combustion
gas vibrations, thus, avoiding uncontrolled vibration ampliŽfications
and potential over stressing of parts.

8.) There was one other remedy that worked well, and as far as this author knows, was not practiced
outside the Soviet Union. It is temporary bafles in the chamber;
they are made of felt like material that is porous and combustible.
They work only during the start transient and the first few seconds
of burning, before the bafles are consumed.

One or more of these various remedies were successful in eliminating
combustion instabilities during development of each new
Soviet LPRE. None of the remedies listed were 100% effective for
different TC designs, transients, sizes, propellants, chamber pressures,
or mixture ratios. It still is not always clear which of these
approaches will be most effective and simplest for a particular TC
that has experienced incidents of combustion instability.The Soviets
did not appear to use resonance cavities as a remedy,which were
very effective in the United States and other countries.

*TC= Thrust Chamber

[negi]

Sanjay

From HINDU (16th April )

http://www.hindu.com/2010/04/16/stories ... 470100.htm

“We are not sure whether the cryogenic main engine did ignite. We have to confirm this after looking at the various parameters that were monitored during the flight. The vehicle was tumbling. It means it lost its control and altitude. Finally, it splashed into the sea.”

“Our team has all the capability and resilience to do an analysis and take corrective measures. Our target is to fly a GSLV with our indigenous cryogenic engine within one year. But it will be tough,”

From link posted by Neela

"This took place for a second and then the fuel supply to power turbo got blocked. The (Indian Space Research Organisation) chairman and we knew this on Thursday but then we wanted to be doubly sure about it. And now this has been substantiated with the data. By all means this is a great achievement,"

"The two-day meeting has also decided to constitute a failure analysis committee, where complete reasons would be listed of the failure of the mission. Finer details of the probable causes of failure would be analysed thread-bare. This committee would be headed by our chairman and would have sittings here and in Bangalore and in a month the report would be ready," added the space scientist.

So what is this positive spin you are talking about ?

[Sanjay M]

I'm talking about how during the live tele-cast of the mission, Radhakrishnan spoke to everyone, saying that the verniers had apparently failed to ignite. It seems now that it was too early for him to make this pronouncement, and he should have waited for a more detailed analysis/investigation before saying this. The failure of the fuel turbopump is something different. His early statement tried to make it sound like the cryo engine was working and that it was the verniers which failed to do their job. That's what I mean by 'positive spin' - ie. trying to put forth a premature conclusion that it was the verniers and not the cryo engine which failed.

[juvva]

I'm talking about how during the live tele-cast of the mission, Radhakrishnan spoke to everyone, saying that the verniers had apparently failed to ignite. It seems now that it was too early for him to make this pronouncement, and he should have waited for a more detailed analysis/investigation before saying this. The failure of the fuel turbopump is something different. His early statement tried to make it sound like the cryo engine was working and that it was the verniers which failed to do their job. That's what I mean by 'positive spin' - ie. trying to put forth a premature conclusion that it was the verniers and not the cryo engine which failed.

IIRC he did say(during the live telecast) that it is yet to be confirmed that the main cryo ignited, or something like that.

[negi]

I'm talking about how during the live tele-cast of the mission, Radhakrishnan spoke to everyone, saying that the verniers had apparently failed to ignite. It seems now that it was too early for him to make this pronouncement, and he should have waited for a more detailed analysis/investigation before saying this. The failure of the fuel turbopump is something different. His early statement tried to make it sound like the cryo engine was working and that it was the verniers which failed to do their job. That's what I mean by 'positive spin' - ie. trying to put forth a premature conclusion that it was the verniers and not the cryo engine which failed.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PLYH99B2 ... re=related

You can again watch from 08:25 onwards , he clearly states that data confirms command to ignite CUS was issued and that indications are engine was ignited and he follows it up by saying it will be confirmed by analyzing the data , he again says the vehicle was tumbling indicating loss of control probably indicating vernier engines failed to ignite.

Now there is nothing wrong in above statements for we don't know what is the sequence of firing of vernier engines vs the main engine for instance if the former were to ignite at T1+x seconds (T1 being the instant when main CUS fired and x>=1 second) then obviously vernier engines will not ignite in case the turbopump fails.

[SSSalvi]

I'm talking about how during the live tele-cast of the mission, Radhakrishnan spoke to everyone, saying that the verniers had apparently failed to ignite. It seems now that it was too early for him to make this pronouncement, and he should have waited for a more detailed analysis/investigation before saying this. The failure of the fuel turbopump is something different. His early statement tried to make it sound like the cryo engine was working and that it was the verniers which failed to do their job. That's what I mean by 'positive spin' - ie. trying to put forth a premature conclusion that it was the verniers and not the cryo engine which failed.

He is the 1st chairman who has not dabbled hands in actual engineering or science of satellites, rockets and space science. Basically a manager.
But still it would have been better if the he had waited .. .. but impatience is the word for the nature of the person.

[Sanku]

I watched the live telecast of the mission, there was no spin anywhere. ISRO was giving out data and conclusions as it saw it.

When the failure happened they cut out the data and informed everybody that they have a initial theory but could be very wrong this has to be seen and confirmed.

In fact they had already said CUS has ignited BEFORE even they knew that the mission was going to fail, they said "CUS has ignited we are looking at ...... hold on...."

That was how they saw it then. A live telecast of rocket launch with updates every microsecond. Where is the time to think and add spin?

This was their genuine first reaction.

[SSridhar]

I haven't seen the Youtube video posted here. I was watching it live on DD. I clearly remember hearing somebody call-out '3rd Stage Ignition' followed by applause all around as the camera panned on those assembled in the adjacent room, many of whom appeared to be ISRO employees.

[Austin]

What was the total cost of the mission GSLV + Sat cost , Will ISRO recover major part of the money via Insurance or this loss means sunk cost ?

[geeth]

>>>He is the 1st chairman who has not dabbled hands in actual engineering or science of satellites, rockets and space science. Basically a manager.

You mean YEM BEE YAE Type? Not so I suppose, after reading the article below..

http://beta.thehindu.com/sci-tech/article41358.ece

Dr. K. Radhakrishnan is an accomplished technocrat with a distinguished career of more than 38 years in the fields of space technology, applications and space programme management. Dr. Radhakrishnan graduated in Electrical Engineering from Kerala University (1970) and obtained his MBA from the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore (1976). He was awarded PhD by the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, in the year 2000.

Starting his career as an Avionics Engineer in 1971 at Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, Dr. Radhakrishnan held several decisive positions in the Department of Space and ISRO such as Project Director for setting up Regional Remote Sensing Service Centres (1987-89), Director of National Natural Resources Management System-Regional Remote Sensing Service Centres (1989-97), Director of Budget and Economic Analysis for entire ISRO (1987-97), Mission Director of Integrated Mission for Sustainable Development and Deputy Director of National Remote Sensing Agency (1997-2000).

Dr. Radhakrishnan had a short stint in the Ministry of Earth Sciences during 2000-05 as the founder Director of Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services and the first Project Director of Indian National Tsunami Warning System.

As the Director of National Remote Sensing Agency during 2005-08, Dr. Radhakrishnan led NRSA to be the nerve centre of the ISRO’s Disaster Management Support Programme by successfully institutionalising the 24X7 Decision Support Centre (DSC) at NRSA which provides space based inputs to various state and central government agencies during pre-disaster, disaster and post-disaster phases, in close coordination with the Ministry of Home Affairs.

As the Director of Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, Dr. Radhakrishnan (2007-09) led a team of about 4500 professionals including more than 2000 Engineers and Scientists. He was the key person in the Chandrayaan-1 mission, responsible for the realisation of PSLV C-11 launch vehicle. Under his stewardship, five successful launches of Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles (PSLV) were realised and 20 spacecraft, including Chandrayaan-1, were taken to the desired orbits precisely.

Dr. Radhakrishnan is a member of the Space Commission since October 2008.

He is a Fellow of the Indian National Academy of Engineering, Indian Society of Remote Sensing, Systems Society of India, Indian Geophysical Union and Andhra Pradesh Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the International Academy of Astronautics and was the President of the Indian Society of Remote Sensing during 2005-07 and Vice President of Indian Geophysical Union during 2007-09.

Dr. Radhakrishnan was bestowed with the Dr. Y. Nayudamma Memorial Award of Andhra Pradesh Academy of Sciences (2009), BHASKARA Award of Indian Society of Remote Sensing (2008), Silver Jubilee Honour by Ministry of Earth Sciences (2006), VASVIK Industrial Research Award in the field of Electrical and Electronics Sciences and Technology (2005) and K. R. Ramanathan Memorial Gold Medal of Indian Geophysical union (2003). Dr. Radhakrishnan has authored more than 55 publications, including 12 in reputed journals and eight in edited books.

[SSSalvi]

>>>He is the 1st chairman who has not dabbled hands in actual engineering or science of satellites, rockets and space science. Basically a manager.

You mean YEM BEE YAE Type? Not so I suppose, after reading the article below..

http://beta.thehindu.com/sci-tech/article41358.ece

Dr. K. Radhakrishnan is an accomplished technocrat with a distinguished career of more than 38 years in the fields of space technology, applications and space programme management. Dr. Radhakrishnan graduated in Electrical Engineering from Kerala University (1970) and obtained his MBA from the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore (1976). He was awarded PhD by the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, in the year 2000.

Starting his career as an Avionics Engineer in 1971 at Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, Dr. Radhakrishnan held several decisive positions in the Department of Space and ISRO such as Project Director for setting up Regional Remote Sensing Service Centres (1987-89), Director of National Natural Resources Management System-Regional Remote Sensing Service Centres (1989-97), Director of Budget and Economic Analysis for entire ISRO (1987-97), Mission Director of Integrated Mission for Sustainable Development and Deputy Director of National Remote Sensing Agency (1997-2000).

Dr. Radhakrishnan had a short stint in the Ministry of Earth Sciences during 2000-05 as the founder Director of Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services and the first Project Director of Indian National Tsunami Warning System.

As the Director of National Remote Sensing Agency during 2005-08, Dr. Radhakrishnan led NRSA to be the nerve centre of the ISRO’s Disaster Management Support Programme by successfully institutionalising the 24X7 Decision Support Centre (DSC) at NRSA which provides space based inputs to various state and central government agencies during pre-disaster, disaster and post-disaster phases, in close coordination with the Ministry of Home Affairs.

As the Director of Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, Dr. Radhakrishnan (2007-09) led a team of about 4500 professionals including more than 2000 Engineers and Scientists. He was the key person in the Chandrayaan-1 mission, responsible for the realisation of PSLV C-11 launch vehicle. Under his stewardship, five successful launches of Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles (PSLV) were realised and 20 spacecraft, including Chandrayaan-1, were taken to the desired orbits precisely.

Dr. Radhakrishnan is a member of the Space Commission since October 2008.

He is a Fellow of the Indian National Academy of Engineering, Indian Society of Remote Sensing, Systems Society of India, Indian Geophysical Union and Andhra Pradesh Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the International Academy of Astronautics and was the President of the Indian Society of Remote Sensing during 2005-07 and Vice President of Indian Geophysical Union during 2007-09.

Dr. Radhakrishnan was bestowed with the Dr. Y. Nayudamma Memorial Award of Andhra Pradesh Academy of Sciences (2009), BHASKARA Award of Indian Society of Remote Sensing (2008), Silver Jubilee Honour by Ministry of Earth Sciences (2006), VASVIK Industrial Research Award in the field of Electrical and Electronics Sciences and Technology (2005) and K. R. Ramanathan Memorial Gold Medal of Indian Geophysical union (2003). Dr. Radhakrishnan has authored more than 55 publications, including 12 in reputed journals and eight in edited books.

OK read ur post .. thanks

[ramana]

Actually the lesson for all of us is that the apparent causes are not the root causes. No wonder folklore/conventional wisdom says "Dont rush to judgement!"

[Sanjay M]

Also, another lesson is to not repeatedly say, "this will give a fitting reply to..." before you have pulled off whatever was supposed to be the fitting reply. Just like you don't give a Lakshman rekha 50 times.

Because then it's eventually going to look like, "okay, the last 5 fitting replies haven't worked - but don't you worry, eventually we will have a fitting reply! Then you'll eventually learn that we don't like to be trifled with!"

Let ISRO be a space research organization, and not a fitting reply organization. Fitting replies are for the politicians to come up with, not the scientists.

[Sanjay M]

India To Return To Russian Boosters After Failed Rocket Launch

[ramana]

India To Return To Russian Boosters After Failed Rocket Launch

That was planned regardless of the success or otherwise of this flight. The follow-on two flights were to use the Russian engines.

[Sanjay M]

I'm still wondering if the govt will go ahead and announce the Human Space Flight program anyway. They seem to have already allocated funds in anticipation of this. Maybe they can put this money into ensuring that the basic underlying systems work.

[Gagan]

The guy sounds like an idiot.
He ends with the line "The cryogenic engine is very important for India's space launch as well as India's Inter continental Ballistic missile program"

PLEASE someone catch hold of these DDMs and give them a lecture on the total futility of using a cryo engine on an ICBM. And use some colorful analogies that these guys can relate to, since apparently plain ingliss doesn't seem to register with these folks.

[SSSalvi]

Cryo for ICBM??? People who talk public-ally should do some homework about the accuracy of what they r talking.

Novice would simply believe such speeches.