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MR. POLLACK: One other question here and then I would like to open this up to questions from the floor, of which I’m sure there will be many. China enjoys, dare I say, a nearly unique relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan is clearly a very troubled state in a variety of ways, underscore it even more by the events of the past few days. Presumably, this is not something that the Chinese have been very forthcoming in their interactions with India about, but could we -- I’ve heard some voices coming out of China of some concern about the state of affairs in Pakistan and this long precedes recent
events. Can we imagine ways in which this looks less zero sum, or is there any kind of a possibility that you could imagine where China and India could have an intelligent and reasonable and candid discussion about Pakistan’s future and what that implies for both countries?
MR. SARAN: It’s not that we don’t have conversations with China about Pakistan or what’s happening within Pakistan. It is also not the case that China does not express concern about developments in Pakistan, particularly with respect to, say,
fundamentalism or how this impacts on, say, Sinjia. But having said that, I think the Chinese support for Pakistan, I think, is almost unconditional, certainly as far as, say, relationship with India is concerned. We have to accept that as a fact of life.
What we do see, if I look historically at various points at which there has been confrontation between India and Pakistan or even conflict between India and Pakistan. There has been a certain caution in China so they may make sort of
rhetorical statements condemning India, but there has not been much of a stomach for actually getting into an armed confrontation with India on behalf of Pakistan. Will that remain true? Well, let’s see. But Pakistan is a very good, in a sense, and very convenient, you know, (inaudible) for China. So, I’m not surprised. As a professional, I’m not surprised that this is a very convenient thing for China to pursue its interests in the subcontinent. But I as the salience of India-China relations, as the substantive content of the relationship between India and China continue to improve, yes, obviously this will have some impact on the relationship with Pakistan. Much will also depend upon what happens in Pakistan. You know, there is a certain minimum degree of, shall I say, coherence that you need in Pakistan for it to be a coherent ally.
So, that is something which is perhaps more worrisome, and as that’s worrisome not only for China, it is worrisome for all of us.
MR. TALBOTT: Shyam, I hope you won’t mind taking a question about the big story, which I would characterize as the extra-judicial, extra-territorial execution of Osama bin Laden, and I would focus not on the action itself, but what it tells us about Pakistan, both from an Indian standpoint and insofar as you would be comfortable speculating about it from a Chinese standpoint. The circumstances of his death, we are learning more about as the days go by, but what is extremely significant, it seems, is the circumstances of his life for the last number of years, and what that tells us about the very complex arrangement between him and powerful circles and people in Pakistan. And obviously that has
bearing on India’s security and you do know China so well, and the Chinese are very sotto voce about this, but they also are aware of connections between al-Qaeda and extreme Islamist secessionism, particularly in Shinjan. So, would you give us your thoughts on these two questions?
MR. SARAN: As I mentioned, Strobe, that it’s not that we have not had this as a topic of conversation between China and India, you know, the fundamentalism as a threat to both the secular society in India as well as to China and the threat faced by China from elements which may be based in Pakistan, but at the end of the day the Chinese perception, so far, has been that, yes, there is a threat, but Pakistan is such a close ally that it will always deliver on whatever we want Pakistan to deliver on. So, if you just take, for example, the Lal Masjid case, I mean, in a sense, that was the beginning of the end for Musharraf, but he took that action because China was mad because of what had happened to its six nationals.
So, as long as there continues to be a feeling in China that at the end of the day its larger interests are served by this alliance with Pakistan, and that this particular threat -- very specific threat, of terrorism in (inaudible) can be contained, can be handled. Because of the very close understanding and relationship between the two countries, I do not see much change taking place in that. It is depressing, but I think that’s how we see the relationship.
Now, as far as the impact of this particular incident is concerned, of course you have seen the Indian statement. Obviously we are very happy that he’s no longer around, but I think the question in our mind is, how is this going to play out in the next few months? That is the key question. One is, will the United States of America and the international community use what is a big leverage today in your hands to try and bring about a fundamental shift in Pakistani thinking about the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy or is there going to be a temptation to use this for some shortterm ends, short-term end being, well, can we bend them to our will to help us with our exit strategy in Afghanistan, which will be perhaps a short-term gain, but may not resolve the longer term challenge that it poses.
We would certainly hope that it is the latter, because that is -- unless that change comes about in the manner in which Pakistan looks at its interests vis-à-vis India, vis-à-vis Afghanistan, vis-à-vis the United States of America, I think we will continue to face this problem.
SPEAKER: Jack (inaudible), George Washington University. The last two questions set the stage for what I was going to ask. One, about China nexus with Pakistan. Recently after the Sunday incident, China impressed upon Pakistan not to release any information about (inaudible) cases and so on and so forth and not to give any information to India. That’s one instant. Two, Pakistan, in a recent delegation to Afghanistan, Prime Minister Galani and so on and so forth, impressed upon Afghan government to rely more on China than the United States. So, if you see (inaudible)
trend with Pakistan and China. China always tries to create problems for (inaudible).
MR. SARAN: Well, I was not aware of the fact that Pakistan has asked -- sorry, China has asked Pakistan not to share any information on 26/11. That’s news to me. I must confess I have not seen that report.
I think much will depend upon how Pakistan sees its own interests in the engagement with India. So, from our side we have opened the possibilities of a positive turn in the relationship and in that what Pakistan does to bring closure to 26/11 and punish those who were responsible for that horrifying incident, is going to be a key in terms of any kind of reestablishment of at least a minimal degree of trust and confidence. So, if this is what China has told Pakistan and if China -- if Pakistan believes that, yes, this is in Pakistan’s interest, I’m afraid India-Pakistan relations will not
move in a positive direction. I mean, that’s the reality. Reported remarks by Galani to Karzai about depending more on China and less on the United States. I think the ground reality, as we know, is very different.
So, I cannot see -- I cannot see how even from Pakistan’s perspective. What the U.S. role is going to be in Afghanistan is also critical to its own security interests. I think the problem really is that Pakistan is not quite certain about what
its interests are. It is still thinking in very old categories when the whole situation in the region has changed. So, to think in terms of, say, a strategic depth in Afghanistan, it is today -- I think it is quite irrelevant. Or to think in terms of, you know, being able to keep India off balance through the use of terrorism. Well, this is something which already you
are seeing is eating into the Pakistani polity itself. It’s a danger -- more of a danger to Pakistan than it is a threat to India. There are far more terrorist incidents taking place, far more Muslims being killed in Pakistan than today, I think, in India.
So, is Pakistan still going to -- despite the reality that it confronts -- is it still going to think in those old terms? If it does, than I’m afraid, you know, the situation will not change for the better. This is why I said what the reaction to this latest incident is going to be, is what is more important than the incident itself.
