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Unless one is Pakistan. Then we Americans would bend over ... Err ... Backwards to make it easy for them TFTA gregarious army folks, no?TSJones wrote:^^^^^ Arshyam +1
.....nothing rewarding or productive is easy to do......
GPS signals are very weak and can easily be spoofed. Being drastically off in time and distance is not at all surprising. If the Russians or anyone else were relying on GPS for navigation for their air force, then it is a mistake. Similarly, the Russians can spoof GLONASS and none of these navigation systems are reliable. The IRNSS by ISRO is the best option for India. To get accurate navigation you need at least 3 satellites. Right now IRNSS has 6 sats operational and 1 more coming on-line soon for a total of 7 planned.Austin wrote: Not by 100 meters but by 40-50 km according to Pitor Butwoski in his book Russian AirPower , I can check the book for exact phrase but he mentioned like Russian Airforce was surprised to find the GPS signal error was introduced by 40- 50 km , Another time he mentioned this happened was when Tu-160 was landing in Venezuela and they found the GPS was way off mark by many km.
stop projecting your desires on others....speak for yourself about how you like your weird sex. leave me and my country ot of it,,,,,,,vayu tuvan wrote:Unless one is Pakistan. Then we Americans Luke bend over ... Err ... Backwards to make it easy for them TFTA gregarious army folks, no?TSJones wrote:^^^^^ Arshyam +1
.....nothing rewarding or productive is easy to do......
Good pointsV_Raman wrote:Ramana - I will bite - I hope this comes across as analysis
As for Rudradev's statement: "India as a nation that should be dissuaded from becoming an empire at all"
India is already an empire whether USA wants it or not!
We are probably the first in the history of mankind where a substantial unified territory was left behind by another fading empire with the expectation that it will collapse. Look like we will not and hence the heartburn.
First hand account? Chetak ji, will write his stuff but here is mine and it is good three - four years after Kargil.sudeepj wrote:...
I have heard this story of how the US 'switched off GPS over Kashmir' during the Kargil crisis multiple times. But no first hand, authoritative source.. So if Chetak saab can provide one, itll be illuminating.
...
How many people will benefit personally from these kind of dealsramana wrote:Also we need to be wary of op-eds from chatterati and Ind Americans who stand to benefit from US making deals with.India. we saw a lot during nuke deal. Amazing amount of pressure tactics.
There's plenty of middle ground between a cordial hands-off relationship and a tight military alliance. (Given that India isn't constrained by Japan's insitutionalized pacifism, nor doesn't it have South Korea's limitation in terms of sheer size, even a military alliance wouldn't be of the lopsided 'protectorate' kind that they share.)arshyam wrote:Riding on the US's shoulders won't cut it - unless we are content to be like Japan or Korea. I repeat this, I am not content to see India in that level. I think most of this board will agree with me on this point.
arshyam, I agree with your analysis and conclusion. On the question of US bases around the region Bahrain is the most important as the USN Fifth Fleet is based there. And, we cannot access any of those bases under LEMOA because they are not US sovereign bases.arshyam wrote:What are the US bases we will get access to, and which of ours will they get access to. . . . We will on-paper get access to their mainland bases, but since we have no legitimate business there, it won't amount to anything. I can't help but see a disparity there, and if folks say that's all right, that's a different story altogether . . .
Can you Explain a little more on the above point.SSridhar wrote: Xi Jinping and his coterie which is what rules the CPC, the CMC etc. have determined that the 'peaceful rise' of four decades is over and it is time to flex the muscle especially as the economic situation looks grimmer and grimmer. We cannot take China head on and this is a fact, however much it riles us. The only meaningful support to us in an eventual conflict can come from the US. Let's make no mistake about that. This is where we have a problem. The US knows that and is pushing us around, keeping a tight leash on us by also arming the Pakistanis sufficiently. For our part, we have to sell our strength which is that simply no other country, except us, in the region can be a match to China.
The Russians were not relying on GPS but the point that came out was Jamming was deliberate to prevent the use of Wepons and Navigation relying on GPS , Atleast thats the lesson learnt by them in both instances.Mort Walker wrote:GPS signals are very weak and can easily be spoofed. Being drastically off in time and distance is not at all surprising. If the Russians or anyone else were relying on GPS for navigation for their air force, then it is a mistake. Similarly, the Russians can spoof GLONASS and none of these navigation systems are reliable. The IRNSS by ISRO is the best option for India. To get accurate navigation you need at least 3 satellites. Right now IRNSS has 6 sats operational and 1 more coming on-line soon for a total of 7 planned.
How did you conclude this?, the US may also be scouting for future eventualities which includes vacating the bases in West Asia. In that case, Indian bases, especially on the west coast would be most useful.
That'll be a long expensive (possibly sanction-prone) process. They'll also need to start a ballistic missile program in parallel. And in the end, nuclear capability will only secure the Vietnamese mainland. They still won't be able to lock-in enough of the PLA's conventional strength.kit wrote:I would still say the best way to contain China is to open at least two new fronts on china borders away from India.. an obvious one being Vietnam .. a nuclear armed Vietnam will change the whole geopolitics in the region !.. its cheaper for India too .. and will of course promote peace and stability in South Asia as the Americans say !
Haven't disclosed it publicly. I doubt they'll release it to the general public, even after its signed. Although given how risk-averse our mandarins in South Block (and North Block, for that matter) are, and the govt's understandable desire to avoid being raked over coals on topic, I don't think one need be too worried about giving away too much.JE Menon wrote:The discussion seems to be on the basis of some document signed (LEMOA or whatever)... I've looked through the thread to any link which directs to this, or a draft ...since it is to be done only in the next few months. I'm curious because much of the discussion on access to bases seems to know the contents of it. Is there a draft linked anywhere?
NRao, a request. Do not remove the author's name when quoting because it helps the context and the reply to be made.NRao wrote:How did you conclude this?, the US may also be scouting for future eventualities which includes vacating the bases in West Asia. In that case, Indian bases, especially on the west coast would be most useful.
You do realize that, if at all an Indian base is used on a fairly permanent basis, it can be *only* at the invitation of the Indian government.
Also, if and when the US vacates a base in ME, that base will be occupied by either the UK or France.
It I'd a very huge leap to say that the US will actually occupy a base on Indian territory. Not even close.
There's little love lost between the US and Pakistan at this point. Indeed within the US military sphere, the Pakistanis are pretty much despised*, even before OBL was found enjoying a pleasant retirement in a Pakistani cantonment. I've heard this from at least two (Indian) officers returning from exchange visits to the US.SSridhar wrote:The US knows that and is pushing us around, keeping a tight leash on us by also arming the Pakistanis sufficiently. For our part, we have to sell our strength which is that simply no other country, except us, in the region can be a match to China. The US Pivot will not succeed without INDIA. Japan, Philippines and Australia are all right but it will be India that matters in the end. If the US is serious about China, it has to stop playing any game with us. The US negotiates hard and we have to be ruthless as well and under no delusion that the relationship is a 'defining moment of the 21st century', that 'we are natural allies' etc nonsense trotted out by Obama administration. For the time being, it is transactional and that is all there is to it.
Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered, “Hit them now.”
The satellite-guided bombs, dropped from the strategic bomber, struck first. Before the smoke had even cleared, the A-10s rolled in and unleashed all their fearsome firepower. The Predator launched its Hellfires, and the Apache batted clean up.
Around us, the night sky was rent asunder. We watched in awe as bombs burst, tracers flared, and rockets sizzled. When the AC-130 opened up, its battery of weapons only rearranged the bodies.
The strafing runs continued. Nothing that moved survived. Not a single enemy fighter got within a mile of Combat Outpost Margah that night. We stood on our makeshift ramparts and cheered wildly with every blast. Perhaps some of the men were celebrating the destruction of our enemy. I screamed for joy at our survival.
At dawn, we ventured out to conduct a “sensitive site exploitation.” This was army-speak for policing up weapons, documents, and any other intelligence we could glean from the night’s holocaust of fire, lead, and steel.
To the east, we found the blackened ground carpeted with human remains. We dismounted and picked our way through hundreds of meters of arms and legs, ragged half torsos, severed heads with flat-brimmed hats still covering blood-encrusted hair. The stench of death hung in the air. In places, patches of snow that had somehow survived the night had been stained red. In others, small fires still burned and sent palls of grayish smoke wisping across the battlefield.
Broken trees littered the landscape, their barren limbs decorated with ghastly pieces of human beings. From one, a web of intestines dangled from the branches, dripping gore onto the snow below.
We’d seen death’s many faces before this morning. We’d grown hard carrying the dead enemy to our Humvees and dumping them at the local mosques. But even for the most cynical and steeled among us, this charnel house had an effect. Nobody who walks among such things is ever the same again.
We focused on our job. The AKs and machine guns we gathered looked brand new. We stacked them in our rigs alongside RPG launchers that looked factory fresh. The boots scattered about were of better quality than ours. The enemy carried sophisticated radios and military-issue compasses. On dismembered legs we saw kneepads. Torn clothing—the remains of desert camouflage uniforms—fluttered in the morning breeze.
Farther east, we began to encounter more intact corpses. To our astonishment, they wore body armor. Some even had World War I–style helmets still strapped to their heads.
Suppressing our horror was no easy task that morning. But we had to do the job right. At each corpse, the men cleared it for booby traps or unexploded ordnance. They found hand grenades and hundreds of AK magazines. In the pockets of the dead were documents—visas, passports, and notebooks that we knew would be of value. And then we made a startling discovery. Some of these enemy fighters were not Haqqani or Al Qaida at all.
They were Pakistan Army Frontier Corps soldiers, Pakistan’s ragtag border militia. We found their identity cards.
In the spring, we had discovered how Pakistan was allowing our enemy to use its sovereign territory as a rest and refit area. The Haqqani Network trained in Pakistan and received logistical and medical support from our ally’s hospitals.
In the summer, at the Alamo, we had watched helplessly as our enemy used the Pakistan Army troops stationed along the border as willing human shields to prevent us from launching counterbattery fires.
In September, the president of Pakistan had made peace with Taliban representatives, freeing our enemy to throw their full weight against us.
In December, we had been sent out north of the Alamo to escort an Afghan infantry company as it conducted a site survey for a proposed border fence. The Pakistani troops on the slopes overlooking Angoor Ada opened fire on the ANA and pinned them down with those ZSU-4 quad machine guns. Afraid we would fire back and create an even more serious international incident, my platoon was ordered to fall back to FOB Shkin while a Special Forces unit sortied out to rescue the ANA. Greeson and I thought that for sure the episode would become headline news around the globe. We feared that it would spark an open war between the United States and Pakistan. But the incident was never reported.
Now, in January, miles inside Afghanistan, we had discovered that Pakistani Frontier Corps troops had launched a joint offensive with Al Qaida and Haqqani Network fighters against a U.S. combat outpost.
Viv S wrote:There's little love lost between the US and Pakistan at this point. Indeed within the US military sphere, the Pakistanis are pretty much despised*, even before OBL was found enjoyed a pleasant retirement in a Pakistani cantonment. I've heard this from at least two (Indian) officers returning from exchange visits to the US.SSridhar wrote:The US knows that and is pushing us around, keeping a tight leash on us by also arming the Pakistanis sufficiently. For our part, we have to sell our strength which is that simply no other country, except us, in the region can be a match to China. The US Pivot will not succeed without INDIA. Japan, Philippines and Australia are all right but it will be India that matters in the end. If the US is serious about China, it has to stop playing any game with us. The US negotiates hard and we have to be ruthless as well and under no delusion that the relationship is a 'defining moment of the 21st century', that 'we are natural allies' etc nonsense trotted out by Obama administration. For the time being, it is transactional and that is all there is to it.
But fact remains, that ISAF's lines of communication run through Pakistan. ("Death to America" is still the official motto of Iran and with the ongoing tensions with Russia, the Northern Distribution Network isn't an option anymore.) As the troops withdraw, the military aid to Pakistan has been steeply scaled back (its less than 20% of what was in 2011). But until the withdrawal concludes, they can't cut Pakistan loose. Its not an option. Not yet.
While publicly it may express disappointment, this is something the GoI recognizes.. and tacitly accepts. The prospect of a hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan is not something it'd welcome. Especially since the amount of military support isn't particularly daunting at this point. The 9 AH-1s in the news, for example, are being bought on commercial terms. The DSCA clearance was for 15 helicopters, with the balance 6 aircraft presumably to be funded through (now blocked) FMF aid. Same for the 8 F-16s cleared. To be sold full price, which means they'd practically be able to afford only about 4 aircraft for the same budget (the Chinese are inducting that number every two weeks).
*To quote from an excerpt posted by Karan M from the Outlaw Platoon by Sean Parnell
Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered, “Hit them now.”
The satellite-guided bombs, dropped from the strategic bomber, struck first. Before the smoke had even cleared, the A-10s rolled in and unleashed all their fearsome firepower. The Predator launched its Hellfires, and the Apache batted clean up.
Around us, the night sky was rent asunder. We watched in awe as bombs burst, tracers flared, and rockets sizzled. When the AC-130 opened up, its battery of weapons only rearranged the bodies.
The strafing runs continued. Nothing that moved survived. Not a single enemy fighter got within a mile of Combat Outpost Margah that night. We stood on our makeshift ramparts and cheered wildly with every blast. Perhaps some of the men were celebrating the destruction of our enemy. I screamed for joy at our survival.
At dawn, we ventured out to conduct a “sensitive site exploitation.” This was army-speak for policing up weapons, documents, and any other intelligence we could glean from the night’s holocaust of fire, lead, and steel.
To the east, we found the blackened ground carpeted with human remains. We dismounted and picked our way through hundreds of meters of arms and legs, ragged half torsos, severed heads with flat-brimmed hats still covering blood-encrusted hair. The stench of death hung in the air. In places, patches of snow that had somehow survived the night had been stained red. In others, small fires still burned and sent palls of grayish smoke wisping across the battlefield.
Broken trees littered the landscape, their barren limbs decorated with ghastly pieces of human beings. From one, a web of intestines dangled from the branches, dripping gore onto the snow below.
We’d seen death’s many faces before this morning. We’d grown hard carrying the dead enemy to our Humvees and dumping them at the local mosques. But even for the most cynical and steeled among us, this charnel house had an effect. Nobody who walks among such things is ever the same again.
We focused on our job. The AKs and machine guns we gathered looked brand new. We stacked them in our rigs alongside RPG launchers that looked factory fresh. The boots scattered about were of better quality than ours. The enemy carried sophisticated radios and military-issue compasses. On dismembered legs we saw kneepads. Torn clothing—the remains of desert camouflage uniforms—fluttered in the morning breeze.
Farther east, we began to encounter more intact corpses. To our astonishment, they wore body armor. Some even had World War I–style helmets still strapped to their heads.
Suppressing our horror was no easy task that morning. But we had to do the job right. At each corpse, the men cleared it for booby traps or unexploded ordnance. They found hand grenades and hundreds of AK magazines. In the pockets of the dead were documents—visas, passports, and notebooks that we knew would be of value. And then we made a startling discovery. Some of these enemy fighters were not Haqqani or Al Qaida at all.
They were Pakistan Army Frontier Corps soldiers, Pakistan’s ragtag border militia. We found their identity cards.
In the spring, we had discovered how Pakistan was allowing our enemy to use its sovereign territory as a rest and refit area. The Haqqani Network trained in Pakistan and received logistical and medical support from our ally’s hospitals.
In the summer, at the Alamo, we had watched helplessly as our enemy used the Pakistan Army troops stationed along the border as willing human shields to prevent us from launching counterbattery fires.
In September, the president of Pakistan had made peace with Taliban representatives, freeing our enemy to throw their full weight against us.
In December, we had been sent out north of the Alamo to escort an Afghan infantry company as it conducted a site survey for a proposed border fence. The Pakistani troops on the slopes overlooking Angoor Ada opened fire on the ANA and pinned them down with those ZSU-4 quad machine guns. Afraid we would fire back and create an even more serious international incident, my platoon was ordered to fall back to FOB Shkin while a Special Forces unit sortied out to rescue the ANA. Greeson and I thought that for sure the episode would become headline news around the globe. We feared that it would spark an open war between the United States and Pakistan. But the incident was never reported.
Now, in January, miles inside Afghanistan, we had discovered that Pakistani Frontier Corps troops had launched a joint offensive with Al Qaida and Haqqani Network fighters against a U.S. combat outpost.
Viv S, the US enjoys little credibility anywhere (except possibly with the UK, Canada & Australia), leave alone India. We have enormous experience with the US to accept them as a stable, reliable partner. I am not claiming that India had been a saint either, but the unreliability of the US is on a vastly different orbit. It is going to take a very long time for that trust deficit to be bridged.Viv S wrote:There's little love lost between the US and Pakistan at this point. Indeed within the US military sphere, the Pakistanis are pretty much despised*, even before OBL was found enjoyed a pleasant retirement in a Pakistani cantonment. I've heard this from at least two (Indian) officers returning from exchange visits to the US.
But fact remains, that ISAF's lines of communication run through Pakistan. ("Death to America" is still the official motto of Iran and with the ongoing tensions with Russia, the Northern Distribution Network isn't an option anymore.) As the troops withdraw, the military aid to Pakistan has been steeply scaled back (its less than 20% of what was in 2011). But until the withdrawal concludes, they can't cut Pakistan loose. Its not an option. Not yet.
While publicly it may express disappointment, this is something the GoI recognizes.. and tacitly accepts. The prospect of a hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan is not something it'd welcome. Especially since the amount of military support isn't particularly daunting at this point. The 9 AH-1s in the news, for example, are being bought on commercial terms. The DSCA clearance was for 15 helicopters, with the balance 6 aircraft presumably to be funded through (now blocked) FMF aid. Same for the 8 F-16s cleared. To be sold full price, which means they'd practically be able to afford only about 4 aircraft for the same budget (the Chinese are inducting that number every two weeks).
This isn't about them looking out for us. We just need to trust that they'll look out for their own interests. And as you rightly put it, over the long term the US cannot sustain its 'pivot' without Indian support. China is growing into a threat far more formidable than the USSR ever was.SSridhar wrote:Viv S, the US enjoys little credibility anywhere (except possibly with the UK, Canada & Australia), leave alone India. We have enormous experience with the US to accept them as a stable, reliable partner. I am not claiming that India had been a saint either, but the unreliability of the US is on a vastly different orbit. It is going to take a very long time for that trust deficit to be bridged.
Again the point with all three cases was the US looking out for its own interests. As part of its strategy of 'containment' in the 50s & 60s (followed by sanctions), to assist in co-opting the PRC in 1970s (followed by sanctions), and then to fight the Soviets (followed by sanctions - within 12 months of the Soviet retreat).For long, I have said that it is ironic that situations naturally developed, which Pakistan exploited for its anti-India stance, or sometimes were even contrived and then exploited by Pakistan to keep itself on the side of the Western powers to enjoy the benefits of the generous economic and military doles, which it then used against India. 1971, 1979 & 2002 are prime examples.
It'll be a bad hit to US credibility if Afghanistan rapidly collapses in the wake of their withdrawal. But aside from that, its shaping up to be something of a lost cause. Core US interests will not be threatened by an expedited retreat. Before 2001, Afghanistan wasn't on anyone's radar aside from an occasional airstrike to kill jihadists. At this point, given the state of the world, there are enough sanctuaries for radical Islamists, to not be overly concerned with one isolated country.Of course, India has been saying that the US should not leave Afghanistan in a hurry because that was not only in Indian interests but also in regional interests and even the US interests.
Fighting the Communist (and now jihadists) was always a fig leaf really. It was understood that they were primarily to threaten/deter India, and accepted as the cost of doing business.But, that does not mean that India should not seriously protest the huge India-centric arms transfer under the blatant lie of 'counter-terrorism activities'. I don't want to give that long list of arms transfer once again here. We have debated that many times before. In the end, India has to be also mindful of its own security knowing how Pakistan had earlier misused the arms given to fight the Communists. The feelings of officers participating in Shatrujeet, Yudh Abhyas or Vajra Prahar or Op Malabar etc are no indication of how governments behave. No EUA is going to stop Pakistan from using these hardware, assets, and platforms against us if it so decides.
The GoI is bound to recognize the reality that NATO forces cannot continue to operate in Afghanistan unless their supply line is open (also being used to withdraw equipment). We could treat it as a matter of principle and defer further engagement until the US actually pulls out and washes its hands off Pakistan, but the China factor is going to continue to grow in the interim.Of course, we do not know what kind of conclusions have been arrived at, if at all, between GoI & GoTUS regarding Pakistan and if we can trust that given our experience. We are speculating when we say India's protests are "While publicly it may express disappointment, this is something the GoI recognizes.. and tacitly accepts".
Are you referring to the US? Because its not really holding a gun to Pakistan's head; if it did, it wouldn't have taken them 10 years, $1.5 trillion and 25,000 casualties to get OBL. (Unless you meant Pakistan holding a gun to India's head; cause it'd have squeezed the trigger at the first opportunity.)kit wrote:but certainly the one who holds the gun to ones head (pakistan) takes precedence over any friendship offers !!
In particular, a senior official said the need for the LSA was felt during humanitarian rescue efforts such as Operation Raahat that evacuated Indian citizens from Yemen last year.
Fascinating. Let us do some math.Viv S wrote: ....
....
....
*To quote from an excerpt posted by Karan M from the Outlaw Platoon by Sean Parnell
Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered, “Hit them now.”
The satellite-guided bombs, dropped from the strategic bomber, struck first. Before the smoke had even cleared, the A-10s rolled in and unleashed all their fearsome firepower. The Predator launched its Hellfires, and the Apache batted clean up.
Around us, the night sky was rent asunder. We watched in awe as bombs burst, tracers flared, and rockets sizzled. When the AC-130 opened up, its battery of weapons only rearranged the bodies.
The strafing runs continued. Nothing that moved survived. Not a single enemy fighter got within a mile of Combat Outpost Margah that night. We stood on our makeshift ramparts and cheered wildly with every blast. Perhaps some of the men were celebrating the destruction of our enemy. I screamed for joy at our survival.
At dawn, we ventured out to conduct a “sensitive site exploitation.” This was army-speak for policing up weapons, documents, and any other intelligence we could glean from the night’s holocaust of fire, lead, and steel.
To the east, we found the blackened ground carpeted with human remains. We dismounted and picked our way through hundreds of meters of arms and legs, ragged half torsos, severed heads with flat-brimmed hats still covering blood-encrusted hair. The stench of death hung in the air. In places, patches of snow that had somehow survived the night had been stained red. In others, small fires still burned and sent palls of grayish smoke wisping across the battlefield.
Broken trees littered the landscape, their barren limbs decorated with ghastly pieces of human beings. From one, a web of intestines dangled from the branches, dripping gore onto the snow below.
We’d seen death’s many faces before this morning. We’d grown hard carrying the dead enemy to our Humvees and dumping them at the local mosques. But even for the most cynical and steeled among us, this charnel house had an effect. Nobody who walks among such things is ever the same again.
We focused on our job. The AKs and machine guns we gathered looked brand new. We stacked them in our rigs alongside RPG launchers that looked factory fresh. The boots scattered about were of better quality than ours. The enemy carried sophisticated radios and military-issue compasses. On dismembered legs we saw kneepads. Torn clothing—the remains of desert camouflage uniforms—fluttered in the morning breeze.
Farther east, we began to encounter more intact corpses. To our astonishment, they wore body armor. Some even had World War I–style helmets still strapped to their heads.
Suppressing our horror was no easy task that morning. But we had to do the job right. At each corpse, the men cleared it for booby traps or unexploded ordnance. They found hand grenades and hundreds of AK magazines. In the pockets of the dead were documents—visas, passports, and notebooks that we knew would be of value. And then we made a startling discovery. Some of these enemy fighters were not Haqqani or Al Qaida at all.
They were Pakistan Army Frontier Corps soldiers, Pakistan’s ragtag border militia. We found their identity cards.
In the spring, we had discovered how Pakistan was allowing our enemy to use its sovereign territory as a rest and refit area. The Haqqani Network trained in Pakistan and received logistical and medical support from our ally’s hospitals.
In the summer, at the Alamo, we had watched helplessly as our enemy used the Pakistan Army troops stationed along the border as willing human shields to prevent us from launching counterbattery fires.
In September, the president of Pakistan had made peace with Taliban representatives, freeing our enemy to throw their full weight against us.
In December, we had been sent out north of the Alamo to escort an Afghan infantry company as it conducted a site survey for a proposed border fence. The Pakistani troops on the slopes overlooking Angoor Ada opened fire on the ANA and pinned them down with those ZSU-4 quad machine guns. Afraid we would fire back and create an even more serious international incident, my platoon was ordered to fall back to FOB Shkin while a Special Forces unit sortied out to rescue the ANA. Greeson and I thought that for sure the episode would become headline news around the globe. We feared that it would spark an open war between the United States and Pakistan. But the incident was never reported.
Now, in January, miles inside Afghanistan, we had discovered that Pakistani Frontier Corps troops had launched a joint offensive with Al Qaida and Haqqani Network fighters against a U.S. combat outpost.
Viv S wrote:Are you referring to the US? Because its not really holding a gun to Pakistan's head; if it did, it wouldn't have taken them 10 years, $1.5 trillion and 25,000 casualties to get OBL. (Unless you meant Pakistan holding a gun to India's head; cause it'd have squeezed the trigger at the first opportunity.)kit wrote:but certainly the one who holds the gun to ones head (pakistan) takes precedence over any friendship offers !!
But then, virtually at the last minute, Prime Minister Modi had second thoughts and stopped the proceedings in their track, leaving Parrikar to lamely announce at the end of the delegation-level talks that LEMOA was only “a concept” of logistics support. Moreover, seeking an escape route for the BJP government, he added, that this agreement could be “signed in months, if not weeks”. What was left unstated was that, if it meets with hostile reception and turns into a political liability, the timeline could well stretch to never. Like the impetuous announcement by Modi in Paris to buy 36 Rafale fighter aircraft and peremptorily bury the medium multi-role combat aircraft procurement process, the decision on LEMOA, initiated with much enthusiasm, too could become a bilateral issue without closure.
Parrikar has made much of the fact that LEMOA is limited in its ambit, and is not a license for stationing US troops and military wherewithal in this country. This is to miss the larger point that the mere fact of India’s agreeing to aiding and abetting the US in its military objectives is to compromise India, its national interest, and to introduce a foreign extraneous element into India’s strategic calculus and military decision-making. There will be no getting around the objective reality of US forces staging out of Indian bases and ports in military ventures India will have no say in. Absent Indian expeditionary policies, only the US will resupply in India – making this arrangement completely one-sided. The financial reimbursement for Indian supply of fuel, victuals, and other support, and for military infrastructure use, will do more to re-hyphenate India with Pakistan in US’ reckoning than almost anything else. Look at the hoops Islamabad has to jump through by way of US Congressional scrutiny to get the money legitimately owed it to understand the humiliations awaiting India.
While the response of the Leftist parties was along expected lines and the Congress party’s criticism a bit rich considering it was responsible for the 2008 civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the US that has stymied the country’s nuclear weapons capabilities, such reaction is precisely what the Modi government fears will allow the opposition parties to mock BJP’s “nationalist” credentials, make light of its patriotic effusions, and undermine its pretensions to militant guardianship of the national interest. This is no small political risk for the ruling dispensation to take because of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s somewhat cautious attitude to its America-friendly overtures, but more worrisome still, of the Obama Administration’s actions, in the traditional US policy mould that are guaranteed to rile Indian public opinion – Washington’s transfer of F-16 combat aircraft and Viper attack helicopters to Pakistan even as it talks up friendship with India. With friends like the US, who needs enemies?
The foundational agreements also fail to address the core issue of whether and how political and military intimacy with the United States serves India’s national interest. Yes, it is a strategic imperative for India to counter and neutralize China. Yes, it helps for India to join the rimland or littoral states in Southeast and Northeast Asia in configuring a strategically effective collective security system designed to crimp Beijing’s room for military and diplomatic maneuver. Yes, the emerging scenario demands that India more proactively use and deploy its military forces and strategic fighting assets in concert with the other affected countries on China’s periphery, who singly cannot offer resistance to China but together can firm up a strong front against China. This much is basic geostrategics. Should the US want to join in such an organically Asian security enterprise, India should have no objection.
But it is definitely detrimental to India’s vital national interests, its reputation as a would-be great power and, not least, its amor propre, for the Modi government to reduce the country to another cog in the American military machine and accept legally binding agreements that will compel India to provide assistance to American forces in the Asian theatre on missions now and in the future that may directly imperil friendly regimes, such as in Iran, undermine Indian interest, and undermine long term Indian political goals and strategy. But of far greater significance is the potential harm that will be caused to relations India has nurtured over time with putative foes of the US – in the main Russia.
One had so desperately hoped – and this analyst was amongst the first to voice this hope as far back as 2011 -- that the advent of Modi, a plucky provincial politician, who had pulled himself up by his own bootstraps, would root a liberal rightwing Edmund Burke-ian type of conservatism in the country, an ideology based on liberty and small government, and one that put a premium on the individual’s desire to better his lot by the dint of his own effort, and in so doing improve society and country. Most of all, one fervently prayed for the articulation of a grand national vision and the injection of commonsensical precepts into foreign and strategic policies. Instead, the BJP regime has not deviated an iota from the Congress government’s pusillanimous approach and outlook. India continues to acquiesce in security schemes on terms dictated by extra-territorial powers -- US and China. For this to happen, rulers in New Delhi have had to be compliant and/or complicit, otherwise a country India’s size and potential simply cannot be manipulated.
The second part of what I was going to write is that it may be time to learn from the Northern Neighbor:SaiK wrote:I started listing a bunch of questions from various online info...
If we answer these, then we have pretty much covered.
The important thing is to have Agreements. Each follows those parts that suit them.Confucius say Wise Reader Sign Many Agleements In Princilpre, Fool Follows Them In Practice
Thanks Deejay ji! This is very interesting indeed..deejay wrote:First hand account? Chetak ji, will write his stuff but here is mine and it is good three - four years after Kargil.sudeepj wrote:...
I have heard this story of how the US 'switched off GPS over Kashmir' during the Kargil crisis multiple times. But no first hand, authoritative source.. So if Chetak saab can provide one, itll be illuminating.
...
My own first hand account is of 2002-05 vintage from J&K. GPS was unreliable anywhere north of Banihal (including but not limited to Glacier). GPS feed would go haywire (and I have experienced the exacts moments when they conked off to Southern Hemisphere) approaching places West or North West of Rajouri. By this time we were flying helicopters with cockpit fitted GPS. I have flown with hand held GPS in NEastern parts where we would never use them in Op areas.
Also, GPS signals did not provide steady locks (not degradation) in hills or in heavy weather.
For some casual debugging: If you are using civilian GPS receivers, jamming can be done by many sources and is fairly easy. Georgians may have been able to procure these jammers from any number of sources and could have been operating them. That GPS signals were jammed does not imply that it was the US govt. or CIA that did the jamming. Even IRNSS signals will be susceptible to the same kind of jamming. The only solution is to develop technologies to locate the jammers effectively and destroy them.Austin wrote:The Russians were not relying on GPS but the point that came out was Jamming was deliberate to prevent the use of Wepons and Navigation relying on GPS , Atleast thats the lesson learnt by them in both instances.Mort Walker wrote:GPS signals are very weak and can easily be spoofed. Being drastically off in time and distance is not at all surprising. If the Russians or anyone else were relying on GPS for navigation for their air force, then it is a mistake. Similarly, the Russians can spoof GLONASS and none of these navigation systems are reliable. The IRNSS by ISRO is the best option for India. To get accurate navigation you need at least 3 satellites. Right now IRNSS has 6 sats operational and 1 more coming on-line soon for a total of 7 planned.
The Georgians were likely using the Mil Grade Signals hence not subject to same problems , But you are right we must not depend on any external means , IIRC there was also a case of GPS Blink during Brahmos test in Rajasthan that CEO mentioned
OT here so briefly.sudeepj wrote:...
Thanks Deejay ji! This is very interesting indeed..
What were the kind of GPS receivers that were fitted in the cockpits? Were these certified for use as Nav aids in airplanes? Or more of a jugaad using devices that were handheld type?
Was this consistent in specific areas? As in, you go to place XYZ, and GPS just would not work. Was it that all fixes produced were garbage or fixes had occasional outliers? Did these bad fixes appear at specific altitudes? (closer to the ground? higher up?)
Asking some really specific questions, did you (or someone in Signals) try to figure out what was going wrong with the receivers? (For instance, Inability to see Satellites, inability to track, signal strength dropping by several dbHz in specific areas? Lots of jammer signals?)
Thanks again! And pranams for your service to mother India!
and happy about it. The last time I heard something like this was in the late 1950s where JLN watched as PRC devoured Tibet despite entreaties from the US to be allowed to intervene . China! China! the alarmists cried. The navel gazers of the time responded with "Not a blade of grass grows there, why needle our Asian comrades, Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai."svinayak wrote:[
China! China! China!
Why India need to buy X-xx planes from another country - Because of China
Why India need to sign the SLA - because of China
Why India need to patrol the seas with another country - because of China.
It is all about China which makes India take action. What about Indian needs!
Will India's border problem be solved with this.- Nobody can answer