Bharat Rakshak

ramdas wrote:@Shiv:

We cannot destroy Pak. as of now. 100 or so 20 kt fission weapons (that is what we have in the worst case) would kill roughly 8% of Pak's population or 1-1.5% of our population. 100 5 kt nukes will eliminate less than 1% of our population.

100 500 kt nukes would kill 8-10% of our population. Clearly, there is an order of magnitude difference in the consequences. Moreover, an exchange with 15 million dead Pakis and 120 million dead in our country will be seen by some Pakis as worth going for (given the Jihadi mindset).

Since Pakis obtaining 100 500 kt nukes is inevitable, the only solution is to have the ability to obliterate Pakistan i.e, destroy 50% of its population. This requires 100 nukes in the 200-500 kt range.

Let us try and reduce assumptions here

What is the number and yield of nuclear weapons you feel we need to destroy 50% of its population

On what basis do you feel 50% is a reasonable number and not 30% or 75%?

Dumping 150 15kt-200kt on those jihadi b@stards will kill a lot more than 8% of the population. Radiation sickness, starvation due to contaminated soil and lack of transport, civil discord, lack of medical supplies and facilities, etc. will lead to a large percentage of the population dying off. There are simply too many people living on too little. Most of Punjab's arable land will suffer radioactive contamination. All of their large and medium sized cities will be wiped off the map. Punjab and Sindh will bear the brunt of the massive nuclear response. You're looking at about 20-30% population decline within the first 2 years which is more than 40 million people. You are guaranteed even millions more deaths as the Afghans and Iranians seal their borders. You'll have a toxic cesspool of Islam, starvation, and mass killing as they compete for remaining cultivable plots of land. Urea and oil depletion will accelerate this further. Communicable diseases due to lack of vaccinations and poor sanitation, cancer etc. will add to the pain. I wouldn't be surprised if the toll goes over 50% within 6 years.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agricultu ... ulture.png

I had actually done some research based on descriptions of the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the effetc sof nuclear blasts to calculate the effects of a 50 kiloton blast on a densely populated area of Rawalpindi

http://www.aame.in/2012/02/nuclear-weap ... istan.html

Within the blue circle lies an area of about 12 sq km, and in the densely populated environs of Rawal town - the area will have a population of about 300,000, many of them exposed on the street. All buildings in this zone will be crushed burying people within them instantly. Exposed people on the street will be vaporised near the hypocenter. Taking a cue from what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki - one can expect an 85 to 90% mortality in this zone with 5-10 percent alive but injured. For the central zone in Rawal town that would mean more than 250,000 dead and perhaps 10 to 15,000 people injured but alive. Rawal town consist of narrow lanes - which will all be blocked by collapsed buildings and the chances of reaching any injured people in time to rescue them and save them is likely to be remote, unless they can themselves walk out.

Outside the blue circle, but within the orange circle most buildings will be demolished but the chances of being powdered or vaporized instantly are reduced as one goes farther from the center. The decorated wooden frontages of buildings and the sun covers of street vendors, there gas cylinders and lamps will catch fire instantly, and with the blast winds being less severe further away from the center some of these fires will not get snuffed out and will continue to burn. In the Hiroshima/Nagasaki experience, this zone had a mortality of about 25 to 30%. The 38 sq km zone of the orange circle will have more than 400,000 people - who make up the population of Rawal town and other zones around the area. The population density is likely to be smaller over the more posh zones like Askari and Chaklala that fall in this zone but a conservative estimate of 600,000 people is reasonable. A 25 to 30% mortality would leave about 150,000 dead and about 250,000 injured. Of the injured in this zone - many will have severe flash burns and will inevitably die. Others will lie under crushed building debris. Many will have injuries like bullet wounds from flying glass and debris; other will have impact type injuries because they have simply been lifted by an air blast and slammed hard against some surface.

In the zone outside the orange circle Rawalpindi has some densely populated areas and some posh and relatively sparsely populated zones with better constructed houses that may able to withstand the milder blast felt more than 4 or 5 km from the hypocenter. Injuries and deaths in this zone will occur mainly from collapse of light structures, flash burns on exposed skin surfaces, blindness and window glass injuries for people inside homes. These will me most severe just outside the 4 km zone, and reduce as one goes further. In the Japan experience, this zone had a mortality of 1 to 2% and injuries to about 10%. That means - that a million or so people outside the 4 km radius zone will still suffer 20,000 dead and 100,000 injured - though many injuries will be slight.

One 50 kt blast is likely to leave a half million dead immediately after the blast.

If we are looking at 50 kt bombs I would say 5 each on Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad and 3 each on 20 major towns . Seventy five 50 kiloton bombs would leave 40 million dead immediately - that is about 20% of the population. Expect a similar number of deaths in weeks . That is 40% of the population. This is with 75 x 50 kiloton bombs. A similar result may be achieved by say 30 x 500 kiloton bombs. with two each on major cities and one each on the smaller cities.

Here is my argument. If a nation is not able to test its nukes and refine them to get beautiful 200 or 500 kiloton nukes. it makes perfect sense to stick to 1960s tech level 20 kiloton nukes and make 100 or more of them. People who get nuked by 100 x 20 kiloton nukes will not feel any better than people who get nuked by 30 or even 60 x 500 kiloton thermonukes.

It is possible to use open source data to come up with better calculations but maybe 40% population will be wiped out on day 1 and 80% in one month using megaton nukes

Which is better? Wiping out 40 % in one month or 80% in one month? Which would be called "victory" and why?

And then of course there's the comprehensive guesswork with regard to what we have and don't have. It's often fiction based on fiction. Possible useful datapoint that one may take as "precedent". When the CWT was signed and stocks disclosed there were reports that observers were surprised by the breadth and depth of our holdings. And even then who knows if everything was disclosed...

Is the US deterred by North Korea? At least a bit? Even one nuclear weapon has its utility until it is used. Then it becomes just another bomb in war making calculations between the belligerents and numbers, types, yields come into play. But deterrence is over by that time, I suppose.

I think BKs contention about the NK-Pak-China nuclear triad is most likely correct and is corroborated by KS which suggests that the Indian strategic community is more or less in agreement with the route of proliferation. But how does he know so much about what was tested when even the Americans are fumbling. So he is using a lot of assumptions (bluff as Shiv said) to bolster his arguments. I also don't like his constant badgering on the Shakti tests. There have been several reviews post-test and under different govts which have all come to the conclusion that the test met its design parameters. IIRC, KS stated it was a weapon design. Unless we have a bunch of incompetents about to ruin the country this line of argument is fallacious. However, I believe the warhead was 1 tonne and not suitable for MIRVs. There may have been an upgradation to 250 kgs or 180 kgs as alluded to by Arun and the Santhanam led doubts may have been to force the govt to test these designs. The last is my speculation.


The India-Pak entente is a replica of the cold war where adversaries had some 15000-20000 nuclear weapons each. With the nuclear triad and US inability or in case of Pak lack of intention to control this nexus there is very little India can do to prevent it. This constant cursing of the Indian establishment for not testing 5 megaton weapons is not useful. India is by nature not a murderous Islamist or Communist state and will calibrate its response according to its threat perception. The only thing I will agree with is that India needs to have a long hard think on what it wants to do with Pakistan.

Shiv ji, would you take the same reductionist approach for other assets, e.g: use an AIP sub to be equipped with nuclear missiles or worse launch them from a destroyer, instead of a SSBN? Maybe even put a nuclear warhead on an SLCM? Even a Donkey can carry a load of 100KG, you know the math of what this can translate to in terms of yield for various configurations.

When one does have the goods, you improvise and use whatever you have to hurt the enemy is NOT the question in play. However your argument that a capability deemed essential to have (that is why it was being claimed and worked on), which arguably is the main stay of nuclear weapons should not be proven, in the face of credible doubt is a compromising position on what Indian defense needs are - as viewed by its stake holders.

I understand, it is not an easy decision due to the complexity of the global environment, but in terms of capabilities the issue is black and white. As for deterrence, as you well know what is enough to deter is in the eyes of the beholder. For someone like JFK, the inability of USAF to warrant not even a single warhead will be able to land on US shores, during the Cuban missile crisis forced him to negotiate rather than use force. Will a Pakistani general use the same criterion?

Indeed, given TSP's rogue behavior, a prudent planner would assume that the ability to obliterate TSP in a second strike is essential. Which is probably why our planners required thermonuclear weapons in the first place. Even Gen. Padmanabhan in one of his writings has pointed out this requirement of upgrading the deterrent by inducting thermonuclear weapons. Anything short of this amounts to compromising the deterrent, which is the backbone of our national strength.

Not testing would have remained an option had Dr. Santhanam not added credibility to doubts on S-1. Even otherwise, when every other military system is tested, why would one want to leave the performance of a S-1 based warhead to chance ? No chances should be taken in such a serious matter. The only price we pay for testing is some sanctions, which will slow growth down for a few years. This is a smaller price to pay than permanent military inferiority vis a vis TSP.

This constant clinging to minimality of the deterrent is dangerous. Credibility of the deterrent is far more important than minimality.

No one knows what the deterrence is except those who need to know. According to Pakistanis and open source investigative reviews - suggest we have enough material for 2000 weapons. Go figure. If you look at the number of nuclear submarines planned and assume that post-Arihant they will be MIRV capable an average number of 250 weapons have been suggested just based on one expensive leg of the triad. You can google the estimate of number of Agnis of various types and the required warheads. The constant number that FAS belts out should be taken with a pinch of salt or perhaps a bucket of salt. Why should I believe Santhanam and call the scientists on the review boards all liars? BK is a maximalist. He has his reasons some of which are valid but hysteria is not going to help. I don't think it is useful to constantly harangue about the yield of the Shakti tests. IMO the more pertinent question is how to MIRV untested designs of lighter weight. That decision has to be calibrated according to threat perception.

ShauryaT wrote:Shiv ji, would you take the same reductionist approach for other assets, e.g: use an AIP sub to be equipped with nuclear missiles or worse launch them from a destroyer, instead of a SSBN? Maybe even put a nuclear warhead on an SLCM? Even a Donkey can carry a load of 100KG, you know the math of what this can translate to in terms of yield for various configurations.

When one does have the goods, you improvise and use whatever you have to hurt the enemy is NOT the question in play. However your argument that a capability deemed essential to have (that is why it was being claimed and worked on), which arguably is the main stay of nuclear weapons should not be proven, in the face of credible doubt is a compromising position on what Indian defense needs are - as viewed by its stake holders.

Shaurya we have to improvise with what is proven so far because no further tests are going to happen unless something changes. We have missed that boat now. The desirability of testing is a different issue from the practicability of testing. It is a pipe dream at best to imagine that we can do X tests over 2-3 years and then refine designs and say "Tests no 13, 14 and 15 all worked and those designs are now going into our weapons". We can hanker for tests and say (probably rightly) that a world power will strike an independent path for itself and not be held down by taboos imposed by others. That is what NoKo is doing anyway and NoKo is a world power in many ways - although we tend to measure our metrics in some other way.

I really should stop here and say "Better suck up this fact and get used to it". But no. I won't do that.

Under such constraints the only people we can depend on are scientists who work on nuclear warheads. There are a series of designs tests that can be done short of an explosion. We have to settle for that. If scientists say as Feynman is famously said to have pointed out about the Hiroshima bomb ( I paraphrase here) "It has a 10% chance of yielding 2 kilotons; a 20% chance of yielding 5 kilotons; a 40% chance of yielding 8-12 kilotons and a 30% chance of yielding 20 kilotons (or something like that). We will have warhead probabilities that have a good chance of yielding X kilotons based on experiments in the lab and on the field without hot testing.

Are we going to ask our armed forces to depend on probabilities? You bet we are. The armed forces are not newcomers to probabilities. Talk about "kill probability" for AAMs and SAMs or "CEP" for missiles. We have to plan strategy depending on what scientists tell us the probable yield of a given warhead is likely to be. Whether we trust those scientists or not is immaterial. There is no other go - like whether you trust the pilot of the airliner you are getting into.

Talking about "ideal scenarios" and "How I wish to see another 50 tests" etc is pointless blather as far as I can see and predict from the geopolitical scene.

There are many ramifications that stem from what I say - but I think I will simply leave them for another post.

I really wish the BR Mainsite crew puts the old BRM issues online and not offline. Someof these questions were treated in the old days.

ramdas wrote:This constant clinging to minimality of the deterrent is dangerous. Credibility of the deterrent is far more important than minimality.

I think some of these things have been rehashed several times, at least by me on this thread.

Credibility of deterrent is what the other guy believes. Is China deterred by our nuclear weapons? Is Pakistan deterred? There are signs that both are not totally unaffected or laughing at Indian developments although Pakistan does appear to be mocking us. But Pakistan mocks us despite our capability (as it is) because they do not believe we will use it.

Pakistan seeks to fight war at a low grade level where they believe India will not be able to use its nukes. If you disagree with this statement I have nothing to say. But if you agree with it, I would ask, why should Pakistan be concerned so much about our nukes that they seek to fight war where we cannot use our nukes? If there was nothing to fear, they could fight openly and use their nukes on us with facetious confidence knowing that we have a bunch of bluffs that are being held up as our nuclear deterrent.

I put it to you that Pakistan sees some threat from Indian nukes and does not actually want to be hit, but seeks to achieve its goals without getting hit. That means deterrence is working at a level - but that level is unsatisfactory to us. It is unsatisfactory because Pakistan keeps provoking us at a level that makes the use of nuclear retaliation by India an over reaction. Pakistanis could increase the level to which they provoke us - but at some point war may start and Pakistan is carefully keeping below that level.

Now here is the question: Should we respond to Pakistan by increasing the yield of our nuclear weapons, or should we respond to Pakistan by using nuclear weapons with a much lesser provocation - say after a terrorist attack? To rephrase that question, is it our nuclear doctrine that needs changing or is it nuclear forces?

if we increase yields by more testing (as demanded by Karnad) but keep the doctrine at a level where Pakistan is comfortable to keep needling us and we don't use our multimegaton, well tested weapons what is the point? Why would Pakistan be more scared of 100 x 1 megaton Indian weapons rather than 100 x 50 kiloton Indian weapons if we are not going to use them?

Any thoughts?

No one knows what the deterrence is except those who need to know. According to Pakistanis and open source investigative reviews - suggest we have enough material for 2000 weapons. Go figure. If you look at the number of nuclear submarines planned and assume that post-Arihant they will be MIRV capable an average number of 250 weapons have been suggested just based on one expensive leg of the triad. You can google the estimate of number of Agnis of various types and the required warheads. The constant number that FAS belts out should be taken with a pinch of salt or perhaps a bucket of salt. Why should I believe Santhanam and call the scientists on the review boards all liars? BK is a maximalist. He has his reasons some of which are valid but hysteria is not going to help. I don't think it is useful to constantly harangue about the yield of the Shakti tests. IMO the more pertinent question is how to MIRV untested designs of lighter weight. That decision has to be calibrated according to threat perception.

That is in relation to Pakistan.

What about deterrence WRT Jihadis? And Pakistan Army + China + NK? Number of weapons in such cases do not matter. At some stage the basic logic breaks.

Good to see the Chinese financial markets hiccuping.

shiv wrote: There is no other go

ABV and indeed the then BJP leadership was told the same - and not just by their political opponents but by names in the establishment that I rather not name anymore as many of them are dead and have served the nation well - but did make some wrong assessments. Not naming them, as I do not have any smearing agenda but many times it is taken that way. In the midst of this cloud a "go" decision was made by a courageous leadership, who recognized the risks clearly. I will wait for such a clear leadership to emerge - Agree it is a "no go" with the current leadership.

Having said that hope you will agree, we should make as much "noise" as possible. Regardless of the reality of the alleged nuclear triad, I think such an opportunity should not be missed. It is very important that the risks this triad poses, gets in the public realm and its dangers WIDELY known. This message or a form of it, when spoken by many will reach the right ears inside the establishment.

We need at least a recognition inside this administration that there IS a need to test again, even if not publicly acknowledged. When and how is to be determined. Even that decision will not be made easily for it would entail India IS willing and looking to forego its voluntary moratorium on testing. Another matter, that we will claim that this moratorium is unilateral, while the western powers will claim it to be a multi lateral commitment provided.

ShauryaT wrote: We need at least a recognition inside this administration that there IS a need to test again, even if not publicly acknowledged. When and how is to be determined. Even that decision will not be made easily for it would entail India IS willing and looking to forego its voluntary moratorium on testing. Another matter, that we will claim that this moratorium is unilateral, while the western powers will claim it to be a multi lateral commitment provided.

Shaurya could you put your mind to the possible consequences if we were to start testing again? I can write some thoughts on that but would like to see if you or others may have some thoughts on this. I am going to hit the sack now..

The only consequence of testing again would be some sanctions and the consequent fall in the stock market. Some initial panic will be there. Slow growth at 4-5%p.a for a few years instead of 7-9%p.a. Freeze on Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train project for a few years at least. Nothing beyond that. Assorted business lobbies will whine. The nuclear deal will be thrown out, but we are in any case increasing coal production rapidly. So, no major power supply disruptions.

One benefit will be getting out of the ``strategic alliance" with the U.S., which will prove to be a castrating vice in the long run. Major increase in our strategic power: ability to field mobile MIRVed ICBMs so as to have a deterrent ability against all sponsors of TSP. Lower amenability to outside (in particular, U.S) calls for papa-jhappi with TSP.

The benefits outweigh the losses. Why should one sneer at the ``strike out on your own" argument ? At the end of the day, a genuinely sovereign major power has to learn to strike its path out on its own: North Korea's level of national power is a remarkable achievement for a country with its meager resources/messed up agriculture. Our economic situation will never be as bad even if we test: naysayers notwithstanding. With our overall size and resources, we stand to gain far more from such pursuit of sovereignty.

Pakistan is keeping the provocations below a certain level now: when their nuclear deterrent is yet to have an edge over ours. How they would behave when they achieve strategic superiority is anybody's guess. That is not a place we would want to go.

If ``economy" etc is an argument used to prevent our catching up, the establishment values temporary economic gains more than security. There will be a steep price to pay for this.

As far as deterrence goes, they've already got us zeroed. All of our major cities will be vaporized. What a TN weapon allows them to do is target bigger cities with fewer nukes which frees up the heavier fission weapons for medium sized population centers.

Regardless, we'll have to test eventually. IMO, it'll happen sooner than later.

Russia may have an interest in Pakistan accumulating TN to keep the Israelis and indirectly the Americans on their toes.

Likely and optimistic/managed/pessimistic impact on India for conducting a series of tests to validate and confirm its nuclear arsenal and lab designs can be gauged.

I have kept this at a high level, for the details will be known to folks who follow this thread and forum. An entire paper can be written on its assumptions, validity and mitigation techniques.

The primary impact is from US, Secondary impact is from its allies in the EU, UK, Japan and no impact from others. I have classified the impact as Severe, Major, Minor, None/Trivial. One can treat these levels in terms of time and/or percentage of impact. The attached link has the table, Shiv ji, shared with you as an editable link. I am sure this can be expanded with actual hard and soft impact in terms of lost time, $, credibility, etc.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/ ... sp=sharing

ShauryaT: assuming the pessimistic scenario regarding impact, it is still worth pushing for new tests. Nothing outlined there would even bring our growth down by 2% p.a. Any sanctions that result will wither away in a few years. The LCA Tejas would probably face a setback. But proven TNs are worth more than the Tejas program in any case.

In any case, the impact would be temporary owing to the U.S and Allies' strategic compulsions.

US now says the NoKo test was about 6kt.

shiv, If you recall that was the number for the ping pong ball tested at Chagai in May28th 1998!!!!

So all along this 6kt Pu based is the common trigger for the Chinese, Pakis and NoKo.

ramana wrote:US now says the NoKo test was about 6kt.

shiv, If you recall that was the number for the ping pong ball tested at Chagai in May28th 1998!!!!

So all along this 6kt Pu based is the common trigger for the Chinese, Pakis and NoKo.

Sounds like it.

ramdas wrote:The only consequence of testing again would be some sanctions and the consequent fall in the stock market. Some initial panic will be there. Slow growth at 4-5%p.a for a few years instead of 7-9%p.a. Freeze on Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train project for a few years at least. Nothing beyond that. Assorted business lobbies will whine. The nuclear deal will be thrown out, but we are in any case increasing coal production rapidly. So, no major power supply disruptions.

One benefit will be getting out of the ``strategic alliance" with the U.S., which will prove to be a castrating vice in the long run. Major increase in our strategic power: ability to field mobile MIRVed ICBMs so as to have a deterrent ability against all sponsors of TSP. Lower amenability to outside (in particular, U.S) calls for papa-jhappi with TSP.

The benefits outweigh the losses. Why should one sneer at the ``strike out on your own" argument ? At the end of the day, a genuinely sovereign major power has to learn to strike its path out on its own: North Korea's level of national power is a remarkable achievement for a country with its meager resources/messed up agriculture. Our economic situation will never be as bad even if we test: naysayers notwithstanding. With our overall size and resources, we stand to gain far more from such pursuit of sovereignty.

No sure where the "sneering" came from. Not me,

All the consequences that you speak of are related to what might happen to India. If India starts testing again, in order to be serious, we will have to start a series of tests. Maybe 2-3 tests initially. Data analysis. Design refining followed by more tests after a few months and a repeat of that process. So this entire repeat testing process cannot be a two day affair like last time - but maybe spread out over 2 years.

But what will Pakistan, NoKo, Iran and other "threshold nuclear states do"?

Pakistan has two options. One is to avoid testing again and sit tight while India gets the flak. But that means Pakistan is perfectly happy with its weapons designs and does not want more testing. This is a fake premise because we have been saying all along that Pakistan is trying to refine designs and is testing in Korea. Most likely Pakistan will start testing again, freely and without encumbrance. NoKo too will be free of any shackles and cooperation with Pakistan can become overt. Of course sanctions will kick in but if sanctions have little effect on India they will have little effect on Pakistan and NoKo. Iran and other unspecified states may start testing. In fact nations like Nigeria and others may then want to start testing nuclear weapons when they see that India followed by other nations are testing freely again.

Going by your statement (which I will address separately in another post) India currently enjoys some deterrent value against Pakistan. If both countries start testing there is no guarantee that India will stay ahead. It could be status quo or Pakistan could gain an advantage that might possibly have been delaying them. The logic is straightforward. If Pakistan lack something now - they will gain it given time anyway. They will simply gain it faster if they can start testing.

So while we can rest easy by claiming that we have better and bigger nukes after a series of tests, I am unable to see what advantage over Pakistan will accrue from such tests, given that they too will gain the same advantages as we do.

Disclaimer: Please don't mistake me for a peacenik or a minimalist. Using such descriptions about my views are a waste of time. But I promise to make life miserable for anyone who poses arguments that can be trashed by me simply because those are the very arguments that will be made by real peacenik. If emotion, lack of science or logic is used for any argument in this topic I will do my darndest to demolish it. Nothing personal

shiv wrote: So while we can rest easy by claiming that we have better and bigger nukes after a series of tests, I am unable to see what advantage over Pakistan will accrue from such tests, given that they too will gain the same advantages as we do.

Pakistan will most likely take the foolish approach, try to match the tests and invest more in their nuclear and conventional deterrence in an effort to match India and in this process continue to destabilize their country. This will hurt their overall progress and further extend the large differential in economical and human development indices. A less developed, unstable Pakistan works to the advantage of India - even if they continue to wield the best nuclear weapons, guaranteeing the protection of their state from "outside" threats. So, advantage for India?

ramdas wrote:Pakistan is keeping the provocations below a certain level now: when their nuclear deterrent is yet to have an edge over ours. How they would behave when they achieve strategic superiority is anybody's guess. That is not a place we would want to go.

Unless I am mistaken you are saying that our arsenal has some deterrent value today but will lose that value as Pakistan's arsenal gets better. IOW Pakistan has fears about India that they are going to lose by improving their arsenal.

Let me point out the holes I see in this argument (I have pointed this out many times before, and I will do so again hoping that someone can come up with a better reason)

Why is Pakistan scared of us today? Either because we can hurt them or because we can finish them off. It does not matter which of these is correct, but if they make their arsenal bigger and bigger and better they are still gong to be finished off by us, The only thing they can achieve by making their arsenal bigger and better is to hurt us more. Even if they hurt us more we can finish them off. Of course we will get hit, but that is already true. We are already under threat and that threat increases if they get better weapons. But that will not save them. Either way Pakistan is screwed.

Let me use an analogy to illustrate what I mean. Please let us not argue with the analogy because it can never be exact, only illustrative. If you are Pakistan and you have a knife and I am India and I have a gun, you are currently afraid of me and you want a gun. If you get a gun tomorrow, the risk to me increases, but the risk to you does not change. You may shoot me but you will die anyway. You will not be any less dead.

To get back to nuclear exchanges, I believe it is your argument that Pakistan believes that they can now be destroyed by us but they cannot destroy us. So by getting stronger Pakistan can promise to destroy us. But how does that help them? They are going to be destroyed anyway.

The only way your argument can work is as follows:

India can destroy Pakistan today but they can't destroy India, so Indians think that they can get into a nuclear war with Pakistan and destroy Pakistan totally and pay the price of some "recoverable damage" to India because of which we will survive. By improving its weapons, Pakistan feels that any attack on them will lead to total destruction of India and because India can be totally destroyed by Pakistan, Indians will get scared and not try to nuke Pakistan. Then Pakistan can be free to nuke India any time.

Fine. Let us accept this argument as 100% correct. But if this argument is 100% correct what difference will it make if we increase and improve our weapons by testing? We gain nothing. Zilch. Our risk is increasing because Pakistan's arsenal is getting better. Unless we conduct a pre-emptive nuclear strike on Pakistan and simply finish them off, we gain no advantage against Pakistan by improving our nuclear weapons (there are other advantages but I am going to ignore that for now).

What I am trying to point out is is is a completely useless exercise to increase and improve our arsenal in response to Pakistan's upgrading its arsenal. The latter must scare us more but our fears cannot decrease simply because our own weapons get bigger. Our problem with Pakistan is not small Indian weapons to be addressed by bigger weapons. It is Pakistani weapons small and large. If we can restrict Pakistan's arsenal it will be an advantage to us. Increasing our arsenal by restarting tests will not reduce theirs. It will only assist them. Testing again will help us in no way against Pakistan, but will simply put obstacles in our path that we would otherwise not have to cross. Pakistan has some obstacles now - let them enjoy those obstacles and let them develop their arsenal. No matter how big they get we will still nuke the crap out of them, An increase in our arsenal can hurt China more - but with China it is problem of reaching targets that will cripple them.

Starting to test again because we want to deter China is a different subject and I will say what I think in a separate post

ShauryaT wrote:

shiv wrote: So while we can rest easy by claiming that we have better and bigger nukes after a series of tests, I am unable to see what advantage over Pakistan will accrue from such tests, given that they too will gain the same advantages as we do.

Pakistan will most likely take the foolish approach, try to match the tests and invest more in their nuclear and conventional deterrence in an effort to match India and in this process continue to destabilize their country. This will hurt their overall progress and further extend the large differential in economical and human development indices. A less developed, unstable Pakistan works to the advantage of India - even if they continue to wield the best nuclear weapons, guaranteeing the protection of their state from "outside" threats. So, advantage for India?

They are already doing this and it is they who face obstacles. What is the exact reason for India to increase the obstacles we have hoping that Pakistani obstacles will increase more. This is literally a suggestion to cut off our nose to spite our face. Permanent (or long term) damage being done to ourselves in the hope of gaining unspecified advantages over Pakistan,

In any case I have written about this in my previous post

where is the permanent damage to us if we resume testing ? The same argument was made by those who did not want the 1998 tests to happen. What happened after the 1998 tests ?

Tests are to ensure that we do not fall behind in arsenal quality. Right now, we are on par if not ahead. Whether we test or not makes no difference to when Pak will get a TN. They will get it when NoKo gives them that. At that point, should we be on par/ahead or should we fall behind ? After all, nuclear firepower is still a currency of national power no matter how much one may try to brush this aside. There is a reason why Japan/Germany will remain lightweights when push comes to shove.

Ramanaji: the 6 kt estimate might also be to obfuscate reality. Look at the yield equation given here:

mb = 1.0125 log (Yield in kt) − 0.7875 log (overburden in m) + 5.887

(see http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/ ... an-h-bomb/, who have given a link to a relevant seismology paper). Now, Chinese papers have estimated overburdens unto 610 m in the earlier NoKo tests. Assuming 1 km in the worst case, we get a yield of unto 37 kt of Mb=5.1 (USGS/EMSC). Could very well be a successful test with aims like what S-1 aimed for.

So while we can rest easy by claiming that we have better and bigger nukes after a series of tests, I am unable to see what advantage over Pakistan will accrue from such tests, given that they too will gain the same advantages as we do.

Pakistan will get the advantages of bigger and better nukes via NoKo whether or not we test. Question is should we get those advantages for ourselves or should we reconcile ourselves to a superior Pak arsenal. The second option is surely unacceptable.

Pakistan has two options. One is to avoid testing again and sit tight while India gets the flak. But that means Pakistan is perfectly happy with its weapons designs and does not want more testing. This is a fake premise because we have been saying all along that Pakistan is trying to refine designs and is testing in Korea. Most likely Pakistan will start testing again, freely and without encumbrance. NoKo too will be free of any shackles and cooperation with Pakistan can become overt. Of course sanctions will kick in but if sanctions have little effect on India they will have little effect on Pakistan and NoKo. Iran and other unspecified states may start testing. In fact nations like Nigeria and others may then want to start testing nuclear weapons when they see that India followed by other nations are testing freely again.

NoKo is free of any shackles in any case. Better Pak does this overtly than covertly gain advantages over us. As for other states, not all states have the same immunity to sanctions. Small states are far easier to sanction and more affected by them then larger states such as ours. If Iran and other unspecified states want to try their luck, let them. Upholding the existing world order is not our burden. Especially when it is our interests that are being squeezed by various means. If the taboo on going nuclear breaks down and Japan/SoKo go nuclear as well, it would be good for us: China's wonderful plans for Asian hegemony would have backfired spectacularly.

As I see it, China is making its 1990s moves all over again in the nuclear field: it has always tried to box us under the nuclear hegemony of a rabid Pakistan. In 1990's it was about crossing the threshold from conventional to nuclear weapons Pak has proven PRC fission weapons, while we had unproven fission weapons in our basement in limited numbers. 1998 brought us parity/some edge for a while.

Now the same is being repeated regarding the threshold from a limited nuclear arsenal to a full fledged one (at least one order of magnitude firepower wise). Again, if we think like we did in the 1990s, we should get over the fear of sanctions and test.

The 1998 events made sure that the TSP which was better (per capita) than us economically slipped behind. A future round will retard them further: their size ensures that big investments make a far nigger difference to them than they do to us.

Overall, each episode of India's breaking these artificial taboos has only increased its overall national power. Why hold back ?

ramdas wrote:where is the permanent damage to us if we resume testing ? The same argument was made by those who did not want the 1998 tests to happen. What happened after the 1998 tests ?

Tests are to ensure that we do not fall behind in arsenal quality. Right now, we are on par if not ahead. Whether we test or not makes no difference to when Pak will get a TN. They will get it when NoKo gives them that. At that point, should we be on par/ahead or should we fall behind ? After all, nuclear firepower is still a currency of national power no matter how much one may try to brush this aside. There is a reason why Japan/Germany will remain lightweights when push comes to shove.

Permanent (or long term) damage was what i said. Long term damage was LCA program and import of Rafale.

Testing to improve arsenal quality represents shifting of the goalpost. Testing to improve arsenal quality is different from testing because we think that will deter Pakistan more efficiently. I can see absolutely no reason why Pakistan should be more deterred than they currently are by India if we developed smaller weapons of higher yield. If we can ensure their destruction by existing weapons then any more than that will give no added advantage against Pakistan. Maybe against China but that is a different subject.

However if you feel our weapons don't work, and are unreliable and need testing (as most people who ask for testing seem to do) then we have no deterrent today, and you are asking that we start developing weapons by testing. Why would Pakistan be deterred by such a bluff?

The point is that Pakistan will not be any "more deterred" by India starting to test again. That will in fact give them new life as they will then be free to do what they want. And if we start testing using the excuse you have given "They will get it when NoKo gives them that. At that point, should we be on par/ahead or should we fall behind ?" - that will be the clearest signal to Pakistan that India is scared and that Pakistani nukes are scaring us an we are reacting to their nukes and they can control our actions by what they do. Unfortunately deterrence is not about showing how scared we are abut scaring Pakistan. Reassuring them with our own self doubt is destruction of our own deterrence.

ramdas wrote:

So while we can rest easy by claiming that we have better and bigger nukes after a series of tests, I am unable to see what advantage over Pakistan will accrue from such tests, given that they too will gain the same advantages as we do.

Pakistan will get the advantages of bigger and better nukes via NoKo whether or not we test. Question is should we get those advantages for ourselves or should we reconcile ourselves to a superior Pak arsenal. The second option is surely unacceptable.

You are recommending that we start doubting our arsenal when Pakistan improves its arsenal. I don't understand how that works. If our arsenal deters them today, why would it stop working just because their weapons improve. Do you believe that the quality of our weapons is tied up with the quality of Pakistan weapons.

ramdas wrote: NoKo is free of any shackles in any case. Better Pak does this overtly than covertly gain advantages over us. As for other states, not all states have the same immunity to sanctions. Small states are far easier to sanction and more affected by them then larger states such as ours. If Iran and other unspecified states want to try their luck, let them. Upholding the existing world order is not our burden. Especially when it is our interests that are being squeezed by various means. If the taboo on going nuclear breaks down and Japan/SoKo go nuclear as well, it would be good for us: China's wonderful plans for Asian hegemony would have backfired spectacularly.

NoKo is a basket case propped up by the Lizard. Indian growing middle class may not want to pay half the price NoKo has to pay for their independence in this one area. The ban on N-weapons testing is however mandated by the US in a uni-polar world. This situation is unnatural and sooner or later will end. We are talking of the next 20-25 years, a short time in the life of a nation. The science once learned by India (or Pakistan, NoKo, Iran or anybody) can not be unlearned. So, on the long haul testing will start, there is no capping and roll back.
Gautam

ramdas wrote:As I see it, China is making its 1990s moves all over again in the nuclear field: it has always tried to box us under the nuclear hegemony of a rabid Pakistan.

Goalpost shifted again. Now you are saying that we should test because of China.

So you have now quoted three reasons for testing
1. Pakistan's weapons improve: I don't think that is a good enough reason for testing
2. We need to test our weapons quality: This is not about any changes in deterrence. It is about research and quality control
3. We need to test because China is playing games with us: I am willing to debate this as separate from the above two points. Why do we need to test for china's sake. What will be achieved by testing that will make China stop doing what they are doing

^Was only responding to the specific scenario. My position on the tests is not based on a need to deter Pakistan or China on its own. I look at this issue as part of our overall strategic power - a must have to be a great power in its own right. Similarly also support to build (even if only for TD purposes) a true ICBM range category of missiles, even if there are no immediate threats at those ranges. Admittedly a far off use case for an SLBM at those ranges exist. Support the deployment of MIRV, even if China does not have an effective ABM - today. So build this capability without trying to match exact scenarios.

Do not forget, when deterrence breaks down, these weapons become nuclear war weapons, where capacities WILL matter. By the logic you state, Russia should just go to a few 100 SLBM launchers as, deterrence against their likely opponents is achieved. Although the anxieties of US/Russia to wipe out each other have reduced, when these anxieties was at its peak, MAD constituted deterrence --- Not some idea of MUD. The idea is NOT to achieve MUD status with Pakistan, it is to dominate. If Pakistan does invest in the area to the degree, where they are able to inflict unacceptable damage, they need to be overwhelmed with ABM and appropriate doctrinal changes to match their capabilities and intent. It maybe with a first strike.

As for they are already on the path of self destruction, not so, the way I read it. They are spending only 3% of their GDP on defense needs. They do face some challenges but they are not unsurmountable, a position I have held for a few years now, when many were in glee on their 30,000 killed but it is temporary and shall pass as being witnessed. In order to destabilize them, an outside power has to actively assist in that endeavor, only India has the means and will to do so.

Shaurya unfortunately I strongly disagree with the contention that nuclear weapons alone are an indicator a great power. In fact the statement makes me cringe. Nuclear weapons are definitely part of what a great power is, but "great power" means exerting power using force or other means on other powers and then insulating yourself against defeat by your own power - with nukes if need be. Here Bharat Karnad is 100% correct even if he makes idiotic technical arguments

Compared to India both Pakistan and North Korea are "great powers". Both nations behave like the great powers USA, Russia, UK, France, China and non nuclear great powers like Germany and Japan because they use their national power to achieve international strategic goals. Pakistan does not hesitate to enter India, Afghanistan or Bahrain or Iran and cocks a snook at anyone who questions them and tells them to fuk off because they have nukes. Even the US can do nothing. We may not like describing Pakistan and NoKo as great powers but they behave like great powers

Pakistan certainly behaves like a great power. India may be a great power in many ways but we do not behave like a great power. We are loath to use our national coercive power. we are scared to enter conflicts to turn things our way. We dither and try and befriend Israel and Arabs, Russia and the West. Simply getting more and bigger nukes is like putting a gun belt on a goat. We need to use our power which we do not do. India is a wimp power. We beg for UN security council seat without taking sides and expecting that someone else will control Pakistan. We are the first to call out our own inadequacies - malnutrition, shitting in the open, inability to stop Paki terrorists. Testing nukes is not going to change that. Lipstick on pig by a nation not confident of itself or its own power.

Added later:

There are 3 separate subjects here
1. Deterrence
2. Nuclear weapons maintenance and quality control
3. Being a great power. i will probably pen some thoughts on this in a separate thread. Not here

Our not testing is a symptom of the larger disease of our being strategically retarded (or "wimp power" if you put it that way). There is no point in restraining our strategic power just to defer to US or any other power's wishes. There have been instances of our doing the right thing in spite of all external pressures. Each has added to our strategic weight in the world (Poki, Pok 2, Agni V, etc). Restraint will only give hope to outside interests that seek our containment.

@Shiv: maybe you could list the consequences you think we would face if we were to test in the near future. If a few raffles/LCA's is it, then a hefty increase in strategic power more than compensates for what we would lose by this and other similar setbacks in the conventional field.

@Gautam: the middle class is not going to pay a major price for our testing if we were to do so in the next few years. US sanctions or no sanctions have very little bearing on consumer items in India. After all, the middle class did not stop growing in the 1998 aftermath.

Shiv,

Your estimate sounds just about right. Given that we've probably accumulated somewhere around 600 kg of plutonium, we should have enough to throw at Pakistan while keeping ~30 X 50/200kt warheads to break the dragons jaw if they get any ideas.

We should also work on MSR/Fusion power, LIF, super computing etc. to more efficiently utilize and grow stockpile of plutonium while effectively validating our TN designs till the time to test comes. When Pakistan goes under we'll have to focus all our energy on achieving parity with China while slowly expanding our reach to US.

My argument for testing are:-
1] It allows us to miniaturise our warhead and hence gives us wider area to hide our missiles and subs, since the throw distance increases.
2] Increases the number of warheads with current stockpile and hence reduces the cost for maintaining them.
3] Also remember Arun_S claiming that minitaurisation of warhead allows us to carry more missiles in our SSBNs and hence fewer required.
4] Tomorrow eventually Pakistan will acquire ABM technology; in that case we will need to increase the number of missiles since hit probability reduces. Then instead of needing 20 15kt devices we will need say 40 of them. If in such a scenario with our thermonukes we would have required only 2 nukes of 150kt and with ABM 4 would have sufficed.
So, as Master Yoda would have said: "Test we must".

There are two things which GoI will never do :
1. Nuclear Testing
2. Overt action against paki terrorism

Of all the views i read on this dhaga , Shiv makes a good read. I like his line of reasoning. Since this is a serious thread and i am not a learned maulana , i will express less and read more.