Bharat Rakshak

Three RAW officers defect to the West

http://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/ ... efect-west

Three officers belonging to the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external spy agency, have “willingly disappeared” and are now likely to be in a large Western country, which has a history of accepting and facilitating such disappearances of Indian intelligence officers, The Sunday Guardian has learnt. Repeated emails sent to the Cabinet Secretariat, which is the controlling body of the RAW, over a period of two weeks, seeking responses over the development, did not elicit either a denial or an acceptance of the development.

These RAW officers, one of whom is posted at a senior level in the agency, had shifted their families to the western country much before they themselves disappeared. The disappearance of these three officers took place in the last three months, this newspaper has learnt. Two of the officers were handling two South Asian countries, while the third was handling a large East Asian country.

It is assumed that these three officers were working for the intelligence agency of the Western country for long and in all likelihood have passed on vital information to the agency before disappearing.

Emails sent to two departments that handle such defections in this particular Western country did not elicit any response, either a denial or a confirmation, despite repeated attempts.

This is not for the first time that officers working for the Indian spy agency have “willingly disappeared”. Many similar incidents, at least nine as per official records, have happened since the creation of the agency in 1968, including the defection of Rabinder Singh, who was a joint secretary in the RAW before defecting to the United States in 2004.

In 2004, Rabinder Singh had defected to the US via Kathmandu along with his wife with the assistance of the CIA. In 2006, RAW had told a Delhi court that he had been traced to New Jersey and the agency was trying to extradite him.

According to officials in the security establishment, it is virtually impossible to bring back these spies as once they land in their country of refuge, they are given a new identity and are treated as well guarded assets and with time are granted citizenships.

In this game of cloak and daggers, defections are not very uncommon. In the late 1980s, Igor Guejo, a KGB agent disappeared from New Delhi under mysterious circumstances. His red Lada Vaz car was found abandoned at Lodhi Garden, where he used to go for his evening walks. Even as Indian agencies searched for him, Guejo surfaced in New York some days later. It was obvious that he had defected from USSR to the US.

There are also ample stories of how senior bureaucrats and officers of the armed forces have been compromised to work for intelligence agencies abroad. The infamous spy scandal involving the Larkin brothers—one a retired Air Vice Marshal and the other a decorated Major General—was a grim reminder of how Western intelligence agencies had successfully recruited two men with many state secrets.

There have been allegations that a former chief in the defence establishment had close connections with the Americans during one of India’s internal conflict in the 1960s. The names of several politicians who were close to the CIA figure in a book written by celebrated author and journalist, Seymour Hersh.

sivaramn wrote:So on Twitter, we have news that 2 RAW officers have left for a large western country along with their families....so much for friendship

Austin wrote:That's how Intel works our CI folks are just too sloppy in their job.

sivaramn wrote:So on Twitter, we have news that 2 RAW officers have left for a large western country along with their families....so much for friendship

chetak wrote:

NRao wrote:
As they do today, without any agreements.

I see no value in BECA. I cannot see a dire need for CISMOA (the Russian angle is bogus IMHO). The LSA, I can see value.

The LSA that they are asking for and actually want will turn us into a vassal state.

take for eg the arrangement that they have with the pakis. A significant part of a major paki airbase is sovereign US territory, manned and totally controlled by the US and it is completely off limits to the pakis. They resupply that facility at their own sweet will and wish, with the pakis having absolutely no say over the resupply flights or when they come in or what they carry in or out or how many people are based there on a temporary / transit basis, apart from the considerable permanent US staff, communication facilities and "defensive" capabilities.

WTF should we live with the LSA?? Any form of it will entail a long time US military presence on Indian soil, even for "disaster" management. Unless, of course, Modi plans to invade canada and we need to refuel at some US bases

It's like the camel and the tent story. Modi's great pontificating "friend" obama seems to be making very heavy weather of these foundation agreements.

If they need repairs and bunkering, give it to them on a case by case basis, as is being done now and be done with it. There is a considerable difference when are warships on "innocent " passage and otherwise.

They also want full "diplomatic" protection for all their military staff on Indian soil as part of the same agreement. After the cavity search of our diplomatic staff??, no way.

are we some effing coolie country like pakistan or what?? In some decades, we may overtake their economy.

NRao wrote:

chetak wrote:
{quote="NRao"}

As they do today, without any agreements.

I see no value in BECA. I cannot see a dire need for CISMOA (the Russian angle is bogus IMHO). The LSA, I can see value.{/quote}


The LSA that they are asking for and actually want will turn us into a vassal state.

take for eg the arrangement that they have with the pakis. A significant part of a major paki airbase is sovereign US territory, manned and totally controlled by the US and it is completely off limits to the pakis. They resupply that facility at their own sweet will and wish, with the pakis having absolutely no say over the resupply flights or when they come in or what they carry in or out or how many people are based there on a temporary / transit basis, apart from the considerable permanent US staff, communication facilities and "defensive" capabilities.

WTF should we live with the LSA?? Any form of it will entail a long time US military presence on Indian soil, even for "disaster" management. Unless, of course, Modi plans to invade canada and we need to refuel at some US bases

It's like the camel and the tent story. Modi's great pontificating "friend" obama seems to be making very heavy weather of these foundation agreements.

If they need repairs and bunkering, give it to them on a case by case basis, as is being done now and be done with it. There is a considerable difference when are warships on "innocent " passage and otherwise.

They also want full "diplomatic" protection for all their military staff on Indian soil as part of the same agreement. After the cavity search of our diplomatic staff??, no way.

are we some effing coolie country like pakistan or what?? In some decades, we may overtake their economy.

Not even close.

The US had asked for a similar arrangement with India, in A&N.

I am not sure why you are confusing two totally different issues. There should be plenty of other nations that have LSA (that are a lot more stringent that the one India is proposing to sign) and no bases.

Anyways, up to India. Perhaps need to wait for a copy to come out.

Bhaskar_T wrote:Sivramn - 3 RAW officers. Below is one article.

Three RAW officers defect to the West

http://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/ ... efect-west

Three officers belonging to the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external spy agency, have “willingly disappeared” and are now likely to be in a large Western country, which has a history of accepting and facilitating such disappearances of Indian intelligence officers, The Sunday Guardian has learnt. Repeated emails sent to the Cabinet Secretariat, which is the controlling body of the RAW, over a period of two weeks, seeking responses over the development, did not elicit either a denial or an acceptance of the development.

These RAW officers, one of whom is posted at a senior level in the agency, had shifted their families to the western country much before they themselves disappeared. The disappearance of these three officers took place in the last three months, this newspaper has learnt. Two of the officers were handling two South Asian countries, while the third was handling a large East Asian country.

It is assumed that these three officers were working for the intelligence agency of the Western country for long and in all likelihood have passed on vital information to the agency before disappearing.

Emails sent to two departments that handle such defections in this particular Western country did not elicit any response, either a denial or a confirmation, despite repeated attempts.

This is not for the first time that officers working for the Indian spy agency have “willingly disappeared”. Many similar incidents, at least nine as per official records, have happened since the creation of the agency in 1968, including the defection of Rabinder Singh, who was a joint secretary in the RAW before defecting to the United States in 2004.

In 2004, Rabinder Singh had defected to the US via Kathmandu along with his wife with the assistance of the CIA. In 2006, RAW had told a Delhi court that he had been traced to New Jersey and the agency was trying to extradite him.

According to officials in the security establishment, it is virtually impossible to bring back these spies as once they land in their country of refuge, they are given a new identity and are treated as well guarded assets and with time are granted citizenships.

In this game of cloak and daggers, defections are not very uncommon. In the late 1980s, Igor Guejo, a KGB agent disappeared from New Delhi under mysterious circumstances. His red Lada Vaz car was found abandoned at Lodhi Garden, where he used to go for his evening walks. Even as Indian agencies searched for him, Guejo surfaced in New York some days later. It was obvious that he had defected from USSR to the US.

There are also ample stories of how senior bureaucrats and officers of the armed forces have been compromised to work for intelligence agencies abroad. The infamous spy scandal involving the Larkin brothers—one a retired Air Vice Marshal and the other a decorated Major General—was a grim reminder of how Western intelligence agencies had successfully recruited two men with many state secrets.

There have been allegations that a former chief in the defence establishment had close connections with the Americans during one of India’s internal conflict in the 1960s. The names of several politicians who were close to the CIA figure in a book written by celebrated author and journalist, Seymour Hersh.

sivaramn wrote:So on Twitter, we have news that 2 RAW officers have left for a large western country along with their families....so much for friendship

The last week was excellent for India related defence news but bad for India related defence facts. This was almost entirely to do with rumours of the so called “foundational” agreements being signed. This two part series will examine the documents and the objections they face in the Indian context. The first part looks at the LSA and the internal turf battles that prevent its signing. The second part looks at CISMOA & BECA and the huge educational backwardness our military and defence bureaucracy are encumbered with.

As usual the op-ed columns on either got almost all their facts wrong or avoided facts altogether in favour of the “we need to debate this more” card. Clearly it had the desired effect and the joint statement between the two ministers skipped any mention whatsoever of these. The problem with the “more debate” argument is as one of America’s senior-most officials said in an off the record briefing last year “I wish someone here would tell me what India’s exact objections to these agreements are factually”. The facts are easy to dig out – versions of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Basic Exchange of Communications Agreement (BECA) & Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) with Korea, Sweden and Norway are available on the internet.

To start with all of these are agreements – not treaties and the dispute clauses in them specifically ask to avoid arbitration or international adjudication; preferring instead to settle then “at the lowest level possible”. This means disagreements keep getting escalated up the normal command chain till such time agreement is found – in effect both parties have a veto & actions can only happen with mutual consent.

Take the case of the LSA. It gives the US access to Indian bases and India access to US bases and all the facilities associated with bases – such a maintenance, refuelling, etc. There are two arguments peddled against this accord in the public discourse. The first is of a conflict of interest; hypothetically what happens if the US has to carry out a mission against our old friend Russia. The second is and argument of reciprocity; will India for example get access to Oman if and when we choose to blockade Gwadar.

Both are based on an exceptionally poor reading of both history and facts. All US alliances and agreements take into account such conflicts of interest and allow opt out clauses. Take for example NATO – an organisation bound together by a far more robust treaty than any of these agreements we are being asked to sign. During the 1986 Anglo-American bombing of Libya – France, Spain and Italy (all NATO allies) all refused to allow US bases located in their territory to be used, and further denied overflight to planes operating out of US bases in the UK. Similarly the US, France and NATO declared solidarity with the UK when the Argentines took over the Falklands in 1982 but did not provide support to the Royal Navy; on the contrary French technicians continued to assist the Argentines with the anti-ship Exocet missiles causing hundreds of British fatalities. This was done to secure French commercial interests in the region. Britain paid back America in the same coin a year later in 1983 when the US invaded Grenada, leading the furious international condemnation that followed. The conclusion is inescapable - both we and the United States can deny each other facilities for operations that we perceive to be against our interests.

Reciprocity is a trickier issue. India is demanding reciprocal facilities in US bases not on US territory but rather in 3rd countries such as Oman and Bahrain. India will have to negotiate bilaterally with both Bahrain and Oman to access those bases as they still retain sovereign right of refusal to 3rd countries, and then ask the US to expand the LSA to those bases. It is surprising that the Ministry of External Affairs that is so guarded about India’s sovereignty seems to think Bahraini and Omani sovereignty are the US’ to get away. Reciprocally India allowing US access to Indian bases is not the same as India allowing other US allies such as Saudi Arabia access to our bases. Evidently the Indian position is aimed at forcing Oman and Bahrain to cede access of those bases to India. This is a sign of India’s extraordinarily impotent and superficial diplomacy in the region. The reciprocity question forces us to introspect - why is it that India has not carried out military action against Pakistan despite repeated provocations in the past? Has it been because of a denial of basing facilities at Bahrain and Oman or to do with a lack of will, a nuclear stalemate and a military in disarray back home? How would access to the US base in Bahrain for example strengthen our position? How would it ease the virtual hostage situation our Middle East policy is trapped in, with our migrant workers in West Asia and their remittances home? Why have we not offered military services to the Government of Yemen in return for a long term lease on the strategically far more important Socotra Island?

The stand out curiosity has been India’s insistence on a “case by case approval” for this agreement. Little understood this is in fact key to understanding India’s institutional opposition to the LSA that has to do with our own deep internal divisions. The LSA effectively puts interactions between the two militaries – mostly the two navies on autopilot on all issues that they agree on. This near constant interaction brings enormous educational, operational and capability benefits to the navy, but it also effectively denies the IFS and IAS of their most potent power – the power to block either in return for transactional benefits or as is the case in India – just for the sake of blocking. In the case of the IFS this agreement is an existential danger since the Navy is effectively the second diplomatic service of the country. With 55,000 troops as opposed to the MEA’s 700, the Navy is both better funded, better manned and infinitely more capable. Is it any surprise then that since LSA negotiations began the MEA has been trying to usurp decision making on some key naval capabilities such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) as well as floating the canard of India being a “security provider” to West Asia? This is a turf war that is natural in every country on earth. What is dangerous however is conflating narrow sectional interests with the national interest.

Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is an independent defence analyst. He has coordinated the National Security at the Observer Research Foundation & been visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories and the Stimson Centre. He writes about defence policy, technology & defence cooperation on his blog, Tarkash, a part of Business Standard's platform, Punditry.
Abhijit tweets as @abhijit_iyer

chetak wrote: A&N is sensitive for a lot of reasons. It's absolutely a no no for any govt to accommodate the US there.

There is no confusion. I merely pointed out what they actually want and what that actually means to us on the ground, if we are foolish enough to agree, shorn of all the ifs and buts.

amreki men of war have been routinely been putting in to Indian ports for years now. Sometimes as part of a visit, exercise but more often than not as part of their passage on their many deployments.

we have to watch for trickery like the GOI did during the gulf war whereby they slyly permitted the US military overflight rights but denied meaningless "refueling" rights and diverted the attention of the people from what was actually happening to some politically correct but completely bogus claptrap.

Playing down India’s decision to sign a logistic agreement with the US, Chinese state media today said the proposed deal is stalled because of distrust between the two as India wants to be the “most beautiful woman” wooed by all, especially Washington and Beijing.

“Besides their traditional distrust, the speculation heralding a US-India alliance is also an obvious underestimation of India’s ambition for a role of swing-state between superpowers,” an article in the state-run Global Times said as Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar started his first visit to Beijing today for talks with Chinese officials.

“The basic idea is that India would like to continue to be the most beautiful woman wooed by all men, notably the two strongest in the house, US and China,” the article titled ‘Indo-US strategic distrust stalls LSA signing’.

“This is not an unfamiliar role to India. We can still recall how its diplomatic manoeuvring had earned itself a special role between the two competing blocs during the Cold War,” it said.

“Evidently enough, it needs to feel its way forward and try not to agitate China by crossing the bottom line and consequently it declines to discuss the prospect of joint patrols in the South China Sea, despite the obvious interest and much enthusiasm from its American counterpart,” it said.

Last week, US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter concluded his three-day visit to India and announced he and his Indian counterpart have agreed in-principle that all the issues regarding a Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) are resolved and both sides would finalise the text in the coming weeks.

Highlighting India’s decision to sign the LSA, the report said: “Despite a whole range of strategic issues being covered in the visit, the topic of the logistics agreement itself has triggered speculation among international media that both sides are boarding the same boat to contain China.”

In essence, the LSA’s purpose is to share military bases for logistical purposes, including refuelling and repair.

“Therefore it is very much similar to the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), a traditional agreement the US has with many of its NATO allies,” the article said.

“That’s why it has triggered speculation that both sides are moving toward a military alliance arrangement”, it said.

In 2007, the US and Sri Lanka signed an ACSA to allow exchange of logistics supplies during peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations, and joint exercises.
- See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/world/ ... zUITe.dpuf

SSridhar wrote:NRao, a full fledged naval base is going to be too costly for the US in view of the economic situation and the massive expenditure that the US has incurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. Short of funds, the US approach is to have LSA-type agreements with various nations in this region. In any case, India, even under Modi's government would not agree to American bases on its soil. Among the three 'foundational' agreements, the BECA & CISMOA do not directly benefit the US except that it may demand an arm and a leg from us and an incidental benefit of being able to track our assets & platforms. It is the LSA that is of immense direct benefit to the US and it brings India no benefits at all! It is claimed that it sends a 'signal' to China. But, China might not feel much threatened because there is a general perception in ASEAN, Japan & South Korea that the US committment to the region is suspect. The Freedom of Navigation Patrols (FONP) by the US Navy etc are to reassure the doubts amongst its allies in this region. Everybody knows how unreliable the US is. That is why many ASEAN countries want a greater involvement of India in the Indo-China Sea (ICS). That the US military power and its projection capabilities are enormous are never in doubt, but only its reliability factor. In such a situation, we (meaning India) have to not only bind the US legally but also be assured through its actions that it walks the talk. Legal agreements are mere scraps of paper for a country like the US that plays nothing but realpolitik. Unfortunately, India has several bitter experiences with various US Administrations. IMO, the US has not done enough against Pakistan to deserve a closer relationship. No doubt, the Indo-US relationship is on an upswing and nobody in India (even the Communists because their sons & daughters have begun going to the US for education & jobs) grudges that but a hug with the US, because that is what the LISMOA would be, is far away, at least in the minds of most. The LSA is of a massive benefit for the US but it will have to earn it by its actions. So far, there is nothing in the US words & deeds that suggest that they have changed course. But, with my Indian government, I do not know whether it sees the India-US relationship that way or not.

NRao wrote: BTW, India has signed the End User Agreement with the US has she not? So, supposedly there should be Americans crawling for the past few years - that was the fear. Is it true now that it has been a few years? Collecting data.

NRao wrote:Too complex.

As I mentioned in the preamble, these are meant for inter-operations and the LSA, specifically, has been used *mostly* during times of peace. So although I get the noise about war, I just do not get why India cannot say "no" in such times. Where is the threat? What are you afraid of when you know what is going to happen - BR seems to have gamed it well?

Benefit? I see a huge benefit to India too.

This whole topic has been over analyzed. I think it is up to India.

India does weigh a *lot*, just that Indians do not know how to throw that weight around for national benefits. Analyze, come to conclusions, place a process in place and execute. Just too much old fashioned thinking and a ton of fear.

BTW, India has signed the End User Agreement with the US has she not? So, supposedly there should be Americans crawling for the past few years - that was the fear. Is it true now that it has been a few years? Collecting data.

ShauryaT wrote: The EUMA clause needs the US to first ASK for such an onsite inspection, do you know if they have even asked?

Let us be clear on what the EUMA is. It is an agreement that seeks to further the US national interest by putting in some reasonable and some extraneous conditions for buying US equipment.

SSridhar wrote:

NRao wrote:Too complex.

Not at all. It is very simple. I have made three points. India gains nothing. The US in unreliable because the gains are in the rarified atmosphere of being 'potential' and we Indians do not have much faith with respect to the US. Thirdly, the US has to 'act' to 'prove' rather than parroting 'defining relationsjip of the 21st century' and all that nonsense.

As I mentioned in the preamble, these are meant for inter-operations and the LSA, specifically, has been used *mostly* during times of peace. So although I get the noise about war, I just do not get why India cannot say "no" in such times. Where is the threat? What are you afraid of when you know what is going to happen - BR seems to have gamed it well?

Benefit? I see a huge benefit to India too.

Why say 'yes' now when the benefits to India are not at all apparent. I would like you to list the benefits for us, Indians.

This whole topic has been over analyzed. I think it is up to India.

Exactly. My position is simple as I have stated right at the beginning of this post. It is up to us Indians and we largely reject that.

India does weigh a *lot*, just that Indians do not know how to throw that weight around for national benefits. Analyze, come to conclusions, place a process in place and execute. Just too much old fashioned thinking and a ton of fear.

Exactly, again. That is my point too. The 'potential' benefits do not measure up. I expect my Indian government to play hardball realpolitik as much as, if not more than, the US. That is not old fashioned thinking, isn't it?

Top Trump aide lobbied for Pakistani spy front
https://www.yahoo.com/news/top-trump-ai ... 07222.html
For more than five years, Donald Trump’s new top campaign aide, Paul Manafort, lobbied for a Washington-based group that Justice Department prosecutors have charged operated as a front for Pakistan’s intelligence service, according to court and lobbying records reviewed by Yahoo News.

Manafort’s work in the 1990s as a registered lobbyist for the Kashmiri American Council was only one part of a wide-ranging portfolio that, over several decades, included a gallery of controversial foreign clients ranging from Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and Zaire’s brutal dictator Mobutu Sese Seko to an Angolan rebel leader accused by human rights groups of torture. His role as an adviser to Ukraine’s then prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, prompted concerns within the Bush White House that he was undermining U.S. foreign policy. It was considered so politically toxic in 2008 that presidential candidate John McCain nixed plans for Manafort to manage the Republican National Convention — a move that caused a rupture between Manafort and his then business partner, Rick Davis, who at the time was McCain’s campaign manager.

Manafort’s work for the Kashmiri group has so far not gotten any media attention.

But it could fuel more questions about his years of lobbying for questionable foreign interests before Manafort, 67, assumed his new position as chief delegate counter and strategist for a presidential candidate who repeatedly decries the influence of Washington lobbyists and denounces the manipulation of U.S. policy by foreign governments.

Court records show that Manafort’s Kashmiri lobbying contract came on the FBI’s radar screen during a lengthy counterterrorism investigation that culminated in 2011 with the arrest of the Kashmiri council’s director, Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai, on charges that he ran the group on behalf of Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, as part of a scheme to secretly influence U.S. policy toward the disputed territory of Kashmir.

Paul Manafort, convention manager for the Trump campaign, on “Meet the Press,” April 10. (Photo: William B. Plowman/NBC/NBC NewsWire via Getty Images)

The Kashmiri American Council was a “scam” that amounted to a “false flag operation that Mr. Fai was operating on behalf of the ISI,” Gordon D. Kromberg, the assistant U.S. attorney who prosecuted the case, said in March 2012 at Fai’s sentencing hearing in federal court. While posing as a U.S.-based nonprofit funded by American donors sympathetic to the plight of Kashmiris, it was actually bankrolled by the ISI in order to deflect public attention “away from the involvement of Pakistan in sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere,” Kromberg said. Fai, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy and tax fraud charges, was then sentenced to two years in federal prison.

There is another dimension which works against the forging of a strategic partnership and that pertains to the economic and trade relationship. In this important domain, the two countries are adversaries. The US move to establish the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) without any dialogue or consultation with India is illustrative of how the US Trade Representative looks upon India as a spoiler and a constant irritant, without considering whether there are genuine Indian concerns behind the positions we take. Even on India's membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which is not a negotiating body but a forum for sharing best practices, it is the US which is busy warning APEC members that bringing India in would retard progress in the forum. How can India be a strategic and, in particular, maritime security partner in the Indo-Pacific if it is seen as a rank adversary, and treated as such, in the economic and commercial domain in the same region? You cannot be a partner in one domain and a target in another. If that is the case then we should be honest enough to acknowledge that our strategic partnership, which may be of considerable value, nevertheless has clearly defined limits. If the US wishes to keep several options open to pursue its interests, India may need to do the same.

One should acknowledge that India-US relations today are more broad ranging and much deeper than at any time in the past. In the areas of defence and counter-terrorism, the level of cooperation and mutual understanding is unprecedented. But, we should also recognise that there is a constant threat of commercial issues overwhelming the relationship as was the case in 2014-15, when the US pharma industry launched a virtual "beat up on India" campaign on the issue of intellectual property. While India made a major contribution to the success of the Paris Climate Change agreement, at considerable sacrifice of its own long-term energy security interests, the US has dealt a blow to India's renewable energy plans by lodging a complaint at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against India for promoting its domestic solar industry.

Mr Obama recently gave a long interview to The National Interest magazine on the evolving global situation and the US's role in the Asia-Pacific region. India did not figure in the interview. So much for the "defining partnership of the 21st century", which is how he had described Indo-US relations during his first visit to India.

The US presidential elections are round the corner and it is anybody's guess what the new administration will look like and what its foreign policy agenda will be. While there will always be issues on which India and the US will adopt different postures, a strategic partnership should entail that on issues of key interest to each other there will at least be a "no surprises" and a "do no harm" understanding. Spelling out these interests may be a good starting point for dialogue with the incoming administration in Washington.

chetak wrote:The LSA that they are asking for and actually want will turn us into a vassal state.

take for eg the arrangement that they have with the pakis. A significant part of a major paki airbase is sovereign US territory, manned and totally controlled by the US and it is completely off limits to the pakis.

WTF should we live with the LSA?? Any form of it will entail a long time US military presence on Indian soil, even for "disaster" management.

are we some effing coolie country like pakistan or what?? In some decades, we may overtake their economy.

SSridhar wrote:Much as I am dismayed, I believe that the LEMOA agreement is going to be be signed sooner than later. Somehow, even Carter does not seem to be so perturbed after his India visit. By your own admission, if there is only one guy who supported India so much in the Obama administration, is it worth having any agreement at all? How does it even square up with a 'less complex and more simple' analysis?

DINAKAR PERI

‘IEA will formalise exact technology that U.S. will share’

India and the U.S. may not have signed the Logistics Support Agreement as planned during Defence Secretary Ashton Carter’s visit early this week but both sides are close to finalising an Information Exchange Agreement (IEA) on aircraft carrier technologies, as well as cooperation on air wing operations for carrier Vikrant under construction at Kochi.

The IEA will formalise the exact technology that the U.S. will share and at what classification level, design side, operations among other things, a senior U.S. Admiral said. Both sides had already signed the Terms of Reference on June 17, 2015 during the first meeting of the India-U.S. Joint Working Group (JWG) on carrier technology cooperation.

“We provided them a draft when I visited them in February and it is going through the necessary channels of the Indian government to make sure you are ok with it. We are very close,” said Rear Admiral Tom Moore in an exclusive interview to The Hindu, in the US capital late last month. He is the U.S. Navy’s Program Executive Officer for Aircraft Carriers, and the Co-chair of the JWG. From the Indian side it is chaired by Vice Admiral G.S. Pubby, Controller for Warship Production and Acquisition.

“It is a necessary document to take the next step. We have made a lot of progress over the last year,” he noted.

EMALS technology

Once the IEA is in place a case will be put under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme of the U.S. government under which the Electro Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) technology will be sold to India, if the Navy decides to buy it. The IEA found mention in the joint statement issued after talks between Mr. Carter and his Indian counterpart Manohar Parrikar.

India and the U.S. agreed to cooperate on aircraft carrier technologies as part of six “path-finder” projects under the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative during President Barack Obama’s visit to India in January last year.

Consequently the JWG was set up to explore possibility of installing the Electro Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) under development by General Atomics on India’s second Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC-II) which is currently on the drawing board.

On the future roadmap of the JWG, Rear Adm Moore said that the US is currently engaged in a formal process of reviews required as per their law covering high technology sales to other countries and stated, “We are in the stage of looking into that and expect to finish that in the next 6-8 months which will allow us to come to a decision on sharing the technology.”

Meanwhile the Indian Navy too is carrying out a feasibility study to determine the characteristics of the carrier like propulsion, kind of aircraft and type of launch mechanism for which EMALS is under consideration. The Navy intends the carrier to be of 65,000 tons.

Cooperation on Vikrant

In addition to EMALS, the IEA has an agreement for cooperation on air wing operations for the first IAC - Vikrant which is currently in an advanced stage of construction and is on course to begin sea trials by September 2017 and aviation trials after December 2018.

Mr. Moore stated that there is a detailed process for testing, certification and delivery. “We can hold discussions on certifying the flight deck, testing and so on as you are doing it for the first time,” he said.

The third meeting of the Carrier Working Group is scheduled this summer around July in the US. “IEA will be done by then,” Mr. Moore added.

The US Navy has also offered courses related to carrier operations to Indian navy personnel at their Defence Acquisition University. The Indian side is currently reviewing the course catalogue and a decision is expected shortly.

SSridhar wrote:But, China might not feel much threatened because there is a general perception in ASEAN, Japan & South Korea that the US committment to the region is suspect.

devesh wrote:we are falling hook, line, and sinker for this American baiting. I can only hope we are not being led by the nose to the gallows.