Deterrence

[shiv]

Maybe we ought to answer all the ramifications of the question "How will India's resumption of testing" affect deterrence.

I acknowledge the argument that testing and refinement of our designs can aid nuclear warfighting by enabling more MIRVs and smaller and more efficient warheads. But this is about war-fighting AFTER deterrence has failed.

For example, if we started testing today - would that aid deterring Pakistan or any other nation at some stage down the line any more than they are deterred today? Let us assume that Pakistanis are continuously improving their designs and they get ABMs and MIRVs. How would our tests deter them?

This seems to me to be saying: "Pakistan is deterred by us today only because they have no MIRVs and ABMs. They will no longer be deterred when they get all this. They will definitely get all this in a few years and at that time they will be free to nuke us and they will no longer be deterred by us." Ok let me accept this as a valid proposition. The question in my mind is as follows: "If Pakistan is doing all this how do we escape? Can we escape simply by doing more tests and getting MIRVs and bigger size nukes?"

In fact what we are talking about here is the policy of "MAD" or mutually assured destruction. They will destroy us. We will destroy them. The idea is that is they get bigger and better nukes (which they are getting anyway from China) we too must test and get bigger and more nukes. So the only way we can stay abreast of them is to start testing again, and by testing we can improve and increase our arsenal so that we can destroy them even if they have ABMs and even if they can destroy us totally with their MIRVed nukes.

The argument that follows from this is that NFU is useless. If Pakistan attacks us first, we will be totally destroyed before we can react especially as their arsenal gets bigger and more sophisticated. For this reason we must test, increase our arsenal. make MIRVed missiles and change our posture to First Use so that we can attack them and devastate them before they can react with a second strike.

A third argument that stems from this is that if we restart testing and change our posture to first use, we can then retaliate against Pakistani terrorism at will and they will be somehow scared of us because of our First Use policy and our MIRVs. Of course Pakistan has already indicated that they will somehow acquire a second strike capability to hit us after a first strike, but the question is do we have the national will to conduct a first strike on Pakistan? After all the warning time for a nuclear atack from Pakiatan may be less than 10 minutes, so what should our policy be about a first strike on Pakistan. Or would "humanitarian considerations" kick in as Nagal, a proponent of FU says?

And if we have the national will to conduct a first strike on Pakistan, are we going to have a different standard for China? Or are we going to be ready to strike China too with a first strike?

What is the level of destruction we seek in Pakistan, and what is the level of destruction we seek in China, It would seem to make sense to try and achieve that level of destruction in a first strike itself, so what is the kind of arsenal we are looking for. For that we need to know the destructive capability of various yields as well as our own capability to produce the required yields in usable sizes.

These questions also bring in our scientists because they will have to have clear instruction to deliver
a. Nukes of X yield and Y in number and Z in weight and dimensions
b. Delivery systems to deliver them to all desired targets in China and Pakistan

Why not look at these questions for starters - because testing again must have clarity and a definite purpose - not simply to address anxieties of some people.

[ramdas]

Maybe we ought to answer all the ramifications of the question "How will India's resumption of testing" affect deterrence.

I acknowledge the argument that testing and refinement of our designs can aid nuclear warfighting by enabling more MIRVs and smaller and more efficient warheads. But this is about war-fighting AFTER deterrence has failed.

You have provided an answer to your question right here. The probability that deterrence would fail increases if either side (especially a revisionist state) believes that it can win when it comes to nuclear warfighting. A status-quo state relying on nuclear deterrence (faced with a revisionist state) therefore has to have the maximization of its nuclear warfighting capacity (i.e, "nuclear punch") high on its list of priorities. A situation where the status quo state has distinct edge in nuclear warfighting capacity would bring the probability of a breakdown in deterrence as close to zero as possible. In other words, deterrence has to be backed by nuclear warfighting capacity. This is what people like Gen. Nagal seem to be veering towards.

Removing NFU does not mean that every Mumbai/Pathankot has to be responded to by FU. It gives us the option to use preemptive strikes under certain circumstances: like evidence that the other side is planning for a massive first strike. Also, FU should be an option if we are faced with superior conventional forces (like if PRC is making a grab for Arunachal Pradesh). FU as a policy is possible only if we have a credible nuclear warfighting capacity.

What is the level of destruction we seek in Pakistan, and what is the level of destruction we seek in China, It would seem to make sense to try and achieve that level of destruction in a first strike itself, so what is the kind of arsenal we are looking for. For that we need to know the destructive capability of various yields as well as our own capability to produce the required yields in usable sizes.

These questions also bring in our scientists because they will have to have clear instruction to deliver
a. Nukes of X yield and Y in number and Z in weight and dimensions
b. Delivery systems to deliver them to all desired targets in China and Pakistan

Why not look at these questions for starters - because testing again must have clarity and a definite purpose - not simply to address anxieties of some people.

This would be known only to the force planners in the PMO and the SFC. They are the highest competent authority for this. Whatever they say about the need for new thermonuclear armaments is a result of precisely these calculations done after careful thought.

[shiv]

This is what people like Gen. Nagal seem to be veering towards.

Removing NFU does not mean that every Mumbai/Pathankot has to be responded to by FU. It gives us the option to use preemptive strikes under certain circumstances: like evidence that the other side is planning for a massive first strike. Also, FU should be an option if we are faced with superior conventional forces (like if PRC is making a grab for Arunachal Pradesh). FU as a policy is possible only if we have a credible nuclear warfighting capacity.

I have a huge problem with what is essentially an incredible assumption. A nation that does not retaliate even with conventional military to attacks suddenly starts saying that we will nuke you is an idea that I cannot believe. The fakeness of this premise can be easily tested by continuing terrorist attacks (or aggravations at the AP boundary) and not getting any nuclear response from India. That will really kill any deterrence that we imagine we have.

Nagal's credibility is low in my eyes because he says we must not retaliate massively after a tactical nuclear strike but try to de escalate on humanitarian grounds. Are men like these in charge of our nuclear forces? That is a shame.

This would be known only to the force planners in the PMO and the SFC. They are the highest competent authority for this. Whatever they say about the need for new thermonuclear armaments is a result of precisely these calculations done after careful thought.

Why are the PMO and SFC not asking for testing again?

That aside I personally see no harm in discussing the sort of damage that needs to be done and the forces needed for that. Assuming that Papa GoI knows best is the truth, but that will not stop me personally from trying to see what would stop an attacking China or belligerent Pakistan in their tracks

[ramana]

Deterring is about preventing use of nukes by opponents. Pak is deterred only by massive retaliation. Any other stance does not deter them from using nukes. So Mr. Nagal has not understood the dynamic. Nukes are not just weapons to escalate. Having NFU India has to ensure. that threshold is not crossed

[Supratik]

Also we need to delink nukes from Pak sponsored terrorism. Post-1998 even thermonuke possession by India has not deterred Pak from using terrorism against India. As a rational state we cannot use nukes to counter terrorism. So this excuse to test again is fallacious. We have to think of other punitive strategies.

[shiv]

Also we need to delink nukes from Pak sponsored terrorism. Post-1998 even thermonuke possession by India has not deterred Pak from using terrorism against India. As a rational state we cannot use nukes to counter terrorism. So this excuse to test again is fallacious. We have to think of other punitive strategies.

Testing weapons is obviously a very useful method of maintaining reliability and proving designs. But testing because people believe the deterrent is inadequate is something that I have been hearing about since 1998.

Deterrence is about scaring the other guy. The belief that deterrence is inadequate is belief that the other guy is not scared enough. I have always been puzzled at why a guy who is not scared of a 12 kiloton bomb will become scared of a 100 kiloton bomb. Maybe I am a weirdo, but I find both scary and know that if either of those hits close to where I am, things won't be pretty. So if you have a guy who is not deterred by 12 kilotons why would 100 kilotons scare him? Especially when it is the numbers that count.

The other argument that I am seeing is that deterrence changes with improvement in the other guy's arsenal. Here I quote from an earlier post
[quote=""Ramdas"]A status-quo state relying on nuclear deterrence (faced with a revisionist state) therefore has to have the maximization of its nuclear warfighting capacity (i.e, "nuclear punch") high on its list of priorities. A situation where the status quo state has distinct edge in nuclear warfighting capacity would bring the probability of a breakdown in deterrence as close to zero as possible. In other words, deterrence has to be backed by nuclear warfighting capacity.[/quote]

Personally I find descriptions like "revisionist state" and "status-quo" power beyond my understanding. These are names conjured up to generalize thoughts by some "experts" to describe situations that they are trying to make sense from. When you have a state that behaves in an irrational manner (even if the state is a rational one hiding behind a facade of irrationality) all deterrence equations fail. Trying to copy paste the experiences of one geopolitical scenario with another using general terms does not gel well with the way I see things. I understand that I am not supposed to be the expert. Someone else is. But that excuse is not going to put me off.

In general if a nation is not scared of 50 nukes, 200 of them will not scare that nation. More likely, if they are a rational state hiding behind an irrational veneer, they will respond better to a streak of irrationality and unpredictability of Indian actions as well as a general air of untrustworthiness and contradiction of Indian statements. Promises and sincerity on India's part as well as a rational following of internationally accepted "expert comments" about deterrence only lowers India's unpredictability and unreliability factor. Particularly I see a flip flop on FU/NFU as completely unproductive and a sign of confusion. In fact there is no guarantee that we will stick to NFU. It is just a statement - a paragraph. If Pakistan trusts us it is their problem. If Indian experts can doubt the nuclear doctrine and say that India will not respond to a tactical nuke with massive retaliation, why do they stop at that? Why not extend the doubt in the opposite direction. There are two ways of not following our own nuclear doctrine

1. Not responding massively to a nuke attack despite what the doctrine promises
2. Attacking as First Use despite what the doctrine promises

Why do people only say the first one and not the second?

[ramdas]

OK. consider a scenario where we have only 100 or so 20 kt fission weapons. TSP obtains 100+ 500t TNs. A nuke war will then kill 20 million TSPians and 200 million+ Indians. Who would have won the nuke war ? Clearly, TSP and its sponsors. That nuclear war could be winnable will make TSP push for it starting with jihadi terror at a level an order of magnitude or two more than the current level.

OTOH if we have a consistently developed nuclear war fighting capability, the possibility of TSP winning a nuclear war will not exist. This in turn reduces the probability that TSP would "go for it". At the end of the day, any imbalance of power increases the probability of a war be it conventional or nuclear. One does not want to be on the wrong side of such an imbalance. It is not for nothing that no power except India has stopped weapons development after obtaining fission weapons. acquiring more and more sophisticated designs in larger numbers is part of the process of keeping a deterrent relevant.

Of course, developing an element of unpredictability is important. It should however, go hand in hand with a consistent increase in capabilities. Else, we risk our bluff being called the way PRC called Nehru's "forward policy" bluff in 1962.

All these necessary developments are constrained by the so called ``strategic partnership" with the U.S, which has given India no benefits whatsoever. The sooner we ignore this "partnership" and do what we need to do in our interest, the better.

@supratik: who told you that we have a deployed, proven TN arsenal ? Nobody can make that claim.

[member_29247]

Scaring the other guy is more a function of one's ruthlessness and willingness to use national power to achieve national strategic objectives. Not symbolic shows of strength like marching columns and missiles on truck and test after test to show "We have and we have big".

Precisely put, and i for once must admit not impressed by R day parades and aar parr bhashan to inspire deterrence and defense capabilities...

I am impressed by the discipline and dedication for the event to be great spectacle...

If some third rate country in the verge of economic collapse can strike with impunity in side a nuclear armed growing economy .... That show some gal or the complete self destruct tendencies ....

Whic in turn indicates we are deterred and the enemy is not.

So in the world of realty, a nuke nude nation NNN is able to deter a space power and economic power house on the move with superior Nuke technology and that's deterrence in the works for the aggressor not for the restraint oriented law citing and abiding power..

Both conventional and nuke deterrent has failed to protect India.

I could be totally wrong and most often I am.

[NRao]

OK. consider a scenario where we have only 100 or so 20 kt fission weapons. TSP obtains 100+ 500t TNs. A nuke war will then kill 20 million TSPians and 200 million+ Indians. Who would have won the nuke war ? Clearly, TSP and its sponsors. That nuclear war could be winnable will make TSP push for it starting with jihadi terror at a level an order of magnitude or two more than the current level.

Many issues, starting with your assumptions.

When two nations use nukes, there is *really* no winner - neither should/would survive as a functioning state.

Anyhow, would TSP survive as a functional state in your scenario? IF it does, then what *you* are claiming is that India has failed in her goal to level TSP - which is the stated goal.

No matter what, you need to start with the posture that India has published. And take it from there. These assumptions have no end and really no means too. What is "100 or so 20 kt fission weapons"?

Same goes for your "force planning", etc.

Indian posture does not get into a betting game. It is very clear - you use nukes, we will make sure you will *not* function as a state (essentially level you).

If you were to make statement in this light, then even what Dr. Santhanam or Lt. Gen. Nagal's views do not matter. Fizzle and re-test is fine - I have no problem with that. Nagal has some views, fine with that too. BUT, I have a problem if the re-test for a fizzle is because of a no deterrence - remember deterrence is binary, either you have it or you do not, the other side may make assumptions or take chances, that is a diff matter.

[ShauryaT]

There are two ways of not following our own nuclear doctrine

1. Not responding massively to a nuke attack despite what the doctrine promises
2. Attacking as First Use despite what the doctrine promises

Why do people only say the first one and not the second?

The practitioners that I read do mention the second aspect, especially in context of imminent use. Starting from COAS V.P Malik and CSC/CNS Arun Prakash, amongst others, who's names cannot recall now but should be in this thread also. True, the policy folks do not but they too me are a nincompoop lot, that do not know to spell the ABCD of power. simple test, how many ex MoD IAS staff we know of who have articulated positions on defense let alone deterrence? How many of these are in think tanks after retirement or as advisers to the MoD? On the political class, you know who was the head of the defense parliamentary group in UPA2 - The great expert Raj Babbar!

[shiv]

OK. consider a scenario where we have only 100 or so 20 kt fission weapons. TSP obtains 100+ 500t TNs. A nuke war will then kill 20 million TSPians and 200 million+ Indians. Who would have won the nuke war ? Clearly, TSP and its sponsors. That nuclear war could be winnable will make TSP push for it starting with jihadi terror at a level an order of magnitude or two more than the current level.

Look at it this way.

Suppose Pakis have 100 X 500 kt nukes (the same number that won the war for them in your scenario) and we have 500 X 1 megaton nukes (because we and Pakis have been testing and refining)

Pak and India nuke each other. India has eaten 100 x 500 kt. Pakis have eaten 500 x 1 megaton

Who wins? And why?

What will a post victory India look like? What will a post victory Pakistan look like (in case you feel they win)

[Supratik]

@supratik: who told you that we have a deployed, proven TN arsenal ? Nobody can make that claim.

And who told you that we don't have a deployed 1 tonne thermonuke warhead? There were more than one review wrt thermonukes and testing. The people in the know concluded that at present we don't need to test. You are the one making the opposite claim based on opinions of some people. So the burden of proof lies with you. Your posts are going around in circles without making a case. I gave my perception that the 1 tonne warhead worked but they have not tested the lighter warheads and the decision to test will rest on a host of factors particularly if the status quo is disturbed e.g. China helping Pak with thermonukes which we will find out at some point.

[ramdas]

And who told you that we don't have a deployed 1 tonne thermonuke warhead?

Gen. Nagal's statement that we should go thermonuclear indicates this. Unless you claim to know more than someone who has had his responsibilities in this matter.

Look at it this way.

Suppose Pakis have 100 X 500 kt nukes (the same number that won the war for them in your scenario) and we have 500 X 1 megaton nukes (because we and Pakis have been testing and refining)

Pak and India nuke each other. India has eaten 100 x 500 kt. Pakis have eaten 500 x 1 megaton

Who wins? And why?

For one, a 100 weapons with a yield of several hundred kt would finish Pak off thoroughly. With a 500 weapon arsenal of such weapons, we can use the remainder on TSP's sponsors (PRC, Saudi Arabia, etc.) in the event of our having been struck by a 100 500 kt nukes from TSP. For one, this will deter TSP's sponsors from unleasing a rabid TSP while themselves watching the fun from the sidelines.

[NRao]

Gen. Nagal's statement that we should go thermonuclear indicates this. Unless you claim to know more than someone who has had his responsibilities in this matter.

We, on BR, have been through these discussions plenty of time, most notably during the Indo-US agreement and then Dr. Santhanam's claim of fizzle.

Use plural, India has thermonuclear bombs: Kakodkar

He knows, not "should".

[Supratik]

@ramdas

If you are referring to this

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/201 ... nagal.aspx

there is no mention of thermonukes.

If you are referring to this

http://www.forceindia.net/Checks_and_Balances.aspx

then I cannot access the article. Why don't you post it?

[member_28990]

I think we should just change only one word of the doctrine - "NO FIRST USE STRIKE"

[NRao]

At the huge risk of repeating ourselves here:

1998 nuclear tests were perfect, says Kakodkar

The Army should be fully confident as there was no doubt about the nuclear arsenal at its command, the former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman Anil Kakodkar said, seeking to put at rest questions raised over the efficacy of the country’s hydrogen bomb test.

“I think that is guaranteed. The Army should be fully confident. There is no doubt about the arsenal at their command,” he told Karan Thapar on the ‘Devil’s Advocate’ programme on CNN-IBN.

Mr. Kakodkar, who retired from service on November 30, was asked about the remark of the former Army Chief, V.P. Malik, that nuclear scientists should assure the armed forces about the efficacy of the thermonuclear device.

He ruled out the need for further thermonuclear tests, saying the country has several hydrogen bombs with a yield “much more” than 45 kilo tons. “Of course. Why do you put singular, use plural?” he shot back when asked whether India had a thermonuclear bomb.

“Much more than that. I said from up to low kilotons to 200 kilotons,” he said when asked whether the hydrogen bomb had a yield of 45 kilo tons.

Mr. Kakodkar dismissed former DRDO scientist K. Santhanam’s claims over the success of the 1998 thermonuclear tests, saying it would not be correct to assume that he (the defence scientist) knew everything. “We required logistic support which was provided by DRDO…things were being done on a need-to-know basis. To assume that Santhanam knew everything is not correct. Santhanam knew what was within his responsibility,” he said.

Mr. Kakodkar also said it was “totally erroneous” to conclude that the hydrogen bomb test was not a success.

“It is a totally erroneous conclusion. The yield of thermonuclear test was verified, not by one method but by several methods and by different groups, and this has been reviewed in detail,” he said. “I had described the tests as perfect in 1998 and I stand by that,” added Mr. Kakodkar, who played key roles in the nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998.

He also said the instruments used by the DRDO to measure the yield of the tests did not work. “I myself had reviewed this immediately after the test and we concluded that these instruments did not work…If the instruments did not work, where is the question of going by the assertions based on them and what is the basis of those assertions?” he said.

On former AEC chief P.K. Iyengar’s support to Mr. Santhanam’s claims, Mr. Kakodkar said: “Iyengar was not in the picture as far as 1998 tests were concerned. He knows only as much as has been published. Nothing more.”

[NRao]

Do not know if people have followed this line of thinking within India, which resonates with what some here have been posting:

India’s Nuclear Anxieties: The Debate Over Doctrine

May 2015

By Shashank Joshi

In April 2014, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which would be swept into office the following month, included in its manifesto a tantalizing promise to “revise and update” India’s nuclear doctrine “to make it relevant to challenges of current times.”[1] When pressed, party officials suggested they were specifically interested in tinkering with India’s no-first-use policy.

Almost immediately, Narendra Modi, the BJP’s candidate for prime minister, clarified that the policy “was a great initiative of Atal Bihari Vajpayee,” a former BJP prime minister. Modi added that “there is no compromise on that. We are very clear. [It] is a reflection of our cultural inheritance.”[2]

Shortly after taking office as prime minister, in remarks to an audience in Japan in August, Modi said that “there is a tradition of national consensus and continuity on such issues. I can tell you that currently, we are not taking any initiative for a review of our nuclear doctrine.”[3] This would have reassured foreign observers and dismayed some Indians, as it indicated that Modi’s self-assured vision for foreign and security policy probably would not apply to the nuclear realm. Although Modi apparently had decided against an imminent shift, his party’s manifesto nevertheless was reflective of a new current of critical thinking on India’s nuclear doctrine.

India’s nuclear modernization over the past 15 years has largely been framed in material terms: the rising numbers of warheads, the growing ranges of missiles, and the improving delivery systems. These undoubtedly play a crucial role in shaping the triangular deterrent relationship among India, Pakistan, and China. Yet, so do psychological factors, which are shaped in turn by a state’s doctrine, the terms in which the state thinks and talks about potential nuclear use.

In 1998, just after its nuclear tests, India bowed to U.S. pressure and released a draft nuclear doctrine that ruled out first use and endorsed “credible minimum deterrence” while noting that the latter was “a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security.”[4] That elasticity was exploited in the next iteration of the nuclear doctrine, a terse official statement issued in 2003.[5] By that year, India’s nuclear doctrine stood on two connected pillars: India would not use nuclear weapons first, but if its opponents did so, then India’s response would be overwhelming.

Pressure on No-First-Use Pledge

Right from the start, the two pillars were under pressure. A no-first-use policy is tantamount to a declaration of nonuse against states that do not possess nuclear weapons. (Because such states cannot use nuclear arms at all, they cannot use these weapons first. Therefore, any use of nuclear weapons by India against these states would be a case of first use.) The 1998 doctrine modified the policy by noting that states that do not have nuclear weapons but are “aligned with” nuclear-weapon states were not covered.[6] The implication was that non-nuclear-weapon states allied with Indian’s nuclear-armed adversaries—realistically, China or Pakistan—could be targeted with Indian nuclear weapons if their ally were to have used nuclear weapons against India first.

This proviso has very few implications in practice, given the improbability of non-nuclear-weapon states joining hands with China or Pakistan in a war against India, but it demonstrated India’s willingness to experiment with its doctrine. In addition, the 1998 change undercut earlier claims that the no-first-use pledge was “unconditional” because use of nuclear weapons against a third party that did not possess nuclear weapons, even if precipitated by nuclear first use by China or Pakistan, would still constitute Indian first use of a sort.[7]

In 2003, when a new statement of doctrine was issued, India further diluted the doctrine by warning that it might use nuclear weapons in response to a “major attack” with chemical or biological weapons, possibly mimicking the “calculated ambiguity” of the U.S. nuclear posture in relation to attacks with nonconventional weapons other than nuclear ones.[8] To determine why the no-first-use policy was being whittled down, it helps to break down the types of arguments that critics have presented because these arguments have tended to recur.

Keeping even with peers. India should reject a stance that is “weaker” than those of its nuclear peers, particularly the United States or China.[9] For instance, when China was mistakenly viewed as having modified its own no-first-use pledge in 2013, some Indians demanded that India follow suit.[10]

Demonstrating assertiveness. If nuclear adversaries were taking bold steps, India should do so too even if a response, in the form of a more forceful doctrine, would assume a completely different form. For instance, India should respond to an adversary’s warhead buildup (a change in posture) by altering its no-first-use policy (a change in doctrine).

Broadening the scope of deterrence. India should use nuclear weapons to deter not only nuclear attacks, but also chemical and biological attacks. Such an argument implicitly drove the change in 2003.

Strengthening deterrence. A threat of first use can instill greater uncertainty in adversaries and thereby deter them from even non-nuclear provocations. The specific concern here tends to be Pakistan and its sponsorship of terrorist groups.

Maintaining the pre-emption option. First use would allow India to respond to an adversary’s imminent nuclear use, limiting the damage to India, giving India’s relatively small nuclear forces a better chance of survival, or both.

No individual critic has ever made these five arguments together, but they can all be found, with growing frequency, in Indian writings. A sample of the many cases that could be cited illustrates the point.

In 2011, Jaswant Singh, India’s former external affairs, defense, and finance minister and a crucial figure in the U.S.-Indian arms control discussions that followed the 1998 tests, addressed the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s parliament. Raising what he called “the most important question that concerns us all globally,” he argued that the policies he had framed in 1998 and 1999 were “very greatly in need of revision because the situation that warranted the enunciation of the policy of ‘no-first-use’ or…‘credible deterrence with minimum force’, etc. has long been overtaken by events.”[11]

This reassessment and blunt recommendation is significant, coming as it does from a former senior official who as foreign minister was the most prominent public champion of India’s no-first-use commitment and who, in a September 1999 speech to the UN General Assembly, exhorted the established nuclear powers to pledge likewise.[12]

Tellingly, Singh did not explain in his 2011 speech why, precisely, reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first would increase Indian security or address the problems he had earlier identified, such as a growing perceived imbalance in warhead numbers between India and Pakistan in the latter’s favor. He declined a request by the author to elaborate on his logic.[13]

Singh’s analysis does not make a clear connection between the claimed source of the problem—events that have changed India’s security situation—and his proposed solution of a change in doctrine. This might suggest that Singh’s interest in modifying the no-first-use policy, like the interest of others, arose primarily from a generalized desire for nuclear assertiveness as a response to perceived adverse shifts in India’s security and nuclear environment, rather than from a belief in some specific deterrent benefits of potential first use. Put another way, Singh advocated changing the no-first-use policy not because he objected to the policy per se, but because he sought some means of prominently demonstrating Indian resolve in the nuclear realm.

In 2012 an influential Indian think tank, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, convened a task force of experts from across India’s governmental and nongovernmental strategic community. The task force, which was chaired by P.R. Chari, a former civil servant in India’s Ministry of Defence and a respected analyst, published “an alternative blueprint” of India’s nuclear doctrine.[14] That blueprint declared that “India will not initiate a nuclear strike,” but added, cryptically, “‘Initiation’ covers the process leading up to the actual use of a nuclear weapon by an adversary. This would include mating component systems and deploying warheads with the intent of using them if required.”

This reinterpretation of nuclear initiation is tenuous and confusing, but nonetheless far-reaching to the point of absurdity. It suggests that, in a crisis, if Pakistan were merely to mate warheads to missiles or even co-locate previously dispersed nuclear pits and warheads to increase the weapons’ readiness and therefore survivability, this might be interpreted in India as Pakistan having formally “initiated” a nuclear strike. This, in turn, would permit India to launch nuclear weapons first while claiming that it had adhered to its no-first-use policy. Naturally, this amounts to an imprimatur for pre-emption.

Importantly, such arguments are not on the fringe. In June 2014, Lieutenant General B.S. Nagal, head of India’s Strategic Forces Command between 2008 and 2011 and thereafter a department under India’s national security adviser, made a radical argument in India’s Force magazine, saying that India under a no-first-use policy “cannot conduct a first strike on the adversary’s counterforce targets, thus allowing the adversary full capability to attrite [India’s] own capability.” Nagal’s argument is that a no-first-use commitment requires that India potentially absorb a nuclear attack on its own nuclear weapons, leaving New Delhi’s arsenal depleted and therefore incapable of launching a second strike to destroy the adversary’s remaining nuclear forces. This, in turn, forces India to resort to countervalue strikes—that is, strikes against population centers—something Nagal regards as a “moral dilemma.”

Nagal consequently argues in favor of replacing the no-first-use policy with a policy of “ambiguity” that “does not allow destruction of the nation and strategic forces at the outset; hence the arsenal is intact for use.” Ambiguity, Nagal contends, “provides a better range of options to launch decapitating and/or disarming strikes to deal with the adversary leadership/arsenal.”[15] Such drastic language is admittedly rare in the Indian debate, but Nagal is not alone. Another former strategic forces commander, Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar, has argued that Indian forces require “select conventional hardware that tracks and targets [adversary] nuclear forces” to “provide the pre-emptive teeth to a deterrent relationship that leans so heavily” on the no-first-use policy.[16] These are striking arguments, coming from individuals who have served at the apex of India’s nuclear weapons program.

One might reasonably argue that Nagal and Shankar are advancing agendas they could not implement while in office and that their prescriptions place implausibly heavy demands on India’s existing and future intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Yet, their arguments are likely to shape the tone and substance of the public debate over the coming years, a debate that will weigh on future Indian governments. For these critics, the fundamental purpose of diluting the no-first-use policy is to keep India’s adversaries guessing about the nuclear threshold in the hope that the resultant ambiguity deters a greater range of threats.[17]

Pressure on Massive Retaliation

As described above, Modi appears to have poured cold water on moves to alter the no-first-use policy in the direction urged by critics such as Nagal and Shankar. Barring a significant exogenous shock, such as a successful terrorist attack from Pakistan that is interpreted as a failure of deterrence, this is unlikely to change. There is, however, a second pressure on doctrine, relating to the formulation of the policy of massive retaliation. It is ironic that the stronger party in a potential conflict on the subcontinent—India, in relation to Pakistan—should find itself debating the value of flexible nuclear use doctrines, as such pressures ordinarily fall on the party whose conventional forces are weaker. Yet, this is precisely what has happened.

Indian national security adviser Brajesh Mishra addresses the media in New Delhi on August 17, 1999, as India released a draft of its nuclear weapons doctrine. (Raveendran/AFP/Getty Images)

Indian national security adviser Brajesh Mishra addresses the media in New Delhi on August 17, 1999, as India released a draft of its nuclear weapons doctrine. (Raveendran/AFP/Getty Images)
It is often forgotten that massive retaliation was not always part of India’s doctrine. India’s 1999 draft doctrine promised only “punitive” retaliation, a pliable term consistent with both limited and higher-order nuclear use. It was mentioned three times in the document, indicating that considerable care went into its usage. Yet, four years later, the summary of India’s 2003 revised doctrine stated that “nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”[18] It is unclear whether the changed wording was intentional or merely a function of the revision process. After all, the 1999 draft was never an official document, and different personnel were involved in the creation of each doctrine.

Indian concerns over the credibility of massive retaliation are long-standing, and one can find Indian thinkers debating its finer points in the 1980s and earlier. These concerns have sharpened in recent years because of Pakistan’s reported cultivation of tactical nuclear weapons, which themselves can be placed under the broader category of limited nuclear options.[19]

Simply put, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons are perceived to constrain India’s ability to wage limited conventional war in retaliation for terrorist attacks attributed to the Pakistani authorities. This is because if Pakistan employed tactical nuclear weapons, avoiding Indian population centers, a massive Indian nuclear response would not be a proportional and therefore credible response. In addition, Pakistan’s strategic nuclear weapons ensure that it could then conduct a further round of nuclear retaliation against Indian population centers were India to have first attacked Pakistani population centers, thereby creating a further layer of deterrence against New Delhi.

In addition to this well-worn proportionality-credibility problem, there is a second, strategic problem. Whereas India increasingly prepares itself for limited war, “massive retaliation proposes a war with unlimited means for unlimited ends.”[20] If wars are limited, the logic of punishment must be subordinate to the logic of war termination.[21] In other words, India’s use of a nuclear doctrine that carries a high risk of escalation to high-level nuclear use is dissonant with its broader political-military strategy, which is to avoid the kind of large-scale wars that characterized the subcontinent before the 1970s. Indian wars would have limited aims, such as curbing Pakistan’s support for terrorist groups or satisfying Indian public opinion.

Limited aims require that a state end a war at the earliest possible opportunity compatible with these aims. Because massive retaliation escalates a conflict or is seen to do so, it precludes this. Gaurav Kampani, who has studied the development of India’s nuclear program, citing multiple former chairmen of India’s Chiefs of Staff Committee, notes that “senior Indian military leaders” favor “highly calibrated Indian counter-response to terminate war at the lowest possible level of nuclear exchange.”[22]

Thus far, Indian policymakers have publicly reiterated that, despite these complaints, they will not be self-deterred from adhering to the letter of their doctrine on massive retaliation. In an important speech in New Delhi in April 2013, former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, presumably speaking with some degree of official sanction, defended India’s nuclear doctrine and posture from a variety of criticisms.

[If India] is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary. As I have pointed out earlier, the label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective. A limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms. Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Pakistan would be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons.[23]

Saran’s protestations are not taken entirely seriously even within the various branches of India’s nuclear establishment. As Rear Admiral Raja Menon, formerly chairman of the task force on Net Assessment and Simulation in India’s National Security Council, wrote in The Hindu in January 2014, “the ideational systems that will ensure the ‘massive’ retaliation promised in [India’s] doctrine are being increasingly questioned by scholars and analysts worldwide.” He added that “Pakistani observers cannot help but be swayed and dangerously influenced by such literature, thereby inducing them to think the unthinkable,” that a nuclear war, once initiated, could be controlled.[24] Menon later argued that India should replace “massive” with “punitive,” as was the case in India’s 1999 draft doctrine, with the aim of signaling India’s “readiness to fight an escalatory nuclear war.”[25]

Other mainstream analysts have argued likewise. In June 2014, Chari lamented that “the determinism inherent in India’s nuclear doctrine…is too extreme to gain much credibility. It defies logic to threaten an adversary with nuclear annihilation to deter or defend against a tactical nuclear strike on an advancing military formation.”[26] In January 2015, Gurmeet Kanwal, former director of India’s Centre for Land Warfare Studies, repeated that “the word ‘massive’…should be substituted with ‘punitive’ as massive is not credible and limits retaliatory options.”[27]

Even if India were to change its doctrine to punitive rather than massive retaliation, actually developing a range of nuclear options from limited to massive would still be highly challenging. The United States did not possess credible and sophisticated limited nuclear options for two decades after first deploying nuclear weapons.

Among the future challenges for India will be reconciling nuclear flexibility with exceptionally strong, positive, civilian control. Retired senior military officers routinely complain that the armed forces must have greater involvement in the formulation of nuclear policies.[28] Although India has indeed involved its military in nuclear policy over the last decade to a greater extent than at any prior time, civilian political leaders continue to place great emphasis on retaining the authority and the time to make any final decision on nuclear use. They insist on preserving that authority until the last possible moment and would refrain from authorizing a series of low-level, tit-for-tat nuclear strikes because such strikes might require selection among a large and changing number of targets and a high degree of responsiveness to adversary decisions. Furthermore, such strikes might initiate a sequence that spirals out of control and reduce civilian management of each step up the escalation ladder.

These civilian concerns inhibit the prospect of pre-emptive first-use doctrines, but they also restrict India’s ability to employ limited nuclear options in precisely the most likely contingencies—notably, limited Indian offensives on Pakistani territory. This is because limited Indian nuclear use on Pakistani soil could interfere with Indian conventional forces present, but Indian civilians might be reluctant to allow coordination between Indian conventional and nuclear forces in a manner that enhances military authority in the nuclear process. Nevertheless, this would not necessarily rule out relatively simple limited nuclear options, such as the use of lower-yield nuclear weapons against static Pakistani military sites. Such targets could be chosen in advance and would not require a highly sophisticated targeting capability. Moreover, use of nuclear weapons against such targets, depending on location, would not necessarily require a high degree of coordination with conventional forces. In this way, India could reintroduce the possibility of nuclear use that is limited and thus proportional and credible, as described above, thereby addressing the problems identified by critics.

Conclusion

This article has described a series of arguments against two pillars of India’s nuclear doctrine, namely its no-first-use and massive retaliation policies. Underpinning many of these arguments is a widespread sense that “the strategic environment, technological imperatives and…national security,” the factors to which credible minimum deterrence was pegged in 1998, have evolved in the 17 years since India’s nuclear tests and that India’s psychological and material position with regard to nuclear weapons has eroded. Among the causes of this anxiety are the growth in the size and sophistication of Pakistan’s arsenal, perceived slowness in Indian nuclear modernization, nuclear and conventional advances by China, and a worsening security environment on India’s periphery, notably in Afghanistan and Pakistan. All of these factors are aggravated by the Indian state’s opacity with regard to nuclear affairs.

Indian critics’ arguments toward Indian nuclear doctrine should be considered with a series of caveats in mind. First, three consecutive prime ministers have reaffirmed the no-first-use policy, and Modi has ruled out its elimination. Second, many of the arguments described in this article assume the existence of capabilities and institutional changes, some of which are not presently feasible and others of which, notably disarming first strikes, may never become so. Third, there are prominent and numerous examples of advocacy for the status quo. These include Saran’s speech, cited above, and writings by former diplomats Jayant Prasad and Rakesh Sood, all of whom worked on nuclear issues in their careers.[29]

In 2002 a committee appointed to “review the national security system in its entirety” produced the “Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security.” It noted that “the publication of a white paper on the Indian nuclear weapons programme is highly desirable.”[30] This report was partially implemented, but progress was interrupted by the change of government in 2004. A decade later, if the BJP follows through on its commitment at least to look again at India’s nuclear doctrine, then any future review process could afford an opportunity for revisionist voices to apply pressure on the government.

It should be remembered that, in the past, reviews by the Indian government have frequently been commissioned and then ignored, the most notable being a series of defense and security reviews stretching back decades.[31] Therefore, even a review recommending modification of the doctrine would not necessarily lead to revision. If it does, then a shift in the policy of massive retaliation toward ambiguity and flexibility—perhaps a reversion to pre-2003 language of “punitive” retaliation—would be the likeliest outcome. Yet, even this might require a catalyst or shock, such as another major act of terrorism on Indian soil, similar to the November 2008 attacks on Mumbai, that comes to be seen as a failure of deterrence.

[shiv]

For one, a 100 weapons with a yield of several hundred kt would finish Pak off thoroughly. With a 500 weapon arsenal of such weapons, we can use the remainder on TSP's sponsors (PRC, Saudi Arabia, etc.) in the event of our having been struck by a 100 500 kt nukes from TSP. For one, this will deter TSP's sponsors from unleasing a rabid TSP while themselves watching the fun from the sidelines.

Well thank you for trying. But I think you really haven't thought this through with any degree of seriousness, and perhaps there is no point in my continuing. I worry that some of our strategists scratch the surface as superficially and perfunctorily as you have done here.

Nagal certainly seems to be one such man - unless he is part of the bluffing and obfuscation game.

[ShauryaT]

Shiv ji: Have to say this, you have setup a straw man argument by compartmentalizing the issue of deterrence. The issue of testing stems from doubts on credibility and not quantitative issues.

While I will be the first one to admit that we have to calibrate and manage when and how we test due to likely impact, you do need to step forward and at least admit that the credibility of the arsenal needs to proven, in light of credible doubts by informed. If all you do is disparage those who question, it goes nowhere. I would rather go by the words of the SFC commander than a scientist for India's nuclear security. The best way for the scientist to prove his wares is to get them tested to the users satisfaction. The user holds this last word not the designer. My last on this matter.

@NRao. Let us not bring in all the past debates.

[NRao]

Let us not bring in all the past debates

First of all I did not.

However, what is new in this debate? "Nagal" and that is about it.

The issue of testing stems from doubts on credibility and not quantitative issues.

OK, cool. For once the cat has slipped out.

Against whom? And, why?

[member_29190]

Shiv ji: Have to say this, you have setup a straw man argument by compartmentalizing the issue of deterrence. The issue of testing stems from doubts on credibility and not quantitative issues.

While I will be the first one to admit that we have to calibrate and manage when and how we test due to likely impact, you do need to step forward and at least admit that the credibility of the arsenal needs to proven, in light of credible doubts by informed. If all you do is disparage those who question, it goes nowhere. I would rather go by the words of the SFC commander than a scientist for India's nuclear security. The best way for the scientist to prove his wares is to get them tested to the users satisfaction. The user holds this last word not the designer. My last on this matter.

@NRao. Let us not bring in all the past debates.

Interesting thought.

My view, a Millitary General's word is no different from a ordinary person that it will "work". And I doubt if a General be the right person to answer how much destructive power is needed.

[Chinmayanand]

Is there a chance that our warheads sizzle than fizzle when used ? What if a 200kt warhead gives 500kt output ?
Since we have not tested it , it might have been overengineered. Ain't this also a possibility from an optimist ?

[NRao]

Excerpts from Lt. Gen. Nagal's article in Force:

On No First Use (NFU):

The disadvantages of the NFU policy need deliberation. Firstly, NFU implies probable large scale destruction in own country, whilst a feeble argument can be made of limited strikes by the adversary on Indian forces in the adversary’s territory.

Secondly, in India there is hardly any debate on security policy issues, much less on the NFU policy. Inputs indicate that the Indian public in totality is not in sync with the policy. Some call it a cause of concern; others call it ‘the Panipat Syndrome’ of allowing the enemy to defeat us on our own soil. On the political plane, it was not put to public vote as India does not follow a system of referendum. The NDA government released the NFU policy in January 2003. The loss of the election by the NDA in 2004 did not politically validate the policy.

Thirdly, the nation has not been educated on the devastation of nuclear strikes and is psychologically not prepared to be destroyed.

Fourthly, to fight a war with constraints which jeopardise the future of a country is also morally wrong; no leadership has the right to place its population at peril without exhausting other options and opting only for NFU.

Fifthly, NFU policy cannot conduct a first strike on the adversary’s counterforce targets, thus allowing the adversary full capability to attrite own capability. In the current environment of mobile system on land and SSBNs at sea, the probability of destruction of the adversary strategic assets will be extremely low or negligible in a second strike, this therefore limits own retaliatory nuclear strikes to counter value targets, once again a moral dilemma.

Sixthly, NFU policy requires a very extensive and elaborate missile defence system across the country. However, cost and technology will allow it at select points, leaving the nation exposed to nuclear strikes.

A change of policy to ambiguity is recommended, as it encompasses four options including NFU. The benefits that accrue include deterring first strike on India. It may be called destabilising, but four other nuclear weapon states follow this policy. It enhances and improves the psychological state of the nation. A shift to a proactive policy is reassuring to the public. It does not allow destruction of the nation and strategic forces at the outset; hence the arsenal is intact for use. It provides a better range of options to launch decapitating and/ or disarming strikes to deal with the adversary leadership/ arsenal, and allows a proactive CBM policy.

On massive retaliation:

At times doubts are raised over the strategy of MR. Reasons to doubt its applicability are:

Gradual escalation/ quid pro quo will prevent large scale nuclear damage and is a pragmatic option;
Response to a few or one tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) should not be disproportionate which could result in an all-out nuclear war;
Escalation control should be practiced in conventional and nuclear war on moral and humanitarian considerations …
The strategy is not rational, our political leadership may not show resolve during crisis or at the time of decision.

[But] MR is the declared policy, and must be implemented. The nation has placed faith in political leadership and the leadership is expected to fulfil their responsibility. In case we vacillate on the issue or raise doubts about our commitment to the policy, we will send wrong signals to our adversary(s).

On nuclear signalling:

A more proactive public communication will help reassure the public, and it should be practiced in the future, especially when we are committed to NFU. A unique feature of nuclear deterrent signalling has been the role of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) scientists in speaking on strategy, development and employment philosophy. The statements by the scientists also prematurely release information on delivery systems, which later become embarrassing when time lines are overshot/ delayed. A deliberate and well-thought out nuclear signalling policy should be put in place to communicate with the nation and send the desired message to the adversary(s). The political leadership must speak on select occasions on India’s nuclear policy to display the resolve and credibility without conveying an aggressive posture. An open paper on national security including nuclear policy should be issued periodically. This will invite debate and suggestions and enrich the policy.

On MIRVs:

Future developments required are MIRV and MaRV capability. MIRV does provide a system to increase the number of targets destroyed by one delivery vehicle, overcome missile interception defences, deliver more on a single missile, thereby reducing the delivery vehicles. However, the disadvantage of MIRV delivery missile loss does worry planners with small arsenals. MaRV [Manoeuvrable reentry vehicle] is required to overcome missile interception defences, ensure assured strike and it also improves deterrence. Other aspects for future development are improved guidance systems, miniaturisation, bigger SSBNs, anti-satellite capability, space based sensors, earth penetrating systems and host of new technology required to overcome protection/ defensive systems.

On missile defence:

Para 5.4 of the draft doctrine stated ‘the survivability of the nuclear arsenal and effective command, control, communications, computing, intelligence and information systems shall be ensured’. Under the survivability clause one issue that can be evaluated is ballistic missile defence. To protect India with a ballistic missile defence is nearly impractical. However, critical elements of Command and Control, nuclear forces and important industrial/ populations can be protected.

Conclusion:

However, there are differences of opinion on some aspects of the doctrine. The doctrine of strategic deterrence is sound, serves the objectives of deterrence and India would be ill-advised to shift to nuclear war-fighting. Credible Minimum Deterrent is a dynamic and flexible concept and serves Indian planners’ requirements. The most divisive feature is the NFU policy. As discussed earlier, there is a need to give greater space and options to India’s leadership by shifting to a policy of deliberate or studied ambiguity.

Ambiguity covers employment options from first use i.e. pre-emption, launch on warning, launch on launch and NFU, thus not defining the circumstances for use of nuclear weapons and complicating the adversary’s planning. The policy of massive retaliation is appropriate as long as India follows a NFU policy, but will undergo a change if India abandons NFU. Indian political leadership credibility comes under doubt at policy discussion forums. There is a need to conduct better nuclear signalling and obtain the confidence of the public on our nuclear doctrine.

[NRao]

Lt. Gen Nagal also wrote another article, just around the time of the above late 2014). Here is the intro part from Force:

Perception and Reality
An indepth analysis of India’s Credible Minimum Deterrent doctrine


By Lt Gen. B.S. Nagal (retd)

India declared its nuclear doctrine (summary) on 4 January 2003, a refinement of the draft doctrine made public on 17 August 1999. India had unique requirements to address in the strategic environment that forced it to operationalise the nuclear deterrent, concurrently decide on the policy, the strategy and the doctrine to be followed, from this doctrine emerged the concept of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrent’ (CMD). The doctrine is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security.

India’s nuclear doctrine caters for ‘threats of use of nuclear weapons against India’ and ‘nuclear attack on India or Indian forces anywhere’. With a No First Use (NFU) policy, retaliation will be massive, designed to cause unacceptable damage. It also has provisions of nuclear retaliation in case of chemical or biological attacks.

The draft and final doctrine brought to fore certain aspects. First, nuclear weapons remain instruments for national and collective security. Second, India’s strategic interests require effective and credible nuclear deterrence. Third, the requirements of deterrence should weigh in the design of nuclear forces as well as the deterrence strategy. The deterrence strategy must provide a capability with maximum credibility, survivability, effectiveness, safety and security. Deterrence requirements include, firstly will to employ nuclear forces and weapons, secondly robust command and control system, thirdly effective intelligence and early warning capabilities, fourthly sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared forces, lastly comprehensive planning and training for operations. Since then many have debated the issue of ‘credible minimum deterrent’ (CMD) because it was a new term and did not fit the definition of ‘minimum deterrence’ as broadly accepted in western nuclear parlance.

This article seeks to examine India’s CMD, its application, development and implication for decision makers, and how firmly it is in place. Since CMD is directly linked to massive retaliation to cause unacceptable damage, therefore it should not be examined under the prism of minimum deterrence. The examination will include credibility, issues that flow from credibility, retaliation capability, arsenal requirements, force effectiveness, survivability, unacceptable damage, deterrence and strategic stability.

One of the most important principles of nuclear deterrence is credibility, to take political decisions in time to use nuclear weapons, to develop nuclear forces capability to meet the needs of deterrence, to use deterrence for national security, to signal intent to prevent threats from arising. Therefore, credibility is political and force centric, how your adversary(s) and the world views the deterrence emanating from these two determinants. When the US and Soviet Union developed their nuclear weapons, deployed the weapons and developed deterrence strategies, no one doubted their credibility or will to use the weapons, such was the intense rivalry of the Cold War. The US military, NATO and Western thinkers/think tanks developed deterrence strategies of massive retaliation/MAD/flexible response/countervailing etc, and these were integrated into nuclear strategies of NATO. The Warsaw Pact also developed deterrence strategies; this enhanced the credibility of the use of nuclear weapons. The war fighting strategies adopted by their armed forces also in no small measure contributed to enhance the credibility of the nuclear powers, to use the weapons to defend national interest, provide extended deterrence to allies, conduct ideological campaigns and seek enlarged spheres of influence.

This article could be more pertinent to this discussion.

[ramana]

AmberG/KLPD, Does TSP have the luxury of fielding the amount of wasteful use of fissile material as required by all those Nasr payloads?
Such low yields are of nature very inefficient use of fissile materials.
Every where one would expect more efficient use of such materials.
Does TSP have such resources?

And if the state fractures what is the security of those payloads?

[krishna_krishna]

^^^ Ramana on the resources, it is bank rolled by Saudi's so there is nothing which they cannot buy as long as it is available or a portion of it is for saudi use. Regarding security they are well secure by tools masa provided security as long as they are in cantonments when they are dispersed when s**t hits the fan and if during that chaos state breaks I do not think it is secure and they do not care at that point. All they want is to lob it to desh as many as they can even if some are smuggled somewhere we won't be there to witness it, that is their lawhori logic

[ShauryaT]

I think one thing to recognize is Nuclear technology is neither super sexy nor out of reach for any state with some industrial capacity to achieve, especially one that has multiple Fathers. These turds as you may remember were peddling Chines plutonium based designs to Gaddafi.

As for TSP's Nasr, Hatf II and Hatv IX all are claimed to have plutonium designs. The four kushab reactors are running since 2015, the first one operational since 1998 - thanks to China, each able to produce enough WgPu for about 3 devices each year. factor in efficacy degradations at current rates, they could add about 10 each year, is one estimate.

[shiv]

Shiv ji: Have to say this, you have setup a straw man argument by compartmentalizing the issue of deterrence. The issue of testing stems from doubts on credibility and not quantitative issues.

While I will be the first one to admit that we have to calibrate and manage when and how we test due to likely impact, you do need to step forward and at least admit that the credibility of the arsenal needs to proven, in light of credible doubts by informed. If all you do is disparage those who question, it goes nowhere. I would rather go by the words of the SFC commander than a scientist for India's nuclear security. The best way for the scientist to prove his wares is to get them tested to the users satisfaction. The user holds this last word not the designer. My last on this matter.
.

Need not be your last on the matter. But I am trying to highlight one point and it is not clear to me that we need to test to prove credibility. I have said this time and again and will try once more.

There are two key issues here summed up in two words "Credible Deterrence"

If India claims to have nuclear bombs, who needs to believe that statement for it to be a credible deterrent?
Credibility is what Pakistan believes. Not what you believe.

Theoretically even if India has only cowdung for warheads but Pakistanis believe that India has deadly nukes, it is a credible deterrent. Unfortunately people tend to sidestep this argument by saying "Shiv wants India to have cowdung for warheads". That is incorrect so let us keep off that.

Are you asking for testing because you don't believe that our nukes work, or are you asking for testing because you know that Pakistan does not believe that our nukes work?

If you say that Pakistan does not believe that our nukes work, how do you know? Is it possible that you are simply projecting your own anxieties and fears about Indian nukes because you don't find it credible and imagine that Pakistanis too see Indian nukes like you do and do not find them credible?

Can you reassure me that this is not the case? Can you reassure me that testing again is not merely to assuage your own anxieties with no assessment of what Pakistanis may be thinking? I put it to you that it is counter productive to simply test again to assuage your own anxieties. I believe that actually degrades deterrence by telling Pakistan in no uncertain terms that we are doubtful of our own nukes.

Things don't get any easier if we say "We are confident of our current deterrent but we are testing again for research and validation purposes" If we are telling the truth, then these new tests need to be planned properly not just for us but for the signals they send out to Indian doubters and foreign observers. What ar ewe testing and what do we want from tests?

The conclusions that other people reach about our motives will not necessarily be what we say. Suppose we test a 200-250 kt bomb and everyone agrees with that yield estimate perhaps some people in India will be satisfied. But the signal that goes out to others is that perhaps our existing arsenal were really fizzles. That means from the day of testing onwards, India's arsenal can be imagined to be less than what we are claiming. The obvious extrapolation that an informed observer would make from this is that India next has to weaponize the new 200-250 kt bomb. People will claim that an undeliverably large boosted fission bomb can be 250 kt and will not believe we have thermonuclear, having failed once. So should we really test for 500 kt or i megaton?

Our current deterrent and our current choice of targets is based on what yields we have and what weights can be carried by our existing delivery systems. Unless the new 250 kt/1 megaton bombs are exactly the same size and weight as existing designs - a whole lot of things will have to change. Our entire set of missiles will have to me modified, or a new bunch tested to take the new warhead. Whether we are doing this or not will be clearly visible to others. If we don't do it then it means that we just tested to scare others and our designs cannot be weaponized. If we make all the changes (over many years) it means that our deterrent today is a bluff and the time to blackmail India is now before we weaponize with the new warhead. Besides is one test enough? What does it prove?

Alternatively we can do 10 tests of 20 kt bombs and claim that we are testing for fuzing and miniaturization for MIRV. But then people will say that we had duds all these days and we still have only puny nukes.

So what do you propose we do for testing? What signals do you say should be sent out by testing again? And to whom?

I see the issue as complex. However if i take the view that our arsenal today is "not credible" then testing make sense. Now go back and read my first paragraph, rinse and repeat

[NRao]

Interesting article, says by Balraj Nagal. Not very sure if it is the Lt. Gen.

Strategic Stability – Conundrum, Challenge and Dilemma: The Case of India, China and Pakistan

[shiv]

Is there a chance that our warheads sizzle than fizzle when used ? What if a 200kt warhead gives 500kt output ?
Since we have not tested it , it might have been overengineered. Ain't this also a possibility from an optimist ?

Simply, for the heck of it I ask forumites to read the entire page at the following link and
1. Not get bored/spaced out
2. Understand it (optional)

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-4.html

Nuclear bombs are all science. Even on this forum people speak of nuclear bombs using the American expression "Physics package" because that is what a nuclear bomb is.

It is specious nonsense to exclude scientists and science from the nuclear weapon debate. It smacks of a person who himself has no clue what is going on. And generals cannot be excluded from this type of ignorance because our Air Marshals have also shown ignorance of engineering and technology.

And any good bunch of engineers, chemists and physicists, metallurgists and explosive balliistics experts given a chance to do cold tests will be able to predict that a given warhead design is likely to give a 10 to 20 kt yield 50 to 100 kt yield. It is not for nothing that even the people we love to hate on armscontrolwonk say that the most difficult thing about nukes is getting the fissile material

Sometimes we dismiss statements from Pakistan as nonsense, but they actually speak sense when they say "What difference does it make if our 6 kt warhead gives only 2 kt or gives 10 kt. We still have working nukes in large numbers. Mileage can vary . Some will give more yield, some less. But you ain't gonna be happy when you get hit"

[NRao]

A collection of articles on even if deterrence is relevant

May not apply for india, perhaps.

[ShauryaT]

Interesting date for the deterrence discussion. Complete article, behind a paid firewall.
Today in History: Jan 12, 1954 - Dulles Stresses a More Proactive Cold War Policy

In a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announces that the United States will defend against communism through the “deterrent of massive retaliatory power.” Although Dulles did not specifically mention nuclear weapons, it was implied.

The essential thing is that a potential aggressor should know in advance that he can and will be made to suffer for his aggression more than he can possibly gain by it. This calls for a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent power. The method of doing so will vary according to the character of the various areas....

That is a truth which should not be lost sight of as we determine our own policies. Our national purpose is not merely to survive in a world fraught with appalling danger. We want to end this era of danger. We shall not achieve that result merely by developing a vast military establishment. That serves indispensably to defend us and to deter attack. But the sword of Damocles remains suspended. The way to end the peril peacefully is to demonstrate that freedom produces not merely guns, but the spiritual, intellectual and material richness that all men want.

Such are the guiding principles we invoke. We have confidence that if our nation perseveres in applying them, freedom will again win the upper hand in its age-long struggle with despotism, and that the danger of war will steadily recede.

[shiv]

NRao thanks for posting those article by Gen Nagal. Actually I liked them - more or less except the part where he contradicts himself. I will point that out first and then say what i found useful about his information

The man says that India's NFU is wrong because it allows the other nation to devastate us before we can do that to them. This would be a fine comment if he stuck to it. But later on he says that if Pakistan uses tactical nukes we must not retaliate massively but escalate ina gradual manner.

Duh? What if we then get nuked to bits because we thought we could escalate gradually? Besides it appears that Gen Nagal is falling for the Paki trick - they are asking for gradual escalation, hoping that they can get away with a few battlefield nukes and Nagal says "Yes. Let us agree to that"

But what I do agree with is his contention that our nuclear posture should be ambiguous - neither FU nor NFU. But let me use his own arguments to debate this.

Nagal rightly points out that there is this vague concept of "strategic stability" which allows nuclear armed adversaries to exist without nuking each other. He says that between India and Pakistan there is only instability. And he also points out that stability can be there between two states, but when a third nuclear armed state enters the picture the hopes for stability fade. He says this is exactly the case between India and Pakistan, and I certainly agree with those observations.

But when we speak of concepts like "strategic stability" and the fact that there is mostly instability between India and Pakistan should the goal be stability or instability? Stability would be desirable but India and Pakistan are constantly in a game of instability-stability swings. Something happens that induces instability and the other party responds to try and bring stability.

For example, pre-1998 there was stability with both nations having hidden nukes, but Pakistan's nukes were used to threaten India. In 1998 India crossed that barrier and set up a degree of stability. In no time Pakistan reintroduced instability with Kargil, thinking that India would not be able to respond to a local attack by spreading the conflict like 1965 and would lose locally. India did not lose locally and did not open another front either and brought about a stalemate of a semblance of stability by showing that conventional forces were enough against Pakistan

But 2 years later was the Parliament attack and Parakram. Parakram failed because Pakistan was forwarned and even India's conventional might would not have sufficed. This tilted the stability factor towards Pakistan and we had a series of dastardly attacks against which we responded by building a fence an talking about Cold Start. Cold start upset the advantage that Pakistan felt they had and they started responding with tactical nukes. That is where we stand now.

At this juncture it is not clear to me whether either testing or changing our nuclear doctrine will help. But I think that if terrorist attacks continue it may be a good idea to change our nuclear doctrine to one of ambiguity where we threaten a pre emptive strike if we feel that is necessary. To me that sounds like a good plan.

[Supratik]

I could not find any mention of thermonukes by Nagal in the first two articles. I will read the pdf to see if it is there. Also if NRao can post the rest of article 2 we can see if he mentions there. If he hasn't mentioned thermonuke capability or weaponization we have nothing new except that NoKo may be testing Pakistani weapons based on Chinese design which may or may not be thermonukes. But given that Pakistan is Pakistan if they get thermonukes India is likely to know. When that happens we can revisit our doctrine and capabilities. That leaves only our capability wrt China. Whether to test the lighter warheads or not for MIRV and how to deploy them on submarines and Agni VI will be something to look out for.

[member_29190]

Just to add to the discussion.

it is a given that no country will accept even a Hiroshima scale attack, which was around 12-15kt. We have declared 150kt devices.

let us assume our devices are fizzle and it gives out "only" 15kt.

Intention is to target 10 cities in Pakistan. Two 15kt gives me double the destruction of hiroshima. So 20 warheads.

Failure rate of 50%, 40 warheads are required. Let's round it up to 50.

Let's say 2 MIRV/MARV per missile. . So need 25 Agni's.

So with 25 Agni's , with 50% failure rate and "fizzile" warhead, I am able to wack 10 Pakistani's cities.


If I had mega tonne, I would still need 13 Agni's & 20 warheads. So what is the advantage of testing mega tonne?

I would spend money to make sure the sucess rate is atleast 50%.

[NRao]

@Supratik,

No, I do NOT have access to any of the original articles. What I have posted is available on the net (and it should have been posted by those who brought Nagal to this thread).

However, some observations: Nagal has no history of published papers prior to joining CLAWS, so we really do not know his thought sequence. I just do not see him contributing much to the knowledge base - what he says, as far as I can see, is either been said or is known (and perhaps not stated?).

Besides he claims:

Conclusion:

However, there are differences of opinion on some aspects of the doctrine. The doctrine of strategic deterrence is sound, serves the objectives of deterrence and India would be ill-advised to shift to nuclear war-fighting. Credible Minimum Deterrent is a dynamic and flexible concept and serves Indian planners’ requirements. The most divisive feature is the NFU policy. As discussed earlier, there is a need to give greater space and options to India’s leadership by shifting to a policy of deliberate or studied ambiguity.

So,
* on deterrence - which he calls "sound" and "serves the objective of deterrence". Whew!!!! Saved by the quote.
* on CMD, it is "dynamic and flexible", but "serves Indian planners' requirements" (I wonder how he can say this, but a diff matter), and
* on NFU, "most divisive" - multiple observations here: three PMs have followed this, so there is certainly a counter to his position that he has not written about (?) and also, if he can make the statement "serves Indian planners' requirements", then he should know the degree of ambiguity that was/is imposed in the NFU. The fact that he is unable to articulate it leads me to believe that based on his multiple positions in the Gov, he is extrapolating in areas where he has no experience, but thinks he can contribute (a very dangerous path unless he is very clear about the picture).

IMHO, we are where we were. Nothing has changed.

Finally, I find his expectation that the nuclear posture should have been placed in front of the Indian public to be really funny, not to mention outright dangerous. We do that when we want to change land use or want to run major expressways through certain properties, etc - stuff that impacts people on the ground, but on nuclear deterrence ...................never even heard anyone recommend such a thing.

[NRao]

Interesting:

As U.S. Modernizes Nuclear Weapons, ‘Smaller’ Leaves Some Uneasy

As North Korea dug tunnels at its nuclear test site last fall, watched by American spy satellites, the Obama administration was preparing a test of its own in the Nevada desert.

A fighter jet took off with a mock version of the nation’s first precision-guided atom bomb. Adapted from an older weapon, it was designed with problems like North Korea in mind: Its computer brain and four maneuverable fins let it zero in on deeply buried targets like testing tunnels and weapon sites. And its yield, the bomb’s explosive force, can be dialed up or down depending on the target, to minimize collateral damage.

In short, while the North Koreans have been thinking big — claiming to have built a hydrogen bomb, a boast that experts dismiss as wildly exaggerated — the Energy Department and the Pentagon have been readying a line of weapons that head in the opposite direction.

The build-it-smaller approach has set off a philosophical clash among those in Washington who think about the unthinkable.

Mr. Obama has long advocated a “nuclear-free world.” His lieutenants argue that modernizing existing weapons can produce a smaller and more reliable arsenal while making their use less likely because of the threat they can pose. The changes, they say, are improvements rather than wholesale redesigns, fulfilling the president’s pledge to make no new nuclear arms.

But critics, including a number of former Obama administration officials, look at the same set of facts and see a very different future. The explosive innards of the revitalized weapons may not be entirely new, they argue, but the smaller yields and better targeting can make the arms more tempting to use — even to use first, rather than in retaliation.

Gen. James E. Cartwright, a retired vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was among Mr. Obama’s most influential nuclear strategists, said he backed the upgrades because precise targeting allowed the United States to hold fewer weapons. But “what going smaller does,” he acknowledged, “is to make the weapon more thinkable.”
Continue reading the main story
A More Accurate Atom Bomb

The United States military is replacing the fixed tail section of the B61 bomb with steerable fins and adding other advanced technology. The result is a bomb that can make more accurate nuclear strikes and a warhead whose destructive power can be adjusted to minimize collateral damage and radioactive fallout.

As Mr. Obama enters his final year in office, the debate has deep implications for military strategy, federal spending and his legacy.

The B61 Model 12, the bomb flight-tested last year in Nevada, is the first of five new warhead types planned as part of an atomic revitalization estimated to cost up to $1 trillion over three decades. As a family, the weapons and their delivery systems move toward the small, the stealthy and the precise.

Already there are hints of a new arms race. Russia called the B61 tests “irresponsible” and “openly provocative.” China is said to be especially worried about plans for a nuclear-tipped cruise missile. And North Korea last week defended its pursuit of a hydrogen bomb by describing the “ever-growing nuclear threat” from the United States.

The more immediate problem for the White House is that many of its alumni have raised questions about the modernization push and missed opportunities for arms control.

“It’s unaffordable and unneeded,” said Andrew C. Weber, a former assistant secretary of defense and former director of the Nuclear Weapons Council, an interagency body that oversees the nation’s arsenal.

He cited in particular the advanced cruise missile, estimated to cost up to $30 billion for roughly 1,000 weapons.

“The president has an opportunity to set the stage for a global ban on nuclear cruise missiles,” Mr. Weber said in an interview. “It’s a big deal in terms of reducing the risks of nuclear war.”

Last week, Brian P. McKeon, the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy, argued that anyone who looks impartially at Mr. Obama’s nuclear initiatives in total sees major progress toward the goals of a smaller force and a safer world — themes the White House highlighted on Monday in advance of the president’s State of the Union address.

“We’ve cleaned up loose nuclear material around the globe, and gotten the Iran deal,” removing a potential threat for at least a decade, Mr. McKeon said.

He acknowledged that other pledges — including treaties on nuclear testing and the production of bomb fuel — have been stuck, and that the president’s hopes of winning further arms cuts in negotiations with Russia “ran into a blockade after the events in Ukraine.”

He specifically defended the arsenal’s modernization, saying the new B61 bomb “creates more strategic stability.”

Early in his tenure, Mr. Obama invested much political capital not in upgrades but in reductions, becoming the first president to make nuclear disarmament a centerpiece of American defense policy.

In Prague in 2009, he pledged in a landmark speech that he would take concrete steps toward a nuclear-free world and “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” The Nobel committee cited the pledge that year in awarding him the Peace Prize.

A modest arms reduction treaty with Russia seemed like a first step. Then, in 2010, the administration released a sweeping plan that Mr. Obama called a fulfillment of his atomic vow. The United States, he declared, “will not develop new nuclear warheads or pursue new military missions or new capabilities.”

The overall plan was to rearrange old components of nuclear arms into revitalized weapons. The resulting hybrids would be far more reliable, meaning the administration could argue that the nation would need fewer weapons in the far future.

Inside the administration, some early enthusiasts for Mr. Obama’s vision began to worry that it was being turned on its head.

In late 2013, the first of the former insiders spoke out. Philip E. Coyle III and Steve Fetter, who had recently left national security posts, helped write an 80-page critique of the nuclear plan by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a private group that made its name during the Cold War, arguing for arms reductions.

American allies and adversaries, the report warned, may see the modernization “as violating the administration’s pledge not to develop or deploy” new warheads. The report, which urged a more cautious approach, cited a finding by federal advisory scientists: that simply refurbishing weapons in their existing configurations could keep them in service for decades.

“I’m not a pacifist,” Mr. Coyle, a former head of Pentagon weapons testing, said in an interview. But the administration, he argued, was planning for too big an arsenal. “They got the math wrong in terms of how many weapons we need, how many varieties we need and whether we need a surge capacity” for the crash production of nuclear arms.

The insider critiques soon focused on individual weapons, starting with the B61 Model 12. The administration’s plan was to merge four old B61 models into a single version that greatly reduced their range of destructive power. It would have a “dial-a-yield” feature whose lowest setting was only 2 percent as powerful as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.
Photo
President Obama’s pledge in Prague in 2009 that he would “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy” was cited when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Credit Todd Heisler/The New York Times

The plan seemed reasonable, critics said, until attention fell on the bomb’s new tail section and steerable fins. The Federation of American Scientists, a Washington research group, argued that the high accuracy and low destructive settings meant military commanders might press to use the bomb in an attack, knowing the radioactive fallout and collateral damage would be limited.

Last year, General Cartwright echoed that point on PBS’s “NewsHour.” He has huge credibility in nuclear circles: He was head of the United States Strategic Command, which has military authority over the nation’s nuclear arms, before serving as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In a recent interview in his office at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, General Cartwright said the overall modernization plan might change how military commanders looked at the risks of using nuclear weapons.

“What if I bring real precision to these weapons?” he asked. “Does it make them more usable? It could be.”

Some of the biggest names in nuclear strategy see a specific danger in the next weapon in the modernization lineup: the new cruise missile, a “standoff weapon” that bombers can launch far from their targets.

“Mr. President, kill the new cruise missile,” read the headline of a recent article by Mr. Weber, the former assistant secretary of defense, and William J. Perry, a secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton and an author of the plan to gradually eliminate nuclear weapons that captivated Mr. Obama’s imagination and endorsement.

They argued that the cruise missile might sway a future president to contemplate “limited nuclear war.” Worse yet, they said, because the missile comes in nuclear and non-nuclear varieties, a foe under attack might assume the worst and overreact, initiating nuclear war.

The critique stung because Mr. Perry, now at Stanford, is a revered figure in Democratic defense circles and a mentor to Ashton B. Carter, the secretary of defense.

Mr. McKeon, the Pentagon official, after describing his respect for Mr. Perry, said the military concluded that it needed the cruise missile to “give the president more options than a manned bomber to penetrate air defenses.”

In an interview, James N. Miller, who helped develop the modernization plan before leaving his post as under secretary of defense for policy in 2014, said the smaller, more precise weapons would maintain the nation’s nuclear deterrent while reducing risks for civilians near foreign military targets.
Photo
Andrew C. Weber, a former assistant secretary of defense and former director of the Nuclear Weapons Council, called an advanced cruise missile “unaffordable and unneeded.” Credit Pool photo by David Mdzinarishvili

“Though not everyone agrees, I think it’s the right way to proceed,” Mr. Miller said. “Minimizing civilian casualties if deterrence fails is both a more credible and a more ethical approach.”

General Cartwright summarized the logic of enhanced deterrence with a gun metaphor: “It makes the trigger easier to pull but makes the need to pull the trigger less likely.”

Administration officials often stress the modernization plan’s benign aspects. Facing concerned allies, Madelyn R. Creedon, an Energy Department deputy administrator, argued in October that the efforts “are not providing any new military capabilities” but simply replacing wires, batteries, plastics and other failing materials.

“What we are doing,” she said, “is just taking these old systems, replacing their parts and making sure that they can survive.”

In a recent report to Congress, the Energy Department, responsible for upgrading the warheads, said this was the fastest way to reduce the nuclear stockpile, promoting the effort as “Modernize to Downsize.”

The new weapons will let the nation scrap a Cold War standby called the B83, a powerful city buster. The report stressed that the declines in “overall destructive power” support Mr. Obama’s goal of “pursuing the security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

That argument, though, is extremely long term: Stockpile reductions would manifest only after three decades of atomic revitalization, many presidencies from now. One of those presidents may well cancel the reduction plans — most of the candidates now seeking the Republican nomination oppose cutbacks in the nuclear arsenal.

But the bigger risk to the modernization plan may be its expense — upward of a trillion dollars if future presidents go the next step and order new bombers, submarines and land-based missiles, and upgrades to eight factories and laboratories.

“Insiders don’t believe it will ever happen,” said Mr. Coyle, the former White House official. “It’s hard to imagine that many administrations following through.”

Meanwhile, other veterans of the Obama administration ask what happened.

“I think there’s a universal sense of frustration,” said Ellen O. Tauscher, a former under secretary of state for arms control. She said many who joined the administration with high expectations for arms reductions now feel disillusioned.

“Somebody has to get serious,” she added. “We’re spending billions of dollars on a status quo that doesn’t make us any safer.”

[Philip]

How about trying to give NoKo a few billions in aid,removal of eco sanctions and see if that works better at disarmament? The harder one punishes a rogue state,the further it falls back into its bunker mentality and behavior.

[Supratik]

You underestimate the NoKo Fuhrer. This was attempted by the US which led them to the 2013 test and aid was stopped. Nothing wrong in trying again. But the NoKo leadership can only be removed by internal revolt or total collapse of the country. The latter is not going to happen due to Chinese help just like Pak survives due to 3-1/2 friends. If the Americans are serious they should try for covert regime change.