Bharat Rakshak

nit wrote:On the question of if India has a detterent, we would not be spending money on triad & C4, which is very expensive if we had fizziles.

Why did we decide to triad after the 98's test and not before that?

ramana wrote:shiv, Looks like S-1 design implemented in B61.

• 1. After 1945 US believed that all wars would stop because they now had nukes
  2. Soviet test came as a shock
  3. Advances like Hydrogen bombs led to atmospheric testing of huge megaton weapons
  4. US planned to take out all Soviet capability. An enormous arsenal was built up promising to destroy the whole of the USSR
  5, USSR proliferated too and US civilian preparation for nuclear war - nuke shelters etc became the rage. (These facts make people (including many Indians) nowadays imagine that this will actually be useful in surviving nuclear war, a mistaken notion that the US has since given up)
  6. There was an eventual realization that no pre emptive US strike could hope to destroy all Soviet capability and that the US would definitely get hit and the radiation and fallout would not be survivable for anyone
  7. Meanwhile better accuracy of missiles led to smaller warheads - down from megatons to kilotons
  8. Fallout concerns eventually led to moving of tests underground. By this time China too had started atmospheric testing
  9. US and USSR realized that tactical nuclear weapons were really really dirty in terms of fallout and would not actually stop a war.
  10. Cold war continued and Neutron bombs were pushed as the "latest and greatest" to stop a Soviet advance in Europe
  11. Duh!! Europeans realized that all those Neutron bombs would be used on their land and none of them was really free from fallout, despite rhetoric. This poured cold water on those plans (probably light water don't you think? )
  12. There was increasing awareness of environmental concerns of fallout by the 90s - a big change from the 60s - all in my (and your) lifetime
  13. When India showed the capability of building a nuclear bomb in 1974 it became evident that nuclear bombs were not that difficult to built and deploy even by low to medium tech nations. That is when there was a general international worry about proliferation. Countries like Sweden and South Africa who had actually built bombs opted out
  14. It also became clear to more people that no one really wants to be hit even by a 10 kiloton bomb rather than a 1 megaton bomb. Fallout was going to hit more people than the actual happily vapourized people. Everything seemed tickety-boo (using Karnad's expression) as long as someone else was going to get hit by megatons. But none of the powers really wants to give up bombs because they are so tempting. That is when India firmly joined the bandwagon.

• a. An air-dropped munition which remains under control to the last minute unlike missiles
  b. Has low and very low yields with great accuracy
  3. 34 cm diameter is sophistication of US technology. Not that easy as far as I know.

Supratik wrote:@nit,

They are talking about TNWs in response to cold start. They believe that using TNWs will quickly escalate an Indian armored thrust to the nuclear level and bring it to a halt. But that is a fallacious idea against an adversary that is conventionally superior and IMO nuke superior giving it a host of options to respond. Also what if the snake is killed not by cutting the head but by holding its tail and banging hard against a rock. There strategy is based in response to an Indian armored thrust across Punjab and a WW2 style battle of attrition. What if Indian decides to kill the snake by its tail?

nit wrote: All these talk of TN is because Pakis are not confident that strategic maal will give out more yield than tactical nukes.
They believe in Indian response and don't want cities getting wiped out for a failed nuke attack.

shiv wrote:This is where I totally disagree with anyone - even Gen Nagal if he says that we should accept this and not retaliate massively but escalate gradually.

shiv wrote: nit - I agree with some aspects of your assessment. The development of tactical nukes is actually a rational signal by Pakistan that they find India's threat credible and they do not want escalation to fullscale nuclear retaliation but will keep the provocation down to what they feel they need for protection.

This is where I totally disagree with anyone - even Gen Nagal if he says that we should accept this and not retaliate massively but escalate gradually.

No. One nuke and they simply must be nuked out of existence.

The question to the decision maker is, is he willing to murder millions and make a part of the subcontinent unlivable?

NRao wrote: 6) I wonder if Lt. Gen. Nagal, either at the tail end of his stay at SFC or after that went through an Arjun syndrome. After facing what he did not expect to face - potential "murder" - did he chicken out? He needs to answer that question. Seriously

My only request, please do not make this about Gen Nagal. He is not the only one asking such questions there are many more, if you are not aware. Example. If you do not like the murder adjective, use something else. The point remains.

ShauryaT wrote:

NRao wrote: 6) I wonder if Lt. Gen. Nagal, either at the tail end of his stay at SFC or after that went through an Arjun syndrome. After facing what he did not expect to face - potential "murder" - did he chicken out? He needs to answer that question. Seriously

My only request, please do not make this about Gen Nagal. He is not the only one asking such questions there are many more, if you are not aware. Example. If you do not like the murder adjective, use something else. The point remains.

When confronted with a scenario of a TNW - The apex in our decision chain faces many questions and a dilemma exists.

I do not think our doctrine has been thought through on the use of nuclear weapons. Our entire approach to them is one of anathema, as to a certain degree should be but since we do have the capabilities, we have to think through the objectives and goals, consequences and outcomes, risks and opportunities - and go beyond a very basic level to say - please do not use them, even we have them and there will be bad consequences

ShauryaT wrote:.

I will posit this, anyone who argues for massive retaliation for an odd NBC attack or a tactical nuke with a marginal impact in the scheme of things - where it is judged as not something for escalation, unless done so by the attacked party would not have to confront a moral dilemma is being completely unrealistic.

There is a reason why so many from the user community and other serious analysts view ONLY MR response as an issue. The reason is quite straight forward. SFC operational plans are all based on the doctrine, counter value oriented. When confronted with a scenario of a TNW - The apex in our decision chain faces many questions and a dilemma exists. There is no guarantee after the one odd TNW, a massive counter value attack is not under way. Not to acknowledge the moral dilemma of a massive counter value attack is unrealistic. You do not have any control of the enemy's nuclear strategies - for they have their own valid reasons.

The question to the decision maker is, is he willing to murder millions and make a part of the subcontinent unlivable? The second question is, if the enemy has some reasonable assured second strike (I view it as a given for Pakistan), then it would be we who have escalated the scenario and there would be millions dead at our end too. It is all well and good to say, you started it first but the fact remains the escalation to massive deaths would have to be our call. There is a third thing in the mix here and I will say it - even if unpopular. MR presumes at a certain level annihilation of the enemy. I am quite certain that on both sides, this is not the desire. Now to the fourth and final point, I do not think our doctrine has been thought through on the use of nuclear weapons.

shiv wrote: It appears that the old moralizing Nehruvians have inserted themselves into our strategic planning groups and are moralizing

The fact is you cannot deter anyone with nukes unless you are ready tto use them. If you are going to moralize and express doubts then first give up nukes. Sign CTBT, Join FMCT

By Gurmeet Kanwal
Dec 5, 2014

Reluctant Member of the Nuclear Club

Faced with the prospect of having to confront nuclear-armed China and Pakistan, with both of which it had fought wars over unresolved territorial disputes, India conducted a series of nuclear tests at Pokhran, Rajasthan, on May 11 and 13, 1998, and declared itself a state armed with nuclear weapons. Before crossing the nuclear Rubicon, India had sought but had been denied international guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against it. As India was not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the country did not violate any treaty obligations.

It is well accepted in India that nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of warfighting and that their sole purpose is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by India’s adversaries. This was reflected in a statement made by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Parliament in May 1998: “India is now a nuclear weapon state.... We do not intend to use these weapons for aggression or for mounting threats against any country; these are weapons of self-defence, to ensure that India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion.”

Until the May 1998 nuclear tests, almost nothing was known about India’s nuclear doctrine and force structure in the public domain. A draft nuclear doctrine was prepared by the National Security Advisory Board chaired by the late K. Subrahmanyam and handed over to the government on August 17, 1999.

After a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security, the government issued a statement on January 4, 2003, spelling out India’s nuclear doctrine and the operationalization of its nuclear deterrent. The salient features of the government statement included the following: India will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent; follow a no-first-use posture; and will use nuclear weapons only “in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.” It was also affirmed that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage; retaliatory attacks will be authorized only by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority; nuclear weapons will not be used against nonnuclear weapon states; and India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons.

Ashley Tellis, well-known South Asia analyst, has written that India’s nuclear doctrine is “fundamentally conservative…” and that India’s retaliatory nuclear strike “is likely to…maintain its traditionally strict system of civilian control over all strategic assets; minimise the costs of maintaining a nuclear deterrent at high levels of operational readiness routinely; and, maximise the survivability of its relatively modest nuclear assets….” (“India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution,” NBR Analysis, May 2001.)

Recent Calls for Review

In the decade since the nuclear doctrine was unveiled by the government, several organizations and individuals have commented on it. Some of them have been critical of the no-first-use (NFU) posture. Among them, Bharat Karnad (author of Nuclear Weapons and India’s Security [Macmillan, 2004]) has consistently questioned the NFU posture. He has written: “NFU may be useful as political rhetoric and make for stability in situations short of war. But as a serious war-planning predicate, it is a liability. NFU is not in the least credible, because it requires India to first absorb a nuclear attack before responding in kind.”

Former prime minister Manmohan Singh, while speaking at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, on April 2, 2014, called for a global “no-first-use” norm. He said, “States possessing nuclear weapons…(must) quickly move to the establishment of a global no-first-use norm….” This was followed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) promising in its election manifesto to “study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times…” and to “maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostrategic realities.”

Some BJP leaders hinted that the NFU posture would also be reviewed. However, sensing the international criticism that was bound to follow, Narendra Modi, BJP’s candidate for prime minister, emphasized that there would be “no compromise” on no first use. Regardless of election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important government policies must be reviewed periodically with a view to examining and revalidating their key features.

Criticism of the nuclear doctrine has mainly been centered on a few key issues: NFU may result in unacceptably high initial casualties and damage to Indian population, cities, and infrastructure; “massive” retaliation is not credible, especially against a tactical nuclear strike on Indian forces on the adversary’s own territory; nuclear retaliation for chemical or biological attack would be illogical, especially as the attack may be by nonstate actors; and it would be difficult to determine what constitutes a “major” chemical or biological strike.

Most recently, Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal (Ret.), former commander in chief, Strategic Forces Command, and later head of the Strategic Planning Staff at the National Security Council Secretariat, has questioned the efficacy of the NFU doctrine. According to him, “It is time to review our policy of NFU…(the) choices are ambiguity or first use.” He gives six main reasons for seeking a change: NFU implies acceptance of large-scale destruction in a first strike; the Indian public is not in sync with the government’s NFU policy and the nation is not psychologically prepared; it would be morally wrong—the leadership has no right to place the population “in peril”; NFU allows the adversary’s nuclear forces to escape punishment as retaliatory strikes will have to be counter value in nature; an elaborate and costly ballistic missile defense (BMD) system would be required to defend against a first strike; and escalation control is not possible once nuclear exchanges begin. (“Checks and Balances,” Force, June 2014.)

The proponents of NFU agree with the government’s policy and offer persuasive arguments in its favor: India’s strategic restraint posture has provided major gains internationally, including the lifting of economic sanctions and the removal of technology denial regimes, civil nuclear cooperation agreements, and accommodation in multilateral nuclear export control regimes. Most of these will be frittered away if India opts for first use; complex command and control and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems are necessary for a first-use posture; a first-use posture will deny India the opportunity to engage in conventional warfare below the nuclear threshold; first use will lower the nuclear threshold and make the use of tactical nuclear weapons more likely; and South Asia will again be dubbed a “nuclear flashpoint,” which will encourage international meddling and discourage investment.

However, the acid test of whether or not the NFU posture is justified should be to test it against the yardstick of military operations during war. The likely circumstances in which first use may be considered appropriate by its advocates and the counter arguments of its proponents are discussed briefly below.

The most common scenarios include first use by way of preemption based on intelligence warning or during launch on warning or launch through attack. In all of these, there are no easy answers to some obvious questions: What if intelligence regarding an imminent first strike is wrong? The (non)existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is a good example. Which targets will be hit in a first strike? Counter value or counter force or both? Is the destruction of the adversary’s cities justified on suspicion of imminent launch? In either case, the adversary’s surviving nuclear weapons will be employed to successfully target major Indian cities. Would it be worthwhile risking the destruction of Delhi, Mumbai, and other cities in Kenneth Waltz’s words “in the military pursuit of problematic gains”? (“Does India Need the Bomb,” The Times of India, January 26, 2000.)

Major military reverses are also said to justify the first use of nuclear weapons. In the land battle, the worst-case scenarios include the cutting off of the Pathankot-Jammu national highway NH-1A somewhere near Samba; an ingress by the Pakistan army over the forward obstacle system in Punjab or Rajasthan; and a major incursion into the Thar Desert. In none of these scenarios is the situation likely to become so critical as to justify escalation to nuclear levels by way of a first strike, as sufficient reserves are available to restore an adverse situation. Similarly, if an aircraft carrier and one submarine are destroyed or an important airbase with nuclear-capable aircraft is severely damaged, a first strike would not be justified. Hence, it emerges quite clearly that India’s NFU posture was justified when it was first announced and remains appropriate even today.

Deterrence is ultimately a mind game. The essence of deterrence is that it must not be allowed to break down. India’s nuclear doctrine must enhance and not undermine nuclear deterrence. The NFU posture remains feasible for India’s nuclear doctrine. However, the word “massive” in the government statement should be substituted with “punitive” as massive is not credible and limits retaliatory options. The threat of nuclear retaliation against chemical and biological attack should be dropped from the doctrine as it is impractical. Also, the credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine needs to be substantially enhanced through a skillfully drawn signaling plan.

Gurmeet Kanwal is a Delhi-based adjunct fellow with the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

abhik wrote: Will our "massive retaliation" wipe out all, at least almost all paki nukes? If not the gradual escalation will likely be the most likely course of action.

ShauryaT wrote:

shiv wrote: It appears that the old moralizing Nehruvians have inserted themselves into our strategic planning groups and are moralizing

The fact is you cannot deter anyone with nukes unless you are ready tto use them. If you are going to moralize and express doubts then first give up nukes. Sign CTBT, Join FMCT

Proportionality of response is a "factor" in the decision making process. Some others call it escalation dominance. Whatever words you want to use there are contextual factors that are sought to be taken into account. Massive response being ONE of the available options is not sought to be changed. Massive Response as the ONLY option is the objection. If you want to call this reasoning some moralizing Nehruvian approach then I would rather stop providing more names on this thread as examples of the thinking - which IMO is the majority view amongst the informed.

The question to the decision maker is, is he willing to murder millions and make a part of the subcontinent unlivable? The second question is, if the enemy has some reasonable assured second strike (I view it as a given for Pakistan), then it would be we who have escalated the scenario and there would be millions dead at our end too. It is all well and good to say, you started it first but the fact remains the escalation to massive deaths would have to be our call. There is a third thing in the mix here and I will say it - even if unpopular. MR presumes at a certain level annihilation of the enemy. I am quite certain that on both sides, this is not the desire

ldev wrote:I think all the gaming done based on the US-Soviet experience will not work out in the India-Pakistan context.

maxratul wrote:If it is an attack on an Indian city, then there will be massive retaliation. No other option will exist for any politician, of whichever party.
The real question is the response to a tactical nuclear strike in POK/JK with minimum civilian casualties. Knowing the general disrespect the ruling class have for the services, there is a very high chance that we will fold citing "humanity" etc.

maxratul wrote:The doctrine is very clear sir, it is the will to implement it that is in doubt...

The doctrine is very clear sir, it is the will to implement it that is in doubt...

NRao wrote:

The doctrine is very clear sir, it is the will to implement it that is in doubt...

Do not know if you are aware that there are checks and balances to prevent refusal or preemption - else it is not a doctrine. Recall Pakistan went about making bombs and then the US had to provide advice on how to go about completing the cycle - making them is the easy part, protecting them and making sure about a whole range of things completes the picture.

So, anyone making a case of "implementing" or "preempting" is dealing with an incomplete doctrine, which is fair game - then it needs correction. But are you admitting after 15 years that the Indian doctrine is incomplete? That three PMs sat on it and did nothing?



It has been a real long time since I chased this topic and even a small time yesterday revealed something very interesting. In my next post.

Imagine this scenario - after a nuke attack, the PM decides not to retaliate

A doctrine is a statement of intent, and intent needs to backed by will

Ofcourse, if there is a hidden mechanism that automatically activates the SFC bypassing a political go ahead this above scenario is moot. However, I doubt it very much.