Re: Deterrence
Posted: 14 Jan 2016 19:28
Two questions. The first one is easier (IMHO)maxratul wrote:
way I see it, in India the final call on retaliation will have to be political.
Imagine this scenario - after a nuke attack, the PM decides not to retaliate. What will anybody else do? stage a coup?
A doctrine is a statement of intent, and intent needs to backed by will. Going by our track record of "mooh tod jawab denge" i think it is a fair extrapolation that our political class might lack the cojones to launch massive retaliation on Pak in case of nuclear provocation in non civilian context, especially in Kashmir.
Ofcourse, if there is a hidden mechanism that automatically activates the SFC bypassing a political go ahead this above scenario is moot. However, I doubt it very much.
absolutely, and therein lies the rub. Considering the type of democracy India is, are we to understand that there exists a SOP to conduct a nuclear strike bypassing or disregarding political go ahead? And that our political leadership approved such a SOP?shiv wrote: 1. Would you put all this information that you have posted in our nuclear doctrine?
Thanks.maxratul wrote:absolutely, and therein lies the rub. Considering the type of democracy India is, are we to understand that there exists a SOP to conduct a nuclear strike bypassing or disregarding political go ahead? And that our political leadership approved such a SOP?shiv wrote: 1. Would you put all this information that you have posted in our nuclear doctrine?
Going by our track record of "mooh tod jawab denge" i think it is a fair extrapolation that our political class might lack the cojones to launch massive retaliation on Pak in case of nuclear provocation in non civilian context, especially in Kashmir.
I think you are confusing two totally different situations and the way the SOP is set up.maxratul wrote:absolutely, and therein lies the rub. Considering the type of democracy India is, are we to understand that there exists a SOP to conduct a nuclear strike bypassing or disregarding political go ahead? And that our political leadership approved such a SOP?shiv wrote: 1. Would you put all this information that you have posted in our nuclear doctrine?
I think other nations, especially in the West, have formed their stands based on the assumption that India will not test again (as promised - no one asked India for that) and the Indian doctrine.Some BJP leaders hinted that the NFU posture would also be reviewed. However, sensing the international criticism that was bound to follow, Narendra Modi, BJP’s candidate for prime minister, emphasized that there would be “no compromise” on no first use. Regardless of election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important government policies must be reviewed periodically with a view to examining and revalidating their key features.
I was reading somewhere that during the cold war the US in it's counter force targeting had assigned certain high priority targets such as the Soviet hardened buried underground command bunkers outside Moscow as many as 28 warheads EACH. And most of those 28 warheads were 1 MT monsters. And yet they were not certain they would be able to decapitate Soviet command and control because of the presence of known and unknown secondary and backup command centers.maxratul wrote:Primary target of Indian retaliation will be all known pakistani nuclear sites and hideouts. Cities (except perhaps Islamabad/Pindi and Karachi) will be coming much later in the priority list.
Of course, any changes to our doctrine/testing will elicit a negative reaction from the west. Why do you think we cannot afford that ? Nothing positive has emerged on the ground thanks to the ``good boy" image that we have with the west. Any negative action from the west would not exceed what they did in 1974/1998. Our economy did not collapse as a result of their outrage.I think other nations, especially in the West, have formed their stands based on the assumption that India will not test again (as promised - no one asked India for that) and the Indian doctrine.
Changing the doctrine *will absolutely mean* that these nations will reevaluate their stand - cannot say which way it will go, but if I had to bet it will be a -ve for India. This is something India cannot afford.
I think the question should be will Pak be ready to loose 10 cities?ldev wrote:
The moral of the story is what is important is not how completely you can destroy your enemy but how much destruction can you bear yourself, and to what extent can you protect yourself against the destruction (ABM, anti aircraft defence etc.)
My premise is that Pakistan is not a rational nuclear actor vs India. All other nuclear relations are rational. But in the Pakistani psyche, India occupies a special place of hatred. And so vis a vis India, Pakistan's threshold is different. In comparison the India-China nuclear relationship is subject to rational deterrence.nit wrote:I think the question should be will Pak be ready to loose 10 cities?ldev wrote:
The moral of the story is what is important is not how completely you can destroy your enemy but how much destruction can you bear yourself, and to what extent can you protect yourself against the destruction (ABM, anti aircraft defence etc.)
The people who will make this decision are PA Generals. What can we done to make PA Generals love Pakistan?
They will not let it go waste until the goose lays golden eggs. Paki Abduls eatting grass and funding PA General's kid study in US Universities, we are fine.
There are quite a few example that could question that assumption. Of course they hate us, but do that hate us so much that they are ready to sacrifice themselves?ldev wrote: My premise is that Pakistan is not a rational nuclear actor vs India. All other nuclear relations are rational. But in the Pakistani psyche, India occupies a special place of hatred. And so vis a vis India, Pakistan's threshold is different. In comparison the India-China nuclear relationship is subject to rational deterrence.
Ramana - for Pak - the bottle neck is not fissile material. It has quite a lot (both HEU and Pu) but for it more important is still other technology - detonation & delivery apparatus ityadi...For terrorists too, finding fissile material ((Smuggling/buying Pu or even HEU)) is much easier, making a implosion device which works, and delivery vehicles are much bigger challenges. Pak will run out of other things much before it runs out of fissile material.ramana wrote:AmberG/KLPD, Does TSP have the luxury of fielding the amount of wasteful use of fissile material as required by all those Nasr payloads?
Such low yields are of nature very inefficient use of fissile materials.
Every where one would expect more efficient use of such materials.
Does TSP have such resources?
And if the state fractures what is the security of those payloads?
Can you post a link for it please? Thx.Mueller wrote a nice article a few years ago
There have been a few good articles. This from MIT technical review is good one. (You may also google, with radiological wepons mueller etc to get some more)NRao wrote:Can you post a link for it please? Thx.Mueller wrote a nice article a few years ago
(By Richard A. Muller )
Terrorists might attack the U.S. homeland again this summer, the Justice Department and the FBI warned last month. The same day, the Department of Energy announced a $450 million plan to counter terrorist nuclear weapons and dirty bombs. And shortly afterwards, the Justice Department released some details about Jose Padilla, the one-time street thug who had received extensive al Qaeda training and had hoped to explode a dirty bomb in the United States.
But according to the Justice Department announcement, al Qaeda had doubted that Padillas proposal to build a dirty bomb was practical. They directed him instead to blow up two apartment buildings using natural gas. They apparently felt that such an action would have a greater chance of spreading death and destruction than would a radiological weapon. { Actually it was reported in one of the declassified reports - that during the deposition Padillas told his interrogators that he was told , “Forget the dirty bomb, rent several apartments in Chicago and explode them with natural gas.” }
Al Qaeda was right. Perhaps that should scare you. Al Qaeda appears to understand the limitations of these devices better than do many government leaders, newspapers, and even many scientists.
Our experience with radiological weapons the fancier name for dirty bombs is limited. They do not require a chain reaction like fission or fusion weapons, but instead use ordinary explosives to spread pre-existing radioactive material. Saddam Hussein reportedly tested such a weapon in 1987, but abandoned the effort when he saw how poorly it worked. In 1995, Chechen rebels buried dynamite and a small amount of the radioactive isotope cesium-137 in Moscows Ismailovsky park. They then told a TV station where to dig it up. Perhaps they recognized the truth: that the bombs news value could be greater if it were discovered before it went off. For such weapons, the psychological impact can be greater than the limited harm they are likely to cause.
I don't mean to suggest that radioactive materials are harmless. Indeed, consider the story of scavengers in Goiania, Brazil, who found and dismantled an abandoned radiotherapy machine in 1987. { or Delhi episode which had a brf dhaga} The machine contained 1,400 curies of cesium-137. (A curie is the radioactivity of one gram of radium.) Two men, one woman, and one child died from acute radiation poisoning; 250 additional people were contaminated. Several of the 41 houses evacuated could not be cleaned adequately and were demolished.
Imagine now if that radiation weren't confined to a few houses, but were spread over the city by an explosion. Wouldn't fatalities be higher? The surprising answer is: No. If the radioactivity were dispersed in that way, larger area would have to be evacuated, yet in all probability no specific deaths could be attributed to the event.
To understand the details, lets walk through the design of a dirty bomb similar to what Padilla wanted to build. Ill assume the same amount of radioactive material as was in Goiania: 1,400 curies of cesium-137. Radiation damage is measured in units called rem, and if you stand one meter from that source, youll absorb 450 rems in less than an hour. Thats called LD50, for lethal dose 50 percent. Untreated, youll have a 50 percent chance of dying in the next few months from that exposure.
To try do enhance the damage, lets use explosives to spread our 1,400 curies over a larger area, say a neighborhood one kilometer square. That will result in a radioactivity of 1.4 millicuries per square meter, and a careful calculation shows that residents will get a dose of 140 rems per year. But radiation illness is nonlinear. For extended exposures, the lethal dose increases by the fourth root of time, to approximately 1,250 rems for a one-year exposure and 2,500 rems for a 16-year exposure. So 140 rems per year is not enough to trigger radiation illness, even if you stayed there 24/7 for a decade. Radioactive contamination may be the one case for which the solution to pollution really is dilution.
There will be no dead bodies at the scene, unless someone is killed by the explosion itself. I suspect thats why al Qaeda instructed Jose Padilla to abandon the dirty bomb concept and try to plan a natural gas explosion instead.
But even a dirty bomb without casualties could spread nuclear panic, based on the danger of long-term cancer. For doses in the 100-rem range, results from historical exposures suggest the increased risk of cancer is about 0.04 percent per rem. Thats a 6 percent increase in your chance of dying from cancer for each year you spend in the square kilometer. If the radioactivity were spread over a larger area, e.g., a 10- by 10-kilometer square, then the dose would be lower (12.6 rems per year) and so would the added risk of cancer: 0.06 percent per year of exposure. (I am assuming, conservatively, that risk is proportional to dose, even at low doses.
With such contamination, would I evacuate my home? Not if I were allowed to stay. To me, the increased riskfrom the pre-existing average risk of cancer of about 20 percent per year to, say, 20.06 percentis not significant.
But I wouldnt be given the choice. The exposure of 12.6 rems per year is 126 times more than the yearly limit allowed to the public. In fact, the Environmental Protection Agency decontamination standard is 0.025 rems per year, meaning that 98 percent of the radioactivity would have to be removed before I would be allowed to return to my home.
In the September 11 attacks, the terrorists took advantage of U.S. policy and prejudices. They knew they didnt need guns to take control because pilots had been instructed to cooperate with hijackers; nobody expected hijackers to turn planes into weapons. Similarly, a terrorist today might use a radiological weapon, not because of its actual damage, but in anticipation the out-of-scale panic and ensuing economic disruption that the weapon could trigger.
Could other radiological attacks be more potent than our hypothesized cesium-137 example? Electrical generators powered by the decay of radioisotopes, found in abandoned lighthouses in Russia, held 400,000 curies of strontium-90. But strontium-90 emits virtually no gamma rays; it is harmful only if you breathe it or ingest it. A cloud of aerosolized Sr-90 can killbut it does not stay in the air for long. For the same reason, even a radiological bomb made using plutonium is unlikely to be dangerous. Anthrax would be deadlier, and much easier to obtain and transport. Nuclear waste storage facilities and nuclear reactors contain vastly more radioactivity, and the danger from them is substantial, if their radioactivity can be released.
If small dirty bombs threaten so little harm, why are they lumped in with true weapons of mass destruction? The reason is: its the law, as written in the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 104-201) and other places, including California penal code 11417. Defining them this way was a mistake that could lead to misallocation of resources and a general overreaction if such weapons were used. I hope, and expect, that most of the $450 million to be spent on the anti-nuclear initiative announced last month will be used to protect us from nuclear explosives and attacks on nuclear storage areas, and not specifically from radiological weapons.
If terrorists do attack this summer using a dirty bomb, the resulting death might come from automobile accidents as people flee. Dirty bombs are not weapons of mass destruction, but weapons of mass disruption. Their success depends on public and government overreaction. Beware not radioactivity but nuclear panic. The main thing we have to fear from a dirty bomb is fear itself.
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My suggestion for deterrenceldev wrote:
What does GOI do? So, let's say they decide to go per the stated policy of massive retaliation. And let's say they retaliate with all of the 20 kt weapons and 50 of the 200 kt weapons, holding the remaining 50 kt warheads in reserve in case of China. These 70 warheads target the 10 largest Pakistani cities. With the limited number of weapons that both sides possess, neither can go for a counter force strike. So each of these 10 largest Pakistani cities gets hit with about 1 MT each distributed among 5-8 warheads. Given the concentrated nature of the population in the cities in the subcontinent, casualties per MT will be higher than the US studies which assume a much more dispersed and spread out city population in the West/Russia. So let's assume that 50% of the population dies with the blast effect and the others are hit with radiation poisoning. So an immediate casualty figure of 25 million + 80% of the economy destroyed. Pakistan is destroyed as a country, but how many of it's 100 nuclear warheads are destroyed?. Chances are very few if any at all, given that they will be dispersed and hidden to survive just such an Indian strike.
And after absorbing this Indian strike Pakistan decides to retaliate with all of its 100 warheads each with an explosive power of 20 kt. These 100 warheads target the 20 largest Indian cities listed above so an average of 5 warheads per city, some of the larger cities could be targeted with 7-10 warheads, smaller cities with 1-2 warheads. For the sake of simplicity I am assuming that all Pakistani and Indian strikes go through (no intercepts). Each 20 kt warhead hitting a populated city will kill at least 100,000 people immediately given the crowded nature of most cities. So you are looking at about 10 million dead immediately, maybe 20-30 million hit with radiation poisoning and 20 city centers destroyed for all economic purposes. What will be India's economic condition after this exchange? Pakistan will be destroyed, but India's economy will also be virtually destroyed.
My lesson from the above:
Develop and deploy a strong ABM and anti aircraft defence system. If the bulk of the Indian economy and military installations are protected, India will be able to react to Pakistani sponsored terror attacks, confident in the knowledge that should Pakistan escalate to a nuclear exchange, India will be largely protected.
No guarantees about this. But if we must nuke them, we must nuke them and not worry about the consequences forwe are nuking them because they need to be nuked to hell. Qaid E Duhldev wrote: How many of Pakistan's 100 weapons will India be confident of destroying given such odds? And how much destruction will the remaining weapons cause in India?
ldev wrote:^^
Pakistan did not need to test since they were handed over a tested design by China and the HEU alongwith it. Maybe they were given complete devices. They only tested, actually they did not test, what they did was to explode a tested, proofed design as a demonstration to India that India should not feel that it could take liberties with Pakistan after the Indian tests.
Re, Pakistan hate for India. Think about it. What are the chances of a border skirmish with China escalating to a nuclear exchange and what are the chances of a skirmish with Pakistan escalating to a nuclear exchange? Why was India during Kargil so scrupulous in ensuring that it did not cross over into Pakistan including IAF jets conducting air to ground operations?
Whether Pakistan is really irrational or only play acting irrational is an open question. My belief is that they are irrational but only vs India for reasons well known. But what is in no doubt is that various Indian Governments since 1987 at least have believed in that irationality. The last major exercise vis a vis Pakistan was Brasstacks in 1987. There was a belief that India could have gone to war then.
At around 8:45 the US guys state that the French de gaulle was not sure that the US would retaliate against teh Soviets if Europe was invaded.nit wrote:This is a wonderful video on the Command & Control Issues of TNW.
It is important to protect fissile material from extremists in Pakistan more than nuclear bombs because the latter has multi-layer security unlike the former, a senior Pakistani nuclear expert said on Saturday.
Pervez Hoodbhoy, a professor of Physics and Mathematics at Forman Christian College University in Lahore, said there was no need of India and Pakistan to test the nuclear bomb in 1998 as both knew the capacity of the atomic weapon they possessed.
Speaking about the threat of extremists to nuclear warheads in Pakistan, Hoodbhoy said, "Even if Taliban or other extremists organisations can get the weapons, which is not impossible, the nuclear weapons have several locks and passwords. I hope Pakistani weapons too have the Permissible Action Limit (PALs) to ensure the security of weapons.
"But it is the fissile material which should be protected. However, to make a bomb out of it one requires 80-90 kgs of enriched uranium. However, even in this case, it will be very primitive," he said.
Hoodbhoy was delivering a lecture on future of India-Pakistan relations and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit's impact on it. The lecture was organised by Centre for Policy Analysis.
Noting that testing of atomic bomb by any nation is for sending "political messages", he said it could have been avoided.
"India could have avoided testing the (nuclear) bomb. Pakistan too could have avoided not responding to it. It is fairly simple matter to understand the magnitude. The amount of material and purity of material and the core of the uranium bomb. Any PhD Student would have estimated the yield of the bomb.
"Multi-layer" security provided by a bunch of jihadi numbnuts in the paki army is as good as no security, one would think...how long with the US be able to train Pakis in the US and have the guard pakistan's nuclear jewels, if the pakis stop wanting to do that at some point?It is important to protect fissile material from extremists in Pakistan more than nuclear bombs because the latter has multi-layer security unlike the former, a senior Pakistani nuclear expert said on Saturday.
Noting that testing of atomic bomb by any nation is for sending "political messages", he said it could have been avoided.
"India could have avoided testing the (nuclear) bomb. Pakistan too could have avoided not responding to it. It is fairly simple matter to understand the magnitude. The amount of material and purity of material and the core of the uranium bomb. Any PhD Student would have estimated the yield of the bomb.
posted a page or two ago.
Washington, Jan 20: Pakistan's nuclear warheads, which are estimated to be between 110-130 are aimed at deterring India from taking military action against it, a latest Congressional report has said. The report also expressed concern that Islamabad's "full spectrum deterrence" doctrine has increased risk of nuclear conflict between the two South Asian neighbours. "Pakistan's nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, deploying additional nuclear weapons, and new types of delivery vehicles," Congressional Research Service (CRS) said in its latest report. Pakistan warheads In its 28-page report, the CRS noted that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against it, but Islamabad's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons and adoption of a doctrine called "full spectrum deterrence" have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal.
CRS is the independent research wing of the US Congress, which prepares periodic reports by eminent experts on a wide range of issues so as to help lawmakers take informed decisions. Reports of CRS are not considered as an official view of the US Congress. "Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal," said the CRS report authored by Paul K Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin. Moreover, Pakistani and US officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A Q Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials, it said. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programmes, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security, the CRS said. "However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan's nuclear complex," the CRS said