What makes you think they have not done so, so far?,let's hope that the DRDO/HAL rise to the occcasion in the national interest.

What makes you think they have not done so, so far?,let's hope that the DRDO/HAL rise to the occcasion in the national interest.
02-01-13,
India is at war. Tejas fighters wheel over a smoke dark battleground, taking down enemy aircraft with their superior radar and missile capabilities. Lower still, Indian-designed helicopters are giving hell to enemy armour and troop formations with missiles and machine-gun fire. On the ground, mighty Arjun tanks lumber slowly across dunes, sure of their impenetrable Kanchan armour even as they spew death through their 120 mm guns. Jawans crouch and advance with the tanks, firing three-round bursts from their INSAS rifles and lobbing bhut jholokia grenades at their foes. They are tireless, having imbibed performance-enhancing pills, and well-fed, having had spoil-proof parathas and self-heated packaged meals before battle.
This is what a DRDO dream looks like. However, a nightmare was revealed recently when Defence Minister A K Antony ordered the Comptroller General of Defence Audit (CGDA) to do a secret audit of India’s equivalent of the futuristic workshop of James Bond’s ‘Q’ — the Defence Research and Development Organisation that goes by the handle DRDO.
The highlights of the report are frightening. Here are some of them:
http://newindianexpress.com/magazine/article598145.ece
* DRDO has been developing equipment which is either sub-standard or have extended deadlines and additional budgets;
* Many of the projects have been sanctioned without the requisite government approval. Only 10 per cent of projects have come to the ministry for clearance;
* Corruption and nepotism exists in the upper echelons;
* There is an exodus of qualified scientists;
DRDO has challenged the findings but the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has taken cognisance of them. It will be ordering a review of the agency’s approval processes as well as that of the recent proposal to enhance the financial powers for DRDO chief V K Saraswat.
Waste products
Crores of rupees are spent on research that mostly flops
The CGDA audit findings raise serious questions on the capability of this defence outfit, which has an annual budget of Rs 10,500 crore. Established in 1958, it has a network of 52 laboratories nationwide, employing 5,000 scientists with about 25,000 support staff. But only 29 per cent of the products developed during the last 17 years are being used by the Armed Forces. The audit notes that in several cases, DRDO bought equipment from other companies after spending crores on R&D. For instance, the CGDA found that after spending two years and Rs 29.96 crore to develop satellite signal monitoring, DRDO ultimately bought the same from a public sector undertaking on a single tender basis for Rs 24.50 crore in April 2011. “If such technologies are indeed commercially available, where was the need of a development project by DRDO?” the audit asked. DRDO also spent Rs 6.85 crore to develop explosive detectors, which were offered to the army for Rs 30 lakh each. Foreign versions of these are available off the shelf for Rs 9.8 lakh per piece, a price that also includes repair and maintenance.
The CGDA report criticised the ‘joint development’ technology initiative of DRDO, calling it “import of older, foreign technology under the disguise of joint development.” The CGDA accused DRDO of promoting Israeli company M/S SCD without the mandatory formal transfer of technology agreement. Commenting on a DRDO deal to develop a higher format uncooled detector, the CGDA said: “DRDO shall be financing the development expenditure of `19.90 crore by releasing it direct to M/S SCD Israel. Basically, instead of doing development itself, DRDO is funding a foreign agency’s development effort, that too, without any explicit arrangements being finalised about ownership of intellectual property generated from such financing,” noted the CGDA. “Neither the production agency nor the users — mechanised forces of army — have been kept in the loop,” the CGDA report says.
With a chaotic record of arms experiments and eccentric choices of spending money on pickles and automated idli and dosa makers for aircraft carriers, the very reason for DRDO’s existence seems dubious. Says V K Mittal, a former senior scientist with the agency, “DRDO technology is almost two decades old. Two projects, namely Samyukta and Sangraha electronic warfare equipment, were partially inducted in the armed forces, but users felt these were outdated and more expensive than the latest technology available.” Meanwhile, the agency has developed many products that is meant for the soldier at the front: DRDO pickles made of semi-ripe berries and spices such as red chilli powder, cinnamon, cumin, cardamom, black pepper powder, and clovers, spicy potato parathas, instant kadhi mixes, cashewnut barfi, mutton vegetable korma, instant halwa mix, egg biscuits and instant upma mix are among its culinary achievements. The agency also successfully bred a region-specific hybrid goat using technology that mixed the genes of adaptive and meat traits through cross-breeding breeds such as Changthangi and Gaddi and Sirohi and Black Bengal goats. DRDO has also developed ‘Lukoskin’, a herbal care product for leucoderma and the performance enhancing drug Perfomax which is meant to “improve physical and mental performance in high altitude and hypoxic conditions.” In true 007 style, it has also developed a car coolant that will not freeze in extreme temperatures. The crores of rupees wasted in innumerable half-baked projects add up to quite a sum. In a separate report by CAG in 2011-12, the DRDO is criticised for spending crores on random research projects. In 2011, out of 55 high priority projects based on user-requirements, only thirteen went into production. A modular bridge, being developed for the army was shelved in 2010, after eight years of experiments and spending Rs 21.46 crore. Six months later, Rs 13.25 crore was sanctioned for another modular bridge project. The initiative to produce next generation laser weapons was closed down within a month after equipment was procured.
“We are dangerously behind our adversaries. China is far ahead in indigenous technology in both tanks and missiles sector. DRDO’s claim of modern technology is too old when it is delivered to armed forces. It is a big disappointment”, observes security analyst Major General (Retd) Afsir Karim.
Flop wonders
Institutions without qualifications are promoted
Defence minister Antony had asked the CGDA to investigate after receiving complaints on suspected manipulation in DRDO contracts, undue favor to some external vendors, and irregular appointments in the agency which runs a vast network across the country. Its annual budget has no audit verified document to show what value has been generated so far through its technologies. Under a very personal cloud is DRDO chief V K Saraswat. The CGDA has questioned why he granted Rs 2.88 crore to a mathematics institute to develop a futuristic radar when its scientists are not even remotely connected with research relating to the project. Incidentally, Saraswat is the president of the institute’s governing body. The audit also stated that the institute lacked expert manpower, and started recruitment only after getting DRDO funds that were released without due diligence. A Dehradun scientific lab was granted Rs 14 crore to develop a communication link, while the institute headed by Saraswat was also sanctioned Rs 2.98 crore to develop the same technology — it doesn’t have even basic facilities like computers for individual researchers. “It shows that the radar development project is being split in different parts to avoid going to the ministry and users with a proper full scope development programme,” the CGDA said. The DRDO understandably refutes the findings. “These are only observations. The laid down procedure of audit was not followed, and it was issued without authorisation. It is a one-sided report. We will give a point by point reply of audit findings. DRDO has achieved several milestones and that nobody is talking about, ” retorted Dr Ravi Gupta, DRDO’s official spokesperson. However, the CGDA report says that DRDO has tried to camouflage its failures in the name of secrecy and national security.
Says Commodore (Retd) Uday Bhaskar, former head of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), “The Government is not willing to discuss the Rama Rao committee report that talks about reforming DRDO. It shows that they are not serious about the decaying of a government institution, which in the last 30 to 40 years has completely disappointed the users. Money is being spent without any effect on indigenous programmes. I will appeal to Indian Parliament to take this matter and discuss the issue.”
Project black hole
DRDO has been spending fresh money on its own failed projects
The CGDA accuses the DRDO of functioning in a non-transparent manner. “There is no comprehensive database to find out the details of projects sanctioned for execution by the DRDO and how many has been declared as successful,” it said. Antony was also informed that DRDO has been operating as an authority unto itself, bypassing the MoD where many crucial expenses are involved: the agency comes under the ministry and its main objective is to develop a modern technology base and equip the defence forces with internationally competitive systems and weapons. During 2009-2010, DRDO sanctioned 702 projects costing above `50 lakh but only 102 research projects were referred to the ministry. The audit body also questioned the grounds on which DRDO authorities sanctioned new projects in the name of completing failed projects with questionable changes in scope to avoid ministry’s nod. For example, DRDO took up a project for development of counter mine flail (CMF) for T-72 tanks at a cost of `8 crore in December 2002. CMF is a device that creates a safe passage through a minefield by deliberately detonating land mines in front of the vehicle that it is mounted on. Army HQ revised the requirement in 2004, but DRDO continued with the old parameters and in 2008, the product failed tests. In spite of this, it was not closed and in February 2011, another new project costing Rs 49.85 crore was sanctioned for the same CMF project.
Armaments apart, the DRDO has been splurging 10 per cent of its annual budget on construction of offices and auditoriums. CGDA also indicted DRDO for unauthorised sanction of Rs 49.15 crore to develop a vehicle testing facility in Pune — mainly for civilian use — disregarding approval rules.
“There is a lack of transparency and accountability in the name of defence research. For decades, DRDO has been promising a lot to the armed forces but have failed to deliver. The top brass should be made accountable. Unless this happens, money will be squandered away on technologically outdated projects and the armed forces will be cheated,” says Mittal.
Meanwhile, there has been a huge exodus of scientists from the agency. Last year, 86 scientists took VRS. Says Gen Karim, “The functioning of DRDO is improper. In the next five years, the difference between our adversaries and us would be glaring. The MoD is not serious about reforming DRDO. A national blueprint is required for this.”
The swadeshi trap
Unplanned indigenisation leads to losses and aborted projects
In this situation, how efficacious are the agency’s multimillion-dollar projects? India purchases arms worth $6.9 billion from the US, making it America’s second largest defence client after the Saudis. The Congressional Research Service’s annual survey of global arms sales written by Richard Grimmett and Paul Kerr says India is fast upgrading its equipment from its Soviet-era arsenal. In late 1993, a committee headed by then Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and DRDO chief APJ Abdul Kalam had set the goal of 70 per cent of indigenisation in weapons production by 2005; DRDO has not moved beyond the 30 per cent it had reached in 1995. The passion for swadeshi is the principle behind the money being spent by the Indian government on DRDO. But most of DRDO equipment malfunctions or the projects themselves are yet to take off or are delayed, sucking in more and more money.
Rifle recoil: The mass produced INSAS rifle, meant to be the main rifle for the Indian Army has been known to malfunction in extreme conditions. The first known debacle was on August 7, 2005. As the evening shadows grew longer at the Royal Nepal Army’s Pili camp in western Kalikot district, about 550 km northwest of capital Kathmandu, Maoist fighters massed silently outside. The roads connecting the camp that housed about 200 soldiers — mostly employed in the construction of a new highway — had been mined. A little before 6 pm, over 1,000 Maoists attacked the camp. Armed with INSAS rifles, the Nepalese soldiers fought back, but in vain. By 4 pm, the Maoists had captured 100 soldiers, and executed 40 of them. Nepal blamed INSAS malfunctions for the disaster: “The rifles are okay if you fight for an hour or two, but are not appropriate for long battles. If we had better weapons, our casualties would have been much less,” said a Nepal government spokesman. In November 2011, the Ministry of Defence issued a tender for 66,000 assault rifles to replace the INSAS. The MoD wanted the new rifles to be able to switch calibres between the small, high-velocity 5.56 mm rounds the INSAS fires and the devastatingly powerful 7.62 mm rounds of the older FAL rifles.
The story of this short-lived rifle epitomises the drift in the way the DRDO works, and also between it and the armed forces. The DRDO took a decade to design the INSAS. A few years later, it was supplied to the Army throughout the later half of the 1990s. But the Army did not put all its eggs in the desi basket; it bought 100,000 AK-47s from Bulgaria in 1995 for its frontline units in Kashmir. The INSAS began rolling off the lines soon after, at a cost several times that of the Kalashnikov. When war broke out in Kargil in 1999, INSASs jammed; the transparent polymer magazines cracked. Its ammunition-conserving three-round burst went virally fully automatic. An oil spray glitch was detected. By 2002, the Army had ordered the Israeli Tavor 21 rifle for its special forces and the Galil for its snipers. This year, the Special Forces will induct US-made M-4 rifles, the Vietnam-era M-16’s newer version that US soldiers now use in Afghanistan. “DRDO products are half imported and half prepared here, which is dangerous. Defence is too serious business to be left to one party. It is the user — our armed forces — who will decide which product is useful. DRDO cannot claim success of a product sitting in the workshop,” says Gen Karim.
Air disaster: In the early 1980s, the Indian Air Force was over-reliant on Soviet-made MiG-21s, which would be phased out, beginning in the mid-90s. In 1984, the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), a national consortium of over 100 defence laboratories, industrial organisations, and academic institutions with HAL being the principal contractor, was created specifically to manage the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme. The DRDO was to develop the plane’s flight control system, hi-tech radar, and engine. DRDO delivered on the flight control system. However, the radar was the one that was to be developed by Ericsson and Ferranti Defence Systems Integration for the Gripen, a topline Swedish fighter plane. DRDO decided to develop the radar at home, and started in 1997. In 10 years, cost escalations, delays and other serious problems grounded the project, which is now being developed with help from the Elta group, an Israel Aerospace Industries subsidiary. Kaveri, the engine of the LCA — christened Tejas by former PM Atal Behari Vajpayee — was to be developed by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment, Bangalore using prototypes made by General Electrics, USA. By 2003, it had to be abandoned for an upgraded version of the GE engine used in the prototypes selected to power the first pre-production Tejas. The Kaveri had, in the meantime, failed high-altitude tests carried out in Russia, and by 2008, was officially declared unsuitable. GE was selected to provide 99 engines that were even better than the ones used in the first LCAs. Mysteriously, 15 actuators of the aircraft that were part of the LCA’s integrated flight control system went missing in December 2008 from Heathrow, London. The Tejas has flown, and well, but with an Israeli radar and American engine. The Kaveri programme alone cost the nation about Rs 2,800 crore over 23 years; the cost overrun of the entire LCA programme is estimated at about 3,000 per cent.
Tanked hopes: It took 35 years to make India’s main battle tank Arjun. In 1974, DRDO’s Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment at Chennai started designing the tank expected to be ready for war in 10 years. The Arjun was to weigh 40 tonnes with a 105 mm main gun. By the time it was finished in 2000, the tank had grown in size to 58.5 tonnes with a 120 mm gun that can fire rockets. In terms of cost overrun, the Arjun is the champion of delay and drift: it has cost 20 times the initial estimate to make an Indian tank with a German engine. It is so big that ordinary Indian rail wagons, the ones that have been transporting our older Soviet- and British-origin tanks had to be redesigned to accommodate its bulk. Military planners say bridges will collapse under Arjun’s weight. The Army and DRDO have been at loggerheads over the Arjun. Field tests have varied wildly: some have given the Arjun a junk rating, and others say it’s the best thing to have happened to the Armoured Corps. The tank is a ‘jugaad’ queen. South African howitzers have been mated to its chassis to make a self-propelled field gun that DRDO calls Bhima. The army will, at last, add to its ranks about 250-odd Arjuns, and 1,000 T-90s. The next Indian tank, the Futuristic MBT, may well come from a joint initiative with Russia.
As the MoD prepares to review DRDO’s financial procedures, the news is not all bad on the achievement front. Last week, the 350-km range surface-to-surface Prithvi II missile was successfully flight tested at the Integrated Test Range, Chandipur in Odissa. Saraswat, a multitude of rings embedded with various stones flashing on his fingers celebrated by feeding laddoos to the army commander present. However, the question for him is, after the ministry’s review, what’s for just desserts.
First time I've read of this.Says V K Mittal, a former senior scientist with the agency, “DRDO technology is almost two decades old. Two projects, namely Samyukta and Sangraha electronic warfare equipment, were partially inducted in the armed forces, but users felt these were outdated and more expensive than the latest technology available.”
I am not sure why we are so negative, even we can't quote information. Why the hell, we don't highlight what we have achieved in stead of highlighting what we could not achieve. And project it as failure.Philip wrote:Indian Express:30/5/13.
AKA ,"rapping the DRDO on its knuckles",tells the DRDO "Perform or perish"!
The LCA is given its IOC-2 date and this was final said AKA,"I am waiting for the LCA to become a reality".AKA asked the IAF,DRDO,HALto work together so that the finalIOC-2FOC would be achieved by 2014 end.
Media does not highlight it that bad and corrupt DRDO organization has several excellent scientists, technologists and laboratories which get awards ...The Defence Minister Shri AK Antony today expressed optimism that the country’s indigenously developed fighter aircraft- LCA TEJAS- will get Final Operational Clearance of the Indian Air Force by the end of next year. Speaking at the Annual Awards Functions of DRDO here, he said, all stakeholders including the DRDO, IAF and HAL must put their energy together in a focused manner to achieve this objective.
Shri Antony said countries that depend on imported arsenals cannot become great nation. Shri Antony said we continue to be the largest importer of Defence equipment. The share of indigenous content in Defence procurement is low. “Our experience has been that foreign vendors are reluctant to part with critical technologies. There are delays in the supply of essential spares. There are exorbitant price increases. The Services too realize that we cannot be eternally dependent on foreign equipment and platforms”, he said.
Referring to the expansions of domestic defence industry, Shri Antony said this has to be achieved through public and private sector initiatives. He said there is ample scope for joint ventures also. “All the stakeholders in the defence sector- DRDO, Armed Forces and the industry must work in tandem and develop trust and confidence in each other’s capabilities.” Cautioning against time and cost over runs in projects Shri Antony said Indian Companies must compete with global players in developing state- of- the art technologies of acceptable commercial parameters and must meet customer satisfaction.
The Minister complimented DRDO for their magnificent achievements in 2012. He referred to the first flight of Agni-V, two successful tests of our Ballistic Missile Defence programme in February and November 2012, first flight of LCA Navy, establishment of a cyber-forensics laboratory, initiation of production of NBC systems, ToT for composite armour for helicopters and investment casting of aero engine components and said these are just some of the many accomplishments.
He, however, asked the scientists not to be complacent. “The DRDO must keep its focus trained on the areas of core competence and not fritter away its energy and resources. In today’s world of cut-throat competition, the choice is very clear-‘perform, or perish’. From designing stage to the stage of final production, timelines must be strictly adhered to and satisfaction of the end user is the litmus test of achievement”, he said.
He said, the security environment in our neighbourhood; civil strife and turmoil in the Middle East; terrorism and threats to cyber security; piracy; illegal seabed mining in Indian Ocean and space-based threats present complex challenges to our defence capabilities. These require both conventional, as well as latest technological responses.
Expressing happiness the Minister said, it is heartening to note that a large number of major systems are under production and the cumulative production value of all the DRDO developed systems has crossed Rs. 1,55,000 crore. ‘I am sure in the coming years, this figure will go even higher. DRDO must make relentless efforts to accelerate the pace of self- reliance’, he further said.
The function was attended among others by the Minister of State for Defence, Shri Jitendra Singh, Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral DK Joshi and Director General DRDO Dr. VK Saraswat.
On the occasion, Shri Antony gave away DRDO Awards to several scientists, technologists and DRDO laboratories in fourteen categories for their outstanding contributions in different areas.
N Ao/DM/RK
(Release ID :96297)
Going back to the report there seems to be some light as to the controversy.There is an absence of "test pilots".Now who do these test pilots come under? ADA/HAL? If so,then it is not the In that is responsible for the absence of test pilots,but the DRDO/HAL.The above photos show Indian Navy pilots being trained in conventional take-off carrier operations at the US Navy’s Naval Air Training Command at Naval Air Station Kingsville, and other institutes, part of an elite Indian Navy strike-pilot programme that commenced in 2006 to train 32 Indian Navy pilots in batches of four every six months over a period of four years.
The Indian pilots follow an identical training trajectory followed by counterpart pilot cadets in the US Navy. The course begins with six weeks of hardcore aviation preflight indoctrination at the Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida. This includes four weeks of theory, swimming instruction and practice, plus two weeks of flight physiology and survival training.
From Pensacola, the Indian pilots move to Naval Air Station Whiting Field, also in Florida, for 18 weeks of flying Beechcraft T-34 Mentor single turboprop trainers. After this, the pilots move to Naval Air Station Kingsville in Texas to begin the real stuff -- flying jets. But first, there's three months at Kingsville just for classroom and simulator preparation. After weeks of flying the glass-cockpit simulator, the pilots finally strap into a T-45 Goshawk. But for the first two weeks, they're made to fly blind -- called "flying under a blanket" or instrument hood. Learn to trust your instruments more than anything else, that's the point. This completes Phase 1 of the six months course.
Phase 2 will be the real juice they're there for. Weeks upon weeks of tactical combat formation, air combat manoeuvering and air-to-ground weapons delivery. Finally, the real meatball! Training finally ends with a trial by fire -- flight qualification on board an American aircraft carrier. But he's got to perform consistently and deliver immaculate landings on a regular basis to finally get carrier qualified to fly MiG-29Ks and LCA Navy off the INS Vikramaditya and Indigenous Aircraft Carrier.
The first Indian Navy pilot to be carrier qualified (CQ) was Captain Surendra Ahuja, who trapped his T-45C ten times successfully on the USS Enterprise in May 2007. Thus began the Indian Navy's tryst, with tailhook aviation after a lengthy hiatus, and one that will continue long into the future.
I thought the VikAd and Vikrant were STOBAR carriers as opposed to CATOBAR like the article saysVipul wrote:Light combat aircraft trials of Navy soon, but no pilots.
It seems India needs the support of US Navy to complete crucial trials of the naval version of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA-N). Absence of pilots experienced in carrier-based operations has forced the Aeronautical Development Agency ( ADA), lead partner in the development of LCA-N, to request the US Navy to train its test pilots in catapult assisted take-off and barrier arrested recovery (Catobar).
None of the naval pilots, after the generation who flew Alizes on INS Vikrant, have any experience in Catobar. With this lacuna adding to its carrier woes, the Navy is training a batch of young pilots in US to prepare them to handle MiG29Ks. But the request to train test pilots further exposes c hinks in India's defence preparedness. The help has been sought to complete their training before the year-end with a view to carrying out take-off and landing trials on the ski-jump installed at INA Hansa, Goa.
"The aircraft still weighs some 500 kg more than the desired weight. Feedback from each trial is helping us plane it further. Its performance has been steady. But it is the Catobar trials that finally give a thumbs-up to any naval aircraft," a top DRDO source told TOI.
Same old whining regarding DRDO and news manipulation here,Philip wrote:The secret world of the DRDO
"Do not think that I am criticising you, I am with you in all times but as the Minister of Defence, it is my duty to say some things to you," he said.
V.K.Saraswat,Cautioning against the dependence on imports for military hardware requirements of the armed forces, he said, "Countries depending on imports can never be great nations."
He said however close a friendly nation may be, it will not pass on the latest state-of-the-art technologies in defence sector and the only answer was to increase indigenisation.
All from the same article so YAWN only again !!!!!He expressed happiness over the fact that "a large number of major systems are under production and the cumulative production value of all the DRDO developed systems has crossed Rs 1,55,000 crore".
A lot of people have gone to there graves painting doom and gloom scenario of Bharat and a lot more will continue to go there doing the same but Bharat is here to stay and will keep moving forward onlee.Neshant wrote:reading that report was depressing.
is DRDO really that incompetent ?
scary.
If we didn't like MK1 that we had in hand yesterday, we won't like MK1a that we have today.MK-1 reluctantly being accepted by the IAF and with great hopes for MK-2 succeeding
NEW DELHI: Facing flak for time slippages in Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas programme, DRDO chief V K Saraswat today attributed the delay to "setbacks" caused by international sanctions and inadequate development of aerospace industry in the country.
Saraswat, who retired today, contended that the DRDO had to start from the "scratch" to indigenously develop the fighter aircraft as the manufacturing base in the country was non-existent. He said these issues have now been addressed to a large extent and other versions of the combat aircraft can be developed in a short time.
"We had to go through the rigours of development from the scratch where we had to develop the whole range of products. This is not a problem in foreign countries where everything is available whereas we had to develop everything," he told PTI in an interview here.
The DRDO chief said this when asked to explain the delay in the LCA programme which has not fructified even nearly three decades after it was initiated. His comments came two days after Defence Minister A K Antony criticised the "time slippages" in the project.
Saraswat noted that the project to develop a Light Combat Aircraft was initiated in early 1980s but soon after Missile Transfer Control Regime (MTCR) came into effect in 1988.
"All suppliers cancelled their agreements and European firms also stopped cooperation. When such a situation occurred, we had to do everything ourselves. This was a major setback," said Saraswat, who also held the post of Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister. This situation continued from 1980 till 2000 when the first aircraft was rolled out, he said. "Time was taken to overcome the blocks created by MTCR. This is the reason for the longer time taken," he said.
The DRDO chief said LCA was the first programme wherein a fighter plane had to be completely designed and developed indigenously in the country, a departure from the practice of manufacturing fighters of other countries under licence. "We did not have any industrial base for avionics, for material. When we wanted to do LCA, there was a lacuna in the whole system," Saraswat said.
He said this was because indigenous development of a fighter aircraft was never under consideration till 1980 and as a result of which the manufacturing base could not be created unlike other countries.
Saraswat noted the policy pursued till then was to buy fighters off the shelf or manufacture them under licence from countries like USSR. After the collapse of USSR, India faced tremendous problems in getting spare parts.
Talking about the LCA project, he said, "We have built all the systems for the LCA today but that resulted in extra money and extra time. That is not the inefficiency of the scientists or the management failure. It is basically bridging the technology gap and learning how large systems are done."
He said the DRDO and the HAL have addressed a number of problems found in the aircraft during its Initial Operational Clearance-I at Bangalore in 2001 and expressed hope that the aircraft would get its IOC-II by the end of this year.
The LCA is expected to cost around Rs 200 crore per piece, which will still be much less than a foreign fighter of the same class, Saraswat said.
He said a big push was given under his tenure for the large scale production of the aircraft at the HAL facilities in Bangalore.
Yes A.K has clearly mentioned that he is not criticising DRDO but the headline say's him "hitting out" at DRDO. There lies the manipulation.Philip wrote:AKA has been clear and concise in his statement.he has called a spade a spade.I don't see where there is any "media manipulation".
DRDO is very much accountable as it faces audit rap and the scientists have to appear before a promotion board where you can only hope for a success if you have successful projects/R&D/product to show them otherwise goodbye promotion. Project review meetings are held from time to time by the director of the lab and where you have to show the progress made by you in the project otherwise hear an earful. Oh and getting into the bad books of the director doesn't help with your promotions as well. So all in all I think DRDO is much more accountable than many other government establishments.Philip wrote:The problem is that the DRDO has had no accountability thus far.Not one senior head of project has been ticked off or sacked for failure unlike what happens in other countries esp. Russia.With the LCA,the "chain has been as strong as its weakest link",as a former VC told me,the "engine".The kaveri fiasco is the key reason why the LCA is delayed,with MK-1 reluctantly being accepted by the IAF and with great hopes for MK-2 succeeding.
Those were pilots for operational squadrons of the IN. This is specifically related to Test Pilots deputed to the N-LCA. None have flown CATOBAR missions.Philip wrote:Vipul,others,was it not over two years ago that we were told that IN pilots would be going to the US to train there? How can we suddenly say that there are no pilots versed in carrier capability! If it is true,then there has been an awful cock-up involving the IN primarily.
Now,what about this! We have already sent our pilots to the US for carrier training,in this report as far back as er....2008!
“After finishing the taking over formalities, I am catching the first available flight to Bangalore to review the project. I am absolutely aware of the issues that are dogging the project and I would now want to see it from close quarters, what the delays are. The Tejas' IOC and FOC cannot be postponed any further,” said Avinash, who will also double up as the Scientific Advisor to Defence Minister.
Yeah, the financier now seems to be serious, very serious, about the dates.Avarachan wrote:It's interesting that Avinash Chander and A.K. Antony are speaking with the same tone regarding the Tejas project. There must be something going on.
http://tarmak007.blogspot.com/2013/06/i ... -drdo.html
“After finishing the taking over formalities, I am catching the first available flight to Bangalore to review the project. I am absolutely aware of the issues that are dogging the project and I would now want to see it from close quarters, what the delays are. The Tejas' IOC and FOC cannot be postponed any further,” said Avinash, who will also double up as the Scientific Advisor to Defence Minister.
Browne said the negotiations went off 'smoothly' for acquiring the Medium Multi Role Aircraft (MMRC) and the deal is expected to be finalised by September or October this year. He also said by the end of next year the IAF would have the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA).
If Arjun is already debacle, then LCA was a debacle a decade ago itself. DDM and firgangie folks have won!Neshant wrote:I don't mind the delay so long as it is inducted and produced in large numbers.
This should not be another Arjun debacle.
Well you cant complain about it. Finally every one is damn serious about the project which means something meaningful will come out of it. LCA has always been dogged with bad Project Management other than the technical and sanction related issues they faced. If the PM gets corrected then things will streamline automatically.Avarachan wrote:It's interesting that Avinash Chander and A.K. Antony are speaking with the same tone regarding the Tejas project. There must be something going on.
http://tarmak007.blogspot.com/2013/06/i ... -drdo.html
“After finishing the taking over formalities, I am catching the first available flight to Bangalore to review the project. I am absolutely aware of the issues that are dogging the project and I would now want to see it from close quarters, what the delays are. The Tejas' IOC and FOC cannot be postponed any further,” said Avinash, who will also double up as the Scientific Advisor to Defence Minister.
Probably prior to the HANSA test facility and NLCA being ready for CATOBAR testing, it may had been too early to send the test pilots for the training in the US. Based on the current schedules of HANSA being operational in the next few months or by early next year and NLCA having completed its landing gear redesign, getting the test pilots through the 6 months course now is more ideal. Probably around 4 test pilots will be sent in batches of 2 each. After that both the operational and the test pilots could be trained in India itself. There will be all the facilities required and enough experienced trainers along with a complete curriculum.Philip wrote:Kartik,why didn't the test pilots also go to the US at the same time as the IN pilots? Didn't the DRDO/ADA/HAL realise that they would need naval LCA test pilots? It seems absurd that they could ignore such a fundamental requirement for the programme...
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What would they have done with their arrested recovery landing skills till the N-LCA was near such testing? Srai has probably hit the nail on the head- that it would have probably required refresher courses anyway, since they'd have trained several years ago and their carrier landing skills wouldn't be fresh.Philip wrote:Kartik,why didn't the test pilots also go to the US at the same time as the IN pilots? Didn't the DRDO/ADA/HAL realise that they would need naval LCA test pilots? It seems absurd that they could ignore such a fundamental requirement for the programme.
Its not CATOBAR training that's required- its the training for arrested recovery that they need. Currently they could go to Russia and get STOBAR training and it would suffice, but I suspect that based on the experience that naval aviators that trained in the US had, the IN believes that the US is a good option.ranji wrote:Why is CATOBAR training needed for NLCA pilots currently? IAC is a STOBAR, isn't it? CATOBAR is not a current requirement.
That's because you've been swallowing all the arguments that the HAL/DRDO apologists, including a delusional forum moderator (perhaps now ex?) have been making on this and other forums about how the LCA and other DRDO/HAL projects were within budget and not excessively delayed and were competitive performance wise.KrishnaK wrote:First time I've read of this.Says V K Mittal, a former senior scientist with the agency, “DRDO technology is almost two decades old. Two projects, namely Samyukta and Sangraha electronic warfare equipment, were partially inducted in the armed forces, but users felt these were outdated and more expensive than the latest technology available.”