Bharat Rakshak

VLADIVOSTOK, September 4. /TASS/.Rosneft sold a 15% stake in Vankorneft to India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC), TASS correspondent reports from the signing ceremony.

Under the terms of the agreement, after the deal is closed ONGC will be presented with two seats on the Board of Directors of Vankorneft, while Rosneft will retain full control of infrastructure of the Vankor cluster.

The agreements on considering the deal were reached on July 8, 2015, in Ufa during the meeting of the Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister.

As TASS reported earlier, Indian ONGC was in talks with Rosneft on buying a stake in Vankorneft (Rosneft subsidiary) for $900 mln.

ONGC was planning to buy a stake in Vankorneft through its subsidiary ONGC Videsh Ltd. According to the company, it would allow producing around 3.5 mln tonnes of oil per year.

chakra wrote:1965 War: Why India quit when it was winning

2 September 2015 Rakesh Krishnan Simha

On the 50th anniversary of India’s 22-day war with Pakistan, we examine Russia’s role in the peace agreement, Shastri’s mysterious death, and why India agreed to end the war when it was close to a decisive victory.



In May 1964, Indian Defence Minister Yashwantrao Chavan made a visit to the Pentagon, the HQ of the American defence department. Chavan, who was trying to rapidly modernise the Indian military, requested the Americans to sell India the F-104 Starfighter – the most advanced jet fighter of that era.

Although the US had supplied the F-104 and the F-86 Sabres in large numbers – virtually free of cost – to Pakistan, India’s request was rebuffed in an extremely crude manner.

In his brilliant little book, ‘1965 War: The Inside Story’, former Maharashtra chief secretary R.D. Pradhan narrates what US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara told Chavan: “Mr Minister, your air force is like a museum. I wonder whether you are aware of the variety of aircraft in your air force. You are still operating with Hunters, Spitfires, Vampires, Liberators, Harvards – exotic names of World War II vintage. All these aircraft are only worthy of finding a place in a museum.”
пустым не оставлять!!

1971 War: How Russia sank Nixon’s gunboat diplomacy

McNamara suggested that until India disbanded that fleet, it was no use acquiring any sophisticated aircraft.

What the American secretary said was offensive – and true. Although the US did not offer any help, what India did with its antiquated planes and vintage tanks remains the stuff of legend. Pradhan says, “With that background, it was an exhilarating moment when some of those junk planes, such as the Mysteres, Vampires and Hunters performed brilliantly against Pakistan’s sophisticated F-86s. In fact, the indigenously built Gnat, a small beaver-like fighter, brought down several F-86s.”

The 1965 War remains memorable for two things. One was a monumental miscalculation by Pakistan. President Ayub Khan, egged on by his scheming and feckless Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, sent a top-secret order to his army chief General Mohammed Musa: “As a general rule, Hindu morale would not stand for more than a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time and the right place. Such opportunities should therefore be sought and exploited.”

Secondly, India’s leadership – as it has done consistently over the past 2500 years – frittered away on the negotiating table what the soldiers won on the battlefield. Pradhan writes: “In a way, India’s leadership, out of its sense of restraint, fair play and endeavour to seek enduring peace and goodwill with the neighbour, seems to have missed opportunities to solve the problem.”

At the end of a bruising 22-day war, India held 1920 square kilometres of Pakistani territory while Pakistan only held 550 square kilometres of Indian land. The Haji Pir pass was also captured by Indian soldiers after an epic battle. And yet India surrendered everything at the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966.

Western ways

The US, which was embroiled in a bloody war of its own in Vietnam, acted mostly through the United Nations. However, the defining western aim was to see their satellite Pakistan get through the war without getting battered. This view is amply summed by Chavan, who wrote about British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s ceasefire proposal at a time when India had the upper hand: “I insisted on military advantages being maintained. The UK proposals look like a trap.”

As three divisions of the Indian Army were slicing across Pakistani defences and thundering across the Ichhogil canal to Lahore, Wilson sent a message to Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan: “Both governments bear responsibility for the steady escalation which has subsequently occurred, and today’s attack in the Lahore area presents us with a completely new situation.”

Wilson’s message implied that India was as much to blame for the war on the subcontinent as Pakistan. “Shastri more or less brushed aside that message,” says Pradhan. “Bias on the part of Britain would rule out the UK from playing any effective role in events after the ceasefire.”

Russian role

Russia, which was following the events with deep interest, maintained its traditional stand that Kashmir was part of India. Pradhan writes Moscow accepted the disturbances in Kashmir had been created by infiltrators from Pakistan.

Russia also backed India at the United Nations. K. Vijaykrishnan writes in ‘The Soviet Union and the India-Pakistan War, 1965’, “Support was available for India on some important technical points and objections India had raised,” he says. Russia supported the Indian position that the Security Council should only deal with "questions directly connected with the settlement of the armed conflict” and not drag in the Kashmir issue.

Fending off China was a trickier affair. Russia did not want an open confrontation with Beijing, but Moscow decided it would not remain a passive spectator if India had to battle on two fronts. According to Vijaykrishnan, during the thick of the conflict, India received a reassuring message from Russian Premier Alexei Kosygin indicating support in the event of a Chinese attack.

Sisir Gupta writes in ‘India and the International System’ that India was aware Russia would never like to see India humbled or weakened. “A strong and friendly India occupying a pre-eminent position in South Asia was very much a Soviet foreign policy interest. Notwithstanding the fluctuations in the Soviet attitude and the zig-zag nature of the course it pursued, there was throughout a broad assumption underlying Soviet policies towards South Asia, that India was the key factor in the region and that any policy which created distrust and dissension between the two countries was to be avoided.”

China got the message and backed off despite Pakistani appeals for help. Chinese strongman Mao Tse-Tung was reported to have told Ayub Khan that "if there is a nuclear war, it is Peking and not Rawalpindi that will be the target", writes G.W. Chaudhury in ‘India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent’.

Road to Tashkent

With the US disinterested in the conflict and the UK showing its true anti-India and pro-Pakistan colours, it was left to Russia to play honest broker.
Kudankulam
Read section: History

It was after some initial hesitation that both India and Pakistan accepted the Russian offer. Ayub Khan later said that Pakistan went to Tashkent as it did not want to risk a veto by Moscow.

There was another reason for Pakistan’s eagerness for talks. According to Pradhan, “The continued presence of Indian troops on the east side of the Ichhogil canal, facing Lahore city, was hurting Pakistan’s pride.” The heat was clearly on Islamabad.

Before leaving for Tashkent, Shastri – who was hero-worshiped by Indian soldiers – had promised his victorious troops that he would not return the land captured from the enemy after so many sacrifices. But after six days of talks, Shastri proved once again that Indians are bad negotiators. He gave away everything.

Was Shastri feeling the pressure from the international community? Most likely not, but perhaps he felt – like his successor Indira Gandhi after the 1971 war – that showing leniency towards Pakistan would buy its goodwill.

Mystery of Shastri’s death

If you were Shastri, you would dread having to face the Indian soldier back home. Hundreds of them had died while capturing the strategic Haji Pir pass, which if India had kept, would have forever nullified Pakistan’s advantage in Kashmir.

On the night of January 10, 1966, the diminutive Prime Minister but a giant among men died of a heart attack. It was his fourth cardiac seizure and was likely triggered by his anxiety at having to face an irate public and having to look into the eyes of his jawans – soldiers – whose hopes he had dashed.

There have been all sorts of conspiracy theories but the reality is that none of the major countries benefitted from his death. Russia had scored a spectacular diplomatic coup, America fully supported the Tashkent Agreement, and Pakistan was happy to get its land back.

That the Indian Prime Minister died of a heart attack comes from a most unlikely source. Shortly after Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalisation policies in 1991, Soviet Land magazine in India published an account by an ex-KGB officer.

According to the former intelligence agent, the KGB was spying on both the Indian and Pakistani delegations in order to find out how much each country was willing to yield during the negotiations. When Shastri started getting a seizure, the KGB was listening but decided not to alert his aides because that would give away their game and lead to a diplomatic showdown with India.

Prelude to Tashkent

Having dissected what transpired at the negotiating table, we need to discuss the prelude to Tashkent.

Although Pakistan was on the verge of being trounced – unlike in 1971 and 1999 when it really got hammered – India generously agreed to a ceasefire after repeated pleas from the major powers.

Why did India stop fighting when it had Pakistan reeling? Why did Chavan and Shastri, who swatted away western pressure and gave a free hand to the Indian military, cave in?

The problem was army chief Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri. The Kolkata-born general came from an affluent background and had become army chief purely on the back of family connections and pure luck. He was elevated following the resignation of another Sandhurst-educated general, Pran Nath Thapar, the army chief of the 1962 War.

Chaudhuri’s mentors were the Sandhurst educated British generals – who had utterly failed before the Germans and Japanese during World War II – and predictably he also lacked war fighting qualities. “He was so good on paper that Chavan often wondered how good he would be in warfare,” writes Pradhan.

Chavan mentions in his war diary that Chaudhuri would frequently lapse into depression. Each time the Indian army suffered a setback, the general would walk into the Defence Minister’s room, and Chavan had to give him a pep talk. Chaudhuri so completely lacked courage that Chavan often forced him to visit the front and personally take stock.
пустым не оставлять!!

Lal Bahadur Shastri’s death in Tashkent still raises questions

Pradhan writes, “On September 20 when the Prime Minister asked Chaudhuri whether India could expect to gain if the war continued for a few days more, he informed the PM that the army was coming to an end of its ammunition holdings and could not sustain fighting for much longer. Chaudhuri advised acceptance of the ceasefire proposal. It was later discovered in overall terms only 14-20 per cent of the Indian Army’s ammunition stock had been used up. At the moment of our greatest advantage the army chief’s non-comprehension of the intricacies of the long-range logistics deprived India of a decisive victory.”

In contrast, Pakistan had expended 80 per cent of its ammo. It had also lost 250 of its latest US-supplied tanks.

Chaudhuri was also criticised for his lack of daring. When the Pakistani cities of Sialkot and Lahore could have been easily taken after the dash and bravery shown by Indian troops, Chaudhuri told Shastri: “We must move with the caution and wisdom of an elephant. We will take them in God’s good time.”

In fact, when the Pakistan Army attacked in the Khem Kharan sector in Punjab, Chaudhuri ordered the Army Commander Harbaksh Singh to withdraw to a safer position. The commander refused, and what followed was the Battle of Assal Uttar – the greatest tank battle since Kursk in 1943. The Indian counter attack on the night of September 10 was so ferocious that by the morning they had knocked out 70 Pakistani tanks.

But what the Battle of Assal Uttar will be memorable for are the 25 enemy tanks found abandoned with their engines running and wireless sets on. It was the perfect metaphor for the plight of the Pakistan Army.

Had India kept its head, today we’d have a lot more to celebrate.

http://in.rbth.com/blogs/stranger_than_ ... ing_394095

New Delhi: Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) has paid just over $1.25 billion or Rs 8,250 crore for a 15 per cent stake in Russian oil major Rosneft's Vankor oil field, a source with direct knowledge of the deal said on Friday.

ONGC expects to get more than 3 million tonnes of oil a year (between 66,000 and 70,000 barrels per day) from its holding in the huge Siberian oil field, the source told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

Rosneft earlier announced the deal to sell the interest in Vankor, a key source of supply to markets in the Asia-Pacific. Chief executive Igor Sechin said that talks with China's CNPC on a Vankor stake were continuing.

Russia was once the greatest supplier of oil and gas in India and we hope to work forward jointly with [Russian energy giant] Rosneft to restore that position again," he said at the Eastern Economic Forum.

According to Ruia, Rosneft has "unparalleled energy asset portfolio."

Austin wrote:ONGC Pays Just Over Rs 8,250 Crore for Vankor Stake: Report

http://profit.ndtv.com/news/market/arti ... ome-latest

New Delhi: Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) has paid just over $1.25 billion or Rs 8,250 crore for a 15 per cent stake in Russian oil major Rosneft's Vankor oil field, a source with direct knowledge of the deal said on Friday.

ONGC expects to get more than 3 million tonnes of oil a year (between 66,000 and 70,000 barrels per day) from its holding in the huge Siberian oil field, the source told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

Rosneft earlier announced the deal to sell the interest in Vankor, a key source of supply to markets in the Asia-Pacific. Chief executive Igor Sechin said that talks with China's CNPC on a Vankor stake were continuing.

Mort Walker wrote:ONGC is a state owned company. Hopefully ONGC can get that 3 million tonnes/year of oil out. I am leery and it could turn out that getting that oil is not cost effective and ONGC is out of the $1.25 billion.

During my visit to Russia last week (due disclosure: at the invitation of Rostec, the umbrella agency that oversees Russia’s high-technology industry), I was struck by the changes from the days of the Soviet Union, as also by important similarities. The drab, socialist Moscow of yore has been replaced by a glittering city, peopled by purposeful men in sharp suits and chic women in impossibly high heels. The double-headed eagle of Tsarist Russia (itself drawn from the Byzantine Empire) is clawing itself back into prominence, replacing the hammer and sickle at prominent places, most notably the Kremlin. Even so, Russia is discernibly stressed by rock-bottom global oil prices, compounded by western sanctions imposed after the intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea. Nowhere is the strain more evident than in the defence industry. Moscow can no longer afford an ambitious $650 billion defence modernisation plan, particularly since --- unlike western defence industries that remain commercially viable by producing both weaponry and civilian products --- Russia’s defence industry serves only military buyers. Boeing and Airbus derive 80 per cent of their revenue from commercially successful civil airliners; in contrast, Sukhoi is struggling to sell its Superjet 100 outside Russia.

What does this mean for New Delhi, and what options does this create for India? In the decade after 1989, as Russia’s military spending plummeted to one-thirtieth the 1989 figure, three-quarters of the Soviet Union’s famed military design bureaus went kaput, putting a million Russian scientists on the streets. With Russian soldiers begging in uniform on Moscow’s streets, the bankrupt state cancelled 1,149 individual R&D projects. Beijing swooped in, hiring hundreds of scientists who catalyzed the birth of China’s now formidable defence industry. New Delhi, in contrast, provided Moscow life support, ordering a generation of weaponry including Sukhoi-30MKI and MiG-29K fighters, T-90 tanks, Talwar-class frigates and other procurements too numerous to recount.

India learnt hard lessons from those purchases, many involving transfer of technology (ToT) to build Russian weaponry in India. Technology sometimes remained undelivered (e.g. the T-90 tank), and India could not enforce flawed contracts drawn up by ill-qualified lawyers and bureaucrats. Spare parts, suddenly manufactured not in the Soviet Union but in successor countries, became New Delhi’s problem. India had bought equipment without providing for maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) and mid-life upgrades (MLU), even though, over the multi-decade service lifespan of a military platform, MRO and MLU tots up to four-eight times the acquisition cost. Consequently, we are still sending Kilo-class submarines to Russia for overhaul.

So should New Delhi turn away from a Russia in economic distress, or do there remain opportunities for us? Unlike in the 1990s, India has many more alternatives: the United States is today eager to bolster India as an emerging counter-balance to China. US Ambassador Richard Verma, at a recent speech in Delhi endorsed India as a “leading power” instead of a “balancing power”. Moscow’s arms prices, once well below western norms, have risen significantly, making Russian weaponry only slightly cheaper than European and American arms. This advantage, many say is negated by lower Russian serviceability rates.

Even so, the answer can only be “Stay tuned to Moscow!” Although details remain outside the public eye, Russia assists India with technologies that the western bloc is unwilling to. One example is nuclear powered submarines. From 1988 to 1991, the Soviet Union leased India the nuclear powered attack submarine, INS Chakra, and helped create the building blocks, including design assistance, that has evolved into a successful Indian nuclear submarine, INS Arihant. Since 2012, a second Russian nuclear attack submarine (SSN) has been with the Indian Navy on a ten-year lease. India hopes to develop a line of SSNs and Russian assistance could be crucial. Well-informed US scholar, Ashley Tellis, says Washington would not even consider sharing SSN technology with anyone.

In fact, the United States, the global emperor of defence technology, has opened the technology door to India only a crack. Over the last five years, over-the-counter sales to India of $10 billion worth of US defence equipment makes for happy reading in Washington. Far less impressive, though, has been progress in the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) that seeks to transform the “buyer-seller relationship” into a more equal one based on co-development and co-production of military platforms. A “joint working group” on aircraft carrier technology and on co-developing jet engines has reported no progress. Like French company, Snecma, earlier, US engine-makers are reluctant to share the costly technologies for materials that go into jet engines’ “combustion chamber”, which must withstand temperatures of up to 2,100 degrees. In contrast, Moscow has recently offered to co-develop with India a highly advanced engine for the “fifth generation fighter aircraft”. Russian co-development would not only provide the Defence R&D Organisation a much-needed breakthrough, but allow New Delhi to signal that it has multiple options. Cultivating Moscow has not just intrinsic benefits; it also induces Paris and Washington not to drag their feet.

Another reason to service the Moscow connection is to prevent a catastrophic Russian turn towards Beijing and Islamabad. Russia’s experience with China in the 1990s, when Beijing apparently modified the Sukhoi-27 fighter into the “indigenous” J-11B, makes Moscow extremely wary of arms sales to China. But lured by China’s massive market size and with few other options, Russia may well yield to China. It would be useful to let Moscow know New Delhi remains a buyer.

Servicing the Moscow connection would allow New Delhi to develop a structured multilateralism for defence acquisition. Such a defence procurement policy flows naturally from a multi-aligned foreign policy, in which each of India’s external relationships is leveraged by the combined weight of all the others.

The mistakes of the 1990s and early 2000s must be guarded against. India’s aim for every acquisition must be clear and spelt out unmistakeably: first, obtaining the crucial technologies for life-cycle support, including MRO, so that India’s military is assured of service support and industry can benefit from follow-on service contracts that are worth four-eight times the purchase price. Second, a contract cannot be awarded just on the basis of L-1 (lowest price); instead, a key determinant must be the technology the vendor is willing to transfer. Such an approach to acquisition would require political courage in the ministry and the expertise to evaluate technology in various forms.

Over the years, global arms vendors, together with New Delhi, have developed a bizarre ritual in which they ceremonially stone the “buyer-seller relationship” devil, and then walk back to the table and sign some more purchase contracts. Changing this would require a new mind set within government, and as many players as possible on the board, including Moscow.

Austin wrote:He is on a all paid trip to Russia courtesy Rostec this time and previously he was on similar all paid trip by LM/Boeing .........change of heart occurs when you see the good side of the other

NRao wrote:
However, there is certainly something wrong somewhere. Not been able to explain the MTA and FGFA status. And the recent events of reduced numbers and direct purchase of PAK-FA is even more mind boggling. Then, what to say about the offer to jointly develop a next gen engine and India not even making a move.

Such a defence procurement policy flows naturally from a multi-aligned foreign policy, in which each of India’s external relationships is leveraged by the combined weight of all the others.

India is under the coordination between major powers US, Russia, Europe/UK/France

The Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, General Colonel of Police Vladimir Kolokoltsev has held talks in New Delhi with the Minister of the Home Office Rajnath Singh. They discussed the potential for cooperation between the two agencies in countering terrorism and cybercrime.

“Remembering the close and friendly relations with Russia, the Indian minister of Home Affairs observed that our good relations have been reinforced and strengthened, and India continues to view Russia as a privileged strategic partner”, stated a press release from the Indian ministry.

Participants at the meeting agreed that terrorism continues to present a serious danger to the international community. In particular, the growing threat of the Islamic State terrorist organization was also noted, which is expanding its operations into cyberspace and is actively disseminating its ideas. For closer cooperation in the war against terror the Russian and Indian ministers agreed to establish an expert group whose main task will be to exchange information in the field of special training preparation for military personal and also exchanges among specialists.

It was announced, in addition to the war against terror, the bilateral discussions also touched on a wide range of issues including countering extremism, crimes involved advanced technology and information technology, cyber security, and also narcotic related crimes.

The parties agreed to stimulate tourism between the countries by simplifying visa requirements.

NATO’s air superiority vis-à-vis Russia is waning, Air Force (USAF) General Frank Gorenc, the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Africa told an audience at this year’s Air and Space Conference held near Washington DC, according to military.com.“The advantage that we had from the air, I can honestly say, is shrinking not only with respect to the aircraft that they’re producing, but the more alarming thing is their ability to create anti-access/area-denial [A2/AD] that are very well defended,” Gorenc said.According to the general, Russia accelerated the development of A2/AD capabilities during the 2008 war with Georgia and has heavily invested in fielding modern long-range surface-to-air missile systems (.e.g., the S-400) and other land-based A2/AD weapon systems based on their experience during the war. “They learned a lot along the way, and they made moves to close the asymmetric advantage posed by the quality of our air force; they’ve done it,” he emphasized.It’s one thing to address a aircraft threat that has increased significantly — which by the way it has — but clearly, surface to air missile systems are much cheaper, they’re much more available and that is a concern,” he added.Indeed, A2/AD capabilities are fundamentally undermining the essence of the American way of war (See: “The End of the American Way of War?”). ”The American way of war requires a robust air reconnaissance … because we believe with air superiority, everything is possible and without it, nothing is possible. We just need to continue to work really hard to make sure that we can provide that to make the aspiration of our joint partners,” according to Gorenc.“We’re going to have to extend the training that we do to allow for access into areas that are very well defended. We’re going to have to develop TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] and continue to develop requirements that allow us to address that modern long-range SAM array,” according to Gorenc

Philip wrote:If we are perceived as being nothing better than Western lackeys,a la Nehru,then both Russia and China will little want India to sit at the UNSC. First India has to demonstrate its unique individual foreign policy and identity and gather many smaller nations with it to form a large group.Only then we will be takens eriously.We had this leverage when we were the acknowledged leaders of the NAM,but simply allowed it to go to sleep and we lost a lot of goodwill after the Cold War.We are mow desperately trying to recover lost ground.Our myopic MEA is mainly responsible for the fiasco.

Philip wrote:If we are perceived as being nothing better than Western lackeys,a la Nehru,then both Russia and China will little want India to sit at the UNSC. First India has to demonstrate its unique individual foreign policy and identity and gather many smaller nations with it to form a large group.Only then we will be takens eriously.We had this leverage when we were the acknowledged leaders of the NAM,but simply allowed it to go to sleep and we lost a lot of goodwill after the Cold War.We are mow desperately trying to recover lost ground.Our myopic MEA is mainly responsible for the fiasco.

but ultimately China {and Russia - working stealth} failed to get the numbers that India had

Philip wrote:Russia's actions,
http://in.rbth.com/world/2015/09/16/rus ... 7253[quote]
Russia to back India for UNSC

Philip wrote:If we are perceived as being nothing better than Western lackeys,a la Nehru,then both Russia and China will little want India to sit at the UNSC. First India has to demonstrate its unique individual foreign policy and identity and gather many smaller nations with it to form a large group.Only then we will be takens eriously.We had this leverage when we were the acknowledged leaders of the NAM,but simply allowed it to go to sleep and we lost a lot of goodwill after the Cold War.We are mow desperately trying to recover lost ground.Our myopic MEA is mainly responsible for the fiasco.