Bharat Rakshak

Four years before her assassination in December 2007, Pakistani leader Benazir Bhutto accused her country’s military leadership of nuclear brinksmanship, but ruled out a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan.
In an interview recovered from a lost archive — it was recorded in 2003 at her Dubai home when she was out of power and in exile — Benazir, commenting on the tactics deployed by the Pakistani security establishment, said: “They think that with nuclear brinkmanship, they can bring India to its knees because they feel no matter how intense the insurgency gets in Kashmir, what can India do?”

“If lndia tries to have a war, the world community will have to come in because they’re both nuclear. And if the world community doesn’t come in, India knows that if they cross towards Lahore, Pakistan will throw a bomb. India might retaliate, but it will still mean that so many people in India will die.”

Pakistan observes Benazir's second anniversary
“Since 1977, our security establishment was hijacked by pro-Zia (ul-Haq) officers. They have a vision in direct contrast with the political leadership’s vision. They think that Pakistan should have a puppet government in Afghanistan, so that we can get strategic depth all the way to the river Amur.”

Asked if she had ever considered launching a nuclear attack on India when she was Prime Minister — she had two stints:1988-90 and 993-96 — Benazir said, “For God’s sake, never have l ever for a moment woken up with such a thought because l know that nuking any Indian, if l was even mad enough to think that, would end up nuking my own people.”

“This is what l don’t understand about the deterrence because neither India can use the nukes, nor can Pakistan. Because whichever country is throwing that nuke knows there is not enough time/space and is going to get it back.”

This interview forms part of a chapter on Benazir Bhutto in this correspondent’s book ‘Bullets and Bylines, Dispatches from Kabul, Delhi, Damascus and Beyond’, published by Speaking Tiger.

Asked if she could characterise the feelings that most ordinary Pakistanis have for India and Indians, she said, “It changes from times of tension to times of less tension. When there is tension and the troops are at the border, then people hate anybody who’s Indian, irrespective of whether they are Hindu or Muslim or whatever. They say they want to attack us, kill us and destroy our country.”

“But when there is no tension, people really welcome Indians. Indian films are very popular in Pakistan, Indian goods are smuggled across in Pakistan all the time, people are desperate to get Indian visas, travel to India, go visit their families, or go and see the Taj Mahal or the Mughal heritage.”

“Overseas in America… the Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis see themselves as South Asians, there is no hatred at all… they feel their interests are the same, they work together, they socialise together, there is no hatred at all.”

“I feel the only way forward… is to try and see what the European Union did and to have a kind of common market. What makes economies move? In my view, economies move through the service centre, through creativity. So if we open up, people will come to visit Pakistan, our hotels will be full, more hotels will be built, more labour will get jobs, same in your country…”

“All the visitors who come will want to have kebab and tikka and nihari… people will want to buy, they will want to spend… go to museums, to sight-see. It’s the flow of money that strengthens economies and that’s what we all need, whether it’s Nepal or Bangladesh or Sri Lanka or India or Pakistan, we all need that.”

NRao wrote:An interesting read.The Sneaky Way the Falcon Controls their Prey's Mind

Water curtain works
Excavation work included advance of two 6m x 6.5m x 1.3km long water curtain galleries. Once completed boreholes of 102mm diameter and 75m long were drilled horizontally at 10m intervals from both sides of the galleries to cover the caverns. These were sealed and connected to a continuous recirculating pumping system injecting water to a pressure of 6 bar to seal any fissures in the rock around the caverns. As an essential part of the project, the water will prevent seepage of crude fumes through the fissures to eliminate the possible risk of explosions. Similarly, the strictly enforced smooth finish specification of the gallery walls, with just 400mm tolerance either side of the tunnels, is set to reduce the risk of voids in the caverns and the possible build-up of fumes and once again preventing the risk of explosions.
The floors of the caverns are 80m below mean sea level and beneath a hill that rises above the site to an elevation of about 130m.

The Natio­nal Command Authority (NCA) has renewed the proposal for a regional Strategic Restraint Regime as it expressed alarm over India’s growing conventional and nuclear arsenals.

The NCA — the principal decision-making body on nuclear issues — at its meeting presided over by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Wednesday, “took note of the growing conventional and strategic weapons’ development in the region”, according to a press statement issued by the ISPR.

Besides expressing its resolve to do everything, short of entering an arms race, for keeping national security intact, the NCA “re-emphasised Pakistan’s desire for establishing the Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia”.

The need for a sustained dialogue with India for resolution of outstanding disputes was also underscored.

The proposal for Strategic Restraint Regime has been on the table since Oct 1998, but India, which is opposed to a regional mechanism, has always avoided discussions on it.

Experts believe that regional stability, in the absence of such an overarching strategic architecture, has been tenuous.

The NCA was of the view that development of conventional and nuclear weapons by India had “adverse ramifications for peace and security” in the region.

Gagan wrote:

SSridhar wrote:Pakistan's National Command Authority calls for strategic restraint pact in S. Asia - DAWN

Besides expressing its resolve to do everything, short of entering an arms race, for keeping national security intact, the NCA “re-emphasised Pakistan’s desire for establishing the Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia”.

The usual tricks.

nit wrote: Pakistan's National Command Authority calls for strategic restraint pact in S. Asia - DAWN

Besides expressing its resolve to do everything, short of entering an arms race, for keeping national security intact, the NCA “re-emphasised Pakistan’s desire for establishing the Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia”.

Arms race is what we should force Pak in to. They should get down to eat grass..

ShauryaT wrote:I have no idea why you say none of our subs will sail with nuclear warheads?

Akshay Kapoor wrote: One of the biggest concerns that the armed forces have is that we have no doctrine or mechanism in place to keep fully functional warheads + delivery systems with the armed forces and then a foolproof mechanism to give launch orders from competent authority (PM ?). And no back ups if PM and political leadership is incapacitated. All of these needs to be thought through and mechanisms set, training done if we are to have a robust second strike capability.

shiv wrote: Well then we have a sham - if that's the word. I seriously doubt if Indian land based deterrents are going to sit around in unmated condition while the sea based ones are mated and ready to fire.

If this is called a weak and risky posture, then there you have it, I believe we have a weak and risky posture. India has no policy of maintaining ready to use warheads anywhere - not even on subs. Just my view.

"In the second strike capability, the most important thing is how fast we can react. We are working on cannisterised systems that can launch from anywhere at anytime," said Dr Chander. "We are making much more agile, fast-reacting, stable missiles so response can be within minutes."

shiv wrote:

Akshay Kapoor wrote: One of the biggest concerns that the armed forces have is that we have no doctrine or mechanism in place to keep fully functional warheads + delivery systems with the armed forces and then a foolproof mechanism to give launch orders from competent authority (PM ?). And no back ups if PM and political leadership is incapacitated. All of these needs to be thought through and mechanisms set, training done if we are to have a robust second strike capability.

From reading statements here and there it seems to me that there is no serious belief among political decision making circles in India that we may be in a situation where we get nuked and we have to suddenly sit up and use nuclear weapons.

This is in stark contrast with the signals we get of testing of nuclear capable missiles (even if that testing in not all that frequent). That apart the information that is leaked out all too infrequently from Atomic energy dept officials is that India has consistently worked on nuclear weapons for a long time. Of course there has been very little public info that I have seen in the last 2 years.

Having said that - senior army officers and diplomats have occasionally made public statements warning that the Indian nuclear deterrent is to be taken seriously. A fairly significant number of retired armed forces officers have been critical of India's opaque doctrine and to me this silence from India while there are almost monthly reports of Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal seems like a surreal drama. India's posture is not reassuring to either Pakis as being harmless and it is not reassuring to Indians because some fear it is toothless. Sorry - this discussion is better off in the deterrence thread - I will cross post there.

srai wrote:You need to have at least one (or two) SSBN constantly deployed on deterrent patrol with its nuclear arsenal. That's one more sure-way to guarantee a viable second-strike option. Others stored in various land bases will not be as survivable when the enemy launches a preemptive first strike targeting all-known storage sites.

shiv wrote:.... If a pre-emptive counter-force strike does not knock out every single Indian nuke is is going to be a wasted strike. ...

Basically I am questioning the idea that a counter force pre emptive strike is going to be 100% effective.

nobody left alive to order a retaliation

Aditya G wrote:

shiv wrote:.... If a pre-emptive counter-force strike does not knock out every single Indian nuke is is going to be a wasted strike. ...

Basically I am questioning the idea that a counter force pre emptive strike is going to be 100% effective.

I don't need a pre-emptive strike with nukes to take out the nukes - that was a scenario applicable to cold war where the US stored ICBMs in land based silos. The enemy can destroy Delhi, Bombay and each of Navy and Air Force stations (say 50 targets in total) so that there is nobody left alive to order a retaliation.

LokeshC wrote:IMVVVHO.

Not directly related to deterrence, but India has one more problem. Decapitation first strike would only be the first of our problems. As soon as that strike is over, the physical wing of the break India forces would move into divide India up into chunks, in the name of protecting India from Indians.

For ex: They would wait until India and Bakistan finish each other and then when they know we are weak and unable to do any more damage, move in.

Our deterrence can never be Bakistan centric. A credible second strike deterrence has to pose a credible, legit threat to the vultures who would be circling around us after the first exchange is over.

NRao wrote:

nobody left alive to order a retaliation

...

One of the major features of deterrence is you yourself do very little and let the opponent do a LOT. That includes things like discussions, authoring papers, etc. Pakis seem to have achieved this by making "tactical nukes". Which may not even work.

IF India wants to gain control over this narrative, then perhaps India should talk about making tactical nukes and keep quite.

geeth wrote: What you say doesn't sound logically correct. The very idea of having a nuclear submarine force is to have a strike capability even if we have to bear a surprise first strike..in such a scenario, if you say "the reality is that submarines sail with their tubes empty", then that submarine force doesn't become part of the nuclear triad. So, it is not wet dreams or masturbation if someone says they expect the submarines sail with ready to fire missiles. If that is not trues, then having such a submarine force is a waste. Cost, technogy or any other bla bla cannot and should not be the reason. Simply put, if it is not the case, then we simply do not have the so called nuclear triad complete.

ldev wrote: If there are going to zero mated warheads why have the submarines on patrol at all? Have them sitting in the docks and then load them up when tensions rise? By definition then all nuclear submarine patrols will be training patrols. A deterrent patrol by definition needs ready to fire missiles.

Karan M wrote:If Arihant's base gets n-attacked where will we have the time to arm? Like it or not, deterrence patrols will likely be carried out with missiles onboard.
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/04/ssbnpatrols/

"You're only saying that to reassure us"

Aditya G wrote:

shiv wrote:.... If a pre-emptive counter-force strike does not knock out every single Indian nuke is is going to be a wasted strike. ...

Basically I am questioning the idea that a counter force pre emptive strike is going to be 100% effective.

I don't need a pre-emptive strike with nukes to take out the nukes - that was a scenario applicable to cold war where the US stored ICBMs in land based silos. The enemy can destroy Delhi, Bombay and each of Navy and Air Force stations (say 50 targets in total) so that there is nobody left alive to order a retaliation.

krishna_krishna wrote: Now think of what some members suggest like we wait till balloon gets up and they you load your submarines and send them to patrol no it does not work that way anywhere in the world. If you see the videos of Russian submarines going for patrol they load the boat and when the are in base the tubes are emptied and filled into ones going on patrol at any point in time some of them are always rotated. They would need periodic testing and maintanence and there would be cost associated but nothing that cannot be paid and will be paid. And I disagree as some member suggest that S Union went bankrupt due to warhead testing and maintenance cost.

nit wrote:

SSridhar wrote:Pakistan's National Command Authority calls for strategic restraint pact in S. Asia - DAWN
quote]

Besides expressing its resolve to do everything, short of entering an arms race, for keeping national security intact, the NCA “re-emphasised Pakistan’s desire for establishing the Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia”.

/quote]

The usual tricks.

Arms race is what we should force Pak in to. They should get down to eat grass..

shiv wrote:. . . the Admiral says that the mating process in canisterized submarine missiles is not one of "using a wheelbarrow to cart the warhead to the missile and using wrenches to do the mating" but the mating is electronic.

krishna_krishna wrote:Shiv, Let me ask you a simple question: With Agni V onwards the plan is to have canasterized even land based maal what do you think happens for a canasterized mijjile ?, they can never be demated for practical operational use.

Like everyone else you also have your claims, assumptions and views My problem is that you state those assumptions as that of indian SFC or official indian establishment. Without stating any credible links where as I can give multiple authentic open source data points to point contrary.

Our doctrine is of "Credible Mininum Deterrence" (that is open to different assumptions and imaginations) no where else doctrine mentions a word recessed. Just because they did for the land based options for liquid mijjiles (in the past) does not mean the same will be assumed for the sea based one. Ones the submarine is in pen/base/refit, they again be removed and put under extra security but nowhere on sea.

And if you read Admiral Arun Prakash that's what he said, no civilian would be permitted on the nuclear submarine we are moving away from that unless we say that admiral is false or not stating correct:

https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uplo ... errent.pdf

In his magisterial 2001 book on India’s emerging nuclear posture, Ashley Tellis wrote that the three key features of India’s nuclear posture were that it was limited in size, separated in disposition, and centralized in control. He noted: ‘‘The weapons and delivery systems are developed and produced, with key subcomponents maintained under civilian custody, but these assets are not deployed in any way that enables the prompt conduct of nuclear operations. Such assets are, in fact, sequestered and covertly maintained in distributed form, with different custodians exercising strict stewardship over the components entrusted to them for
safekeeping.’’18

This belief that India maintains all of its nuclear forces in a disassembled, and certainly demated, state across various civilian agencies persists today.19 But it is largely now a myth. Over the past decade, all observable indicators are that India, while adhering to its posture of assured retaliation, has increased the baseline readiness of at least a subset of its nuclear forces, if not all of them particularly as it marches toward a force consisting largely of so called ‘‘encapsulated’’ or ‘‘canisterized’’ systems in which the warhead is likely pre-mated to the delivery vehicle and kept hermetically sealed for storage and transport (though procedures may exist that allow for the warhead to be mated in the field).20 This encapsulation is made possible by the fact that India’s ballistic missiles are essentially all now solid fuel.

Encapsulation enhances missile longevity by protecting the solid fuel from the elements, but it also complicates our picture of an India managing its nuclear forces in a disassembled or demated state. Though it is possible that reserve components are stewarded by their respective civilian agencies nuclear pits with the Department of Atomic Energy, the explosives package with DRDO, the delivery vehicle with the SFC it seems increasingly likely that India already has some subset of the force within minutes of readiness. This is likely to include co location of subcomponents, and in some cases, potentially fully mated systems that are either a proverbial ‘‘last screw’’ or ‘‘last code’’ from being armed and ready to be released. Indeed, in July 2013 the new DRDO head, Dr. Avinash Chander, revealed that DRDO is increasingly ‘‘working on canisterized systemsthat can launch from anywhere at any time[and] making much more agile,fast reacting, stable missiles so [that a] response can be within minutes’’ forultimately all of India’s nuclear missile systems.2

All Indian nuclear weapons currently are maintained routinely in de-mated condition, though whether this posture will persist after the four ballistic missile submarines are eventually inducted into its arsenal is unclear.

India's nuclear forces are in a de alerted state in peacetime and the nuclear warheads are kept de mated. The fissionable Plutonium cores are in the custody of the AEC

Indeed, Indian nuclear forces are still reportedly kept de-alerted and de-mated, which would obviate LOW or LUA strategies. Such a posture assumes that there will be considerable time between an attack and an order to retaliate because it will be many hours before the various components of India’s nuclear forces can be brought together and mated for delivery. This might change once India’s nuclear submarines assume a strategic deterrent role because India will then have to keep its submarine-based nuclear weapons mated, but it is unlikely that the nuclear submarine component of India’s strategic forces would be ready for many more years.

“India, like Pakistan, is known to keep its nuclear warheads de-mated from the delivery mechanisms. For the INS Arihant to fulfill its operational responsibility, SLBMs mounted with nuclear warheads will have to be deployed on the vessel.”

Finally, India’s imminent deployment of the submarine leg of its nuclear triad makes the current de-mated and de-alerted posture nearly obsolete. As the weapons and delivery systems will be on the same platform (even if they are de-mated) and on a higher degree of alert than on land, the 2003 posture will have to be revisited. Also, delegation of use authority will also have to be considered.

krishna_krishna wrote:^^ None of your so called sources are credible. The capability didn't exist in past that we have now with cannestarized Mijjile in land bases avatar and sea bases ones. We now have the capability period