Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[Johann]

I like any aware Indian am quite cognizant of the liberal leftist theological strand in Pathans (as we call the Pushtuns). I attribute this tendency to a more fundamental and autochthonous--read subcontinental--meme than the allegedly redeeming Persian implant that you seem so strangely enamored of.

Lastly, I don't shiver in my dhoti at the thought of Taliban prevailing and start wishing that the Persian culture would have made it all better. To me, scum is as scum does and they will find one cultural vehicle or other to achieve scummy apotheosis. They can be recognized and dealt with.

KLNM, once again here is the key point with regards to Afghanistan - the decline of Dari speaking Pashtuns and the rise of Pashtun speaking Pashtuns is tied to the larger process that has turned the Pashtuns from a strategic Pakistani liability into a Pakistani asset.

I'm certainly not asking you to 'shiver in your dhoti', but consider the change from the time in 1949 when Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's entry into the UN. Both the Dari speaking monarchy, and the educated, Dari speaking population that initially supported the communists lost both political and to an extent national cultural power.

Its this transformation that has led Indians to debate about just how many thousands of people and billions of rupees need to be sent to Afghanistan to contain the Pakistani threat there.

My real concern is exactly the RAPE scum who, like Iqbal manage to conceal their vicious, vulgar and mediocre minds under a veneer of Persianized cosmopolitanism.

...Iqbal belongs to this category. It is laughable to see him painted as someone redeemed by his Persophilia. He was a mediocre and derivative mind and an ersatz Nazi. That he defines the bar for refinement and intellect for the Persophile RAPE elite is a measure of the intellectual quality of this class.

Theres a couple of issues here. The first is that I brought up the issue in the context of Afghanistan rather than Pakistan. As I said the key here is that the growth of Pakistani influence and power and the cultural elements of whats going on.

Even if we must talk of Pakistan and the Subcontinent, the trajectory of Iqbal from RAPE to Indian nationalist, to Indian Muslim nationalist is worth thinking about. I certainly don't believe that exposure to Persian civilisation on its own is some kind of panacea on its own. In the political arena what matters is the question of identity and identity based mobilisation. While your posts and Devesh posts are more concerned with Islam and Muslims as a whole, I'm specifically interested in the Pakistan problem.

Iqbal represents the growth of the idea that there is a unique *all-India* Muslim identity, and thats totally tied to the way Urdu simultaneously eclipsed both Persian and more local languages. The rise of Urdu as a marker of Pan Indian-Muslim identity was the precursor to Pakistan. Why else is the language of a tiny minority the national language of Pakistan? At least in the case of India and Hindi the political centre of gravity lay in the Hindi belt. The politics of Pakistani national identity are inseparable from the politics of Urdu. So that's one of the key contexts for the lament of the rise of Urdu at the expense of Persian.

[Johann]

[One can thank this manSyed Ahmad Barelvi for this change. He brought about Wahabism to the Pashtun lands in the early 19th century. It took a century and half to radicalize the Pasthuns and the TSP helped by ushering in the Taliban.
The Taliban are like the Ikhwan for the TSP Kabila.

Yes, exactly, Ramana!

On the other hand I don't think Syed Ahmad changed the course of history, but was just the first result of the interaction of two larger changes in the balance of power within the Muslim world.

- The decline of the physical power of Islam in Central Asia has meant the loss of intellectual power. The problem with the growth of the power of Indian Islam is that it is by nature defensive about its minority status since 1857, and that anxiety manifests itself in a much more fundamentalist approach. Iqbal and the minority of Deobandi ulama alike who decided to push for Pakistan were terrified that under the conditions of modern secular nationalism and democracy Muslim identity would simply dissolve and disappear into a larger Indian identity. It really freaked them out just how many Muslims were willing to call Gandhi 'Imam' and give up beef.

- Modernity's emphasis on standardisation and rationalisation and social self-segregation of different economic classes has made the ulama and mullahs much more powerful within traditional Muslim communities all over the world (at the expense of other kinds of leadership within those communities), while simultaneously debasing the intellectual content of ulama education.

[ramana]

Our Nitin Pai writes

Why Pakistan interferes in Afghanistan
in PERSPECTIVE by Nitin Pai —

June 19, 2012 at 6:18 pm | 0 comments

http://pragati. nationalinterest .in/2012/ 06/why-pakistan- interferes- in-afghanistan/

A strong, independent Afghanistan is perceived as an existential threat to Pakistan
Just why is Pakistan interested in installing a friendly regime in Afghanistan? Books and articles written over the last couple of decades, will offer arguments such as the need for strategic depth to counter India; the need to prevent an Indian encirclement of Pakistan; and, even more grandly, the creation of an Islamic centre of power that stretches from the shores of the Arabian Sea to the Caucasus Mountains. Going by the statements of members of the Pakistani establishment and some of its commentators, these do appear to explain why Pakistan seeks to dominate Afghanistan.

Yet, to a large extent, the ambition and the paranoia that motivates these objectives are in the realm of fantasy. Some important people in Pakistan do believe in these fantasies—and we must take them seriously, because those important people can and do act on the basis of their delusions. However, there is also an argument to be made that these fantasies, paranoias and strategic sophistries mask the real motive.

The reality is that Pakistan seeks to dominate Afghanistan for the fear of its own dismemberment. Until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Islamabad’s main agenda was to prevent Kabul-supported Pashtun and Baloch nationalism from escalating into full-blown movements for independence. The strength of Pashtun nationalism and Kabul’s rejection of the Durand Line—both of which continue to this day—create deep insecurities in Islamabad, causing it to bolster Islamism as an ideological counter, instigate political instability in Afghanistan and attempt to install a friendly regime there.


It is a matter of historical record that Pakistan—under President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—began training Islamist militants in 1973, long before the Soviet invasion. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Massoud received training in Pakistani camps so that Bhutto could counter Kabul’s “forward policy” towards Pakistan. Kabul’s policies over the Durand Line had caused Pakistan to close its borders with Afghanistan in 1961. When the Baloch insurgency erupted in the early 1970s, Kabul, under the Daoud regime, supported it.


Bhutto’s response was to nurture proxies in the form of Islamist militants—an old trick for the Pakistani establishment—under the leadership of the then Brigadier Naseerullah Babar, who as Inspector-General of the Frontier Corps, set up training camps in North and South Waziristan. More than 5000 militants were thus trained between 1973-1977. This took place, it must be stressed, before the Soviets invaded in 1979. The narrative that most people accept—that Pakistan’s sponsorship of the mujahideen was a response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—is factually incorrect. Rizwan Hussain’s Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan has a good account of this.


The Pakistani establishment fears that a strong independent Afghanistan—like the one that existed up to the mid-1970s—will pursue an irredentist agenda, claiming the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. People in the tribal regions of Pakistan have only a tenuous association with the Pakistani state. Even for people in the so-called “settled areas” of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly the North West Frontier Province), age-old Pashtun solidarity is often stronger than allegiance to a new-fangled geopolitical entity called Pakistan. Afghanistan can well decide to again support the insurgency in Balochistan to weaken the Pakistan state enough to prise out the Pashtun lands for itself. Pakistani strategists, therefore, can see an existential threat in a strong, independent Afghanistan.

They can’t, however, state this as the official reason because to do so would be to admit the hollowness of the idea of Pakistan. That is where fantastic notions of strategic depth, pre-empting strategic encirclement or building a Central Asian caliphate come in useful. “Strategic depth” is a plausible justification to convince patriotic Pakistanis of why their military is interfering in Afghanistan. Islamabad’s case appears a lot more ‘understandable’ to international opinion if it cites the fear of Indian encirclement, rather than fear of Pashtun and Baloch self-determination as the explanations for its actions. Domestic and foreign Islamists will be enthused by the idea of flying the green flag of Islam all the way to the borders of Russia.

There are two broad ways to address Pakistan’s insecurities. First, the Pakistani military-jihadi complex might be persuaded to stop destabilising Afghanistan if it were convinced that Kabul will not lay claim to Pashtun lands east of the Durand Line. In practice that would be nearly impossible, not least because Afghan nationalism will not accept it. Even Mullah Omar’s Taliban regime—despite owing its power to Pakistani support—didn’t.
The other way is for Pakistan to evolve a political and economic framework where all its citizens, including the Pashtun and the Baloch, see a common, shared future. In other words, this requires Pakistan “to get its act together” and assure its citizens of equity, justice, rule-of-law and a promise of a better tomorrow. All of Pakistan’s neighbours including Afghanistan will, as it is in their interests to co-operate with Islamabad towards this end. For a number of reasons—the most importance of which is the military-jihadi complex—Pakistan’s leaders are unwilling to take this course.
Therefore, some matters will be decided by the force of arms. If at all.


Nitin Pai is the editor of Pragati

[svinayak]

Iqbal and the minority of Deobandi ulama alike who decided to push for Pakistan were terrified that under the conditions of modern secular nationalism and democracy Muslim identity would simply dissolve and disappear into a larger Indian identity. It really freaked them out just how many Muslims were willing to call Gandhi 'Imam' and give up beef.

Very interesting. Around 1900 the muslims were willing to come back to being Hindu.
The British govt help the Muslim league and stopped this process by giving incentive to Muslims.

[Johann]

Acharya,

This was later, during the Khilafat movement around 1920. It wasn't about becoming Hindu, but rather demonstrating mutual solidarity at the communal level, although that is what people like Iqbal were afraid it might lead to.

The Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind which was mostly nationalist, activist Deobandi clergy actually the issue of Indian self-government ahead of the issue of preserving the caliphate. They had no interest in becoming Hindus, but were very conscious of both being Indian and Muslim.

The Muslim League under the Ali brothers were the national leadership of the Khilafat movement, although both Iqbal and Jinnah kept their distance until the movement failed. Part of the problem is that the Ali brothers and the movement leadership promised that if Muslims sacrificed enough there would be Home Rule within a year at the most. Iqbal and Jinnah reaped the benefits of the failure of those failed hopes.

The issue of the Khilafat movement was also controversial within the INC - Gandhi was somewhat isolated on the question.

[devesh]

the alphabet soup of Islamic organizations which developed after 1857 should be understood for one main feature: they all grew and established themselves under the watchful gaze of the British. the same Brits who never had any problems in crushing any Hindu resistance outside of INC, somehow couldn't do the same with the Islamic radicals. whatever nonsense we are fed, we need to be clear that India was well on way to solving the Islamic problem, but this process was interrupted by the British and their covert/overt approval of Islamic obscurantism. at a future time, we should be ready to declare the demands and voices of the alphabet soup as Null and Void, b/c their very birth was nurtured and fed by foreign imperialists.

[Roperia]

Afghans flee shelling from Pakistan: official, witnesses | Yawn

Afghans die by artillery fire from Pukis while the-sole-superpower-of-the-world sits helpless and tries to find a way to get-the-hell-out.

American M-777s are there only to protect the fortresses they have build to save themselves from being overrun by hordes of Puki ISI trained Taliban.

If and when we get the DRDO produced Bofors guns, we should donate our 105 mm Indian Field Guns to Afghan army.

[abhishek_sharma]

How Obama’s foreign policy team relates to the Vietnam War — or doesn’t

Life Inside Little America in Afghanistan

An exclusive excerpt from the new book Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan.

Does China Want to Dominate Afghanistan? If only.

[Samudragupta]

Pax-Sinica: Why the U.S. should hand over Afghanistan and Central Asia to China

In northern Afghanistan, a potentially rich, U.S.-backed oil and gas tender is under way this week. Central to hopes for a face-saving force withdrawal in two years, the competition is part of a U.S. strategy of initiating a vibrant, self-sustaining industrial base in Afghanistan that can bring jobs and stability over the long term. What the tender's Pentagon advisers hope will not happen: another Chinese triumph in Afghanistan's nascent oil and mining sector. Why? As a Pentagon official told me, the United States fears that China will end up "dominating Afghanistan."

From two decades of watching and covering the country, I feel confident saying that China will not end up "dominating Afghanistan," because the Afghans are too astute to let that happen. They do not require foreigners to inform them of the downside risks of falling under the sway of an outside power. Yet how astute are we?

By appearances, not very. We seem to have determined that because China is a great rival in many sectors, it is by definition a danger everywhere. But the logic does not hold in Central and South Asia, where a robust Chinese economic role -- a Pax Sinica, if you will -- may be what stands between the success and failure of primary U.S. and Western strategic objectives. "Without China's assistance, almost nothing of sustainable consequence will happen in South or Central Asia -- in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, or elsewhere," Larry Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Gen. Colin Powell, told me.

For two decades, the United States has sought to fashion Central Asia -- and, since 9/11, Afghanistan -- into a bastion of free-market democracy that respects human and civil rights. In the 1990s, the policy centered on reducing Russian influence in Central Asia through the construction of independent oil and gas pipelines. After 9/11, the policy shifted to creating a support base for the war in Afghanistan, eventually becoming what is known as the Northern Distribution Network. Now, NATO troops have plans to withdraw in 2014, and the United States is attempting to erect the foundation of a sustainable economic base on its way out. But the hour is late, and the plan runs the risk of Potemkinism -- a nice try aesthetically, but lacking substance. The Chinese themselves are highly unlikely to explicitly come to America's aid. But the United States could achieve some of its aims -- a more stable Afghanistan, and a more economically independent Central Asia -- with China's implicit help by embracing some of its objectives.

The Afghan tender is for six exploratory blocks of land ranging in size from 1,200 to 2,200 square miles in and around the north-central Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif. According to a report last year by the U.S. Geological Service, the blocks contain an estimated 1 billion barrels of oil. If the estimate proves out, it is sufficient to attract attention from relatively large multinational oil companies. We won't know who the bidders are until Saturday, when they must file an "expression of interest" with Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines. (Complete offers are due in October, and the winner is to be announced by the end of the year.) But a Chinese company such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is expected to bid. If that Chinese company goes on to win, it will be the country's second big hydrocarbon triumph in Afghanistan in as many years. It will also escalate an already loud fracas in the West.

In a series of policy journal articles, most recently in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, former U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and his son, Alexander Benard, have protested last year's first-round oil tender victory by CNPC. Khalilzad, who served as ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq during the George W. Bush presidency, now runs Gryphon Partners along with his son. The firm helps companies seeking business in the two nations and elsewhere by, among other things, introducing them to senior officials there. In Afghanistan, Gryphon has represented Britain-based Tethys Petroleum, which CNPC beat out in the first oil tender. The father-and-son pair has targeted the tender's Pentagon advisers for criticism, arguing that CNPC's triumph was a mockery of fair competition, and that the Pentagon should have carried out a policy of favoring U.S. companies. The argument becomes a bit overheated -- Benard's Foreign Affairs essay suggests that the good old days were when U.S. Marines were dispatched to straighten out countries that flouted the entreaties of American businessmen. But we do come to understand that the father and son unhappily believe that they and other American businessmen need better advantages abroad to win.

But that's not how business actually gets done in this era of globalization. In Russia, for example, President Vladimir Putin has recently let three contracts for the prized Arctic go to ExxonMobil, Italy's ENI, and Norway's Statoil. In Africa, the hottest new play is the eastern coastline states of Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania, but the boom is led by American, British, and Italian companies. In other words, you do not have to be Chinese to win big. And there do not have to be gunboats.

In the case of Afghanistan, the Chinese are highly unlikely to win the latest tender, primarily because the Afghans will want to mix things up. But if they do win, it will not be a disaster. On the contrary, "the more economically invested China is, the more it's a status quo actor and willing to support the future stability of the country," Andrew Small, a scholar at the German Marshall Fund, told me.

We are not talking about a Chinese security role. In terms of foreign adventurism, Beijing has no record of exercising its military might abroad apart from in Tibet and the South China Sea. Perhaps its territorial notions will expand over time, but I found no one who suggested that China wishes to play a security role in Afghanistan or Central Asia.

China's role as a serious economic player in the region goes back a decade and a half. Starting in the mid-1990s, it began to seek and obtain oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In 2006, CNPC became the only company to obtain prized rights to an onshore natural gas field in Turkmenistan, in large part by pledging to quickly monetize the field with a pipeline into China. The 1,100-mile pipeline was completed three years later.

In contrast, the West has failed to build any pipeline connecting Central Asia to the outside despite some 17 years of trying. The West's sorry pipeline story goes back to the 1991 Soviet breakup, when increasing numbers of American oil companies began to seek deals in Central Asia. The Clinton administration got behind the construction of new oil and gas pipelines as a way both to export the companies' hydrocarbons and to reduce Russian influence in the region. One idea was to build a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea connecting Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, and on to Turkey and then Europe. In recent years, the line took on the name Nabucco.

The policy continues today, but has morphed into a truncated line known as "Nabucco West" that leaves out Turkmenistan and starts in Azerbaijan, namely because the Turkmen have refused to commit to the idea. The Obama administration has also resurrected a line promoted in the 1990s by Unocal connecting Turkmenistan to the Indian subcontinent via Afghanistan. Today it is known by the acronym TAPI.

Both lines -- Nabucco and TAPI -- have confronted serious obstacles since neither is very practical from a commercial standpoint. Yet what about turning the axis of both proposed lines east? Rather than shipping Azeri gas to the west, what about exporting it east, into the existing Turkmenistan-China line? The result would be the same -- the Caucasus in this case would have another economic outlet independent of Russia. And in the case of Afghan gas, a Chinese dogleg would also accomplish the same ultimate goal: monetizing Afghanistan's natural wealth. A parallel oil line could be built as well.

Then there is the talk of a "new Silk Road," embraced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the U.S. military's Central Command. The idea is a massive Afghan economic development program, with new roads, railroads, electric lines, and energy pipelines connecting the borders of Europe with the ports of the Arabian Sea and India, with Afghanistan as a hub in the economic center. I am told that although the plan is still being discussed, it shows no signs of materializing. There are many reasons for that, including its grandiosity. But I would raise another reason -- that it has been honchoed from Washington. According to interviews, China not only is excluded as a partner; its role appears not even to have been seriously contemplated. "There are lots of China bashers who don't like the idea of China being involved at all," said a U.S. official with knowledge of the process. The omission makes this already far-fetched plan less realistic.

As it happens, the Chinese are themselves erecting a new Silk Road, though they eschew that moniker, from which both Afghanistan and the United States could find themselves outsiders. But if the United States shakes off the cobwebs and includes China in its thinking, perhaps the Washington-led plan would seem more feasible. A centrist rationale for getting together with China to achieve such U.S. aims is not new. In the Washington Quarterly last year, Evan Feigenbaum, a former deputy assistant secretary of state and now an advisor to Mitt Romney, described the Chinese-led outlines of an evolving new Asia. "The United States and China don't need joint approaches to pursue strategic cooperation, just mutually beneficial ones," Feigenbaum wrote. "And in Central Asia, where Russia has had a near-hammerlock on the region's oil and gas, China's new assertiveness comes primarily at Russia's expense."

The Pentagon itself is not monolithic on the subject. Small, of the German Marshall Fund, suggests that a sizable number of thinkers in the Pentagon favor a more fully engaged Chinese presence in Afghanistan. Indeed, he is among the few I spoke with who think that such geopolitical logic will carry the day in U.S. policy in Central Asia. "I do actually think it's going to be one of the few areas of Chinese foreign policy where what they're doing will be seen in relatively positive terms," he said.

Ultimately, the Chinese themselves, and not just the Afghans, are likely to be restrained. The Chinese will be cautious about overstepping when the United States shifts to a civilian presence in 2014, analysts told me. In addition, CNPC and other Chinese companies have their own, limited appetite for risk and will "be hesitant about being overexposed and overcommitted," Small said. It is only left to a more nimble United States to recognize the opportunity to succeed through Chinese means.

A complete mess..that is what can be termed about the article. The article has been written with the single minded focus of tapping the hydrocarbons in Central Asia and for this aim to succeed put up a lot of confused ideas about Geopolitcs and Resource none of which share a link with each other....

Its pretty simple China have the capacity to control the so called and overglorified unruly Afghans...In this respect comparison with FSu does not stand a chance as China commands the following advantageous factors wrt FSU...

1. Economy which can support protracted conflict.
2. Necessary Demography to fight mainly the Pustuns
3. Access to warm water ports and trade routes.
4. Necessary diplomatic maneouvering capability wrt to the Afghan neighbours.
5. It controls the TSPA.
6. Necessary motivation to shut out both the Russians and the West from the Central Asia.

So in accordance to the above points if the West thinks that they can trap the Chinese in the Hindukush..well nothing much to say.

[shyamd]

Pak nod to Afghan transit

ARCHIS MOHAN
New Delhi, June 25: Pakistan has formally allowed its territory to be used to send Indian food aid to Afghanistan, helping New Delhi replace a back-door channel that involved higher risks and costs.

Wheat will be shipped to Karachi and ferried from there to Kabul by road, as is being done at present under the unofficial arrangement.

But now, the gunny bags used for packing the grain will not have any markings suggesting they originated in India and will only mention “Goods in transit to Afghanistan”.

The move is being seen as a precaution against terror attacks. Islamabad is unsure of the reaction of radical elements to such an arrangement. It has so far resisted attempts by India to conduct trade with Afghanistan via Pakistani territory. Indian goods are now sent to the war-torn nation through Iranian ports and from there on a highway that India’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has constructed.

Sources said Islamabad agreed to grant the transit permission as it involved assistance to a food-starved Afghanistan. The aid is part of the 2.5 lakh metric tonnes India promised in 2009. Nearly one lakh metric tonnes have already been sent over the past year.

India had feared attacks on the consignments as the trucks made their way through Pakistani territory. There were no untoward incidents but the absence of paperwork and the lack of tenders and insurance meant the aid cost both India and Afghanistan much more to transport.

Both New Delhi and Kabul had sought the transit nod from Islamabad, which acceded to the request partly reassured by the incident-free transportation so far.

After the permission came through, the external affairs ministry invited bids earlier this month to have the wheat transported. The tender mentions some precautions, including one about the lack of markings and another that requires only ships with an Afghan flag to carry the wheat from Gujarat’s Kandla to Karachi.

It also lays down that contracted costs can change in the event of “civil unrest, border issues, extreme weather conditions especially rainfall, act of god, terrorist attacks, or any other unforeseen circumstances which is beyond the control of Afghanistan”.

Ministry sources appeared cautious, however, when asked whether the aid transit could be a precursor to trade with Afghanistan via Pakistani territory, a prospect that promises huge saving cost savings.

“This (aid nod) is indicative of some flexibility on Pakistan’s part. Pakistan will benefit in terms of increased revenue if its territory is used as transit route for India-Afghanistan trade,” said a source.

[ramana]

Meanwhile Nightwatch reports:

LINK

Afghanistan: A release from the International Security Assistance Force on 25 June reported an increase in attacks by anti-government forces during April and May. Insurgents launched nearly 3,000 attacks around the country in May, up 21% from May 2011, the International Security Assistance Force said. The coalition statistics -- which count all Taliban direct attacks from rocket fire and suicide bombings to small-arms fire and roadside bombs -- also showed a modest year-on-year rise in insurgent attacks in April, with just under 2,000 violent incidents.

According to a news commentary, this violence reversed 11 consecutive months during which insurgent attacks dropped from the previous year's levels, a metric that coalition commanders have frequently highlighted as evidence that the Taliban had lost the initiative in the war.

Comment: NightWatch continues to check daily summaries of fighting. Since the start of the spring offensive in late March and early April, Taliban and anti-government attacks have been high. However, it has almost become a stretch of the evidence to describe the attacks as countrywide because the overwhelming majority of them are concentrated in the areas of the US surge, the 12 Pashtun provinces of the south and southeast.

Anthony Cordesman described the report as "spin" because it does not take into account Taliban intimidation operations at the local level that do not involved Afghan or Coalition forces and thus do not get entered into official data bases. The government of Afghanistan has no mechanism or channel for village chiefs to make reports and the Taliban intimidation obviously discourages it. But such conditions frequently are the case.

It also is unclear in open source materials how much Afghan National Police reporting funnels into the official Coalition data base.

There are some other shortcomings in the reporting system, but they are far less important than the admission of 100 direct attacks per day on Coalition forces. Those numbers are about one -third the level of the Iraq insurgency at its worst. That was waged by upwards of 100,000 full and part time Iraqi fighters.

An average of one hundred attacks per day in a remote, less developed country that manufactures no implements of war or war fighting supplies, represents a lot of ammunition and supplies from Pakistan, and a vigorous level of activity in Afghanistan after 11 years of operations by both sides.

One commentary attributed the increased violence to a poor poppy harvest, presumably freeing up drug farmers to fight. That linkage is not as clear or direct as reported. Officials also derided the Taliban for their inability to hold ground or attack in battalion strength, claims the Soviets made when they were in Afghanistan.

The Taliban, on the other hand, claimed the increase corresponds to the start of their offensive. Ockham's razor favors the Taliban explanation as does the daily fighting reports from open sources. The Taliban and anti-government fighters are surging.

And TSPA is rising!}

[ShauryaT]

Pakistan’s Impending Defeat in Afghanistan

Irrespective of how the coming security transition in Afghanistan pans out, one country is on a surprising course to a major strategic defeat: Pakistan. Every foreseeable ending to the Afghan war today—continued conflict with the Taliban, restoration of Taliban control in the southern and eastern provinces, or a nationwide civil war—portends nothing but serious perils for Islamabad. But judging from Pakistan’s behavior, it appears as if this fact has eluded the generals in Rawalpindi.

I am not sure if Ashley Tellis has this one right. A stable and prosperous Afghanistan under the guidance of foreign sources cannot be in the PA's interest, as they see them.

[ramana]

All we can do is scenario analysis.
What if Tellis is right?

What does it (defeat in Afghanistan) mean?
- to TSP and its foundational myth?
- Pashtuns
- Afghanistan
- India
- Regional stability

[Roperia]

Presence of Taliban sanctuaries in Afghanistan beyond explanation: Shehrbano Rehman | Tribune

Pot calling the kettle black!

[Prem]

Presence of Taliban sanctuaries in Afghanistan beyond explanation: Shehrbano Rehman | Tribune Poaq calling the kettle black!

Afghans/ Isaaf are showing mirror to the Poaqs and Poaqs find the reflection ugly. The nightmere have just begin. These CBMs= Cross Border Measures Isaaf style wont take long to make Poaq cry Uncle HU or Unkcle U. The night is nigh when Massa send the raiders into Lahori Sanctuary to snatch the fat Mullah Prof.

[shyamd]

x post

Ramana , was just told US will be designating Haqqani as terrorists and pressure is being put on TSP. So it makes sense - this is a US operation to put pressure on Pak. The reason why they didnt designate them as terrorists before was because US wanted to negotiate. Looks like that is now all off the table.

I think this is also because regional situation is changing - hint hint. See the news on J&K too.

[krisna]

Haggling over Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s future matters much more to Pakistan than to the United States. This elemental truth is forgotten in U.S. deliberations about how best to leverage Pakistan to achieve a political settlement in Afghanistan. Pakistani military and intelligence services have demonstrated that they are willing to risk ties with Washington to achieve a friendly government on their western border — a government that most Afghans and Washington would oppose. This is the central roadblock to U.S.-Pakistani relations and to a stable Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s leaders will continue to seek U.S. assistance even as they tirelessly pursue a government in Kabul that, after most U.S. troops withdraw in 2014, will be friendlier to them than to India. If the Pakistanis fail to ensure this negotiated outcome, they will employ allies to upend an Afghan government that they deem unfriendly.

why pakis want a friendly regime in Afghanisthan-- according to crap-on -- ( whitewashes the truth-- see this post by Ramanaji

Pakistani distrust is heightened by events of four decades ago: India severed East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan in their 1971 war. Pakistani leaders will not abide another territorial loss or an extended, foreign-backed insurgency, not when they are feeling so vulnerable. Pakistan has suffered the second-highest number of mass-casualty attacks — behind only Iraq — over the past five years. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services firmly believe that sooner or later, New Delhi will be unable to resist the temptation to dismember their country again. In fact, Pakistan’s dissolution would jeopardize Indian growth and security. And Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities have frozen a territorial status quo, which serves Indian interests. The prospect of a clash would be raised only if spectacular acts of terrorism originate from Pakistan.

What’s more, Musharraf’s promises to the Bush administration were highly qualified, even at the outset. Pakistani military and intelligence services, based in Rawalpindi, provided havens for Afghan Taliban leaders and for proxies operating across the poorly demarcated border. The longer Pakistanis protected those who would presumably serve their interests in a future Afghan government, the more drone strikes Washington authorized on their havens. These strikes will ultimately fail to influence the outcome of an Afghan settlement — but they have already succeeded in making the United States more hated in Pakistan than India.

Pakistan has a poor track record of controlling its proxies in Afghanistan, but its proxies are considered better than the alternatives. Pakistani military and intelligence services are holding a losing hand that they cannot lay down, while Washington’s cards grow weaker with time

uncle experts in the region always look superficially thru' the India-paki prism.
edited the "crap"

[ramana]

He is wrongly named.
Should be crap on!

[svinayak]

Pakistan’s leaders will continue to seek U.S. assistance even as they tirelessly pursue a government in Kabul that, after most U.S. troops withdraw in 2014, will be friendlier to them than to India.

Pakistani leaders will not abide another territorial loss or an extended, foreign-backed insurgency, not when they are feeling so vulnerable.

Pakistan’s military and intelligence services firmly believe that sooner or later, New Delhi will be unable to resist the temptation to dismember their country again.

In fact, Pakistan’s dissolution would jeopardize Indian growth and security.

Lot of assumptions here.
India assumption here is mostly a reading of the US analysts and does not have any realistic facts

[Kanishka]

India set for larger role in postwar Afghanistan

New Delhi --

As the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan prepares for the pullout of combat troops by 2014, India cautiously positioned itself Thursday to expand its role in the country's postwar stabilization by helping direct global business investment there.

Indian officials signaled the move - which came after months of prodding by the United States - by hosting an international conference here to discuss the possibility of investment in Afghanistan's mines, infrastructure and agriculture. The country's mineral and hydrocarbon wealth alone is estimated to be between $1 trillion and $3 trillion.

The conference comes just two weeks after the Taliban issued an unusual statement praising India for resisting the U.S. calls for it to play a larger role in Afghanistan, and New Delhi appeared to use the forum to define a unique niche for itself: By taking a lead in promoting investment in Afghanistan, it acknowledged Washington's vision of achieving long-term stability in the war-torn country. But by restricting itself to the language of commerce, it avoided appearing intrusive - and also nodded to the aversion voiced by Pakistan and the Taliban to the idea of an Indian military presence there.

"We need to offer a narrative of opportunity to counter the anxiety of withdrawal, uncertainty, instability and foreign interference," India's foreign minister, S.M. Krishna, told the representatives of firms from 40 countries who attended the conference. "The military drawdown should not result in a political or security vacuum that will be filled by extremists once again. There should be something productive in its place."

India has committed $2 billion to reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan, including building roads and schools and installing power lines. It also helps train the country's bureaucrats and police. But so far, its decision to steer clear of a military role has earned it goodwill among Afghans, and it appeared to confirm that stance Thursday.

"With today's conference, India is saying it is best at giving nonmilitary assistance and that it will help mobilize other countries and coordinate investment so that Afghanistan does not feel left in the lurch after the troops pull out in 2014," said Lalit Mansingh, a former Indian ambassador to the United States.

Not sure why the Western media links Afghanistan's commercial potential with india's efforts in almost every article on the country.
India's presence in Afghanistan is not for "commercial gains". India's primary goal is to stablize Afghanistan and help the Afghans help themselves. Commercial gain, if any, is a by product. We are not there to loot the Afghans and it is an important message to convey to the Afghan people.

[svinayak]

[
Not sure why the Western media links Afghanistan's commercial potential with india's efforts in almost every article on the country.
India's presence in Afghanistan is not for "commercial gains". India's primary goal is to stablize Afghanistan and help the Afghans help themselves. Commercial gain, if any, is a by product. We are not there to loot the Afghans and it is an important message to convey to the Afghan people.

That kind of narrative creates resentment inside Pakistan and ultimately competition.

They want India to stir the region and create false image of India as a rival. India has to control its image

[Prem]

India Consortium to Submit Bids for Afghanistan Mines .

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 ... lenews_wsj

NEW DELHI -- A consortium of Indian state-owned companies will submit bids for copper and gold mines in Afghanistan by the middle of July, a senior executive at one of the companies said Friday."We need to submit the bids now, otherwise we may just miss the bus," Shakeel Ahmed, chairman and managing director of state-run Hindustan Copper Ltd., told reporters.The consortium was examining four mining sites and will bid for at least two copper mines, he said.
.The consortium also includes Steel Authority of India Ltd., National Aluminum Co. and Mineral Exploration Corp. Mr. Ahmed said the group has short-listed two of three private companies which had shown interest in taking part in the projects.Resource-rich Afghanistan has been scouring the globe for investors to develop its mines in an attempt to lift one of the world's poorest nations out of misery through investment.Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines said companies from the U.S., Canada, U.K., United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Australia had also expressed interest in the projects.As the U.S. prepares to withdraw most of its forces by the end of 2014, Afghanistan is looking for ways to gradually reduce its dependence on foreign assistance.On Thursday, top Afghan and Indian officials and industry leaders sought to woo investors in New Delhi, trying to assuage their concerns over security and political instability in the country.Mr. Ahmed said Friday transport of the mined ore won't be a problem as the Afghan government was constructing rail links from the sites.Analysts say there is more to India's commercial drive in Afghanistan than a desire to seek out economic opportunities.Promoting Indian business in Afghanistan can be seen as part of a softer push to expand its influence in the country, something the U.S. has also encouraged New Delhi to do.India sees this largely as a way of balancing Pakistan's ambitions and the Taliban in Afghanistan. New Delhi's growing involvement in Afghanistan, particularly its training of local troops, has worried Islamabad, which sees Afghanistan as falling within its sphere of influence.

[Kanishka]

NYT OP-Ed: By CHINMAYA R. GHAREKHAN and KARL F. INDERFURTH
An Umbrella for Afghan Stability

As the date for the drawdown of NATO forces from Afghanistan approaches, an atmosphere of optimism is being created, mainly in the Western media, about the prospects of a reasonably successful transition to a stable and eventually prosperous Afghanistan.

Much is being read into the manner in which Afghan national security forces handled simultaneous Taliban attacks on several targets in Kabul in April. But those incidents, no doubt competently dealt with by the Afghan forces, should not lead to any definitive conclusions regarding their capability to face up to the insurgency after 2014.

The security forces should, and probably will, be better equipped and trained by then, but it would be prudent not to be overconfident about their ability.

While the focus is on the preparedness of the security forces, less is being heard about the other, equally important pillar of the transition process: reconciliation. One does not know who, if anyone, is talking to the Taliban.

The so-called office for the Taliban in Doha is not known to be open for business. The assassination of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani has eroded whatever effectiveness the High Peace Council, appointed by President Hamid Karzai to negotiate with the Taliban, had to conduct talks.

The Taliban laid down certain conditions before they would agree to serious talks, one of which was the transfer of five detainees from Guantánamo to Qatar or somewhere close by. The United States has not complied with the demand. The Taliban have also refined their public diplomacy over the years and can be expected to play hard or soft, as required. They have not given up on their ambition to set up an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan.

It is imperative that the two tracks — getting the Afghan national security forces up to speed and political reconciliation — make significant and parallel progress before 2014. Though U.S. forces will remain in significant numbers beyond 2014, they will be there in a training capacity, and it is not clear whether they would intervene to help Afghan forces.

Even if there was good progress on the two tracks by 2014, it should not be assumed that Afghanistan would enjoy stability. Afghanistan’s troubles have been caused largely by external powers meddling in its internal affairs for their own reasons, starting with the Soviet invasion in 1979.

What Afghanistan needs is a compact with its neighbors not to interfere and intervene in one another’s internal affairs. As former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently said, “We have to get the states around Afghanistan, including Iran, as well as Pakistan and India, and in the background, Russia and China, to collaborate in creating an umbrella of stability for Afghanistan because if that doesn’t happen, eventually they’ll be threatened too.”

The “Heart of Asia” conference in Istanbul in November 2011 took a significant step toward this objective, issuing an unambiguous commitment of all the neighboring states not to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

But the “Heart of Asia” ministerial conference held June 14 in Kabul did not reaffirm the non-interference obligation in unambiguous terms. Its statement said only that “Afghanistan commits that it will not allow any threat from its territory to be directed against any other country and expects its neighbors to do the same.”

Afghanistan’s future security requires that a mechanism be put into place to ensure that the signatories to the pledge of non-interference live up to their commitment. One possibility is to set up a United Nations observer group to keep a watch on along the borders and report violations or complaints to the Security Council.

The U.N. secretary general should start to lay the groundwork for this regional security initiative, without banking on successful progress on the other two tracks, strengthening the Afghan national security forces and political reconciliation.

He already has the mandate to do so under the declaration of the Bonn conference of December 2001, and both the Istanbul and Kabul “Heart of Asia” declarations have reaffirmed the central role of the United Nations in support of regional cooperation.

[Kanishka]

India's growing stake in Afghanistan

India is flexing its soft power muscles this week by hosting an international investment conference on Afghanistan, barely a week before another global gathering in Tokyo to pledge aid. The BBC's South Asia correspondent Andrew North examines the deepening ties between India and Afghanistan.

On a recent flight from Kabul to Delhi none of the Afghan passengers were surprised when take-off was delayed.

Business class was still empty. Some VIPs must be running late, they concluded.

They were right, except the late arrivals turned out to be very important policemen - among them a colonel - severely injured in another insurgent assault on Kabul.

It is quicker to fly to next-door Pakistan. But when officials like this need help, Afghanistan would rather trust its old friend India to look after them.
Battle for influence
Encouraged by the US and its Nato allies as they prepare to retreat in 2014, India and Afghanistan are deepening their ties, to the frustration of their neighbour sandwiched in-between.

SM Krishna Indian foreign minister:
“ We need to offer a narrative of opportunity to counter the anxiety of withdrawal, uncertainty, instability and foreign interference”

The two states signed a strategic partnership last year, which among other things promises more Indian help in building up Afghan security forces.

More than 100 Afghan officers are already attending Indian military colleges, with the number set to rise.

In effect, the next round of the age-old battle for influence in Afghanistan has begun.

India is watching closely the actions there of its huge northern rival China, which has secured rights to vast copper deposits.

The Indian government is keen to emphasise the soft power side of its strategy, such as Thursday's gathering at a plush Delhi hotel aimed at attracting more foreign investment into Afghanistan.

"Let the grey suits of businessmen take the place of the olive green fatigues of soldiers and generals in Afghanistan," Indian Foreign Minister SM Krishna told a conference hall filled with would-be investors.

In financial terms, India is already one of the biggest players in Afghanistan.

It has pledged or spent some $2bn (£1.3bn) worth of aid over the last decade to build roads, power stations and even the Afghan parliament.
'New silk road':

India has been rewarded with rights to mine Afghanistan prime iron ore reserves.

It is state companies who are leading the way so far though.

Private investors at the conference seemed to be doing more window-shopping rather than being ready to invest - with many nervous about events after the Nato pull-out.

But for Indian companies there is an open door, from the Afghan street to the presidential palace.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai did his university studies in India and speaks Hindi.

Walk through central Kabul and you soon lose count of the number of places selling Indian music and movies.

While you never hear a good word about Pakistan, you rarely hear a bad one about India.

Afghan officials at the Delhi meeting were talking of a "new silk road" between the two countries, even though Commerce Minister Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi admits Afghanistan is still "one of the riskiest places in the world to do business".

But go to a private Delhi hospital and you see a new kind of silk road already emerging, with a boom in Afghan medical tourism.

It is not just security personnel coming for specialist care, but thousands of other Afghans for routine operations.

Some hospitals now have separate reception desks with staff speaking the two main Afghan languages to handle the numbers.

As most Afghan patients pay with wads of crisp dollars, the hospitals want them to keep coming.

Locals in Delhi's Lajpat Nagar district, where many Afghan medical tourists stay, joke it should be renamed "Little Kabul".

The connections between the two nations are set to get physical, if a recently signed deal to pipe gas 1,700km (1,056 miles) from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan and Pakistan to India goes ahead.

India's state gas company is one of the leaders of a consortium trying to persuade global investors to stump up $7.6bn (£5bn) for the so-called TAPI pipeline later this year.
It is a rebirth for an old idea which US companies tried to get the Taliban to sign up to before 9/11 - and with the route by-passing Iran, the Americans are encouraging it again.

With the obvious security challenge of trying to lay and protect a pipeline not just across Afghanistan - but also the troubled Pakistani province of Balochistan - the project has been derided by some in India as, well, a pipe dream which leaves Delhi beholden to its old enemy Pakistan.

There are fears it will only increase the risks India faces in Afghanistan.

It has already lost diplomats in bomb attacks on its in Kabul embassy - attacks India says were carried out by Pakistani-backed groups.

Getting in deeper only inflames India-Pakistan tensions, some argue.

Why does not India just get out and leave "Af to Pak" asked a column by Shekhar Gupta, the influential editor of the Indian Express.

Foreign ministry spokesman Syed Akrabuddin says India's presence is about its own strategic self-interest.

"Afghanistan is in our neighbourhood and there is a history of Afghan soil being used for terror attacks on India. We can't have that again," he said.

The truth is that few Indians pay much attention to their government's policy in Afghanistan.

If they consider the country at all, they think of it as a place of suicide attacks.

But there is a kinder image too, from the Kabuliwalla story taught in many Indian schools - about a poor Afghan who comes to Calcutta to work to pay off his debts and befriends a young girl.

The many Afghans coming to India for medical treatment or business are showing another side to their country too, one Indians realise they can benefit from.

Delhi's "Little Kabul" looks set to keep growing.

[Prem]

Afghanistan aims to restore its cultural heritage
http://dawn.com/2012/06/28/afghanistan- ... -heritage/

The assertion of cultural sovereignty is part of an effort to unite Afghanistan and prove it can stand on its own after most foreign troops leave at the end of 2014.The government says it wants an end to “foreign interference”, usually a reference to Pakistan, but also Iran with which it is locked in a fierce debate over ownership of some of the greatest poets and philosophers in the region.Poetry is big in Afghanistan, from the time of the kings of the 10th century to the present day, permeating every level of society from children in school to warlords and even the austere Taliban who study long works of classical Persian poetry as part of their education in religious schools.It’s the thread that runs between Afghanistan’s often warring ethnic groups whether Tajik, Hazara, Pashtun, Uzbek, Turkmen, Nuristani, Baluch, or any of the many other sub-groups and clans.But along with the death and destruction of the past three decades, Afghans say they also lost a chunk of their rich cultural heritage with Iran, Pakistan and even Turkey claiming parts of it.Many, like Khalili, left the country to escape the wars and died in faraway lands which slowly began to claim them as their own, Afghanistan says.Now it aims to get its heritage back.“Iran wants to show the world it had a glorious past. This has been going on for years, they have been claiming many of our literary figures as their own. We cannot remain silent,” said Jalal Noorani, an adviser at the Information and Culture Ministry.Debate has long raged over Rumi, arguably the greatest Persian poet, but now as Afghanistan begins to stand on its feet, the claims and counter-claims have intensified not only over him but also others.Rumi, known as Mawlana Jalal-ud-Din Balkhi in Afghanistan and Mevlevi in Iran, was born in the 13th century in Balkh which was at the time an eastern part of the Persian empire of Khorasan but is now a province in northern Afghanistan.Still, this new burst of cultural revivalism in Afghanistan can help bridge the distance between the Tajiks and the Hazaras, and to a certain extent the Pashtuns, he said.“A supra-ethnic Afghan identity needs non-violent icons.”

[Prem]

http://dawn.com/2012/07/01/rare-meeting ... t-taliban/

Rare meeting between Afghan government, Taliban

ISLAMABAD: A Taliban emissary sat face-to-face this week with a senior Afghan government official responsible for peace talks in a rare high-level gathering between the bitter adversaries, an official said Saturday. he encounter at a peace and reconciliation conference in Kyoto, Japan, was a rare a positive sign in faltering attempts to find a peaceful end to the protracted conflict in Afghanistan.It also provided an unusual opportunity for Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government to sit down with its enemies, the Taliban and the Hezb-e-Islami insurgent group.Siddiq Mansour Ansari, a peace activist who was invited to attend the meeting this week at Kyoto’s Doshisha University, said it was the third peace and reconciliation conference organized by the school but the first time the Taliban had sent an emissary.The Taliban’s former planning minister, Qari Din Mohammed Hanif, took part in the conference “to explain the policies of the Islamic Emirate,” Taliban spokesman Zabilullah Mujahed told The Associated Press by telephone.Taliban officials rarely travel abroad for public meetings, and Mujahed didn’t say how Hanif, an ethnic Tajik from Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan province, made the trip to Japan.Although a senior member of the Taliban and a member of the movement’s political committee, Hanif is not on any wanted list.The Afghan government was represented by Mohammed Masoon Stanikzai, a senior member of the government’s High Peace Council, which is responsible for talks with the insurgency

[Johann]

Pakistan’s Impending Defeat in Afghanistan

Irrespective of how the coming security transition in Afghanistan pans out, one country is on a surprising course to a major strategic defeat: Pakistan. Every foreseeable ending to the Afghan war today—continued conflict with the Taliban, restoration of Taliban control in the southern and eastern provinces, or a nationwide civil war—portends nothing but serious perils for Islamabad. But judging from Pakistan’s behavior, it appears as if this fact has eluded the generals in Rawalpindi.

I am not sure if Ashley Tellis has this one right. A stable and prosperous Afghanistan under the guidance of foreign sources cannot be in the PA's interest, as they see them.

Tellis is trying to persuade the Pakistani strategic establishment that they're as usual being tactically brilliant with their Afghan policies, and encouraging them to factor in the cost of blowback from too much 'success'. Although he has an important point I doubt they'll listen. Playing the spoiler in Afghanistan is just too easy for them. As for blowback the Pakistani establishment has gotten used to the new post 9/11 normal of war inside FATA and they accept it as the cost of doing business until the Americans go away.

Which is why the only American message likely to work is one that helps the Paks understand just how wrong their assumptions about 2014 are. "Guess what? The strikes are still coming, and will keep coming for as long as you shelter groups closely allied with Al Qaeda. Even if you ever develop the stones to try and shoot a Reaper, (a) your radars will stop working, and (b) if needed they'll start coming straight down from out of the blackness of space itself instead of from east or north". Its not enough for these messages to reach those with stars on their khaki shoulders.

[Johann]

Not sure why the Western media links Afghanistan's commercial potential with india's efforts in almost every article on the country.
India's presence in Afghanistan is not for "commercial gains". India's primary goal is to stablize Afghanistan and help the Afghans help themselves. Commercial gain, if any, is a by product. We are not there to loot the Afghans and it is an important message to convey to the Afghan people.

Kanishka,

Given the state Afghanistan is in, investment is not seen as an inherently exploitative thing if the foreign firm has local Afghan partners, invests in local communities, infrastructure, pays decent royalties, etc.

Its well known by Afghans that Indian firms are bidding for mining contracts, and that the private players in particular need to turn a profit.

Its also understood that the GoI doesnt want to see Afghanistan dominated by Chinese commercial influence.

In any case the logistical and security costs and complexities of all of these kinds of projects are simply enormous. There are so many different players and factions all of whom are willing to play spoiler unless their demands are satisfied.

The Chinese are discovering that Afghanistan is not Africa, or even Pakistan. Its it own special nightmare, and Pakistan has a lot to do with that. The day might come when Chinese regional commercial interests grow to the size that they are forced to confront Pakistan's security policies in Afghanistan.

[shyamd]

Yawn reports that afghan foreign ministry says that if pak doesn't stop attacking Afghanistan, Afghanistan will take the case to the UNSC

[ShauryaT]

Stabilising Afghanistan: Role of Key Regional Players

With some effort, New Delhi could be persuaded to deploy up to one division (15,000 troops) to join a UN peacekeeping force provided Pakistan’s sensibilities about Indian military presence in Afghanistan can be taken care of.

[Roperia]

Afghanistan, Pakistan clash over border violence

PESHAWAR, Pakistan — Pakistani officials accused up to 60 Afghan soldiers on Monday of crossing into Pakistani territory and sparking clashes that killed two tribesman.

...

Both countries blame each other for harbouring Taliban fighters active on both sides of their 2,400 kilometre (1,500 mile) border, fanning distrust between Kabul and Islamabad, and complicating a peace process in Afghanistan.

Kabul threatened to report Islamabad to the UN Security Council over what it alleges is the shelling of villages, while Islamabad said it would protest formally to Kabul against the latest incursion.

"If our bilateral discussions regarding this issue brings no result, we will refer this issue to the United Nations Security Council," Afghan foreign ministry spokesman Faramarz Tamana told AFP.

In Pakistan's semi-autonomous tribal belt, security officials said two tribesmen were killed in Upper Kurram district in clashes with 60 Afghan army soldiers.
Another tribesman was also wounded "after they traded fire with Afghan army soldiers on seeing them inside Pakistani territory," a senior official told AFP on condition of anonymity.

The clashes lasted for more than 90 minutes after which security forces were sent to the area on the Afghan border, he said.
Local residents said the Afghans were pursuing attackers fleeing Shehar-e-Nau village in Paktia province. Afghan defence officials denied the alleged incursion.

"We are not aware of such an operation by ANA (Afghan National Army) in that area," Daulat Wazir spokesman for the Ministry of Defence said.
Colonel Ahmad Jan, spokesman for army corps 203 in southeastern Afghanistan said: "It is not true, our forces have not entered Pakistan. We have not had any operations near the border recently."

A spokesman for Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security intelligence agency said cross-border fire had killed four people, including a woman and a child, and wounded six others, in the last week.

Afghans and Americans blame Pakistan for not doing more to eliminate havens on its soil, which are used as launch pads for attacks across the border.
Last month, the US commander of NATO in Afghanistan blamed the Pakistan-based Haqqani network for a siege on a lakeside hotel in Kabul that killed 18 people.

US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta also warned last month that Washington was running out of patience with Pakistan over militant havens.
But in Pakistan, border attacks have raised fresh concerns that Pakistani Taliban, who fled a 2009 army offensive, have regrouped and again pose a threat.
Officials said dozens of militants based in Afghanistan on Sunday attacked a checkpost in Upper Dir, a district in the government-controlled part of Pakistan, for the second time in eight days.

They said six militants were killed after crossing into Sabir Killey village in the Soni Darr area of Upper Dir. One official told AFP the "firefight continued late into the night".

Another official said there were reports "hundreds of militants" were gathering in Afghanistan's eastern province of Kunar.

"Authorities have alerted local lashkars (tribal militia) amid fears of a bigger clash," he told AFP on condition of anonymity.

Intelligence officials say the attackers are loyalists of Pakistani cleric Maulana Fazlullah, who fled into Afghanistan when the army recaptured the Swat valley after a two-year Taliban insurgency ended in 2009.

Swat neighbours Upper Dir, which is a key transit route between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

...

The Taliban released a video showing severed heads of 17 Pakistani soldiers who they said were killed in a similar cross-border attack on a check post in Soni Darr on June 24.

...

Islamabad lodged a strong protest with Kabul over the June 24 attack.

[ShauryaT]

One thing to watch for is a deal between PA and Karzai and his Durrani Pashtun base, just to keep India out of the picture. This scenario is possible, under US auspices and the US maybe using the India card to make PA act against Haqani's and Afghan Taleban. Provides PA with a friendly Afghan government as PA will be driven by keeping India out of the picture - at any cost. Thoughts?

[ramana]

Karzai and his Durrani base won't make such a deal for the TSP and its Ghilzais will double cross them.
As long as there are Ghilzais in K-P which is forever the TSP has to support the Ghilzais lest they want to erase the Durand Line.

The Taliban movement was also a way to employ the radicalized Ghilzais in Afghanistan instead of in NWFP.

But since then the D-G divide is not so rigid.

[abhishek_sharma]

After America: Will civil war hit Afghanistan when the U.S. leaves?

[ShauryaT]

Karzai and his Durrani base won't make such a deal for the TSP and its Ghilzais will double cross them.
As long as there are Ghilzais in K-P which is forever the TSP has to support the Ghilzais lest they want to erase the Durand Line.

The Taliban movement was also a way to employ the radicalized Ghilzais in Afghanistan instead of in NWFP.

But since then the D-G divide is not so rigid.

Factor in the fact that the Afghan Taleban are themselves not that homogeneous and can be split. As you say, the D-G divide is not so rigid. Means a conciliation between parts of Taleban, Karzai's Kandahar base, the PA - under US pressure is possible. There are parts of Taleban, who do not want to fight the US, if they move out of the region.

It will be hard for me to believe, that the PA will not sell their mother's soul to keep India out of Afghanistan - at this point. While India OTOH should do everything possible to get into Afghanistan - at this point. It will be interesting to watch, how the US, PA, Afghanistan move forward.

[ramana]

To puts things in prespective, TSP has always sold its soul to the highest bidder or one who can help it damage India, for it doesn't have one.


India is like water. TSP or WKK/DIE or US cant keep India away from Afghanistan at this juncture.

If you look back over the millenia Afghanistan are what ever its name looks towards India fior sustenance. It was only during the early Ghazni period that it looked westwards under the gaze of Islam. The Afghans are looking Eastward at a consolidated India unlike the fragmented India of the early Islami centuries.

In simple terms the force of history is with India this time.

[Johann]

One thing to watch for is a deal between PA and Karzai and his Durrani Pashtun base, just to keep India out of the picture. This scenario is possible, under US auspices and the US maybe using the India card to make PA act against Haqani's and Afghan Taleban. Provides PA with a friendly Afghan government as PA will be driven by keeping India out of the picture - at any cost. Thoughts?

Karzai and the PA can strike temporary deals but they will never trust each other, ever. There's simply no ideological or experiential bond between them, and Karzai is not willing to embrace a position of dependence on Pakistan.

The PA was ultimately responsible for the death of Abdul Haq, Karzai's brother. On the other hand the PA knows that Karzai is an Afghan nationalist in whose embassies the back rooms often contain maps showing the NWFP and Baluchistan as part of Afghanistan.

[paramu]

The PA was ultimately responsible for the death of Abdul Haq, Karzai's brother. On the other hand the PA knows that Karzai is an Afghan nationalist in whose embassies the back rooms often contain maps showing the NWFP and Baluchistan as part of Afghanistan.

Can we see these maps. Is it also in digital format

[ramana]

X-posting....

NightWatch For the night of 3 July 2012

Some more steps in the US-Pa'i square dance (AKA US-Pa'i GUBO) in which TSPA is the caller...

Pakistan-US: Pakistan agreed to reopen its roads to NATO supply convoys in return for a statement of condolences by the US. What Secretary of State Clinton said to Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar is repeated verbatim below, as reported in Pakistan's Daily Times on 4 July.


"Foreign Minister Khar and I acknowledged the mistakes that resulted in the loss of Pakistani military lives….We are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military. We are committed to working closely with Pakistan and Afghanistan to prevent this from ever happening again."


Khar told Clinton the land routes were reopening, and that "Pakistan will continue not to charge any transit fee in the larger interest of peace and security in Afghanistan and the region," Clinton said.


The Pakistani Taliban announced that they will target NATO convoys. Pakistani trucking firms demanded improved security.


Comment: A statement of condolences, regret or sorrow over losses that does not include an admission of culpability is not an apology. Both top diplomats admitted mistakes were made, but neither admitted culpability. There is no apology and that means Pakistan blinked, sort of.


US officials and generals have expressed regret repeatedly over Pakistan's loss of soldiers' lives during the friendly fire incident last November. Money and politics have worked in favor of a breakthrough on this issue. The Pakistan Army apparently needs the $1.1 billion that the US has now promised to release as its part of the bargain. This is not new money for the US, but what had been budgeted already.


Pakistani politics facilitated compromise because the new prime minister, Raja Pervez Ashraf, is not associated with the previous tough policy position adopted by former Prime Minister Gilani. Ashraf acted immediately to reopen the supply routes, bypassing the National Assembly, which Gilani was unable to do because of the intensity of public sentiment right after the incident.


Sub-continent politics also favored a breakthrough. The action of Pakistani officials, observing the US arrangements to withdraw forces and equipment through central Asia and Russia, indicate they realized, a bit belatedly, that the US was freezing Pakistan out of the Afghanistan end game and empowering India, Russia and Central Asian states, all allies of the northern, non-Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan.


Today's agreement reinstates Pakistan as a consequential actor in the end game. At home and to the Islamic world, Pakistan is now a facilitator of the withdrawal of non-Muslim/NATO forces from a Muslim land and region that Pakistan treats as a part of its sphere of influence - the Pashtun southern provinces of Afghanistan.


It also offsets any increase in Indian influence in Afghanistan. US Defense Secretary Panetta's statement about encouraging a larger Indian role in Afghanistan might have been the pivotal event that spurred the Pakistanis to make a change in policy.


Pakistani concessions and benefits IOW, Pa'istani GUBO

The Pakistan Army and the new Prime Minister made concessions so as to get the money and restore Pakistani influence. They now have found satisfactory language that the National Assembly and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani had rejected earlier. They dropped the demand that US/NATO drone attacks cease. They also dropped the transit surcharges for NATO supply trucks. Nevertheless, they now are in a position to influence and even control the US and NATO withdrawal through Karachi. Pakistanis and Pakistani trucking firms now will enjoy the spill over benefits of an army in withdrawal, instead of the central Asians.


US concessions and benefits IOW, US GUBO

The United States now will release the $1.1 billion to Pakistan's armed forces. The money, from a US 'coalition support fund' designed to reimburse Pakistan for the cost of counter-insurgency operations, had been withheld due to tensions between the two countries over the closure of the supply routes. The US taxpayers will benefit from enormous savings because of the cost differential between the northern and southern logistics routes.


Finally, the US reduces its dependency on Russian good will and cooperation for the use of Russian railroads in withdrawing US forces.


A Pakistani commentary

Hasan Askari, a prominent and astute Pakistani analyst, provided context to the agreement, in an interview on 3 July before US and Pakistani officials announced the agreement.


In response to a question, Askari said, "You see, the "signals" now are that the routes will be reopened as the dialogue between Pakistan and the United States was on what should be the "text" of the apology, what would be the acceptable manner, and what would be the condition for movement of supplies…."


"And even otherwise it would be better for Pakistan that if it has to play any role in Afghanistan and has to 'neutralize' the role of India GUBO otherwise big bad India will screw you because , then it will have to work jointly with the international community. Pakistan's interest will be in jeopardy if it remains isolated."


"Look, whatever decision is made, it will be made with the consent of the military because the 'high security matters' or 'high foreign policy matters' of Pakistan are not settled unless the military is involved in it. Therefore if a decision is made that means that the military agrees on it. The civilian government cannot step forward without the consent of the military. The civilian government is facing the pressure of the Supreme Court on one hand and on the other it is facing the pressure of the Opposition and on top of that it cannot stand further pressure from the military."

Comment: The Pakistan Army's pride was the stumbling block because the incident showed that it was and remains unable to defend Pakistan's western frontier. The Army drove this change in policy. The civilian government did as it was instructed.


The Army is wielding power through the civilian government on national security policy. The agreement to reopen the supply routes appears to indicate that the elected civilian government has become the figurehead for the Army again on national security issues, after a five year hiatus.

IOW, The TSPA executed a soft coup again with US help...

[svinayak]

The Army is wielding power through the civilian government on national security policy. The agreement to reopen the supply routes appears to indicate that the elected civilian government has become the figurehead for the Army again on national security issues, after a five year hiatus.


IOW, The TSPA executed a soft coup again with US help...

The Taliban group was the hindrance and stopped all compromise in the army, govt and Parliament.

US with its connection replaced the PM.
The Army took control of the decision making bypassing the parliament.