Bharat Rakshak

On September 9, geopolitics unexpectedly hit the news headlines when Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov made an important statement about the ongoing talks between Moscow and Islamabad on the delivery of Russian multirole Mi-35M attack helicopters and the latest Su-35 fighter jets. Ryabkov said Pakistan is Russia's “closest partner” and the ties between the two countries are evolving beyond the military sphere to include other sectors such as energy. At the same time, he also suggested that this will not have a negative impact on relations between Moscow and New Delhi.

Coming from a top Russian official, these statements cannot be considered as a mere kite flying stunt by the Russian media. Such a tectonic strategic shift may not have come as a pleasant news to Indian ears, but before we react to this startling change in the Russian position, it is important to first understand the deeper and nuanced aspects of Russia’s motives.

Interestingly, within days of Ryabkov’s statement, a prominent Russian political analyst Andrew Korybko provocatively detailed why Pakistan is gaining pivotal importance in the Russian geo-strategic calculus. The article, titled “Pakistan is the “Zipper” of Pan-Eurasian Integration”, appeared on 15 September on the website of the Russian government funded think-tank – Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS) established by the President of the Russian Federation. The RISS puts up policy papers to the President’s office, the Federation Council, the State Duma and the Security Council as well as to Government offices, ministries and departments. (The RISS has closely interacted with IDSA in the past and the two institutions have signed a MoU for joint research. However, the Russian think-tank has not shown much interest for cooperation with IDSA in the past few years).

As a keen watcher of Eurasian affairs, I thought it is important to share the significant points articulated by Andrew Korybko in his rather astounding article so that the Indian strategic community can understand the new thinking among informed Russian circles.

In Part I of his article, Korybko deals with the ‘zipper’ concept of how Pakistan can draw together four of Eurasia’s most prominent economic entities, and examines the key imperatives for Russia to build a strong Strategic Partnership with Pakistan. In Part II, he does crystal gazing on the most probable ways in which the US can attempt to offset everything or derail Pakistan’s future destiny of joining the Eurasian integration process.

Korbyko’s article begins by saying that contrary to popular myth about Pakistan as a “backward land of terrorism and poverty” that carries little actual weight, the West purposefully neglects the country’s rising geopolitical importance in Eurasia and its potential to connect the massive economies of the Eurasian Union, Iran, SAARC, and China to create an integrated pan-Eurasian economic zone.

The article then elaborates why Russia recognises Pakistan’s prime geopolitical potential and how it is manoeuvring to speed up the development of full-spectrum relations with this “South Asian gatekeeper.” It says that Russia’s overarching goal is to provide a “non-provocative balancing component to bolster Pakistan’s regional political position and assist with its peaceful integration into the multi-polar Eurasian framework being constructed by the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership.”

Interestingly, it draws attention to China’s grand vision of building a trans-Pakistani trade corridor under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which could be a catalyst for connecting the four economic blocs together. This includes linking of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with SAARC intersecting at the Xinjiang-Pakistan junction to be developed under the CPEC.

From the Russian perspective, the article suggests, the CPEC not only represents a “geopolitical pivot for China, but also a geo-economic one”, for “it’ll position the country within easy access to the Mideast oil fields”. This is the only way China will be able to quell the “externally orchestrated destabilization that it’s lately found itself experiencing in Xinjiang.”

It stresses the importance of the Iran-Pakistan-China pipeline project (a part of the CPEC) becoming a reality and suggests that “should Xinjiang succeed in becoming a significant Eurasian trading hub in connecting China, Eurasian Union, SAARC, and Iran, then it would catapult in geo-economic significance to become an ultra-strategic Heartland region.”

On the prospect of India joining the Eurasian system, Korbyko’s article says that the touchy issue of India’s claim over “Pakistan-administered Kashmir” could come in the way. However, “if Indian companies employ this route, the economic allure might be too tempting to resist.” Further, if Indo-Pak differences could be relaxed (perhaps within the SCO framework), then “the organization would finally be able to cash in on its economic capability and fully integrate with itself and the rest of Eurasia.”

Importantly, the article discloses how Russia’s strategic ties with Pakistan are moving towards very “exciting future possibilities” despite Russia being “India’s closest friend”. It notes that the emerging trend might appear somewhat “perplexing” but it isn’t all that “unexpected.” Because, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent emergence of South Asian “nuclear bipolarity” have reduced the intensity of Indo-Russian strategic ties as well as America’s dealings with Pakistan. These shifts in focus (India’s westward and Pakistan’s eastward) do not, however, suggest that either India or Pakistan has completely deserted its erstwhile partner; only that they are seeking adjustments to protect their national interest in the changed context. But at the same time, these shifts in focus have not yet altered the Indo-Pak standoff. In this context, the article notes, both India and Pakistan seem to be willing to give multilateralism under Eurasia a chance, as evident from their entry into the SCO.

More interestingly, the author points to the Kremlin’s calculation of its ability to intermediate between Beijing and New Delhi in the event of a major India-China crisis. But he also says that Russia does not enjoy the same leverage to do so in an India-Pakistan conflict situation. As a result, in the latter situation, Moscow would prefer to “push the US into the mix – giving it plenty of opportunity to divide and conquer according to the present geopolitical circumstances.” Korybko then goes to point out that “if Russia were to compensate for its diplomatic ‘blind spot’ with Pakistan and reinvigorate the bilateral relationship with Islamabad, then it could mirror the role that it plays between India and China in also helping to balance the tension between India and Pakistan.” This strategy, the article argues, would eventually “push the US out of the playing field, though India will still retain its current level of ties with the US but not for the purpose counterbalancing Pakistan.” It suggests that both India and Pakistan would then rather rely on their same “trusted partner Russia”, which for its part will be able to mediate between the two (like it does with India and China).

The article admits to the trust deficit between India and Pakistan as the weakest link in the ‘zipper’ vision, though the vision could still succeed without the SAARC component because the “EEU would gain by India’s physical incorporation into the unified Eurasian infrastructural framework.” Korybko also points to Russian diplomatic and strategic competence being capable of minimizing Indo-Pak discord and exploring the economic benefit of their peaceful collaboration.

The Russian analyst then explains how Russia made the first strategic move in this regard in June 2014 by offering to sell attack helicopters to Pakistan for the latter’s drug-combating efforts. Though the “paradigm shift” was attributed by many to Russia’s concerns over post-2014 NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, the main idea was to initiate the process of depolarisation in India-Pakistan tensions and to make the multi-polar concept more cohesive as a result. The article says that Russia’s next move would be to help Pakistan with technical expertise for building a portion of the Iran-Pakistan-China gas pipeline in the near future.

According to the write up, Pakistan’s own excitement has increased after sensing the enormous economic opportunities that will unfold after CPEC completion. Pakistanis could see the “writing on the wall” and even contemplate sealing a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Union. This signifies how seriously Russia takes its evolving partnership with Pakistan. The article underlines how the relationship is also gaining a soft power touch, with both sides preparing for their first-ever cultural exchange year. In a symbolic significance of what is likely to come, the article says that “Pakistan’s national military band performed at the Moscow International Music Festival.”

The article notes that “there should thus be no doubt at this point about the commitment of both sides for deepening the relationship as the ongoing interactions between the two are beyond passing convergence of business interests.” It further says that “Both sides understand the larger significance of what they’re doing”, which is to work for the “shared vision of an integrated and multi-polar Eurasia.”

However, on the down side and for the Eurasian enterprise to succeed, the author anticipates that CPEC and the ‘zipper’ plan could face a major blow either due to instability within Pakistan or India’s possible refusal to participate in it.

Interestingly, the article notes that any possibility of all-round Russia-Pakistan engagement could speed up Indo-US proximity which, in turn, will lead to provocation by the “US and its information proxies”. Things could also be exacerbated by an exaggerated “Indian threat assessment of Russia’s activities.” Any Indian paranoia over Russia’s ‘sliding away’ to join the China-Pakistan ‘axis’ would consequently negate the main reasons behind the Russian-Pakistan strategic partnership, which is to “place Moscow in a position to intermediate between New Delhi and Islamabad and keep regional relations stable enough so as to jump start the envisioned multilateral economic partnership.” {I am not sure if the Russians are bringing in here a convoluted argument to justify their 'sliding away' from India to join China-Pakistan axis (their own words) in order to push their own agenda (of which we may not be very clear now) or they are making a serious error of judgement by aligning with the Pakistanis. In either case, they must go through the US-Pakistan history. The US supplied arms, trained the Pakistani military and supported that state in order to expect cooperation from them in its anti-Communism plank. Pakistan did nothing of that sort. In fact, it ended up being on the sides of both the Chinese and the Americans at the same time. Pakistan's calculus in its relationship with the US was to use it against India and India alone. With China, this policy of India-paranoia did not lead to any issues because China considers India as an enemy too. The Russian situation is not like that}

The author, however, argues that Russia’s Pakistan gambit might fail most likely because of the United States playing dirty. In such a scenario, Russia would be worse off and risk losing a major strategic partner in India. Pakistan, on the other hand, will “never see its relation with Russia as equal level to one it has with China.”

The article cautions that Russia needs to proceed delicately taking into consideration how the Indian establishment views Russia’s evolving ties with Pakistan. It does not discount the ability of the US to split Russia and India through Pakistan, like it did with Russia and the European Union through Ukraine (although for different reasons).

The author fears the possibility of the US creating a rift through “information warfare” especially when Indo-US defence ties are deepening. He notes that this could have in a way “possibly played a part in influencing Moscow’s decision to resume arms exports to Pakistan.” The article draws attention to the saliency of “underreported military development” that makes the US more integral to India’s national security, and this it says coincides with New Delhi’s strategic overlap with the US in containing China. “The longer this progresses, the further the US will embed itself into India’s deep state apparatus {It may be true but the Soviet Union did or attempted to do the same during the 70s, 80s & 90s. It is something India will always have to be wary of whether it is the US or USSR, now Russia.} , with all of the unfortunate foreign policy consequences for the multi-polar world” the article notes.

The writer then dwells on the personal rapport shared between Modi and Obama and other aspects of the Indo-US friendship which, he thinks, could be an “exaggerated charade for political purposes, there’s nothing tangible to indicate that this is the case” and by itself doesn’t pose any worries for Russia.” But what really worries Russia is the possibility of Obama leveraging his friendship with Modi to “enact certain policy shifts”, such as “his encouragement to India’s Act East policy for unstated reason that can aggravate relations with China.” According to Korybko, Russian interests would be most endangered by the “US winning over India into viewing the Russian-Pakistan strategic partnership as a threat” and suggests that Putin should “continually reinforce his relationship with Modi so that the latter is insusceptible to being tricked by Obama into doubting the Russian President’s intentions.”(It is pertinent to note here that in his congratulatory message to Prime Minister Modi on his 65th birthday, issued by the Kremlin on September 17, President Putin praised how the Prime Minister rightly enjoys high international authority both in his homeland and abroad as a proficient politician and statesman. The message says “we highly appreciate your efforts to strengthen the special and privileged strategic partnership between our countries, develop Russian-Indian interaction in solving topical issues of the regional and global agenda.”)

Further, the article points to the likelihood of American involvement in creating instability in Baluchistan. Baluch separatism driven by American interests is not just for destabilising Gwadar (the source of CPEC) or for the political fragmentation of Pakistan but to create a new geopolitical space to be carved out of the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan as well. Such a Baluch proxy, it says, could provide the US with a greater degree of influence over both Iran and India in controlling trans-regional transport connectivity. Of course, the author cites the Pentagon’s foremost author Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters’ infamous map Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look, which specifically earmarks a “Free Baluchistan” carved out of Iranian and Pakistani territory.

Korybko then moves beyond the Baluch separatist scenario to highlight the presence of militant Islamic radicalism in FATA – the most important destabilising factor in Pakistan. To add to that he draws attention to the rise of ISIL and its “expansive neo-Caliphate ideology” in Afghanistan’s three provinces of Farah (west), Helmand (south), and Nangarhar (east). The ISIL, he says, could use Nangarhar province as a staging ground for pushing deeper into Pakistan by eliminating the Durand Line and “annex” the ‘state of Hind’ (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar). Further, Korybko also says that if more “Taliban fighters defect to the up-and-coming group” a scenario of a birth of a “transnational ‘mini-Caliphate’ between Nangarhar and parts of FATA would evoke the shades of ISIL’s prior successes along the Syrian-Iraqi border.” Not just that, the article vividly points to how ISIL is also moving in the northern direction, citing the defection in May of Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov, the head of Tajikistan’s Internal Special Forces, to ISIL. It hints at the possibility of ISIL gaining invaluable intelligence and employing Khalimov’s knowledge in infiltrating into the most ‘ideal’ location in Gorno-Badakhstan region. If this occurs concurrently, the article suggests, the “US then would be keen, among other things, to take revenge for Kyrgyzstan denouncing its cooperation agreement with the US.” Therefore, the article does not rule out the possibility of a quadrilateral South-Central Asian Caliphate emerging in “heavily fortified Pamir and Hindu Kush mountain ranges, with Pakistan being the southern peg of this vile construction.”

The article paints another disruptive scenario of how the US could derail Pakistan’s geo-economic destiny by engineering a possible “Colour Revolution against Prime Minister Sharif or any of his successors”, although it also says that the violent protests last year did not pan out as a doom and gloom scenario for Pakistan. Korybko does not foretell the exact contours of the follow-up disruptive attempt, but says that with the “improved political technology available” it might likely embrace “anti-corruption” slogans led by an amorphous and superficially apolitical “civil society” in Pakistan. Such a structural innovation, the article suggests, would “allow the coup’s leaders to readjust their social infrastructure (leadership, members, slogans, etc.) on the fly a lot more efficiently than if they followed the comparatively rigid practices of their predecessors in organizing the event around clearly defined political parties led by a few well-known (and easily compromised) individuals.”

This scenario to be deployed in Pakistan would be “Colour Revolution 1.5”. The article notes that this will be halfway between the comparatively ‘docile’ 2003 Colour Revolution 1.0 in Georgia and the “out-of-control Hybrid War mayhem of Colour Revolution 2.0 in EuroMaidan.” Colour Revolution 1.5 in Pakistan could go either way, “towards 1.0 if it sputters out like in Armenia or towards 2.0 if it dangerously intensifies like it did in Syria.” The article says that 1.5 could become a dangerous innovation to “regime change strategy” and that the US would be committed to apply it first with smaller targets before being “perfected and repackaged to Pakistan.”

The article argues that Moscow has rightly taken the “bold step in reaching out to Islamabad and soliciting a strategic partnership” and the quick pace of the partnership taking a revolutionary shape is a “natural fit for both partners.” But this trend, according to the article, has incited the US’ “geopolitical jealousy”, which is keen to call upon a “mixed bag of secessionist, terrorist, and Colour Revolution destabilizations to offset Pakistan’s catalytic role in bringing Eurasia together.” The author then calls upon Russia, China, and Iran to defeat the threat so that Pakistan can become Eurasia’s economic ‘zipper’ and linking these (and perhaps even SAARC’s) economies together in an emboldened multi-polar future.

The article concludes by saying that the EU is mistakenly staying out (due to US pressure) of this trans-Eurasian integration process, which is becoming the primary theme of the 21st century. But “the rest of the main continental economic powers – the Eurasian Union, Iran, SAARC, and China – stand poised for closer integration with one another owing to the infrastructural overlap that Pakistan’s geostrategic location provides.”

The central theme of Korbyko’s article is to highlight the pivotal importance of Pakistan and the Russian eagerness to build a foundation of political trust with the Pakistani leadership so as to better assist in the management of Pakistani-Indian tensions.

To be sure, Pakistan can certainly help Russia shift its focus away from its current difficulties but Moscow should be doubly careful whether Pakistan will not become a staging ground to break up Russia further. The Americans have already tested the Pakistani betrayal, and China too sooner or later will become another victim of Pakistani treachery.

Surely, the Russians have always displayed enthusiasm for mediation between India and Pakistan, but Moscow would do well to remind itself of its failure to achieve success in the mid-1960s. I will leave the interpretation and analysis of this important article to the readers.

Russian-Indian cooperation in the scientific field dates back over decades but particularly rapid development of relations in this sphere has happened over the last year. Important milestones were the signing of an agreement to establish the Russian-Indian Association of Universities, and an announcement by the Russian Science Foundation (RSF) and the Indian Ministry of Science and Technology to jointly sponsor an international team competition in the field of scientific research. During the eighth session of the Russian-Indian Working Group on Science and Technology, held on September 3 in Moscow, representatives from both countries examined ways to further develop their cooperation.
Early successes

Nikolay Toivonen, head of the Russian delegation and director of the International Department of the Ministry of Education and Science, emphasized the successes achieved in the development of intergovernmental cooperation. The Ministry of Education and Science has already implemented six joint projects with the Indian Department of Science and Technology (DST) and five with the Department of Biotechnology.

In addition, the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR) and the Indian DST have initiated a cooperation programme, which provides support to basic research projects. On September 21, the RSF and the Indian Ministry of Science and Technology plan to announce a jointly sponsored international team competition in the field of scientific research.

This competition will be co-financed by grants; 4.6 million rubles from the RSF and up to 6 million rupees by the DST, annually.

“I would also like to point out that next year we will be celebrating the tenth anniversary of our cooperation. Moreover, this year we have decided to expand our cooperation by increasing the number of supported projects – from 25 to 50,” said Toivonen.

Coordination of research programmes

Toivonen also noted the rapid development of various institutions providing funding for scientific research, stressing that today in Russia they are working on developing an infrastructure to ensure that this system continues.

“We are paying great attention to ensure that institutions wisely harmonize their activities, in order that work continues on projects that were already started and developed during previous stages,” he explained, adding that research and development projects should be supported up to the point of their final implementation by the industrial sector.

Arabinda Mitra, head of the Indian delegation and manager of the DST’s International Division, noted that in India also, work is on to integrate scientific research with industrial production.

Both sides agreed that in organizing bilateral cooperation in the scientific field, they should work to involve not only representatives of various interested government agencies, but also financing organizations.

It was acknowledged that some difficulties existed in the process of joint collaboration work, such as ensuring parity in financing of projects. In this regard, Dmitry Korotkov, representative of the Science and Technology Department of the Ministry of Education and Science, talked about the Russian-Indian Council of Scientific Funds, in which not only the leading funders who that finance scientific research in Russia and India will participate, but also interested private business enterprises. Indian colleagues supported this Russian initiative.

Similar projects have been developed within the framework of the BRICS. However, as Korotkov stressed, a bilateral organization will be easier to build, and it is very likely that a Russian-Indian council can implement work faster.

The first meeting of such funders could take place in early 2016.

Separately, representatives of both sides noted that India’s decision to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) would open up new possibilities in the field of scientific and technical cooperation. The decision on India becoming a full member of the SCO was made at the SCO summit in July 2015 in Ufa.

From person to person

In addition to financing, at the meeting they also discussed the organization of scientific work, for example, the allocation of priorities. Participants noted that in order to achieve better results, they should increase the number of contacts between representatives of both working groups, as well as between the research teams. Delegates agreed that various approaches should be used, from the organization of webinars on specific topics to motivational programmes for workers and educational trips for scientists and students.

These initiatives will be further developed within the framework of the Russian-Indian Association of Universities.

First published in Russian in S&T RF.

Austin wrote:Who so every writes such complicated article with so many nations and conspiracy theories deserve a noble price

Just keep this thread for India-Russia news else as hnair said people may get banned

With whom did you meet in India, and what agreements have been achieved?

We met with several companies, including the Indian Railways and the division which is engaged in the creation of new freight corridors and the organization of high-speed traffic.

We agreed on the resumption of cooperation and the participation of Russian companies here in three areas: the creation of freight corridors, the modernization of infrastructure and increasing traffic capacity, including speed and security.

What will be the mechanism of interaction?

We have agreed to establish a working group on the formation of these projects. I think that this proposal will be formalized in the near future.

Did you discuss the participation of Russian Railways in the tenders?

We want to participate in tenders for railways electrification and asked the Indian side for the conditions.

What kind of joint projects are being discussed? Direct contracts between companies, or your participation in tenders?

For now we are talking only about our participation in tenders.

Did you discuss the acquisition of Russian rolling stock by India?

Yes we did. We demonstrated the technology and the type of rolling stock, which is produced at Russian enterprises, including «Transmashholding», «Transport Machines» and others.

There is interest, but we have not discussed the actual terms of delivery yet.

Will this issue also be discussed by the working group?

Absolutely. The supply and manufacture of rolling stock will definitely be on the agenda.

When is the working group expected to identify the first projects to develop cooperation?

I believe, before the end of the year.

How do you see India's railway budget for the next fiscal year?

Indian railways is comparable with the Russian railways, both in terms of traffic volume and length of lines.

As for the budget, considering the condition of Indian railways, it is not enough, but it is important that the government is taking steps to increase it.

We were told that in the next two to three years, investments would be increased by 40 percent. The program which has been adopted for the next five years is complicated. We hope it is implemented.

Austin wrote:You can just link the article since its already posted above

Tourism departments of three states - Kerala, Goa and Uttarakhand - have decided to jointly set up a formal association with Russia's tourism and culture ministry to promote tourist arrivals and cultural exchanges, daijiworld.com reports on Tuesday.

A marketing campaign to be launched to increase the arrival of Russian tourists to India through various cultural and tourism promotional programmes.

Kerala Tourism director P.I. Sheikh Pareeth said he had held talks in the regard with Russian tourism and culture ministry's tourism and regional policy department head Olga Yarilova, while he was in Moscow last week to take part in the OTDYKH Leisure, a leading international trade fair for travel and tourism.

A team of key Russian tour operators and state tourism representatives from Goa and Uttarkhand, India Tourism and Indian embassy officials too were present at the meeting.

The Russian delegation raised the issues on reducing the visa fees and the airport fee incurred on chartered flights from Russia to India and also expressed concern about the lack of Russian-speaking guides in Kerala.

Mort Walker wrote:

Karan M wrote:Austin,

Good find. The the non sentimental kind need to look at this.

Military Aid of USD $ 31 Billion from 2002-2016

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf

Something Amreeka rakshaks on bharat rakshak try to downplay.

Actually, I provided that link to Austin in another thread. No one is trying to downplay the duplicity of unkil here. At the same time you can not sugar coat that Russia is a corrupt kleptocracy (Putin's inner circle has a net worth of $200 billion) that is a white Christian country where its people desire to integrate with the rest of Europe. India is far from their minds.

Vipul wrote:Multatuliji my post is not without reason. My post are in context of a series of Russian perfidies which ofcourse the Natasha loving Russian fan-boys will try to ignore or gloss over. Why they even want India not to pursue its interests and try to be a pacifist power following Russian diktats (NAM argument above was such a lame and comic one )

i) Signing the TOT for T-90 Tanks with India and then refusing to transfer the technology to make barrels.
ii) The wanton blackmailing and extortion of triple the amount committed by India for buying the Gorshkov
iii) Trying to sell sub optimally performing KLUB missiles to India and rectifying issues only after Indian Navy refused to take delivery.
iv) Upset at loosing the kilo class refit business to Indian ship yard how Russians intentionally mismanaged the INS Sindhukirti upgrade in India and over 9 years made the Indian shipyard do several multiples of the work then normally would have been done at a Russian shipyard. This while they were supposed to "supervise the work" for the upgrade.
iv) The PAK FA/FGFA saga where Russians agreed to do a 50-50 development role for India and then after taking the Indian Money for design phase unilaterally reducing India share from 50% to 26% and now 13% which will further go down by the time India takes delivery (if it happens and i hope it does not).

I am sure there are other instances which i am not recollecting now while i am writing this post. If admins find my my post offensive then my apologies.

Here's the [url=http://en.riss.ru/analysis/18882/]original article


Pakistan Is The “Zipper” Of Pan-Eurasian Integration

The mainstream media myth about Pakistan carries little factual weight and purposely neglects the country’s rising geopolitical importance in Eurasia

Andrew Korybko.

Philip wrote:The rumour may be a none-too-subtle way for Russia to tell us that if we don't want a deal on the FGFA, a decision on the table when Mr.Modi meets Pres.Putin in Nov, then all bets are off. Russia will feel free to sell to whom, whatever it wants, just as the US sells F-16s, TOW missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, etc. to Pak. If we can live with the US's massive mil/civil aid to Pak and engage with it like its latest bum-chum, then so will Russia loosen its exclusive mil-ties with India by selling its milware to anyone, even our mortal enemies.

Philip wrote:I don't discount the poss. of the PLAAF getting the SU-35 first before the Pakis.The rumour may be a none-too-subtle way for Russia to tell us that if we don't want a deal on the FGFA,a decision on the table when Mr.Modi meets Pres.Putin in Nov,then all bets are off.

The general sentiment, in India and more in Russia, is that the relations between the two countries have lost their earlier warmth. Do you agree with this, and if yes, why do you think this has happened?
The Russian-Indian relations during the days of the Soviet Union were omnipresent indeed but it is essentially wrong to argue that the two nations have cooled off each other since. In fact, having disengaged from ideological background our relationship has become more sincere and warmer than before. These are the sentiments that overwhelmingly prevail in Russia and we are very proud of the unprecedented level of trust and friendship with India. This is true of relationship between the leaders of the two countries irrespective of who is in power in Moscow or New Delhi. This is equally true of feelings of the general public. Trust is the very essence of our relations, something that does not come overnight but is nurtured for years and tested at the times of hardship. If some started to believe otherwise I wish to testify as a longstanding insider officially and personally that they are fundamentally wrong.

Russia and India pursue the same goals on international arena of which the recent BRICS and SCO summits in Ufa are indicative. Prime Minister Modi will visit Russia again by the end of the year for the bilateral summit expected to generate fresher ideas to deepen cooperation at both the global and bilateral levels. Russia is very extensively engaged with India in politics and economy although the latter has been less effective for objective reasons. I would say both the countries are rediscovering each other economically in terms of applying the capacity of private SMEs and start-ups while successfully maintaining traditional cooperation in such areas as hydroelectric power, mechanical engineering, metallurgy, oil and gas industry, petrochemicals etc.

The most promising has been the area of nuclear energy. Russia is the only country practically collaborating with India in the nuclear energy sector. Two state-of-the-art nuclear power units with the world safest light water reactors have already been constructed at the Kudankulam site. Unit 1 is operational and unit 2 is being prepared for attaining criticality. Preparatory works for the construction of units 3 & 4 at the same site are underway.

I would like to reiterate that the Russian engineers have successfully implemented all post-Fukusima safety requirements outlined by the Indian Regulator AERB. A very important factor is the economic viability of the Russian projects. The Kudankulam units offer the most competitive price for electricity strictly corresponding to the figures stipulated by the Indian Government.

It is noteworthy that the Russian-Indian collaboration in the nuclear sphere is not limited to NPP construction. There are joint projects in nuclear science and on aspects of nuclear fuel cycle. Russian and Indian scientists effectively cooperate in research at the Russian Joint Institute of Nuclear Research in Dubna and within the framework of such international projects like ITER programme (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor).

How many reactors will Russia eventually build in India?

I would say as many as you wish us to.

How do you view the ties in the defence sector?

In terms of volume and investments this is by far the most advanced area of bilateral cooperation. The value of our business in military hardware with India is over USD 30 billion, more than India has with all other foreign partners put together. And this business continues to flourish.
Moreover, Russian-Indian military technical cooperation is based on transfer of technology and mutual development of hi-tech platforms, licensed production of modern Russian equipment in India and modernisation of Russian weapons, which are in service with the Indian Armed Forces. This kind of extremely versatile cooperation is hors concours too. By all means Russia and India has a unique partnership within the global military market serving as an enviable example of the combination of trust and benefit.

Currently we are exploring new vistas of cooperation in research and development not only on GtoG but also on BtoB basis. Russian companies are in talks with Reliance Defence and Aerospace (RDA) for possible joint production of ships, submarines and aircraft under the transfer of technology. We have been deeply engaged with HAL for many years, which is India’s major public sector company and Russia’s time-tested and reliable partner. We are looking forward to expanding ties with Indian companies, which have been selected to participate in the “Make in India” programme. Russia is the only country, which has so far started working under this scheme. Again, while others talk, Russians do. Isn’t it the proof of the true strategic character of partnership? I think it is.
What do you think is holding back the signing of the final contract for the Fifth Generation Fighter?

Obviously such a sophisticated aircraft cannot be made overnight. It involves a long process of research and development, which is going on smoothly. This project is identified as a priority one by both countries, and we are committed to complete it as soon as possible.

There is a lot of talk about Russia-Pakistan cooperation. There have been high-profile visits on both sides and agreements have been signed for defence and military cooperation. How do you view this growing relationship in view of your historical ties with India?

Relations, which Russia develops with countries of the world, are not directed against anybody. Particularly, Russia’s policy in South Asia is consistently based on principles of promotion of regional stability and non-interference into the affairs of sovereign states and bilateral disputes. India is our historic and special and privileged strategic partner, and we have always been mindful and will continue to consider in the first place the Indian security concerns. This is our natural choice. The unique level of mutual trust and understanding on almost every issue of the international agenda should leave no scope for doubt about the future of the Russian-Indian ties even for sceptics.

Hence the relations with Pakistan while being independent in nature will never have any designs against India. Islamabad is a very important player in joint efforts to maintain regional stability, especially in view of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and growing threats of international terrorism fuelled by ISIS and rampant drug production. These factors require collective counteraction and target-oriented capacity building. And these are exactly the reasons for our recent arrangements with Islamabad on the supply of four Mi-35 helicopters. I would also like to respond to the idle talk and pure invention of the media by reiterating that Russia has not discussed and does not have any plans to sell Su-35 aircraft to Pakistan.
It was reported in the media that when Pakistan chief of army staff General Raheel Sharif visited Russia, a defence and military technical cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries.

The agreement you mentioned pertains to the military cooperation and provides for a general framework for interaction between the armed and security forces and capacity building.
The relations between India and Pakistan are not very good.
Why don’t you informally facilitate talks between the two countries?

Russia entirely supports the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan and the early and peaceful resolution of all contentious issues, including trans-border terrorism and Kashmir. However, we are not in a position to interfere in any bilateral dispute unless we get a specific consensus-based request or invitation. Certainly, we acknowledge the existing legal architecture, which includes the 1972 Shimla Agreement and the 1999 Lahore Declaration urging the two parties to resolve their issues bilaterally. Russia hopes that New Delhi and Islamabad will show further restraint and continue to improve their relations according to the Ufa spirit.
According to one of the basic principles of the SCO Charter the member-countries do not import bilateral issues into the SCO agenda. The same is expected of India and Pakistan. On the contrary, there is a feeling that the SCO may become an additional platform for narrowing down of the differences between the two countries through cooperation.
What does Russia think of China’s One Road One Belt initiative?
We support the Chinese initiative as a promising opportunity to promote trans-regional connectivity in Eurasia and improve linkages between Asia and Europe. A lot of attention is given to the development of transportation and energy potential of the Central Asian countries, from which the neighbouring regions will also benefit. There is a great scope for joint endeavours, and we would welcome the growing Indian participation.Meanwhile increased efforts are being made to expedite the North-South Transport Corridor project, which is designed to enhance connectivity and economic cooperation between South and Central Asia and Europe and harmoniously blends with the Chinese initiative.

Karan M wrote:Austin, are you tracking the Russian air strikes in Syria? Or their ramifications. Very interesting and completely upends Israel and the west's plans for Syria.

According to Mishra, “the flight test of the BrahMos air launched version (on Su-30MKI) is planned for February-March 2016. We think that one flight test would be enough after which the air version would be cleared for production.” As the user has been co-opted in this venture by BrahMos Aerospace from the beginning, more flight tests would be unnecessary, he said.

Elaborating on the six steps for the air version, of which two are over, Mishra disclosed that structural modifications on Su-30MKI have been done by HAL (Nasik). According to him, “the Russian Sukhoi design bureau was approached. After two years of negotiations, the price that they quoted for structural modifications was exorbitant. This is when HAL took on the challenge and showed desired results which were successfully demonstrated in middle of 2014-2015.”

The second successfully demonstrated step has been the ‘launcher realisation’, which has been designed, developed and produced by BrahMos Aerospace. Mishra said that, “the DGQA has already given conditional clearance for the launcher implying that mechanical and electrical activities needed for the launcher on aircraft have been vindicated.”

The third step, according to Mishra, will be the integration of missile with the launcher for flights in various profiles. Once done, this will be followed by the ‘Drop Test” to ascertain the behaviour of the missile once released from the aircraft. The fifth step would be to integrate sensors with the missile and to ensure that there is no ‘major deviation between the theoretical and demonstrated parameters.’ The last step would be the ‘flight test in total configuration.’

Once the final flight test is done, two Su-30 aircraft will be flight-tested by ASTE, Bangalore (user) as the precursor to unspecified numbers of aircraft being armed with the BrahMos missile. According to Mishra, there are numerous agencies involved in the flight test. These include Cemilac, DARE, NAL, DG AQA, RCMA, MSQAA, HAL, ASTE (Bangalore), SDI and the project office of BrahMos’ to name a few.

On BrahMos-M, Mishra said plenty of work has been done and ‘we are in touch with the user (Indian Air Force). “BrahMos-M will be a new design. A compact engine with better energy propellant which will not compromise on 300km range; lighter weight with less diameter; speed of 3.3 Mach; and better packing and routing of pipes with computer-aided design.”

To ascertain the feasibility of BrahMos-M, three steps have been initiated. One, HAL has done some preliminary studies. Two, DRDO has conducted design studies which will be shared with Russian NPOM partner. And three, Russia is willing to develop the new propulsion system keeping BrahMos Aerospace in the loop. This is not all

The seeker for BrahMos-M will have sufficient redundancies to include anti-radiation, Radio Frequency and Imaging Infra-Red. The guidance in addition to the present G3 combination will also come from indigenous satellite navigation constellation — IRNSS — which will have a total of seven satellites of which three have been placed in space.”

The BrahMos-M with a weight of 1.4 ton for the air force version and 1.6 ton for the navy version will be a breakthrough. “We expect five BrahMos-M to be carried by Su-30 (two each on the wings and one on the belly), and two each missile with the MiG-29K and the fifth generation fighter aircraft being co-developed with Russia.” Thus, “BrahMos-M is ready to be moved from the drawing board to real work once the government gives the green light.”

The hypersonic BrahMos, Mishra reflected, “is on the drawing board.” BrahMos envisages a hypersonic engine to replace the present supersonic. “It is envisaged to provide speed of Mach 5. It will follow different aerodynamic laws; and have different propulsion, materials, electronics, data links and suppliers,” said Mishra adding that, “We (BrahMos and DRDO) are already working on the engine and hope to test it in five years.”

President Vladimir Putin talked tough on Syria in his New York meeting with President Barack Obama. He signalled that Russia was no longer prepared to acquiesce in unilateral American actions in West Asia, despite American sanctions imposed on it, following its actions in Ukraine and Crimea.

What has emerged is a more assertive Russian role to challenge destabilising and disastrous American policies in Iraq, Libya and most notably Syria. Ill-advised American actions in West Asia have resulted in the rise of the barbaric ISIL and a massive refugee exodus from conflict zones, which has destabilised Europe. What is now emerging is an unannounced Russia-China partnership backed by Iran, Iraq and the Assad dispensation in Damascus, to counter American unilateralism and dominance in West Asia.

Strong response

Coincidentally, these Russian moves coincided with a visit to New Delhi on September 15 by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov. The Russian envoy focused attention on the expansion of membership of the UN Security Council and the situation in Syria. Gatilov paid lip service to support for India’s candidature for permanent membership of the Security Council. Moscow, thereafter, chose to join China and Pakistan in seeking to undermine the G- 4 initiative in the General Assembly, which aimed for an early decision on restructuring the Security Council.

Interestingly, no meeting was scheduled between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Putin in New York. Moscow has made no secret of its concerns about the US getting an increasing share in defence acquisitions by India.

Faced with unrelenting American hostility and sanctions, Russia now appears to have taken a decision to respond strongly in West Asia and elsewhere. It will strengthen its partnership with China, even if it involves acting as a junior partner of China in crucial areas like the Afpak region and in Central Asia, where China has seized effective control of access to energy resources. This has eroded the historical dominance of Moscow in the oil and gas sectors, in its south-eastern, Central Asian neighbourhood.

In Afghanistan, Russia plays a silent partner to Chinese-Pakistani initiatives seeking ‘reconciliation’ with the Taliban. This is happening even as the Taliban, joined by the remnants of Chechen resistance and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, seizes control of Kunduz, sending shivers down the spines of neighbouring Central Asian states, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

Softening towards Pakistan?

There has also been a noticeable shift on relations with Pakistan, now described by Russian academics as Russia’s “South Asian gatekeeper”, and even on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The India-Russia joint statement in 2003 called for Pakistan “to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan controlled territory (POK).”

The Russians now avoid mentioning any linkage between Pakistan and terrorism. This became noticeable after Pakistan’s foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, and army chief, General Kayani, visited Moscow in 2012 and issues of Russian defence supplies were broached.

What followed was an agreement for Russia to supply RD 93 engines directly for JF 17 fighters being assembled in Pakistan with Chinese collaboration. Things moved further ahead after the visit of General Raheel Sharif to Russia, with Sergei Ryabkov, the deputy foreign minister, describing Pakistan as Moscow’s “closest partner” and promising to supply Pakistan advanced Sukhoi 35 fighters and MI 35 attack helicopters. Sukhoi 35 fighters are also being sold to China. Cash-strapped Pakistan, slated to acquire Israeli-designed advanced J 10 fighters from China, can hardly afford to pay for Russian fighter aircraft.

The modernisation of China’s arsenal over the last two decades has largely come about by the acquisition of equipment ranging from fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, to warships, from Russia. Moscow is, however, less than happy at the manner in which China has violated copyrights and reverse engineered defence equipment it has supplied to Beijing. But Moscow has few options now, faced with the falling prices of oil, gas and other natural resources, amidst growing concerns in western Europe about excessive dependence on oil and gas supplies from Russia At the same time, Russia is miffed at the manner in which China reneged on a $400-billion, 30-year agreement on purchase of Russian natural gas, reached with Putin last year.

Grandiose plans

Russia is seeking to complement its own plans for a ‘Eurasian Union’ with China’s grandiose ‘one belt one road’ initiative, while envisaging expanding economic connectivity with Iran, Saarc and China. Its strategic thinkers would like to construct an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline and extend it to China while hoping that India could be persuaded to go along, even if the pipeline is constructed through POK. The military dimensions of this thinking can be gleaned from the fact that in recent months there have been joint military exercises between China and Russia not only on Pacific shores, but also, for the first time, on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, even as Moscow was planning its Syrian deployments.

It remains to be seen whether, given its economic limitations, Moscow can fulfil these grandiose plans. It will live to regret its U-turn on the Taliban, once the impact of Taliban medievalism is felt by its Central Asian partners. While the Taliban may appear like “good guys” in comparison to the ISIL, which has been reinforced by hundreds of Chechens, there is nothing to suggest that the Taliban have changed their ideological inclinations, or forsaken their erstwhile Chechen and Central Asian partners. Nor is there any reason to believe that groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani Network are going to abandon their Islamist propensities.

India has experienced Moscow’s flirtations with Pakistan and China in the past and seen them end in disappointment for Russia. Moreover, the Russians cannot forget the enthusiasm with which Mao and Deng made U-turns to embrace the US and dumped them. New Delhi will hopefully strengthen its extensive engagement with Moscow and advise it on how best its firms can take advantage of its new ‘Make in India’ policies, while strengthening their robust defence partnership. At the same time, Moscow would be well advised to understand precisely what India’s concerns are.

The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan