Deterrence

[SSridhar]

In the initial stages of the nuclear game, three parties were involved. The SFC, DRDO and the DAE. The missiles, HE lens and the Core were distributed among these three. It also helped India to follow the 'recessed deterrence' status to cool-down those bristling at the Shakti-II tests. As the NCA took shape and as other technological processes such as dispersal of weapons, canisterization and the sea-based deterrence began to happen, the de-mated scenario disappeared. It had to.

The draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine(IND) of August, 1999 clearly emphasized the recessed-deterrence. We know how people like Ashley Tellis were hammering away on that.

3.2. The doctrine envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time, and the ability to retaliate effectively even in a case of significant degradation by hostile strikes.

I do not think anybody talks so much about the de-mated scenario. It is simply not possible when one considers even a 100 warheads. If we consider decoys, it may be even 400. Where would DAE or DRDO go for for 2000 people (assuming conservatively 5 per warhead for a 24X7X365 availability) each who are willing to keep travelling with the SFC day and night and to remote places at that? And, who would these people be and how would DRDO & DAE ensure secrecy with so many people. The SFC, as a military unit, is a different matter.

[shaun]

Its not only NFU , to get into the various apartheid clubs , we pledged moratorium on testing. And what it got us , some numbers 1,2,3,...!! We should get our IFF online and resume testing.

The bakis get over confident and do stupid thing when ever they get some thing shiny from their sugar daddies. Kargil war , ended double quick when they found their mizzile's guidance , dud. These days ,the "proven" TNWs making them confident of any punitive actions and thus the various (mis)adventures .

[shiv]

Well this is the best information I could get - it is better than I thought but not much information to suggest that we are ready for a massive first strike. Sounds like some may be mated, some "nearly mated" and some demated.

That is my read too. The last authoritative read on the issue that I know of is from Koithara's book circa 2012. He is critical of the de-mated stance but things have been changing. Apart from canisters, some birds say Agni III has been deployed under mountain tunnels in the NE. A 30 minute process is in place to "arm" the warheads. Do not recall, where I read this. The separate locations for warhead and missile storages has been abandoned, in favor of colocation. In some cases the warhead arming is indeed an electronic process now. My working presumption is the demated stance only is a myth by now.

I certainly hope it is a myth.

A powerful deterrent stance requires a show of some sort. If Agni missiles in Republic day parades are a "signal" that can be read in some way or the other, then the "show" (or no show) is a signal to whoever watches us.

I don't want to digress but if the Agni no show on R Day is a signal that we do not want to flaunt a long range nuclear capable ballistic missile I cannot understand what means are being employed to show that a deterrent exists and is ready. It seems to me that our policy has not gone beyond doing things subtly and in a manner that pretends that we are reluctant rather than ready.

This has never been the nuclear stance of any nation other than Israel. Geopolitically it appears to me that we are desperately trying to say "Oh we really don't like doing this but we are being forced into doing all this". But apart from a half-point we gained in a nuclear deal with the US, nothing much has changed. We still find Japan hemming and hawing at us and Oz being coy about Uranium supplies; China telling us to bugger off with NSG and no one being able to do a single thing about 4 Chinese Pu reactors and proliferation of Paki nukes and supply of F-16s to Pakistan.

Of course one could ask if any of these things would change if we adopted a more robust posture about deterrence, rather than all this subtlety. The double nuclear threat we face from Pakistan and China is unprecedented and yet we have to behave the good boys. May I add another dimension to this debate?

It has always seemed to me that in the areas of defence and foreign policy, the Indian government has always behaved like a benevolent king who believes his subjects don't understand an would be carried away by emotion if they were in any way involved in the decision making chain - even as simple expressions of public opinion. We the Indian public are still treated that way. We can clearly see the double nuclear threat and yet the Indian government simply does not open its mouth and say anything. If the government says anything at all - it is always blather like "India has always taken a principled stand about nuclear weapons'. Statements about the state of preparedness are either left to occasional references by diplomats or senior military officers and are no more than a few token words.

We are clearly hiding something. Why are we hiding our deterrent from the very foes who need to feel a threat? Is the case being made that the deterrent is only hidden from the Indian public but the foes are magically being informed. If that is the case I am still not seeing any articles expressing great concern appearing out of China or Pakistan. Yes, Pakis do write about India's access to Uranium. The Chinese have sometimes written about the Agni series. But absolutely no reaction from the very nations who should feel threatened by us. Are we trying to reassure them? Are we trying to stop them from getting anxious about our nukes? Would that be deterrence?

[shiv]

Topical, posting FWIW
India needs to start thinking like a nuclear nation

Last week the Vice Chief of the Indian Air Force Air Marshal BS Dhanoa declared that India would not be able to fight a two-front war involving Pakistan and China.The IAF’s numerical strength is at an all-time low, and the Air Marshal has said that “our numbers are not adequate to fully execute an air campaign in a two front scenario.”

Taken by itself, it is an astonishing statement. Is it possible that any country possessing nuclear weapons would risk fighting an all-out war with another, leave alone two of them?

The chances are remote. But that was not just the Air Force speaking, but the considered view of the government of India framed in an operational directive given by the defence minister to the three services in 2009.It urges them to be ready for a two-front war, never mind that the services have never in the past two decades been resourced to fight even one short war with one adversary.

Threats

There are several issues here. First, is the question of assessing the nature of threats to India’s security. Surely, with a million plus troops in its Army, a 600+ fleet of combat aircraft and a powerful navy – India is not exactly a push-over, even for a Sino-Pak combination.

Second, the two-front scenario has been the proverbial nightmare that India has confronted since the mid-1960s.It probably came closest to fruition in the September 1965 India-Pakistan war when China issued an ultimatum to India to cease fire, and also moved some forces in the Sikkim area to aid beleaguered Pakistan.

Our Soviet alliance checked China in the 1971 war, and there were never any serious indications that Beijing would indeed get into the fight, despite Henry Kissinger egging-on China to attack India.During the Kargil war when Pakistan sought Chinese help even the rhetoric was absent, and Beijing politely told Pakistan to get Washington to pull its chestnuts out of the fire.

Third, is the more serious issue of nuclear weapons.Most reasonable people will assume that a state known to have nuclear weapons is likely to use them only in the face of mortal danger.Even if India shot off just 10 nuclear weapons, they would be enough to destroy two major cities and kill tens of millions of people in Pakistan or China and, of course, the other way around as well.

Which leader would contemplate such an outcome? The Chinese are much more focused on this issue and believe that the chances of all-out war are remote. They prepare their forces to win what they call “informationised local wars”, whether on the seas or the land.

Weapons

India has been singularly unable to adjust its military thinking to the fact that it also possesses nuclear weapons. This is because politicians have decreed that nuclear weapons are not really weapons, they are political instruments meant to be used only for retaliation, or to prevent nuclear blackmail.

So, while the weapons delivery systems are embedded in the military, their command and control is entirely civilian.Most military personnel do not know anything about India’s nuclear capabilities and act on the belief that their job is to fight a conventional war, while the government of the day will hopefully come through if it goes nuclear.

While the civilians must, indeed, command the nuclear forces, they must understand that they are, in the ultimate analysis, weapons, resting at the very top of the escalatory ladder. Militaries may not control the employment of such weapons, but they should be fully cognisant about their use and integrate them in their planning scenarios.

‘Campaigns’

One consequence of mentally separating nuclear and conventional weapons is that the outlook of the Indian military has not changed.So, it still sees itself conducting World War II like “campaigns” against adversaries.The Army continues to hold a large fleet of tanks in its armoury, even though the plans that were made for their use have been shelved because they will trip Pakistan’s red lines.

India need not unilaterally disarm, but it could consider a verifiable reduction of the most aggressive land weapons system with Pakistan.enhance the mobility and firepower of our forces facing China.

The Modi government has a uni-dimensional focus on modernising the equipment of the military, perhaps it should provide some leadership in modernising their organisation and strategy.And, in the meanwhile, initiate a conversation with China and Pakistan about nuclear weapons and their dangers.

[svinayak]

s
So think of subs on patrol like those bombers on sortie with mated warheads vo ensure retaliation only Vhe sub patrol is longer.

Further once K4 with its MIRV, needs mated warheads for no other way.

So one era or yuga of recessed deterrence is coming to an end.

And a new one beginning.

India needs 1MT per tube. This is the requirement to make sure that India is serious in this business.

It may take some time but India has to reach it. several SSBN must be deployed with this yield.

[Supratik]

The AgniIII warhead is 2.5 tonnes. It is carrying something nasty. Probably boosted fisson. 1 Megaton??? The K4MkI is supposedly a derivative of the AgniIII or if entirely new make but of the same class.

[NRao]

If the following is the definition of recessed deterrence

Recessed deterrence may be defined as a credible nuclear weapons capability which a country is able to draw upon for political and diplomatic purposes, and is able to deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame and effectively use it physically for military purposes….

Then where is the flaw in it to be concerned?

[member_22733]

If there is a long chain of procedures that need to be completed and they are intertwined between different agencies, the threat is that the weakest link in the chain either gets destroyed or compromised before being able to complete its part.

Political machine in India has been its weakest link, and may remain so for the forseeable future.

[shiv]

If the following is the definition of recessed deterrence

Recessed deterrence may be defined as a credible nuclear weapons capability which a country is able to draw upon for political and diplomatic purposes, and is able to deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame and effectively use it physically for military purposes….

Then where is the flaw in it to be concerned?

Jasjit Singh, a thinker I admire, has his name associated with recessed deterrence. His definition does not spell out specifics and procedures and cannot be faulted. It is how the recessed deterrence is implemented that can give rise to concern.

De-mated warheads (perhaps no more now) were only the start of the problem. A (civilian) polity that believes that nuclear weapons are not to be used but just to he held up as a symbol would be a serious defect. "Deterrence" can only come from willingness to use - and Jasjit Singh spells that out very clearly when he says "deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame and effectively use it physically for military purposes"

[ramana]

Above interpretations deal with land based systems either aircraft or missile delivered.

Once it gets deployed at sea things have to change.
That's is where the tree officers are coming from.

OTH we see some opaqueness in the civilian side both scientists and political leaders.

It could possibly mean some hesitancy in the codes transmission area.

[NRao]

Will respond in greater detail later, but

Once it gets deployed at sea things have to change.
That's is where the tree officers are coming from.

Is there a nation that did not place a "political officer" on subs?

Every nation has had a "rogue" officer. Gen Patton wanted to pound the Soviets, another wanted to nuke NK and perhaps China too. Don't tell me the Soviets did not have or the Chinese or Pakistanis do not have one. Just the nature of the beast.

More l8r

[ramana]

Its not that. Not unauthorized launches.
Reliable when undersea.

So once Arihant gets underway we will put this to rest.

[NRao]

Its not that. Not unauthorized launches.
Reliable when undersea.

Other side of the same coin. In that, not launching when told to launch. Which is what I interpreted the following to mean:

A (civilian) polity that believes that nuclear weapons are not to be used but just to he held up as a symbol would be a serious defect.

Except that one is civilian and one is military.

However, point taken.

Jasjit Singh, a thinker I admire, has his name associated with recessed deterrence. His definition does not spell out specifics and procedures and cannot be faulted. It is how the recessed deterrence is implemented that can give rise to concern.

Definition should not come with and nor should we expect them to provide implementation.

De-mated warheads (perhaps no more now) were only the start of the problem. A (civilian) polity that believes that nuclear weapons are not to be used but just to he held up as a symbol would be a serious defect. "Deterrence" can only come from willingness to use - and Jasjit Singh spells that out very clearly when he says "deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame and effectively use it physically for military purposes"

This to me it says there are two flaws in the definition:

1) While you want to address "de-mated warheads" Jasjit ji clearly states ""is able to deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame" - so he accepts "de-mated warheads" as acceptable

2) While Jasjit ji says "a country is able to draw upon for political and diplomatic purposes", you have doubts that the "civilian polity" will actually use a tool meant for certain situations.

Well, both are valid and well discussed points - at least in the US.There was a vid posted (I think by TSJ) that talked about the very early days of nuclearization of the US. Nukes were *really* de-mated - the tactical nukes had to be hand assembled and that posed a lot of problems (as one can imagine) and the process they went through.

The second issue has also been dealt with (at least in the US) - what if the authority refuses to use nukes. Of course India has a NFU policy, so it is a very diff situation, but, at the same time, there has to be some mechanism to overcome a reluctant political system - I do not know what it is in India, but if there is no such mechanism, then India really does not have a mature escalation process in place - and that is a huge problem. A weak political leader could be easily identified, propped up and taken advantage of - rather easy to do , especially in India.

_____________________--

Wanted to comment on the article. Partial:

Have no idea if this person knows what s/he is talking about.

India has been singularly unable to adjust its military thinking to the fact that it also possesses nuclear weapons. This is because politicians have decreed that nuclear weapons are not really weapons, they are political instruments meant to be used only for retaliation, or to prevent nuclear blackmail.

Yo. I have no indication that Indian politicians see nukes as a "not really weapons", so I will wait to confirm that. However, what is wrong with instruments for retaliation or prevent nuclear blackmail? That is the purpose for India at least - given NFU.

So, while the weapons delivery systems are embedded in the military, their command and control is entirely civilian.Most military personnel do not know anything about India’s nuclear capabilities and act on the belief that their job is to fight a conventional war, while the government of the day will hopefully come through if it goes nuclear.

Military vs. civi is throughout except for Paki and NK (same), where else are they under military control? Strange.

Confused. M2K/Jags are under IAF command, right? And are the SFC considered civilians? They are part of the planning process - should be.

"Most military personnel do not know", so, do the ones that need to know, know? There is absolutely no need for everyone to know a strike capability during war.

While the civilians must, indeed, command the nuclear forces, they must understand that they are, in the ultimate analysis, weapons, resting at the very top of the escalatory ladder. Militaries may not control the employment of such weapons, but they should be fully cognisant about their use and integrate them in their planning scenarios.

No idea what this means.

On the subject of transparency, the day India changes he NFU then India needs transparency, else it is good that she introduces as much confusion as possible. Else it becomes very predictable to game a situation and suicidal from an Indian PoV. So, if, under transparency, claims she has 100 nukes of x types, it is very easy to game what an opponent needs to potentially overcome it. Or India has to invest very, very heavily in covering those 100 nukes - hide them, decoys, etc. Which is cheaper for India - opacity. It is good. In fact, it will help overcome a weak political system. Politicians, if they say one thing others can say something else and introduce confusion to support Indian stance.

[shiv]

De-mated warheads (perhaps no more now) were only the start of the problem. A (civilian) polity that believes that nuclear weapons are not to be used but just to he held up as a symbol would be a serious defect. "Deterrence" can only come from willingness to use - and Jasjit Singh spells that out very clearly when he says "deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame and effectively use it physically for military purposes"

This to me it says there are two flaws in the definition:

1) While you want to address "de-mated warheads" Jasjit ji clearly states ""is able to deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame" - so he accepts "de-mated warheads" as acceptable

2) While Jasjit ji says "a country is able to draw upon for political and diplomatic purposes", you have doubts that the "civilian polity" will actually use a tool meant for certain situations.

.

Jasjit says nothing about demated warheads. Jasjit Singh wrote that back in 1998 long before India had even declared an arsenal and he was saying that the arsenal should be there first before any type of deterrence can be there

I have very serious doubts about the civilian polity because of the large number of articles that have appeared quoting Indian sources as saying that nuclear weapons are not meant for warfighting.

There is a degree of semantic chicanery here. Let me explain. If nuclear weapons are not meant for warfighting, then perhaps they are meant for deterrence. But if they must deter there has to be some threat of using them in a war. So far so good. Everything is hunky dory.

But what if deterrence fails. What if there is a war where someone nukes us. Are we then going to sit back and say "Nuclear weapons are not for warfighting. We keep them symbolically for deterrence. If deterrence has failed that is fine. We are still not going to use them because we have a principled stand where we believe that nuclear weapons are not meant for warfighting"

The only criticism I have seen of this shockingly idiotic scenario I have posted is "Oh - It can't be. It's obvious that it can't be"

How is it obvious?

[ShauryaT]

Securing realism at the Washington summit - Bharat Karnad

New Delhi’s enthusiasm for these summits is incomprehensible. Animated less by national interest than a desire to join the causes dear to the US, Indian prime ministers have been imprudent, ignoring the wisdom of staying aloof from such international conferences that invariably end up eroding India’s freedom of strategic action and room for foreign policy manoeuvre. Responsible for negotiating the deleterious nuclear deal with the US, which stymied the country’s development of thermonuclear weapons fetched India nothing in return — neither the rights and privileges of a nuclear weapons state nor the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as assured by the July 18, 2005 joint statement signed between then US President George W Bush and then prime minister Manmohan Singh. Singh, however, attended the first two of these summits.....

As if to prove he is no laggard in conceding sovereign nuclear policy ground, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has prepared for the Washington conference by formally committing to join the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC). This gesture, while doubtless pleasing to the US government and Western nuclear industry leaders, who can expect to sell India nuclear power plants worth tens of billions of dollars, violates the 2010 Nuclear Liability Act. This made foreign vendors accountable for accidents sourced to deficient or flawed nuclear reactors and related technologies they supply, and does not limit their compensation to victims, as the CSC does to $300 million. Modi’s flouting the Act means the Indian taxpayer not only pays through his nose for technologically faulty imported nuclear reactors but, in the case of nuclear accidents, also for compensatory payouts in excess of the CSC cap, which could potentially run into billions of dollars.....

The US is investing $1 trillion to rebuild its strategic triad over 30 years or $35 billion annually, including the upgrading of the B61 Mod 12 tactical nuclear bomb, designing new “tailored yield” thermonuclear warheads, developing next generation strategic bomber and nuclear-powered submarines in order to achieve, what deputy secretary of defence Bob Work called “technological overmatch” against Russia and China. Russia is spending some $16 billion a year in sharpening its nuclear attack capability, stressing the centrality of its modernised arsenal in future wars and as means of compensating for its conventional military inferiority (thereby neatly reversing its thrust of the Cold War when it enjoyed a massive conventional military edge). Moscow has embarked on a new strategic bomber (Tu-PAK DA) project, and deployed the advanced Borei-class ballistic nuclear missile firing nuclear submarine (SSBN), and the Topol-M Inter-Continental range Ballistic Missile (ICBM) that President Vladimir Putin has deemed “indefensible”.

China with an annual expenditure in excess of $10 billion on its newly named Strategic Rocket Forces is the only P5 state increasing the size of its nuclear arms inventory besides fielding new fusion warheads on DF-21A and DF-31 missiles, and the JL-2 submarine-launched missile from the new Jin-class SSBN. Meanwhile, Britain and France, each with yearly budgets for strategic forces of around $7 billion, are seeking to modernise their thermonuclear warheads by sharing in fusion weapons advancement infrastructure (Teutates programme), such as the multi-axes hydrographic-radiographic testing EPURE facility at Valduc with second and third laser streams becoming operational by 2019 and 2022, respectively, and the inertial confinement fusion facility in Bordeaux. The British nuclear weapons establishment at Aldermaston has just improved the W76-1Mk-4 hydrogen warhead for hardened targets, and installed the Orion laser that is a thousand times more powerful than the Helen system it replaced.

Read | US pushes Pakistan to cut down growing nuclear arsenal

The militant tilt of the P5 aside, China continues to undermine India’s nuclear security by transferring to Pakistan design expertise to configure new missiles and miniaturise its fission warheads. The Modi government, much like its predecessor, has reacted to the skewing of the international and regional nuclear military “correlation of forces” by actually strengthening the decrepit NPT system that has victimised India by, among other things, reiterating the testing moratorium. Disowning a treaty it is not signatory to, resuming open-ended testing to extend the country’s thermonuclear muscle and reach, and responding, however belatedly, to China’s proliferation excesses with tit-for-tat transfer of critical nuclear missile technologies to countries such as Vietnam, on the Chinese periphery, is the way to go. But New Delhi seems content only with occasionally tom-tomming India’s ICBM and thermonuclear punch when, in fact, absence of evidence indicates evidence of absence of any such capabilities.

It is time Modi departed from the traditional script and spoke candidly at the Washington summit about the irreparable NPT regime and hinted at India’s options. He may win himself and the country leverage and respect by speaking the truth.

[shiv]

Securing realism at the Washington summit - Bharat Karnad

It is time Modi departed from the traditional script and spoke candidly at the Washington summit about the irreparable NPT regime and hinted at India’s options. He may win himself and the country leverage and respect by speaking the truth.

[ShauryaT]

Hoping Karnad's fears do not bear fruition.

Missile test-launch schedule altered
Posted on March 15, 2016 by Bharat Karnad
A second test firing of a cannisterized Agni-5 IRBM, which was announced by DRDO early Feb without the date being revealed, was scheduled from Balasore on the Odisha coast today. It didn’t take place. Instead, a 700km A-1 MRBM was launched, perhaps, as consolation. The talk is the instructions for this change came from PMO which was concerned US President Barack Obama would have been upset by the symbolically “provocative” action of firing a long range missile in the run-up to the nuclear security summit in Washington, thereby imperiling the “success” of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trip, March 31-April 1.

The problem though is DRDO’s launch schedule cannot so casually be trifled with because there’s high level of preparations that involved. As mentioned in a previous blog the window for the test firings is for this week. It remains to be seen if the A-5 was merely postponed or taken off the table altogether and should the cannisterized A-5 launch not happen in the next few days, then those in the know claim it’d be a good indication of the BJP govt bending to US’ will much as its predecessor Congress Party regime had done during its tenure, and the desire to please the US Govt uppermost in its mind rather than the national interest.

[ShauryaT]

It is good to have some Indics in American academia and think tanks to balance the complete foreigner dominated views on Indian programs. Best is to have our own resident experts to articulate but then we need real research institutions, where such people can live and work. Key thing to note, Indian political leaders slept through from at least 77-89, as Pakistan was weaponizing. My guesstimate is Pakistan had a weapon by 1984 and a way to deliver by 1987.

Interesting point by one female voice that India sought nuclear guarantees from both US and USSR simultaneously after 1964. Shastri's name was mentioned for after 65. If someone knows more about this, please post.

[ramana]

Lal Bahadur Shastri sent LK Jha on a mission to the US and USSR to seek nuclear guarantees and was rebuffed.
He then authorized PNE preparation. All this was in run up to the 1968 NPT.

You can read WOP by Chengappa or George Perkovich's book.

[ShauryaT]

Thanks ramana.

[ramana]

Lal Bahadur Shastri sent LK Jha on a mission to the US and USSR to seek nuclear guarantees and was rebuffed.
He then authorized PNE preparation. All this was in run up to the 1968 NPT.

You can read WOP by Chengappa or George Perkovich's book.

During the late 50s the question for Western scholars was when will India test the bomb? Not if it will test the bomb.
However the 1962 Chinese aggression, the subsequent military expansion, the death of Nehru in 1964 and later Homi Bhabha in Jan 1966 all made India nuke nude.
So LBS had to scramble to get some guarantees after China tested in Oct 1964.

However US created the Gilpatric Commission which recommended freezing the nuke powers to the existing P-5 with cutoff date of 1968 for test. There was a PNE clause which India later used in 1974.

[ramana]

ShauryaT, We need to understand better this Washington Conference on NPT.

Please post any relevant articles papers what not on this.

[ShauryaT]

OK. If DC crowd can attend this event, it may shed some light.
A Global Reality Check on Nuclear Security

Progress has been made in recent years to prevent the theft of weapons-useable nuclear material around the world, but some of these materials remain dangerously vulnerable. At a time of rising risk from the self-proclaimed Islamic State and other groups, governments must redouble their efforts to prevent nuclear weapons from getting into the hands of terrorists. Ahead of the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, a new report presents a stark choice: will the world recommit to continuous improvement in strengthening nuclear security, or will efforts decline and the danger of nuclear terrorism grow?

Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William Tobey of the Harvard Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom will launch the new report, Nuclear Security: A Global Reality Check. Carnegie’s Toby Dalton will moderate.

[NRao]

Sorry for partial reponses, no time, bu.

Jasjit says nothing about demated warheads.

Well, you can either have them mated or de-mated. Is there another option (outside of George Perkovich, below)? He could not have meant mate them for sure, I think we can agree on that.

Jasjit Singh wrote that back in 1998 long before India had even declared an arsenal and he was saying that the arsenal should be there first before any type of deterrence can be there

Yes, it predated Indian arsenal, by design.

George Perkovich had his "Non-Weaponized Deterrence", while JS had his "Recessed Deterrence".

The diff, as I recall, was that GP wanted nations to have everything, but stop short of weaponizing (and not build any missiles that carry nukes and a few more) (there is more to this).

JS on the other hand stated that go ahead and build all components, including he warheads, but keep them separate. And, I think GoI has followed this. ????? Also I recall a claim that Gen. K. Sundarji supported JS. Need to dig out some of these articles, but you can google on Jasjit and de-mate and see a number of articles.

[ShauryaT]

The operational use and management of the doctrine undergoes forced changes with evolving capabilities. AC Jasjit Singh or COAS K. Sunderji's words spoken then can be only of limited use today. e.g: Many used to use sunderji's support for a minimal nuclear arsenal as support for the position that India does not need a TN based arsenal. However, as time went by Sunderji did change his views, in support for TN tests.

So, let us not fight too much over what AC Jasjit Singh wrote.

[ramana]

OK. If DC crowd can attend this event, it may shed some light.
A Global Reality Check on Nuclear Security

Progress has been made in recent years to prevent the theft of weapons-useable nuclear material around the world, but some of these materials remain dangerously vulnerable. At a time of rising risk from the self-proclaimed Islamic State and other groups, governments must redouble their efforts to prevent nuclear weapons from getting into the hands of terrorists. Ahead of the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, a new report presents a stark choice: will the world recommit to continuous improvement in strengthening nuclear security, or will efforts decline and the danger of nuclear terrorism grow?

Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William Tobey of the Harvard Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom will launch the new report, Nuclear Security: A Global Reality Check. Carnegie’s Toby Dalton will moderate.

Its one of the fear mongering seminars.

First of all its nuke science to set off something after getting the stuff.
Secondly its next to impossible to set off a stolen device.

The real problem is the plausible deniability given by US and its chatteratti to rogue nation states to 'lose' their weapons to non state terrorists.


So Belfer center is better spend its time on how to retract the sorcerer's apprentice.

[JE Menon]

The tone of the conference via a vis India was probably set by the Adrian Levy articles. Hence the timing. There will probably be an equal equal during it, and talk of Hindu nationalism and such like.

For balance, somebody will say something of our non proliferation virtues.

Some good chai biskoot will be served, some will get to stay at nice hotels and catch up with old friends and some conference one-night stands will happen with jokes about aging involved.

[kit]

Maybe GOI feels the time is right and priorities are different ? ... also developing India 's own "pakistans" (the plural) ..in china's neighbourhood is a good strategic move .. and by "development " I mean nuclear !

[RoyG]

The tone of the conference via a vis India was probably set by the Adrian Levy articles. Hence the timing. There will probably be an equal equal during it, and talk of Hindu nationalism and such like.

For balance, somebody will say something of our non proliferation virtues.

Some good chai biskoot will be served, some will get to stay at nice hotels and catch up with old friends and some conference one-night stands will happen with jokes about aging involved.

Bingo.

Btw, Vipin Narang is a Sheldon Pollock cheerleader. Funny thing is, he doesn't know why. Doesn't take away from his work on nuclear strategy though.

[RoyG]

It is good to have some Indics in American academia and think tanks to balance the complete foreigner dominated views on Indian programs. Best is to have our own resident experts to articulate but then we need real research institutions, where such people can live and work. Key thing to note, Indian political leaders slept through from at least 77-89, as Pakistan was weaponizing. My guesstimate is Pakistan had a weapon by 1984 and a way to deliver by 1987.

Interesting point by one female voice that India sought nuclear guarantees from both US and USSR simultaneously after 1964. Shastri's name was mentioned for after 65. If someone knows more about this, please post.

They all have a problem analyzing strategy because they don't understand the aims of the Secular State within India and Islamic State (Pak Army) within Pakistan.

Parasites by nature are realists and view the host itself as the primary threat. TacNW should be seen within this prism.

TacNW achieve 4 objectives:

1) Threatens provincial secessionists within host country w/ severe sickness if parasite faces permanent removal. (Shiv, we should study the rationale and outcome of Syria's chemical weapon use within its own territory)

2) Allows for deployment flexibility to counter foreign aggressor.

3) Force multiplier in that it quickly mobilizes diplomatic and military resources of world powers like the US and China against foreign aggressor.

4) Added psychological barrier for political leadership of aggressor country.

Pakistan will have advance warning of Indian incursions across IB. All they would need to do is fire 1-2 off in Balochistan to terminate conflict. They already have 100+ nukes facing us. They've already maxed out the utility of their offensive doctrine.

[ramana]

- However when submarines are the preferred mode of response, the option of de-mating goes away for subs have to come back to shore for such mating process. In a war the shore base could be vaporised.

So think of subs on patrol like those bombers on sortie with mated warheads to ensure retaliation, only the sub patrol is longer.

Ramana - this is perfectly logical from the point of view of deterrence.

It is illogical from the point of view of India's stated wimp-like view on nuclear weapons as not being weapons of warfighting which means that nuclear weapons should never be ready for use.

How many of our babus and politicians subscribe to this viewpoint? What clout do they have?

When you have people questioning the rationale for massive retaliation, and calling for a change or modification of doctrine in view of Pakistan's "Tactical Nuclear Weapons" it appears to me like someone is saying "Pakistan does not intend to use a massive nuclear attack on India. They are just protecting themselves. As long as we don't attack them, they are not going to attack us. So if it comes to a war-like situation, it is not good to have hot heads holding ready to use nuclear weapons"

Now you know and I know that the sentence I have posted above is bullshit. We cannot trust Pakistan to be kind to us. A decapitating strike is quite possible given the depth of hatred. This obviously means that weapons must be kept ready and mated. But do you see what I am trying to say. The fact that weapons must be kept "ready and mated" is obvious to us.

It has been obvious to us for over a decade now, but for over a decade we have never asked if nukes are mated or not in our Agni, Prithvis and air bases. In the last decade we never asked if nukes are mated. This thread is now 7 years old. Not in a single page has this question come up. We have all been sitting pretty and not paying attention to the fact that none of our nuclear weapons to date may be mated and ready. We have simply assumed that they must be ready or will be made ready soon enough. Now, after all these years we have got an Arihant and we are saying that we are now "really really ready".

If someone posts the argument "Hey the nukes have been demated all these years and deterrence has held perfectly well. What makes you think that it is necessary for Arihant to carry mated missiles all the time? You were not worried for the last 10-15 years? Why are you suddenly so concerned?". What is the answer to that?

Are we really ready? Who says we are? All of us have been content to think that the decision making apparatus has got its act together all these years. The question boils down to this:

1. If our nuclear doctrine has been unaffected by the doubting Thomases then we already have a mechanism to keep our land based nukes nearly ready. That is, the Army and Air Force already have procedures in place to rapidly use nuclear weapons should the need arise. The doubtful nonsense about keeping cores away from warheads has already been dispensed with. All that remains is for the Navy to join the group with their own ready to use nuclear weapon.

2. If, on the other hand we still have a policy of keeping cores separate, then it means that a new policy will have to be made for Navy alone, enabling Navy to have access to ready to fire "mated" nukes with the same old lethargy and diffidence affects the question of warheads for Army and Air Force delivered weapons? Will that have to be changed in future. Suddenly, with the coming of Arihant, are we going to see a new posture of greater readiness?

There is a huge difference and for this it is best to ignore the navy for now - because the nuke sub is only now coming online.

Imagine that we have ready to fire Prithvis, Agnis and Air dropped nuclear weapons. These must be stored securely and I assume that they are stored in places where they can be attended to by both the concerned armed force and the nuclear engineers. In case of hostilities - say something like Kargil there will be set procedures to move out these ready to use weapons to areas of deployment where they can be used. There is no question of "mating" them

If on the other hand the warheads are not mated then we still have the same secure storage, but one extra step is added - in fact many steps probably. In case of a national emergency and a political decision made to deploy nukes, the nuclear engineers have to mate the fissile cores with the warheads and the warheads have to be loaded on to the delivery vehicles. If this is the existing system it would be absurd not to change once the Arihant gets deployed with nuclear missiles.

Right now we only have hints and suggestions that tell both stories. One story is that we have ready to use nukes. The other story is that they are still de-mated. I have posted articles that say both things. I understand the argument that says, "It is better to be ambiguous and keep our opponents guessing. Why should they know anything more than the fact that they will be vaporized if they cross our nuclear red lines"

But my argument is surely, if our nuclear doctrine is massive retaliation then there is no harm in openly admitting that we will have ready to use nukes. There is no harm in pointing out that we have ready to use nukes even when there is no crisis. Giving the impression that our nukes may not be ready because there is no crisis at the moment is a bad idea. It actually degrades deterrence. But that idea is out there doing the rounds in a thousand conferences, meetings and articles. if that idea is wrong then someone in authority must say it out loud and not simply give vague hint-hint wink-wink from which we are supposed to understand and feel reassured.

Gen Sunderji wrote a series of articles in early 1990s before the NPT extension conference to address what is needed for deterrence. And concluded one has to be prepared for nuclear war fighting for credible deterrence.
First step is to have weapons.
As a result PVNR got ready to test in 1995 but did not as US satellites had seen the test preparation and the shock value would be lost. Still the devices were in the shafts and the 13 day ABV govt was told to get it finished. However the short lived govt had no chance of winning the vote of confidence and the successor govt would have to face the flak. So again it was differed. Deva Gowda order more shafts to be built.
Finally in 1998, ABV govt ordered the tests and weaponised. No more peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) stuff.
So after the doctrine was put in place and a series of delivery systems were developed and deployed.
During Kargil there were reports of India having readied some Prithvi and an Agni.
In Operation Parakram, the IN ship with Dhanush was deployed of Karachi and was not carrying flowers or jalebis.
So very clearly there was war fighting capability operationalized.

So I don't know what this wimpy war fighting is all about?
Coming to the other things in your post.

Separated cores is bakwas. Reason is there have to be numerous electrical tests need to be conducted prior to handing over an assembled weapon. And no field facility can do such a thing.
However such fiction is good for policy wonks to chatter about.

As for air delivered weapons, please go read WOP where Gen Sunderji is quoted about visiting a storage area where such weapons are stored.

As I said Arihant changes everything hence the angst. It changes because the weapons have to be mated and sent undersea. So how will they communicate. Some angst is there and has to be addressed by sea trials.

When Arihant goes on deterrent patrol as Admiral Nirmal Verma assured us long ago all this angst will go away.

Also note the payload weights for A-I, A-4, A-5 and K-4. All are heavy mofos over 1 tonne i.e.> 2240 lbs.

So they are war enders.

Its a new era or yuga.

PS: Are you piskoing or have real feedback?

[ShauryaT]

Bharat Karnad Reports:

Just learned that the test firing of the canisterized Agni-5 that was earlier scheduled for yesterday and postponed virtually at the last hour, has now been cancelled altogether, at least in the present time window. This decision at the highest levels of govt was owing to Washington’s supposed allergy to rising powers displaying their distant strike capabilities. The K-4 SLBM fired from a moored underwater pontoon tube system tested March 8 was, unlike the A-5, not in a ready state of induction. A-5, hermetically sealed in a canister with a dummy warhead, was set to be launched from its mobile platform to its full range, whence the Modi PMO’s hesitation.

[habal]

why is this guy Modi so sensitive to takleef's of usa, he doesn't mind charging sky high prices for $32/barrel gasoline or taxing EPF doesn't make any shame. Only american allergy travel's through his antenna. And he is supposed to be India's war time PM. So this is it.

[ramana]

habal, We need to know more about this Washington conference? What are its objectives and who all attend it?

[ShauryaT]

>> Bharat Karnad
>>But New Delhi seems content only with occasionally tom-tomming India’s ICBM and thermonuclear punch when, in fact, absence of evidence indicates evidence of absence of any such capabilities.

A skeptical public and media stance is essential to keep the powers in check. Power corrupts and those in power often lie. Be they political, bureaucracy or military. The public should seek evidence to the degree possible, it can be shared. India is not going to become a respected power and more importantly defend her interests by tip-toeing around the interests of great powers. One word confrontation and many times, just the willingness to do so can make the difference between a strong and weak power.

Rethinking Mao's infamous statement in the 60's on the willingness to loose 300 million people, even if that guy was 1% serious, he knew that 99% this will never come to be. A risk worth taking in his view to send a clear message that China will not be subdued by nuclear threats. I am providing some extreme examples here but hopefully the point is clear. India needs to be able to take confrontational positions on some issues. But she also needs to up her game and double her defense spending (it is a 1.7% of GDP today). Where is my Nationalist government? Need a way for government to pay political costs for not heeding to the needs of national security. It is the only way they will listen.

[habal]

ramana'ji i'm hearing about this from you. I will ask somebody who may know.

[TSJones]

Modi wants India to do unrestricted business with the US where India has large favorable trade balance(one of the few) . This really, really matters to him.

[shaun]

Separated cores is bakwas. Reason is there have to be numerous electrical tests need to be conducted prior to handing over an assembled weapon. And no field facility can do such a thing.
However such fiction is good for policy wonks to chatter about.

Ramana saab , maybe what you are telling is the actual status but deployment of missiles doesn't necessarily means it is nuclear tipped . As far as warhead not mated with the delivery system well there can be three different scenarios ,

*First, weapons, (frame and core kept separately at the storage facility) at the military units, to be mated with the delivery systems only within a matter of a few hours.

* Second, weapons (core plus frame) stored at military bases for rapid mating with the delivery systems

* Third, weapons (fissile cores minus frame), kept in the storage, to be mated rapidly with the frame readily mounted on the delivery systems.

Though the First scenario may need more time than the Second, the two cases may involve higher risks of accidents or technical errors at the time of “quick” requirements. So the most plausible status is the third scenario.

credit http://www.southasiaanalysis.org

[Prem]

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... outh-asia/
Nuclear Security Summit and South Asia

In his speech in Prague in 2009, President Obama touched on an important subject for the first time. He talked about security against nuclear terror, meaning securing nuclear arsenals against falling in the hands of non-State actors. A year later, the first meeting of stakeholders (NSS) numbering no fewer than 53, was held in Washington to deliberate and gradually inch towards a consensus formula of how nuclear arsenals could be safeguarded.The fourth and perhaps the final meeting of the NSS, to which India and Pakistan have also been invited, is to be held in Washington 31 March-1 April, 2016. President Putin of Russia has declined to participate.…Pakistan was making small tactical nuclear weapons was clear to the world from the day Pakistan started its missile programme.India and Pakistan, two nuclear countries in South Asia count fairly well in the deliberations and in the decision l .likely to come out of the final round of talks.In a news briefing in Washington in the third week of October 2015, Pakistan foreign secretary, Aizaz Chaudhury disclosed for the first time that his country had made low-yield nuclear tactical weapons “for use in the event of a sudden attack by its larger neighbor.”Two days later, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with President Obama. Reports are that they talked about Pakistan’s nuclear programme including Afghanistan and militant groups such as the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba both on banned organizations list of the US.
Quoting Pervez Hoodhbhoy, a nuclear physicist and independent security analyst based in Lahore, BBC reported in a news commentary on October 21, 2015, "The fact that Pakistan was making small tactical nuclear weapons was clear to the world from the day Pakistan started its missile programme. It meant that Pakistan had developed low – yield nuclear warheads to be delivered by those missiat short ranges in a battlefield having localized impact, unlike big bombs designed to destroy cities.”
Experts say that the 2011 testing of nuclear-capable Nasr missile by Pakistan with a 60 kilometers range was an indication that Pakistan was building an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons for use in a theater of war.Hasan Askari Rizvi, suspects that Pakistan may have designed even smaller nuclear weapons, capable of being shot from a specially-designed . at short ranges in a battlefield having localized impact, unlike big bombs designed to destroy cities.”
According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pakistan could have 350 nuclear warheads in the next decade, becoming the world’s third biggest nuclear power, outpacing India, France, China and the UK.
It is clear that Pakistan has decided to use nuclear option in case of war with India and that it is not ruling out the possibility of hosting Taliban for whatever purposes.What then should be the foremost agenda of the 4th NSS meeting in Washington on 31 March? Obviously, it should be a detailed review of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in the backdrop of how Islamabad tries to justify its relentless effort of increasing nuclear stockpile including limited tactical nuclear weapon.However, deeper study in the scenario throws up contradiction in the words and practice of the US. The joint statement issued by Kerry and Sartaj after the conclusion of strategic dialogue belies the stated intentions of the US. The joint statement is a long eulogy on the “achievements” of Pakistan in meeting the challenge of the terrorists in the northern part of the country. John Kerry had full-throated praises and encomiums for Pakistani army fighting the “terrorists” in Pakistan’s north but but not a single word or hint about the terrorist engines on Pakistani soil working against India and Afghanistan. Proliferation of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and induction of tactical nuclear weapons in that arsenal did not figure in their joint statement.
In other words Kerry means to say that only the Taliban and Al Qaeda outfits who are fighting against Pakistan in KP region are the terrorists Pakistan should fight against and the scores of other terrorist groups in Pakistan are outside the pale of terrorism. Mumbai attack and recent attack on Pathankot airbase are no terrorist activities for him. Sale of nuclear powered 8 F-16s apart, the Obama administration in February 2015 asked the US Congress to provide more than $ 1 billion in aid to Pakistan including a six fold increase in foreign military financing. The budget proposal described Pakistan as a “strategically important nation” and the proposed US assistance “will strengthen its military in fight against extremism, will increase safety of nuclear installations”.This lays bare the double speak of the US on much trumpeted NSS which President Obama has invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi to participate.All this notwithstanding, BBC said in its commentary of 9 March that there are suggestions that US may offer Pakistan membership of the Nuclear Supplies Group, with legitimate access to available research and technology, in return for some curbs on fissile material production an its missile programme. Sartaj Aziz already reacted by saying that Pakistan will not accept any unilateral curbs unless same are a

[ramana]

So its' a Nuclear Stakeholders meeting to which Russia with largest arsenal outside US is not attending. And is 4th such meeting in Obama's term.

Looks like a bakwas meeting to underwrite TSP nukes.
If they get 350 weapons they are the world's problem.

Recall what I said right after Chagai tests.