Bharat Rakshak

devesh wrote:what is the Kurdish stance toward the Sunni agenda? specifically, the Saudi sponsored Sunni agenda? or even the Turkish version? a lot of depends on them. if the Kurds can be kept away from zealotry of the Sunnis, there could be a paradigm change in the ME.

devesh wrote:lot of water has passed under the bridge. now, the Kurds are a people with a victim narrative. I am seriously asking this: is Kurdish society pro or anti-Saudi-Sunni nexus?

is Kurdish society pro or anti-Saudi-Sunni nexus?

Life returned to central Aleppo, an AFP reporter said, in stark contrast with the Syrian city's rebel-held outskirts where activists reported renewed bombardments and food shortages on Tuesday.

Shops were open for business and residents went about their errands in the city centre, while fighting raged in the east, west and south of the country's commercial capital.

But, after more than a month of violence in Aleppo, the frustration was palpable nonetheless.

"People just walk down the street and look at our merchandise, shirts and pants, but very few are buying because they fear for the future," said 25-year-old shopkeeper Abdu al-Ghafoor.

"Instead, they buy clothing and backpacks for the school year," he told AFP.

Ongoing violence in the northern city and elsewhere in Syria have cast doubt on whether schools can actually be re-opened in conflict-hit areas of the country.

In rebel strongholds of the city, activists spoke of ongoing shortages.

"The regime prevents food from reaching the liberated areas [under rebel control]. Residents are forced to smuggle products from neighbourhood to neighbourhood," Barra, an activist in the opposition bastion of Sakhur, told AFP.

"When I buy something, I have to go to several grocery stores and supermarkets before finding what I want. Eggs, yogurt, rice and childrens' milk are almost non-existent. Markets are almost empty," he said via Skype.

Bombing intense

"It's difficult to find gas canisters also... It's a real siege, collective punishment," said the activist. "If the regime could deprive us of air, it would."

According to Barra, "garbage is everywhere and people are trying to clean what they can, but the bombing is so intense."

On Tuesday, the activist said several districts were bombarded with artillery and rounds of mortar fire as was an area near Aleppo airport, on the edge of Nayrab district in the southwest of the city.

In Salaheddin district, a rebel was killed in clashes with government forces, while a civilian was killed by sniper fire in the southern area of Sukari, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said.

The Britain-based watchdog also reported army shelling of Izaa, next to Saif al-Dawla in the city's southwest.

State television reported that a "unit of the armed forces killed five terrorists, including a sniper, behind a building for immigration and passports in the Old City" of Aleppo.

On Monday, a senior commander in charge of the government's five-week military assault on Aleppo predicted his forces would recapture the city from rebels within 10 days.

Elsewhere in Aleppo province, shelling killed two girls and an attack on an army checkpoint left four soldiers dead.

In Damascus, fighting erupted in the Yarmuk Palestinian refugee camp overnight between rebels and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Observatory said.

Two thirds civilians

Panicked residents fled the camp in droves, said the Syrian Revolution General Council, an activist network.

On Tuesday, the Observatory reported fierce bombardment by troops of the Damascus suburb of Deir al-Asafir.

In the central city of Hama, regime forces closed off roads to Al-Fraya neighbourhood and stormed the area, killing 12 men including an army defector, it said.

Elsewhere in central Syria, a 15-year-old rebel was killed during clashes in Old Homs, in a city which has been devastated by shelling since the early days of the revolt.

Violent clashes also raged in the eastern city of Deir Ezzor as rebels battled for control of a military security headquarters, costing the lives of three rebels and eight troops, according to the Observatory.

Two rebels died in fighting elsewhere in Deir Ezzor, two civilians - including a child - died in the southern province of Daraa, and a man was killed in the northeastern province of Idlib at an army checkpoint, bringing Tuesday's initial toll to at least 37 dead.

The watchdog says more than 26 000 people have been killed overall in Syria since the revolt against President Bashar Assad's rule broke out in March 2011, more than two-thirds of them civilians.

Foreign Islamists intent on turning Syria into an autocratic theocracy have swollen the ranks of rebels fighting to topple President Bashar Assad and think they are waging a "holy war," a French surgeon who treated fighters in Aleppo has said.

Jacques Beres, co-founder of medical charity Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), returned from Syria on Friday evening after spending two weeks working clandestinely in a hospital in the besieged northern Syrian city.

In an interview with Reuters in his central Paris apartment on Saturday, the 71-year-old said that contrary to his previous visits to Homs and Idlib earlier this year about 60 percent of those he had treated this time had been rebel fighters and that at least half of them had been non-Syrian.

"It's really something strange to see. They are directly saying that they aren't interested in Bashar Assad's fall, but are thinking about how to take power afterward and set up an Islamic state with sharia law to become part of the world Emirate," the doctor said.

The foreign jihadists included young Frenchmen who said they were inspired by Mohammed Merah, a self-styled Islamist militant from Toulouse, who killed seven people in March in the name of al-Qaida. The seven people included three soldiers from North African immigrant families, a rabbi and three Jewish children.

Assad himself has consistently maintained that the 17-month-old insurgency against him is largely the work of people he refers to as "foreign-backed terrorists" and says his forces are acting to restore stability.

During his previous visits to Syria - in March and May - Beres said he had dismissed suggestions the rebels were dominated by Islamist fighters but he said he had now been forced to reassess the situation.

The doctor's account corroborates other anecdotal evidence that the struggle against Assad appears to be drawing ever greater numbers of fellow Arabs and other Muslims, many driven by a sense of religious duty to perform jihad (holy war) and a readiness to suffer for Islam.

But while some are professional "jihadists," veterans of Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya or Libya who bring combat and bomb-making skills with them that alarm the Western and Arab governments which have cheered the rebels on, many have little to offer Syrians but their goodwill and prayers.

Beres described treating dozens of such jihadists from other Arab countries, but also at least two young Frenchmen.

Paris has for several years been concerned that French radical Islamists who have travelled to lawless zones would return to plot attacks at home. Merah had travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan to receive training.

Indiscriminate bombing

On his previous trips he worked in makeshift hospitals, but this time Beres said he received as many as 40 injured people each day in a normal hospital that was under rebel control in the economic hub Aleppo.

He said he had treated civilians who had been queuing for bread at a market place when it had been shelled.

"The baker was killed. He was a thin man completely covered in white flour with shrapnel holes and blood all over. It was a striking and troubling image," he said.

"What people have to know is that the number of dead is a far cry from what's been announced. I'd say you have to multiply by two to get the real figure."

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights says that more than 23,000 people have been killed in the uprising. More than 200,000 Syrians have fled to neighboring Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon.

Beres, who entered Syria via Turkey's northern border, said he had also seen signs that Ankara was trying to stop Syrians crossing the border.

Showing his muddied surgical case, shoes and clothes, Beres said that Turkish forces had flooded the Reyhanli border area with water making it difficult for refugees to cross unnoticed.

"We were caught by the Turkish army. It took us 20 hours to cross the border and I was fined $500 for crossing the border illegally. They flooded the border completely so that they can hear who is crossing. Those they do catch they are sending back," he said.

The Syrian crisis is the next test of the relationship between Russia and the West. In this respect the degree of Russia’s firmness in support of the regime of Bashar Assad and Moscow’s willingness to escalate the situation with Western nations came as a surprise both to Western capitals and foreign observers, especially in light of Russia’s “acquiescence” in the foreign intervention in Libya at the beginning of 2011.

This makes clarifying the motives for the Russian response to events in Syria rather interesting. Western observers and the mass media sought in their characteristic manner to explain the Russian position by predominantly focusing on Moscow’s desire to keep its supply and maintenance base in Tartus or to profit from the sale of Russian arms to Syria. Upon closer examination, however, it is precisely these factors that appear doubtful, although it is worth examining them in greater detail.

Russian arms exports to Syria

From the mid-seventies (after Egypt “fell out” of the USSR’s orbit) Syria, as the most faithful and key ally of the USSR in the Middle East, was probably the largest recipient of Soviet weapons outside the Warsaw Treaty Organization. As a result, Syria was able to establish a strong military almost completely outfitted with relatively modern (at the time) Soviet weaponry. Moreover, shipments of arms and military equipment were made at least partially on credit.

After the collapse of the USSR, the brakes were put on military and technical cooperation (MTC) between Moscow and Syria because Damascus did not have sufficient funds of its own for new large-scale purchases of weapons, and the Russian leadership insisted that Syria acknowledge its Soviet-era debts (estimated at 13.4 billion dollars in 2005). An additional factor that complicated MTC with Syria was Russia’s desire to improve relations with Israel and with Western countries, which led to caution over shipments to Syria.

For this reason, by 1997 only insignificant contracts were under way with Syria. However, Syria keenly wanted to receive modern weapons for its large but obsolescent army and was seeking to garner Russia’s political support, and Moscow did not want to lose the Syrian market, so a compromise was struck in 1997 at a Russo-Syrian intergovernmental commission on MTC. In December 1998 this commission agreed on terms of payments for the shipment of special equipment and the provision of technical assistance. As a result, Russia was able to send Syria a large shipment of AKS-74U and AK-74M assault rifles, grenade launchers, and various types of ammunition. At the time all shipments were being made purely on a commercial basis.

In 1998-1999, the Tula Instrument Design Bureau (KBP), which at the time was a special exporter (that is, it had a license for the independent export of its goods without the need for state intermediaries) entered into a number of contracts with Syria for Metis-M (AT-13) and Kornet-E (AT 14) antitank missile systems. Later Syria made new purchases of these systems from KBP and Rosoboroneksport – it is known that in 2005 a fifth contract for the Kornet-E had already been concluded.

Between 1998 and 2001 Russia and Syria held intensive high-level talks during which the Syrians submitted purchase requests for a large quantity of various missile defense systems, combat aircraft, helicopters, armor, etc. However, in view of the fact that the Syrian debt problem had not been settled, major contracts were not concluded with the exception of relatively minor agreements to repair equipment the Syrians already had.

It was only in January 2005 that an agreement was reached to write off 70% of Syria’s foreign debt to Russia which, at that time, constituted 13.4 billion dollars. As a result of the talks it was reduced to 3.6 billion dollars. In all likelihood one of the conditions for writing off the debt was Syria’s commitment to enter into contracts for the purchase of a large shipment of Russian arms on a commercial basis at a fixed price (a method later used by Moscow with Algeria and Libya).

In January 2005 the Syrians had already concluded agreements to purchase Strelets antiaircraft modules with missiles from the Igla (SA-18 and SA-24) MANPAD system. In order to tamp down the concern of Western countries and Israel over such shipments, Russia demonstratively cancelled (supposedly on the personal instructions of Vladimir Putin) the expected contract for supplying Syria with the Iskander-E (SS-26) tactical ballistic missile system. Taking into account that the Iskander was ready for full-scale serial production no earlier than 2011, this action was, to all appearances, a transparent political ploy with the goal of persuading Israel that its concerns were being listened to while continuing shipments to Syria of less “politically provocative” arms.

Under the terms of the Russian-Syrian arrangements of 2005, in late 2006 and early 2007 Syria concluded a package of major contracts with Rosoboroneksport to purchase Russian arms worth some 4.5 billion dollars, and this defines the nature of Russian-Syrian MTC up to the present day. The signing per se of the contracts and their content was not reported publicly, and to this day the Russian authorities and Rosoboroneksport are extremely sensitive about information on these contracts, sometimes even denying their very existence. According to available data, these contracts include:

Eight MiG-31E heavy interceptor-fighters at a cost of up to 250 million dollars. This was both the first and so far the sole export contract for MiG-31 airplanes. The airplanes were supposed to be manufactured from remaining Soviet stock at the OJSC Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft-building Plant “Sokol.” Work was begun but in May of 2009 the contract was cancelled (or suspended) for political reasons – apparently, because of Israel’s concerns. Not a single plane was shipped.

Twelve MiG-29M/M2 fighters (with an option for another 12) worth up to 600 million dollars. This is the first contract for the new modification of the MiG-29 fighters that in their present form are the land-based analog of the MiG-29K carrier-based fighters being shipped to India. The work is being done by RAC MiG (JSC) which was able, with Syrian funds, to do the R&D work for the MiG-29M/M2. At the end of 2011 the MiG-29M and the MiG-29M2 (a two-seater) were built from the same development prototype, and serial production of twelve aircraft began. According to available information, the shipment of the first consignment (and possibly of even all twelve aircraft) to Syria is planned for the end of 2012. For the time being, the fate of the option for twelve more planes has not been decided. The aircraft are supposed to be supplied with air-to-air and air-to-surface aircraft guided missile armaments produced by Tactical Missiles Corporation.

Eight battalions (two brigade) of the Buk-M2E (SA 17) medium-range air defense missile system worth one billion dollars. Syria was the first customer for this modification of the air defense missile system. The contractor is the OJSC Almaz-Antey Missile Defense Concern and the manufacturer of the systems is the OJSC Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant. The first two battalions were shipped to Syria in 2010, presumably two more in 2011, and the completion of shipments is planned for 2012-2013.

Up to 12 battalions of the modernized S-125-2M Pechora-2M (SA-3B Mod) medium-range air defense missile system worth about 200 million dollars. The contractor is the Russian-Belarusian OJSC Financial and Industrial Group Defense Systems. The first four battalions were shipped to Syria in 2011 and four more were sent to Syria aboard the Alaed cargo ship in 2012.

36 launchers of the Pantsir-S1 (SA-22) missile-artillery air defense weapon system worth 700 million dollars. The manufacturer is OJSC Tula Instrument Design Bureau. Shipments of the launchers began in 2008 but so far only 12 have been shipped. The contract should be completed in 2013.

Two battalions of the K-300P Bastion-P (SSC-5) mobile coastal anti-ship missile system with 36 Yakhont K-310 (SS-N-26) supersonic anti-ship missiles worth 250 million dollars. The contractor is OJSC NPO Mashinostroyenia Corporation. One battalion was shipped in 2010, the second in 2011.

An unknown number of Khrizantema-S (AT-15) tank destroyer missile systems (on BMP-3 chassis). The contractor is the OJSC Kurganmashzavod . In all likelihood, the shipment has not yet taken place.

Shipment of Igla-S (SA-24) portable air-defense missile systems (including, possibly, the Strelets as part of a package). The manufacturer is OJSC Degtiarev Plant. Presumably, all shipments were made in 2008-2010.

Modernization of 1,000 T-72 tanks worth one billion dollars. The contractor is the OJSC Uralvagonzavod Research and Production Corporation using a Syrian repair facility. Presumably work began only in 2011 and so far substantial progress has not been made.

Subsequently, in 2007-2008 Syria concluded a number of contracts with Rosoboroneksport to repair and modernize the aviation equipment of the Syrian Air Force: 15 Su 24MK front-line bombers (the contractor is the OJSC 514th Aircraft Repair Depot in Rzhev and work began in 2010), a certain number of MiG-29 fighters in their modernized MiG-29SM version (the contractor is the OJSC MiG Russian Aircraft Construction Corporation and the first four planes were modernized in 2011), repair of a certain number of MiG 23MLD fighters (the contractors are the OJSC MiG Russian Aircraft Construction Corporation and the OJSC 275th Aircraft Repair Depot in Krasnodar, and in 2011 seven planes were repaired), and the repair of 20 Mi-25 attack helicopters and two Ka-28 anti-submarine helicopters. The first four Mi-25 helicopters were repaired by the OJSC Rostvertol in 2008, but in 2009, because of disagreements about price, the helicopter repair contract was transferred to the OJSC 150th Aircraft Repair Depot in Kaliningrad, where 16 Mi-25s and two Ka-28s were repaired by 2012 (the last three Mi-25s are supposed to be delivered to Syria on the Alaed ).

Since 2009 there has been a shipment of supersonic Kh-31A (AS-17) supersonic anti-ship missiles and Kh 31P antiradar missiles made by the OJSC Tactical Missiles Corporation (it is known that in 2009-2010, 87 missiles were shipped for a sum of 80 million dollars).

In September 2010 Syria signed a contract to supply four S-300PMU2 (SA-20B) air defense missile systems (the two parties on the two systems/battalions), produced by OJSC Concern PVO Almaz-Antey, with an estimated value of up to 800 million dollars.

Finally, in December 2011 Rosoboroneksport entered into a contract to ship 36 Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft to Syria for a minimum of 550 million dollars. However, information from the designated contractor (OJSC Irkut Corporation) says the contract has so far not been approved by the Russian government and has not gone into effect.

In 2005-2011 considerable shipments of Russian military vehicles, including Ural and Sadko trucks, were made to Syria.

Altogether, since 2006 approximately 6 billion dollars worth of contracts have been concluded with Syria for the shipment of arms and military equipment and for associated shipments and work (repair, shipments of spare parts and munitions, etc.). In this regard, Syria put the emphasis in its purchases on modernizing its air force and air defense. Despite widespread reports that Syria was fairly punctual with its payments, fulfillment of most of the contracts was clearly dragged out; moreover, in most cases it was clearly dragged out by Russia for political reasons and the contract for the MiG-31E was cancelled. In 2012 it was reported that Russia had suspended the delivery to Syria of the first batch of the S-300PMU-2 systems. As a result, it is estimated that so far Syria has received shipments of approximately one billion dollars of the aforementioned amount, of which 560 million dollars worth were shipped in 2011. This constitutes 5% of Russian defense exports in 2011, making Syria a significant but far from key recipient of Russian arms.

Owing to Russian procrastination on a number of shipments, their commercial profitability for the producers is questionable. According to our estimates, in 2012 Syria will receive another 500 million dollars worth of Russian arms at the very most, unless shipments of MiG-29M/M2 fighters and S-300PMU2 air defense missile systems start at the end of the year.

It is noteworthy that Russian did not sell Syria such weapons systems as the Iskander-E missile system, and has not fulfilled the contract for MiG-31E interceptors and S-300MPU2 air defense missile systems. Thus, from the very beginning Russia has conducted a policy of refusing to sign any weapons deals with Syria which Israel and the West would find very objectionable; essentially it has never been prepared to supply Damascus with the most powerful weapons systems. The restraint in shipping MANPADS to Syria as well as the general policy of delaying a number of military shipments to the country is apparently in the same vein.

It is obvious that from the very beginning Russia has subordinated its MTC with Syria to its political relations with the West, even to the detriment of its commercial interests and political ties with Damascus. For Russia, MTC with Syria does not have that great a significance either in the commercial or military-technical sense. If future shipments to Syria are disrupted, it is more than likely that Rosoboroneksport will be able to resell all the equipment ordered by the Syrians (above all the most expensive items – MiG-29M/M2 fighters, S-300MPU-2 and Buk-M2E air defense missile systems, and Pantsir-S1 systems) to third countries and minimize its own losses. If the Assad regime manages to suppress the uprising, then Syria, subjected to Western sanctions and seriously weakened economically, will scarcely be able to continue making major purchases of Russian arms under new contracts. In either case Russia cannot view Syria as an especially important partner in terms of MTC, and the impact of Russian military shipments to Damascus on Russia’s overall policy on Syria is probably insignificant.

The Facility in Tartus

The Russian Navy’s 720th supply and maintenance base in the Syrian port of Tartus has been in operation since 1977 (the agreement on its use was concluded in 1971), and at present it is the sole Russian military facility outside the borders of the former USSR. Although this facility is a major topic of Western speculation regarding Syria, its actual military and operational significance is quite negligible.

The supply and maintenance base in Tartus basically comprises two floating docks with a couple of warehouses, a barracks, and several buildings on the shore. On a permanent rotation basis in Tartus there is one of the Black Sea Fleet’s repair ship, which comes from Sevastopol for a six-month period. The shore complement of the base numbers no more than 50 seamen. The facility itself is completely unsuited as a permanent base and is designed only for brief port calls by no more than 1-2 vessels to resupply. The base lacks any defenses.

In general, the supply and maintenance base in Tartus has more symbolic than practical significance for the Russian Navy. The facility cannot provide support for the deployment of any kind of significant naval group in the Mediterranean Sea, and visits to it even by Russian vessels in the Mediterranean, according to available data, are made more for demonstrative purposes than out of a genuine need to replenish supplies.

The loss of the supply and maintenance base in Tartus would not have a serious impact on Russian naval activities. In all likelihood, the fate of the Tartus base, like the question of Syrian-Russian MTC, is far from being the main decisive motive in Russia’s policy on Syria; it is just one item on the total list of “Russian interests” in that country.

Russian motivation

Russian policy toward Syria essentially amounts to supporting the current Bashar Assad regime and preventing foreign military intervention to overthrow him under the Libyan scenario. It is essentially based on a fairly broad consensus in the political and academic communities and among the broader public. Russian President Putin is acting here in his customary role of implementer of a “firm” “consensus” policy “in defense of Russian interests” and “limiting the high-handedness of the West.”

Unquestionably, for Putin motives of preservation also play a role to some extent; his authoritarian regime is also encountering a groundswell of protest at home, and this protest finds political approval and support from the West. Putin cannot help but sympathize with Assad as a fellow authoritarian ruler fighting against “foreign interference in internal affairs.” However, as experience shows, Putin is too pragmatic and opportunistic to make such ideological credos the cornerstone of his policy.

What is most important here for the Russian authorities is precisely the existing consensus of the political and academic (“expert”) elite, which boils down to the demand to “not lose Syria.” It is widely believed in Russia that the collapse of the Assad regime would mean the final loss of Moscow’s last client and ally in the Middle East, the total loss of its last foothold in the regime, and the final rollback of even the illusory traces of former Soviet might there. Syria is looked upon as one of the last symbolic fragments of Soviet “superpower status” and the “great power” scepter inherited by Russia from the USSR. Western intervention in Syria (which Russia is unable to hinder by military means) will be looked upon as a deliberate trampling underfoot of one of the few symbols of Russia’s great-power status.

These views are reinforced by the pessimistic attitude prevailing in Russia toward the wave of “Arab revolutions” in the Middle East, both in general and toward the possible outcome of the Syrian revolution in particular. The overwhelming majority of Russian observers believe that the current events in Arab countries have led to the total destabilization of the region and opened the way for Islamists to seize power. In Moscow’s view, the only real alternative to Islamic influence in Arab countries is secular authoritarian regimes. They alone can counter the Islamic “street” by forcibly imposing modern civilizational and cultural standards on archaic Middle Eastern societies. Therefore the struggle in Arab countries, including Syria, is perceived as a struggle between “the people who wear ties and the people who don’t.” The sympathies of Russian society, which has long suffered from terrorism and extremism under Islamic slogans in the North Caucasus, is fully on the side of the “people with ties” here. Moscow views Assad not so much as a “bad” dictator as much as a leader fighting an upsurge of Islamic barbarism.

The active support for the uprising in Syria from such “luminaries” of democracy and “secular society” as Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and the Islamist government of present-day Turkey) only heightens deep suspicions in Russia regarding the Islamist nature of the current Syrian movement and the Middle Eastern movement in general. Russia has long been concerned about what it considers the Saudi export of Islamism of a radical Wahhabi stripe. And the obvious inter-religious and sectarian contradictions that are tearing Syria apart and playing a large role in the conflict there give rise to apprehensions that Syria may become “Lebanon writ large.”

Finally, a considerable role is also played by Russia’s traditional displeasure at the West’s unilateral interventionism, augmented by the general negative view of the actions by Western countries in Libya in 2011, with the patently loose interpretation by Western governments of resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, or the outright violation of those resolutions for their own benefit (as happened with arms shipments to the Libyan insurgents). From Russia’s viewpoint, in Libya the Western countries, led by the U.S., demonstrated cynicism, treachery, and a typical policy of “double standards.” Therefore, the West’s moralistic homilies and appeals concerning Syria are perceived by Russian public opinion as yet another manifestation of cynical hypocrisy of the lowest kind.

The Syrian situation focuses all the main foreign policy bugbears, complexes, and phobias of Russian policy, the Russian elite, and Russian public opinion. In fact, the nature of the events in Syria itself is eclipsed here by fundamental Russian reflections (and reflexes!). Moreover, Putin, always striving to use these reflections for his own benefit, is now triply compelled to try squeezing everything possible out of them to bolster his political system. Moscow’s sober position regarding the crisis in Syria is therefore inevitable and there are no alternatives to it. This position is not entirely based on cold calculations of the benefits of shipping Russian arms to Damascus, not on the wish to retain Tartus, and not even on the desire to strike a deal behind the scene with the United States. This position is based on the conviction that the revolution in Syria, especially when supported by the intervention of Western and Arab states, will greatly harm Russian interests on a much broader scale.

nakul wrote:It's too late. Ukraine is already in China's pocket. We could deal with the other nations first. Lets start with TATRA..

pentaiah wrote:If Britain were to be the super power like in 19th century would immediately foster a Kurdistan state carved out of Iran, Turkey Iraq Syria
But US being US with half cocked ideas will not do it but it will happen with or with out US precipitating, Who thought Yugo would go, Georgia the Stalin's mother land would separate and Lativian countries would be free... for that matter MK Gndhi would not even remotely thought duplicate Gandhi's would rule...
Like the out of India thread a 100 yrs from now there will be debate MK Gandhi and Indira Gandhi were blood relatives as they spell their names same and both were in India

History is pregnant always with possibilities

brihaspati wrote:But the Muslim armies had to be treated with equal or even more ruthlessness to break them [three people have showed this effectively before the modern period, Richard, Hulagu, and Vlad - and all three are roundly abused in iIslamic narratives.]

Philip wrote:The Syrian motley band of fighters could very easily be turned around and asked to invade Israel in the future! Thisis exactly whatv happened in the aftermath of the Afghan War against the Soviets with the emergence of Osama bin Laden.

Manfred Lange, Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), said the military was telling leaders that there was no good case for military action and the political process had to be pursued.

"The political process has to be pushed forward, sanctions need to take effect. At the moment, this situation cannot be solved by the military in a responsible way," he told a briefing.

Syria receiving Iranian arms 'almost daily' via Iraq

For years the Kurdish minority was discriminated and even denied Syrian nationality; and as the situation became more precarious for his regime, al-Assad gave many of those Kurds associated with the PKK passports and made other concessions to get them on side.

To get across the border, we pretended we were going to Fish Khabour, 85 kilometres north of Dohuk, where we would visit some of the villages on the Iraq-Syria border. That was how we managed to get past the final government checkpoint in the semi-autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Jaoush wears military clothes and carries a Kalashnikov. As we toured the area he was happy to provide lots of information about what we were seeing. He pointed out that this area, the Jazira area in Syria’s far northeast, is well known because it holds more than half of all of Syria’s oil. Jaoush and his friend reckoned that after counting the oil wells in this region for four days, they thought there were thousands of them here.

We also pass through another village, Wank, which was one of the first towns around here to be Arabized. This was a policy that former Syrian leader, Hafez al-Assad, had in common with neighbouring dictator Saddam Hussein. Both leaders tried to weaken the substantial Kurdish communities here by pushing Arabs from other parts of their countries in and moving Kurds out.
Jaoush told us that the heads of the Arabized villages had come to the Kurds in the village of Datba, where he’s from, two days ago and asked to stay in the area. The Arabs said that if they were able to stay they would even return the property that had been confiscated from the Kurds by the al-Assad government.

The Syrian army still keeps some bases in this area but that their presence is really only a formality: the Kurds are in control here. Since taking control of the Afrin, Kobani, Sari Kani and Derik areas in Syria’s northeast, the Kurdish have set up their own independent administration. Jaoush confirmed that this administration was associated with Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish rebel leader of PKK

[Editor’s note: As per Al Jazeera the central Syrian government is still paying the salaries of civil servants and the Kurdish administrators were not ready to, and indeed could not afford to, remove all signs of al-Assad in the city.]

The YPG is more like an army; its members wear black uniforms and khaki jackets and they completely cover their faces with scarves, leaving only their eyes visible. The YPG is commanded by a 30-year-old woman here. “All of the military in Derik is ours,” she told NIQASH, while keeping her face similarly covered. “In Derik we have 300 soldiers and if there’s any kind of emergency we can easily increase that number. We train our forces properly and every member is on duty for between five and 10 hours a day.”

Every Friday there are anti-regime protests on the streets of Derik, organized by young Kurdish people who use loudspeakers to gather a crowd. Women stand on the left side and men on the right and then after the protests are finished, families simply return home again. (See the pictures in the link)

In general, it seemed to us that most people were just going about their daily business, going to work, coming home, having dinner – nothing seemed unusual about their lives here. Market council member Ahmad told us that he believes that the Kurdish shouldn’t give up these territories again, that they shouldn’t let the al-Assad government back in here and that Syria’s Arabs should also be persuaded that al-Assad no longer controls the country’s northeast.

First, American intervention would diminish Iran’s influence in the Arab world. Iran knows that if his regime fell, it would lose its most important base in the Arab world.

Second, a more muscular American policy could keep the conflict from spreading. Syria’s civil war has already exacerbated sectarian strife in Lebanon and Iraq

Third, by training and equipping reliable partners within Syria’s internal opposition, America could create a bulwark against extremist groups like Al Qaeda, which are present and are seeking safe havens in ungoverned corners of Syria.

Fourth, American leadership on Syria could improve relations with key allies like Turkey and Qatar.

Finally, American action could end a terrible human-rights disaster within Syria and stop the exodus of refugees, which is creating a burden on neighboring states.

We cannot wait for the United Nations to act; that is highly unlikely. Nor can we expect the Free Syrian Army to oust Mr. Assad on its own (sdre's are also waiting for some action for a looonnnng time )

The focus should be on Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city and commercial hub. The F.S.A. already controls much of the territory between the city and the Turkish border, only 40 miles away. With American support, Turkish troops could easily establish a corridor for humanitarian aid and military supplies. Defeating the government’s forces in Aleppo would deal a serious blow to Mr. Assad and send a powerful signal to fence-sitters that the regime was dying.

Damascus, the capital, should be the second target. But unlike Aleppo, it can’t be easily reached from a Turkish base. It could, however, be supplied from Dara’a, which is 70 miles from Damascus and less than five from the Jordanian border.

To prevent Assad from staging a devastating response, the American-backed alliance would have to create a countrywide no-fly zone, which would first require taking apart Syrian air defenses. While our allies could take the lead in maintaining the no-fly zone, it is necessary in Syria, as in Libya, for America to take the lead in establishing it; only our Air Force and Navy have the weaponry needed to dismantle Syria’s air defenses with little risk

A “lead from behind” approach can work in Syria. President Obama need only apply it.

devesh wrote:I don't think Israel will move against Assad. they are not fools. they will not willingly pave the way for a ME which is consolidated by the Sunnis. even if Assad happens to be an Iranian supporter, the costs of letting the Sunnis take over might be too high. b/c once they consolidate, Israel will be the next target.

Gunjur wrote:from israel pov, would israel prefer a united syria or divided syria??

shyamd wrote:

Gunjur wrote:from israel pov, would israel prefer a united syria or divided syria??

Alawites will be their new friends if it gets divided. But they will be surrounded by Sunni's and united (GCC, Egypt, Jordan and now Syria). Egypt being the MB will do their own thing from the looks of things but they can't sway too far away from the GCC due to economics. But KSA influence will be there in all the countries surrounding Israel.

Imo, as long as Germany/EU and US are around and maintain the power/tech/weapons balance in favour of israel, israel will be fine. Long run.... I don't know. Look at the christian kingdoms in that area for a historical perspective - the Kingdoms survived due to Europe but once that was taken away, they were easy prey.

Gunjur wrote:

brihaspati wrote:But the Muslim armies had to be treated with equal or even more ruthlessness to break them [three people have showed this effectively before the modern period, Richard, Hulagu, and Vlad - and all three are roundly abused in iIslamic narratives.]

Sir ji, who is this vlad you are talking about? Is he some vladimir of russia who resisted islamic incursions in russian steppes?? Please let us know. TIA.

Qatar's prime minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani, told there was a "Plan B." "You need to make safe haven areas, first of all," he said. "That would require a no-fly zone.

"If the Syrians want to break that, that's another subject. We need somebody to have the teeth to tell them 'don't do that', because that will not be allowed," he said.

The Syrian regime's richest opponent, the business magnate Firas Tlass has pledged his fortune to the "revolution", promising to fund rebel groups, humanitarian aid and an organisation to deal with the chaos after President Assad has gone.

The Tlass family has long been a stalwart of the Syrian regime
By Ruth Sherlock, Istanbul8:00PM BST 27 Sep 2012
In his first interview with a western newspaper since leaving Syria, the country's biggest industrial tycoon has told the Daily Telegraph of how the ownership of his conglomerate of huge companies is to be given to a panel of leading opposition figures, and the profits used to help to build a democratic society in Syria.
"I am supporting a complete program [to oust the regime]. I am putting my fortune behind this, totally, until the end," said Mr Tlass. "But this is nothing. If I give all my money it is not worth one gram of the blood spilt by the Syrian people."
The Tlass family has long been a stalwart of the Syrian regime. Mr Firas' father Mustafa Tlass and Bashar al-Assad's father Hafez, worked together to bring the Assad family to power. His brother is the defected Brigadier General Manaf Tlass who was a close childhood friend of the Syrian president.
For decades the family benefited from its insider status. Firas Tlass was thought to have been influential on the privatisation process started by the regime in recent decades. Named Min Ajl Suriyya (MAS), or 'For the sake of Syria', Mr Tlass' empire spans several industries in Syria, from roasting coffee beans to construction and is thought to be worth billions of Syrian pounds.
"What Syria gave me I will give it back to Syria," said Mr Tlass.

After the collapse of the Syrian regime Mr Tlass said he plans to create a non-governmental organisation that will have formal ownership of MAS. "I am preparing the legal papers now. It will be owned by a panel of seven leading figures of the opposition, and I will make the accounts public and transparent," said Mr Tlass.

The NGO will use the company's profits to "prepare the people of Syria for new way of thinking", said Mr Tlass: "My dream is that Syria becomes a real democratic country".
His antipathy with the Syrian government stretches back for nearly a decade said Mr Tlass. "The Assad family thinks that they own this country and that the people in it are their sheep. Only the family owns the farm. Even us, people close to the regime, we were just seen as their guards. That's how they work with Syria," said Mr Tlass, recounting a catalogue of examples where businessmen who had garnered favour with the country's leadership were given sizeable business contracts.
"In 2005 I made friends with part of the opposition. We put together a study for political, economic and social reform and sent it to Bashar. Two months later I received a cold reply asking me why, as a businessman I was dealing in politics?" said Mr Tlass.
Mr Tlass told the Daily Telegraph that he would never seek a political leadership role in a future Syria, but he dismissed exiled opposition groups, including the bedraggled Syrian National Council as lacking the vision saying Bashar al-Assad would stay in power for "50 more years" if they led the revolution.
Instead he said he would fund a new leadership from "inside Syria". Refusing to give names he said a number of community leaders from cities across Syria were part of a group being groomed to form a transitional government.
"We need to create a national front, a council of 30 people that can form a transitional council and govern for the period up until the election of a new parliament," said Mr Tlass.
The council should represent the dozens of groups that currently make up Syria's fragmented opposition as well as Alawite figures from the ousted regime he said. "The Alawites look to the regime as their representatives, non-regime figures are seen as traitors if they join the opposition. We have to include some of the old guards".
In the past weeks Mr Tlass had been speaking with key figures of the country's business elite and working to convince them to join the revolution, he told the Daily Telegraph. As businesses close and the country's economy slides to a standstill amid the civil war, the country's commercial core is beginning to jump ship he said. Even business partners of Syria's biggest businessman and regime loyalist Rami Makhlouf are beginning to move away from the Assad family he said.
"Most of Makhlouf's business partners are leaving him," said Mr Tlass. "Now we need the Syrian businessmen from inside and outside the country to group together and provide funds for the opposition".

Just got told that UAE last month issued diplomatic visas to Gen Assaf Shawkat and sister of Bashar - Bushra Al Assad.

(Reuters) - Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's widowed sister Bushra has left Syria and is living in the United Arab Emirates, a source close to the UAE government said on Thursday.

shyamd wrote:Panning out exactly how I said back in October - businessmen will change and start to support the revolution.

Mr Tlass told the Daily Telegraph that he would never seek a political leadership role in a future Syria, but he dismissed exiled opposition groups, including the bedraggled Syrian National Council as lacking the vision saying Bashar al-Assad would stay in power for "50 more years" if they led the revolution.

Instead he said he would fund a new leadership from "inside Syria". Refusing to give names he said a number of community leaders from cities across Syria were part of a group being groomed to form a transitional government.

shyamd wrote: ----------------------------------
Ahead of the curve once again
27th August 2012

Just got told that UAE last month issued diplomatic visas to Gen Assaf Shawkat and sister of Bashar - Bushra Al Assad.

Bashar al-Assad's widowed sister has left Syria for UAE- source

(Reuters) - Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's widowed sister Bushra has left Syria and is living in the United Arab Emirates, a source close to the UAE government said on Thursday.

Neocon military historian and columnist Max Boot teamed up with one-time academic and Bush administration defense official Michael Doran to publish an op-ed in the New York Times “Five Reasons to Intervene in Syria Now.”

First, knocking off al-Assad would shrink Iranian “influence in the Arab world.” What influence? The Gulf Arabs loath the mullahs. North Africans could care less what Ahmadinejad does. It’s the Hezbollah connection, of course, that’s Doran and Boot’s real target here. It’s always about “Israel” for the neocons. Without the use of Syria as a conduit for Iranian arms transfers to Lebanon, Hezbollah will find resupply difficult during its next defense against Israeli aggression.

Second, throwing gasoline on Syria’s fires will “keep the conflict from spreading.” They point to spinoff sectarian dustups in Lebanon and Iraq, and Turkish accusations that Assad is supporting Kurdish guerillas in Turkey “in order to inflame tensions between Kurds and Turkey.”
As if Kurdish Turks needed Syrian assistance to feel tense about Ankara. Kurds rebelled against the Ottoman Empire over two hundred years ago. The establishment of the modern Turkish state (virulently anti-Kurdish) led to Kurdish rebellions in 1920, 1925, 1930, and 1938.

Third, Doran and Boot argue the US should “train and equip reliable partners within Syria’s internal opposition.” This will lead, they contend, to “a bulwark against extremist groups like al-Qaeda which are present and seeking safe havens in ungoverned corners of Syria.” Sound familiar? The neocons are desperately seeking a Syrian Ahmed Chalabi. Just as in Iraq, al-Qaeda was nowhere to be found prior to the onset of the conflict. The recent arrival of suicide bombings in Damascus has neocons double down. “Train and equip”? “Reliable partners”? As in Afghanistan? “Reliable” for what? Who might these people be? Will the neocons get to vet them?

Fourth, dumping Assad “could improve relations with key allies like Turkey and Qatar.” The Turks have a half million men under arms. Their Air Force includes F-16s, drones, mid-air refuelers and AWACs craft (parts of a fleet larger than that of Germany, France or Italy). Doran and Boot should send a version of their op-ed to an Ankara or Istanbul paper calling for Turkish leadership of the mission. Chances are the Erdogan government is not interested in attacking a neighbor with which it is not at war.

Fifth, Doran and Boot remember the horrors inflicted on Syrians by Assad’s agents. They propose “putting allies in the lead” while avoiding the “slippery slope toward a ground war.” Screw boots on the ground, we’ll whack ‘em from afar. They list “our closest friends in the region”—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Qatar and Israel—plus the Euro-Imperial Duo of Britain and France as champing at the bit to begin the bombing. Their recommendation is for the US and its local friends to violate the UN Charter and other international law by attacking a United Nations member without Security Council permission. The Security Council’s “responsibility to protect” in Libya did not include, argue Moscow and Beijing, acting as the Libyan rebels’ air force for offensive action against Gaddafi’s military.
Doran and Boot’s suggestion to avoid the Free Syrian Army but find someone on the ground to supply with guns and bombs is typical neocon loopiness. If the CIA and other “special operators” have yet to identify a “cohesive organization” that meets Doran and Boot’s loose criteria for lethal aid, what makes them think it’s any more likely now?

It’s been increasingly difficult to know how seriously to take neocon arguments. Do they actually believe them themselves? It never ceases to surprise that the neocons retain any authority whatsoever, let alone appear on the op-ed page of the New York Times. Neoconservatives were dead wrong about Iraq. They are genuinely dangerous on Iran. They must not be heeded on Syria.