NEW DELHI: Security agencies will soon be equipped to intercept emails and cyber chats in real time through the Centralised Monitoring System (CMS). The high-tech CMS, expected to be operational in a year, will be set up in 30 locations across the country, including Delhi and state capitals.
CMS will enhance capacity of security agencies to monitor over 1,500 gbps of traffic through international gateways. Currently, about 25-30% traffic can be tracked by Indian agencies. It will allow decryption of voice-over internet protocol ( VOIP) like Skype, mails and cyber chats in real time.
CMS will allow voice matching during a mobile phone call with reference to a sample in the database and zero in on the phone's location. The data can then be integrated on a digital map.
At present, security agencies can locate a person within a 500m radius after intercepting mobile phone conversation. CMS will reduce the radius to 50m enabling security agencies to zero in on the target faster.
Security officials are not too confident about voice matching though. "It has about 60-70% success in countries which use the technique," said a senior official.
The Rs 450 crore CMS will have facilities to monitor voice calls, SMS, MMS, GPRS and fax communications on landlines, CDMA and GSM networks.
The Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT) and National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) are working together to put in place CMS. The software will be developed by C-DOT.
For the hardware, a tender was floated by the home ministry last week. Besides companies in the US, Israel, China and Russia, there are a couple of indigenous manufacturers of some hardware components.critical hardware like this should be bought from LOCAL manufacturers rather than NON-STATE actors
With terrorists becoming tech-savvy and using latest communication technology, India's security establishment has long felt the need to upgrade its technical capability. In a series of attacks carried out by Indian Mujahideen, emails were sent soon after a blast claiming responsibility for the carnage. The proxy server through which the email was routed was often located in another country. "Precious time was lost in closing in on the terrorists or their cronies," said an official.
The proposal for CMS has been gathering dust since 2006. "The department of telecom (DoT) is primarily responsible for the delay. Despite constant push by the IB, DoT wasn't interested. Incompetence and lack of focus of its officers are also to be blamed," said a senior official. Service providers also tried to stall it as it meant investment for them, he said.
With CMS, a more stringent monitoring system is being put in place to avoid leak of intercepts as happened with the Niira Radia tapes. Ratan Tata had moved Supreme Court against the leak of the tapes.
"The new system will have more stringent checks and balances to avoid leak of content of intercepts," said a senior official associated with the project.
In the revamped system, security agencies will submit the name of the person/s they want to track to the home secretary. Using his discretion, the home secretary will approve the proposal. The home secretary's order will be sent to DoT which will intercept the target and give its content to security agencies. This will be reviewed by the home secretary after three months. A committee headed by the cabinet secretary will review orders of the home secretary.
The new system excludes service providers from tracking and interception. Earlier, security agencies asked private service providers to intercept a target's phone conversation following approval by the home secretary.
DoT's Telecom Enforcement Resource and Monitoring (TERM) Cell will monitor to prevent unauthorized interception or access to records and violation of norms.
Intelligence & National Security Discussion
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Soon agencies to intercept email, chats in real time
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
darshan ji, my info comes first hand from one of the primary investigators of the case. 
AM might be a loony org, I don't know enough but in this case they were framed.

AM might be a loony org, I don't know enough but in this case they were framed.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
So there are more "Madhuri Guptas" in the foreign office who are ready to give-up state secrets for pak money .........
VinodTK wrote:‘Spy’ freed from Pakistan prison makes shocking allegationsGopal Das, an Indian prisoner languishing in a Pakistan jail for 27 years, has made shocking allegations that Indian foreign office staff had provided a tip-off to the Pakistani authorities which enabled them to catch Das.
:
Talking with media persons, Das said, "The Indian officers had provided the inputs because of which I was picked up by the Pakistani authorities. The Indian officers did it for money. Indian politicians and ministers made several appeals to the Pakistani government for my release, but all in vain. The authorities agreed to release me only when the SC stepped in."
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
ISI mole in Indian Army jailed for three years
Just 3 years for spying?An Indian Army personnel, who was working as an ISI module and passing on sensitive information inimical to the country’s security to Pakistan, has been sentenced to three years in jail by a Delhi court.
“The accused is convicted under section 120-B of the IPC for entering into criminal conspiracy with one Pramod who was working as an ISI agent to indulge in espionage activities to transmit sensitive and secret information regarding Indian Army to the enemy country (Pakistan),” District Judge O P Gupta said, holding Army Signal Man Ritesh Kumar Vishwakarma, guilty of indulging in espionage activities.
The court convicted him under various other sections of the IPC and the Official Secret Act.
A native of Bihar and posted in Army’s signal unit at Leh in Jammu and Kashmir, Ritesh was arrested by Delhi Police’s Special Cell sleuths at Palam airport here on October 20, 2006.
The sleuths had received a tip-off that the 28-year-old signal man would be reaching Delhi’s Palam airport from Leh by Jet Airways at about 9: 15 AM on October 20, 2006 and would be carrying some sensitive, secret, defence-related documents for passing the same to ISI agents.
Ritesh was caught with documents including several hand-written notes related to the Army, diagrams about security plans, pen drive, camera and camera films.
Prosecution said the police had got the tip-off that Ritesh was working with some ISI agents based in Kathmandu for the purpose prejudicial to the safety, security and interest of India.
“He had been unauthorisedly collecting and communicating to some ISI agent and some other foreign agents, information which was calculated to be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy country. Passing of the said information was likely to effect sovereignty, integrity and security of India,” the probe agency said.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
X-posted...
Pioneer
LINK
Pioneer
LINK
New issues put questions over Kim Davy extradition
May 16, 2011 11:03:56 PM
Udayan Namboodiri
The prospects of CBI succeeding in extraditing Niels Holck aka Kim Peter Davy, the alleged “mastermind” of the 1995 Purulia Arms Drop, has got a little dimmer in the past few days. That’s because the CBI itself has blundered by producing “evidence” which could backfire. Add to that the Defense’s move to produce two important witnesses whose testimonies could well bolster some typical European perceptions of the Indian justice system.
First, this is how the CBI shot itself in the foot. After the government pompously announced early May that it was sending two officers to Copenhagen with “evidence” of Kim Davy’s guilt (which was actually unnecessary since the issue before the Court is the tenability of India’s diplomatic assurances, not who-did-it), the CBI submitted a 23-page “excerpt” of an “interrogation” of Peter Bleach from 1996.
When this document was e-mailed to Bleach for his comments, he confirmed what was always suspected. That it was part of the 30-page confession which he had typed out soon after his arrest in 1996 on the laptop of the then CBI S.P. (and now IGP Operations in NIA), Loknath Behera, and Upen Biswas, then eastern regional director of CBI and recently elected Trinamool Congress MLA. Bleach also said that JK Dutt, who was Joint Director of CBI at the time, was present when he typed it out.
We got independent confirmation of this from Biswas, who we interviewed in his Salt Lake, Kolkata, residence on February 14 this year. Biswas recalled the event well. “Bleach decided to tell all when I persuaded him that we have evidence linking the seized cache of weapons to the AN-26 aircraft which he was flying in”. Though Biswas was subsequently removed from the case as a result of an internal power struggle in the CBI, he said the confession should have formed part of the chargesheet under Section 160 (1) of CrPC which was submitted to the Calcutta City Civil Court on April 30, 1996.
But the statement vanished. Says Bleach: “I wrote down every detail of the operation right up until the time I was detained at Mumbai. Behera always said that he would print a copy and give it to me but he never did. Later on, the CBI told the court that I had never made any statement to them, and they denied the existence of this document.”
“I recognised this (23-page “excerpt) immediately as part of the document I wrote. But it is certainly not complete, and it may have been altered. This was simply saved electronically on a laptop and anybody could have altered it. It has no value whatsoever as evidence. However, notwithstanding that, I am now curious as to where it has come from. Whilst the contents may have no evidential value, the document as a whole may be vital evidence showing that the CBI lied to the court. I was right - the document did exist and the CBI knew it existed.”
JK Dutt, who appeared in the Times Now TV “News Hour” show on April 28, denied that Bleach had ever typed out a 30-page confession. But on the following night, Biswas came on the same show and contradicted his former colleague.
In December 2010, the lower court in Hillerod had rejected the extradition plea. Under the format of the Appeal which will be heard over the next four days in the Eastern High Court, the Prosecution, i.e. the Denmark government assisted by a CBI lawyer, will press for Niels Holck’s extradition. On Wednesday, the Defense will present its case and the judgment of the five-member Bench is expected the following day.
Now, if the CBI thinks the contents of the extract is “proof” of Niels Holck’s culpability, its legal eagles perhaps overlooked the vital parts which says that the original plotter was a man called Peter Haestrup, from whom Peter Bleach had received the first inquiry for AK-47s. Not only that, Bleach had stated – and still maintains – that it was Haestrup who had invited him over to Copenhagen by sending him a first class air ticket, and the first meeting had taken place in Haestrup’s riverside villa. The man who the world later knew as Kim Davy joined the meeting later.
Surprisingly, the CBI converted this admission by Bleach into a product of its “investigation” and its team went to Copenhagen in 2002 with a power point presentation which emphasised it. Haestrup’s role was described on the very first page in that PPT. He was described as “son of an important person of Copenhagen”. The other bullets on that page say he was: “ A business contact of Niels; had negotiated with Bleach for purchase of arms in August 1995 …visited Dhaka and Bangkok along with bleach…attended crucial meeting at Bangkok on 27.09.95.”
Now, those very words may well come back to damn the CBI. The logical question which nobody has ever asked the CBI before is: “Why wasn’t Peter Haestrup’s extradition sought?” Or, worse, “what is the Government of India scared of?”
That question may well be answered by Haestrup himself when he takes the witness stand on Wednesday. The elusive Dane, who has always shunned publicity, may have quite a story to tell because it is widely believed that he had alerted Danish intelligence about the impending Purulia arms drop. The political angle to the conspiracy – revealed by Kim Davy over Times Now TV last week – may get some credibility as well. Why else would the CBI be reluctant to bring him before an Indian court?
Another crucial witness for the Defense is Christer Brannerud, a Swedish police superintendent seconded to Interpol in France at the time of the arms drop, who, for the life of him, could not understand why the Indian government consistently ignored his reports on Kim Peter Davy’s whereabouts in the years between 1996 and 2002, when he was in charge of the case. CBI officers frequently undertook globe trots, covering countries as disparate as Australia, Peru, South Africa and Kazakhstan, to “look for Kim Davy”, knowing all along that he was in Denmark.Finally, a Calcutta High Court order forced the CBI to move extradition papers in October 2002.
Christer Brannerud was requested by CBI to carry out a full analysis of all that happened at the European end of the conspiracy and submit the report to the CBI. Now, by another self goal, the CBI had admitted having received his report but used the excuse of “national security” to bar it from being admitted as evidence in the case against Peter Bleach and the five Latvians at Calcutta City Civil Court.
Bad luck for the CBI, the existence of Brannerud’s report is well known in Denmark, and it is probable that Brannerud will be questioned on its contents.
Tomorrow: first report on the Extradition Trial
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
PM met the Service chiefs today, could it be related to the usual rambling Pasha made yesterday about rehearsals and targets ? DM was also present in the meeting...
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
India takes stock of arsenal in Nuclear Command Authority meet
India on Monday took stock of its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems like long-range ballistic missiles, fighter-bombers and warships towards its quest to have an operational nuclear triad -- the capability to fire nukes from land, sea and air -- in the near future.
Sources said the top-level meet held by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was "not just a general security review'' but in fact a full-fledged Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) conference to assess the steps being taken to consolidate and strengthen India's "minimum but credible nuclear deterrence".
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The status of two crucial but delayed "strategic programmes", the 5,000-km-range Agni-V missile and indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant, is said to have figured in the discussion apart from "overarching strategic issues".
While the three-stage Agni-V is to be tested later this year, INS Arihant is also slated to go for "harbour and sea trials" once its miniature 83 MW pressurized light-water reactor gains "full criticality". The defence establishment is eager to induct INS Arihant, armed with 12 nuclear-tipped missiles, by next year because it will constitute the most effective and difficult-to-detect leg of the nuclear triad.
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
That is being said. Who knows. Just 3 days back IA wanted 500 k troops in J&K against Chinese. Pash might be a scapegoat and Chinese must be the real intent.mmasand wrote:PM met the Service chiefs today, could it be related to the usual rambling Pasha made yesterday about rehearsals and targets ? DM was also present in the meeting...
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
New CBI HQ: Built at Rs 186 crore, and no interrogation room!

In a shocking lack of vision and planning, officials from the Central Bureau of Investigation have found that their newly-constructed hi-tech office building in New Delhi
Built at the cost of Rs 186 crore by the National Buildings Construction Corporation Limited, the 11-storey building is expected to house all branches of the CBI under one roof.
Though, the CBI press release had announced that it will have an interrogation room but professionals find that there is no privacy, or nor safe corners fit to question criminals.
It seems that the planners of the swanky building simply forgot to provide a soundproof interrogation room. "The security of the structure is also debatable," says a senior officer.
He said, "If protestors were to attack the building with lathis and stones, they can easily break the glass. This can create a security risk, because the entire front side is covered with glass without any iron grills."
The building, which is a state-of-art green structure, was inaugurated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [ Images ] on 30 April, and has a garden on the top floor and also boasts of a jacuzzi for the officers.
Although, the CBI initially boasted that there was an interrogation room on each floor, officers have now found that the chic ambience of open spaces with glass as dividers and square work stations will not help officers who work on criminals to get crucial evidence!

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Maybe it was a Human Rights exercise to prevent allegations of torture! The complaints are silly.
CBI can question people where they want. Besides the politicians ensure the results go no where. So why waste such rooms!
CBI can question people where they want. Besides the politicians ensure the results go no where. So why waste such rooms!
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
yeah, those complaints are silly. What do they want? Some BDSM dungeon complete with masked dominatrix with a zippered hood ready in her hand? Or a cold room with stainless steel furniture and a portrait of Felix Dzrezinsky scowling?
Too much movies means people think interrogation is about taking out nails with a needlenose and clamping alligator clips on nipples...... geez
Too much movies means people think interrogation is about taking out nails with a needlenose and clamping alligator clips on nipples...... geez
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
They can lease Abu Ghraib!
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
30,000 crores recovered in 2 years
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 416002.cms
CBDT chairman Sudhir Chandra said they have gone after big shots and every search or survey has yielded more than Rs 100 crore in black money.
and we know that they havent even scratched the surface
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 416002.cms
CBDT chairman Sudhir Chandra said they have gone after big shots and every search or survey has yielded more than Rs 100 crore in black money.
and we know that they havent even scratched the surface
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
As I said, this was not due to Pashas Musharraf talk. Army presents three-point plan to counter Chinachackojoseph wrote:That is being said. Who knows. Just 3 days back IA wanted 500 k troops in J&K against Chinese. Pash might be a scapegoat and Chinese must be the real intent.mmasand wrote:PM met the Service chiefs today, could it be related to the usual rambling Pasha made yesterday about rehearsals and targets ? DM was also present in the meeting...
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
chacko, now that put things in perspective! Specially after China's lifelong hug to TSP.
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
^^^ Possible. I am not discounting anything.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
B.Ramanji in Pioneer on Purlia Arms drop case:
LINK
And what was the name of the extremist who wlaked away from Mumbai airport without going through immigration etc?
This is a fit case for root cause analysis. Any takers?
Use the five whys? for starters.
LINK
So what does he think caused the failure?Answers to Purulia arms drop mystery still awaited
May 28, 2011 1:15:41 AM
B Raman
This is an insider’s account of the colossal blunder which preceded the 1995 Purulia arms drop and it is admitted here for the first time that Peter Bleach, the “pilot” of the An-26, was unjustly treated by the Indian government whereas he should have been rewarded
The clandestine Purulia arms drop of December 1995, in which an aircraft piloted by a group of mercenaries hired by an unidentified extremist organisation — suspected to be the Anand Marg — managed to fly right across the Indian air space to Purulia in West Bengal, air-drop a consignment of arms and ammunition to a collecting party on the ground and fly to Pattaya in Thailand unprevented and unintercepted by the Indian intelligence and security agencies and the Air Force despite the availability of precise advance intelligence is a shameful episode in the history of Indian intelligence.
A few weeks before the actual air-drop, the extremist organisation which had procured the arms and ammunition had approached a retired pilot of the British Air Force and offered to pay him handsomely if he organised the air-drop successfully. Even though tempted by the sum offered, he did not initially agree to carry it out. He asked for time to think over it. He then contacted an official of the British Defence Ministry and told him about the approach made to him by the extremists. The official advised him not to reject the officer and wait for further instructions.
The Defence Ministry official then told the MI-5, the British Security Service, about it. The MI-5 immediately informed the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), with which it had a liaison relationship. The R&AW, after examining the matter, asked the MI-5 to advise the pilot to accept the task and to keep the MI-5 informed of all his meetings with the extremist organisation and the detailed plans for the air-drop including the date and time, the place of the air-drop and the flight path.
The pilot faithfully carried out the instructions and kept the MI-5 informed of all the details at every stage. These details were passed on by the MI-5 to the R&AW which, in turn, passed them on to the Intelligence Bureau, which was responsible for follow-up action. It was reported that the R&AW passed on the details given by the pilot through the MI-5 to the IB as if it had collected them on its own from one of its sources instead of specifying that the details were coming from the pilot himself through the MI-5. If the R&AW had taken the IB into confidence and told it that the details were coming from the pilot himself through the MI-5, the IB might have taken the details more seriously.![]()
Normally, in such cases, if the matter had been handled professionally, the R&AW would have taken the clearance of the Prime Minister for flying out a team of officers of the IB and the R&AW to the UK to meet the pilot secretly with the help of the MI-5 and the British Defence Ministry, and take his co-operation for organising a trap on the ground so that the collecting party could have been arrested while collecting the air-dropped arms and ammunition and the identity of the extremist organisation established. Nothing of that sort was done. The R&AW passed on the information in a routine manner to the IB without specifying that it was coming from the pilot through the MI-5. The IB, instead of organising the follow-up action itself, passed it on to the West Bengal Police in an equally routine manner. The then Chief Secretary of the West Bengal Government later on complained that the IB had sent the information by registered post and that it was received after the air drop had taken place and the aircraft had flown out of India.![]()
The IAF intercepted the aircraft on its way out of India and forced it to land at Mumbai. One person on board the plane, who reportedly belonged to the extremist organisation, managed to quietly walk out of the airport without being stopped by the security and the immigration. The British pilot and crew were arrested. Sections of the media had reported that the pilot was in a very violent mood and abused the police and intelligence officials. No wonder. He had taken the initiative in alerting the intelligence agencies and keeping them informed of all the details. He expected that he would be honoured and rewarded. Instead, he was treated roughly, prosecuted and jailed. A few weeks after this incident, the then British Home Secretary had come to India on a scheduled visit. In his interaction with our local media, he pointed out how the British intelligence had kept its Indian counterpart informed.
I have been writing about this shameful episode off and on since 1996. In my book “Intelligence — Past, Present and Future” published in 2001 (Lancer Publishers of New Delhi), I had stated as follows on Page 233: “The normal response of any professional counter-terrorism agency, on the receipt of such precise information, would have been to organise a trap in co-operation with the pilot who had reportedly volunteered the information, for catching the terrorists on the ground while they were collecting the arms and ammunition after the air-drop. Till now, no satisfactory explanation has been forthcoming from the security agencies as to why this was not done.”
The writer is Former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat
And what was the name of the extremist who wlaked away from Mumbai airport without going through immigration etc?
This is a fit case for root cause analysis. Any takers?
Use the five whys? for starters.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
‘Ex-Nepal King meets RAW agents, Gyanendra asked to play a role’
1Share
Telegraph Nepal
Nepal’s ex-King Gyanendra Shah has met with the visiting high ranking intelligence agents from India.
The Deputy Chief of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) A. B Mathur and RAW South-Asian Affairs Chief Alok Joshi had entered Shital Niwas- personal residence of Shah late evening May 27, 2011.
The RAW agents report directly to the Indian Prime Minister.
The meeting took a formal shape after Shah was repeatedly requested by the Indian officials.
The RAW agents are in Kathmandu for over a week now. They have been holding secret meet with the leaders of Nepali Congress, rightist panel of the United Marxist Leninists, former royalist parties such as Rastriya Jan Shakti Party and the RPP led by Pashupati Shumsher Rana and leaders of various Madhesh based parties of the country.
Reports made available to telegraphnepal.com have it that the Indian agents had made complaints about the increasing anti-India sentiments in the country and also told the King that the Maoists do not want good relations to prevail between Nepal and India. They held Maoists responsible for the current sorry state of relations between the two countries.
They also said that political stability in Nepal was next to impossible because the parties were quarrelling even during the last minute of the CA body expiry.
Nepali instability has already hurt India very hard, this was the message the two Indians conveyed to the King.
Former Indian ambassador K.V. Rajan and Gyanendra’s business partner Prabhakar Rana had arranged the meeting, sleuths confirm.
During the meeting Gyanendra was also advised to play active role. But, what sort of role and how he is going to act has not been made public.
The meet was followed by a lavish dinner.
Should this then mean that former King Gyanendra too is not that far from the approach of the RAW?
The Kantipur FM, May 28, 2011, 2:00 PM news bulletin has confirmed the meeting.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
One Indian reporter told me that PRC and Pakistan are funding this Nepal insugrency and they are working to create a large riftReports made available to telegraphnepal.com have it that the Indian agents had made complaints about the increasing anti-India sentiments in the country and also told the King that the Maoists do not want good relations to prevail between Nepal and India. They held Maoists responsible for the current sorry state of relations between the two countries.
Nepali instability has already hurt India very hard, this was the message the two Indians conveyed to the King.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Going by what B Raman says...looks like RAW wants to be *perceived* as TFTA and IB will not take a look at intel *seriously* if it is not coming from TFTA. I don't know whether toIf the R&AW had taken the IB into confidence and told it that the details were coming from the pilot himself through the MI-5, the IB might have taken the details more seriously.


Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
^^ Not sure if it reflects poorly on earlier tip-offs of R&AW to IB (that IB doesn't even take RAW tip-offs seriously due to earlier junk) or that the IB culture is screwed and needs a kick on mush to improve??
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
It appears that several officials are on visit to Nepal and India appears to be concerned. SSB was put on alert earlier. The telegraphnepal is completely anti india, they have even given out passport numbers of officials who are conducting discrete diplomacy.Acharya wrote: One Indian reporter told me that PRC and Pakistan are funding this Nepal insugrency and they are working to create a large rift
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Missing in action: Indian Intelligence
The truth is more intelligence is needed to effectively conduct intelligence operations. Investigations reveal that both the CBI and Home Ministry's excuses may be exactly that — excuses. The CBI's own records, as of January 1, show that 5,147 people work for it. That includes the peon and the CBI chief. The workforce is admittedly less than what the CBI has sanction for — around 6,500. Even so, complaints of "overwork" may not really hold. As of this week, the CBI is handling just 867 regular cases and 142 cases of preliminary enquiry. Experts say the real problem may not be not understaffing but incompetence and bureaucratic sloth. Former CBI chief Joginder Singh is intensely critical of India's intelligence gathering system overall. "Nowhere in the world does it happen but in CBI that you review your own performance and pat yourself on the back. And in case of any failure, no heads roll ever — be it the Batla House encounter, 26/11 or even the recent goof-ups," he says.He may have a point. Indian intelligence and investigative agencies — CBI, NIA, IB and R&AW — have had an alarmingly long list of failures in recent times. That includes the Kargil incursions, 26/11 attacks and the David Headley affair.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
India orders major security audit at vital installations
ndia has ordered a major security audit of its vital nuclear and oil installations across the country in the backdrop of the audacious May 22 terror attack on Pakistan's Mehran naval airbase at Karachi.
Government sources said on Monday that the security audit would be carried out by the Intelligence Bureau in coordination with the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which guards most of the vital non-military infrastructure.
The installations to be audited include all important in-shore and off-shore oil infrastructure, nuclear establishments, airports and sea ports, the sources said.
The instructions for the security audit came following a review meeting called by Cabinet Secretary K.M. Chandrasekhar soon after the Karachi attack in which two of the five US-supplied P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft were destroyed.
"The idea of the audit is to plug any gaps and to tighten the screws on the security apparatus in those installations," the sources said.
The defence installations are already on a state of high alert after the Mehran attack and their regular security inspections are continuing, sources added.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
VinodTK wrote:Missing in action: Indian IntelligenceThe truth is more intelligence is needed to effectively conduct intelligence operations. Investigations reveal that both the CBI and Home Ministry's excuses may be exactly that — excuses. The CBI's own records, as of January 1, show that 5,147 people work for it. That includes the peon and the CBI chief. The workforce is admittedly less than what the CBI has sanction for — around 6,500. Even so, complaints of "overwork" may not really hold. As of this week, the CBI is handling just 867 regular cases and 142 cases of preliminary enquiry. Experts say the real problem may not be not understaffing but incompetence and bureaucratic sloth. Former CBI chief Joginder Singh is intensely critical of India's intelligence gathering system overall. "Nowhere in the world does it happen but in CBI that you review your own performance and pat yourself on the back. And in case of any failure, no heads roll ever — be it the Batla House encounter, 26/11 or even the recent goof-ups," he says.He may have a point. Indian intelligence and investigative agencies — CBI, NIA, IB and R&AW — have had an alarmingly long list of failures in recent times. That includes the Kargil incursions, 26/11 attacks and the David Headley affair.
Everyone complains but no progress in improving the system. The real problem is intelligence has been used by rulign party to harass its opponents and INC is th biggest culprit and is finding resistance to implement any reforms because of its own track record. One measure is to have laws prohibiting gathering intelligence on political opponents but then the Westminister system has to change as Indian coalition politics cannot support this requirement. A way would be to prevent govt resources to gather politicial intelligence?
Until the politcal control of intelligence to retain power is changed, India will continue to suffer from gaps and there will be reams of opinion from former chiefs of how things would/could be better but no evidence of what they did to change the system!
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
I think this article belongs here. If not, please move/refer me to the right forum.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME27Df06.html
The reporting journo was found dead ... Throws light on the Al-Qaeda links to Pak Navy crack-down. Is worrisome for India and US.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME27Df06.html
The reporting journo was found dead ... Throws light on the Al-Qaeda links to Pak Navy crack-down. Is worrisome for India and US.
Al-Qaeda carried out the brazen attack on PNS Mehran naval air station in Karachi on May 22 after talks failed between the navy and al-Qaeda over the release of naval officials arrested on suspicion of al-Qaeda links, an Asia Times Online investigation reveals. ...
Asia Times Online contacts confirm that the attackers were from Ilyas Kashmiri's 313 Brigade, the operational arm of al-Qaeda. ...
The deeper underlying motive, though, was a reaction to massive internal crackdowns on al-Qaeda affiliates within the navy. ....
"Nonetheless, we observed an uneasy grouping on different naval bases in Karachi. ......That was the beginning of an intelligence operation in the navy to check for unscrupulous activities."
The official explained the grouping was against the leadership of the armed forces and opposed to its nexus with the United States against Islamic militancy. When some messages were intercepted hinting at attacks on visiting American officials, intelligence had good reason to take action and after careful evaluation at least 10 people - mostly from the lower cadre - were arrested in a series of operations.
"That was the beginning of huge trouble," the official said.
Those arrested were held in a naval intelligence office behind the chief minister's residence in Karachi, but before proper interrogation could begin, the in-charge of the investigation received direct threats from militants who made it clear they knew where the men were being detained.
The detainees were promptly moved to a safer location, but the threats continued. Officials involved in the case believe the militants feared interrogation would lead to the arrest of more of their loyalists in the navy. The militants therefore made it clear that if those detained were not released, naval installations would be attacked.
It was clear the militants were receiving good inside information as they always knew where the suspects were being detained, indicating sizeable al-Qaeda infiltration within the navy's ranks. A senior-level naval conference was called at which an intelligence official insisted that the matter be handled with great care, otherwise the consequences could be disastrous. Everybody present agreed, and it was decided to open a line of communication with al-Qaeda.
Abdul Samad Mansoori, a former student union activist and now part of 313 brigade, who originally hailed from Karachi but now lives in the North Waziristan tribal area was approached and talks begun. Al-Qaeda demanded the immediate release of the officials without further interrogation. This was rejected.
The detainees were allowed to speak to their families and were well treated, but officials were desperate to interrogate them fully to get an idea of the strength of al-Qaeda's penetration. The militants were told that once interrogation was completed, the men would be discharged from the service and freed.
Al-Qaeda rejected these terms and expressed its displeasure with the attacks on the navy buses in April.
These incidents pointed to more than the one al-Qaeda cell intelligence had tracked in the navy. The fear now was that if the problem was not addressed, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply lines could face a new threat. NATO convoys are routinely attacked once they begin the journey from Karachi to Afghanistan; now they could be at risk in Karachi port. Americans who often visit naval facilities in the city would also be in danger.
Therefore, another crackdown was conducted and more people were arrested. Those seized had different ethnic backgrounds. One naval commando came from South Waziristan's Mehsud tribe and was believed to have received direct instructions from Hakeemullah Mehsud, the chief of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban). Others were from Punjab province and Karachi, the capital of Sindh province.
After Bin Laden was killed by American Navy Seals in Abbottabad, 60 kilometers north of Islamabad, militants decided the time was ripe for major action.
Within a week, insiders at PNS Mehran provided maps, pictures of different exit and entry routes taken in daylight and at night, the location of hangers and details of likely reaction from external security forces.
As a result, the militants were able to enter the heavily guarded facility where one group targeted the aircraft, a second group took on the first strike force and a third finally escaped with the others providing covering fire. Those who stayed behind were killed.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Rather than "less" political control, we need greater political control of the intel setup..Today, its not political, but exclusive executive control that is the issue...No other country in the civilised world today keeps its intel setup outside Parliamentary scrutiny...Bringing in Parliamentary scrutiny over the entire setup - RAW/IB/NTRO - the lots, will be the first step in reforming the system..ramana wrote:Until the politcal control of intelligence to retain power is changed, India will continue to suffer from gaps and there will be reams of opinion from former chiefs of how things would/could be better but no evidence of what they did to change the system
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
I guess you don't understand the issues. I wrote this many times. The ruling party/group is like the King and intelligence works to keep them in power. Hence the executive ie the PM controls the agencies. The fear is the vote of no confidence. One way is to assure full term to the group that forms the govt. However that will go against the Westminster model. So till they find a way out IB will be under PM protecting the govt.
The other way is to legislate non use of govt agencies on political opponents. But this has its own complications.
What you suggest is another transplant on India and wont work.
The other way is to legislate non use of govt agencies on political opponents. But this has its own complications.
What you suggest is another transplant on India and wont work.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Why hasn't the intelligence setup given rise to India's own J Edgar Hoover? Seems they are not ambitious and are content to be flunkies, when they are ideally placed to blackmail everyone, Prime Minister on down, to get what they need.ramana wrote:Until the politcal control of intelligence to retain power is changed, India will continue to suffer from gaps and there will be reams of opinion from former chiefs of how things would/could be better but no evidence of what they did to change the system!
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
somnath wrote:Rather than "less" political control, we need greater political control of the intel setup..Today, its not political, but exclusive executive control that is the issue...No other country in the civilised world today keeps its intel setup outside Parliamentary scrutiny...Bringing in Parliamentary scrutiny over the entire setup - RAW/IB/NTRO - the lots, will be the first step in reforming the system..ramana wrote:Until the politcal control of intelligence to retain power is changed, India will continue to suffer from gaps and there will be reams of opinion from former chiefs of how things would/could be better but no evidence of what they did to change the system
yup...so that every tom, dick, and harry can poke into their business and complain about "massive" surveillance of Muslims, and "brutal" torture techniques, and "communal" feeling being a motivating factor. yup....exactly what the Indian intelligence setup needs....
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Now, how exatly can you say that if it hasnt even been tried? What is so uniquely "bad" about Indian democracy that it cannot oversee the workings of its intel setup? Political intel gathering is a reality everywhere - in India, in the US, in UK, in Russia and most other countries..The issue in India is not political intel gathering per se, but the widely-held perception (maybe true as well) that most of the efforts are towards that and not towards other crucial imperatives..Now how can the latter be improved in a democracy? We can either depend on the prescience/brilliance of a PM, and keep waiting ad infinitum..Or we build institutional structures to promote the same..Parliamentary oversight brings in greater acocuntability to the executive..It is actually even more imperative for intel as everything that they do is outside the public domain..If Defence can be under Paliamentary oversight, there is no conceivable reason why intel should not..ramana wrote:I guess you don't understand the issues. I wrote this many times. The ruling party/group is like the King and intelligence works to keep them in power. Hence the executive ie the PM controls the agencies. The fear is the vote of no confidence. One way is to assure full term to the group that forms the govt. However that will go against the Westminster model. So till they find a way out IB will be under PM protecting the govt.
The other way is to legislate non use of govt agencies on political opponents. But this has its own complications.
What you suggest is another transplant on India and wont work.
Well, you have instances of RN Kao, BN Mullick - their influence on the political leadership of the day was arguably no less than J Edgar Hoover's..The problem is that any individual-led strategy only lasts the indiviual's tenure (or his retention of sanity!)..In the US, they set up an entire institutional structure behind the intel setup - complete with legislations, Parliamentary oversight, the works..We have tended to make do with ad hocism (there is still no legilation that defines RAW and its roles and responsibilities), under the garb of absolute non-transparency and acountability...vera_k wrote:Why hasn't the intelligence setup given rise to India's own J Edgar Hoover
Obviously you have no clue what Parliamentary oversight means...devesh wrote:yup...so that every tom, dick, and harry can poke into their business and complain about "massive" surveillance of Muslims, and "brutal" torture techniques, and "communal" feeling being a motivating factor. yup....exactly what the Indian intelligence setup needs
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
^^^
the entire post is a fake "diagnosis," if it can be called that, of the situation. that IB is nothing more than political info gathering machine for ruling party is basically an open secret. it is the perception b/c it is the reality. it has been so ever since British established it.
please do enlighten me what "parliamentary oversight" means....after all I'm a dumb "reactionary," who uses "muscular" vocabulary to incite "dangerous," "communal" feelings, and also happen to be brain dead of course. so you can help me...
the entire post is a fake "diagnosis," if it can be called that, of the situation. that IB is nothing more than political info gathering machine for ruling party is basically an open secret. it is the perception b/c it is the reality. it has been so ever since British established it.
please do enlighten me what "parliamentary oversight" means....after all I'm a dumb "reactionary," who uses "muscular" vocabulary to incite "dangerous," "communal" feelings, and also happen to be brain dead of course. so you can help me...
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
So what is the "right" diagnosis, if I may? And lets say you are right, IB is just a political hack of the govt..Then? What should be done to rectify the situation? Pray?devesh wrote:the entire post is a fake "diagnosis," if it can be called that, of the situation. that IB is nothing more than political info gathering machine for ruling party is basically an open secret. it is the perception b/c it is the reality. it has been so ever since British established
Well, since you are so vehement about the adjectives, I wont venture to contradict you!devesh wrote:please do enlighten me what "parliamentary oversight" means....after all I'm a dumb "reactionary," who uses "muscular" vocabulary to incite "dangerous," "communal" feelings, and also happen to be brain dead of course. so you can help me...

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
somnath wrote:Parliamentary oversight brings in greater acocuntability to the executive..It is actually even more imperative for intel as everything that they do is outside the public domain..If Defence can be under Paliamentary oversight, there is no conceivable reason why intel should not..
Thats a very valid point you have made I would agree there , the intel setup should have an effective Parliamentary oversight that does a constant review on its performance and brings in accountability to the other wise a very opaque system.
Depending on one mans brilliance or his chosen appointee to run Intel setup is not a healthy state of affairs and many weakness and inabilities would be swept under the carpet.
We still do not know if intel agency is accoutable for spectacular failures like Mumbai blast , Kargil , 26/11 and many smaller but similar intel failure episode that took place , was any body from intel held accountable for this failures , were they brought to justice or any probe made into individuals omission and commission.
In the end people of india has the right to know as these agencies gets funded from tax payers money , parliamentary oversight would bring in greater accountability and successes of our agency would be well appreciated by the people and institutional deficiency can rectified.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
devesh, you are gunning for the messenger rather the message, consider yourself cautioned.
coming to IB, you are right, it's nothing but a political info gathering machine for the ruling party (not strictly true, because it does quite a decent job in counter terrorism and COIN).
how do you set that right ? I would like to hear your ideas.
what somnath says, and in this rarest of the rare occasions I agree with him, the way to do it would be to get the 'other' side involved, the side that IB is used against, the opposition.
form a select committee on intelligence comprising of the leader of the ruling party/coalition in parliament (or a senior MP chosen by him), the leader of the opposition (or a senior MP chosen by him) AND a retired senior bureaucrat from the world of intelligence and security whose candidacy is approved by both the ruling and opposition coalition. this committee will have the power to summon before itself any officer or minister, hold closed door sessions if needed. it will also have veto power on funding and an advisory role to the government. the reports would have to be made public by law with sections censored out if required.
'that', my friend is how you get things done in a democracy, add the checks and balances so that there is no misuse of power.
caveat : I would keep external intelligence out of this for the moment. see how it goes and come back to it at a later date.
coming to IB, you are right, it's nothing but a political info gathering machine for the ruling party (not strictly true, because it does quite a decent job in counter terrorism and COIN).
how do you set that right ? I would like to hear your ideas.
what somnath says, and in this rarest of the rare occasions I agree with him, the way to do it would be to get the 'other' side involved, the side that IB is used against, the opposition.
form a select committee on intelligence comprising of the leader of the ruling party/coalition in parliament (or a senior MP chosen by him), the leader of the opposition (or a senior MP chosen by him) AND a retired senior bureaucrat from the world of intelligence and security whose candidacy is approved by both the ruling and opposition coalition. this committee will have the power to summon before itself any officer or minister, hold closed door sessions if needed. it will also have veto power on funding and an advisory role to the government. the reports would have to be made public by law with sections censored out if required.
'that', my friend is how you get things done in a democracy, add the checks and balances so that there is no misuse of power.
caveat : I would keep external intelligence out of this for the moment. see how it goes and come back to it at a later date.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Select committees only consist of elected reps..They can summon an "expert" for guidance...and a select committees cannot function with 2/3 members, especially if these are ultra busy people like PM (in fact PM can never be a member by definition) and Leader of Opposition...That would work for an appointments commitee - for appointment of key personnel..Typically they would have 7-8 members in a select committee...There should be enough bandwidth for a comprehensive review of the unit under discussion..they cant have vetos on funding - that is a prerogative of the Prliament, but they can comment adversely..And then bring the reports out in public...That is how accountability is built..Rahul M wrote:form a select committee on intelligence comprising of the leader of the ruling party/coalition in parliament (or a senior MP chosen by him), the leader of the opposition (or a senior MP chosen by him) AND a retired senior bureaucrat from the world of intelligence and security whose candidacy is approved by both the ruling and opposition coalition
And there isnt anything particularly extra sensitive about RAW either - as it is there are lots of overlaps between RAW and IB...No reason why RAW shouldnt be under scrutiny, given that so much of our threats are "offshore"..
Having said that, its IMO quite unfair to tar IB with a coat of "politics" black -someone here described them as "traitors", "bribe takers" or some such sometime back...Almost every single successful CI effort has had an IB imprimatur -
Op Black Thunder (Ajit Doval's recce mission)
Mizoram - a textbook case, run almost fully by IB - so a state where IAF had to be used (the only time in India) hasnt seen insurgency for 25 years..
Decimation of JKLF and Hizb as operational units in J&K...
And many more...
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
by leader of the ruling party I meant the majority leader, not the PM. right now that post is held by pranab mukherjee IIRC.
people'sISI's representatives' like sahabuddin doesn't get in.
I agree that IB is not ineffective but it could be better and one way to do that would be to stop wasting money and manpower on doing election surveys.
that's the situation now. to introduce parliamentary oversight they will have to change the whole thing by law anyway. equal representation of ruling and opposition would lead to paralysis. a neutral expert as a full voting member would prevent that. make his appointment subject to approval by the parliament if needed. the size of any such committee would have to be kept small so that 'Select committees only consist of elected reps..They can summon an "expert" for guidance
unfortunately that rarely works in our case. any such committee would have to have powers beyond criticising for it to be effective. our politicians have no shame, so criticism does not affect them.they cant have vetos on funding - that is a prerogative of the Prliament, but they can comment adversely..And then bring the reports out in public...That is how accountability is built..
I agree that IB is not ineffective but it could be better and one way to do that would be to stop wasting money and manpower on doing election surveys.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
The situation we have currently is anomalous..Typically, leader of Lok Sabha is the PM..Rahul M wrote:by leader of the ruling party I meant the majority leader, not the PM. right now that post is held by pranab mukherjee IIRC
There is no reason to change the "law" to introduce parliamentary oversight...There is nothing in law that prevents it...And in a typical standing committee, while they try to make a proportionate representation, it is not necessarily so...the whole idea is for the legilaure to work cooperatively in overseeing the exective, (currently) behind closed doors...By all accounts, it works pretty well...And there is no "voting" required, the committees dont have to "decide" on a matter, they are there to see, ask tough questions, and note down the issues, make it public, the govt has to come back with an ATR by law...About certain people, its not a big deal..These committees are very carefully vetted by the senior Parliamentary leaderships of all parties..Rahul M wrote:that's the situation now. to introduce parliamentary oversight they will have to change the whole thing by law anyway. equal representation of ruling and opposition would lead to paralysis. a neutral expert as a full voting member would prevent that. make his appointment subject to approval by the parliament if needed. the size of any such committee would have to be kept small so that 'people'sISI's representatives' like sahabuddin doesn't get in
Actually by all accounts these committees are quite efective...The Arjun saga is a case in point...One of the turning points in its fortunes was when the Defence sub committee went out and damned the T90 acquisition, and also damend the non-movement on Arjun...Which is when ministers like Rao Birendra Singh started taking personal interest, and the wheel turned...I have heard similar stories from people who have been summoned by some of these committees - publicservants are often quite shaken after a session, and dont want to be re-summoned again...Nandan Nilekani said the same thing publicly ifI am not mistaken..Rahul M wrote:unfortunately that rarely works in our case. any such committee would have to have powers beyond criticising for it to be effective. our politicians have no shame, so criticism does not affect them
It could be btter of course..But dont if they do election surveys anymore - parties can use the likes of AC Nielson easily now, and do...Rahul M wrote:I agree that IB is not ineffective but it could be better and one way to do that would be to stop wasting money and manpower on doing election surveys
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Big Birather is here
IB wants telcos to store call data for 5 years http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... inistry-ib

IB wants telcos to store call data for 5 years http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... inistry-ib
The Intelligence Bureau (IB) wants all mobile phone companies to store call data records, or details of all phone calls made by their customers, for a period of five years
The project aims to develop a technology platform where users will have to mandatorily submit some form of an online identification or password to access the internet every time they go online, irrespective of the service provider.