
Ivy League economist ethnically profiled, interrogated for doing math on American Airlines flight
The U.S. must open up its market for services to Indian firms, just as India has liberalised foreign direct investment in many sectors such as railways and defence for the benefit of American firms, Niti Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant said.
“India has opened up every sector of the economy in the last two years. While India is becoming more and more open, America must also open its services sector for Indians to go and work there. It can’t be a halfway house,” Mr Kant said, stressing that domestic political issues are a factor every country has to contend with. He was speaking at a session following the annual general meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce in India.
The Indo-US relationship will only flourish further when there’s reciprocity in market access, Mr Kant said.
“India has allowed American companies to come in and flourish otherwise GE would have never got the biggest contract to build locomotives for the Railways. Similarly, America must welcome Indian services and software companies to work there.”
Richard Verma, the US Ambassador to India, said that the US has more government-level engagement with India than any other country in the world. “We have 38 dialogues underway on different sectors between the two governments at the assistant secretary of state level and above,” he said, adding that new records were set on several bilateral fronts in 2015.
“Our bilateral trade is about to touch 108 billion dollars. Indian companies investing into the U.S. touched a record in 2015. Defence trade has touched $14 billion, 1.1 million visas were issued to Indian travellers in 2015 — the highest ever,” said Mr Verma, citing this as a barometer of commercial and people to people engagements between the countries.
The Niti Aayog chief executive officer said that the biggest foreign direct investment into India in recent times was American Tower Corporation’s purchase of a 51 per cent controlling stake in Viom Network.
“ATC would actually be controlling about 57,000 mobile towers in India. We expect that better management of towers in India will see a quicker rollout of 4G and much lower call drops to India. They will bring in technology to ensure that,” Mr Kant said.
SSridhar wrote:Open up services sector, Kant tells U.S. - The HinduThe U.S. must open up its market for services to Indian firms, just as India has liberalised foreign direct investment in many sectors such as railways and defence for the benefit of American firms, Niti Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant said.
“ATC would actually be controlling about 57,000 mobile towers in India. We expect that better management of towers in India will see a quicker rollout of 4G and much lower call drops to India. They will bring in technology to ensure that,” Mr Kant said.
Has any part of our network not been compromised till now? I guess almost all our backbone switches and OS are American and even most of the advanced SW used for few departmentsSSridhar wrote:^^Complete communication leakage to the US.
By PTI
WASHINGTON: The US had a trade deficit of USD 1.7 billion with India and of USD 26 billion with China in the month of March, according to official figures.
The goods and services deficit was USD 40.4 billion in March, down USD 6.5 billion from USD 47.0 billion in February, the US Department of Commerce said in its latest monthly figures.
March exports were USD 176.6 billion, USD 1.5 billion less than February exports while imports in the month were USD 217.1 billion, USD 8.1 billion less than in February, it said.
According to the Commerce Department, the deficit with China decreased USD 6.2 billion to USD 26 billion in March. Exports from China increased USD 0.1 billion to USD 8.5 billion and imports decreased USD 6.1 billion to USD 34.4 billion, it said.
The March figures show surpluses with South and Central America (USD 3.2 billion), OPEC (USD 0.7 billion), United Kingdom (USD 0.5 billion) and Saudi Arabia (USD 0.1 billion).
Deficits were recorded with China (USD 26 billion), European Union (USD 11.1 billion), Germany (USD 5.9 billion), Japan (USD 5.9 billion), Mexico (USD 5.2 billion), South Korea (USD 3.0 billion), Italy (USD 2.4 billion), India (USD 1.7 billion), France (USD 0.9 billion), Brazil (USD 0.2 billion), and Canada (USD 0.1 billion).
According to the latest monthly report, the balance with the United Kingdom shifted from a deficit of USD 0.5 billion to a surplus of USD 0.5 billion in March.
Exports from the UK increased USD 0.6 billion to USD 4.8 billion and imports decreased USD 0.3 billion to USD 4.4 billion.
The surplus with Saudi Arabia decreased USD 1.2 billion to USD 0.1 billion in March. Exports from Saudi Arabia decreased USD 0.9 billion to USD 1.4 billion and imports increased USD 0.3 billion to USD 1.3 billion.
SSridharji, the corporate acquisition trend is expected to accelerate in coming years and decades. Since this area will never be covered by the mass media, I'm checking if it is worthwhile to track all corporate acquisitions/takeovers in a separate new dhaga under "Foreign ownership of Corporate India" or something like that (unless one exists), people may find it easy to track these things. Happy to start one under econ if it is worth.SSridhar wrote:^^Complete communication leakage...
More info and streams: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/transformers/The day-long gathering will include a robotics competition for high-schoolers in the area.
The Washington Post will put on next month a day-long technology event it’s calling Transformers, apparently because Jeff Bezos, decided he wasn’t busy enough with the Amazon and Blue Origin and the Posts regular goings-on.
The paper released new details today about what will be a D.C. summit on May 18 about today’s biggest and boldest innovations in the tech and business spheres, with a whole bunch of speakers including journalist Katie Couric; IBM Watson general manager David Kenny; Reddit co-founder Steve Huffman; Virgin Galactic chief executive George Whitesides; DARPA director Arati Prabhakar; and of course Bezos himself.
The Post reported that the gathering will also include a robotics competition in which the paper’s engineering will mentor local high-schoolers, which sounds pretty cool. They’ll purportedly be building an information-gathering tool for a “mock-story environment.” Bezos, along with chief executive of CyPhy Works Helen Greiner (also a speaker at the event) will pick the winners at the end of the day. You’ll be able to livestream the whole thing here.
No word yet on what the winners get or what, if anything, the robots will actually be used for, but maybe they’ll get free subscriptions to Amazon Prime Video, at the very least.
“Robots are performing surgery,” goes the Post announcement. “Computers are beating humans at our own games. Businesses and governments are collaborating in unprecedented ways, opening up new markets and models. On May 18, some of the most transformative thinkers in the country will discuss breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, commercial space travel, and medicine — providing opportunities for a powerful exchange of ideas, strategies and lessons learned.”
The Post originally announced this summit a year ago, saying the usual stuff about innovators coming together to “upend the status quo.”
China's agressive behavior in the South China Sea has complicated the U.S. pivot to Asia. But those same antics, plus some Chinese muscle-flexing off the coast of the Indian subcontinent, may well give the pivot a new lease on life — in a different ocean.Indian military officials and policymakers, for decades obsessed with Pakistan, are now growing increasingly worried by what they see as potentially threatening moves by China. Beijing’s growing blue-water navy is becoming more active in the Indian Ocean, with bigger ships spending more time there than ever before. China is inking port deals across India’s watery backyard, from Sri Lanka to Djibouti, that many in New Delhi see as a threat to Indian security.With a still-unresolved border dispute simmering between the two countries, and with recent Chinese moves in the South China Sea providing an alarming glimpse of what a rejuvenated Beijing is really after, India seems closer than it has in years to embracing closer ties with the United States by jettisoning decades of non-aligned foreign policy.“Of course there has been a change in India’s strategic vision,” retired Vice Admiral Anup Singh, who until 2011 headed up the Indian Navy’s Eastern Command, told Foreign Policy. India’s BJP government and security officials are “all in favor of a solid handshake with the United States, because that is the only way to maintain the balance of power.”Those closer ties are finally being realized after an April visit to India by U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter. After years of frustration seeking to turn New Delhi into a strategic partner, plagued especially by bogged-down talks on increased defense cooperation between the two countries, the U.S. and India at last reached agreement in principle on a deal to allow each nation’s militaries to use the other’s naval, land, and air bases to resupply and pre-position hardware.
The accord will likely open the way for other deals on sharing nautical data and arranging secure communications. And following years of discussions, the two governments have launched joint research and development projects, collaborating on aircraft carrier and jet engine designs. India and the United States are now working together in particular to hone anti-submarine warfare techniques, given the pace of Chinese sub deployments to the Indian Ocean.In the meantime, defense trade between the two powers reached $14 billion last year.For years, India foot-dragged over the completion of some of the accords, such as the logistics-sharing arrangement which would, in the near term at least, will be more beneficial to the U.S. Navy than the Indian Navy. Spooked by the specter of an expansive China, though, India is shedding decades of diplomatic standoffishness.“The deals are very significant, because they indicate that Indian policymakers are beginning to realize that there could be more benefits elsewhere, namely strategic deterrence against China,” said retired Indian Capt. Gurpreet Khurana, who since 2003 has run India’s National Maritime Foundation.Tellingly, Carter’s visit marked the first time ever a U.S. defense secretary visited India’s Eastern Command, the slice of India’s Navy most focused on China, and which is home to the bulk of India’s most advanced ships, including nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier.Not only has New Delhi turned a new page with Washington, India’s top brass also has shifted its approach to Japan and Australia, pursuing naval cooperation and inviting the two countries for the first time to exercise and sail in the Indian Ocean. India is also pursuing closer ties with Vietnam. “Is this driven by China? I think so. I think clearly it is,” said Adm. Jon Greenert, who retired last year U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, the top uniformed job in the navy.“The Indian Navy’s interest in moving further east in the Indian Ocean and coming into the Pacific to exercise is an indication of that,” he told FP. Until recently, India’s Navy focused solely on the west of the Indian Ocean and had no interest in operating at long distances from its coast, he said. Especially after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, India has been forced to increase patrols of its vulnerable shoreline.China’s behavior in the South China Sea — including the construction of artificial islands, expansive territorial claims, and the dispatch of advanced military equipment to disputed rocks and reefs — has spooked nearly all of its Asian neighbors. Some Indians, still scarred by the 1962 war with China, point to what Beijing is doing there as proof that China can’t be trusted. But what’s really got New Delhi worried is Beijing’s seemingly more-innocent behavior in the Indian Ocean itself.Beijing has after fits and starts reached a long-term deal for access to a deepwater port in Sri Lanka, right on India’s doorstep. That deal alone was a wake-up call in India, especially as a Chinese submarine paid Sri Lanka a very public port call in the middle of negotiations. The Indian government reportedly encouraged a change in Sri Lanka’s leadership in early 2015, in part to ensure that the tiny island was ruled by a government less friendly to Beijing.Since then, China has for the first time ever arranged for an overseas base, in Djibouti. In between, China has steadily increased its footprint with port accords in Pakistan, basing agreements in the Seychelles, and outposts on the Comoros Islands; late last year, a Chinese firm started work on a new port in Mozambique.Those are not military bases of the sort which the United States maintains all around the world, and are nominally more about developing China’s commercial reach through the world’s main shipping lanes; China has an ambitious plan to recreate the ancient “silk road” by land and by sea. Nonetheless, such “dual-use” facilities cause concern across the whole region.New Delhi worries about what China is trying to achieve with its “string of pearls” across the Indian Ocean, Greenert said. “They are looking at it with apprehension.”One former national security adviser to an Asian government calls China’s proliferating port deals “piss markers.” Khurana, the former captain, says that “China is biting us everywhere.”And now that Beijing has openly declared its intent to build and deploy a blue-water navy that can operate far from home, Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean is visibly ramping up. For eight years, China has maintained an anti-piracy flotilla in the Indian Ocean, and the ships comprising that fleet are getting bigger and more advanced, though attacks by Somali pirates have fallen dramatically. Chinese submarines and much bigger ships, like amphibious docking ships that can carry troops and aircraft, are routinely present in the area.“All of this is meant to exercise their naval muscles,” said Adm. Singh. Another retired senior Indian admiral, Raja Menon, wrote last month that closer U.S.-Indian ties could make it easier to push back against China right where it hurts — in the strategic chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca, through which China imports much of its oil and natural gas.“There’s nothing more likely to ensure a peaceful Chinese rise than the ability to squeeze the Malacca jugular as a strategic threat,” Menon wrote.U.S. officials are still not convinced China will succeed in building a logistical network in the Indian Ocean that could be used by its expanding navy, as regional governments may draw the line at any deals that appear to open the door to military bases that encroach on sovereignty.And plenty of analysts take a more sanguine view of China’s activities. The anti-piracy patrols, for example, have for years been heralded by U.S. and European naval officials as China’s contribution to protecting the global commons, notes Nilanthi Samaranayake, a South Asia analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, a think tank. The submarine visits are public and transparent, not sneaky. And any rising power with a growing navy will naturally operate further from home. The Chinese port deals, including one as a far away as Greece, are more about the world’s biggest exporter protecting its economic interests, many stress, than preparing secret naval-bases-in-waiting.That’s one reason that many in India are still cautious about openly bandwagoning with the United States, despite the recent bilateral defense deals.“India is always going to be hedging a little bit, because they don’t want to be seen as antagonizing China too much,” Samaranayake said.Still, if China exports the same kind of behavior to the Indian Ocean that it’s been inflicting on neighbors in the South China Sea — from dispatching oil rigs to disputed waters to ramming fishing vessels from other countries– then India could jump off the fence in a hurry.“If we actually see China be aggressive in the Indian Ocean, that could really help crystallize Indian policy toward China, and move the relationship with the U.S. forward,” Samaranayake said.Photo credit: CHAD M. TRUDEAU/U.S. NavyCorrection: An earlier version of this article incorrectly identified Adm. Greenert’s former command. He retired as Chief of Naval Operations.
For the first time on a public platform, Secretary Carter used the term ‘strategic handshake’ to describe India-US ties. It marks a testimony to the budding strategic partnership that is forming between the two nations by indicating the growing convergence of India and US’s interests in the region. Carter called the US-India relationship as the “defining partnership of the century”. However, Indians should not over read this as the Americans are looking to head into in the Asia-Pacific with full force and need a strong base of allies to support them which includes among others, Japan, South Korea and Australia.
Experts discuss U.S. relations with India, China, and Pakistan and will discuss the challenges and opportunities for the United States in light of changing regional geopolitics.
It has been 27 years since the USTR office launched its Special 301 report to rate other countries on their IPR regime. Although India overhauled its IPR legislation completely in 2005 and moved over to the products patent regime to honour commitments under the TRIPS agreement, its status in the Special 301 report remained the same. This year, too, India was placed in the ‘priority watch’ list of countries that, according to the US, need to tighten their IP laws.
The US’ problem with India’s IPR regime has nothing to do with adherence to WTO norms. The powerful US pharmaceutical lobby has a problem with Indian pharma producers, who have managed to serve the poor not just in India but across the world. Cheap generic medicines (copied versions of drugs whose patents have expired) manufactured in India have been making medical care affordable for millions in Africa and Latin America, not to mention the US itself.
With patented medicines worth several billion dollars going off-patent in the current decade, pharmaceutical giants, many US-based, are trying to evergreen their patents through cosmetic changes, and applying for fresh patents. But they have been largely unsuccessful in India. A special provision in the Indian Patents Act, Section 3 (d), allows the Indian Patents Controller to deny patents on items that are not significantly different from their older versions. Through its Special 301 report, the US is trying to push India to drop Section 3 (d). It also does not want compulsory licences to be issued for manufacture of copies of patented drugs to address situations of national emergency, as permitted by the TRIPS agreement.
With the multilateral trade laws on its side and the interest of millions of poor, India should either ignore or laugh off the USTR’s efforts.
US service sector is protected with trade barriers. For example, a foreign owner cannot hold more than 26% of a media house or bank.NRao wrote:I am very surprised with this request by Kant. "Service sector" normally falls under "Consultancy" (soft) (not software). And, that sector is open to anyone and everyone.
Rupert Murdoch.vera_k wrote:US service sector is protected with trade barriers. For example, a foreign owner cannot hold more than 26% of a media house or bank.
^^^BNP Parbas owns 100% of a California based bank.vera_k wrote:US service sector is protected with trade barriers. For example, a foreign owner cannot hold more than 26% of a media house or bank.
From Wiki -Rupert Murdoch.
They all should be open, perhaps with the exception of healthcare.Service Sector wrote: Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Utilities
Transportation and warehousing
Information
Financial activities
Professional and business services
Education and health services
Leisure and hospitality
Other services
Government (Federal,state, and local)
Book by Pakistan’s ex-envoy to U.S. Husain Haqqani contains then-ISI chief Gen. Shuja Pasha’s ‘revelation’.
The planners of the 26/11 attacks were “our people” but it wasn’t “our operation”, the then-ISI chief Gen. Shuja Pasha had admitted shortly after the Mumbai attacks in 2008, says former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani. The revelation, which appears in a forthcoming book on India-Pakistan relations, recounts the visit by General Pasha to Washington on December 24-25, 2008, where he made the startling admission.
At the end of his meetings with his CIA counterpart Gen. Michael Hayden, General Pasha had reportedly visited Mr. Haqqani at the ambassador’s residence. “Pasha said to me ‘Log hamaray thay, operation hamara nahin thha’,” Mr. Haqqani writes in the book — India vs Pakistan: Why Can’t We Just Be Friends?
Speaking to The Hindu over the telephone from Washington, Mr. Haqqani said Gen. Pasha had also told Gen. Hayden that “retired military officers and retired intelligence officers” had been involved in the planning of the attacks.
The conversation between the chiefs of the ISI and CIA has been recounted in three books earlier — by then U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice in her memoirs, Bob Woodward in his book “Obama Wars” and earlier this year by Gen. Hayden himself in his autobiography, Playing to The Edge. However, this is the first time Gen. Pasha’s words corroborating the ISI link have been recorded by a Pakistani official.
No prosecution
According to Mr. Haqqani, the link was confirmed by the fact that Pakistan’s government never prosecuted the accused.
“The fact that we never pursued the case against the accused [officers] in the 26/11 case despite all the evidence that had been provided: not just by India, but by the U.S., by the American NSA including intercepts of conversations during the attacks, that pointed a finger at us, at the Pakistan government,” he said.
According to Mr. Haqqani, who faced charges of treason in Pakistan in 2011 after the military accused him of writing a “Memo” to the U.S. government on the Osama Bin Laden killing, the Army’s denial of any link to the 26/11 attacks was of a piece with their stand on other strikes “all the way from the 1980s to Dawood Ibrahim.”
Yeah but the US had one of the most segmented and corralled banking sectors until the '70's. Even interstate banking within the US was restricted.TSJones wrote:there are foreign owned banks in the US. a bunch of euros and asian ones as well.
the US has one of the most wide open economies in the world. period.
http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callrep ... x?type=fbo
Certainly. The US remain one of the most open societies AFTER it has ensured that being open is to their benefit. A robust and strong IP regime along with various trade treaties ensures that the benefits of innovation remain protected. Coupled with these the US does one of the best jobs of killing its own deadwood. Meaning the outsourcing of low end jobs both manufacturing and services to others. So, as an example iPhones are made in China, but with only $6 as the net addition of value that China does in the process. For all the so called software giant India is supposed to be, I do not think India does even $100 million of IP owned software exports.TSJones wrote:
the US has changed also.
ancient history aside, the US remains one of the most open societies and economies in the world, back then and now.
Negotiations on sharing logistics and military bases in the Pacific Ocean have exposed the sturm und drang plaguing recent U.S.-India relations. In mid-April, during U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s trip to South Asia, he and Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar announced that the two countries had plans to sign an agreement known as a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) “within weeks.” Though details on the agreement remain scant, Carter declared that the Indian and U.S. armed services are now “operating together by air, land, and sea, collaborating on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security.” And by agreeing “in principle to share and exchange logistics,” the two countries would have the capacity to “do even more” in such missions.. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has come under fire from political opponents who object to any pact that might grant U.S. forces access to Indian soil. And thus it appears that New Delhi may have backpedaled on LEMOA in an effort to placate them.
But what makes strategic sense may flout political reality. Each action to tighten diplomatic or military ties between India and the United States summons an equal and opposite pushback from the Indian body politic. Call it Newton’s Third Law of South Asian diplomacy. India is a standoffish great power, mindful of its dominant place in the Indian Ocean region and reluctant to appear to defer to any other power. It also has a turbulent past vis-à-vis the United States dating to the Cold War, when New Delhi professed nonalignment but inclined toward the Soviet bloc. It takes time to get over past animosities, no matter how pressing the reasons for doing so. It may also take a push from a domineering China — a country that entertains grand ambitions in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, Beijing’s aggressive conduct in the South China Sea signals that a bellicose turn may be in the offing west of Malacca.
New Delhi and Washington must defy this law of diplomatic physics to allow bilateral ties to make the great leap forward strategic logic would dictate — rather than inching along, as they have in the past. This will remain true unless China poses a clear and present danger in the Indian Ocean — like it does now in disputed territory in the South China Sea — overcoming resistance to closer working relations.And even that figure exaggerates. Factor in the rhythm of training, routine upkeep, and major overhauls, and U.S. Navy task forces can count on, at most, about 17 logistics ships. Indeed, so thin is the sea services’ logistical margin that, if I were a hostile maritime power, I would put sinking U.S. logistics ships first on my wartime to-do list. Why bother assailing well-defended aircraft carriers or destroyers? Do away with the logistics fleet, and the combat fleet’s striking power wilts.Navies cruising far from home, even if they have robust combat logistics fleets, also need bases. Oilers, for instance, have to refill their tanks at a base after dispensing fuel to the fleet. Nearly a century ago, Rear Adm. Bradley Fiske likened bases’ purpose to “supplying and replenishing the stored-up energy required for naval operations.”
To stay with Fiske’s physics simile, the fleet swiftly discharges its potential energy at sea. Smaller warships, such as cruisers and destroyers, defend aircraft carriers and other high-value units against air, surface, and undersea attacks. These vessels, with lesser storage capacity, quickly expend fuel, stores, spares, and ammunition. They must refuel every three to four days lest they exhaust their bunkers. A virtually inexhaustible fuel source drives nuclear-powered aircraft carriers through the water, but even flattops aren’t exempt from the law of logistics: Thirsty air wings demand jet fuel to stay aloft for aerial combat or routine patrols. By no means does nuclear power liberate carriers from their bases. The ship may be able to go anywhere, but it can accomplish little without regular resupply.
Think of it this way: The relationship between the base, the logistics ship, and the fleet is like the relationship between the power outlet, your portable battery, and your portable electronic gizmos while on extended travel. You can recharge your devices for a while without searching for a power outlet, but the portable battery itself needs to be recharged once exhausted. At which point finding an outlet or USB port becomes your top priority. The combat fleet is the iPad or iPhone, the logistics ship the rechargeable battery, and a well-equipped harbor the power outlet. The more outlets — and the more strategically located near important operating zones — the better.. Planting new logistics hubs along the U.S. lines of advance helped the U.S. military surge across the Pacific Ocean toward the Japanese mainland. This approach is viable during total war. In peacetime, however, naval forces cannot simply seize territory and convert them to refueling bases. Washington must court friendly host nations — like India — to gain access.The Indian Navy likewise needs access to shore installations to voyage beyond the subcontinent’s immediate environs. Look at a map of Eurasia. The U.S. sea services operate mainly from logistics hubs such as Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan and Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. In other words, they’re positioned at the extreme east and west of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean theater. India is a peninsula of colossal proportions jutting into the Indian Ocean, occupying a central position along the sea lanes connecting Japan with the Persian Gulf.
Yet the infrastructure to support naval operations far from Indian coasts remains minimal. If India wants to operate at the eastern or western reaches of maritime Eurasia, it needs logistical support. If the United States wants to operate between those extremes, its sea services can benefit immensely from port access in that South Asian midsection. Reciprocal benefits beckon.
In other words, LEMOA will complete an arc of logistics facilities sweeping all the way from Tokyo Bay to Bahrain — helping the partners stage operations throughout the Indo-Pacific. (By similar logic, China has bankrolled seaport development at sites like Gwadar in western Pakistan and has commenced construction of a naval facility at Djibouti, in the Gulf of Aden.) The pact will give New Delhi the option to dispatch expeditionary forces beyond the Indian Ocean — say, to uphold freedom of navigation in the contested South China Sea. And it will help the U.S. sea services execute the nautical component of the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, keeping naval forces on station where and when it matters.
New Delhi telegraphed that it would not sign away its freedom to say no to U.S.-led military enterprises that could ensnare India in regional conflict. And why would it? No one likes to issue blank checks, even to friends or allies. Political blowback follows failure as surely as night follows day: see War, Iraq, 2003. India would not be spared the blowback from a similar U.S.-led debacle. Nor could New Delhi escape the political splatter even if it merely acted as a silent partner, holding back any direct force contribution while supplying U.S. forces with fuel, stores, or spare machinery parts. It will take clear, painstaking diplomacy to explain U.S. purposes and strategy, overcoming likely Indian misgivings about martial ventures.Indian leaders, in short, fear they could implicate their nation by joining the fray in any capacity. And Indian leaders also probably fret about pressure from China — which would never let them forget it if some operation went awry, hurting Chinese interests in South Asia. An errant venture could hurt New Delhi’s good name, damaging its standing with fellow Indian Ocean states. Worse, it might even embroil India in conflict with its neighbors. That’s why even the appearance of abridging India’s nonaligned posture makes officialdom queasy.
. If tightening up ties with the United States makes strategic sense, Indian leaders’ desire to keep up relations with Russia helps generate an equal and opposite reaction slowing forward progress on initiatives such as LEMOA.India, moreover, is mindful of its stature as the Indian Ocean’s natural hegemon. The United States may be a friendly, English-speaking, democratic seafaring state. It’s also a non-Asian great power whose navy dominates India’s backyard. That rankles, even as New Delhi welcomes its help in policing regional waters and fending off the rival great power that is China. Neither the partners’ common English language, nor common heritage as scions of the British Empire, nor common form of government, nor common purpose of keeping order at sea will beget a formal alliance soon — if ever.
Only a truly overbearing China might overcome this rocky past. Indian leaders have voiced misgivings, for instance, about the presence of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean, a presence that is becoming more and more routine. They also worry that Beijing will transform its limited presence at places like Gwadar and Djibouti into a full-blown network of naval facilities — a precursor to a standing naval presence that encircles the subcontinent from the sea. Until China’s ambitions come into sharper focus, however, the push-and-pull dynamic between Washington and New Delhi will portend fitful progress and an uncertain outcome. This U.S. administration and the next must keep working toward an entente — but it must work at India’s pace, framing the rationale for naval cooperation in terms of India’s interests as India construes them. There’s no substitute for patient diplomacy toward this reluctant friend.
Around a dozen members of a right-wing Indian Hindu group lit a ritual fire and chanted mantras Wednesday asking the Hindu gods to help Trump win the United States (US) presidential election.While Trump has dominated the Republican primary race to decide the party's candidate for the November election, his calls for temporarily banning Muslims from America and cracking down on terrorist groups abroad have earned him some fans in India."The whole world is screaming against Islamic terrorism, and even India is not safe from it," said Vishnu Gupta, founder of the Hindu Sena nationalist group. "Only Donald Trump can save humanity."Members of the group gathered on a blanket spread out in a New Delhi protest park along with a collection of statues depicting gods including Shiva and Hanuman ─ as well as photos of a smiling Trump.Above them hung a banner declaring support for Trump "because he is hope for humanity against Islamic terror."
Bogus article and fake informationJhujar wrote:How the United States Can Maintain Its Dominance in the Pacific Ocean
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/10/how ... rs%20Picks
T he Indian Navy likewise needs access to shore installations to voyage beyond the subcontinent’s immediate environs. Look at a map of Eurasia. The U.S. sea services operate mainly from logistics hubs such as Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan and Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. In other words, they’re positioned at the extreme east and west of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean theater. India is a peninsula of colossal proportions jutting into the Indian Ocean, occupying a central position along the sea lanes connecting Japan with the Persian Gulf.
Yet the infrastructure to support naval operations far from Indian coasts remains minimal. If India wants to operate at the eastern or western reaches of maritime Eurasia, it needs logistical support. If the United States wants to operate between those extremes, its sea services can benefit immensely from port access in that South Asian midsection. Reciprocal benefits beckon.
In other words, LEMOA will complete an arc of logistics facilities sweeping all the way from Tokyo Bay to Bahrain — helping the partners stage operations throughout the Indo-Pacific. (By similar logic, China has bankrolled seaport development at sites like Gwadar in western Pakistan and has commenced construction of a naval facility at Djibouti, in the Gulf of Aden.) The pact will give New Delhi the option to dispatch expeditionary forces beyond the Indian Ocean — say, to uphold freedom of navigation in the contested South China Sea. And it will help the U.S. sea services execute the nautical component of the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, keeping naval forces on station where and when it matters.
New Delhi telegraphed that it would not sign away its freedom to say no to U.S.-led military enterprises that could ensnare India in regional conflict.
. If tightening up ties with the United States makes strategic sense, Indian leaders’ desire to keep up relations with Russia helps generate an equal and opposite reaction slowing forward progress on initiatives such as LEMOA.India, moreover, is mindful of its stature as the Indian Ocean’s natural hegemon. The United States may be a friendly, English-speaking, democratic seafaring state. It’s also a non-Asian great power whose navy dominates India’s backyard. That rankles, even as New Delhi welcomes its help in policing regional waters and fending off the rival great power that is China. Neither the partners’ common English language, nor common heritage as scions of the British Empire, nor common form of government, nor common purpose of keeping order at sea will beget a formal alliance soon — if ever.-
Only a truly overbearing China might overcome this rocky past. Indian leaders have voiced misgivings, for instance, about the presence of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean, a presence that is becoming more and more routine. They also worry that Beijing will transform its limited presence at places like Gwadar and Djibouti into a full-blown network of naval facilities — a precursor to a standing naval presence that encircles the subcontinent from the sea. Until China’s ambitions come into sharper focus, however, the push-and-pull dynamic between Washington and New Delhi will portend fitful progress and an uncertain outcome. This U.S. administration and the next must keep working toward an entente — but it must work at India’s pace, framing the rationale for naval cooperation in terms of India’s interests as India construes them. There’s no substitute for patient diplomacy toward this reluctant friend.
Well, that's one growth industry for sure. No reason for the lawyers to feel left out now.India will file 16 cases against the US for violating World Trade Organization ( WTO ) treaties Parliament was informed on Wednesday.
https://twitter.com/padhalikha/status/7 ... 9357321216ShauryaT wrote:^^Have all the nuts in the world decided to band together?
Ohh. . . the US seems to be acting quickly!A US trade team is in India to discuss domestic sourcing. US officials will hold discussions with their Indian counterparts today in New Delhi to dissuade India from going to the WTO against the local sourcing norm in programmes run by several states in the US. India has warned the US that it plans to challenge 15 programmes run by nine American states.