Bharat Rakshak

Singha wrote:Hopefully move on or around deir hafr

Singha wrote:why curious ? its a mine belt laid around the theyam oilfield in deir azzor ... armies do use a lot of mines to act as a tripwire and delaying tactic and channeling into firing zones. not all have that explosive cable thing which can shake the ground for miles.

habal wrote:many of these mines belonged to the state, isis got holds of unguarded arms dumps in aleppo circa 2012-13 and got lots of mines for free. there were many arms dumps in classified locations which may have been given away to isis by flee sylian almy. It's free u know, that's their tagline.

They aren't mines as such but factory produced IED's with a pressure plate (the stick) to make it victim initiated. Could be as simple as a factory ISIS captured with a press that once produced something along the lines lamp shades or light fittings. Using the same system of press to punch the bodies of the IED out of the same tin, pack it with recovered military explosive or HME. Looks to be an attempt at a shaped charge with the cone on the bottom. Just an industrialised version of some guy making them out of pressure cookers in his mud hut.

sarang wrote:With my untrained eyes, I am unable to locate the hit. Can anybody help?

Russia’s military intervention in Syria represents a significant departure from previous Russian uses of force in the post-Cold War era, which were all confined within Russian territory or the near-abroad, and, along with its recent successful military operation in Crimea, has led Western analysts to reassess Russia’s military capabilities. While the Russian military demonstrated a number of improvements during the Crimean operation compared to previous operations, the campaign was largely executed by elite ground units and special operations forces (SOF). The current conflict in Syria, however, has primarily been an air campaign utilizing an array of new technologies, weapons, and conventional capabilities.

Some analysts have called it “Russia’s first U.S.-style war” because Russia is fighting the campaign away from its borders with airpower and long-range precision guided munitions that place only minimal risk to its own forces. Many analysts, whether implicitly or explicitly, have compared it either to Russia’s performance during the 2008 South Ossetia Conflict with Georgia or to current American capabilities. When compared to the 2008 Five-Day War, Russia’s performance in Syria has demonstrated a marked improvement and disproven many Western analysts who believed Russia was not capable of launching such a campaign so far from its borders. Yet, a significant gap remains between US and Russian capabilities, and, after six months of direct Russian military support, whether Russia can translate tactical successes into a strategic victory is still far from certain.

In contrast to the 2008 South Ossetia conflict in which the Russian Air Force was unable to establish air superiority or properly support its ground forces, Russia’s air campaign in Syria has demonstrated a remarkable turnaround over the previous seven years. Russia has demonstrated clear improvements in its command, control, and communications (C3) by executing a relatively complex air campaign with up to 90 sorties per day with a variety of fixed-wing, including both tactical fighters and strategic bombers, and rotary-wing aircraft flying from bases in Syria and in Russia. Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS), and Navy have tested a number of new long-range weapon systems in Syria, which demonstrates that Russia can project force farther and more accurately than previously expected. Furthermore, the air-ground coordination between Russian aircraft and a collection of Syrian, Iranian, and Hezbollah ground forces is a stark improvement from 2008 when Russian forces suffered multiple friendly fire incidents and the VKS proved unable to properly support Russian ground forces.

Among the most surprising developments for many Western observers, is the particularly high sortie rate the modest size Russian air contingent in Syria is achieving, estimated to be approximately 40 per day during the beginning of the operation and reaching 90 per day for short periods of time. This operational tempo is particularly surprising considering the number of Russian military aircraft crashes during the Spring and Summer of 2015, which many Western analysts viewed as an indication the VKS was being pushed beyond its limits. However, the high operational tempo is facilitated by the proximity of the Russian air base in Syria to rebel targets, whereas American aircraft typically operate at greater ranges from aircraft carriers. While the U.S. has conducted much more intense and longer air campaigns than Russia’s campaign in Syria, few other nations in the world, including European NATO members, could execute and sustain such an operation on their own as demonstrated by the NATO interventions in Kosovo and Libya.

Furthermore, the logistical capability required to mount and sustain such an operation, already six months long, beyond Russia’s borders is particularly impressive. Through a combination of sea and air lift, Russia has deployed a diverse expeditionary force of more than 3,500 troops with an assorted air component of more than 70 rotary and fixed-wing aircraft and ground forces, including anti-aircraft (both from platforms on land and at sea), armor, artillery, electronic warfare, intelligence, logistics, and other support units. Although the Russian Navy was forced to reflag Turkish cargo ships to sustain the buildup of combat power in Syria, the rapid deployment of Russian forces to Syria without any major mishaps is impressive.

Russia has also used its Syrian intervention to battle test and showcase new capabilities. The VKS has used a variety of precision-guided munitions (PGM) to target rebel positions, including GLONASS-guided KAB-500S bombs and Kh-25ML laser-guided missiles. While only approximately 20% of airstrikes have been from PGMs, even the use of unguided “dumb” bombs have been effective and sufficiently accurate for most targets.

Arguably the most notable new weapon exhibited in Syria is the Kalibr (SS-N-27) cruise missile, which has been fired from both submarines and surface ships at distances of more than 900 miles. Even though there were reports of some of the missiles falling short of their targets, the Kalibr is an important new capability, particularly for force projection. Russia has also showcased its strategic bombers, including its Tu-160, T-95MS, and Tu-22M3 bombers, typically escorted by Su-27SM or Su-30SM fighters, firing air-launched cruise missiles and dropping unguided bombs. On one of these operations, two Tu-160s circumnavigated Europe flying approximately 13,000 km to launch Kh-101s cruise missiles into Syria. The air campaign had previously been led by an assortment of tactical fighters and bombers based in Syria, and the strikes demonstrated that Russia’s strategic bombers could still conduct coordinated long-range strikes using Kh-555 and Kh-101 air-to-ground missiles.

While these strikes could have certainly been accomplished by tactical aircraft in Syria, Russia sent a message to adversaries and allies alike of its capability to project power abroad. Syria has been a useful “operational proving ground” for Russia both to test new weapon systems and to demonstrate the effectiveness of older platforms, which received insufficient funding and maintenance throughout the 1990s. Not only has Russia displayed that it can project force across much of Eurasia but it has also shown that its strategic bombers can still fulfill their role in the nuclear triad. Russia’s air campaign is also an effective advertisement for foreign sales of its new and previously untested weapons, such as the Su-34 and Su-35 tactical bomber and fighter. In addition, the combat search and rescue (CSAR) mission launched after the downing of the Russian Su-24 by Turkish F-16s was a clear improvement over the virtually nonexistent efforts during the South Ossetia Conflict.

Despite these various improvements, questions remain about Russian capabilities. Although Russia has demonstrated new guided weapons, the targeting and PGM capabilities remain behind that of the most advanced Western nations. VKS aircraft do not employ targeting pods which are found on many Western military aircraft, and Russia’s relatively limited use of PGMs indicates that it still must depend on dumb bombs for any future campaign. In addition, although Russia is employing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in Syria, the VKS lacks the Western level of sophistication with its UAVs. UAVs have become an integral part of American ISR capabilities and supplement airstrikes from manned platforms with precision strikes. The ability to operate in dangerous antiaircraft environments without placing lives at danger and to maintain nearly continuous observation of target locations is a critical capability, particularly in counterinsurgency or unconventional conflicts. Despite the use of modern Su-34s, the majority of sorties flown by Russia’s Aerospace Force in Syria have been by aging Su-24 and Su-25 variants which, while upgraded, remain the backbone of Russia’s tactical aviation. Moreover, Russia has been relying on the tested Mi-24P (and upgraded Mi-35M) and Mi-8AMtSh helicopters in Syria, which possibly indicates there are lingering questions about the combat readiness of its Mi-28N and Ka-52 platforms.

Thus, Russia’s military involvement in Syria demonstrates that significant progress has occurred since the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. Yet, the extent to which Russia’s expeditionary force is representative of the entire Russian military is questionable. With the relatively small scope of operations in Crimea and Syria, Russia could afford to send only its best-equipped and best-prepared forces; however, it is unlikely that the majority of Russia’s air and ground forces are as well trained and equipped. Moreover, many of Russia’s most prominent issues during the Five-Day-War, such as conducting suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions against an opponent with a capable antiaircraft force, are not being tested by fighting against unconventional and relatively poorly-armed rebel groups in Syria.

Russian airstrikes and advisors have undoubtedly played a significant role in solidifying Assad’s position and in supporting recent advances by Syrian government forces near Aleppo. Yet, as the U.S. has discovered through a number of military operations dominated by airpower, airstrikes alone are often not sufficient to achieve a satisfactory military or political solution to a conflict. With its expeditionary force, Russia can continue to prevent the Assad Regime from collapsing and expand some of its territory; however, unless Moscow drastically increases its commitment, pro-regime forces are unlikely to retake the remainder of the country and defeat the Islamic State. Thus, it is still too soon to determine whether the military means employed in Syria fit the Kremlin’s long-term political goals, and what, if any, exit strategy Moscow has planned.

When compared to its performance during the 2008 conflict, Russia’s military operation in Syria is a clear improvement; however, when compared to current American military capabilities, Russia’s military is still far from parity. Many of the new capabilities that Russia has demonstrated in Syria, such as the use of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, air-launched PGMs, or GLOSNASS/GPS navigation, the U.S military used effectively twenty-five years ago during Operation Desert Storm and in subsequent conflicts. Thus, Russia’s Syrian intervention in many ways resembles the capabilities of an American military operation from the 1990s; however, few European NATO members could achieve what Russia has in Syria. Previously, the U.S. was the only country in the world that could independently execute a coordinated, combined-arms military operation far from its borders, and Russia has now joined this exclusive club. This not only represents an important new tool for Russian foreign policy that has been absent since the Cold War, but also a shifting balance of power along Russia’s borders.

TSJones wrote:we've been bombing in and around Mosul for months on end. I stopped posting about it because you guys got hostile about it.

one raid even struck an ISIS bank blowing cash in a huge explosion all over the city.

another Marine unit is being sent to Iraq. we already have 3000 to 5000 troops in Iraq.

RT ‏@RT_com now1 minute ago
BREAKING: Iraqi Shiite militias say US troops ‘forces of occupation,’ demand withdrawal http://on.rt.com/77le

RT ‏@RT_com now2 minutes ago
DETAILS: US military 'making new suspicious attempt to restore presence in Iraq under pretext of fighting ISIS' http://on.rt.com/77le

RT ‏@RT_com now1 minute ago
MORE: US military 'staying in Iraq under pretext of fighting their own creation, ISIS' http://on.rt.com/77le

deejay wrote:01 US marine gets killed in Iraq and check what US bombing did to Mosul in the link. Daeshbags hugging the ground all the way. If only they had done it when others had died.

https://twitter.com/IraqiSecurity/statu ... 6552372224

On Monday morning, a Russian missile struck the Syrian Arab Army’s (SAA) positions in the Palmyra countryside, killing 17 soldiers and wounding 26 others during a fierce battle with the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS). According to a battlefield correspondent that is embedded with the Syrian Armed Forces in the Palmyra countryside, the Russian missile hit a group of soldiers from the Syrian Marines, killing the entire unit and their commander ‘Ali Rahmoun. The friendly-fire took place near the Palmyra Triangle, where the Syrian Armed Forces are currently advancing amid fierce resistance from the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham. The incident was not intentional; however, poor coordination was cited as the reason for the friendly-fire that killed 17 Syrian Marines. Several western publications reported that ISIS killed 26 Syrian soldiers in Palmyra today; this is incorrect – the majority of the casualties today came as a result of friendly-fire. The Syrian and Russian armed forces have yet to comment on this matter because of the ongoing investigation

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/fr ... n-marines/ | Al-Masdar News

Singha wrote:love the looks of the platypus...like a old black vulture but can fly a long way and drop a lot of heat