Bharat Rakshak

A_Gupta wrote: ↑30 Jun 2025 04:55 Surely we can find the Congress election manifesto which has this?

A_Gupta wrote: ↑30 Jun 2025 05:01 About Iran: the ceasefire is likely temporary. How temporary depends on how badly Iran uranium enrichment capabilities are degraded. It also depends on political factors in the US and Israel.

SRajesh wrote: ↑26 Jun 2025 17:14 Vayutuvanji
Did not Sam Pitgaya use Unkil's old equipment and remodel as CDOT and make money in the interim!!
Also Pitgaya has been involved in many guplas noo!

Most recently, the United States-Israeli attacks on Iran demonstrated not just new strategies of drone deployment and infiltration but also new vulnerabilities. During the 12-day conflict, Iran and vessels in the waters of the Gulf experienced repeated disruptions of GPS signal.

“At times, disruptions are created on this [GPS] system by internal systems, and this very issue has pushed us toward alternative options like BeiDou,” Ehsan Chitsaz, deputy communications minister, told Iranian media in mid-July. He added that the government was developing a plan to switch transportation, agriculture and the internet from GPS to BeiDou.

Iran’s decision to explore adopting China’s navigation satellite system may appear at first glance to be merely a tactical manoeuvre. Yet, its implications are far more profound. This move is yet another indication of a major global realignment.

For decades, the West, and the US in particular, have dominated the world’s technological infrastructure from computer operating systems and the internet to telecommunications and satellite networks.

This has left much of the world dependent on an infrastructure it cannot match or challenge. This dependency can easily become vulnerability. Since 2013, whistleblowers and media investigations have revealed how various Western technologies and schemes have enabled illicit surveillance and data gathering on a global scale – something that has worried governments around the world.

Iran’s possible shift to BeiDou sends a clear message to other nations grappling with the delicate balance between technological convenience and strategic self-defence: The era of blind, naive dependence on US-controlled infrastructure is rapidly coming to an end. Nations can no longer afford to have their military capabilities and vital digital sovereignty tied to the satellite grid of a superpower they cannot trust.

This sentiment is one of the driving forces behind the creation of national or regional satellite navigation systems, from Europe’s Galileo to Russia’s GLONASS, each vying for a share of the global positioning market and offering a perceived guarantee of sovereign control.

GPS was not the only vulnerability Iran encountered during the US-Israeli attacks. The Israeli army was able to assassinate a number of nuclear scientists and senior commanders in the Iranian security and military forces. The fact that Israel was able to obtain their exact locations raised fears that it was able to infiltrate telecommunications and trace people via their phones.


On June 17 as the conflict was still raging, the Iranian authorities urged the Iranian people to stop using the messaging app WhatsApp and delete it from their phones, saying it was gathering user information to send to Israel. Whether this appeal was linked to the assassinations of the senior officials is unclear, but Iranian mistrust of the app run by US-based corporation Meta is not without merit.

Cybersecurity experts have long been sceptical about the security of the app. Recently, media reports have revealed that the artificial intelligence software Israel uses to target Palestinians in Gaza is reportedly fed data from social media. Furthermore, shortly after the end of the attacks on Iran, the US House of Representatives moved to ban WhatsApp from official devices.

For Iran and other countries around the world, the implications are clear: Western platforms can no longer be trusted as mere conduits for communication; they are now seen as tools in a broader digital intelligence war.

Tehran has already been developing its own intranet system, the National Information Network, which gives more control over internet use to state authorities. Moving forward, Iran will likely expand this process and possibly try to emulate China’s Great Firewall.

By seeking to break with Western-dominated infrastructure, Tehran is definitively aligning itself with a growing sphere of influence that fundamentally challenges Western dominance. This partnership transcends simple transactional exchanges as China offers Iran tools essential for genuine digital and strategic independence.

As long as the Bayt remains intact, meaningful political
transformation inside Iran is unlikely. The idea that Khamenei’s
reduced public and political visibility has created a power vacuum
risks misreading the regime’s internal architecture. Instead,
policymakers must recognize the Bayt as the enduring nerve
center of Iran’s theo-military state, an institution capable of
outlasting its founder and ensuring continuity of the Islamic
Republic’s confrontational posture toward the United States and its
regional adversaries. For any meaningful change to occur in the
Islamic Republic—including regime change—the Bayt and its
extensive apparatus must be significantly weakened through a
combination of sanctions, cyber operations, and military measures.
Until this takes place, the supreme leader’s iron grip over the
regime will endure, regardless of Khamenei’s disappearances.

“Where is the Supreme Leader?” This question has been repeatedly raised in the context of escalating tensions and the prospect of a direct military confrontation between Iran and the United States. In recent months, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the 86-year-old head of state, has appeared in public far less frequently, and reports suggesting that he may be operating from secure underground locations have intensified speculation.

Some observers in the West interpret this reduced visibility as evidence of fear, vulnerability, or even a potential leadership vacuum, especially given his traditionally hands-on authoritarian style. However, the situation is more complex. As this paper argues, the Supreme Leader’s physical absence from the public sphere should not be equated with declining authority. Rather, his power continues to function through an extensive network of loyal institutions and intermediaries that operate largely behind closed doors, allowing him to maintain and even consolidate control over the regime’s core security and political structures despite heightened external threats.

Drawing on original and primary Persian-language sources, including material obtained from within the regime, this research by United Against Nuclear Iran offers the first comprehensive English-language study of the Bayt (Office of the Supreme Leader), one of the most powerful and least understood institutions in the Islamic Republic

What has become the most powerful political entity in the Islamic
Republic has its roots in Shia Islam’s convention surrounding the
Bayt-e Ulema (House of Religious Scholars).

Based on Shia doctrine, every lay Shia Muslim is required to follow
the guidance of a mojtahed for everyday life matters. A mojtahed is a
senior cleric with the rank of ayatollah who possesses the ability and
religious authority to conduct ijtihad—the doctrine of interpreting
religious texts, including the Quran—and make prescriptions based
on that interpretation. Once a mojtahed becomes popular and
develops a following, they earn the title of marja-e taqhlid (“source of
emulation”) and at this point they establish their own office, or bayt.
By convention, the marja’s sons and sometimes sons-in-law, or
aghazadehs (“noble born”), are assigned to help manage their
father’s office, including overseeing its day-to-day operations,
collecting religious taxes, and conveying their father’s responses to
his followers’ questions. This role places the aghazadehs in a unique
position of authority over their father’s matters—something that is
reflected in the supreme leader’s Bayt today. However, while all
marjas had their own bayt before 1979, this office was exclusively
restricted to religious affairs.

A_Gupta wrote: ↑01 Mar 2026 20:24 This is how I put it:

Ayatollahji was a person of religious and spiritual significance to a lot of compatriots - in that role of his, I regret his death.

Ayatollah was an oppressive dictator, giving the Iranians no freedom, and supporting terrorism and proxy wars across Western Asia. In that role, I have no regrets for his loss.

Ayatollah was in the middle of negotiations, and in the middle of that he was attacked and killed. In that aspect, I condemn the killing.

Added: Ayatollah definitely violated that often quoted fig leaf precept of Islam - "there is no compulsion in religion". Contemporary Iran is an example of a lot of compulsion in religion.

A_Gupta wrote: ↑01 Mar 2026 20:24 ...
Ayatollahji was a person of religious and spiritual significance to a lot of compatriots - in that role of his, I regret his death.
...

gakakkad wrote: ↑01 Mar 2026 20:56 ....Iran that goes pack to its Zoroastrian traditions is in interest of the whole world . Especially that of India .

Manish_P wrote: ↑01 Mar 2026 21:12

A_Gupta wrote: ↑01 Mar 2026 20:24 ...
Ayatollahji was a person of religious and spiritual significance to a lot of compatriots - in that role of his, I regret his death.
...

'ji' ?!

Sounds just like Osama ji

On the eve of the strike on Iran, U.S. officials envisioned a four- to five-day operation that would return a weakened Tehran to the negotiating table. According to one source, an American official conveyed an even more immediate proposal. Through a mediator, apparently Italy, he suggested reaching a ceasefire agreement today or tomorrow. Iran rejected the idea outright.

A_Gupta wrote: ↑02 Mar 2026 00:32
Only in his role as a religious/spiritual leader, and the fact that some Indians feel his loss - so for that aspect of this person, I am not gong to be dancing in the streets.
...