Bharat Rakshak

TAIPEI, Taiwan – The fatal shooting of a Taiwanese fisherman by the Philippine Coast Guard has become the latest incident to roil tensions over territorial disputes in and around the South China Sea, with Taipei on Friday calling for Manila to apologise for the shooting.Taiwan said that the Philippine Coast Guard opened fire on Thursday on a 65-year-old fisherman in waters claimed by both governments. The Philippines acknowledged the Taiwanese claim, but said its personnel were acting in self-defence.Meanwhile, China sought to make common cause with Taiwan against Manila, deploring the shooting in harsh rhetoric that threatened to spark another diplomatic tussle between Beijing and the Philippines, a key US ally in one of Asia’s most contentious areas.Speaking to reporters in Taipei, foreign minister David Lin blamed the Philippine coast guard for opening fire on the fisherman’s boat, the Kuang Ta Hsing No. 28, on Thursday, from a vessel belonging to the fisheries department of the Philippines Department of Agriculture in the Bashi Strait, about midway between southern Taiwan and the northern Philippines.\“We strongly condemn the fatal shooting of a Taiwanese fisherman by the Philippine fishery department,” Lin said. “We urge the Philippine government to open a full investigation on this case and send their apology to Taiwan’s government.”n before Lin spoke, the Chinese foreign ministry in Beijing had condemned the incident, a clear attempt to side with Taiwan on a matter of nationalistic pride involving disputed maritime territory.
Spokeswoman Hua Chunying called it a “brutal act” and echoed Taiwan’s demand that Manila investigate.“We are expressing our deep grief on the death of the Taiwan compatriot and condolences to the victim’s family,” Hua said.

Christopher Sidor wrote:It is the army too. The proposal to create 2 mountain strike corps was sent recently. It should have been sent atleast 5 years ago. Our Army cannot plan for what types of weapons that it will need 10 years from now and give the requirements to our R&D firms now. A majority of them go to arms show and pick up brochures and then land up and demand the same weapon system. Even now I bet the current army chief will not go GoI and say that we need the following items by 2023 so that we can take the fight deep into Tibet and East Turkmenistan. Also let us not forget the incessant fighting among the armed forces, they have successfully sabotaged the proposal for a strong CDS and combined integrated commander at various commands/zones.

May 10, 2013, 7:53 p.m. ET, Wall Street Journal
A Dangerous Rift Between China and Japan
As the U.S. urges restraint, Asia's two great powers play politics with the past and court a crisis.By IAN BURUMA

When Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing in 1972 to restore Japan's relations with China, a country that had been devastated by Japanese military aggression in the 1930s and '40s, his host Mao Zedong allowed himself a moment of levity. Responding to Tanaka's apology for what Japan had done during the war, Mao answered that there was absolutely no need to apologize. After all, he said, without the Japanese invasion, the Communist revolution would never have succeeded.

Secure in his nationalist credentials, as the leader who unified China, Mao could afford this little joke, which also happened to be the truth. Such a remark would be unimaginable for any of the technocrats who rule China today. Maoism can no longer justify the Communist Party's monopoly on power, since few Chinese believe in any kind of Communism. Nationalism is now the dominant ideology, and the rulers have to prove their mettle, especially toward Japan. This need is particularly acute when a new leader takes power. The latest party boss, Xi Jinping, needs to show people, not least the military brass, that he is in charge.

Which is why a petty dispute over a few uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea is causing a serious and possibly dangerous rift between the two major powers of East Asia. The Chinese have recently sent naval ships close to the islands, as well as military aircraft. Japan responded by scrambling F-15s. And the U.S., still the major military power in the region (though, if China has its way, not for very much longer), is urging the two parties to remain calm, while voicing its continuing support of Japanese administration over the territory. A conflict in East Asia could be much more dangerous than anything happening in the Middle East. Taiwan might be involved, as well as the Korean peninsula. Apart from the potential loss of life, it would be a huge threat to the world economy, and it would pit the U.S. directly against China.

The Japanese call the tiny island group the Senkaku, and the Chinese call it the Diaoyu. Fishermen have trawled the waters around there for centuries, and in 1968, a United Nations commission discovered potential oil and gas reserves there, too. But neither the fish, nor the possible access to oil, quite explain why emotions are running so high, why Japanese businesses have been boycotted and Japanese stores and factories torched, why Japanese tourists and businessmen have been molested, and why hotheads in both countries indulge in talk of war.

On the surface, the dispute is about history, about which country has the best historical claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu. In fact, it is more about politics, domestic and international, revealing the tangled relations in a region where history is frequently manipulated for political ends.

The historical record of sovereignty over the islands is murky. First of all, there are different notions of what constitutes sovereignty. Traditionally, the Chinese Empire saw itself as the center of civilization. Its authority over peripheral countries, such as Korea, Vietnam or the Ryukyu Islands (including the main island of Okinawa, now Japanese), was not so much a question of borders and laws as of proper deference. The periphery was expected to pay tribute to the Chinese court, in the way of vassal states. Even Japan, more independent than other vassals, went along with this to some extent.
After the humiliation of China in the mid-19th-century Opium Wars, and the forceful entry of U.S. gunships into Japan at the same time, Japan began to take a very different view of the world. Mimicking the Western imperial powers, Japan decided to carve out an empire of its own, using brute force as well as Western legal concepts. China's humiliation at the hands of the British was deepened by the even greater humiliation of being defeated by Japan in a brutal little colonial war over Korea in 1895. This is how Japan acquired Formosa (now Taiwan), as well as other possessions in East Asia, including those Senkaku islands.

Contrary to popular belief, China and Japan were not always hostile to one another. For much of its history, Japan looked up to China as the center of civilization. And even after Japan's rise to the status of a modern empire at the turn of the 20th century, Japanese attitudes to China were complicated. Japanese nationalists were often sympathetic to Chinese revolutionaries who toppled the imperial system in 1911. Universities and military academies in Japan drew in many Chinese students in the 1910s and '20s. Before the Japanese invaded their country in the 1930s, many Chinese viewed Japan as a model of modernity.

The horror of the Japanese war in China, unleashed in its full fury in 1937, would change everything. Eight years of Japanese occupation, leaving more than 10 million Chinese dead, devastated the country. And memories of Japanese atrocities—biological warfare in Manchuria, the massacres and mass raping in Nanking, among other places—are still kept fresh in what's called "patriotic education."

This wasn't always so. Chairman Mao was more interested in consolidating the revolution, by some very bloody means of his own, than in dwelling on the recent past. The Nanking Massacre was never made into a big issue under Mao. Nanking was, in any case, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist capital in 1937 and therefore of little interest to Communist propaganda. And the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, administered by the U.S., as part of Okinawa, and only given back to Japan in 1972, were barely ever mentioned.

It was only in the 1980s, after Deng Xiaoping opened China up to business with the capitalist world, very much including Japan, that memories of Japanese barbarism were deliberately stirred up. That is when a monumental museum was built in Nanking to remember the "300,000 dead" (almost certainly an exaggerated figure, which in no way mitigates the ghastliness of what the Japanese did).

A dispute over a few tiny, uninhabited rocks could be more dangerous than anything happening in the Middle East.

Patriotism, based on grievances over a century of humiliations inflicted by foreign powers, from the Opium War to the Nanking Massacre, became the official ideology: Only the firm rule of the Communist Party would prevent China from suffering similar humiliations again. And besides, memories of foreign aggression are a convenient distraction from equally distressing recollections of what Chinese have suffered from their own rulers.

This, then, is what the dispute over those little rocks between Taiwan and Okinawa stands for in China today. It is a symbol of patriotism, without which the Party would have no legitimacy. Giving in to Japan would bring back memories of humiliation. Standing up for Chinese sovereignty is a test of China's revived status as the major power in the region.

And yet, even Deng Xiaoping had never made a fuss about this particular issue; he said in 1978 that the Diaoyu question should be shelved for the time being, as "our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all."

Reasons why Deng's wish failed to come true are to be found not only in China, but in Japan, which has had to contend with its own history of humiliations, the worst of which was losing the war in 1945. The U.S. took over Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands, including Senkaku/Diaoyu. Japanese armed forces were disbanded. Americans lectured Japan on the evils of militarism and wrote a brand new Japanese constitution outlawing the use of military force in international affairs. Henceforth the U.S. would take care of Japanese security, in effect turning Japan into a vassal state again, this time of the U.S.

Most Japanese, devastated by war, were quite happy with this arrangement. Being the first constitutionally pacifist nation even gave them a warm glow of moral superiority. The only Japanese who fiercely opposed it were right-wing nationalists, who felt humiliated by Japan's renewed vassal status. Mainstream conservatives were content to concentrate on business and industry.

“Japan's role as a kind of cat's paw of American dominance will be the source of ever greater tensions. ”

When Mao's Communists took over China, however, the U.S. changed its mind. Visiting Japan as Eisenhower's vice president in 1953, Richard Nixon called the pacifist constitution "a mistake." The Japanese were encouraged to rebuild their military, now called the Self-Defense Forces, and Japan would have to serve as a huge U.S. base for containing China, as well as other military ventures in Asia, such as the Korean and Vietnamese wars. And all this without revising the pacifist constitution to which most Japanese had grown attached.

The pacifist left in Japan, often sympathetic to Mao's China, felt betrayed. The U.S. was accused, not without reason, of reneging on its own pacifist lessons to Japan, by dragging the country back into conflicts with other Asian countries. Conservatives were split between the old nationalists who wanted to rewrite the constitution and become fully independent from the U.S., and the more business-minded elite, who opted to go along with anything Washington demanded.

Even when Japanese businessmen pressed for closer relations with China in 1970, the Japanese prime minister, Eisaku Sato, staved them off out of deference to the U.S. policy of containing China. No wonder that he felt deeply humiliated when President Nixon suddenly announced his new rapprochement with China in the following year without bothering to inform the Japanese. This, combined with the sudden devaluation of the dollar, is still known in Japanese history books as the "Nixon Shokku" (Nixon Shock).

One year after that, Okinawa was given back to Japan on condition that the U.S. retain its military bases there. This meant that the Senkaku/Diaoyu would be administered by the Japanese government. Also in 1972, Japan formally made peace with China.

Despite periodic spats with China over symbolic issues, such as the alleged rewriting of Japanese school textbooks, denying the Nanking Massacre, or visits by Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni shrine, where the souls of Japanese war dead, including World War II criminals, are commemorated, business between the two countries, now worth more than $300 billion a year, continued to grow. In fact, the more China relied on business with Japan, the more Chinese politicians felt the need to assert their nationalist credentials by bringing up the war. This kept nationalists in China at bay and the Japanese on their toes.

However, even more than half a century after Japan's wartime defeat, the problem of Japan's status remained unresolved. A great economic power, with huge economic interests in China, Japan was still a vassal state of the U.S. in matters of security. The inadequacy of this arrangement is increasingly felt, and not just among the old nationalist right wing. A continuing source of tension in Japanese foreign policy is the need to act like a major power while still being deferential to American interests. This dilemma has a huge impact on Japan's relations with China.


When the conservative Liberal Democratic Party government, which had governed Japan almost permanently since the war, was defeated in 2009, the new government, led by the Democratic Party of Japan, promised that a new, more open, more democratic, less bureaucratic era had began. One of the things that would have to change was Japan's dependency on the U.S. While stressing the importance of the U.S. alliance, Japan would forge closer relations with China, as well as other Asian nations, and shed some of the deeply unpopular U.S. military bases in Okinawa.

The U.S. government, long used to Japanese subservience, reacted as fathers do when children threaten to run out of their control, and quickly blocked these initiatives. So did Japanese bureaucrats, who had no intention of letting mere elected politicians diminish bureaucratic authority by taking initiatives of their own. China continued to see Japan as a pawn of U.S. imperialism. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's idea of building an "East Asian Community," loosely modeled after the European Union, went nowhere, as did his plan to move the U.S. base out of Okinawa. Mr. Hatoyama was seen as a failure; his plans for a vaunted new era had failed to lift off.

In 2012, the right-wing populist governor of Tokyo, a former novelist named Shintaro Ishihara, saw his chance to make a mark. Hoping to become prime minister, he decided to take the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue off the shelf to which Deng Xiaoping had consigned it. If the Japanese government wouldn't defend this vital piece of Japanese territory against Chinese provocation, he, Mr. Ishihara, would buy it for the city of Tokyo from its private owner. In a fit of panic, the Democratic Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda nationalized the islands, declaring that they belonged to the nation and there was no more room for compromise. His hope was that with Mr. Ishihara out of the way, China would be pacified.

He was wrong. China's rulers had to assert their nationalism. Words turned into gestures; army helicopters and fighter planes were dispatched. The government of the Democratic Party of Japan fell. The Liberal Democrats are back, led by Shinzo Abe, an old-school nationalist. His grandfather was Nobusuke Kishi, who was arrested in 1945 as a war criminal and later became a close ally of Richard Nixon in the struggle against Chinese communism. Mr. Abe is unlikely to change Japan's state of dependency on U.S. security, especially in the light of China's increasing military clout.

Things, in short, are back to square one: Pax Americana containing China, with Japan as Washington's loyal vassal. This might seem a stable, even comfortable, position from the U.S. point of view. In fact, it isn't. For a long time, the Chinese put up with the U.S. being the policeman of East Asia, because the prospect of a more independent, fully rearmed, even nuclear Japan would be worse. But Japan's role as a kind of cat's paw of American dominance, with Japanese nationalists compensating for their subservience by indulging in bellicose talk, will be the source of ever greater tensions, which are bad for everyone, including the U.S.

Eventually, a balance of power will have to be found between China and Japan, but that will mean a gradual withdrawal of U.S. might, which is precisely the opposite of what President Barack Obama's "pivot to Asia" is aiming to achieve. If prolonged for too long, arrangements made after World War II to create stability in the region will help to undermine it.

—Mr. Buruma is the Henry Luce professor of human rights and journalism at Bard College. His latest book, "Year Zero: A History of 1945," will be published by Penguin in September.

Luo Yuan, a two-star general in the People's Liberation Army, raised the territorial stakes again this week, saying the Ryukyus had started paying tribute to China in 1372, half a millennium before they were seized by Japan.

"Let's for now not discuss whether [the Ryukyus] belong to China, they were certainly China's tributary state," Luo said in an interview with China News Service. "I am not saying all former tributary states belong to China, but we can say with certainty that the Ryukyus do not belong to Japan," he added, in comments translated by the South China Morning Post.

RajeshA wrote:What Western Universalism and Christian Proselytism is to the West, what Islam is to the Ummah, the same way Territorial Expansion is to China!

RajeshA wrote:What Western Universalism and Christian Proselytism is to the West, what Islam is to the Ummah, the same way Territorial Expansion is to China!

RoyG wrote:

RajeshA wrote:What Western Universalism and Christian Proselytism is to the West, what Islam is to the Ummah, the same way Territorial Expansion is to China!

Wow, truly insightful!

ramana wrote:

RajeshA wrote:What Western Universalism and Christian Proselytism is to the West, what Islam is to the Ummah, the same way Territorial Expansion is to China!

The common theme to all of these movements is "Reconqista" of imagined borders.

Lalmohan wrote:^^^ mandate created by Genghiz Khan and codified into Chinese thinking by Kubilai Khan when he shifted the centre of Mongol power to Beijing
"all lands from sunrise to sunset"

Well the leveraging of the Han population is one of China's most important traits. It is not merely demographic warfare but there is an additional cultural dimension associated with it. To understand this we need to take a look at China and India's historical dynamics.

The similarities:
-Both are ancient civilizations with a large base of urban populations with extensive cultural adaptation for technological capabilities.

-Both India and China have faced ferocious assaults from invaders from the North/NorthWest and have been defeated repeatedly by the invaders and conquered.

-Both have reasonable natural resources.

But then the differences creep in:

India while constantly exporting new ideas failed to project power. India culturally defeated China in Tibet (My post in the earlier History thread) but China still militarily overran Tibet. While China was beaten by invaders it always took the fight back to them. Now it occupies the very lands of these erstwhile invaders. Tai T'sung's ideal of military imperalism was never forgotten by the Chinese.

The second point is that the Chinese Han population has been a master of internalization of external influence. For example recently a China acquaintence provided me with a chinese version of Hindu deity kArttikeya. The deity was portrayed in a thoroughly Chinese form with slanting eyes etc. But the same deity in Java or Cambodia would be quite Indian. So just as the Indian ideas were completely Sinicized, Marxism too was completely internalized and blended with Tai T'sung's spirit. It is this trait that makes the Han demographic expansion really potent.

Unfortunately India faced Abrahmic invaders, unlike China. I wonder if Chinese civilization would survived the way it has if Timur's intended invasion of China had fructified (Imagine the horrors of an Islamic China ).

In short the differences between India and China are merely a function of their differential attitudes towards using their demographic power.

Thanks Akash, but evidently I did not put the point accross well enough:
Quote:
Originally posted by Carl:
Didn't India also assimilate earlier pre-Islamic intruders?
Yes, there is no disagreement here. The point I was trying to make was per say not about assimilation in our own territory but demographic war fare outside our center of gravity.

Quote:
And didn't India also 'project power' in the north-west and south-east?
Agreed, we did project power on many occassions in history, and even against China. But these attempts were not consolidated by taking over occupied territories. A good example is the failure to take back what now forms the Terrorist state and Kashmir from the Moslem invaders. The difference I was trying to bring out is that we did not deposit our populations from the doabs or the banks of the Kaviri in captured territory the way, the fertile Han population is deposited all over the world. When we Indianized central Asia and the Far East in the historical past, there was a core Indian elite but the local population was infused to a very small extant with Indian genes.

By internalization of Marxism, I would say that the Chinas did not become brown Sahebs like many of us, but incorporated Marxism in their imperialistic dynastic world view.

Han China conciously reduced Indian and Iranian influences, however compatible and benign they were.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 1&start=40

The operation of the chIna-s is understood poorly by most outsiders. The old rAjan jAvAharlAl was an example of this. Starting with the notorious Shi Huang Di of the Chin, they developed a system of cloaking the inner political infrastructure of legalism with outer coats. These coats are used both to fool their own people as well as outsiders depending on the situation. This inner legalism-outer coat model also allowed the chIna-s to imitate the dominant geo-cultural trends of the age while retaining an inner control and identity via the legalist structure. Originally it was the outer sheen of Confucianism coating legalism, while in the Sui/Tang period the outer coat included the bauddha mata while retaining same the inner pattern. In more recent times this outer coat has included socialism and more recently “Westernism”. This duality allows the chIna-s to interact and participate successfully with the dominant geo-cultural trend while retaining a certain inner identity. This inner identity is also projected inside the sphere of the dominant geo-cultural trend by careful image building. One striking example is that of the British biochemist Joseph Needham who was attracted to the chIna-s due to the shared common outer core of socialism. But he was soon used by the chIna-s to project an enormously positive image of their intellectual achievements to the world. While there is no question of the genuine achievements of the chIna-s, it is clear that Needham has exaggerated and over-attributed stuff to the chIna-s. Even today in the US the government pays to have exhibitions and seminars on ancient chIna medicine. In contrast, other civilizations with comparable achievements are typically denigrated by the west and negatively portrayed. Another aspect of this image building has been the acceptance of the chIna-s as equals or superiors by the western system. This aspect is based on a variety of factors such as: 1) the chIna-s exploiting the mlechCha fascination for shveta-tvacha and presenting themselves as shveta-charman-s too. 2) The chIna-s trying to project themselves as having higher IQ than the mlechCha-s. 3) Taking up mlechCha names and emulating aspects of mlechCha culture to make the mlechCha-s feel comfortable with them. As a consequence the mlechCha-s have gained respect for the chIna-s and have a positively larger than life image of them. Finally, the mlechCha-s have in quest of an unnecessarily lavish lifestyle shipped away much of their production and debt to the chIna-s, creating a dependency. All this image-building has made the chIna-s themselves feel a sense of superiority and entitlement to world dominance.

http://manasataramgini.wordpress.com/20 ... opolitics/

In fact in 1958, Mao himself made the connection between himself and Qin Shi Huang.

"He buried 460 scholars alive - we have buried 46,000 scholars alive," he said in a speech to party cadres. "You [intellectuals] revile us for being Qin Shi Huangs. You are wrong. We have surpassed Qin Shi Huang a hundredfold."

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19922863

India needs to develop a national understanding about what to expect, and aim for, in its relationship with China

Even without the focus of the summit, India-China relations demand a more serious consideration than the intemperate reactions provoked by the preceding contretemps. That virtual hysteria, reminiscent of our self-defeating pressures of 1962, should not be allowed to distract from genuine public anxiety. We need to develop a national understanding, if not a national consensus, about what to expect and aim for. Democracies need public education and some sureness about their capability. Depsang produced neither.

What exactly happened, what it signifies, who provoked whom or conceded what — theories abound, but resemble tea-leaf readings. Whatever it all means apropos China, it is painfully telling about the ways in which the Indian state handles its affairs. The state is not just government; Parliament, political parties, the media and the public opinion it greatly shapes, and of course the permanent apparatus of the administration, are all part of it. All have long been making it impossible to conduct even our most important affairs with seriousness, let alone dignity. Vainglorious declamations about war merely reflect immaturity. A former defence minister calls China our sole enemy and Pakistan no threat, as though Pakistan has not, inter alia, been China's eager agent; for him to declare that "if there is to be a war, so let it be"

is frighteningly irresponsible. The Trinamool Congress joins the attack, despite single-handedly strengthening China's position around us by harming our relations with Bangladesh, while Tamil Nadu ruins our relations with Sri Lanka. All parties prefer cheap jibes to constructive debate, while the media inflates and exceeds their effusions. Not one leader saw fit to suggest that, our security environment being an overriding national priority, all parties should get together to work out urgent improvements. Our descent to such pettiness is what makes us so unprepared for the challenges facing us.

A state's greatest asset is the respect it commands. Others deal with you as they see you: one way if you look strong, efficient, knowing what you have to do and capable of doing it, and another if you betray indecisiveness, incompetence and other weaknesses. That does not mean there will not be profound differences over policies. All countries are in two minds about how the new superpower will act: a cooperative leader in the search for an equitable, stable world order, or an assertive hegemonist. Powerful states historically do both, so one should expect that. Others wait and see, but

we, with our problems, cannot afford that. We need at least a working hypothesis.

To arrive at one, what is cited in support of the two broad approaches, the apprehensive and the optimistic, should not be scoffed at. We should also stop letting feelings and predilections obstruct objective assessments. Let us recognise that, apart from particular happenings, there are inherent geopolitical realities. Free of our sentimentality, and with its tradition of strategic thinking, China sees two assets we could use to its detriment: we adjoin Tibet, and we jut far into the Indian Ocean, thus positioned to undermine it in the former and interfere with its vital sea links. We have never quite realised the intensity of Beijing's sensitivities regarding Tibet. Howsoever earnestly we might reassure them, they go by capabilities, not protestations.

Similarly, we must note what China can do to our detriment, especially considering what it already has done — and they surely understand this. They made Pakistan, historically eager to get the better of us, a nuclear power, at one stroke offsetting our conventional superiority. With our other neighbours having their own differences with us, the circle of containment is easily consolidated, with no little help from our own failures to handle our neighbours well. The port facilities China is developing doubtless have other objectives, but protestations that they are not aimed against us are like ours of innocence regarding Tibet. We too must judge by capabilities.

Nor can we forget that we have major unsettled problems, including claims to our territory from two countries. Should, alas, those ever erupt in violent conflict, not one state will come to India's assistance. We would stand alone. No state so placed can neglect potential dangers or the need to prepare for them. Here, we should consider how others view our possible rise. Who welcomes it and who does not? Most don't bother, two surely do, a handful would positively want it as suiting their global interests. While nobody would help us in extremis, some would help us become strong enough to prevent extremis.

We should not slur over unwelcome facts in determining policies, nor assume we are inevitably adversaries. States have evolved a durable modus vivendi despite far more acute conflicts of interest. After Depsang, the loudest voices have warned of evils to come. Our official policy seems to be to widen areas of cooperation while attempting resolution of differences. Whether commonalities on global issues like the WTO or climate change, or even greater economic ties, can bind us in amity, or at least prevent the worst, remains debatable, but the attempt would certainly serve our interests, provided we also gear ourselves up. That is where our ability to function as a purposeful state is key; all parts must live up to their responsibilities. Dare we hope they will?

The writer is a former ambassador to Pakistan, China and the US, and secretary, MEA

Ahead of Premier Li Keqiang’s visit on Sunday, China has said it is “working very hard” with India to find a solution to the boundary dispute at an early date, but stressed that it did not see the recent border tensions as affecting the larger relationship. {It came to the conclusion because India itself seriously downplayed the aggression and equated the victim with the aggressor by withdrawing from its own land further inwards. China sees India not being aggressive even against Pakistan and knows therefore that repeated Chinese aggression will end in a whimper from India. As K.S.Bajpai says, as posted just above, "Others deal with you as they see you" This is why the pappi-jhappi with Pakistan is completely detrimental to our overall image and hence the way other countries treat us. It is not merely capabilities that we need to project but also our determination to use our capabilities whenever India is threatened. So far, since 1986, there has not been a particular demonstration of that determination notwithstanding 1999.}

Officials here suggested that the fast-growing trade relationship was likely to receive more attention than the boundary question as Mr. Li, the second-ranked leader, visits New Delhi and Mumbai, accompanied by a large business delegation.{The fast-growing trade relationship grows fast only in one direction, from China to India. Indian exports, already languishing against all countries this year, is even more acute with China. Indian correspondents like Ananth Krishnan are simply not stating the truth when they talk about the fast-growing trade relationships. China is trying to hem us in multiple ways, aggression on land, untenable claims to Indian territory, pearl of strings all around, superior diplomacy and last but not the least, trade}

He will leave here for New Delhi on Sunday on what would be his first overseas visit after he took over in March. After a three-day visit, he will visit Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany. Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Song Tao told reporters here on Thursday that “the fact that Premier Li has chosen India as one of the countries on his first overseas trip shows the importance the new Chinese government attaches to China-India relations”. {This is the propaganda to which naive and flattery-liking Indian leadership fell for the hundreth time}

Business summit

Mr. Li will have talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, President Pranab Mukherjee and other leaders, Mr. Song said. He will also give a speech on India-China relations and attend a business summit in Mumbai.

While there were “historical issues” such as the boundary question, there was “a consensus between two countries, and the leaders, that we have more overlapping interests than competition”, Mr. Song stressed.

Both sides are holding consultations to finalise agreements that will be announced during the visit, which begins on Sunday.

Among 16 agreements proposed by the Chinese side is a border defence cooperation agreement, which is understood to be a comprehensive proposal that looks to incorporate earlier border agreements signed between the two countries. {IMO, China is rushing this agreement through by simply claiming it to be a collection of the earlier agreements. China did not want to give much time to India on this matter and hence created a crisis and agreed to withdraw only after India agreed to this proposal. It dangled the 'first visit' of Li as a carrot}

India and China signed agreements in 1993 and 1996 to maintain peace and tranquillity and to put in place confidence building measures along the Line of Actual Control.

In 2005, both countries reached an understanding on political parameters and guiding principles on the boundary question.

Mr. Song declined to go into specifics about the proposal, but said, “We have both been working very hard to find a solution to the border issue at an early date”.

“We have signed political parameters for the boundary question and we have reached consensus on a framework for settling the issue,” he added, referring to an agreed upon 18-point consensus. Both sides are currently negotiating on a framework to settle the dispute in all sectors — seen as the most difficult of a three-stage process.

The first stage involved political parameters, and the final stage will see a delineation of the border in maps and on the ground.

China is sending an investment promotion mission and one of the biggest ever business delegations to India next week to accompany Premier Li Keqiang on his State visit, top officials said on Thursday, to demonstrate that the government was taking ‘very seriously’ the widening trade imbalance.

China and India are, next week, expected to sign a number of business cooperation agreements, including investment and financing deals, as Mr. Li travels to New Delhi and Mumbai.

His visit takes place against the backdrop of fast-rising bilateral trade, which reached $66 billion last year as China became India’s second-largest trading partner. Bilateral trade stood at a few billion dollars a decade ago.

Despite the rapid increase in overall trade, the increasingly unbalanced nature of the relationship has emerged as a source of concern, with the deficit reaching a record $29 billion last year, in China’s favour. Indian imports of Chinese machinery and equipment, particularly in the power and telecom sectors, have emerged as a key driver of trade, while India continues to export raw materials such as iron ore.

While India is pushing for greater market access for information technology and pharmaceuticals companies, it has had limited success so far.

New initiatives

China was taking the issue of the imbalance ‘very seriously’ and had launched a number of initiatives to bridge the gap, Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Jiang Yaoping told reporters on Thursday. An investment promotion mission will travel to India next week, he said, to follow up on the work of three earlier missions sent in 2008, 2010 and 2012.

“We believe that balanced trade is conducive to interests of both sides,” he said. “The reason we have a trade imbalance is because of economic patterns and structures of the two countries.’’

Mr. Jiang said the nature of the trade relationship was changing, particularly with India emerging as the biggest destination for project contracts for Chinese companies. As of March, 2013, he said, Chinese companies had completed projects in India worth $35.1 billion. Both countries, he said, had signed purchase contracts worth $1.65 billion, financing agreements worth $11.64 billion, and engineering and construction products worth $3.5 billion.

Next week’s visit will see deals signed for business cooperation agreements, as well as the first meeting of the China-India CEOs forum and a China-India business cooperation summit.

Bilateral trade reached $73 billion in 2011, when China became India’s largest trade partner, but fell to $66 billion last year on account of the global downturn. As of April this year, trade was down 6.2 per cent. Mr. Jiang, however, said he was optimistic that the $100 billion target for 2015 would be ‘realised on schedule’.

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Song Tao said, on Thursday, China would take steps to “facilitate Indian companies’ efforts to explore the China market,” pointing out that China will import $10 trillion worth of goods and invest $500 billion overseas in coming years.

“We hope that the Indian side will take a proportionate share of China’s imports and outward investment,” he said. “We are ready to work with India to tap into the potential of bilateral trade and better promote two-way investment, so that we can gradually resolve the issue of the trade deficit”.

India has rejected China’s proposal for having a bilateral arrangement to notify each other in advance before sending troops on patrol along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The proposal for setting up a bilateral institutional mechanism was woven into the draft text of the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) that China recently gave to India. New Delhi and Beijing are currently negotiating the proposed agreement, although it is not clear whether it would be ready for signing before Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s maiden visit to India commencing next Sunday.

Indian Army was against disclosing the patrol timings to the Chinese, which would rob off the crucial surprise element in border patrolling. “It’s our territory. We can patrol it whenever we want,” an army officer told Deccan Herald.

Indian industry looks forward to the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to New Delhi which is expected to deliver significant results, especially as it is the new head’s first overseas tour. We feel that trade and economic relations must figure near the top of the bilateral agenda during this visit.

Over the last decade, a series of top-level political visits between India and China has established a new trajectory of engagement. A conducive atmosphere for bilateral economic cooperation has been created and strengthened. Trade between the two Asian giants has soared from just over $7 billion in 2003-04 to $67.8 billion in 2012-13. Indian companies have entered the Chinese economy with cumulative pledges of over $1 billion. Chinese investments in India aggregated $657 million by October 2012.

The scope for further investments in both directions is high, and industry of the two countries should leverage the strong direction shaped by the governments to take our multidimensional economic engagement to a new level.

To translate new opportunities into mutual gains, both sides can now aim at going beyond trade and investment to real development cooperation. Sharing of best practices and models in areas such as skill development, healthcare, participatory governance, and other development fields could offer rich benefits.

India has made good progress in life sciences industries such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. By sourcing drugs from India, China could offer better healthcare services to its citizens. Similarly, China has taken great strides in rural development through its town and village committees, which have decentralised economic development. India could learn from this model for empowering its 600,000 villages.

Likewise, while China has developed high capacity in advanced manufacturing and technology-rich electronics, India has built an impressive software and IT services sector. The convergence of the two is already taking place as global companies source hard and soft inputs from both countries. A real partnership between the two countries could take this convergence to the next level.

China’s cities and urban development has been one of its major success stories. Transport, low-cost housing, sanitation, water management and related sectors have attained high efficiencies in the country. India too is embarking on an ambitious project of building clean and green manufacturing townships. The participation and investments of Chinese companies could go a long way in devising best models for India.

We also need to learn from China’s renewable energy prowess. We see opportunities for growth across all conventional areas such as manufacturing, services, infrastructure and the financial sector.

The current bilateral trade scenario offers some concerns with respect to the trade imbalance, low value addition of Indian exports to China, and concentration on a few items. To redress this imbalance and make trade more sustainable, it is necessary to incentivise Indian exports to China. More transparent laws and procedures, mutual recognition of standards and harmonisation of conformity assessment procedures, and greater cooperation in trade finance could help this process.

India and China stand at a historical juncture where global affairs are transforming. Innovative cooperation mechanisms, especially in economic engagement, could stimulate a new sustainable partnership within this changed context. Indian industry has been pinning its hopes on the two governments taking up these issues on a priority basis during Li Keqiang’s visit.

Chandrajit Banerjee is Director General, Confederation of Indian Industry
The views expressed by the author are personal

ramana wrote:LINK

Lets dance with the Chinese

Trade between the two Asian giants has soared from just over $7 billion in 2003-04 to $67.8 billion in 2012-13. . {This 'soaring' has been most;y one-way.}

India has made good progress in life sciences industries such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. By sourcing drugs from India, China could offer better healthcare services to its citizens. {India has been pleading with China to let Indian pharma & IT companies to enter China but that has not happened. This is in spite of promises made to visiting Indian PM Man Mohan Singh (April, 2011) and even earlier when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in December, 2010.}

Likewise, while China has developed high capacity in advanced manufacturing and technology-rich electronics, India has built an impressive software and IT services sector. The convergence of the two is already taking place as global companies source hard and soft inputs from both countries. A real partnership between the two countries could take this convergence to the next level.

The current bilateral trade scenario offers some concerns {some ? } with respect to the trade imbalance, low value addition of Indian exports to China, and concentration on a few items.

India and China stand at a historical juncture where global affairs are transforming. {Does China seriously believe that the India-China relationship stands at the much-cliched 'historical juncture' or are we deceiving ourselves ?} Innovative cooperation mechanisms, especially in economic engagement, could stimulate a new sustainable partnership within this changed context. {China wants land and resources from other countries and not finished products. It wants to export finished goods. India does not have a manufacturing base of depth, width and quality to deal with China. Besides, China's overt animosity with India and its contempt for us are displayed frequently. How are we going to develop a 'sustainable partnership' ?} Indian industry has been pinning its hopes on the two governments taking up these issues on a priority basis during Li Keqiang’s visit.

Chandrajit Banerjee is Director General, Confederation of Indian Industry

Shishir Gupta, Hindustan Times New Delhi, May 18, 2013

Even for someone as well-versed with realpolitik and high table diplomacy as national security advisor Shiv Shankar Menon, the 19-kilometer deep incursion by a platoon of the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) into the perceived Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Depsang Plains on April 15 in remote Ladakh came as a big surprise.


What flummoxed Menon and Raisina Hill was not the act but its timing. The beligerence came virtually a month before the first official visit of newly appointed Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India and was vacated just four days before the preparatory visit of external affairs minister Salman Khurshid to Beijing on May 9.

China watchers believe the Depsang incursion could be a product of the rivalry between the PLA and the PLA Navy, which has recently been aggressive in the East China Sea. This one-upmanship had the unfortunate consequence of reviving bitter memories of the 1962 Indo-China border war. Although the PLA withdrew on May 5 due to tough diplomacy by New Delhi, the incursion has inadvertently cast a shadow on Premier Li's three day visit to India beginning Sunday.

The onus is now on Premier Li to bridge the trust deficit as pragmatic India wants to close the Depsang chapter and is genuinely keen to engage China. This is evident from the high profile exchanges lined up for Beijing, with NSA Menon ready to engage State Councillor Yang Jiechi for the 16th round of Special Representative dialogue on the boundary issue next month followed by visits of defence minister AK Antony and PM Manmohan Singh. On his part, Keqiang is expected to sign five of the 16 agreements proposed with India with visa simplification and border defence at a negotiating stage.

Given that both sides want to make the border peaceful, India is inclined to sign the border pact but is prepared for tough negotiations to protect its national interests. There could also be a positive last minute forward movement on a bilateral mechanism to jointly assess the upstream construction projects on the Brahmaputra river as proposed by PM Singh to President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the last BRICS summit at Durban.

With $66 billion in bilateral trade skewed to the extent of $29 billion in favour of Beijing, PM Singh and his delegation will push Keqiang's team for access to the Chinese market while offering India as a safe investment destination for the potential $500 billion kitty with the Middle Kingdom. The Chinese proposal to develop a high speed rail network in India may be on the agenda next week but India is still to take a call due to humongous capital cost and other competitors in the market.

Just as bilateral trade and investment will bring the two countries closer, political issues discussed behind closed doors will inject a reality check into the relationship. Without naming Pakistan, PM Singh had first hinted to President Xi that China's ties with others must not hurt India or become an impediment to bilateral ties, at the Durban Summit. The same concern, along with presence of anti-India insurgent groups in China, will find voice in the bilateral dialogue, with Premier Li expected to raise the Dalai Lama issue.

Significantly, the Indian reiteration for "One China" policy did not reflect for the first time in the joint statement issued even during former premier Wen Jiabao's December 2010 visit to New Delhi. For the UPA government the "One China" policy must be linked to the "One India" policy at a time when Beijing is participating in infrastructure projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal said: "India is allowing itself to be managed by China in a way that suits its interests and damages ours. With the growing economic and military gap between us, we are becoming more timid and diffident in dealing with China's challenge to us. The underlying strategy of the Xi Jinping regime, whatever the surface noises, will remain that of squeezing India strategically while tactically reaching out to it to keep it tethered to its present posture of seeking China's goodwill."

Manmohan Singh's government is well aware of the dangers on the road to India-China bonhomie but is pragmatic enough to realise there is enough scope for both countries to grow without being labelled adversaries. New Delhi is willing to engage Beijing on equal footing for it knows that if you are not on the high table with China, then you are on the menu.

Jayanth Jacob

Ahead of Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s visit here from May 19, India has proposed a military-level mechanism aimed at controlling adversarial incidents — the kind witnessed recently in the Despang valley in April — and keeping the peace and tranquility along the border.

The mechanism of coordination and cooperation at the military commander-level is proposed after the failure of flag meetings. Having an ear to the ground would complement the flag meetings and the mechanism that exists now between the two foreign ministries to deal with border incidents, senior government sources told HT.

The Indian proposal is in response to a draft Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) framed by China.

However, it seems like a long haul before the two countries agree on any new mechanism on border management, and it will not be anything “altogether new”.

There are reservations in certain quarters in India about the Chinese proposal, which the government is looking at.

The government sources say it is “more realistic” to see “concrete movement in this area” when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits Beijing later this year. But the Indian side believes better “communication at the area commander- level” could help in better “handling of the incidents of incursions arising out of differing perceptions about the line of actual control”.

And, the flag meets have been found “not enough to sort out the issues quick enough” as the orders have to come from the top.

Under BDCA, China has proposed a slew of measures for the expansion of friendly contacts and more communication between the troops of the two sides on the ground that will preempt adverse incidents along the line of actual control.

India and China share an unsettled boundary of over 4,000 km. The last incident of incursion in the Despang valley lasted more than two weeks to settle and it cast a shadow over the bilateral ties just ahead of Li’s visit.

ramana wrote:Official History of the 1962 war

Read Chapter 10 Review and Reflections

And send copy to the GOI.

The three-day visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India, starting on Sunday, will reflect the “forward-looking” intentions of the new leadership in Beijing to reboot bilateral ties despite the recent mistrust, State media commentaries have suggested a day ahead of the visit.

The “choice of India as the first leg” of Mr. Li's maiden overseas tour as Premier “sent out a clear signal that Beijing’s new leadership prioritises enhancing ties with New Delhi despite border spats and other disputes,” the official Xinhua news agency said in a commentary issued on Saturday.

Official media outlets have, in recent days, played down differences with India, particularly over the border issue, in the wake of the recent stand-off along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.

Big picture

The Xinhua commentary suggested that the “swift cooling-down” from “the latest border spat” had reaffirmed that both sides were “looking at the big picture of their ties, instead of being carried away by incidental matters.”

“The China-India relationship is more about the future than about the past. It is with such a forward-looking mind that China’s new leadership has decided to take new initiatives to further deepen bilateral ties and mutual trust,” the commentary said. “Li’s upcoming trip will be a crucial step in that direction.”

Separately on Saturday, the Communist Party’s official newspaper, The People’s Daily , published a commentary authored by the Chinese Ambassador to India, Wei Wei, saying Mr. Li’s visit “will open a new chapter in Sino-Indian relations.”

Mr. Wei wrote that China did not have “the strategic intent to contain India,” saying that “there are no such things as ‘string of pearls’ that China is planning to build against India in the Indian Ocean.”

“China has legitimate interest in the Indian Ocean, and India also has legitimate interest in the Pacific,” Mr. Wei said. {Look at how he says Pacific instead of China Sea} “These are not in contradiction with each other.”

On the boundary issue, Mr. Wei, who took over in January, said both countries “need to have enough confidence in peaceful and friendly consultations through existing bilateral mechanisms, and to promote proper settlement of related issues as soon as possible”.

“To achieve this goal,” he said, “both sides have to be rational, they should properly control their differences, refrain from upgrading the issue, and not let the problems affect the overall situation of Sino-Indian relations.” {In other words, whenever China takes an aggressive position and intrudes a few dozen Kms inside India, India must not escalate, sit quetly, conduct diplomatic dialogues and not retaliate in anyway}

Trade imbalance

On the widening trade imbalance and India’s concerns on the management of trans-boundary rivers on account of Chinese plans to build dams on the Brahmaputra – two issues expected to figure prominently during Mr. Li’s visit – Mr. Wei said:, “As long as the two sides have mutual understanding on the basis of mutual trust, take good care of each other’s concerns and interests, they will be able to find a proper solution to the problem.”
{They don't have trust and China does not bother about the concerns of India. So, how are they going to find a solution, Mr. Wei ?}
While acknowledging that both countries “cannot fully restore mutual trust without resolving the border dispute,” the Xinhua commentary suggested that “good faith in each other’s strategic intentions” could raise the level of trust. {This is China's way of telling India that India must not be seen in the company of China's antagonists such as Japan or Vietnam etc; that Tibet belongs to China; that Taiwan is part of China; that the seven dashed lines delimit the South China Sea; that Pakistan is the Chinese paw against India and it has to be accepted; that the 'string of pearls' is in Chinese strategic interests and India must simply accept it etc}

Alluding to India’s concerns over certain aspects of China’s ties with Pakistan, the commentary said China had “never sought to enhance ties with any other country at the expense of its relationship with India.” It added, in an apparent reference to the U.S. “pivot” or rebalancing to Asia, seen by many Beijing analysts as a containment strategy, that it was “Beijing’s belief that India, an early advocate of the non-aligned movement, will pursue its China policy at its own will without being part of the schemes of other powers.”

Singh told the Chinese leader, "If peace is disturbed, it impacts all other areas of the relationship." Although he did not go into the details of the Depsang incident, it was a clear indication that it would not be business as usual if another such incident happened.

Despite the border intrusion, China has been making the right noises about improving relations with India. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang will echo that theme during his visit to India this week. But New Delhi needs to look beyond the rhetoric and make hardheaded assessments about its relations with China.

This does not mean that India should not be open to Chinese efforts to improve relations or resolve the border dispute. What it does mean is that India should look to Chinese actions rather than its words.

Pushing to resolve the border dispute should not become an excuse to give in to China's demands that India stop building up its Himalayan defences. India began improving its infrastructure in the region belatedly, much after China had made significant improvements to its infrastructure in Tibet.

The terrain advantage along the border always lay with Beijing and China's infrastructure development in Tibet made the situation even more lopsided in China's favour. On the other hand, Indian infrastructure building in the region has been slow.

Giving in to Chinese demands on this issue would be foolish because though the threat of a border war is remote, it cannot be ruled out entirely. In addition, a military imbalance along the border will have telling effects on India's position even on the border negotiations. Irrespective of the state of the negotiations, India needs to speed up its efforts to strengthen its border defence capabilities.

The border dispute is only one facet of the challenge that India faces with China. A more serious issue is China's unrelenting efforts to counterbalance India, to which New Delhi has rarely responded in kind. As the weaker party, India should have been the one that should have been balancing China. Oddly, it is China that has shown greater interest in countering New Delhi.

This includes direct attempts to undermine India, such as India's claims to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and attempts to join the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) and other groups associated with non-proliferation.

Beyond such direct efforts, Beijing continues to seek to counter India through its strategic partnership with Pakistan, a country with which China shares no economic interest, cultural or historical ties or ideological affinity. The only glue that binds the 'all-weather partnership' is a mutual interest in balancing India.

China not only shared nuclear weapons technology with Pakistan - a gift unparalleled in international relations - but also consistently championed Pakistan's case in multilateral fora. And there is little indication that this has changed or will change in the near future. China's policies are based on a strategic culture and worldview which is hardwired to think of international politics in terms of conflict and the pursuit of power.

So China sees India as a potential adversary and sees its growing power and partnership with others such as the US, Japan and other Asian powers as a possible threat to China. China is not unique in having such a power-oriented strategic culture except that it is possibly much more power-oriented and power-conscious than other countries.

The problem is that India has been the opposite. New Delhi has been probably much less power-oriented than most others and has historically shown a particular reluctance to balance against China. Whether this is a result of China successfully deterring India or simply left-over Nehruvianism, the consequence has been New Delhi's willingness to give unnecessary credence to China's concerns rather than India's interests.

Indian decision-makers need to remain open to the possibility of moving the border negotiations forward and improving other aspects of China ties. But equally, New Delhi needs to realise that irrespective of how well this visit goes, China will not stop balancing India.

Therefore, India should not have to sacrifice balancing China at the altar of better relations.