Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Nikhil T · Post by **Nikhil T** » 26 Nov 2011 11:16

REDIFF: The inside story of squabble between NTRO and RAW

sum · Post by **sum** » 27 Nov 2011 13:44

^^ Just done reading Mitrokhin Archives-Part 2 ( KGB and the 3rd world).

Have to admire the Chinese counter-intel if one goes by the archives since it claims that even the super-duper KGB at its peak achieved ZILCH penetration of China and had hardly handful of low level agents, let along high level contacts.

Now, i can think of why even our intel on China isn't always the greatest, esp when a gorilla like KGB had to return empty handed ( compared to the way they had penetrated India and other nations inside out). Being on the China desk in RAW may not exactly be a much envied position if one goes by the picture of Chinese intel/counter-intel painted.

sum · Post by **sum** » 28 Nov 2011 15:24

We need an intelligence czar in the country

hen 26/11 happened, IPS officer Anil Choudhary was senior advisor in the National Technical Research Organisation after his retirement in 2005.

In his long career Choudhary has served in the Intelligence Bureau as special director before moving on. He has a vast experience in counter-terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir [ Images ] and the north-east.

In this final part of a two-part exclusive interview to rediff.com's Sheela Bhatt, Choudhary gives insight into why NTRO, which reports to the Prime Minister's Office, failed to come up to expectations. He also suggests how India [ Images ] could tighten its security apparatus.

After 26/11 while speaking from public platforms Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [ Images ] and Home Minister P Chidambaram [ Images ] have said many times that they would like to strengthen NTRO. But why is it lagging behind? Why is there a lack of urgency in the matter?

Each agency has its own technical intelligence capability. Each and every security agency has it but the Research and Analysis Wing (India's external intelligence agency) has the maximum expertise in technical intelligence.

The RAW took birth in 1968 a few years after the Chinese aggression when the need was felt for raising the level of our external intelligence. That time the division of IB assets, in terms of manpower and gadgets, was done. The major portion of the technical intelligence was given to RAW. The IB was left as the poor cousin in its technical intelligence capacity. The IB is still far below the mark in its technical intelligence capacity.

The NTRO was proposed to fill the gap. It was supposed to find out from the IB, RAW and defence intelligence what they need (in terms of technical support in snooping). The NTRO was created to concentrate in the areas where Indian intelligence agencies were lacking and then produce the technological support systems to help them. The intelligence agencies were to come to the NTRO and not the other way round!

After 26/11, we were told that government has come out of its inertia on the issue of national security. Then why has the NTRO failed?

We needed to attract the best scientific and technological talent that has a global edge. You have to compete globally. The NTRO has not been able to attract the right people for various reasons.

Is it due lack of funds?

I don't think it's because of lack of funds. It is so because it is part of the government. You know, it is still governed by the recruitment rules of the government!

Is it due to the lack of scientific mindset within the intelligence establishment?

Hmmmno. The issue is not about the intelligence establishment. The NTRO is a scientific and technical organisation which is supposed to generate intelligence; the product here is not a missile, not a boat, not an aircraft. Here the product is intelligence. It requires the flow, the regular ongoing flow, of intelligence which is fashionable and actionable.

Sir what is the status now? How is it working? The institution is in which stage today?

As I mentioned to you few things are happening. In 2009, the work on satellite imagery was good stuff. We did a good job, really. We got lots of appreciation for what we were providing. That is the area where NTRO has been productive. In some other areas it has not lived upto its expectations.

One of the technical areas where the NTRO was given the major role was in cryptology (the science of secure communications). Decryption (process of converting the cipher into plain text) and encryption (process of converting the plain text into a cipher) is a very difficult and highly specialised job. You don't find people with the combination of qualification and experience in this area. There are few people around doing the job.

Basically, the best mathematical brains in the country can be groomed to do it. The US has been able to tap such brains because they do talent spotting in universities; they mark the best mathematical brains among the students and get them to the office of the national intelligence. They groom them and they pay them very well. They have developed the technology and have the first rate ability to make and break codes.

Which is India's weakest link in technical intelligence?

This is the area of weakness (the lack of advanced technology of encryption and decryption)

What is government doing to make up for it?

I don't know. I am sure they are doing something.

How do you see the role of NTRO in the coming days?

I do hope that the NTRO will be allowed to fulfill the role it was created for.

My view is that the IB needs to concentrate on counter-terrorism. The IB's technical intelligence capacity needs to be built up a lot more. There is an opportunity for all intelligence organisations like the IB, RAW and NTRO to put their all ideas before the committee headed by eminent bureaucrat turned diplomat Naresh Chandra. The committee is known as the Task Force on National Security. It's looking into external and internal security.

What are the major issues you will like to put forward to make the NTRO a robust institution?

I don't know what's it is worth but I think, there has to be the meeting point of all the intelligence agencies. The solution lies in having the apex body which should have effective control over all organisations. The person who is heading the apex body should call the shots. All the heads of agencies should report to him. That has not been happening, unfortunately.

Right now, the RAW doesn't report to the home ministry. It reports to the PMO. The IB reports to the home ministry. The National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon doesn't oversee the IB. He can access the reports of the IB. But he doesn't effectively control or command the IB, today. You can't expect the prime minister giving direction on an on-going basis to any agency. We need the interaction point. We need an intelligence czar in the country. He should oversee all the intelligence agencies.

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 28 Nov 2011 17:36

[quote="sum"]We need an intelligence czar in the country

[quote]

I think He is spot on ! A simple summary of action points to our Inteligence agaencies and GOI/home ministry ;

1) IB should pull up its socks. IB's technical intelligence capacity needs to be built up a lot more.
2) NTRO should also improve its effectiveness in ALL the area's including technical inteligence & CRIPTOLOGY ! The area of weakness (the lack of advanced technology of encryption and decryption)
3) All inteligence agencies should meet and share the information. One way suggested is to have a APPEX BODY (common BOSS) above them ! (ofcourse, it is agreed, that PM has got lot to worry about Anna hazare, baba Ram dev, lok pal and managing oppossition parties and allies on various issues in parliment etc etc !

)
4) GOI/ Inteligence agencies should revamp the recruitment process so as to get BEST brains in our country for inteligence. (I am sure there are so many youngsters who are waiting to contribute to Indian development!)
5) The role of NSA needs to be redefined, to get maximum benefit to our country.

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 28 Nov 2011 17:38

Two picked up in Chennai for alleged terror links, taken to Delhi

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Nov 2011 21:25

So where is the JCB (Joint Cipher Bureau) in the new setup?

aditya.agd · Post by **aditya.agd** » 28 Nov 2011 23:33

Post 26/11 there appears to be no lessons learnt. Despite the terror attacks still no one seems to be accountable. Indian govt is back to playing peace cards with Pakistani killers.

No importance to innocent lives lost due to ISI / Paki army actions.

Too much politics to save chair but no effort to run a nation properly. Shame on the Indian defense planners and authorities.

I hope someone rectifies this situation one day.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Nov 2011 23:46

Most likely the GOI got some assurances from US that they wont run DCH types in India. hence the return to inaction.

member_20653 · Post by **member_20653** » 30 Nov 2011 03:16

As you can see I am a newbie here. To start off I came up with this - What are the real capabilities of RAW in 21st century ? I've read quite a bit of its past. Does it has what it takes to play global high stakes in this century? Any external intelligence agency must surely have two things on its list, obtaining denied technologies and industrial espionage. Is there anything in open source that suggests RAW has played a key role in short circuiting the technology denials in place against us ? Moving forward as defense industries inch closer to self sufficiency over time, is it not time to think of developing economic strength through reverse engineering, IPRs, new technologies, designed developed and made in india products ? I never read of industrial espionage by RAW or Indian agencies, whilst there are many about Japs, Chinese and Russians. Are we just happy to load up on other country developed technology costing foreign exchange? What does the GOI do to help indigenous commercial technology companies say that one day can compete with Intel or Apple ? How long do we need to play catch up and when is the time to lead ?. Modern science is an open book. The transition from science to technology to product to marketing is the crucial link.

member_20067 · Post by **member_20067** » 30 Nov 2011 07:35

not sure whether it has been shared and discussed before . .

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 923975.cms

Armed Iran ship in EEZ worries India

India is in a dilemma about an armed Iranian ship MV Assa that has dropped anchor off Lakshadweep over a month ago. On November 23, India sent a second diplomatic missive "note verbale" to Iran asking them to remove the ship from India's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Iran, said officials, has been stonewalling New Delhi's requests. Technically, Iran is not in violation of any international law because in the EEZ India is allowed access to assets or resources, but there is freedom of navigation. Under the latter principle, Iran can keep its ship there.

Unofficially, Indian officials have been told that Iran is "monitoring" traffic in the region for security purposes and to tackle piracy. Indian officials have told them that Indian Navy had cleared about 500 miles of pirates.

But that hasn't stopped the Iranians from keeping their ship there. It is unnerving for the Indian Navy particularly because Teheran not doing anything. But a constant stream of boats with sailors who get on the "mother" ship take turns bring supplies etc makes it seem like the Iranians plan to be there for some time. It is seen as a security threat by the Indian services.

India is concerned that Iran has given different reasons for its ship being stationed there - from saying it was travelling to Singapore, and then to China etc.

sum · Post by **sum** » 30 Nov 2011 09:35

Any external intelligence agency must surely have two things on its list, obtaining denied technologies and industrial espionage. Is there anything in open source that suggests RAW has played a key role in short circuiting the technology denials in place against us ? Moving forward as defense industries inch closer to self sufficiency over time, is it not time to think of developing economic strength through reverse engineering, IPRs, new technologies, designed developed and made in india products ? I never read of industrial espionage by RAW or Indian agencies, whilst there are many about Japs, Chinese and Russians. Are we just happy to load up on other country developed technology costing foreign exchange?

In his memoirs, B.Raman mentions that his scheme of taking a posting in Paris under cover of a Hindu journo was nixed by MEA saying that it would not be correct

and we should always follow the "legal" route of diplomatic cver.

So, that should answer if we would even ever dare to indulge in industrial espionage when we are afriad to even send our spooks in NOC positions anywhere!!

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 30 Nov 2011 13:08

Blast in Imphal ahead of PM's visit, 1 killed
One man critically injured in Manipur bomb blast

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 30 Nov 2011 13:10

Six suspected Indian Mujahideen operatives held

sum · Post by **sum** » 30 Nov 2011 13:31

^^ Seems to be a good inter-agency job here and mercifully, only "secular" states seem to be involved else we would have had dharnas to release the "innocent minorities" being held by communal police.

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 30 Nov 2011 14:30

Very correct, this is a sad reality what to do ? majority is fearing to act against on minority, even if they are terrorists !

sum wrote:^^ Seems to be a good inter-agency job here and mercifully, only "secular" states seem to be involved else we would have had dharnas to release the "innocent minorities" being held by communal police.

Kailash · Post by **Kailash** » 30 Nov 2011 15:14

Is there anything in open source that suggests RAW has played a key role in short circuiting the technology denials in place against us ? Moving forward as defense industries inch closer to self sufficiency over time, is it not time to think of developing economic strength through reverse engineering, IPRs, new technologies, designed developed and made in india products ? I never read of industrial espionage by RAW or Indian agencies, whilst there are many about Japs, Chinese and Russians.

Ideally, such details should not be in public domain. A failed operation would be embarrasing, with far reaching diplomatic consequences. The countries you have mentioned have technology denied to them - no way they can get it except to steal. We did source components - from the US (through a third country) immediately after Pokhran. But these were exceptional times. Now that west has opened up to India, there is little reason to steal.

One thing that can be done is the private sector acquiring stakes in specialist companies and buying startup companies with patents. Stealing workforce from these companies, would be legally better than stealing technology.

member_20653 · Post by **member_20653** » 01 Dec 2011 03:48

One thing that can be done is the private sector acquiring stakes in specialist companies and buying startup companies with patents. Stealing workforce from these companies, would be legally better than stealing technology.

The west ain't naive by any stretch to passively watch non-west gobbling up strategic companies/technologies. Chinese have trillions is free cash yet they cant lay a finger on any real piece of cake in the west. The west seem to have clearly defined boundaries and game plan. We may acquire a Jaguar or some mining interests here and there, but they control the strategic technologies. Stolen technology cant be sold to the source (west) but can be sold to others. Consider chinee, they stole wireless tech from west and re-sell to non-west at cheap. West knows its stolen they dont buy any of it but the rest of world does. Thats more dollars in the bank account for the chinee. We need to think on those lines. If we never challenge the west in any aspect we will end up true to our history - non-invasive peace loving harmless but malnourished people. Don't get me wrong, I am just talking facts. I would like to see more confrontations with west. Otherwise we are their convenient poodles.

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 01 Dec 2011 13:59

Ishrat Jehan encounter: Gujarat HC orders CBI to probe case

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 01 Dec 2011 14:11

x posting from Army discussion thread.
'Pakistan warned of dangerous consequences if India attacked again'

aditya.agd · Post by **aditya.agd** » 01 Dec 2011 16:52

i hope indians take some action instead of warning.

sum · Post by **sum** » 02 Dec 2011 09:19

Good stuff on our TECHINT ( inspite of the alarmist tone of the article) :
The government's listening to us

In the summer of 1999, an officer at a Research and Analysis Wing communications station in western India flipped a switch, and helped change the course of the Kargil conflict. RAW's equipment had picked up Pakistan's army chief and later military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, speaking to his chief of staff, General Muhammad Aziz, from a hotel room in Beijing. “The entire reason for the success of this operation,” the RAW officer heard General Aziz saying on May 29, 1999, “was this total secrecy.” He probably smiled.

For the first time, India had hard evidence that Pakistan's army, not jihadists, had planned and executed a war that had brought two nuclear-armed states to the edge of a catastrophic confrontation. RAW's computers established that the voices were indeed those of Generals Musharraf and Aziz, pinpointed their locations – and undermined Pakistan's diplomatic position beyond redemption.

India's strategic community finally awoke to the possibilities of modern communications intelligence, and unleashed a massive effort to upgrade the country's technical capabilities. A new organisation, the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), was set up; scientists in the Indian Institutes of Technology were tapped, and quiet efforts to acquire technology worldwide were initiated.

Late into the night the 26/11 attacks began in Mumbai, that investment paid off: equipment flown in from New Delhi by the Intelligence Bureau allowed investigators to intercept the assault team's communications with the Lashkar-e-Taiba's headquarters in Pakistan. Police forces across the country have since scrambled to purchase similar equipment, making India one of the largest markets for global vendors.

But this isn't good news: India has no appropriate legal framework to regulate its vast, and growing, communications intelligence capabilities. There is almost no real institutional oversight by political institutions like Parliament — which means there is a clear and imminent danger that the technology could undermine the very democracy it was purchased to defend.

Who is selling?

From a trove of documents obtained by The Hindu, working in collaboration with WikiLeaks and an international consortium of media and privacy organisations monitoring the communications intelligence industry, it is evident Indian companies are already offering technologies very similar to the most formidable available in the world.

Himachal Pradesh-based Shoghi — once blacklisted by the government pending investigation of its relationship with corruption-linked former telecommunications Minister Sukh Ram — has become one of the largest suppliers to the Indian armed forces and RAW. It offers a range of equipment to monitor satellite, mobile phone, and strategic military communications.

Shoghi's SCL-3412 satellite communications link monitoring system can, its literature says, even “passively monitor C and Ku-band satellite compressed and non-compressed telecom carriers from Intelsat, Eutelsat, Arabsat, Turksat.” The company also claims its equipment can automatically analyse “bulk speech data” — in other words, listen in and pick particular languages, words, or even voices out of millions of simultaneous conversations taking place across the world.

India's other large communications intelligence firm, Indore-headquartered ClearTrail, says its products “help communication service providers, law enforcement, and government agencies worldwide to counteract the exploitation of today's communication networks, fight terrorism and organised crime.” The company's brochures say it has portable equipment that can pluck mobile phone voice and text messages off the air, without the support of service providers — service providers who must, by law, be served with legal authorisation to allow monitoring.

The Hindu telephoned officials at both companies, and then e-mailed them requesting meetings to discuss issues raised in its investigation. Neither company responded; one said it was barred from discussing technical questions with the media by its terms of contract with its military clients.

Large parts of the most sophisticated equipment, defence sources told The Hindu, come in from Israel — itself a beneficiary of a special relationship with the United States. “Israeli vendors often tell us that they're charging extraordinarily high prices in return for breaking embargos on sharing these technologies,” one officer said, “but there's no way of knowing this is the case.”

“If we get what we need,” he said, “we're willing to pay — there's no point quibbling over a few million dollars.”

Ever since 26/11, companies like Shoghi and ClearTrail haven't been short of customers: police forces have queued up to purchase passive interception technologies, which allow them to maintain surveillance not just on phone numbers specified in legally-mandatory warrants from the Home Secretary, but on all conversations in an area, or region. There are even cases of out-of-state operations: the Delhi Police have periodically maintained a passive interception capability at the Awantipora military station in Jammu and Kashmir, an act with no basis in law. { DP listening post in J&K??} The Army also has significant passive interception capabilities along the Line of Control (LoC) — which also pick up civilian communication.

Computers at key net hubs

India's National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) has also deployed computers fitted at key internet hubs — the junction boxes, as it were, through which all of the country's internet traffic must pass. Police forces in several States, among them Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Andhra Pradesh, have followed suit, with smaller variants of the same technology.

The risks of this proliferation of technology have become evident over the last two years. In Punjab, one of four passive interception units is reported to be missing, feared to have been lost to a political party or corporate institution. Andhra Pradesh actually shut down its passive interception capabilities after it accidentally intercepted sensitive conversations between high officials. Karnataka officials also accidentally intercepted conversations involving a romantic relationship between a leading politician and a movie star — while Mumbai has had several scandals involving unauthorised listening-in to phones owned by corporate figures and movie stars.

Intelligence Bureau sources told The Hindu they had been working, for the past several months, to get States to shut down the 33 passive interception units in their possession — but with little success. The pervasive attitude in a federal or quasi-federal polity seems to be: if the Centre can do it, why can't we?

Police do require warrants to tap individual phones, but in practice authorisations are handed out with little thought. In one notorious case, the politician Amar Singh's phone conversations were recorded with the consent of his service provider on the basis of what turned out to be a faked government e-mail. Mr. Singh's personal life became a subject of public discussion, but no one has yet been held accountable for the outrageously unlawful intrusion into his privacy.

Last year, journalist Saikat Datta authored a disturbing exposé, alleging the NTRO's passive interception capabilities were being misused for political purposes — and even activities closely resembling blackmail. Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram denied such activities were taking place, although he has no supervisory power over the NTRO — but there has been no investigation.

The fact is that the government has no real interest in rigorous oversight. The Intelligence Bureau, for example, has long been summoning call data records for individuals from service providers with no legal cause, allowing it to maintain a watch on behalf of the Union Home Ministry of contacts maintained among journalists, politicians, corporate figures, and government.

In the absence of a full investigation into malpractices, and proper oversight, there is simply no way of knowing who might, and in what circumstances, have been targeted through passive interception means — and that's the whole problem.

“When an officer on a salary of Rs.8,000 a month has pretty much unrestricted access to this kind of technology,” a senior Maharashtra Police officer admitted, “things will go wrong, and have gone wrong.”

Earlier this year, Congress spokesperson and Member of Parliament, Manish Tewari, introduced a private member's bill that would enable Parliamentary oversight over the intelligence services — the worldwide pattern in democracies. “The advancement of communications interception warrants that a very robust legal architecture to protect the privacy of individuals needs to be put in place,” he says. “The intrusive power of the state has to be counter-balanced with the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.”

In his case, no one seems to have been listening.

Ever-larger investments

India is set to make ever-larger investments in these technologies, making the case for oversight ever more urgent. In 2014, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), aided by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), is scheduled to launch India's first dedicated spy satellite, the Rs.100-crore communications intelligence satellite, tentatively named CCISat. Like similar systems operated by the United States, Russia, and Japan, among others, CCISat will suck up gigabites of electronic information from its orbital position 500 kilometres above the earth, passing it on to military supercomputers that will scan it for information of military and intelligence value.

From the public sector giant, Bharat Electronics, India's principal electronics intelligence manufacturer, we know that CCISat is just a small part of the country's overall spy technology programme: in 2009-2010, it supplied some Rs.700 crore worth of electronic warfare equipment, and was scheduled to make deliveries worth Rs.900 crore in 2010-2011. Electronic warfare systems, both offensive and defensive, were reported to make up over half its order book of Rs.15,000 crore last year.

Larsen & Toubro, as well as the Tatas' Strategic Electronics Division, have also expanded their capacities to meet an acquisitions drive that Indian military officials estimate will cost the country Rs.22,500 crore (about $4.5 billion) before the end of the decade.
This may be money well spent: there can be little doubt that communication intelligence has contributed significantly to defending India.
However, the failure to regulate the technology will have far-reaching consequences for our democracy — and could even mean its subversion.

sum · Post by **sum** » 02 Dec 2011 09:20

The art and science of communications intelligence

In March 1950, the National Security Council of the United States of America issued a top-secret directive that, in ways few people fully understood then or since, transformed our world. “The special nature of Communications Intelligence activities,” it reads, “requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies or recommendations of the Executive Branch relating to the collection, production, security, handling, dissemination or utilisation of intelligence and/or classified material shall not be applicable to Communications Intelligence activities.”

Less than two decades after that directive was signed, the U.S. controlled the most formidable system of surveillance the world has ever seen: satellites and listening posts strung across the planet picked up everything from radio-telephone conversations from cars in Moscow to transatlantic telephone conversations and data on India's nuclear programme. Known as Echelon, the system provided the western powers with an unprecedented information edge over their adversaries.

From data obtained by WikiLeaks, working with an international consortium of media organisations, including The Hindu, and other partners, we have the first real public domain insights into how much more advanced — and how much more widely available — this surveillance system has become.

The South African firm Vastech, for example, offers systems that can capture data flowing across telecommunications and internet networks in multiples of ten gigabites, and scan it for pre-determined parameters — the voice of an individual; a particular language; a phone number; an e-mail address. The Indian companies, Shoghi and ClearTrail, The Hindu found, market systems that can capture giant volumes of traffic from mobile phone and satellite networks and subject it to similar analysis. France's Amesys is among several companies to have provided equipment like this to states like Libya — enabling their parent state access to the buyer's own communications, through electronic back-doors, but at the price of allowing them to spy on dissidents, with often horrific consequences.

In coming days, The Hindu will report on the consequences of the proliferation of surveillance technology — but it is important, first, to understand the state of the science of communications espionage.

Evolving technology

Interception technologies are as old as communications. Julius Caesar, the imperial historian Suetonius recorded, was concerned enough about the prospect of his military communications being intercepted — in general, by the simple expedient of corrupting or capturing his messengers — to use what cryptographers call a substitution cipher — replacing the letter A with D, B with E and so on. Had one of Caesar's military messages contained a reference to The Hindu, it would have read Wkh Klqgx. Elizabeth I's spymaster, Robert Walsingham, excelled in using spies to capture information on Spain's military ambitions, and plots against his queen.

Early ciphers were easy to crack with techniques like frequency analysis, leading intelligence services to design ever more complex codes. The eminent science journalist Simon Singh's Virtual Black Chamber — so named for the rooms espionage agencies used to crack enemy codes — has a fascinating historical account of the never-ending battle between cryptographers and cryptanalysts (as well as online tools for aspiring amateur code-makers and code-breakers).

The rise of wireless communication in the early decades of the twentieth century, though, made it possible for information to be passed instantly across great distances — and for states to begin intercepting it. From 1925, Germany began deploying a path-breaking mechanical encrypted-communication system code-named Enigma, which resisted the combined efforts of cryptanalysts — thus allowing the Nazi military machine an unprecedented degree of secrecy in its military communications, and facilitating its new strategy of high-speed mechanised war.

In 1939, the Polish mathematician, Marian Rejewski, led a team that made some breakthroughs against Enigma, based on studies of a machine stolen by the country's spies. Then, in 1943, a top-secret British team, made up of an eclectic collection of scholars, technicians, and scientists led by the mercurial Alan Turing, used electromechanical devices — the first computers — to finally crack the Enigma code. Even then, full penetration of Enigma's naval variant needed a daring raid that allowed code-books to be salvaged from the submarine U559, without allowing Germany to suspect the vital information had not gone to the sea-bed.

Experts have claimed that breaking Enigma hastened the end of the war by two years. Winston Churchill, the United Kingdom's wartime Prime Minister, described the work of the code-breakers as a “secret war, whose battles were lost or won unknown to the public, and only with difficulty comprehended, even now, by those outside the small, high scientific circles concerned.” “No such warfare had ever been waged by mortal men,” he said. The secret war involved hideous choices — for instance, allowing German air and naval attacks to kill allied soldiers when they could have been pre-empted, in order not to raise suspicions that Enigma had been compromised.

Big Brother Science

Learning from their experience, the allied powers invested heavily in communications intelligence after the end of World War II. In 1947, the four English-speaking powers — the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand — signed a treaty allowing for the sharing of intelligence. Listening stations run by the four countries across the world, supplemented from the 1970s by satellites, allowed a new software system — known as Echelon — to suck up virtually all electronic communication from around the planet. For example, part of the inter-city microwave signals carrying phone traffic went into space, because of the curvature of the earth. The NSA's satellites would pick up the data—and Echelon would mine it for useful data.

In the 1990s, a steady flow of information in Echelon came into the public domain, based on disclosures by the former Canadian spy Mike Frost, New Zealand's Nicky Hager, American James Bamford, and British journalist Duncan Campbell. India itself was using some Echelon-like signals intelligence technologies by this time. The United States had begun to supply the Research and Analysis Wing's Aviation Research Centre equipment to spy on China's nuclear programme and naval assets from 1962; acquisitions were also made from the Soviet Union.

Public disclosure of Echelon raised growing concerns that it might be misused for states to conduct espionage against their own citizens, as well as to further their commercial interests. In 2000 and 2001, the European Parliament released reports addressing these issues.

The furore forced former CIA director James Woolsey to admit, at a press conference held in 2000, that the United States did conduct espionage in Europe. Mr Woolsey said, however, that just 5 per cent of his country's economic intelligence was derived from stolen secrets — and used to target states or corporations that were either violating international sanctions or paying bribes to gain contracts. He said intelligence of this kind was not passed on to companies in the United States — adding that to harvest usable commercial information would mean resources were sucked away from the core national-security mandate of his organisation.

Fred Stock, a former Canadian intelligence officer, earlier gave testimony that suggested Mr. Woolsey's claims were, at best, a part of the truth. Mr. Stock said he had been expelled from his service in 1993 for criticising its targeting of economic and civilian targets — among them, information on negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Chinese grain purchases, and French weapons sales. He claimed Canada's spies also routinely monitored high-seas protests by the environmental organisation, Greenpeace.

Evidence also exists that the NSA spied on U.S. targets — though not on U.S. soil, thus bypassing national legislation. Margaret Newsham, who worked at Echelon's Menwith Hill facility from 1977 to 1981, testified that conversations involving the late Senator Strom Thurmond had been intercepted. The technology to target conversations involving particular people, she said, had existed from 1978. Ms Newsham's revelations seemed to buttress what many had long suspected — which is that the 1947 agreement allowed the U.S. and the U.K. to spy on their own citizens, by the simple expedient of subcontracting the task to their alliance partner.

Few people, however, remained willing to deal with these concerns after 9/11: increasingly, western governments allowed enhanced surveillance against their citizens, as part of the so-called war against terror. The data gathered by WikiLeaks and its partners graphically demonstrate that almost every aspect of our everyday lives — everything from the hubs of the fibre-optic cables which carry the world's e-mail and internet traffic to mobile and landline phone conversations — can, and are, scanned by intelligence services. The odds are that when you read this article, replete with words like “terrorism,” a computer somewhere is recording your activity, automatically recording your computer's precise geographical location, and matching all this against public records that contain your details.

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 02 Dec 2011 11:02

sum wrote:Good stuff on our TECHINT ( inspite of the alarmist tone of the article) :
The government's listening to us

Himachal Pradesh-based Shoghi — once blacklisted by the government pending investigation of its relationship with corruption-linked former telecommunications Minister Sukh Ram — has become one of the largest suppliers to the Indian armed forces and RAW. ...

Large parts of the most sophisticated equipment, defence sources told The Hindu, come in from Israel — itself a beneficiary of a special relationship with the United States. “Israeli vendors often tell us that they're charging extraordinarily high prices in return for breaking embargos on sharing these technologies,” one officer said, “but there's no way of knowing this is the case.”

I hope our boffins are aware that it is absolutely routine practice to install hardware Trojans which can be used to inject false signals, especially at times of crisis.

Detection of such hardware Trojans is basically impossible ... it is a very painstaking process involving sophisticated semiconductor fabrication equipment which India probably does not have, and it will destroy the chip being tested. And even if you do all that it is a very chancy thing.

So far I have not seen any symptom of anybody coming to grips with this issue, although DRDO has been making some vague statements from time to time.

Same issues also apply to imported AWACS equipment.

member_20653 · Post by **member_20653** » 03 Dec 2011 03:24

cool way to recruit..any ideas for something similar in india

http://www.canyoucrackit.co.uk/

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ ... olved.html

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 03 Dec 2011 19:14

vasanth_k wrote:cool way to recruit..any ideas for something similar in india

http://www.canyoucrackit.co.uk/

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ ... olved.html

VASANTH, Welcome to BR. When there is no doubt this is a better way to identify the skills required, When we apply in India, we should be wary of foreign spy's in India, who can crack too.

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 03 Dec 2011 19:15

Governments monitoring email, China sucked out CBI's mails: Assange
IANS | Dec 3, 2011, 06.52PM IST

Governments monitoring email, China sucked out CBI's mails: Assange

NEW DELHI: WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange Saturday said governments the world over were curbing personal liberty and individual privacy by continuous monitoring of phone calls and emails under the guise of tracking Islamist terror.

In a special address, beamed from London through video, at a medium Summit here, Assange said he had come across evidence of China hacking into the emails of the Indian "central government".

"Chinese six years ago were sucking out the emails of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)," he said, painting a grim picture of individual freedom under threat from governments of the world.

He said the governments worldwide were keeping emails and phone calls under surveillance "not necessarily for terrorists but may be for economic intelligence".

This bulk of information, he said, "flows through largest US companies".

He named US' Lockheed Martin and Boeing as the companies which access the information and said: "It is handed out to those individuals and companies who are close to building communications equipment".

"Bulk surveillance of entire nations is on," he said disclosing that an unnamed German firm was tempting the governments to buy its military surveillance tools with an unusual open offer.

"Interception of entire nations by western firms works against transparency for public for secretive groups. We should strive for laws for open society," he said, adding that Islamist "terror was being used as a cover for illegal interceptions" misused for economic intelligence by private companies.

He said governments of the world in collaboration with private companies were working with laws that would ensure secrecy and block information to the public.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 971422.cms

Shows the foolishness of buying foreign interception equipment, as we are doing.

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 03 Dec 2011 20:48

^^^ It shows the foolishness of buying the "wrong" equipment, as we are doing.

Even with all this technology, India had to depend on the USA to get call records many many times. Indian intelligence agencies are still having a hard time decrypting BlackBerry encryption services and other consumer encryption technologies that are widely used. Further, the Maoists have been eager and frequent users of cell phones and despite the best efforts of Intelligence agencies, their use of cellphones hasn't provided too much "actionable" intelligence. It was HUMINT that helped get Kishenji, not monitoring capabilities.

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 04 Dec 2011 06:52

Brando wrote:^^^ It shows the foolishness of buying the "wrong" equipment, as we are doing.

Even if you buy what you think may be the "right" equipment, you are getting something that is thoroughly riddled with undetectable hardware trojans.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Dec 2011 06:56

On major problem Indian intelligence agencies are confused at who are the enemies of India?

Is it TSP, China, anyone else or those who are against the INC? The last one is due to the IB heritage of RAW etc.
I think they concentrate on last category and thus get surprised.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 04 Dec 2011 07:04

May be we need to draft standards to consider IFF type policy codes to identify. In the new age of globalization of economic spread, there would be equal opportunity for enemies to inroad. build systems specific to these standards, and derive rules engines to detect them.

Craig Alpert · Post by **Craig Alpert** » 04 Dec 2011 09:35

North Bihar is the new Azamgarh, says IB

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 04 Dec 2011 13:24

India should effectively exploit these ethnic minorities to our advantage, like chines are exploiting/influincing our poor people to become Maoists ! Give them back, the same coin.
China to overhaul administration in border areas near India and Pakistan

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 04 Dec 2011 14:06

Good job, keep it up guys !
Top ULFA leader, Indian journalist detained in Myanmar

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 04 Dec 2011 14:16

Pranav wrote: Even if you buy what you think may be the "right" equipment, you are getting something that is thoroughly riddled with undetectable hardware trojans.

True, however isn't it better to get capabilities and thus intelligence that is compromised than having no intelligence what so ever ?
The questions that need to be considered is whose trojans are going to come packaged with the hardware we do buy and "if" its worth the trojans to gain the capabilities of tracing, anticipating and deterring terrorists and other anti-national activities that save lives. If it is only the Israelis, the Russians or the Americans who have backdoors into our systems, we should consider ourselves fortunate given the current scenario.

member_20653 · Post by **member_20653** » 04 Dec 2011 19:12

Brando wrote:
Pranav wrote: Even if you buy what you think may be the "right" equipment, you are getting something that is thoroughly riddled with undetectable hardware trojans.
True, however isn't it better to get capabilities and thus intelligence that is compromised than having no intelligence what so ever ?
The questions that need to be considered is whose trojans are going to come packaged with the hardware we do buy and "if" its worth the trojans to gain the capabilities of tracing, anticipating and deterring terrorists and other anti-national activities that save lives.

The hardware trojans are only as good as their capability of getting the information out of the system. Whatever crazy trojan that comes with the alien systems, it should be possible to firewall its communication with external networks so it stays within. Unless there are enough spies within our network.

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 04 Dec 2011 22:42

yess all hardware board should be shielded in copper screen shrouds to eliminate any wireless communication from/to the components inside. Once they are shrouded test it with rf radiation and a rf power detector inside by sweeping across all frequencies from 0.1 GHz to 39GHz. However, these do not guarantee against intelligent trojans that might be triggered based on certain environmental conditions or after some number of runs

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 05 Dec 2011 06:43

I think wireless systems, radar systems and networking equipment are most vulnerable to Trojans. There was also some news a few years back about every copy of Microsoft Windows having back doors for the American NSA. Mobiles phones are also very vulnerable.

As Assange claims, entire nations are subjected to eavesdropping. I'm sure western nations have built good data mining tools to scan the huge volumes of data.

sum · Post by **sum** » 05 Dec 2011 09:30

This report confirms what BRF had said all along about the INC just taking off from where the British left and using all resources only for their survival instead of for the nation. It says ( quoting greats like Ajit Doval etc) that >2/3rds of IB is pruely used for political intelligence and few numbers are for actual national security duty:

New intelligence technology feeding surge in political espionage

Large part of Intelligence Bureau remains deployed on political tasks, not national security duties

Early this summer, India's intelligence services were facing the most serious internal security threats since 26/11: new urban terror cells, on which there was little information, were known to be planning strikes; Maoist insurgents had expanded their reach and lethality to unprecedented levels; Pakistan's descent into chaos had threatened renewed violence in Jammu and Kashmir.

Few people at the North Block headquarters of India's domestic intelligence service, the Intelligence Bureau, cared: dealing with these national problems, strange as it might sound, isn't their job.

Instead, highly placed intelligence sources have told The Hindu, a large part of the IB's resources were committed, and remain committed, to providing the government raw information and assessments on its increasingly bleak political prospects. In the summer, the IB carefully monitored Congress leader Rahul Gandhi's public meetings in Uttar Pradesh after the events at Bhatta Parsaul; later it sought to penetrate Anna Hazare's anti-corruption mobilisation in New Delhi.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Union Home Minister P.Chidambaram, the sources alleged, both received briefings on these events, in part based on passive communications intelligence monitoring — technology capable of intercepting staggering amounts of voice, text and e-mail data, without legal authorisation. Earlier this month, The Hindu, in partnership with a media consortium brought together by WikiLeaks, revealed India's intelligence services and police forces had made large-scale acquisitions of such equipment since 26/11.

It is improbable that either the Prime Minister or the Union Home Minister knew what the basis of the information provided to them was — and neither, the sources insisted, had authorised its use. The equipment had in fact been deployed with a legitimate objective — ensuring that at large rallies political leaders were not targeted by terrorists. There are, however, no firewalls in the IB to ensure that data obtained for counter-terrorism aren't available to political analysts; nor is there a system to ensure that the interception of information is first logged, and then destroyed.

Less than a third of the IB's estimated 25,000-strong manpower, two former high-ranking officers told The Hindu, is dedicated to what might be described as national security tasks — like monitoring terrorist groups or extremist organisations. Even that ratio, one serving officer said, was “a charitable assessment.”

There are at least two joint directors — officers of a rank equivalent to inspectors-general of police and joint secretaries to the Government of India, who sit at the apex of the permanent bureaucracy's operational systems — devoted to analysis of the activities of Congress dissidents and non-Congress parties. Five other joint directors have the job of making assessments of the political landscape across India, with the help of the stations the IB has in State capitals, which in turn help the Director brief the Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister on potential political challenges emerging across the nation. There are only one or two joint directors for the operations division that deals with counter-terrorism.

Even though it is improbable that the Home Secretary would issue warrants to tap the conversations of opposition leaders, the IB was able to use technology to build a picture of who had been talking to whom and when — and, in some cases, what their conversation had been.

For politicians in power, this kind of information is invaluable; for everyone else, it ought to be a nightmare.

The East India Company's political officers, the seeds which gave birth to the modern IB, saw mass movements as the main threat: for them, state and government were one and the same thing. Little changed in the years after Independence: except in the North-East and Jammu and Kashmir, the IB invested the bulk of its energies on monitoring revolutionary communists. The IB's anti-communist unit, the “B-Wing,” was its most prestigious division; the former National Security Adviser and now-West Bengal Governor, M.K. Narayanan, spent much of his career in the unit.

In 1969, though, after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi broke with the right wing of her party, the B-Wing diminished in size. Mrs Gandhi believed that the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, not the Left, was the principal threat to India — and also, weakened by the rifts in her party, began to use the IB as an independent channel of information-gathering on adversaries and the bureaucracy. “There were plenty of people in the intelligence services who built careers out of feeding her paranoia,” one contemporary recalls.

Following the end of the Emergency, her abuse of the IB led some officers to be hounded out — but there was no effort at structural reform.

In 1987, on the eve of the outbreak of the long jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, the IB station in Srinagar had fewer than 100 personnel — most of them focussed on the Congress' troublesome ally, the National Conference, not the Islamist networks that would soon send thousands of people across the Line of Control for training at Inter-Services Intelligence-run training camps.

Punjab had a far larger IB station — but much of it was, again, committed to watching the many factions of the Shiromani Akali Dal through the 1970s. India, as a result, had next to no information on the training of Khalistan terrorists and their links with the ISI until the early 1980s.

Ever since then, the numbers of IB personnel committed to national security tasks has slowly grown — a process that has been further nudged along by the organisation's current chief, Nehchal Sandhu, himself a career-long counter-terrorism operative.

‘A product of history'

“I think the problem was the product of history,” says A.S. Dulat, a highly regarded career intelligence officer who retired as chief of the Research and Analysis Wing after serving in the IB for over two decades, “the product of time when we could not take our survival as a nation for granted. It is unforgivable that it still goes on today — and it needs to stop, now. It is in the interests of neither our intelligence services nor our polity, just a handful of self-serving individuals.”

Not a few serving intelligence officers agree with that — but national security still hasn't become the IB's principal task: it only began monitoring the Maoist movement late in the day, and police officers in West Bengal, Orissa, and Chhattisgarh told The Hindu that the organisation has only just begun to put together a serious body of intelligence.

Expending staff resources on political intelligence gathering is all the more reprehensible because the IB is desperately understaffed. In 2008, the Union government announced it had sanctioned 6,000 additional staff — expanding the organisation by almost a quarter. In practice, though, the strength of the 25,000-member organisation has stayed static, in part because it hasn't found the kinds of staff it needs, but also because it can train only some 1,200 personnel a year, barely covering for retirement.

Does this mean the IB's political intelligence work should end?

Complex questions

Back in March 1658, Henry Cromwell, Lord Deputy of Ireland and Oliver Cromwell's son, offered an evocative description of what intelligence services are called on to do, in a letter to England's spymaster, John Thurloe: “picking the locks leading into the hearts of wicked men.”

In a thoughtful 2009 volume on domestic intelligence-gathering in the United States, the scholar Brian Johnson pointed out that the reason to have intelligence agencies in the first place was to gather information “not related to the investigation of a known past criminal act or specific planned criminal activity.” That is the job of police services; intelligence organisations must search for crimes no one has — as yet — committed.

The core of the problem is this: we do not all agree on who Henry Cromwell's “wicked men” might be. From 1975, following allegations that the United States' intelligence services were spying on its own citizens, an official committee led by Senator Frank Church issued 14 reports revealing that peaceful dissidents had been targeted for surveillance. Even in countries like the U.S. and the United Kingdom, where oversight mechanisms exist, credible fears of abuse still exist.

“I think we should not have a simplistic view of this issue,” argues Ajit Doval, who served as IB Director in 2004-2005 and was the first civilian to be awarded a Kirti Chakra, for a daring undercover operation that led to the successful conclusion of the second siege of the Golden Temple. “The fact is that in India, there are many political movements which may not be terrorist in character, but are none the less real threats to the nation. The Khalistan movement was not, after all, initially violent — but better intelligence on its intentions would have saved lives.”

“The distinction I would draw,” Mr. Doval says, “is this: political intelligence should be focussed on gathering information on actual and potential national security threats, and the despicable behaviour of some individual intelligence officers, who seek to curry political favour.”

There is no simple answer — but in India, where political parties have shown little interest in understanding and debating even a private member's bill seeking oversight of our intelligence services, the first steps towards one are yet to be taken.

Upendra · Post by **Upendra** » 05 Dec 2011 13:25

IB advised against FDI

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 05 Dec 2011 17:55

sum wrote:This report confirms what BRF had said all along about the INC just taking off from where the British left and using all resources only for their survival instead of for the nation. It says ( quoting greats like Ajit Doval etc) that >2/3rds of IB is pruely used for political intelligence and few numbers are for actual national security duty:

New intelligence technology feeding surge in political espionage

Large part of Intelligence Bureau remains deployed on political tasks, not national security duties

Shame on our Indian political leaders; No wonder, why MKN was a congress pet (and madam Sonia still missing him as NSA !) Opposition to raise this issue in the parliment and get some useful inteligence flow in to our nation to fight real terrorists and NOT simply opposition party leaders !! All nationalist people in bureaucracy/Defense/IAS/IPS/Scientists/ DRDO/Retired Scientists/Dr.Kalam etc should come out in open and influence such a decision.