Bharat Rakshak

abhishek_sharma wrote:‘Russia for Russians’

There are also an increasing number of so-called ‘intellectual nationalists’. Some of them believe that ‘ethnic Russians need to liberate themselves from Russia.’ After the break-up of the USSR, republics such as Georgia or Lithuania were liberated to become nation-states. National republics inside Russia, such as Tatarstan and Chechnya, have special status and enjoy special privileges. The only people not to have received their own state, the argument goes, are Russians, who are now enslaved by a corrupt Kremlin which works with the national republics to crush ethnic Russians and deny them basic rights. Other nationalists think that Russia needs to get rid of the ‘Muslim’ republics in the North Caucasus and Tatarstan – 11 per cent of Russian citizens are Muslim; the figure is set to grow to 30 per cent by 2030 – and reintegrate Ukraine, Belarus and Northern Kazakhstan: they say this will make Russia more ‘democratic’ and ‘progressive’. Still others want to see a restored Orthodox tsar single-handedly ruling over the whole of Eurasia. - See more at: http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/11/05/pe ... DShwj.dpuf

Tuesday, February 12, 2013
CIA TO CHOOSE NEXT POPE?

"The Secretary of State and the real power behind the papacy is Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, an old insider who also engineered the sacking of Gotti Tedeschi, head of the Vatican Bank, last May.

"Tedeschi had taken seriously the call of the European Parliament for 'greater transparency' by the Vatican Bank /IOR, and was about to disclose to Brussels how his bosses had been laundering money for the mob for decades.

"It was the pivotal Cardinal Bertone who leaked the pope's diary and other incriminating papers to a catholic-friendly journalist in Rome last year .... to prepare the world for Ratzinger's removal."

By Cheryl K. Chumley
The Washington Times

Tuesday, November 26, 2013

People crowd St. Peter's Square at the Vatican, on occasion of the celebration of the Easter mass Sunday, March 31, 2013. Pope Francis is celebrating his first Easter Sunday Mass as pontiff in St. Peter's Square, which is packed by joyous pilgrims, tourists and Romans. (AP Photo/Alessandra Tarantino)

The Obama administration, in what’s been called an egregious slap in the face to the Vatican, has moved to shut down the U.S. Embassy to the Holy See — a free-standing facility — and relocate offices onto the grounds of the larger American Embassy in Italy.
The new offices will be in a separate building on the property, Breitbart reported.

SEE ALSO: Pope Francis takes veiled swipe at ‘progressive’ Democrats

And while U.S. officials are touting the relocation as a security measure that’s a cautionary reaction to last year’s attacks on America's facility in Benghazi, several former American envoys are raising the red flag.

It’s a “massive downgrade of U.S.-Vatican ties,” said former U.S. Ambassador James Nicholson in the National Catholic Reporter. “It’s turning this embassy into a stepchild of the embassy to Italy. The Holy See is a pivot point for international affairs and a major listening post for the United States, and … [it’s] an insult to American Catholics and to the Vatican.”

Mr. Nicholson — whose views were echoed by former envoys Francis Rooney, Mary Ann Glendon, Raymond Flynn and Thomas Melady — also called the justification for closing the existing facility a “smokescreen,” Breitbart reported.

“That’s like saying people get killed on highways because they drive cars on them,” he said in the report. “We’re not a pauper nation … if we want to secure an embassy, we certainly can.”

Moreover, the existing facility has “state of the art” security, he said.

Mr. Flynn, meanwhile, said the administration’s announcement reflects a hostility toward the Catholic Church.

“It’s not just those who bomb churches and kill Catholics in the Middle East who are our antagonists, but it’s also those who restrict our religious freedoms and want to close down our embassy to the Holy See,” he said in the National Catholic Reporter. “[There’s no] diplomatic or political benefit to the United States” from the relocation at all, he added.

Catholic Vote, a publication for the Church community, called the move “an unmistakable slap in the face” that clearly communicates that the United States cares little for the diplomatic facility.

And Mr. Nicholson went on, as Breitbart reported: “It’s another manifestation of the antipathy of this administration both to Catholics and to the Vatican — and to Christians in the Middle East. This is a key post for intermediation in so many sovereignties but particularly in the Middle East. This is anything but a good time to diminish the stature of this post. To diminish the stature of this post is to diminish its influence.”

Read more: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 ... z2oXJVV9vH

abhishek_sharma wrote:The French As Dostoevsky Saw Them

The administration of President Barack Obama plans to urge the Japanese government to take concrete action to repair ties with China and South Korea, according to senior U.S. officials.

In light of the fallout expected from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s first official pilgrimage to war-related Yasukuni Shrine last month, the United States is worried the provocative act will undermine the stability of the region and is closely watching to see whether he will pray at the shrine again, the officials said.

The moves reflect the Obama administration’s concerns that the bad blood between Japan and its neighbors will adversely affect Washington’s alliances in Asia.

In a rare statement after Abe’s Yasukuni visit, the U.S. government said it was “disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors.”

A senior official in the Obama administration said the statement was not a particularly scathing expression but accurately described a candid feeling of disappointment on the U.S. side. It stemmed from discontent that Tokyo did not heed a warning from its top security ally against visiting the Shinto shrine, the official said.

When Abe’s adviser, Seiichi Eto, visited the United States in November, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel made it clear that a Yasukuni visit by Abe would hurt bilateral ties.

Eto replied that the trip was a campaign promise for the December 2012 general election, the U.S. officials said.

On Dec. 26, Abe’s team informed Washington of his decision to go to the shrine about 90 minutes before the visit.

The pilgrimage, the first by a sitting Japanese leader in seven years, drew immediate rebukes from China and South Korea, who suffered from Japanese aggression before and during World War II and regard the shrine as a symbol of the nation’s past militarism. Yasukuni honors Japan’s war dead, including Class-A war criminals.

According to the U.S. officials, the Obama administration is worried that plans to revise the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation guidelines may draw protests from regional players, including China, and weaken the trilateral framework with South Korea that forms the basis of Washington’s “Asia pivot” strategy.

The plan, they said, is primarily aimed at ensuring regional stability, but it is widely viewed as a bid to engage an increasingly assertive China.

Obama is scheduled to make a swing through Asia in April, including his first visit to Japan in about 3½ years. But if Tokyo is unable to find a way to mend fences with Beijing and Seoul at a time of rising tensions, calls for the president to steer clear of Japan during the tour may find growing support within his administration.

abhishek_sharma wrote:No One Reads Kafka in Gitmo

ramana wrote:

abhishek_sharma wrote:The French As Dostoevsky Saw Them

Dostoevsky was one impressive dude.

The administration of President Barack Obama plans to urge the Japanese government to take concrete action to repair ties with China and South Korea, according to senior U.S. officials.

In light of the fallout expected from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s first official pilgrimage to war-related Yasukuni Shrine last month, the United States is worried the provocative act will undermine the stability of the region and is closely watching to see whether he will pray at the shrine again, the officials said.

The moves reflect the Obama administration’s concerns that the bad blood between Japan and its neighbors will adversely affect Washington’s alliances in Asia.

....

Japan’s strategic predicament behind the Yasukuni curtain
6 January 2014
Author: Hugh White, ANU

Why did Prime Minster Abe visit Yasukuni Shrine? Tessa Morris-Suzuki says:

His core aim is to ‘escape from the postwar regime’ — that is, to reverse the liberalising reforms introduced to Japanese politics and society in the wake of the Asia Pacific War — and his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine is a very explicit expression of that aim.

I don’t doubt that she is right, but her answer does lead us straight on to another question: why does he want to ‘escape from the post war regime’? What is driving him?


There seem to be two possible answers to the question of Abe’s motives. One looks inwards, focusing on Abe himself — his family history, political values and personality — and on the elements in Japanese society and politics with whom his ideas and values resonate. I think this is the answer Tessa favours, and it seems to be taken for granted by most people outside, and possibly many inside, Japan who have commented on the issue. No doubt there is a lot of truth in it, and it leads to a satisfyingly simple response: blame Abe.

But this does seem to overlook another, more outward-looking explanation. Japan today faces its toughest strategic crisis since 1945, which is challenging the foundations of the post-war strategic posture that has served it so well for so long. To put it simply: as China grows, Japan has more and more reason to be anxious about China’s power, and less and less confidence in America’s willingness to protect it.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute shows how real those concerns are. China’s escalating pressure and America’s ambiguous response send an ominous message to Tokyo: that America would rather see Japan’s interests sacrificed than risk a confrontation with China, and that Beijing knows this. This is fatal to the Yoshida Doctrine of dependence on the US alliance as the foundation of Japan’s security. Japan can no longer afford to be a status quo power in Asia, because the old status quo no longer provides a reliable basis for Japan’s security.

{And the US since Nixon which is responsible for Japan's security has been feeding the rise of China all along.}

No one in Japan seems to know how to deal with this. Abe’s instinct, shared by many others, is to move in two directions at once. On the one hand, to pull closer towards America by building up Japan’s capacity to support America throughout Asia, thus making America a better ally for Japan. At the same time to push away from America by asserting greater independence. Needless to say this push-and-pull policy won’t work, so Japan’s strategic policy is headed for a muddled and dangerous patch.

What has this got to do with visiting Yasukuni? There might be answers to this at two levels.

First, at the level of diplomacy, it seems worth wondering whether Abe is not trying to send some messages. The visit could be a message of defiance to Beijing — Abe’s answer to China’s ADIZ. He is saying to Xi Jinping, ‘You can’t stop me doing this’. And it could be a message of displeasure and disappointment to Washington for its timid and tepid support against China, and for its willingness to blame Tokyo as much as Beijing for the escalating dispute.

In other words, the visit to Yasukuni might, in part, be Abe’s way of saying that Japan is not willing to accept a new strategic order in Asia under which Japan’s interests are sacrificed by Washington to avoid problems with Beijing. One can see why that might be a message that Abe wants to send.

At a second, deeper, level the visit to Yasukuni is not just an assertion of a particular view of Japan’s past but also of its present and future. The strategic posture built around dependence on the United States has always been inextricably intertwined — in American as well as Japanese thinking — with Japan’s acceptance of the interpretation of history sponsored by the Americans after 1945. Visiting Yasukuni is therefore a repudiation not just of the US-sponsored view of history but of the whole idea of Japan as a strategic client of the United States.

The tragedy for Japan is that this melding of history and policy makes it so hard for everyone — Japanese and non-Japanese alike — to separate questions about Japan’s past as a strategic actor in Asia from very different questions about its future, and makes it all too easy to assume that moving on from the Yoshida Doctrine necessarily means rehabilitating Japan’s militarist and imperialist past.

That of course is quite wrong, but Abe himself may well believe it. As Tessa suggests, there is real weight in the inward-looking explanation of Abe’s conduct, because he does have his own ambitions to reshape Japan’s political and social milieu along reactionary lines, and to reinterpret Japan’s history. That makes it very unfortunate that he is leading Japan at this moment in its history as it wrestles with a strategic transition that would in any case be complex, risky and traumatic.

So we can blame Abe for using Yasukuni to convey messages about Japan’s strategic anxieties, and for the fact that this only amplifies Japan’s problems. But his visit did not create the problems, and the anxieties that they give rise to are real and legitimate. We can’t blame Abe for them. So while we criticise Abe, we should also start taking Japan’s strategic predicament seriously. No one — especially no one in Washington — seems so far to have done that.

What would that mean? Well for America it means facing a tough choice. The United States must either commit itself unambiguously to defending Japan’s core interests whatever the cost, or it must help Japan move away from the US–Japan alliance and regain the strategic independence it surrendered after 1945. This may be the most important implication of Abe’s much-heralded excursion.
Hugh White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University.

TOKYO – Diplomats from China and Japan are invoking the evil Lord Voldemort from the bestselling "Harry Potter" series in their feud over the Yasukuni war shrine in Tokyo.China says the shrine, which Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited recently, glorifies Japan's militaristic past.Writing in The Telegraph last week, China's ambassador to the United Kingdom said: "If militarism is like the haunting Voldemort of Japan, the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is a kind of horcrux, representing the darkest parts of that nation's soul."A horcrux contains part of Voldemort's soul, and all seven horcruxes must be destroyed to kill him.In response, the Japanese ambassador said China plays "the role of Voldemort in the region by letting loose the evil of an arms race and escalation of tensions."

The European Union Monday said it is following the case of two Italian marines in India "very closely" and noted that any decision on this case would be "very carefully assessed" even as an EU commissioner has called on the EU to stop free trade negotiations with India.


"We continue to follow the situation very closely as we have been from the very beginning that any decision on this case would be very carefully assessed from our side," an EU spokesperson for foreign affairs, Maja Kocijancic, told a news conference here.

According to media reports, the two Italian marines, Salvatore Girone and Massimiliano Latorre, may face trial under charges that provide for capital punishment if they are found guilty. The two were detained in India after shooting dead two Indian fishermen while guarding an Italian oil tanker off the southern state of Kerala in February 2012.


"We the European Union encourage India to find as a matter of urgency a mutually satisfactory solution to this long standing case in accordance with international law and UN conventions on the law of the sea," said Kocijancic who is the spokeswoman for EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton.

"This issue also has a bearing on the issue of global fight against piracy to which the EU is strongly committed. We will continue to follow the case," she added.

Meanwhile, the EU Commissioner responsible for industry and entrepreneurship, Antonio Tijani, who is from Italy , tweeted "Can we keep negotiating FTA India when death penalty is considerated against EU citizens fighting sea piracy?I think not."

No longer Uncle Sam’s grain market
TEJINDER NARANG

The price of wheat is determined by Black Sea region countries, and corn by Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine.

The views of analysts that world grain prices are bearish simply because they are declining in the US’ Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) may not be entirely true.

Price movements in the Black Sea region have been quite the opposite of what transpired on futures exchanges. US leadership in agro trade is on the decline and other origins are asserting themselves. This is borne out by some recent developments.

WHEAT DYNAMICS

US share in world wheat trade has declined to 20 per cent from 30-35 per cent in 1990-2008. In recent times, the Black Sea nations of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have been the largest single bloc of wheat exporters of about 35 million tonnes (mts) while the US share is around 28-30 mts out of the world’s total volume of 140 mts.

Egypt, the world’s largest wheat buyer (10-12 mts per annum) is heavily dependent upon Black Sea Wheat (BSW), as are other nations in Africa and West Asia. The Far-East gets its wheat from Australia. Since 2011, Indian wheat export of about 5-6 mts has been competing with Black Sea and Australian wheat.

US futures exchanges, CBOT and the Kansas Board of Trade (KBOT), are no longer “reliable” platforms of price discovery. The high speculative interest of hedge funds in futures trades distorts evaluations. The price trends (bullish or bearish) indicated by these exchanges are disregarded by other origins.

During the last quarter of 2013, the values of US’ Hard Red Winter (HRW-12 per cent protein) wheat, which is comparable to Indian wheat and tracked by KBOT, plummeted by $45/mt ($290 fob), while Black Sea quotes climbed up by $45/mt from $250 to $295.

From India’s export perspective, Black Sea values are more relevant than what is happening in the US or its future exchanges. Moreover, Indian fob export price has to be compared with the landed cost (CIF) of the nearest origin — the Black Sea or Australia.

The US is the world’s largest producer of corn — about 350 mts. It had a share of 60 per cent share in world coarse grains in 2000-08 but that is now down to 40 per cent.

Recently, China “rejected” about 600,000 tonnes of US corn on GMO-related aberrations, though China requires about 5 mts maize this year.

The US or its sellers cannot muster the courage to drag China to international arbitration or the WTO for destabilising the market for fear of jeopardising future business.

After all, China imports 65 mts of soya bean, mostly from the US.

Discarded corn cargoes are finally offloaded in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and elsewhere at a discount. Perhaps to firm up CBOT prices, the US Department of Agriculture underplayed corn yield in its monthly report dated January 10, 2014.

Corn exports from Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine of 20 mts each acted as a dampener on US prices. It is this trio that determines world’s maize prices, rather than the CBOT.

The irony is that the US has supported higher GMO corn production in these very South American countries from whom they are facing the heat. India’s corn exports, too, are calibrated on the basis of this trio, and not the US.

RICE TRENDS

The US was never a frontrunner in rice trade, whereas India is. Surprisingly, the US and Pakistan are on the same footing on rice production and exports. Both produce about 6-7 mts of rice each, and export about 3-3.5 mts. This is in contrast to India’s export of 10-11 mts (25 per cent of world trade) and about 7-8 mts each by Thailand and Vietnam. Global rice trade is expected to reach 40 mts for the first time, from about 38 mts, because of China’s additional demand, to be serviced mainly by Vietnam.

Three factors are responsible for Indian supremacy in rice trade — the populist but unfriendly Thai trading policies, the demand pull of basmati rice from Iran, and the switching of Sub-Saharan consumers from traditional foods (cassava and millet) to rice, which is viewed as a ‘fast’ food because of its shorter preparation time. The expansion in African price-sensitive markets has been supplied largely by India and Vietnam.

Rice trade is linked to the processing of paddy, packaging, and blending rather than bulk shipments. It is labour-intensive. The participation of the US in the rice trade in a big way is difficult.

Lower world prices of wheat and corn do not spell good news for Indian exports. However, basmati rice export — which is growing — is a high value addition item. Non-basmati rice export will depend upon Thailand’s ability to sustain its financial and economic mismanagement. The influence of the US here is marginal.

(The author is a grains trade analyst.)

Forecasting world events is a difficult task that takes guts and discipline. Though you can find endless scenarios in a number of places, Stratfor – the same people that predicted, in 2002, the EU crisis; and in 2010, the U.S.-Iranian negotiations – focuses on countries’ constraints, which eliminates the impossibilities down to a likely path.

Here are a few things we see ahead by 2039:

The United States will continue to be the leading economic power.

Conflict in the Middle East will continue, but the United States will take a much more hands-off approach in the region.

German and Russian interests will align, trading natural gas and technology, and could potentially threaten Washington's global strategy.

Mexico will become an industrial powerhouse by taking low-level production from China and monetizing its energy sector.

China will continue to face more internal tension and slower economic growth.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is expected sometime in the coming weeks to weigh in decisively on the Israeli-Palestinian talks he’s been shepherding, and the reports, statements and signs are that he will come down on Israel’s side like no American mediator ever has. Indications are he will present the outline of a deal that’s less forthcoming to the Palestinians than the offers presented them by Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert in 2008 and premier Ehud Barak in 2001. In other words, the emerging American “framework agreement” appears to ask the Palestinians to accept peace terms that are worse than the Israeli ones they already rejected.

This doesn’t mean anything for the chances of a peace agreement, though, because no such chance has ever been sighted, not six months ago when the talks, scheduled for nine months, began and certainly not now, when the bad blood between the Israeli and Palestinian sides has only increased. But seeing as how the talks were hopeless, the goal of each side has been to make sure that the other side ends up with the blame for their inevitable failure. If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu comes out looking like the rejectionist, it would accelerate the growing boycott, sanctions and divestment (BDS) movement against Israel, especially in Europe, and put the wind at Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ back in his diplomatic campaign in the United Nations, which envisages bringing Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians to The Hague. But if, on the other hand, Abbas gets blamed, then the Palestinians would be thrown on the defensive and Israel would be able to breathe much easier.

The import, then, of a heavily “pro-Israel” U.S. proposal is that it would all but compel the Palestinians to reject it, putting the blame – at least in American eyes – on them. The recent momentum of the anti-occupation movement would likely be blunted. Thus, the effect of Kerry’s incredibly dogged efforts and evident good intentions would be to strengthen the status quo – Israel’s 46-year military rule over the Palestinians – weaken the opposition to it and even further darken the dimming prospect of a Palestinian state arising alongside the State of Israel.

This is the opposite of what Kerry had in mind when he set out on his mission. But it’s exactly what Netanyahu has been playing for. And it appears the earnest, optimistic American has been played.

According to Thomas Friedman’s New York Times column last week, which basically confirmed earlier reports in the Israeli and Palestinian media, Kerry’s proposal – a kind of memorandum of understanding from which Israelis and Palestinians would negotiate toward a final agreement – includes “unprecedented” security arrangements for Israel along the Jordan Valley, which runs inside the eastern border of the envisioned Palestinian state. This signals that Israeli soldiers would be stationed on the territory of a Palestinian state for many years, something Olmert never asked for and which the Palestinians have rejected out of hand as a continuation of Israeli military control over their land.

Furthermore, the U.S. offer reportedly does not call for any Palestinian refugees from the seminal 1948 war to be able to return to Israel proper (the land where the refugees had previously lived). Olmert had offered to allow at least 5,000 refugees to come back, and Barak’s team was negotiating the matter with the Palestinians, for whom this is a cardinal issue of national dignity, and for whom an American offer of no returnees at all would likely not be taken well.

In addition, Kerry has allegedly gone along with Netanyahu’s demand that the Palestinians not only recognize the State of Israel, which they did in 1988, but that they also recognize it as “the nation-state of the Jewish people,” which is a relatively new Israeli demand. The Palestinians reject it as prejudicial to the rights of the 20% of Israel’s citizens who are Arabs, and as a demand that they abandon their “narrative” of the century-old struggle between the two nations in favor of the Israeli narrative. And indeed, that is how Netanyahu framed the issue in a speech in Tel Aviv last week: “The conflict is not over these territories; it is not about settlements; and it is not about a Palestinian state either. … [T]his conflict has gone on because of one reason: the stubborn opposition to recognize the Jewish state, the nation-state of the Jewish people.”

Also, on the all-important subject of Jerusalem, Kerry reportedly speaks of a Palestinian capital “in” the city’s eastside, which Israel conquered from Jordan in the 1967 Six Day War. But he has not said where or in how much of East Jerusalem that capital would stand, and as Netanyahu has always insisted on keeping every inch of it, the likelihood is that Kerry will retreat substantially from the 2000 (Bill) Clinton parameters. That document gave the Palestinians all of East Jerusalem’s Arab-populated neighborhoods as well as sovereignty (together with Israeli “symbolic ownership”) over the most contested site of all, the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. On the Israeli side, Barak offered the Palestinians part of the Old City, while Olmert went so far as to offer to internationalize the Temple Mount and even the adjacent Western Wall, considered the Jewish people’s holiest site. It’s almost unimaginable that Kerry will ask Netanyahu to even come close to matching their offers.

Finally, while Kerry adheres to the traditional American view that Israel and a Palestinian state should be divided along the pre-1967 Six Day War border, with land swaps to accommodate Israel’s large “settlement blocs,” he has not said which land should be swapped – and here again, Netanyahu is asking to retain more land than Barak or Olmert did. The Israeli premier wants to keep the Hebron and Beit El settlements, too, which would cut deep into the heart of Palestinian territory and make a geographically viable state all the harder to carve out of the settlement-riddled West Bank.

Netanyahu has said all along that he will not be as “generous” as his predecessors in the prime minister’s office, and Kerry has tried not to alienate him. The result is that the secretary of state has moved further and further away from the Palestinians until they can hardly see each other anymore.

The Palestinian leadership is reportedly preparing to say no to the framework agreement and go back to the United Nations. Even one of the most moderate Palestinian officials, Yasser Abed Rabbo, was reported by Haaretz as saying “no Palestinian leadership can accept Kerry's formula for a framework deal, which [Abed Rabbo] says is vague when it comes to issues important to Palestinians and detailed regarding Israeli concerns.”

If the Palestinians do walk away and Kerry blames them for the talks’ failure, the Palestinians and their supporters may be able to turn the tables on the Americans by saying the agreement was so absurdly biased toward Israel that they had no choice but to reject it, so the true guilty party is Kerry himself. But while a diplomatic war with Washington might play well with the international left, it would not with Europe, whose economic and political support is crucial to the Palestinians. Nor, of course, would it go down well with Washington, whom the Palestinians probably can’t afford to alienate either.

Their best hope may be that the extreme right wing of Netanyahu’s coalition government rebels against the prospects of his saying yes to Kerry on any terms, and brings down his government. The rumblings of such an insurgency were heard in Jerusalem last week. But if, as it seems, Kerry’s framework agreement is so bad for the Palestinians that they’re guaranteed to turn it down, the extremists in Netanyahu’s government probably have enough sense to wait until it happens so Israel can come out of this ordeal as the “winner.” After all, Israel’s right-wingers, including Netanyahu, like the status quo, so they can live with it indefinitely; it’s the Palestinians who are pinned under foreign domination and demanding change, so the ball will be in their court. And thanks to Kerry, their already-Sisyphean task of upending the nearly half-century-long status quo looks like it’s about to get harder yet.

Islam in the Arab Spring
Sunday, 02 February 2014 | Talmiz Ahmad | in Agenda

In the post-Arab Spring phase, there is pressure to reform in West Asia, says Talmiz Ahmad

Over the last two years of the Arab Spring, the West Asia-North Africa region has been witnessing an inter-play between the various strands of Islamism and national and regional political scenarios in an environment of robust competition and even conflict. While the various conflicts between the Islamists and secular/liberal elements in different countries have received considerable international attention, the principal competition at present is between the different streams of political Islam.

Over the last century Islamism has manifested itself in three broad strands: The quietist Salafism of the Wahhabiya in Saudi Arabia; the activist tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood that has evolved over the last 20 years in Egypt, with influence in other countries as well; and the radical strand mainly represented by A1 Qaeda and its affiliate outfits. None of these strands of Islamism are monolithic, nor are any of their organisational structures or even belief-systems cast in stone.

{All three are manifestions of the same Arabist revival of political Islam}

At present, all of them are witnessing considerable internal debate and dissent as Islamists seek, for the first time in recent history, to take responsibility for democratic governance after their long experience of oppositional politics. Since this is an entirely novel situation, both for the countries concerned and the parties competing for political advantage, the scenario in each of the countries is one of considerable domestic discord as the principal protagonists seek to re-define (or reaffirm) their vision, agenda and institutions so that they resonate with the requirements of governance and the aspirations of their citizens for a modern and successful political and economic order that respects their strong religious moorings. Obviously, governance is not made any easier by pressures on the mainstream parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and A1-Nahda, from the more hardline Salafi groups (and their external patrons) and, beyond them, the radicals linked to a resurgent Al Qaeda.

In Saudi Arabia, the Al-Saud-Wahhabiya order is under pressure both from the aspirations of its nationals who are seeking political and economic reform and its own activist Salafists, the Sahwa, who, in alliance with liberal elements, Islamist and non-Islamist, are advocating radical changes, possibly even a constitutional monarchy. In response to these domestic aspirations, the Kingdom has embarked on a massive programme of national reconstruction and welfare in the hope that this will dilute, if not nullify, agitations for political reform.

The Kingdom has rejected the possibility of radical political change not only at home but in every other member-country of the Gulf Cooperation Council as well. Thus, the popular agitation for reform in Bahrain has been stigmatised as a product of Iran’s “interference” and a part of its larger design for Persian/Shia hegemony across West Asia. Saudi Arabia is therefore confronting Iran in different theatres in the region, but particularly in Syria in the hope that regime change there will deliver a body-blow to Iran’s strategic outreach to the Mediterranean by severing its links with its staunch Alawite ally and the Hezbollah, its powerful militant arm in Lebanon. This Saudi-Iranian confrontation has now also acquired a sharp sectarian character, with efforts across West Asia to mobilise a “Sunni axis” to confront the “Shia crescent” led by the Islamic Republic.

Separate from these competitions, within or between organised state entities, we are also witnessing the proliferation of A1 Qaeda-affiliated entities that are taking advantage of the absence of an effective central authority and security apparatus in failed or failing states to mobilise local support and embark on a campaign of violence against “strategic” targets that include government entities and Western individuals and institutions. These entities now have a strong presence in Yemen, Somalia, Libya and Northwest Africa, while their militias play a lead role in the Syrian conflict. Al Qaeda, following the removal of Arab tyrants and the electoral successes of Islamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring, senses an opportunity for the furtherance of its own agenda, over the long-term, to realise the “caliphate” based on the shariah, commencing with small liberated enclaves in former state entities and finally by capturing the entire state and even the global ummah.

Thus, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, almost every country in West Asia and North Africa is under pressure to reform, with domestic and regional politics being marked by contentions between the various strands of Islamism and the sectarian divide that dates back to the early days of Islam. At the same time, the recent emergence of the National Salvation Front in Egypt and the Nida Tunis in Tunisia, both of which seek to unite diverse non-Islamist elements in a formidable electoral alliance, suggests that in coming years Islamists may have to compete not only with their ideological cousins but also with entities outside the Islamist discourse.

While staking their claims to influence and power in the public sphere, all Islamists base their assertions on certain aspects of pristine Islam, particularly the Quran and the Sunna, as also Islamic law as practised over the centuries in Islamic domains. This harking back to the past has yielded a variety of modern-day expressions due to the different texts and scholars that had been selected for study and emulation, and the meanings relevant to contemporary times that have been drawn from these works by modern scholars who see them as inspirational sources. This effort is further complicated by the fact that much of the present-day discourse evolved when the Islamists were in opposition and were involved in a life-and-death struggle with tyrannical regimes which had been ruthless in responding to their challenge. Obviously, now that Islamist parties have got the unprecedented responsibility of governing, they will necessarily have to review their earlier discourse and imbue it with fresh ideas

The writer, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, is the author of the book, The Islamist Challenge in West Asia (Pentagon Press)

With the partial lifting of sanctions on Iran, India will conduct dry runs next month in a multination corridor that would sharply cut transportation time between India, and Central Asia and Russia, Iran being the pivot.

The announcement figured in the protocol signed after a meeting between Minister of State (Commerce & Industry) E.M.S. Natchiappan and Azerbaijan’s Minister for Ecology and Natural Resources Huseyngulu Baghirov here on Tuesday.

“The two countries have the requisite momentum to take the relationship to next level. The completion of the corridor will lead to mutually beneficial connectivity between the two regions,” said Mr. Natchiappan said in a news release.

The dry run was delayed by a year because of a 500-km missing link in Iran. Tehran completed 372 km of the Quazvin-Rasht-Astra link last year and 163 km of the remaining route including the last leg leading up to Azerbaijan is being readied. Baku too had to build a bridge over the Astra river.

This will reduce the time taken for Indian goods to reach Russia and the Caucasus by at least a month, say officials, who pointed out that India and a few leading countries had persevered with the project despite western disapprobation when Iran was under sanctions.

While Bandar Abbas, southern Iran port, will be the fulcrum of cargo movement in the North-South Corridor, India will discuss another route from the port of Chah-bahar during the forthcoming visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Mohammad Zarif .

Unlike the North-South Corridor, which has the backing of 16 countries, the route from Chah-bahar snaking up Iran’s eastern border with Afghanistan is being quarterbacked entirely by New Delhi and Tehran. India expects Iran to provide clarifications on this Chah-bahar-Zahedan-Mashhad route that will give the country access to Afghanistan and then on to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Oil sector investments

Tuesday’s meeting also discussed Indian investments in the prestigious Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and upstream and midstream oil and gas assets in the Azerbaijani Chirag Guneshli (ACG) area.

On Wednesday, Iran Ambassador to Moscow Mehdi Sanaee and Novak underscored the need for the implementation of agreements they have reached in the energy sector.

Sanaee said Iranian ministries of oil and energy are ready to facilitate Russia’s investment in Iranian oil and gas sectors and for cooperation between the two countries in oil equipment.

Sanctions on Iran energy sector were imposed based on the unfounded accusation that Iran is pursuing non-civilian objectives in its nuclear energy program.

In October last year, Russia's second largest oil company, Lukoil, voiced its interest in participating in Iranian oil and gas projects.