Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stability

Manu · Post by **Manu** » 09 Oct 2008 03:36

Urdu IS Hindi but in a different script and a few Persian Words for embellishment.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 09 Oct 2008 04:16

One small step is to promote the urdu in devnagari script.

Some progressive minded pakistani writers have advocated this approach. It has appeared in the sunday section of jang newspaper.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Oct 2008 10:50

Manu wrote:Urdu IS Hindi but in a different script and a few Persian Words for embellishment.

Manu, I think so too thats why I suggested it. I hear folks are going beserk over this small suggestion.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 10 Oct 2008 02:14

Dalai Lama is not well....need to make sure India's defenses/offensive capabilities are on solid ground by the time inevitable happens.

There will be a major struggle over his succession. PRC will try to install their puppet (Pu Yi -Last manchu puppet of Japanese ) type of operation.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Oct 2008 03:48

Indian dilemma
Both Russia and Iran will be keenly watching how India, which was a soul mate in the late 1990s staunchly supporting the anti-Taliban alliance, reacts to the current US-British-Saudi move. Indian leaders never tired of underscoring that there was nothing called "good Taliban" and "bad Taliban". That was up until a year ago. However, there is bound to be uneasiness in both Moscow and Tehran as to where exactly Delhi stands at the present juncture in the geopolitics of the region.

One thing is clear: a US-sponsored oil/gas pipeline via Afghanistan suits India, though that may undercut Russia and Iran in the energy sweepstakes.

From all accounts, discussions were going on between the security establishments of India and the US for the past several months regarding an Indian military involvement in Afghanistan. Washington has been pressing for a major Indian role. A two-member Indian team, which visited Kabul in early September, claimed they were on a mission sponsored by the government to make an assessment of the layout for Indian military involvement. The team apparently held discussions with top American diplomats and military officials based in Kabul.

Evidently, Delhi was clueless regarding Saudi King Abdullah's secret mediation with the Taliban. This intelligence failure had to happen. Indian diplomats have been somewhat smug about the unprecedented influence they wielded with the Kabul regime, and as happens in heady times, they began blandly assuming the durability of the present Afghan setup.

They worked shoulder-to-shoulder with their US counterparts in Kabul and American thinking inevitably began coloring Delhi's perceptions. It seems the intellectual osmosis ultimately became one-sided. Under constant US encouragement, the inebriating idea of a major military role in Afghanistan and playing the "great game" crept into the Indian calculus. Delhi seems to have incrementally lost touch with the Afghan bazaar and ground realities.

The US-British-Saudi plan to accommodate the Taliban in the power structure in Kabul creates a dilemma for Indian policymakers. To do an about-turn and begin to distinguish "good" Taliban is ridiculous. It will be seen as kow-towing to the US and will be difficult to rationalize. The antipathy towards the Taliban runs deep in the Indian mindset, since no matter the actual character of the Taliban's "Islamism", a threat perception gained ground in Indian opinion regarding "Islamic terror" from Afghanistan. The Indian establishment unwittingly contributed to this by harping on the ubiquitous "foreign hand" in terrorist activities in India. A rollback of the thesis will take time.

Furthermore, India views that the Taliban as an instrument of policy for Pakistani intelligence and as detrimental to Indian regional security interests. All in all, Delhi will feel greatly relieved if the US abandons its plan to co-opt the "good" Taliban.

In the above scenario, both Tehran and Moscow will be looking forward to foreign minister-level consultations with Delhi in the coming weeks. Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee is scheduled to visit Tehran in early November. Again, in November, in the run-up to the year-end visit by President Dmitriy Medvedev to India, Lavrov and Prime Minister Vadimir Putin will have consultations in Delhi.

The geopolitical reality, however, is that all three countries have transformed in recent years and their foreign policy priorities and orientations have also changed. They relate today to US hegemony in Afghanistan from dissimilar perspectives of national interests.

In Asia Times article by M. BhadraKumar
Scramble for Afghanistan

Wonder if the Kabul Embassy bombing was ablowback for this new found bonhomie between US and India and ISI bombed the Indian embassy as a warning?

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 17 Oct 2008 04:54

http://www.slideshare.net/guest1987a8/f ... nstability

kit · Post by **kit** » 19 Oct 2008 22:49

http://www.terradaily.com/reports/New_F ... s_999.html

New Formula Predicts How People Will Migrate In Coming Decades

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 Oct 2008 19:58

Pakistan is crucial to world

Pakistan is crucial to world map

By IRFAN ASGHAR submitted 23 hours 57 minutes ago

Some pseudo-intellectuals are bumming around the world trashing Pakistan and the heavily skewed media is awash with reports making a dark portrayal of the future of this land of the pure. Rumours are doing rounds that Pakistan will be dismantled or erased from the world map, it will be balkanised or fragmented into multiple pieces and that it will be divested of its nuclear capability by the US-led West in collaboration with certain anti-Pakistan powers by and by. All this has made for a general feeling of doom and gloom in Pakistan.

If we have a going-over of the case, what stands out a mile is that all these reports and rumours are highly asinine and nothing short of being hogwash. Pakistan has born to survive and it is destined to be an invaluable part of the world map for keeps. On having mature reflection, two factors come to the fore as prime guarantors of the survival of Pakistan on the world map: To start with, Pakistan has got a valiant and highly-octane military which is quick off the mark and has got peerless chutzpah to insulate the country against external aggression. General Kayani has rose to the occasion and provided the much needed leadership and sense of direction to his people at one of the most difficult times in the nation's history by sending a shot across America's bows. Pakistan's army will make mincemeat of anyone who tried to undo the sovereignty of this country. Moreover, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and it is no stranger to unpleasant situations. It has already fought three conventional wars with another nuclear nation next door.

The other most important factor is the geopolitical importance of Pakistan which acts as a bulwark against malicious and venomous designs. Being in the box-seat geopolitically, Pakistan holds all the aces and catches the sight of influential foreign powers. Several foreign powers are always keen on the sustenance of Pakistan and will definitely go an extra mile to support it in its bid for survival against the heinous motives of some other powers. This can be discussed on the following counts;

Firstly Pakistan is located at the junction of great powers. The near future is going to be pregnant not only with the traditional rivalries of US and Russia but also an endless struggle between them for supremacy in regional and global politics. In such situation, the world will not only see the conflict of interests between US and Russia but also efforts by them to make as many friends as possible to solidify their position. And Pakistan will be the pivot of attraction for both powers.

Secondly, Pakistan is located in close proximity to the oil rich ME countries and it can influence the shipment of oil. The icing on the cake is that it lies adjacent to the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. It is going to be a major player in the Central Asia geo-political game. A major geographic issue will be decisive here: both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan lack any sea access. Consequently Pakistani harbours on the Indian Ocean could function as outlets for the new Central Asian energy routes - a major stake which piques the interests of not only China and Russia but also of western powers. The US has entered Afghanistan to occupy the energy resources of Central Asia and Pakistan is well-positioned geographically to emerge as a commercial hub for land-locked Central Asia and beyond. Pakistan's seaports are equidistant from Europe and the Far East.

The most vivid proof of Pakistan's geo-political importance can be gauged from the fact that it is US and NATO's trustworthy ally in the fight against terrorism. Pakistan's co-operation is critical to all US plans. The incontrovertible truth is that war against Al-Qaeda can be won only if Pakistan cooperates with NATO-ISAF forces. This is because Pakistan provides logistical support to the US in the form of fuel and ammunitions. If Pakistan ditches America at this stage in the War On Terror and closes the border to all NATO supply to Afghanistan, its enterprise in Afghanistan will be doomed to failure and it will meet a fate worse than death.

Pakistan is a country whose future determines the success or failure of the whole of the region. In the mid-nineties, Yale historian Paul Kennedy called Pakistan one of the most pivotal states of the world. America thinks of India as a strategic partner for maintaining balance of power against China but Pakistan is a key to the stability of the whole world. It is central to making short work of new threats to the world. Time and again, the West has turned its back on Pakistan. This blunder should not be made again or else it may occasion horrendous consequences.

The writer is a foreign affairs analyst

E-mail [email protected]

Actually its a recasting of the message that Olaf Caroe gave the British and the US. Conversley, if someone wants to change the game, then break up of TSP is what it takes. The sorcer's apperentice dreams of casting spells.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 Oct 2008 22:34

X-posted...

SSridhar wrote:People being expelled from Balawaristan to protect Chinese Engineers

Northern areas and Gilgit Police Tuesday expelled 300 suspected people from the area and recovered 450 vehicles.

The step has been taken to ensure the security of Chinese workers and engineers working at Karakoram highway, a private TV channel quoted a police officer in Gilgit as saying.

According to the officer, hundreds of Chinese workers and engineers are executing development work in Karakoram highway and the steps were taken to save them from terrorism and ensure their security.

The suspected people have been expelled due to unavailability of documents, he said, adding that, Police have also confiscated 450 illegal vehicles.

Sources told Online, the action was taken after the abduction of two Chinese engineers from scenic valley of Swat, where a military operation was underway against militants.

Superintendent Police, Gilgit, Ali Sher commenting on the measure clarified that the people expelled had no proof of registration cards, identity cards and passports and were living in Gilgit and its adjacent areas on a special order from the home department.

durvasa wrote:Well, ladies and gentlemen, while this particular incident of driving away innocent Kashmiri locals for settling Chinese residents seems minor, you are seeing the commencement of the successful culmination of the paki's plan to get $100bn (or is it $10bn) from International donors (read China). Where are Arundhati Roy and Harsh Mandar when they are needed?

Pakis are ready to sell Northern Areas and Gilgit to China and protect Pakjab's Honour and Virginity when this apology of a country is about to go bankrupt. Without Indian Kashmir, POK has no intrinsic value to Pakjabis. All the reports from Land of Unkil and Land of the pure have suggested that Pakis have realized the futility of grabbing J&K from cunning Yindoos by force. Pakis are ready to cut short their losses and encash what they can by selling POK.
So be ready to see China controlling POK/NA/Gilgit, cleaning up the Muslim jehadi cancer there and converting it a mini-Tibet in about a decade!

surinder wrote:Right now TSP is able to protect its NA. India cannot invade and take it, as of now. If in the near future, TSP nears collapse, then India might be tempted to retake NA. If that happens, it is my strong sense that China will step in to assert the protection of NA. It will not formally take over, but will declare itself the protector of this land and would tell India that an attack on NA is = attack on PRC. India will most likely back off from NA in that scenario.

I think the future scenario for India in NA does not look rosy at all.

Loss of NA weakened us. Loss of Tibet weakened us. Combination of the two further exponentially weakened us.

Rye wrote:NA/PoK is formally part of India and belongs to India if/when Pakistan becomes and ex-country. Chinese taking over NA will be seen as an act of war by India, but I do not see anyone in India going to war, and if China takes NA, China will only let go of it for something in the NE India/Arunachal Pradesh. Any move by the Chinese in taking control of NA is something to watch out for...the recent news of Pakis making way for chinese in Gilgit indicates this POV is at least partly right. Maybe the pakis are planning to hand over more territory that does not belong to them to the Chinese in exchange for hard cash? They are really desperate.

vsudhir wrote:TSP's western sponsors besides, thanks to the great game hard wiring, will be far more willing to see TSP collapse and balkanize once they're assured that the geopolitcally critical NA won't fall into Dilli's lap. I fully expect them to wink and approve of this covert NA takeover by PRC.

The only ones who can't/won't talk abt it will be the Hurrirats and their islamist cohorts in the valley.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 21 Oct 2008 23:02

PRC supply lines - should they decide to take NA will be dangerously over extended and exposed to sabotage by taliban wolfs, tibetian partisans or IA regulars.

Moves of this kind require approval from all major geopolitical players such as Russia and the west...it is neither's interest to let this happen.

They will have to contribute hundreds of thousands of troops to secure the supply lines. I do not see this happening. Should it happen by a long shot, it would mean PRC is next in line after the British empire, USSR, now the US, to bite the dust in the northern areas/afghanistan - the cockpit of asia.

++++++++++
Added later: Only way to deny the NA From coming under Indian control would be to resurrect Afghanistan as the new poodle, but to think the Taliban will be a poodle to the west are living in a fools’ paradise.

durvasa · Post by **durvasa** » 21 Oct 2008 23:36

I expect and hope that India would not be as passive in giving away NA as it has been in the case of Tibet but I don't see or hear many Taliban Wolfs, IA regulars and Tibetans partisans very active in COK and Tibet in stressing Chinese supply lines, esp when PLA can be supplied by Pakis in NA for a few Yuan. May be I am not supposed to see all that RAW/Taliban/Tibetan activity in China but whatever these outfits have publicly achieved behind the bamboo curtain is not inspiring.

Hoping that China would need or ask major power approval for annexing NA is a loser's mindset. They did not ask approvals when annexing Tibet, Kashmir and Part of Arunachal Pradesh. And why should US and Russia (if this is what you mean by major powers) object to China doing an Alaska on NA by paying the current occupier, when they did not do jack for the forcibly occupied and much larger Tibet.

The only major (or currently-middling) power that is going to oppose to this market transaction could (I can't be more definitive) be India. And it would be much easier, in a relative sense, for India to take back NA before it is handed over to China then after. Time window for that too is closing fast.

Every time pakis are in financial or military trouble they have prostituted their 'strategically placed' geographical body to the interested parties; whether it is renting airstrips to US for spying on erstwhile USSR, or letting US as a conduit to contact communist China, or allowing Arabs to come to Baluchistan for carnal pleasures or letting Taliban (and their Arab and US backers) to attack USSR or selling Aksai Chin for three decades of subsidized nuclear or military help, or renting Gawadar to China to build and own a military-strategic harbour or getting paid for letting US bomb initially Afghanistan but later the non-Pakjab areas of Pakistan itself. I see no reason why they won’t that again when need $10bn just to survive and save their hobour and I can’t think or any better way Paki’s would get that money, without getting guboed so badly by the West that even an experienced and ‘war-worn’ hooker like her would think twice.

In a kafka'esque turn, In its effort to gain strategic depth in Afganistan against India, Pakistan has become the Strategic depth for all relevant parties including US, KSA, China and most of all Taliban and everyone is screwing it to the deepest extent. But that is hardly a consolation for us. IF we can not make Pakistan our Mexico, we at least need to make them our Cuba.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 Oct 2008 23:48

I said in another thread that throughout India history it is marked with material oppulence coupled with polticial impotence for the whole historical period regardless of who is the dominant power elite.

X-posted...

surinder wrote:Please note, NA will not be ceded to PRC. PRC will not assert soverignety on NA. It will merely declare this area as its protectorate. I am pretty confident of this scenario playing. I am sure PRC has already war-gamed the scenario. PRC's has in all wars with TSP, tried to make life difficult for India and limit its elbow room. For India there does not exist any war with TSP which does not involve PRC as a calculation. In fact, I beleive the recent attempts by PRC to humiliate India are directly related to squeeze India because they think India has reduced pressure on the Western front. It is designed to convey to India that cooling on the Western front (TSP) will compensated by heating on the Eastern & Northern.

All is not hopeless: There is a way out of this chakraviyu: It is to stand up and fight. On ther other hand, there is no solution to the problem if all India wants is to avoid pain (which is India's main concern, by and large). If PRC declares NA its protectorate, India should challenge it and be ready for a MOAW (mother of all waars). If it wins, it will have a great future and great peace. If it looses (or does nto fight) then it is will continue on its current course of shrinking. I am afraid India will choose the latter path.

Poet Iqbal had said in an Urdu couplet: Lamho ne galti ki, sadiyon ne sazaa payi. Xlation: Mistakes were made by "seconds", punishment was endured by "centuries". The critical mistake of India to take NA and assert the borders of J&K in 1947, 48, 65, 71 has cost us dear. We will pay for it for a very very very long time.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 22 Oct 2008 00:53

Durvasa, as the former IAF chief said, it is not intentions but capabilities that matter. US and British troops holding joint exercises in Ladakh, US army C-in-C visiting siachen etc. All this in the past few days....what is going on?

PRC took over Xinjiang with USSR approval(may be west as well but not sure) in 1949. Great power interaction in central asia is what this thread is all about. Read about it in the first few pages of this thread.

You ask why the west and Russia should not object to PRC taking over NA - becuz I hold the view it is not in their interests to see PRC gaining direct access to the Indian ocean...malabar 2008 in BOB is for the same reason.

Taliban wolves does not have to mean Jalaluddin Haqqani or Mullah Omar, the IMU -Yuldashev or the Uighurs operating with Taliban support are the same.

Read B Raman's article in SAAG on Taliban angst againt PRC in the aftermath of the Lal masjid disaster.

More later.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 22 Oct 2008 01:28

Perhaps it would be a better option for India to pay that $10B to Pakistani leadership and conduct a small war (for show-up) to gain control over POK… And we many even offer joining IPI project as a payoff. (Added later) It will be cheaper than any other option...

If US/KSA/Russia/PRC and even Israel can buy out Paki leadership, why can’t India? We may not admit it but who cares?

IMHO it boils down to an clear intent, strategy, and right price to achieve this…

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 22 Oct 2008 02:08

The old great game culminated in an understanding between the Tsarist Russia and Great Britain wherein the following agreement was reached (there were other parts of this agreement but focus is on the relevance for the subcontinent) :

1. The borders of Russian influence stops at the amu darya.
2. Afghanistan is a buffer state but within the British sphere of influence.

When the British left India they did not want the Suncontinent to fall under Soviet hegemony, hence Pakistan came into the picture. However the northern regions of India which came into the closest proximity with Pakistan was a cause of concern. To address this : a buffer region between USSR and Pakistan called Wakhan corridor was created and given to Afghanistan (not sure about the date).

However the British being the cynical SOBs that they are, wanted to wear suspender and a belt at the same time. Hence they engineered the invasion of J&K state and gerrymandered the creation of POK and ensured it stayed in the hands of their proxies: Pakistan.

The utility of this arrangement is now under question due to Pakistan’s failing health. Also the new great game player: PRC wants risk free access to the oil rich regions of the middle east. As a rising great power it inherits the interests of the west in ensuring India stays cut off from Central Asia.

Hence as I see it, there are two major questions facing the old great game players(West and Russia):
1. Should PRC gain access to middle east through the land route? If yes, then POK will go to PRC.
2. USSR’s borders have receded to the regions hundreds if not thousands of miles west of amu darya. They are nowhere close to the POK region and the threat of communism subverting the subcontinent has receded. So should India be given land access to the Central asian regions as well. If yes then POK should go to India.

If the answer is NO to both (1) and (2), then a new arrangement has o be worked out. This means new proxies have to be found to manage this geographically strategic region.

The answer to this to give a new lease of life to the time trusted Sunni alliance. The Taliban are the obvious choice. They will be a headache for all the major players – India and China. Not to mention Russia and Iran as well.

The other option – not necessarily exclusive to the option mentioned above is to break J&K as a separate state from India. POK can be part of this independent state and through these two proxies the offshore balancing strategy put in place by the west post WWII will be executed.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Oct 2008 09:33

E-Book

Lord Roberts of Kandahar's bio: Forty years in India

A very good perspective of the First and Second Afghan Wars

renukb · Post by **renukb** » 22 Oct 2008 11:13

IMO, India should go for IPI, as it would be beneficial to India. Lets not worry about Pakistan. Iran needs Gas money too, paid for by India. Perhaps when the deal happens, Iran and India should include a clause stating that any stopping of gas supplies to India is an act of war, in which case both Iran and India can take military measures to fix the smoother gas supply. Pakistan will have to honour the deal, bcoa it gets them $$.

THE GREAT GAME
- Where is India on the new map of energy security?

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081022/j ... 995591.jsp

“Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia …they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world,” wrote George Nathaniel Curzon in 1898, at the high noon of the British Empire.

Central Asia all but ceased to figure in international relations during the Soviet era. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, triggered off another struggle for influence over the newly independent states in Central Asia and the Caspian region. A century after Lord Curzon, the American energy secretary, Bill Richardson, highlighted the geo-strategic importance of the region, albeit in more prosaic terms. “This is about America’s energy security, which depends on diversifying our sources of energy worldwide,” he said in October 1998. “It’s also about preventing strategic inroads by those who don’t share our values. We’re trying to move these newly independent countries toward the West. We would like to see them reliant on Western commercial and political interests than going the other way. We’ve made a substantial political investment in the Caspian, and it’s very important to us that both the pipeline map and the politics come out right.” A new Great Game had been launched in Central Asia.

Though the theatre of contest remains broadly the same, the players as well as the stakes are very different today. In the 19th century, the principal players of the Great Game were Russia and Britain. Today, the leading players in the new Great Game are the United States of America, Russia and China, together with a supporting cast including the European Union, Turkey and Iran, among others. Central Asia was only the theatre of the 19th-century contest; the principal stake lay elsewhere. The stake was the control of the approaches to Britain’s Indian empire, rather than the resources of the arid lands of Central Asia. The objective in the current contest is to control access to Central Asia’s vast oil and gas resources. The geopolitics of the new Great Game no longer focuses on potential invasion routes, as it did in Curzon’s time, but on the alignment of oil and gas pipelines.

Since the Caspian-Central Asian region is landlocked, its petroleum and natural gas production can reach major foreign markets only through pipelines leading directly to consumer countries or to international ports from which they can be shipped to consumer countries. During the Soviet era, all pipelines constructed in this region passed through Russia. Even today, the bulk of oil and natural gas produced in the region is exported through pipelines running northward through the Russian Federation. Thus, for instance, gas from Turkmenistan is currently delivered to Central Europe via Russia.

Two new pipeline routes have radically changed the geopolitical map of the Caspian-Central Asian region. An east-west oil pipeline now runs from Baku in Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in Turkey, bypassing Russian territory. A new west-east pipeline transports oil from Kazakhstan to China. Both these ambitious ventures have important strategic implications.

The strategic objective of the US-backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is to reduce Western dependence on Russia for energy imports. Russia, with its vast deposits of oil and gas, is an energy superpower. The EU is already heavily dependent on Russia for gas imports and this dependence is expected to increase further as a result of declining offshore production in the North Sea. The new pipeline will enable the EU to secure access to Caspian oil and gas without giving Russia the control or leverage that it might exercise as a transit state.

The construction of the pipeline was an immense political enterprise in a region divided by deep animosities. The shortest routes from Baku to Ceyhan lie through Iran or Armenia but neither was politically acceptable. The US would not even contemplate an option involving Iran, a “rogue state” in its eyes. The latter option was impracticable because Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan are characterized by deep hostility, while its ties with Turkey are still marred by historical animosities. Ruling out these shorter — and more economical — alignments, the only feasible option was the pipeline that now initially runs northward from Baku (Azerbaijan) to Tbilisi (Georgia) and thence southwards to Ceyhan (Turkey).

The alignment of the pipeline thus took into account existing regional political realities. At the same time, it is also creating new political realities. The Western alliance is building closer ties with both Georgia and Azerbaijan. Both countries have contributed troops to current peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Kosovo. Georgia has received sizeable military aid from the US, and is now an eager candidate for Nato membership. Washington is pressing for Georgia’s early admission, but several of its west European allies are reluctant to get drawn into Georgia’s dispute with Russia over the status of the territories of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. Azerbaijan, more wisely, has thus far refrained from seeking Nato membership, while indicating that the option remains open for the future.

China’s search for energy security provides the strategic rationale for the Kazakhstan-Xinjiang pipeline. China’s spectacular economic development can be maintained only if it is able to import increasing volumes of oil and gas. The quest for energy security has led China to invest heavily in oil and gas fields in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. This enables Beijing not only to secure access to overseas “equity oil” but also to diversify its sources, thereby minimizing the risk of a disruption of supplies on account of political instability in an oil-producing country.

The Chinese have been prepared to pay high prices for oilfields in Central Asia. Heavy costs are also involved in transporting oil and gas over a distance of 3,000 kilometres from Kazakhstan to China’s industrial heartland. Many analysts have drawn the conclusion that Chinese policy in this regard is shaped by strategic factors. They maintain that Beijing is prepared to pay a premium for oil and gas transported by overland routes because it apprehends that, in certain contingencies, the US may employ its naval supremacy to impose a maritime oil embargo against China. As in the case of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, energy security considerations (rather than purely economic calculations) appear to provide the rationale of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline.

How does India fit into this new geopolitical map? Indian officials are reportedly holding talks with their Turkish and Israeli counterparts to examine the feasibility of transporting Central Asian oil from Ceyhan to the Israeli port of Ashkelon on the Mediterranean, linked by an overland pipeline to the Red Sea port of Eilat, from where supertankers could pick up shipments destined for India. This route would avoid the overcrowded Suez Canal or the long detour around the African continent.

The Ceyhan route might be an attractive short-term option. The preferred long-term goal, however, must be to obtain access to Central Asia’s oil and gas reserves through less circuitous southward routes running through Iran or through Afghanistan and Pakistan. For example, crude oil from Azerbaijan could be carried through pipelines to Iranian ports for shipment to India. Gas from Turkmenistan could be delivered to India through Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Political factors obstruct early implementation of these projects. The Iran option would face strong opposition from the US, and would be practicable only if other powerful countries can be recruited as partners in the enterprise. The Pakistan-Afghanistan option must await restoration of peaceful conditions in southern Afghanistan and adjacent areas of Pakistan. Yet, we must not lose sight of these alternatives because of the important contribution they can make to our energy security — and to consolidating our ties with neighbours.

The author is a retired ambassador and is currently a Distinguished Fellow at The Energy and Resources Institute

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 23 Oct 2008 21:50

Question for all those forumites who think PRC will takeover NA - EVen assuming this were to happen, even if this were to happen, what is the benefit to PRC?

The shores of the arab sea still one thousand miles away. Not mention this is reputedly the most ungovernable territory in the world, and India can still get land access to central asia through other routes

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 23 Oct 2008 21:55

renukb wrote:

IMO, India should go for IPI, as it would be beneficial to India. Lets not worry about Pakistan.

You write nonsense like this expect people to take you seriously? Who is going to guarantee the security of the IPI? The Pakistani army? Taking your idea further, maybe the Lashkar-e-toiba can be provided funds by the Indian govt. to safeguard the pipeline..should also assist them with terrorist attacks inside India. The pakjabis in charge will make sure that there is no energy security for the IPI -- as long as Pakistan is broken up, such ideas seem feasible as the non-pakjabis in Pakistan are not anti-India, else it is delusional.

Pakistan will have to honour the deal, bcoa it gets them $$.

Riiight, Pakistan has always honoured various deals cut with India -- just look at their behaviour w.r.t the IWT proves you right.

satya · Post by **satya** » 23 Oct 2008 23:49

India should go for Iranian Gas & CAR Gas in collaboration with Russia as an equal stake-holder but only via sea route ie first with exclusive LNG terminals at Iranian Port ( another advantage will be to IN to get a foothold in Persian Gulf ) and under sea pipeline as second way ( irrc part of Gas supply to Germany from Russia is coming under sea pipeline by passing Poland so from a technological point of view it shouldn't be a big hurdle) . With Russia in picture , we can expect Iranians to honor their obligations ( apart from heavy financial penalties & gas reserve creation on Indian Mainland as a further safeguard ) . Bypassing TSPian Land and making available this gas via under-sea pipelines , the geo-political importance of TSP gets diminished along with that of A'stan , not completely but enough to bring various players to a favorable negotiating terms with India . This window is open for a limited period of time ( perhaps 1-2 years till this financial mess is sorted out and global energy prices downward) apart from this new huge gas reserve in Turkmenistan , we can have plenty of gas. Another issue is once this pipeline becomes operational , it will be a big & steady revenue earner for Iranians and we can be sure in future should a regime change happen in Iran , this pipeline will make sure Indian interests are safeguarded under a new regime . Future is CNG for India , not only will it provide us energy security but also downgrade significantly this 'Great game syndrome' passing down generations of Europeans & now Americans . We don't want Chinese to catch this syndrome fully .

JMHTs

surinder · Post by **surinder** » 24 Oct 2008 00:26

Paul: Question for all those forumites who think PRC will takeover NA - EVen assuming this were to happen, even if this were to happen, what is the benefit to PRC?

The shores of the arab sea still one thousand miles away. Not mention this is reputedly the most ungovernable territory in the world, and India can still get land access to central asia through other routes

PRC will not take over NA, but only back its security (from India). The advantages to PRC are many: most of them are India-related.

Denying India from retaking NA, ensures that Kashmir is truncated, and so is India. This area, obsviously provides land access to CA, esp. A'stan. While the land is hard to use, air bridges can be opened. Keeping NA in TSP+PRC hands will deny India that access. Access through Iran is longer, and also dependent on Iranian good wishes.

Secondly, PLA and PLAF can encircly India more effectively. Keep it hemmed in. Getting NA would be a big psychological booster, and PRC knows this and does not want India to have it.

Thirdly, if India gets, NA, its security needs on the TSP front diminish. It can outflank the PRC in areas that border Xinjiang.

Fourthly, the land route is tremendously useful for arms, missiles, nuclear related shipments. It may not be suitable for general trade, but that the defence-related transfer is greatly eased.

Many of the other reasons are the same as those which make US, Japan want to prevent the takeover of Taiwan. It reduces the strategic space for the targetted nation.

chandrabhan · Post by **chandrabhan** » 26 Oct 2008 09:02

Hi Paul,Ramana Sir,
I have a suggestion that may sound ridiculous to some However, I would still go ahead.
India must open a line of credit for TSP on an urgent basis - around $5 Bn
This will be a masterstroke in this great Chess game. I will list them down as follows...
[*]This will somehow help kill the myth that the concierge service arm of TSP has been propagating since the creation," India is out there to get us".
[*]This will lead to a general discontent for the TSP army throughout the nation ( for falsely propagating the myth)
[*]May lead to Army tightening further control, leading to further chaos, thus hastening the fall
[*]Many mullahs openely would oppose it
[*]We can tie up the loan to the spents we want them to undertake - make selective investments in Baluchistan/Fata. use the monies to be spent on the areas dominated by Durranis
[*]Sarcastically leave open the slit by making comments about pakistan's "All weather friends" and their refusal to dole out cash.
[*]We must make use of this misery to humble by sugar coating our words ," We were one nation after all ", "We have sindh in our national anthem and we will not let our brethren die of hunger and poverty" and lot more.
We must completely ignore the Pakjab area for this investment

Chandrabhan

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 26 Oct 2008 21:21

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20081001f ... rgain.html
From Great Game to Grand Bargain
Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid

From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008
Summary: The crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan is beyond the point where more troops will help. U.S. strategy must be to seek compromise with insurgents while addressing regional rivalries and insecurities

BARNETT R. RUBIN is Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the author of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan and Blood on the Doorstep. AHMED RASHID is a Pakistani journalist and writer, a Fellow at the Paci?c Council on International Policy, and the author of Jihad, Taliban, and, most recently, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.

The Great Game is no fun anymore. The term "Great Game" was used by nineteenth-century British imperialists to describe the British-Russian struggle for position on the chessboard of Afghanistan and Central Asia -- a contest with a few players, mostly limited to intelligence forays and short wars fought on horseback with rifles, and with those living on the chessboard largely bystanders or victims. More than a century later, the game continues. But now, the number of players has exploded, those living on the chessboard have become involved, and the intensity of the violence and the threats it produces affect the entire globe. The Great Game can no longer be treated as a sporting event for distant spectators. It is time to agree on some new rules.

Seven years after the U.S.-led coalition and the Afghan commanders it supported pushed the leaderships of the Taliban and al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan, an insurgency that includes these and other groups is gaining ground on both the Afghan and the Pakistani sides of the border. Four years after Afghanistan's first-ever presidential election, the increasingly besieged government of Hamid Karzai is losing credibility at home and abroad. Al Qaeda has established a new safe haven in the tribal agencies of Pakistan, where it is defended by a new organization, the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. The government of Pakistan, beset by one political crisis after another and split between a traditionally autonomous military and assertive but fractious elected leaders, has been unable to retain control of its own territory and population. Its intelligence agency stands accused of supporting terrorism in Afghanistan, which in many ways has replaced Kashmir as the main arena of the still-unresolved struggle between Pakistan and India.

For years, critics of U.S. and NATO strategies have been warning that the region was headed in this direction. Many of the policies such critics have long proposed are now being widely embraced. The Bush administration and both presidential campaigns are proposing to send more troops to Afghanistan and to undertake other policies to sustain the military gains made there. These include accelerating training of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police; disbursing more money, more effectively for reconstruction and development and to support better governance; increasing pressure on and cooperation with Pakistan, and launching cross-border attacks without Pakistani agreement to eliminate cross-border safe havens for insurgents and to uproot al Qaeda; supporting democracy in Pakistan and bringing its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under civilian political control; and implementing more effective policies to curb Afghanistan's drug industry, which produces opiates equal in export value to half of the rest of the Afghan economy.

Cross-border attacks into Pakistan may produce an "October surprise" or provide material for apologists hoping to salvage George W. Bush's legacy, but they will not provide security. Advancing reconstruction, development, good governance, and counternarcotics efforts and building effective police and justice systems in Afghanistan will require many years of relative peace and security. Neither neglecting these tasks, as the Bush administration did initially, nor rushing them on a timetable determined by political objectives, can succeed. Afghanistan requires far larger and more effective security forces, international or national, but support for U.S. and NATO deployments is plummeting in troop-contributing countries, in the wider region, and in Afghanistan itself. Afghanistan, the poorest country in the world but for a handful in Africa and with the weakest government in the world (except Somalia, which has no government), will never be able to sustain national security forces sufficient to confront current -- let alone escalating -- threats, yet permanent foreign subsidies for Afghanistan's security forces cannot be guaranteed and will have destabilizing consequences. Moreover, measures aimed at Afghanistan will not address the deteriorating situation in Pakistan or the escalation of international conflicts connected to the Afghan-Pakistani war. More aid to Pakistan -- military or civilian -- will not diminish the perception among Pakistan's national security elite that the country is surrounded by enemies determined to dismember it, especially as cross-border raids into areas long claimed by Afghanistan intensify that perception. Until that sense of siege is gone, it will be difficult to strengthen civilian institutions in Pakistan.

U.S. diplomacy has been paralyzed by the rhetoric of "the war on terror" -- a struggle against "evil," in which other actors are "with us or with the terrorists." Such rhetoric thwarts sound strategic thinking by assimilating opponents into a homogenous "terrorist" enemy. Only a political and diplomatic initiative that distinguishes political opponents of the United States -- including violent ones -- from global terrorists such as al Qaeda can reduce the threat faced by the Afghan and Pakistani states and secure the rest of the international community from the international terrorist groups based there. Such an initiative would have two elements. It would seek a political solution with as much of the Afghan and Pakistani insurgencies as possible, offering political inclusion, the integration of Pakistan's indirectly ruled Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the mainstream political and administrative institutions of Pakistan, and an end to hostile action by international troops in return for cooperation against al Qaeda. And it would include a major diplomatic and development initiative addressing the vast array of regional and global issues that have become intertwined with the crisis -- and that serve to stimulate, intensify, and prolong conflict in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan has been at war for three decades -- a period longer than the one that started with World War I and ended with the Normandy landings on D-day in World War II -- and now that war is spreading to Pakistan and beyond. This war and the attendant terrorism could well continue and spread, even to other continents -- as on 9/11 -- or lead to the collapse of a nuclear-armed state. The regional crisis is of that magnitude, and yet so far there is no international framework to address it other than the underresourced and poorly coordinated operations in Afghanistan and some attacks in the FATA. The next U.S. administration should launch an effort, initially based on a contact group authorized by the UN Security Council, to put an end to the increasingly destructive dynamics of the Great Game in the region. The game has become too deadly and has attracted too many players; it now resembles less a chess match than the Afghan game of buzkashi, with Afghanistan playing the role of the goat carcass fought over by innumerable teams. Washington must seize the opportunity now to replace this Great Game with a new grand bargain for the region.

THE SECURITY GAP

The Afghan and Pakistani security forces lack the numbers, skills, equipment, and motivation to confront the growing insurgencies in the two countries or to uproot al Qaeda from its new base in the FATA, along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Proposals for improving the security situation focus on sending additional international forces, building larger national security forces in Afghanistan, and training and equipping Pakistan's security forces, which are organized for conflict with India, for domestic counterinsurgency. But none of these proposals is sufficient to meet the current, let alone future, threats.

The Pakistani military does not control the insurgency, but it can affect its intensity. Putting pressure on Pakistan to curb the militants will likely remain ineffective, however, without a strategic realignment by the United States. The region is rife with conspiracy theories trying to find a rational explanation for the United States' apparently irrational strategic posture of supporting a "major non-NATO ally" that is doing more to undermine the U.S. position in Afghanistan than any other state. Many Afghans believe that Washington secretly supports the Taliban as a way to keep a war going to justify a troop presence that is actually aimed at securing the energy resources of Central Asia and countering China. Many in Pakistan believe that the United States has deceived Pakistan into conniving with Washington to bring about its own destruction: India and U.S.-supported Afghanistan will form a pincer around Pakistan to dismember the world's only Muslim nuclear power. And some Iranians speculate that in preparation for the coming of the Mahdi, God has blinded the Great Satan to its own interests so that it would eliminate both of Iran's Sunni-ruled regional rivals, Afghanistan and Iraq, thus unwittingly paving the way for the long-awaited Shiite restoration.

On September 19, 2001, when then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf announced to the nation his decision to support the U.S.-led intervention against the Taliban in Afghanistan, he stated that the overriding reason was to save Pakistan by preventing the United States from allying with India. In return, he wanted concessions to Pakistan on its security interests.

Subsequent events, however, have only exacerbated Pakistan's sense of insecurity. Musharraf asked for time to form a "moderate Taliban" government in Afghanistan but failed to produce one. When that failed, he asked that the United States prevent the Northern Alliance (part of the anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan), which had been supported by India, Iran, and Russia, from occupying Kabul; that appeal failed. Now, Pakistan claims that the Northern Alliance is working with India from inside Afghanistan's security services. Meanwhile, India has reestablished its consulates in Afghan cities, including some near the Pakistani border. India has genuine consular interests there (Hindu and Sikh populations, commercial travel, aid programs), but it may also in fact be using the consulates against Pakistan, as Islamabad claims. India has also, in cooperation with Iran, completed a highway linking Afghanistan's ring road (which connects its major cities) to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf, potentially eliminating Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for access to the sea and marginalizing Pakistan's new Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, which was built with hundreds of millions of dollars of Chinese aid. And the new U.S.-Indian nuclear deal effectively recognizes New Delhi's legitimacy as a nuclear power while continuing to treat Islamabad, with its record of proliferation, as a pariah. In this context, pressuring or giving aid to Pakistan, without any effort to address the sources of its insecurity, cannot yield a sustainable positive outcome.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 26 Oct 2008 21:29

Barnett Rubin Article quote:

In this context, pressuring or giving aid to Pakistan, without any effort to address the sources of its insecurity, cannot yield a sustainable positive outcome.

What source of insekurity is he talking about?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Oct 2008 06:11

Rye wrote:Barnett Rubin Article quote:
In this context, pressuring or giving aid to Pakistan, without any effort to address the sources of its insecurity, cannot yield a sustainable positive outcome.
What source of insekurity is he talking about?

Rye, look at his co-author and the highlighted part in Acharya's post. It leaves no doubt the grand bargain they want is India to give them what they want.

BTW, Rashid is on all the intellectual talk shows. He was on UCTV: Conversations with History, Book Tv etc plugging his book. ANd not the Indic tradition that doesn't die down. They inovke Bhasmasura legend!

I think next admin we will see joint training patrols on both sides of the Indus.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 27 Oct 2008 06:19

Sorry, Ramana, Acharya's highlight does not seem to answer that question, unless Indian withdrawal from Afghanisthan is what the author is seeking....don't see why GoI would oblige to such demands anyway.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 27 Oct 2008 08:23

Rye: The author is pointing to the same old zero sum game. TSP looks at all wins by India as its loss. Hence, India cannot be allowed to progress. For how long the west will bite this bile of garbage is yet to be seen. But, the ship is for sure turning. TSP's insecurity is that the west will leave it behind to rot and die.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 27 Oct 2008 08:43

Pakistan's very basic insecurity, or at least that is what it has led the Americans and the British and its own people to believe, is the fear that India is irreconciled to its creation and is waiting for an opportunity to devour it. It therefore sees every move that India makes, from that perspective and that perspective alone. India's presence & influence in Afghanistan, a country with which it has a border dispute, is looked at as another sinister Indian attempt to gang up with an enemy to overwhelm her. In the same way, only a merger of J&K with herself is seen by it as the guarantor of its water and as a buffer between its garrisons which are close to the current Indian border, and India. The fraudulent accession of J&K to India is viewed as a cunning move by India to eventually grab the whole of Pakistan. In Pakistan's view, it is India that nurtures an implacable enmity with her. So, everything that India does is viewed by Pakistan through the prism of Indian attempt to reincorporate the 'lost' (Pakistani) territories within an Akhand Bharat once again. It believes that India works the same way Pakistan does, that is India is Pakistan-centric. That's the insecurity. In its thinking, the only way Pakistan's security can be assured will be when a preponderant India is weakened, possibly dismembered, and simultaneously Pakistan gains territories, the original idea of Rehmat Ali.

renukb · Post by **renukb** » 27 Oct 2008 08:49

Rye wrote: You write nonsense like this expect people to take you seriously? Who is going to guarantee the security of the IPI? The Pakistani army? Taking your idea further, maybe the Lashkar-e-toiba can be provided funds by the Indian govt. to safeguard the pipeline..should also assist them with terrorist attacks inside India. The pakjabis in charge will make sure that there is no energy security for the IPI -- as long as Pakistan is broken up, such ideas seem feasible as the non-pakjabis in Pakistan are not anti-India, else it is delusional.

Riiight, Pakistan has always honoured various deals cut with India -- just look at their behaviour w.r.t the IWT proves you right.

I have been on BRF since 1998 or so May be this is my 18000+'th post here. Atleast some here remember my prev avatars or so I guess. Some time back I was a very strong opponent of IPI, citing security threats. But I do see light / opportunities where others see darkness.

IPI without US interference will do good for India. It will give you cheap gas, not only that Both Iran and India gets a chance to beat the crap out of TSP, if TSP creates problems in supply. May be we must get part of gas from Russia and Turkemenistan using the same pipeline, make them part of the pipeline security members, with conditions that refusal to supply the Gas is an act of war. May be the pipeline can be jointly monitored by the armies of all parties involved, to ensure security. Also you can add a clause stating that $$ earned out of this deal can not be used for military purposes. Where there is a will, there are ways. Go Figure it out. When 2 people fight 3'rd party wins. China has always been the 3'rd party, all along, be it the fight between India - Pak or US - Russia, and is growing like a big monster. This has to STOP. Our conventional warfare technology has to grow by leaps and bounds in the next decade. US long term interests in OUR region are very clear. They don't want to SOLVE any issues in this region, but keeping alive every problems help them sell their mil hardware to every nation here. Where as India's long term interests lie in resolving all the regional conflicts, perhaps with some compromise.

You know what, name one nation apart from Bhutan that has not been hostile to India. This shows that India is doing something wrong with its neighbours. We need to create a non-hostile neighbour hood. Only this can ensure India's prosperity. With so many hostile nations around, you will always have a drag effect on your growth. Can't pull on like this forever. Economic co-operation is one way to start having good relationships. Providing security assurances is another way to attack the problem of distrust. Hence proposal of a Federation that gives economic and security assurances is the right step in the future.

chandrabhan · Post by **chandrabhan** » 27 Oct 2008 10:35

Our strategic aims are served well by this Pipeline and we must go ahead with this. Reasons...

This will help us enlist Iran against TSP
With economic interdependence with them we can somehow cow down the concierge army too, getting security guarantees from them for the pipeline. Failing that we must get our boots on the ground through an international coalition of troops in Baluchistan(Priority). Baluchistan has to priority for us to put a stake in ground. Slowly and surely we must come around the view of sending our troops to defend national interests.
I completely agree that we should extend/connect this pipeline with making one from CA/Russia and enlist them as well for security. We must tie, bind some parts of TSP economically(Local population) and I am certain when their interests would be hurt they will retaliate.
It is a funny situation as fas as India and America are concerned. All the neighbours abuse these countries However, you ask thema country to live in they invariably chose these very countries.

renukb wrote:
Rye wrote: You write nonsense like this expect people to take you seriously? Who is going to guarantee the security of the IPI? The Pakistani army? Taking your idea further, maybe the Lashkar-e-toiba can be provided funds by the Indian govt. to safeguard the pipeline..should also assist them with terrorist attacks inside India. The pakjabis in charge will make sure that there is no energy security for the IPI -- as long as Pakistan is broken up, such ideas seem feasible as the non-pakjabis in Pakistan are not anti-India, else it is delusional.

Riiight, Pakistan has always honoured various deals cut with India -- just look at their behaviour w.r.t the IWT proves you right.
I have been on BRF since 1998 or so May be this is my 18000+'th post here. Atleast some here remember my prev avatars or so I guess. Some time back I was a very strong opponent of IPI, citing security threats. But I do see light / opportunities where others see darkness.

IPI without US interference will do good for India. It will give you cheap gas, not only that Both Iran and India gets a chance to beat the crap out of TSP, if TSP creates problems in supply. May be we must get part of gas from Russia and Turkemenistan using the same pipeline, make them part of the pipeline security members, with conditions that refusal to supply the Gas is an act of war. May be the pipeline can be jointly monitored by the armies of all parties involved, to ensure security. Also you can add a clause stating that $$ earned out of this deal can not be used for military purposes. Where there is a will, there are ways. Go Figure it out. When 2 people fight 3'rd party wins. China has always been the 3'rd party, all along, be it the fight between India - Pak or US - Russia, and is growing like a big monster. This has to STOP. Our conventional warfare technology has to grow by leaps and bounds in the next decade. US long term interests in OUR region are very clear. They don't want to SOLVE any issues in this region, but keeping alive every problems help them sell their mil hardware to every nation here. Where as India's long term interests lie in resolving all the regional conflicts, perhaps with some compromise.

You know what, name one nation apart from Bhutan that has not been hostile to India. This shows that India is doing something wrong with its neighbours. We need to create a non-hostile neighbour hood. Only this can ensure India's prosperity. With so many hostile nations around, you will always have a drag effect on your growth. Can't pull on like this forever. Economic co-operation is one way to start having good relationships. Providing security assurances is another way to attack the problem of distrust. Hence proposal of a Federation that gives economic and security assurances is the right step in the future.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 27 Oct 2008 20:06

renukb, I am not against the IPI for starters -- it is a must though I think it is very important that it not become a knife in Pakistan's hands to be held at the throat of the Indian economy. What is your overall thinking of how that can be avoided if IPI comes to fruition and the Pakjabi army is still in control of Pakistan, all rejuvenated after a fresh infusion of cash from the USA to create trouble for Iran (for the US) and India (for pakistan "interests").

IPI without US interference will do good for India. It will give you cheap gas, not only that Both Iran and India gets a chance to beat the crap out of TSP, if TSP creates problems in supply. May be we must get part of gas from Russia and Turkemenistan using the same pipeline, make them part of the pipeline security members, with conditions that refusal to supply the Gas is an act of war.

If that can be guaranteed and enforced, then the IPI revenue can be used to divide the pakjabis from the Balochis (who will be denied their fair share by the pakjabis). OTOH, Pakis will only try proxy/asymmetric warfare and use the proxies to destabilize the pipeline and then claim that they are not responsible for the damage...India cannot go to war because none of the above clauses have been violated.

May be the pipeline can be jointly monitored by the armies of all parties involved, to ensure security. Also you can add a clause stating that $$ earned out of this deal can not be used for military purposes.

Pakis are masters at cooking their books, so this seems weak.

Where there is a will, there are ways. Go Figure it out. When 2 people fight 3'rd party wins. China has always been the 3'rd party, all along, be it the fight between India - Pak or US - Russia, and is growing like a big monster. This has to STOP.

Who are the two countries "fighting"? India has a peace process with pakistan, BTW, so we are all friends with Pakistan onlee.

Our conventional warfare technology has to grow by leaps and bounds in the next decade. US long term interests in OUR region are very clear. They don't want to SOLVE any issues in this region, but keeping alive every problems help them sell their mil hardware to every nation here.

This is an absolute certainty -- and this is also the reason why Pakistan will have extra-regional backers willing to screw the situation against India's interests...Barnett Rubin and Rashid's article makes that very obvious.

Where as India's long term interests lie in resolving all the regional conflicts, perhaps with some compromise.

No need to do that all in one weekend, so that we can have the rest of the month off. IMO, conflcts can be resolved only when there is a change in the attitude in the ground -- a bit like drug addicts having a chance to get off drugs only when they really want to change. Now, for pakistan to demonstrate that it no longer hates India and has given up its anti-India existence, they can perform certain actions to convince India. (a) sign up the NPT as a NNWS (b) remove all their terror assets in Nepal and Bangladesh and the North East. This would undercut all the pakistani capabilities that are a long-term threat to India's existence. If the Pakistanis pass this litmus test, it seems reasonable to get into a joint IPI with them, else Pakistani would just acquire another capability to hurt India without letting go of any of its current capabilties.

You know what, name one nation apart from Bhutan that has not been hostile to India. This shows that India is doing something wrong with its neighbours.

That does not mean tying up to a jihadi pakistan that is yet to give up its anti-India hostility -- that would just compound the above errors.

We need to create a non-hostile neighbour hood. Only this can ensure India's prosperity.

So you ignore friendly countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka, and you want to hook up with Pakistan which is still hostile to India? The idea of hooking up with friendly countries is all fine -- what is being questioned is your (wrong) view that Pakistan is a friendly country.

With so many hostile nations around, you will always have a drag effect on your growth. Can't pull on like this forever.

I agree. So do this in the right order -- first form a economic link up with Nepal and Sri Lanka to create the framework for an Indo-centric coalition in India's neighbourhood. If Pakistan is still around and can pass various litmus tests, then they would be a good addition to this framework, and hopefully they will not be a negative influence in such a body like Pakistan (and Bangladesh) is today.

Economic co-operation is one way to start having good relationships.

Only if the other party is GUARANTEED to not have ideological problems to your existence, else this would just be a repeat of Prithviraj Chauhan's follies....

Providing security assurances is another way to attack the problem of distrust.

Correct. So the pakis can start by signing the NPT and dismantling all their anti-India terror infrastructure, so that India can let go of its distrust.

Hence proposal of a Federation that gives economic and security assurances is the right step in the future.

The federation is not going to give security just because the pakis sign some peace of paper with clever clauses written the GoI in it -- that has never stopped the pakis from hurting India before and it will not do that this time either. They will work around their clauses (which will be "negotiated" by the pakis to leave enough room for proxy/asymmetric warfare against India).

All this "Economic interdependence" stuff while pakistan is still under the control of the Paki army seems suicidal -- of course, if there is a good chance that Pakistan's breakup is imminent, then the IPI must be started so that it can be continued once the Paki army loses control of its territory.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 27 Oct 2008 20:22

Many moons ago, I thought we discussed the IPI issue threadbare. The landline is an absolutely NO GO for India. We have wasted a lot of time in investigating and planning an undersea pipeline.

Vivek K · Post by **Vivek K** » 28 Oct 2008 01:04

A game changer from China - China may lend Russia $25 billion as part of oil deal

What is the effect of this on India's relations with Russia? Will this herald a pro-China tilt from Russia?

What impact if any will this have on a) FGFA, b) Akula lease and c) other military deals (TOT for T-90 and Gorshkov).

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 28 Oct 2008 10:33

Surinder: Point taken. However consider the following.

Should PRC push into POK, they will come into open confrontation with the sunni islamist forces. This would be a dream come true for the AQ and the Uighur freedom fighters who would not have to trudge all the way to Kashghar and take on PLA forces forces from a position of weakness. They can do that in POK itself with the full moral, diplomatic and not to mention logistical support from their Pashtun, Uzbeg, and AQ brethren.

The results for PRC will nit be unlike the outcome of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Israelis went there to eject the PLO out and ended up making the underdog Shiite population the defacto rulers of south Lebanon.

At the same time PRC may not mind India managing these troublesome territories and in the process outsource these headaches to India. This will ensure a buffer force between PRC and the Taliban and provide opportunities for collaboration between these two common adversaries of India.

As we all know from centuries of painful learning, a neighbour’s neighbour is likely to be your best friend.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 28 Oct 2008 21:10

The enemy is not India by Maharaja Krishna Rasgotra and Stanley A. Weiss: IHT

The road to stability in Afghanistan, it is now clear, runs through Pakistan - specifically the tribal areas that Taliban and al Qaeda fighters use as a sanctuary. Less understood is that the road to stability in the tribal areas, and across the region, also runs through India.

Old fears of India, with which Pakistan has fought three wars since their 1947 partition, are at the root of much of today's dangerous Pakistani behavior. Islamabad's long-running goal of achieving "strategic depth" with a compliant Afghanistan lingers in elements of its army and powerful spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and their support to anti-Afghan Islamic militants.

Even now, with those militants turning their guns on the Pakistani government and with Pakistani forces engaged in long-overdue offensive in the tribal areas, most of Pakistan's military remains deployed in the east - toward India and disputed Kashmir.

The result? When American officials recently pressed Pakistan's army chief Ashfaq Kayani to be more aggressive in the tribal areas, he claimed, according to Newsweek, that he lacked the military capability to confront several sizable insurgent strongholds at once.
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Islamabad's fears of India are surpassed only by its fears of ethnic disintegration. Many of its ethnic parts, cobbled together like so many other post-colonial states, have never accepted Punjabi domination of the government and military, which - unlike in India - has prevented the emergence of stable federal structure of more or less equal, autonomous units.

Indeed, among Islamabad's greatest worries is that the tens of millions of Pashtuns on either side of the border with Afghanistan could realize their ancient dreams of an independent Pashtunistan.

Islamabad therefore misreads Indian efforts to promote security and economic development in Afghanistan, including New Delhi's massive $1 billion reconstruction program, as attempts to isolate or encircle Pakistan. The answer from Pakistani-backed militants? This summer's deadly suicide bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul.

If old Pakistani fears of India are key to understanding Pakistani behavior toward Afghanistan, then removing those fears is key to changing that behavior.

As the dominant political and economic power in the region, India should take the lead. New Delhi should continue to assure Islamabad that India's only objective is a truly independent, united, stable and drug-free Afghanistan.

Specifically, India could offer credible assurances of the security of Pakistan's eastern frontier, explore mutual force reductions on that frontier and unilaterally open its borders - including the Line of Control that divides Kashmir - to tariff-free trade.

For its part, Islamabad must recognize that a stable Afghanistan to its west and a friendly India to the east will help prevent a catastrophic implosion in Pakistan. Finally assured of a secured eastern frontier with India, Pakistan should build on its recent offensive and deploy enough troops in the west to secure the border with Afghanistan, followed by extensive investments in education and development in the tribal regions.

Islamabad should put an end to financing, arming, training and infiltrating terrorists into Kashmir and other parts of India. This would pave the way for other confidence-building steps - visits of senior military leaders, free trade and joint economic ventures.

The United States could help allay any lingering fears in Islamabad by endorsing Indian assurances of the integrity of Pakistan's eastern frontier. More broadly, Washington should support Pakistan's fragile democracy by focusing aid on economic and social development rather than the military.

With Pakistan finally assured that India no longer poses a threat, India could then consider a truly historic step worthy of a great and growing power - contributing military forces to stabilizing Afghanistan.

Such a deployment would require a joint request from Kabul, Washington and the United Nations. Indian training teams could play a critical role in strengthening the Afghan military and police.

Reconciliation between Pakistan and India and the presence of Indian forces in Afghanistan may seem illusory. But the return of civilian government in Islamabad gives new hope. If attention can be focused on the real and growing terrorist threat to the region - not those imagined in Islamabad - then fear and loathing in Pakistan could finally give way to trust and cooperation in Afghanistan.

Maharaja Krishna Rasgotra, a former foreign secretary of India, is president of the Observer Research Foundation, a think tank in New Delhi. Stanley A. Weiss is founding chairman of Business Executives for National Security, a nonpartisan organization based in Washington.

Mr Krishna Rasgotra is doing India a big disservice, if he is trying to drag India into the quicksands of Afghanistan, just so that USA can call victory and run away.

As I have often said earlier, there should be no large scale deployment of Indian troops in Afghanistan unless and until there is a secured, internationally acknowledged land corridor between India and Afghanistan to ensure our supply lines. That means Northern Areas and PoK should become part of India. Moreover Chitral, Kohistan, and few northern divisions of NWFP should be allowed to be used as a buffer area for Indian operations and deployment.

Anything less than a secure land corridor, should not even be entertained by Indian strategic planners, as sufficient conditions for any large-scale Indian deployment. If it has to be a long term pledge, than we should be prepared. It is for US to see to it, that such an Indian intrusion into Northern Areas and PoK gets the international diplomatic and political support and Chinese acquiescence.

Otherwise we will be sending our soldiers in harm's way unprepared and unsecured.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 28 Oct 2008 21:16

RajeshA wrote:

As I have often said earlier, there should be no large scale deployment of Indian troops in Afghanistan unless and until there is a secured, internationally acknowledged land corridor between India and Afghanistan to ensure our supply lines. That means Northern Areas and PoK should become part of India. Moreover Chitral, Kohistan, and few northern divisions of NWFP should be allowed to be used as a buffer area for Indian operations and deployment.

Well said, saar. It would be extremely stupid to do the US's dirty work in Afghanisthan and put Indian troops in danger without having secure supply lines that are completely under Indian control. Anything less would be putting the soldiers at risk unnecessarily and would be irresponsible on the part of the GoI. Is ORF really that US-centric to ignore Indian interests? Not surprising, but still.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Oct 2008 21:28

The Rasgotra-Weiss article should be read alongside the Rubin-Rashid article posted above. Its a debate thats going on between experts on how to assuage TSP about India in order to stabilize TSP's FATA and Afghanistan. I wouldnt be surprised if there was a seminar where these four met up in Duplicity and this is a result of that.

I still hold that stabilizing TSP is not in Indian interests if not the Western world's.

Rye, ORF was setup by R.K. Misra with Reliance funds and has a "partnership" with Brookings. So its US thinktank setup in Delhi with Indian "experts" to mold Indian opinion. The Indian experts lend themselves for chai pani and psuh US interests in India. Unveven Cohen kind of folks are easily unmasked but will take more effort for "Uncle Tom" experts.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 28 Oct 2008 21:39

Rye, Rajesh, Ramana

The Indian supply route to Afghanistan is called Iran. Why do you think the GoI has invested in infrastructure connecting Chahbahr port and south-central Afghanistan? What do you think all of those Indians from the BRO in Afghanistan have been targeted for by the Taliban?

Whoever has places like Kohistan/Chitral/Malakand/Swat, whether Pakistan, India, Afghanistan or the PRC will find pacification a bundle of laughs.

Eastern Iran for all of its potential challenges (mostly US-Iranian tensions, lawlessness and violent Baluchi opposition to the Iranian government) offers India far quicker access to Afghanistan than anything else.

Pulikeshi · Post by **Pulikeshi** » 28 Oct 2008 21:41

ramana wrote: I still hold that stabilizing TSP is not in Indian interests if not the Western world's.

Agreed on TSP, but what about stabilizing Afghanistan? Is'nt that in Indian interests?
So what if Uncle wants to stabilize TSP - that is their problem. If we care about Afghanistan, would it not benefit our interests?
Also, if TSP is insane enough to object, would we not get them to fight in our ground of choosing?

The only issue, as Rye points out in doing all this is the ability to have a secure supply line
that is completely under Indian control. I don't see an issue with this move as long as the
supply line is enabled. Will the line through Iran be cost prohibitive?

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 28 Oct 2008 21:44

deleted.